


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INDIA UNDER THE BRITISH CROWN

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By

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With the collaboration of

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PREFACE

The publication of this volume has a melancholy interest. It was undertaken by the late lamented Major B. D. Basu, I. M. S., as a continuation of his well-known work, *Rise of the Christian Power in India.* In it the political history of India is carried to the end of Lord Reading's viceroyalty. The Author collected and studied all the books and other sources of information necessary for writing this work. The plan and outline were his. He also prepared elaborate notes, as well as references to the sources of information. But, owing to failing eyesight, he had to take the help of two professors of history for placing in the hands of the printer a complete manuscript of the book in a finished form. They are the late Professor Phanindra Nath Bose, M.A., Ph. D., of Nalanda College, Bihar, and Professor N. N. Ghosh, M.A., L. T., of Ewing Christian College, Allahabad.

Their task was made comparatively easy by the elaborate notes and references with which they were provided by the Author. One of them, Professor N. N. Ghosh, having his residence in Allahabad, had the opportunity of constantly keeping in touch with the Author and consulting him, whenever necessary. The vast knowledge which Major Basu had of official and non-official documents and British Paliamentary debates, and his own personal knowledge of the political affairs of the country for well-nigh forty years, were fully utilized in the composition of the book. Considerable help was derived from the collection of valuable historical works and rare books of reference in the Author's fine library. He had a very capacious and retentive memory, and, to the wonder and admiration of his co-workers, would often quote chapter and verse of many a work of reference to supply information or correct errors. It is sad to think that he has not lived to see his work published.

My cordial thanks are due to Professors P N. Bose and N. N. Ghosh for the labour they have bestowed on the work.

Calcutta, *The Publisher.*
November, 1932.

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Major B. D. Basu

INDIA UNDER THE BRITISH CROWN

CHAPTER I.

LORD CANNING.
1857-1862.

THE SEPOY MUTINY.

The administration of Charles John Viscount Canning was memorable in the modern history of India in more than one respect. His rule may be regarded as the turning point in the history of modern India. He followed Lord Dalhousie as the last Governor-General under the East India Company. He also followed the same policy as laid down by his predecessor. Lord Dalhousie, Lord Canning and his successor Lord Elgin were class fellows. Of this trio, we read :

"The touching story of the personal attachment between those three successive rulers has been recorded in 'A British Friendship ;' and we shall only seek to cast a clearer light on the part that each has played in Indian history."*

Lord Canning had already acquired a reputation for scholarship at Oxford and for statesman-like ability as Postmaster-General.

Bearer of an illustrious name, being the son of the first minister of George IV, Lord Canning had sat in the House of Lords for twenty years and acquired experience of official work. At the farewell dinner given to him by the Court of Directors Lord Canning spoke in a prophetic mood :

"I wish for a peaceful term of office ; but I cannot forget that in the sky of India, serene as it is, a small cloud may arise, no longer than a man's hand, but which, growing larger and larger, may at last threaten to burst and overwhelm us with ruin."

This utterance turned out to be prophetic and during his rule occurred the terrible Sepoy Mutiny which shook the very foundation of the Empire of the East India Company.

Now, what was the cause of the Sepoy Mutiny ? Much ink has been spilt over this memorable event and numerous theories have been propounded as to the real cause of the Sepoy Mutiny. That the military policy of the merchant-politicians of the East India Company was responsible for creating discontent in the minds of the sepoys, cannot be gainsaid.

The military policy of the Company was criticised not only by outsiders, but also by the generals and military experts of the Government. Thus we have the frank opinion of General Sir Thomas Munro, who had entered the Madras Service as a cadet in 1780 and who had subsequently risen to the post of Governor of the

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* *The Company and the Crown* : By T. J. Hovell-Thurlow, (Allahabad Reprint) p. 5.

Madras Presidency. He was not in favour of the policy of excluding the Indians from the high posts in civil and military service, because that exclusion "would excite a spirit of discontent too powerful for us to subdue or resist." He wrote to the Governor-General on the effects of the British policy in 1817 thus :

"The strength of the British Government enables it to put down every rebellion, to repel foreign invasion, and to give to its subjects a degree of protection which those of no native power enjoy. Its laws and institutions also afford them a security from domestic oppression unknown in those states ; but these advantages are dearly bought. They are purchased by the sacrifice of independence of national character, and of whatever renders a people respectable. The natives of the British provinces may without fear pursue their different occupations as traders, or husbandmen, and enjoy the fruits of their labours in tranquility ; but none of them can aspire to anything beyond this mere animal state of thriving in peace, none of them can look forward to any share in the legislation, or civil or military government of their country."*

He continues to say :

"It is from men who either hold, or are eligible to hold, public office that natives take their character ; where no such men exist, there can be no energy in any other class of the community. The effect of this state of things is observable in all the British provinces, whose inhabitants are certainly the most abject race in India. No elevation of character can be expected among men who, in the military line, cannot attain to any rank above that of subadar, where they are as much below an ensign as an ensign is below the Commander-in-Chief, and who in the civil line can hope for nothing beyond some petty judicial or revenue office, in which they may, by corrupt means, make up for their slender salary. The consequence, therefore, of the conquest of India by the British arms would be, in place of raising, to debase the whole people. There is, perhaps, no example of any conquest in which the natives have been so completely excluded from all share of the government of their country as in British India."

In another letter to Lord Hastings in 1818, he wrote thus again criticising the policy of the Company. He said :

"Our Government will always be respected from the influence of our military power, but it will never be popular while it offers no employment to the natives that can stimulate the ambition of the better class of them. Foreign conquerors have treated the natives with violence and often with great cruelty, but none has treated them with so much scorn as we ; none has stigmatised the whole people as unworthy of trust, as incapable of honesty, and as fit to be employed only when we cannot do without them. It seems to be not only ungenerous, but impolitic, to debase the character of a people fallen under our dominion."

Again, he wrote thus in 1824 :

"With what grace can we talk of our paternal Government if we exclude them from every important office, and say, as we did till very lately, that in a country containing 150,000,000 of inhabitants no man but a European shall be trusted with so much authority as to order the punishment of a single stroke of a rattan ? Such an interdiction is to pass a sentence of degradation on a whole people for which no benefit can ever compensate. There is no instance in the world of so humiliating a sentence having ever been passed upon any nation. . . . The advocates of improvement do not seem to have perceived the great springs on which it depends ; they propose to place no confidence in the natives, to give them no authority, and to exclude them from office as much as possible ; but they are ardent in their zeal for enlightening them by the general diffusion of knowledge. No conceit more wild and absurd than this was ever engendered

* Gleig's Life of Sir Thomas Munro, Bart., *K. C. B.*

in the darkest ages, for what is in every age and every country the great stimulus to the pursuit of knowledge, but the prospect of fame, or wealth, or power ?. . . . In proportion as we exclude them, we lose our hold upon them; and were the exclusion entire we should have their hatred in place of their attachment, their feeling would be communicated to the whole population and to the native troops, and would excite a spirit of discontent too powerful for us to subdue or resist.*

This outspoken critic even goes further and says that

"it would certainly be more desirable that we should be expelled from the country altogether than that the result of our system of Government should be made a debasement of a whole people."†

Unfortunately, the far-reaching opinion of Sir Thomas Munro was not taken heed of. He had rightly feared that in proportion as the English would exclude the Indians from the civil and military services, they would lose their hold upon Indians. The wary Scottish veteran, Sir Thomas Munro, also feared that the great extension of the British Indian Empire by constant annexation would tend to give a mutiny its extent and power. He said :

"If we could subdue all India to our dominion, it is doubtful if this would be desirable either for the natives or ourselves. One of the effects of this conquest would be, that the Indian army, having no longer to combat warlike neighbours, would gradually lose its discipline, and that the native troops would have leisure to contemplate their own strength, and turn it against their European masters."

Not only Sir Thomas Munro, but also Sir Henry Lawrence, who fell at his post in the Residency of Lucknow in the hands of the mutineers, foretold, as it were, the outbreak of the Mutiny. Writing in 1855, Sir Henry Lawrence pointed out the absence of any outlet for the talents and ambition of the Indians. He wrote :

"These outlets for restlessness and ability are gone; others are closing. It behoves us therefore now, more than ever, to give legitimate rewards, and, as far as practicable, employment, to the energetic few, to that leaven that is in every lamp—the leaven that may secure our empire, or may disturb, nay, even destroy it."

Again, the same writer wrote :

"Legitimate outlets for military energy and ability in all ranks and even among all classes must be given. The minds of subadars and resseldars, sepoys and sowars, can no more with safety be for ever cramped, trammelled, and restricted as at present than can a twenty foot embankment restrain the Atlantic. It is simply a question of time. The question is only whether justice is to be gracefully conceded or violently seized. Ten or twenty years may settle the point.§

There are other writers also who thought in the same strain. Thus the late Rev. Mr. Gleig wrote an article in the *Edinburgh Review* in 1853, only four years before the Sepoy Mutiny. He thus concluded his article :

"We have won an enormous empire with the sword, which is growing continually larger. We established a system of civil administration there which protects the peasants and disgusts all the classes above him. . . . With a large body of discontended gentry everywhere and whole

* Quoted in *Recollections of a Military Life*, by Sir John Adye, pp. 150-152.

† *Ibid., p.* 152.

. ys by Sir Henry Lawrence, 1859. (quoted in *Recollections of a Military Life*, pp. 153-154.)

clusters of native princes and chiefs interspersed through our dominions, it is idle to say that the continuance of our sovereignty depends from one day to another on anything except the army. Now the army is admitted by all competent judges to be very far in many respects from what it ought to be."

Another cause of the Mutiny was the Annexation policy of Lord Dalhousie. About this policy we read:

"But the best comment on the annexation policy is surely offered by Lord Dalhousie's final minute of the 28th February, 1856, "reviewing his administration in India, from January 1848, to March 1856," wherein he states that during the eight years of his rule "four kingdoms have passed under the sceptre of the Queen of England; and various chiefships and separate tracts have been brought under her sway." The "Kingdoms" are those of the Punjab, Pegu, Nagpore and Oudh; the chiefships, those of Sattara and Jhansee, with the territories ceded by the Nizam. The two first being stated to be "the fruits of conquest," the remainder may all be fairly deemed "the fruits of policy." By these various acquisitions, he further tells us, "a revenue of not less than 4,000,000 has been added to the annual income of the Indian empire."*

About the origin of this policy of Annexation, Mr. John Malcolm Ludlow says:

"It is between fifteen or twenty years, I believe, since" "a party strong in intellect"—to use the words of a recent pamphlet—but mostly very young in experience, began advocating "British rule everywhere, and Anglo-Saxon improvements and ways in everything." The readiest pen at their command was that of "Brahmine Bull," *alias* that able but much-lauded and self-lauded man, Colonel Herbert Edwards. Sir Henry Elliot and Sir Henry Lawrence were leading members of the school; Mr. Thoby Prinsep helped it with a pamphlet in 1853; Mr. George Campbell with a big book; when its doctrines had been officially promulgated by a Governor-General in 1848, there was no lack of Members of Council to indorse them. Mr. Marshman and the *Friend of India* never tired of urging them; most of the Indian papers followed in his wake. Such a policy was, therefore, undoubtedly that of the bulk of the Anglo-Indian public, when Lord Dalhousie came to embody it in his minutes, his despatches and his acts."†

Now what was the result of this policy of Annexation? The same writer observes:

"Now if we recollect that the rancour of Nana Sahib is avowedly owing to the suppression of the Peshwa's pension, the coincidence of sphere between the rebellion, or the dread of it, and the annexation policy, is most remarkable. For though the late Governor-General did not even advert in his final minute to the Peshwa's pension,—though he did not seem to have considered the withdrawal of £8,000 a year from a native family of the highest rank worth mentioning to his Leadenhall street masters—it is obvious that act belongs essentially to the policy which declared that the British Government was bound not to neglect any rightful opportunity of acquiring terrritory "or revenue." And with this addition, we see at once that the list of Lord Dalhousie's annexations by policy is that of our past dangers. He annexed the kingdom of Oudh, the principality of Jhansee, and Oudh and Jhansee have been strongholds of rebellion. He annexed Sattara, and Sattara has barely escaped becoming such a stronghold. He obtained a cession of territories from the Nizam, and Hyderabad has seen bloodshed in its streets, and the Nizam's whole country has been as it were a powder-barrel, which a spark might explode. Nor should the name of Nagpore be absent from the list. . . . And the same English traveller, to whom I have before

* *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown Toward India*: By John Malcolm Ludlow, p. 14.
India: Its Dangers considered in 1856: by a Retired Officer (Jersey 1858), p. 33.

† *Ibid., pp.* 11-12

referred, declared, from personal experience, that there was "much discontent in Berar,"—that the annexation of Nagpore was one of the causes which have "given rise to a very strong feeling against us."*

Finally Mr. J. M. Ludlow in his *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India* thus dwells on the results of the Annexation policy of the British statesmen :

"I do not say that annexation was the sole cause of the rebellion. There is nothing more convenient, and nothing more fallacious, than to attribute great events to single causes. Where the scene of such an event is simply more than half of all India, this method became absolutely futile. I am quite persuaded that other causes concurred with annexation to produce the Indian rebellion ; religious causes, economical causes, social causes, legal causes. . . . But I believe that the annexation policy, as such, supplied the rebellion -from Oudh, with its disciplined soldiers everywhere, with leaders. Without Oudh without Nana Sahib and Tantia Topee of Bithoor—without Jhansee and its Ranee—with firm allies for us instead of a chafed ally and unquiet subjects at Hyderabad, at Sattara, at Nagpore, what remains of it ? Khan Bahadoor Khan, the opium eater at Bariely ; old Kooer Sing at Jugdeespore ; the Nawab of Banda in Bundelkhand. Would these have convulsed an Empire ?"†

It should be noted here that this policy of annexation was not favoured by many British statesmen in India. They included the Duke, and Lord Hastings, and Mountstuart Elphinstone, and Sir John Malcolm, and Sir Thomas Munro, and Lord Metcalfe, and St. George Tucker. The Duke had remarked that "wherever we spread ourselves," we make "additional enemies, at the same time that by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our Government and of defending ourselves, are proportionately decreased."§

We have already quoted the wise opinion of Sir Thomas Munro, who predicted the Mutiny and sounded a note of warning as to the danger to India from the unemployment of the aristocracy and disbanded sepoys of the annexed States. He wrote :

"The native army would be joined by all that numereus and active class of men formerly belonging to revenue and police departments, who are now unemployed and by many now in office, who look for higher situations, and by means of these men, they would render themselves masters of the open country and of its revenue..........."

Similar warning had come from Sir Erskine Perry, who in his powerful speech in the House of Commons on April 18th, 1856, thus appealed to the British people :

"I trust that even on financial considerations, the House will pause awhile before it lends its assent and approval to these annexation doctrines. But on the still higher grounds of right and justice, on the obligation which rests upon this nation as a great Christian Power to prove by our example and conduct in the East the superiority of that pure religion we profess, and of that morality of which we are always boasting, I do earnestly hope that some of the observations I have made, but especially the opinions of the illustrious men I have quoted, will induce the House to interpose by its authority, by its inquiries, by its protection of those interests committed by Providence to our control, and check that headstrong propensity in our Indian rulers to territorial aggrandisement, which, if not founded on right and justice, must tarnish the British name and ultimately imperil the permanence of our Government in the East."

The words of Sir Erskine Perry turned out to be prophetic, because within a year we have the Sepoy Mutiny, which tried to "imperil the permanence of our Government in the East."

* *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

It is well known even to School boys that the introduction of the Enfield rifle and the greased cartridges were the immediate cause of the first convulsion. The following passage shows how the story of the greased cartridges got abroad among the sepoys. We read :

"Early in January, 1857, when the manufacture of these cartridges (which, before being used, must be torn by the fingers or bitten) was proceeding briskly in the Artillery Arsenal of that place (Dumdum), a low caste workman asked a soldier of the 2nd Grenadiers, a high class Brahmin, for a draught of water from his *lotah* or drinking vessel. The grenadier declined, on the plea that the vessel would be defiled."

"You think much of your caste," sneered the *classie*, "but wait a little ; the *sahib-logue* will soon make high and low caste on an equality ; as cartridges smeared with beef fat and hog's lard are being made up in the magazine, which all sepoys will be compelled to use."

"The astounded grenadier rushed, in an agony of shame and terror, to the sepoy lines, where the news was speedily discussed with much real, and probably more pretended alarm : for the story spread like wild fire and the credulous sepoys of both religions readily believed it was a base attempt on the part of the Government to undermine their faith."*

Lord Canning was then ruling over the destinies of India. The cloud, which he had seen as no bigger than a man's hand, assumed threatening form. He tried to combat the rumours among the sepoys by a proclamation, which appeared in the *Calcutta Gazette* (Extraordinary). It ran thus :

"The Governor-General of India in Council has warned the army of Bengal that the tales by which the men of certain regiments have been led to suspect that offence to their religion or injury to their caste is meditated by the Government of India are malicious falsehoods."

The above quotation will show where the real cause of the Mutiny lay. Wrote that great historian, Lecky, in his admirable book, *The Map of Life*:

"Recent researches have fully proved that the real as well as the ostensible cause of the mutiny was the greased cartridges. It was believed that the cartridges which had been recently issued for the sepoy regiments were smeared with a mixture of cow's fat and pig's fat, one of these ingredients being utterly impure in the eyes of the Hindoo, and the other in the eyes of the Mussalman. To bite these cartridges would destroy the *caste* and carry with it the loss of everything that was most dear and most sacred to him both in this world and in the next. In the eyes of both of the Moslem and the Hindoo it was the gravest and the most irreparable of crimes, destroying all hopes in a future world, and yet this crime, in their belief, was imposed upon them as a matter of military duty by their officers. It was as if the Puritan soldiers of the seventeenth century had been ordered by their commanders to abjure their hopes of salvation and to repudiate and insult the Christian faith."

Lecky does not remain satisfied with the above indictment, but goes on to adduce evidence to show that the story of the greased cartridges *being actually used*, is true. He says that, as it is a shameful and terrible truth that, as far as the fact was concerned, the sepoys were perfectly right in their belief. Then he goes on to say quoting from Lord Robert's *Forty-one Years in India* :

"The recent researches of Mr. Forrest in the records of the Government of India prove that the lubricating mixture used in preparing the cartridges was actually composed of the objectionable ingredients, cow's fat and lard, and that incredible disregard of the soldiers' religious prejudices was displayed in the manufacture of these cartridges."*

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* Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, p. 242, 1898. (London).

Lord Canning issued in the *Calcutta Gazette*, Extraordinary, May 18, 1857, the ollowing Proclamation :

"The Governor-General in Council has learnt that this suspicion continues to be propagated by designing and evil-minded men, not only in the army, but amongst other classes of the people."

"He knows that endeavours are made to persuade Hindoos and Mussalmans, soldiers and civil subjects, that their religion is threatened secretly, as well as openly, by the acts of the Government, and that the Government is seeking in various ways to entrap them into a loss of caste for purposes of its own."

"Some have been already deceived, and led astray by these tales."

"Once more, then, the Governor-General in Council warns all classes against the deceptions that are practised on them."

"The Governor-General has invariably treated the religious feelings of all its subjects with careful respect. The Governor-General in Council has declared, that it will never cease to do so. He now repeats that declaration, and he emphatically proclaims that the Government of India entertains no desire to interfere with their religion or caste, and that nothing has been or will be done by the Government to affect the free exercise of the observances of religion or caste by every classs of the people."

"The Government of India has never deceived its subjects, therefore, the Governor-General in Council now calls upon them to refuse their belief to seditious lies."

"This notice is addressed to those who hitherto, by habitual loyalty and orderly conduct, have shown their attachment to the Government and a well-founded faith in its protection and justice."

"The Governor-General in Council enjoins all such persons to pause before they listen to false guides and traitors, who would lead them into danger and disgrace."

BY ORDER OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL

CECIL BEADON
Secretary to the Government of India.

Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary,
May 18, 1857.

Even this Proclamation could not stay the approach of the Sepoy Mutiny.

A writer in the *Calcutta Review** observed about this Proclamation :

"This was a bottle of oil poured out upon a stormy sea to quell the wild tumult of its waves. But the Governor-General did not put his trust in papers or any other contrivance of mere statecraft. He summoned European troops from all quarters, from Burma, Madras, Ceylon, the Mauritus, Bombay, Persia, nay, from New South Wales."

Thus began the eventful revolt of the Bengal army.

The Mutiny failed due to the lack of unity of purpose among the various leaders and the lack of organization. The entire civil population of India was friendly to the British and the Sikhs of the Punjab stood loyally by their new masters in the hour of their crisis.

A writer in the *Calcutta Review* (1857) observes :

"Had the whole Indian army mutinied, and had it revolted simultaneously, or had the British power been assailed by a popular as well as military insurrection, the majority of Europeans in India would have perished within a month and the re-conquest of Hindustan, instead of pacification of two Presidencies, would be the task now imposed upon the British nation." (p. 391).

* Lecky—*The Map of Life*, p. 103. Quoted from Lord Robert's *Forty-one Years in India*.

* *Calcutta Review* XXIX 1857, pp. 387-388.

Thus the mutiny of the whole Indian army and its success would have meant the downfall of the British power in India and the British people would have had to re-conquer India from the hand of the mutineers. Even the success of the Oudh mutineers would have been crushing to the advancing column of General Outram. The British public in India would have then raised the cry : What would happen to Calcutta ?

Another writer in the same *Calcutta Review* (1857) in giving an interpretation of the Mutiny, says :

"The army felt that the introduction of a new order of things was attempted and the leaders became conscious, that now or never was the time for striking a blow. It was necessary to establish a mutual understanding between the Brahmanic party, far the stronger, and the Mahomedans, intimately connected with the chief notabilities of India, the ex-king of Oudh and the king of Delhi. A compromise was evidently effected between the two not very harmonious elements. There was to be a Delhi Raj, the restoration probably of other Mahomedan thrones,—but the Brahmanic party, no doubt, looked beyond the realisation of these common plans to a re-establishment of the ancient glories of Brahmanism." (P. 438).

Thus, if the Sepoy Mutiny had succeeded, there would have risen the Delhi Raj in place of the British Raj. The nominal head of the Delhi Raj would have been Bahadur Shah, the old Mogul Emperor. Oudh also would have been restored to the old Nawab family. But more powerful than these Moslem rulers would have been Nana Sahib, who perhaps had in his mind the re-establishment of the Hindu Raj.

The mutineers wanted to keep the real power in their own hands, keeping the Emperor at Delhi and the King of Oudh as mere puppets. Thus says the Duke of Argyle in his *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, (p. 97) :

"It was said, too, that the dethroned king of Oudh, or at least some of his mintsters, had aided in this work. This is possible too, although there is very scanty evidence of the fact. But so far as the Royal Family of Oudh is concerned, the party which opposed the annexation of that country have little reason to quote the mutiny in support of their opinions. *It was their object to keep that family in Lucknow, as the representative of the House of Timour was kept at Delhi.* We know what was the result and effect of this policy. *It gave to the mutineers a standard and a name, and the semblance at least of a political object.* On a smaller scale it would have been the same in Oudh. It was inevitable under any circumstances that, when the Mutiny broke out, advantage should be taken of it by the powerful chiefs, each with his little army of retainers and his fortress, who had so long preyed on the country, and who under our Government could prey no longer."

Both the old Emperor at Delhi and the King of Oudh were used as mere puppets by the revolted soldiers. This view is taken also in a letter from Sir John Lawrence, forwarding to the Governor-General of India the Proceedings on the Trial of the King of Delhi :

"Whatever may have been the King's participation in the events subsequent to the outbreak at Meerut, nothing has transpired on the trial. or on any other occasion to show that he was engaged in a previous conspiracy to excite a mutiny in the Bengal Army. Indeed, it is Sir J. Lawrence's very decided impression that this mutiny had its origin in the army itself; *that it is not attributable to any external or antecedent conspiracy whatever,* although it was afterwards taken advantage of by disaffected persons to compass their own ends : and that its proximate cause was the cartridge affair, and *nothing else.*

(Quoted in the Duke of Argyle's *India Under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 98).

Not only India would have been divided into Delhi Raj and the Hindu Raj—each trying to assert its supremacy over the other, but outside India the foreign enemy would have also been watching the course of events in India. If the foreign enemy had seen that the sons of India, both the Hindus and Musalmans, were fighting against one another, the same old story would have been repeated ; the foreign enemy would have swarmed over the fertile plains of Northern India.

This foreign enemy was Dost Muhammad, the ruler of Afghanistan, who was still alive. We all know that vengeance sleeps long, but it never dies, and Dost Muhammad was waiting for an opportunity of taking vengeance. Thinking that the Sepoy Mutiny would succeed, he crossed the frontier and marched into the Punjab. The Sikhs had carried fire and sword into his country and he was going to retaliate it against them.

We read in the *Indian News* of 27th July, 1858 :

"It is equally clear that, had the ill-used Dost Mahammad desired it, he would have found a swarm of Afghans ready to aid in recovering Peshawar."

THE QUEEN'S PROCLAMATION

It was in 1858 that the Queen Victoria announced to the Princes, Chiefs and People of India that

"For diverse weighty reasons we have resolved to take upon ourselves the Government of the territories in India, heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India Company."

In the *Rise of the Christian Power in India* (Ch. XCVI. p. 972) Major Basu has mentioned the circumstances which led Queen Victoria to issue the Proclamation while assuming the Government of India. For further observations on the subject, see his *Consolidation of the Christian Power in India* (p. 91.)

In India, the Proclamation was read by Lord Canning at Allahabad on 1st November, 1858. Lord Canning chose Allahabad as the place to give publicity to the Proclamation, because Allahabad was more centrally situated than Calcutta.

About Lord Canning's durbar near the Fort at Allahabad it is said that there are few sights, perhaps, more striking than a great durbar in India. "The scenic splendour of the pageant," writes Wyllie (in his *Essays on the External Policy of India* "constitutes its humblest charm, that might be rivalled or surpassed in other lands ; but, except perhaps at an imperial coronation in Moscow, nowhere else can be found so harmonious a combination of the distinctive types of Europe and the East, so vivid a revelation of all that can best symbolise the wonders of comprehensive empire. On one side there is the disciplined might of England, represented by a gathering of picked troops—infantry, cavalry and artillery—capable, as they stand, of making a victorious promenade throughout the length and breadth of India, though half the country should be in arms against them ; on the other, the fantastic pomp of Asia, impersonated in an array of luxurious princes, who by the lustre of their jewels, the bellicose aspect of their motley followers, the bulk of their elephants, and the costly caparisoning of their horses, convert the act of homage to their common master into an occasion of emulous display—each striving to outshine his peer. *In some sense it is an oriental edition of the Field of the Cloth of Gold.* The vast plain all round the city of rendezvous is white with innumerable encampments. Every camp clusters round the flag-staff of a separate authority and at every staff, save one, the dropped flag denotes sub-

ordination to a superior power in the vicinity. A long, broad street of marquees, tenanted by the various members and attaches of the supreme Government, leads up to the palatial mass of canvas forming the Viceregal pavilion. The feudatory chief whose turn may have come to approach the 'Lord Sahib's' presence, is greeted at the mouth of the street by a salute of guns in number apportioned to his rank. Up the street his *cortege* slowly moves through lines of British troopers, whose sabres flash welcome in the sunshine. A fanfare of martial music announces his arrival at the entrance of the pavilion; between two rows of clashing weapons His Highness is conducted to his alloted place...Behind the latter, and drawn aside, as having no proper status in a purely Eastern ceremony, gleams a small and select *parterre* of English ladies. All present are seated, and a growing stillness indicates the hour for the Viceroy's advent. All rise as he appears, heralded by a royal salute and with a brilliant Staff around him .. Then he mounts the throne, and the business of the darbar begins."*

About the Proclamation, Mr. Thurlow, Private Secretary to Lord Elgin, says:

"It forms the Magna Charta of 180,000,000 souls belonging to mixed creeds, and may be studied with advantage by all who search for landmarks in contemporary history; but it should not be forgotten that it is a far cry from the banks of the Ganges to those of the Thames, and that although the distance is great, even in the case of wealthy appellants to the Privy Council, it is infinitely more felt by the impoverished, uneducated, and scantily-fed ryots who consitute nineteen-twentieths of an Eastern population."†

Mr. Ludlow in his *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India* says:

"For let us be assured that something does interfere with the fulfilment of every single gracious pledge which the Proclamation contains...in the present case, it is impossible to mistake the evil influence at work. At home, a Council containing some of the worst representatives of the old India House—an East Indian Company still struggling to maintain a ghastly sort of existence after its political death—a gloomy Leaden hall Street dungeon-palace, still shrouding the Government of India within its recess, and cutting it assunder from the great shrines of our national greatness at Westminster, the Hall and the Abbey, and Palace,—in India, a whole generation of officials and their dependents, bred and trained up under another system, wedded to other traditions;—above all, perhaps, the feelings of imperious hatred to their darker fellow-subjects, which the rebellion seems to have called forth in the Anglo-Indian population at large,—offer of themselves obstacles the most serious to the loyal and thorough carrying out of the principles of the Proclamation, even if there were no warfare going on, no armies on foot, no Tantia Topee to reduce, no native hatreds, treacheries and discontents." (pp. 6-7).

Mr. Ludlow continues:

"Very dissonant with the Queen's Proclamation is that of the Governor-General which accompanies it, dated 1st November 1858, which "summons" the faithful to co-operation, which will "exact a loyal obedience" from India's millions,—as if loyalty were capable of being exacted! I cannot wonder that earnest men, even now, dare hardly hope in the reality of the new policy. "There was not a single promise in the Proclamation," writes one of such, "that has been made in the most solemn way before and as regularly broken; and after about six months of the Queen's Government, I do not see a symptom in any departmental measure to carry out the promises of the Proclamation; indeed, as far as symptoms go, I see indications of adherence to the old Company's system." Such forebodings may be amply justified, yet for years to come, by events; in spite of amnesties and gracious promises, we may yet have other rebellions to subdue." (pp. 7-8).

In another place, the same writer makes the following observation:

"The Proclamation looks forward to the "prosperity," to the "contentment," to the "gratitude"

* *Life of Major General Sir Henry M. Durand*: By H. M. Durand, I., pp. 288-289.

† *The Company and the Crown*, p. 245.

of the Queen's native subjects. I am fully persuaded that one and all are capable of being realised. But let us beware, as I have said before, of endeavouring to realise them too much after our own fashion; let us beware lest a too great haste for English improvements bring with it a rough impatience of native ways and customs, and so restore the too easy tendency to an annexation policy." (pp. 319-320).

In concluding his well-written book, *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India*, Mr. J. M. Ludlow has the following remark:

"I have treated the Proclamation, as I said I would, as a reality. I believe it was so meant No set of men, I trust, in Her Majesty's Cabinet would be so base as to put forth such a document without the will to fulfil it,—to forge the Queen's name, if I may so speak, to promises made only to be broken. Yet I cannot but repeat that, as I am assured, "the natives in every part of India are already remarking that, simultaneously with, and immediately after its publication, the acts of the Indian authorities are in direct violation of its spirit and its letter,"—that they speak already of the Queen's Government as likely seemingly to turn out merely "the old farce under a new name." (p. 326).

Here follows a footnote in which the writer says:

"The appointment of the Inam Commission at Madras, as the *last* act of the Company's Government, and the *first* public measure following on the inauguration of the Queen's Government, has in particular roused the bitterest feelings in that Presidency."

The writer concludes:

"If this state of things be suffered to go on, 'the most awful risk imaginable,—to use the words of one who feels deeply on this matter,—will be run. For I firmly believe that if the policy which the Proclamation nobly disowns be resumed,—the policy of annexation and absorption,—of all-grasping covetousness,—of insolence of race,—of special pleading with laws and treaties,—the loss, the deserved and ignominious loss of our Indian empire will come upon us sooner than we dream." (p. 327).

In another footnote he adds:

"I had scarcely written these words (21st December 1858), when Mr. Russel's letter to *The Times*, dated Pursaidepore, November 14, met my eye—complaining of the parsimony with which copies of the Proclamation were supplied to our officers,—of the official translation being written in a fashionable court Oordoo, which the common people in Oudh could not understand,—of the repugnance shewn to the amnesty by 'valued and distinguished servants of the old Company;' and stating that "a very distinguished officer of the Government, whose rank in the councils of the Indian Empire is of the very highest, actually suggested to one of the officers charged with the pacification of Oudh, that he should not read the Proclamation till he had battered down the forts of the chiefs."


About this Proclamation, the Duke of Argyle in his *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, says:

"As regards the administration of affairs in India, no change whatever of principle was required. It is, therefore, more than doubtful whether it was expedient to issue any Proclamation to the People of India—such as that which the Cabinet of Lord Derby issued in the name of the Crown—as if new authority were for the first time assuming their Government. In respect to religious toleration there was nothing to promise, except an adherence to former practice. This is a far safer guide for the expectations of a people than the words of a Proclamation, which are liable to endless misinterpretation. Lord Canning spoke wisely when he said (referring, however, to another case), "I believe that the issue of Proclamations is not the surest or safest mode of influencing the natives

of India. The experience of the past year has furnished examples of the ingenuity with which the meaning of such documents can be perverted, or their language misrepresented by the enemies of the State. The Government was not a new one, neither were its principles of administration new. Already the words of the Proclamation are used as an armoury for debate, and are wildly quoted as consistent or inconsistent with the tenor of particular measures. "We do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us, that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects." Would this have prohibited the abolition of the Suttee ?—or the measure securing to converts their share of their family possessions ?—or the act of legalising the marriage of Hindoo widows ?—or the support by grants-in-aid of missionary schools ?"

Allahabad forms an important landmark in the history of British India. It was to Allahabad that Clive went to receive the grant of the Dewany from Shah Alam. So the British Government of India was hatched in Allahabad. Canning must have remembered this when he chose Allahabad to announce the Proclamation of the Queen, transferring the Government from the hands of the "Society of Adventurers" not "Gentlemen" to the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland. Allahabad should be looked upon, therefore, as the place of hatching and rearing of the British Government of India.

The Fort at Allahabad built by Akbar the Great was considered one of the strongest in Asia. Lord William Bentinck and Lord Canning were in favour of making Allahabad the seat of the Government of India.



Lord Canning



Lord Lawrence



Sir Thomas Munro

CHAPTER II

CLEMENCY CANNING

Lord Canning is said to have adopted a very mild course towards the mutineers. His policy was, therefore, vehemently opposed by the Britishers in India, who nicknamed him as *Clemency Canning*. We find him proposing that

"The lives of all other talookdars, chiefs and zamindars who made due submission would be safe, provided their hands were not stained with European blood, in which case they would be excluded from all mercy."*

The Court of Directors in their despatch, dated 24th March, 1858, also "*suggested a lenient line of policy*, while admitting that crimes had been committed against us which it would be criminal to forgive, and recommended that we should act to the people, when fully subdued, with the generosity and justice which are congenial to the British character."†

After suggesting this lenient line of policy towards the mutineers, this remarkable document concluded:

"In carrying these views into execution you may meet with obstructions from those who, maddened by the scenes they have witnessed, may desire to substitute their own policy for that of the Government ; but persevere firmly in doing what you may think right : make those who would counteract you feel that you are resolved to rule, and that you will be served by none who will not obey."§

This policy afterwards found expression in the following words of the Queen's Proclamation :

"Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects."

The cry for vengeance was raised by the Britishers in India. They did not want clemency, but vengeance. There Lord Canning did not side with them, but carried out the amnesty as announced in the Queen's Proclamation. Many Englishmen had asked the Government to "plough up Delhi," others at least "to destroy the great Mosque." Lord Canning thus writes to the Queen :

"There is a rabid and indiscriminate vindictiveness abroad, even amongst many who ought to set a better example, which it is impossible to contemplate without a feeling of shame for one's countrymen. Not one man in ten seems to think that the hanging and shooting of forty to fifty thousand mutineers, besides other rebels, can be otherwise than practicable and right. Nor does it occur to those who talk and write most upon the matter, that for the sovereign of England to hold and govern India without employing, and to a great extent trusting natives, both in civil and military service, is simply impossible....To those whose hearts have been torn by the foul barbarities

* Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, p. 329.

† *Ibid.*, p. 329.

§ *Ibid.*

inflicted on those dear to them, any degree of bitterness against the natives may be excused. No man will dare to judge them for it. But the cry is raised loudest by those who have been sitting quietly in their houses from the beginning and have suffered little from the convulsions around them, unless it be in pocket. It is to be feared that the feeling of exasperation will be a great impediment in the way of restoring tranquility and good order, even after signal retribution shall have been deliberately measured out to all the chief offenders."*

From the above letter it will be seen how much "rabid and indiscriminate vindictiveness" had been abroad among the Europeans of those days. Not only in India, but also in England such a spirit was rampant. The Queen also shared "his† feelings of sorrow and indignation at the un-Christian spirit shown to a great extent" in England by "the public towards India in general, and towards sepoys without discrimination."

While on the subject of amnesty, it is interesting to reproduce here a letter addressed to Lord Canning by Lord (then Sir John) Lawrence. He wrote on February 1, 1858, thus:

"I do not know whether you may feel disposed or not to grant anything like an amnesty in favour of the least guilty of the mutineers and insurgents in Oudh and elsewhere. But I feel persuaded that such a measure would be very politic. It is much easier for people to advocate the destruction of all offenders than to show how it can be effected. Now that we have taken Delhi, beaten every large body of mutineers in the field, and are prepared to enter Oudh again in force, we should simplify matters much if we issued a Proclamation declaring that those mutineers who have not murdered their officers or women or children, and who gave up their arms shall be allowed to go to their homes and live unmolested. In like manner, I would deal with the common insurgents. We could then deal more easily with the desperate characters. At present, all are held together from the very desperation of their condition. If this continue, it is difficult to foresee when the country will be pacified. When the enemy can no longer keep together behind walls in numbers, they will break up into small parties, plunder the country and carry on a guerilla war.

"At present, many Englishmen advocate a policy of extermination, never reflecting how injurious such a course of conduct must prove to ourselves. In the same way, they advocated the annexation of the Punjab in 1846, utterly forgetful, or rather in total ignorance, of the circumstance that we had not the means of carrying out such a measure. In both the Sikh wars matters were quickly adjusted and peace and security restored, because we dealt wisely with our enemies. After the first war, we treated the Sikhs as a nation with generosity. In the second war, we acted with equal consideration to them as individuals. While we put down crime with a strong hand, as regarded the past we were lenient and generous.

"I fully admit that we have now to deal with a very different enemy. Still we should not also forget that as a ruling power, we have also our short-comings and want of foresight to answer for. We placed temptation and opportunity before the mutineers, which it was difficult to resist. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, committed themselves simply from the force of circumstances; on the one hand, threatened with fire and sword if they refused; on the other, plunder and social advantages were pressed on them. Many hesitated long, but seeing no vitality in our power, no prospect of succour, they concluded that the game was up, and began to act for themselves. It is well-known that, in former days, the Mahratta armies were recruited by the people of the very provinces which they were laying waste. Oppressed and plundered today, these people become robbers and plunderers in their turn. And so it may prove with our enemies. We cannot destroy them without injuring all their relations and connections. The one hundred thousand mutineers of the Bengal army

* *Life of Lord Lawrence*: By Bosworth Smith, pp. 416-17.

† *Lord Canning's despatch.*

and its contingents probably represent half a million of men. Will it not then be wise to reduce the number of desperates as far as possible? Unless matters are managed with great tact and judgment, our difficulties in Oudh may only commence after the capture of Lucknow. The mutineers have their homes and families in Oudh. They can fly no further. They will disperse, and may make a gueriila war of it against us."†

Mr. Bosworth Smith thus comments on the above letter:

"The views contained in it were supportted, as I gather from other letters, by Sir James Outram from the beleaguered Alum Bagh, and by General Mansfield, who was the mainspring of the preparations for his liberation. But, for some reason or other, they were not acted upon by the authorities till it was too late, and with the consequences which Sir John Lawerence had predicted."*

MISTAKES OF LORD CANNING

Kaye and Malleson in their *History of the Indian Mutiny* pointed out certain mistakes committed by Lord Canning in the early days of the Sepoy Mutiny. In enumerating those early mistakes of Lord Canning, they observe:

"In 1857 he (Lord Canning)' was yet new to India and he dealt with the sudden emergency on the advice of the officials he had inherited from his predecessor; hence his early mistakes. It is not too much to affirm that on every one of the points on which he differed from the non-official community he was wrong, and the members of the non-official community were right. I need only mention (1) the first refusal to accept the offer of the European community to form a Volunteer Corps, (2) the slowness in dealing with the mutiny at Berhampur and the mode of dealing with it, (3) the delay in depriving the native troops at Barrackpur of their arms—a delay which caused the memorable panic of 14th of June. The fourth matter in which the mercantile community showed greater prescience than the ruling power was in the earnestness with which they pressed disarming of the regiments at Danapur."§

LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S CHARGE AGAINST LORD CANNING

Some critics "ascribed the revolt to religious fanaticism roused into action by the apprehension of danger from the aggressions of Christianity favoured and assisted by Lord Canning." Lord Ellenborough charged Lord Canning with helping missionaries with donations. Such patronage of Christianity misled the people, who fearing their faith in danger rose in revolt. Thus we read in the *Calcutta Review*, (1857):

"Lord Ellenborough, who may be considered as the spokesman of this party, brought the charge against Lord Canning in the House of Lords that he had given donations to several missionary institutions, declaring it inadmissible in the case of an Indian Governor-General to draw a line of distinction between his public character and his private actions, and contending that such conduct was fraught with the most imminent danger to the safety of the Indian Empire and proved Lord Canning's unfitness for his high and responsible office."**

The charge is, no doubt, unfair on Lord Canning. The Christian missionaries did the pioneer work of spreading English education in India, which was and still is an integral part of their evangelical work. In helping missionaries with donations Lord

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* *Life of Lord Lawrence*: By Bosworth Smith, pp. 423-24.

† *Ibid.*, p. 422.

§ Vol. VI, p. 7.

** *Calcutta Review*, 1857, p. 392.

Canning was, no doubt, guided by the best of motives. It is party politics more than truth and reason which is responsible for this charge, for Indians have more reasons than one to appreciate the friendliness and honesty of purpose of Lord Canning.

ANOTHER CHARGE AGAINST LORD CANNING

"Besides the charge brought by Lord Ellenborough against Lord Canning, the European inhabitants of Calcutta sent in a petition to the proper authorities demanding the recall of Lord Canning. The charge brought against Lord Canning by them was that he did not support the anti-Moslem cry raised by the European community in India after the Sepoy Mutiny. The Duke of Argyle, in his *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, thus writes about the agitation for the recall of Lord Canning :—"The European inhabitants of Calcutta, in the petition which they signed for Lord Canning's recall, record it as one of the high crimes and misdemeanours of the Governor-General, 'that he had lately sanctioned the appointment of a Mahommedan to be Deputy Commissioner of Patna ; and also the appointment of other Mahommedans to places of trust—to the great offence,' they are pleased to add, 'and discouragement of the Christian population of the Presidency.'"*

Lord Canning, however, did not follow the anti-Moslem policy as advocated by the European community in India. The Duke of Argyle writes :

"Throughout the Mutiny Lord Canning persevered showing his confidence in the native races, whenever and wherever he had an opportunity of doing so. The employment of natives in civil office, long urged upon the Government of India, had been increasing during recent years. It is perfectly true that, amongst the natives so employed, there were some instances of treachery during the height of the Mutiny. But Lord Canning did not allow this fact to reverse a course of policy on which so much depends."†

The European community in India did not like that the Indian Government should after the Mutiny continue to give the Mahommadans places of trust. Hence their petition against Lord Canning, demanding his recall, because he was till then appointing Indians to high civil posts.

THE DUMPY MUTINY AND ARMY AMALGAMATION

After the Sepoy Mutiny, there was a talk of amalgamating the armies of the Company with those of the Crown.

"The demand for amalgamation had been very general. Having fought and died together, there arose between the Queen's and Company's armies a feeling that each was not unworthy of the other : neither was this feeling purely sentimental ; each saw, or thought he saw, a positive advantage in such union. .....Thus in a way and for a time, the scheme was positively popular... Among the endless difficulties besetting its consideration, ranked primarily pensions, funds and local service claims."§

But the scheme did not satisfy many European soldiers. They "protested against being handed over from one service to another without being allowed some voice in the matter, and such a strong feeling of dissatisfaction was manifested, that it *attained the aspect of insubordination in one corps.*"

It is remarked by Mr. Thurlow :

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* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 93.

† *India under Dalhousie and Canning* : By the Duke of Argyle, p. 93.

§ *The Company and the Crown* : By Thurlow, p. 20.

"Neither can it be lost sight of that in practically endeavouring to obliterate all former service claims and regimental pride, the Government has been guilty of a policy as unwise and calculated to estrange the army, as those measures of the Restoration, when the tricolor, with the names and numbers of distinguished corps, gave place to the Bourbon flag, and to a series, perfect, indeed, in arithmetical progression, but wanting in those grand associations upon whose wings the eagles had been borne to Moscow and Madrid."*

This insubordination of some of the European soldiers is known as the *Dumpy Mutiny* and the Government followed its policy with firmness. "To all who objected to the change, Lord Canning offered their discharge and a free passage home to Britain. In reality the soldiers felt no objection to the royal service; but not unnaturally, looked for a small bounty, similar to that which the royal troops received when, at the expiration of their time, they re-enlisted into other regiments. As this expectation was injudiciously denied them, 10,000 men *demanded* their discharge."†

It is interesting to listen to the opinion of a British General about this revolt of British soldiers in India. Thus General Sir John Adye, G. C. B., writes about this Dumpy Mutiny in his *Recollections of a Military Life*:

"In the early part of 1859 another serious and untoward event occurred, in the *discontent of the men of the local European forces* at many of the large stations all over the country. Hitherto, in each Presidency, the artillery and three regiments of infantry consisted of men recruited at home, but who served continuously in India—in fact, a local European army distinct from the Queen's troops. In the years gone by, and during the Mutiny, they had performed great services, and were deservedly held in high esteem. When, however, in 1858 the rule of the old East India Company came to an end, the great majority of these men considered that, as the Queen has assumed direct authority over the local armies, they were entitled either to their discharge, or, at all events, to a bounty on the transfer of their services to the Crown. Their claims were referred to England for consideration, but were ultimately refused by the Home Government; and, as a consequence, *serious disaffection, combined in some cases with violence and a refusal to perform their duties, ensued.*"§

General Adye betrayed his leanings towards the European soldiers when he said:

"It may perhaps be conceded that the curt refusal of their claim was not altogether judicious, but in reality the causes of discontent lay deeper and had been accumulating for some time."**

The Commander-in-Chief for India at this time was lying ill at Simla. He gave vent to his opinions in a letter, written in May 1859, in which he said:

"I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that henceforth it will be *dangerous to the State to maintain a European local army*......We cannot afford to attend to any other consideration than those of discipline and loyalty, which may be constantly renovated by the periodical return to England of all the regiments in every branch of the service."††

General Adye then continues:

"The Viceroy was much pressed by some authorities at the time to grant the bounty, notwithstanding the refusal of the Home Government; but to have done so and to have given way

* *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

† Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, Vol. II, p. 338.

§ *Recollections of a Military Life*, pp. 168-169.

** *Ibid.*, p, 169.

†† Shadwell: *Life of Lord Clyde*, ii, p. 419, quoted in General Adye's *Recollections of a Military Life.*

to violence would have been a virtual abnegation of authority, and would not in reality have removed the disaffection. In this dilemma, Lord Canning at length gave a free discharge and passage home to all who wished it, and about 10,000 men then left for England. The cost is said to have been a million sterling. Many of these men, after a short holiday at home, re-enlisted in various Queen's regiments and returned to India. The general result. however, was that ere long the local European troops ceased to exist as a separate force, and became merged in the army of the Empire."*

INDIAN COUNCILS ACT AND SIR DINKUR RAO

The Indian Councils Act was passed in 1861 "to educate natives of high standing and acquirement to a sense of our desire that they, like other subjects of our vast dependencies, learn to rule themselves." But the right of electing their own representatives was not yet granted to Indians. The power of nomination was in the hands of the Viceroy, who used, in those days, to reward men of his choice by nominating them as members of the Council. Thus Mr. Thurlow says·

"Those were days of punishment and rewards, and Lord Canning was the only arbitrator competent to judge which chief had trimmed his sails so as to merit slight or favour."†

Thus Lord Canning used his nomination to a seat in the Council as a bait to attract the Indians of high position. Lord Canning also rewarded his friends in the time of the Mutiny by offering them a seat in the Council. We find him nominating Raja Dinkur Rao in the Council for his past services. Mr. Thurlow again says :

"Next on the list of Lord Canning's early nominations comes Raja Dinkur Rao, the far-famed minister of Scindia, to whose sound advice it was mainly due that the Mahratta country remained faithful in 1857. His genius was devoted to the prosecution of well-laid schemes, having for their object the re-establishment of a strong Maratha empire ruled by the Maharaja Scindhia : and his intellect had taught him that this end could only be attained through British influence. In Gwalior his enemies pretended that his councils were dictated by a selfish policy, and the Mutiny of 1857 still further tended to estrange from him his master's confidence. His best efforts in an honest cause were thus misinterpreted and frustrated : and somewhat summarily dismissed from office and the Gwalior Court, he threw himself on our protection, and it became a sort of duty to look after him."§

Major Meade, Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, also wrote about him :

"He (Raja Dinkur Rao) was not, however, suffered to remain unnoticed ; for on the establishment of the Governor-General's Legislative Council in 1861, he was among the first members selected to sit therein as representatives of the native community of the Empire."

"His services and usefulness in the lofty and novel sphere to which he was thus transferred were such as might have been expected from his previous career and character, and are well-known to have been much appreciated by the Viceroy of India."**

Indians are, no doubt, thus admitted to high posts, but still many more are excluded from taking an active part in the work of administration. Thus Mr. Thurlow raises an interesting point when he says :

"Though we have here seen that natives of the highest rank are now admitted to partake in legislation, and that in many instances posts of great responsibility and trust are confided to them,

* *Ibid.*, pp. 169-170.

† *The Company and the Crown*, p. 43.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

** *Ibid.*, p. 242.

yet the *doctrine of exclusion still possesses* a sufficient number of adherents to warrant the quotation of some passages, penned many years ago, proving that even the more enlightened administrators of bygone times *pleaded the claims of the native to a greater share in the affairs of government,* and were quite alive to the mischief of exclusion. One of these, Mr. John Sullivan, a member of the Council of Madras, wrote as follows : "If we put on one side of the account what the natives have gained by the few offices that have been lately opened to them, with what they have lost by the extermination of the various native states, we shall find the net loss to be immense ; and *what the native loses the Englishman gains.* Upon the extermination of a native state the Englishman takes the place of the Sovereign, under the name of Commissioner ; three or four of his associates displace as many dozens of the native official aristocracy, while some hundreds of our troops take the place of the many thousands that every native chief supports. The little court disappears—trade languishes—the capital decays—the people are impoverished—the Englishman flourishes and acts like a sponge, drawing up riches from the banks of the Ganges, and squeezing them down upon the banks of the Thames."*

Lord Canning had given his consent to the annexation of Oudh. Malleson says :

"The question of the annexation of Oudh had been a Cabinet question, and as a member of the Cabinet Lord Canning had given his consent to the policy, which after much discussion in Leadenhall and in Downing Street found final expression in the Court's Despatch of 19th of November."†

OUDH

The province of Oudh was annexed by Lord Dalhousie and his act has been called by some as "the crowning stroke of his annexations." But on the other hand, it is known to many as a *"Dacoitee in excelsis."* Lord Canning was also responsible for the annexation of Oudh. During the Sepoy Mutiny, the province of Oudh served as the stronghold of the mutineers and gave much trouble to the Government of Lord Canning. He wanted to destroy the aristocracy of Oudh by confiscating the lands of the Talookdars. While the British troops were taking city after city in Oudh, Lord Canning had prepared a Proclamation confiscating the lands of all the Talookdars except six. We read of this document:

"At this crisis Lucknow was still in the hands of the rebels, and in contemplation of its capture by Sir Colin Campbell, Lord Canning had prepared a Proclamation to be issued as soon as our colours once more waved over the city. It dwelt upon the rebellion, and the crimes of which the people of Oudh had been guilty, and the retribution to which they had subjected themselves. It stated that their capital should be held by a force that nothing could withstand ; that the authority of the British Government would be carried into every corner of the province ; that those who had been steadfast in their allegiance would be rewarded, and that, therefore, the Rajahs of Bulrampore and Pundah, Rao Buksh Singh of Kutiaree, the Talookdar of Sissaindie, the Zamindars of Gopul Chair, and of Baiswarah, were "to be henceforward the sole hereditary proprietors of the land which they held when Oudh came under the British rule, subject only to such moderate assessment as may be imposed upon them ; and that these loyal men will be further rewarded in such manner and to such extent as upon consideration of their merits and their position, the Governor-General shall determine."

"With the above six exceptions, he announced *the entire soil of Oudh as confiscated to the British Government,* and simply promised that the lives of all other talookdars, chiefs and

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* *Ibid.,* pp. 46-47.

† Kaye and Malleson's *History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8,* Vol. I, p. 279.

Zamindars who made due submission would be safe, provided their hands were not stained with European blood, in which case they would be excluded from all mercy."

Thus Lord Canning was planning the confiscation of the entire soil of the talookdars of Oudh. But for the Earl of Ellenborough, he would have carried out his threat of the confiscation of the property of the talookdars. Lord Canning wanted to crush this landed aristocracy of Oudh. Fortunately for them, the Earl of Ellenborough interfered at the right moment. When he "received a copy of Lord Canning's proposed Proclamation" of Oudh, "together with that of certain instructions issued to Sir James Outram," he found out quite "distinctly that the confiscation of the kingdom of Oudh was no idle threat."

He therefore decided to interfere and protested against the contemplated confiscation of Oudh :

"In his capacity of President of the Board of Control, he wrote a new despatch, denouncing the Oudh Proclamation in language so strong "and sarcastic as to be almost insulting and spoke of the talookdars and other proprietors of Oudh as if they were more sinned against than sinning, and were entitled to be treated rather as patriots than as rebels."*

Lord Ellenborough thus concluded his despatch :

"Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the people. You have acted on a different principle. You have reserved a few as deserving of special favour, and you have struck with what they feel as the severest of punishment the mass of the country.

"We cannot but think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in the precedent you have made. We desire, therefore, that you will mitigate in practice the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the land-owners of Oudh. We desire to see British authority in India rest upon the willing obedience of a contented people : there cannot be contentment where there is general confiscation.

"Government cannot long be maintained by any force in a country where the whole people is rendered hostile by a sense of wrong ; and if it were possible so to maintain it, it would not be a consummation to be desired."†

Thus the timely despatch of the Earl of Ellenborough saved the confiscation of the lands of the talookdars of Oudh by Lord Canning. Speaking of the talookdars, Mr. J. M. Ludlow says :

"I take it, therefore, that the talookdars of Oudh, our enemies, are our *injured* enemies, and deserve that this should always be borne in mind. Nor dare we forget that, in spite of injuries received, they have for the most part conferred benefits upon our countrymen. Hurdeo Buksh and his relatives perilled their lives to save those of Mr. Edwards and his party. Roostum Sah, Mr. Tucker tells us, "*though deprived of almost all his villages, and reduced to sell his wife's ornaments*, saved the lives of my brother, Chariton and the Sultanpoor refugees." "It is singular," says Mr. Gubbins, speaking of the same chiefs and another, "that Roostum Sah and Lall Honwunt Sing, in the Salone district, who had both been severe sufferers by the settlement proceedings, *should have distinguished* themselves by their kindness to British officers."§

* *Ibid.*, p. 329.

† Kaye and Malleson's *History of the Indian Munity of 1857-8*, Vol. V, pp. 178-179.

§ Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, II, pp. 328-329.

If indeed, as Mr. Gubbins also tells us, other talookdars "who had retained their villages with greatly diminished assessments, have been most active against us," may it not be that, on the annexation of their country by foreigners, the noblest specimens of the class were not those who would be most likely to welcome them,—the vilest rather were those who would soonest cringe to them and their underlings,—almost all-powerful as we see the latter to have been in Mr. Edwards' book ? But as a rule, throughout the rebellion, to use Mr. Tucker's words, "the chiefs behaved like gentlemen."*

Yet, Lord Canning wanted to confiscate the talooks of these gentlemen !

The great French writer, M. de Montalembert, writing in his admirable treatise on an English Parliamentary Debate on India, says in relation to this Proclamation:

"Such an act was of a nature to wound deeply, not only the dearest interest of an indigenous population of five millions of souls, but also the public conscience of England, tardily, but profoundly convinced that respect for the right of property is the base of every social right. Above all, astonishment was felt at seeing this Proclamation come from Lord Canning—Lord Canning, who surprised in the second year of his administration by the explosion of a revolt the most unforeseen and the most formidable which had ever broken out against a foreign domination, had shown himself until then superior to the terrible difficulties of his situation, and had resisted with a constancy, the most noble and the most Christian, the sanguinary incitements of the English in Calcutta against the rebels and against the Hindoos† in general. The Anglo-Indian press, exasperated by the inflexible moderation of the Governor-General, had fixed upon him, by way of injurious *soubriquet*, the surname of "clemency," and called him nothing else but "Clemency Canning." And it was this man who now decreed, against a people *en masse*, a chastisement as impolitic as it was excessive, as iniquitous by its universal application as by its falling so cruelly on the posterity alike of the guilty and the innocent."

Lord Canning's Oudh Proclamation, therefore, as the above quotation shows, reveals the interesting fact that even a just and at heart a kind head of the Indian administration is not above falling into the evil counsel of Civil Servants to adopt an impolitic and iniquitous policy of action.

It was unexpected of Lord Canning to issue the Proclamation, as it was unexpected of Lord Ellenborough, a man who had shown an utter disregard for truth and moral principles in annexing Sindh, to oppose Canning's action. Lord Ellenborough was then the President of the Board of Control and a member of the British Cabinet. Whether it was the palpable injustice of the action, or personal jealousy or any other motive from which Lord Ellenborough disapproved§ Viscount Canning's Proclamation and compelled him to go back upon it, nobody knows. But the fact remains that a

* *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India*, By J. M. Ludlow, p. 309.

† We believe that he used the word 'Hindoos' to mean Indians, as almost all European writers did then and as some do even now. -Editor.

§ Richard Burton suggests that perhaps Lord Ellenborough opposed the annexation of Oudh, because it was effected by the "Bayard of India," who had opposed the annexation of Sindh because he had no hand in it. Another probable reason is that perhaps Lord Ellenborough wanted, himself to be the Viceroy after Lord Canning had been recalled ; or perhaps his conscience (if political administrators of India like him have any conscience at all) smote him for his past iniquities in India.

just man was stopped from committing an unjust act by an unjust man of Sindh and Sindhia fame.*

In the course of a debate in the House of Lords on this question the noble Lord said :

"You have confiscation before you in its naked hideousness, which nothing can cover over or excuse. It is the most cruel punishment that can be inflicted on a country. I am told that my dispatch tends to weaken the authority of the Governor-General. Certainly it takes from it a great power for evil, but it gives it a greater still for good. When Lord Canning receives my dispatch, I hope he will change his advisers. I do not believe that this Proclamation is the work of Lord Canning; it is too contrary to all that I know of him. He must have been led away by those who have learned nothing and forgotten nothing and who think that after this terrible convulsion no change is to be made in the abuses of the civil power in India.

.........It remains to be seen whether you wish that the war in India should never have an end. If Parliament...by the vote proposed allows the peoples of India to suppose that you approve the principles of the Proclamation, and that you disavow the principles of my dispatch, you will have in India a social war. You have succeeded in all your wars that have been merely political, but I do not hesitate to declare, that in a social war we shall end in being conquered."

RECALL OF SIR CHARLES TREVELYAN.

During the viceroyalty of Lord Canning, the Presidency of Madras was governed by Lord Harris. He was succeeded by Sir Charles Trevelyan, whose quarrel with the Finance Member brought about his recall.

About Sir Charles Trevelyan we read :

"Bred to the Indian Civil Service, he had mastered young the elements of native thought, and to the prefection of this study he had since devoted such leisure as belongs to London office life. Education was a subject on which, in England, he had bestowed much labour, and its Eastern branches were those he specially delighted in. It was, therefore, natural that he should turn his earliest attention to these considerations, and the result was such that during his year's local government *he paved the way to most of our subsequent Indian educational reforms.*"†

Now, what was the cause of the recall of such an able ruler? It was due to a characteristic of his. We are told :

"One thing, however, he could not brook—interference; and least of all in matters of finance. Hence arose thnt well-known opposition which Mr. Wilson's measures met with at his hands, and when the local sway over income and expenditure became by a stroke of Mr. Wilson's pen, reduced to a simple question of account, Sir Charles Trevelyan could no longer hold himself, and solemnly recorded his insubordination."

That was the cause of his quarrel with Mr. Wilson, the Finance Member of the Viceroy. It also led to the recall of this capable administrator.

"In the struggle that ensued, as usual, the weak went to the wall, and Sir Charles returned to England, in disgrace indeed with his employers, but not without the consciousness that, short as was his tenure of Madras, it had yet proved long enough to stamp his name indelibly on the history of India."§

* See for details of the iniquitous acts of Lord Ellenborough Major B. D. Basu's *Rise of the Christian Power in India,* dealing with Lord Ellenborough's Adminisrration (1842-1844.)

† *The Company and the Crown,* by T. J. Hovell Thurlow (Allahabad Reprint) p. 26.

§ *Ibid.,* p. 27.

The real cause of the quarrel with the Finance-Member, we find described by General Adye in his *Recollections of a Military Life.* He says:

"When the Mutiny came to an end, its financial bearings and the enormous expenditure incurred, not only on account of the large reinforcements from home, but also in the arrangements which had been necessary for the due prosecution of active operations all over the country, pressed heavily on the Government of India; and it became an urgent duty to meet the Financial deficit, which amounted to several millions sterling. Amongst other measures it was decided to introduce an income tax. Sir Charles Trevelyan, backed by his Council, *protested against such a policy.* In his opinion, an income tax, in the condition of the native feeling, was *likely to revive dangerous discontent;* further than this, he argued in successive despatches to Calcutta that, as the Mutiny was over, the proper way of meeting the deficit was by a reduction not only of the English reinforcements, but also by disbanding many of the new native regiments which had been hastily and temporarily raised during the crisis. Finding that his remonstrances were in vain, he at length published the entire correspondence in one of the Madras daily journals. As Governor of a Presidency containing fifty millions of people, he considered it his duty that his views should be made public. The result was that in a few days he received a message by telegraph from Sir Charles Wood, the then Secretary of State for India, announcing his recall. Whether the Governor acted with due discretion in the measure he took to ensure publicity for his views, may be questioned; but in my opinion, he was perfectly right in his main principle that, the crisis being over, the financial equilibrium could best be attained, not by unusual and obnoxious taxation, but by a reduction of the enormous military expenditure, the necessity for which had passed away and which was eating up the resources of the Empire in the East. His recall was a public misfortune."*

He was very popular in Madras, and "local enthusiasm reached its highest pitch when all within that jealous presidency learnt how resistance to Calcutta had proved his ruin. From that moment he became to the eyes of millions *a martyr in a people's cause,* and he left their surf-bound shores amid more tears and honest expressions of regret than we have ever known bestowed upon a presidency ruler."

Indeed the recall of Sir Charles Trevelyan caused a gap not easily filled up.

THE IMPOSITION OF INCOM-TAX

The Sepoy Mutiny found the coffers of the Indian Government exhausted. The Finance Minister, therefore, tried his best to levy new taxes. It has, therefore, been said:

"Mutiny and debt, and the great names of Wilson, Laing, Trevelyan have succeeded one another with such rapidity in the last few years, as to leave, one would imagine, little time for passing more than measures of paramount importance; and the only cause for wonder is, that so much has been effected."

It was Mr. Wilson, the Finance Minister, who imposed the income tax for the first time in India. In 1860 Act XXXII (an Act for imposing Duties on profits arising from property, professions, trades and offices) was passed by the Indian Legislature. This Act imposed Duties of 3 and 1 per cent on property and profits classed under 4 schedules. An income tax extended to all incomes from Rupees Two Hundred a year and upwards. From the very beginning this income tax was not popular with the people. "The income tax came into force from 31st July, 1860. The total collections

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 174-175.

in the Presidency and Suburbs, up to the end of the year, amounted to Rupees 5,00,328, on an annual assessment of Rupees 10,76,540. The gross collections (in Bengal) of little more than five months, exceded twenty-three lakhs of Rupees, out of a completed assessment of nearly thirty-six lakhs of Rupees"*

The income tax thus imposed proved to be a heavy burden on the people of the country. Even in 1866, Mr. T.J. Hovell Thurlow complanied that *"the oppressive weight of the income tax still remained upon the shoulders of the Indian people".* Many wanted that this oppressive tax should be abolished. Mr. Thurlow continues:

"In the removal of this *unpopular source* of revenue, which Mr. Wilson first imposed for a limited period only as a war tax, or we might almost say a retribution on the Indian people for the calamities of 1857, the Government of India has but kept its pledged truth"†

The successor of Lord Canning was, therefore, pledged to the removal of the *uneasy burden of the income tax* from native shoulders at the earliest moment compatible with financial pressure, and, if not sooner, certainly at the expiry of the five years for which it had been imposed.

We quote below the opinion of the Honourable Raja Dinkur Rao about the abolition of the oppressive income tax:

"Though it is necessary for the Government to take Income-tax from the people, yet it is evident how much all classes of *people complain against it,* and it is clear that they are obliged, besides paying the tax, to suffer much inconvenienee from the regulations connected with it. *It is, therefore, necessary to abolish it at once.* There is no doubt that the income which is realised from this impost can be made up from some of those items mentioned."§

THE DHAR AFFAIR.

The State of Dhar in Malwa, near Indore, was an ally of the Government of India. During the Sepoy Mutiny, this little State of Dhar remained faithful to the British Lion. It was ruled by a boy of thirteen, the adopted son of the late Raja, with the help of the widow of the late Raja. It helped the British Government in every possible way. We read:

"From the moment of the outbreak (October, 1857) the Dhar authorities showed themselves strictly faithful; protected the post, protected the electric telegraph, kept the roads safe, forwarded elephants, guns, men at the bidding of the British authorities, a detachment of 50 sepoys with two guns, for instance, being sent for the protection of the British agent at Bhopawar."**

What was the return for this faithful service? The answer we get in J. M. Ludlow's book—in the letter: *How some of our Allies have been lately treated.* We read:

"As ill luck would have it, nevertheless, the British agent at Bhopawar sent a *fakeer* from Ajmeer to be confined at Dhar. On his arrival the Pathans rose and rescued him to the cry of "deen" (faith) and seized the fort of Dhar,—the authorities having just time to place in safety the ammunition and military stores that were in and near the town."††

* *Annals of Indian Administration,* Vol VI, p. [illegible]

† *The Company and the Crown,* p. 193.

§ *Ibid.,* p. 201.

** *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India,* by J. M. Ludlow, p. 158.

†† *Ibid.,* p. 158.

The Dhar State asked for help from the Indian Government, "constant applications for assistance were forwarded to the British authorities. Assistance, however, did not come".

What was the result? The Ranee was forced to enter into an agreement with the troops "stipulating the pardon of the *fakeer,* pay enforcement of claims, in short, such terms, as a mutinous soldiery will exact." The Ranee sent a copy to the British Agent and again, when the troops threatened to sack the town, implored assistance from the British. At last the long expected help came, and "after ten or twelve days' siege, the mutineers evacuated the place by night."

What was the treatment meted out to the Dhar State? We are told:

"The Agent demanded the keys of the treasury, they were handed over to him. He required that the minister a *protege* of the British Government, who held a *jagheer* under its guarantee,—and other persons, should be put in arrest. It was done. For seventeen days that the British troops remained at Dhar, they were supplied with artificers, and every thing that was required."*

Not only this, more punishment was to follow. The British Lion wanted to forfeit the State of Dhar in return for the faithful services rendered by the State. We read:

"On the 14th February, 1858, a Mussalman, Meer Mohammad Shahamat Ali, appeared at Dhar, bearer of two letters to the Ranee and the young Prince from the Agent for Central India. Their contents must have been the same as those of a Proclamation which came with them, dated like the letters 19th January, 1858 and which was issued under the signature of the same Meer Shahamat Ali as officiating Superintendent. It declared that the "infidelity and ingratitude" of Dhar could not possibly "be overlooked," that the prince "having forfeited the Government of Dhar would never be reinstated," that arrangements would be made for the maintenance of himself and the Ranee. The Proclamation then concludes in the following strain,—which, from the pen of a Mussalman, must have touched every Rajput's pride to the quick: "This Proclamation has been issued for your information. It is incumbent on you to understand its contents and conduct yourself accordingly, and with sincere and complete submission to be obedient to the officer who had been appointed to the charge of the affairs of the State, in consequence of the treaty owing *to the unpardonable miscoduct of the Dhar Durbar.*"

The country was, therefore, provisionally sequestrated,—the treasure in the privy purse of the young prince was confiscated,—the state property of elephants, camels, horses, etc., put up to auction, only a few horses being reserved for the use of the young chief. The minister's *jagheer* was confiscated. The lands assigned, by Mahratta custom, to the *Ranee* for charitable purposes, amounting in value to £5,000 a year, were placed under sequestration. Meer Shahamat Ali took charge of the State as Superintendent, and the young prince was not allowed to sit on a chair in public."†

That was the return the State of Dhar got for all the services rendered during the Munity. This annexation of the principality of Dhar—even temporarily—is nothing but "a flagrant outrage upon all justice." The British Government afterwards tried to undo the previous "outrage" by restoring the principality to the Ranee and her adopted son.

Thus writes Mr. J. M. Ludlow on the Dhar affair:

"Now it is most true Dhar has been restored. But has English morality sunk so low as this, that a flagrant outrage upon all justice should be deemed atoned for by simple restitution? The treaty

* *Ibid.*, p. 159.

† *Ibid., pp.* 159-160.

with Dhar of 1819 binds the Raja of Dhar to act "in subordinate co-operation with the British Government" (Act. 2), binds the British Government "to protect the State of Dhar and its dependencies." In what had the State of Dhar omitted to fulfil its part of the treaty? How did the British Government fulfil it, when after receiving all the help that Dhar could give, it left that State so long without the protection stipulated at the mercy of the mutineers? And then, forsooth, it must take advantage of its own wrong, without the shadow of a judicial investigation, without notice, without so much as a specific charge;—only those vague ones "enmity and opposition" "which are the very resource of despots in want of an excuse—to declare the treaty abrogated, to annex, temporarily at least, the territory of an ally, to bully a woman and a child,—Hindoos by the hands of a Mussalman,—to confiscate private property, to outrage the feelings of a whole people through those sales by auction of their chief's goods and chattels which invariably prove so deeply galling. Restitution indeed, after such proceedings as these! Why, if you doubled the Dhar territory it would be barely compensation enough to the State,—let alone the individuals, the Minister for instance, who declares that before the outbreak of the troops their mutinous disposition was more than once communicated by him to the British authorities, and their aid implored. If this be the way our friends are treated after such a crisis as that of 1857, Heaven preserve us from any other."*

RE-ORGANISATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY

With the Sepoy Mutiny British rulers began to consider the question seriously: whether they would keep the existing strength of the Indian army or reduce its strength. After the Sepoy Mutiny was put down the British statesmen thought it desirable to reduce the strength of the Indian army, as they saw that there was no knowing when the Indian army would again rise in rebellion. The policy of the British rulers was then to reduce the strength of the Indian army and increase that of the British army in India.

Accordingly on 15th July, 1858, Her Majesty appointed a Commission "to inquire into the organisation of the Army lately serving in the pay of the East India Company". The following gentlemen were appointed to serve in the Committee:

(1) General Peel, (2) Duke of Cambridge, (3) Lord Stanley, (4) Marquess of Tweeddale, (5) Viscount Melville, (6) Sir H. G. Smith, (7) Sir G. A. Wetherall, (8) Major-General Patrick Montgomery, (9) Major G. H. Hancock, (10) Colonel Burlton, and (11) Colonel T. F. Tait.

The Commission were to report on the following questions:

1. The terms on which the Army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown.

2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in Indian Provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquility.

3. The proportion which European should bear to native troops in Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery respectively.

4. How far the European portion of the Army should be composed of Troops of the Line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only.

5. In connection with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion and of securing the efficiency of the latter.

* *Ibid.*, *pp.* 160-161.

6. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what Regiment would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company.

7. Whether there should be any admixture of the European and Native Forces, either regimentally or by Brigade?

8. Whether the Local European force should be kept up by Drafts and Volunteers from the Line or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?

9. Whether it would be possible to raise any Regiment in the colonies either for temporary or permanent service in India?

10. Whether the Native Forces should be Regular or Irregular or both; and if so in what proportion?

11. Whether any Native Artillery Corps should be sanctioned?

12. Whether cadets sent out for service with the Native Troops should, in the first instance, be attached to European regiments to secure uniformity of drill and discipline?

These were the terms on which this Army Commission were to base their Report. They were asked to examine army experts as witnesses and were also authorised to call for any Government Papers that might be necessary for coming to any definite conclusion on the above questions.

The trend of thought as betrayed by the above questions certainly points towards the consolidation of the European Forces in India. With this comes another question: whether any Native Artillery Corps should be sanctioned. Before the Sepoy Mutiny, the Indians were freely admitted to the British Indian Artillery Corps. The Indian Government now wanted to exclude the Indian soldiers from the Artillery section of the Indian army.

After examining the witnesses, the Commission drew up their Report, which they submitted to the Government of Her Majesty on 7th March, 1859. They categorically gave their considered opinion on all the questions raised.

The substance of their Report is as follows :

1. The 56th Clause of the Act for the Better Government of India assures to the Indian Army the same pay and advantages as they enjoyed in the service of the East India Company.

2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in Indian Provinces should depend on internal disturbances or external aggressions of India. The force, according to the Commission, should be about 80,000, that is, 50,000 for Bengal, 15,000 for Madras and 15,000 for Bombay.

3. The proportion of European to Native troops in Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery should not be greater than 2 to 1 for Bengal, 3 to 1 for Bombay and Madras. The Artillery should be a European Force except in such stations as are peculiarly detrimental to the European constitution.

4. There was no unanimity in evidence as to whether the European portion of the Army should be Troops of the Line or Troops for service in India only. The majority, however, holds that should it be ultimately decided to leave vested

interests undisturbed at present, the present proportion of Line Regiments to Local Corps should not be diminished.

5. The priodical relief of the former may be effected as before, but their tour service in India should not exceed twelve years. The efficiency of the latter may be secured by the establishment of depot battalions.

6. Exchange from one branch of service to another would be advantageous, if it could be effected without prejudice to existing rights.

7. Such admixture of European and native troops regimentally would be detrimental to the efficiency and discipline of both ; by brigade it would be most advantageous.

8. It may be partially kept up by volunteers from the Line Regiment returning to England. Recruiting in England should be carried on in the same way as for Regiments of the Line, by officers of the Local Force.

9. It would not be advisable to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India.

10. The irregular system is best for the Native Cavalry in India, each regiment having one Commandant, one Adjutant, one European officer per squadron and a Medical officer.

11. No, but every consideration should be given to native corps of Artillery, which proved their loyalty in the Rebellion.

12. Such cadets should be thoroughly drilled and instructed in their military duties in England.

These were the main points from the Report of the Army Commission. Besides these, among others, they recommended :

1. That the Native Army should be composed of different nationalities and castes and as a general rule mixed promiscuously through each regiment.

2. That all men of the regular Native Army should be enlisted for general service.

The Report of the Army Commission substantially changed the character of the Indian Army. After the Sepoy Mutiny, the Indian Government were not willing to depend mostly on the goodwill of the Indian troops. They, therefore, wanted to increase the number of European troops in India, by substantially decreasing the strength of Indian troops. They also did not want to keep the Artillery in the hands of the Indian soldiers. The recommendations of the Army Commission were that the Artillery should be a European Force, except in such stations as are peculiarly detrimental to the European constitution. Again, in reply to the question : Whether any Native Artillerv Corps should be sanctioned, they recommended : No, but every consideration should be given to native corps of Artillery which proved their loyalty in the Rebellion.

Thus the fate of Indian troops, specially in the Artillery section, was decided and the Indian soldiers were debarred from joining the Artillery section.

About the re-organisation of the Indian army, the Duke of Argyle says :*

*·*India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 127.

"A reconstruction of the Army of India has been another consequence of the great Mutiny. The necessity of *maintaning* for the future a *much larger proportion of European troops*, was the first conclusion which every man drew instinctively from that event. Under the impulse of feelings natural after so narrow an escape, the tendency was to overestimate the change which was really needed. Eighty thousand men was the number to which opinion pointed as the minimum required for safety, and at the present moment we have nearly 72,000 (in 1863). We have seen that when Lord Dalhousie left India the British Force had been reduced to 45,300 men. Whatever doubt there might be as to the exact figure at which it should stand in future, *there could be no doubt that it had been dangerously reduced and must be largely reinforced.*"

With this question, however, also came the question of Finance. The Duke of Argyle says :

"The effects of the Mutiny may be told in a few words. In the year before the outbreak, the revenue and the expenditure had been almost exactly equal. During the three years 1858-59-60 the aggregate deficiencies exceeded 30 millons. In 1857 the capital of the Indian public debt had stood at (about) 59½ millons. In February, 1860 it exceeded 90 millons. Even at that date the Mutiny had added about 30 millions to the Indian debt, which has now further risen to about 100 millions. But if the effect was alarming, at least the cause was simple, and the remedy obvious. *The cause was enormons military expenditure and the remedy must be mainly, if not exclusively, military reduction.* In 1856-57 the total military charges had been below 11½ millions; in 1358-59 they were upwards of 21 millions. One-half of the whole British Army was quartered on the revenues of India, and the Native Force, instead of being smaller, was vastly larger than it had been before the Mutiny arose. The European troops of all arms amounted to 1,12,000 men, whilst the native troops, including the irregular levies and the military police had risen to the enormous figure of 310,000 men—an excess of about 50,000 men over the Native Force as it had stood in 1856.

"But the Government of India found itself not only in the face of an enormous deficit, but in the face of opinions on its future military system which would have rendered escape from that deficit impossible. The Military Commission appointed in this country to enquire into the subject were unanimous that the number of European troops to be kept in India should not be less than 80,000 men, and further, that the proportion that this Force should bear to the *Native* troops should never be less than one to three, and in many districts should be one or two. The Native Army must therefore be from 1,80,000 to 2,00,000 men. Although this purely professional opinion was at once perceived to be impracticable by the Government at home, yet it was hard to see how retrenchment could be carried so far as to restore an equal balance to the Indian Exchequer. Two millions annually—on which there could be no reduction--had been then already added to the expenditure on the interest of the debt alone; so that, unless the military establishment could be reduced even below the amount at which it had stood before the Mutiny, it was impossible that, with the existing revenue, the Government could escape from a position of permanent embarrassment."*

INDIAN COUNCILS ACT OF 1861.

The Indian Councils Act of 1861 is an important step towards the creation of Indian Legislative Councils. This is the first time that a special Act was passed to create Legislative Councils. By Section 44 of the Act of 1861, the Governor-General was authorised to establish a Legislative Council for the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William and to specify the number to be nominated in making laws and regulations. The extent of the legislative powers of the Council was thus defined:

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In cases of emergency, the Governor-General could make "ordinances for the peace and good government" of the country, which had the force of laws for six months.

The Councils for the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay were not constituted but the provisions of the Act dealing with the making of laws and regulations for the Bombay and Madras Presidencies were extended to the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William.

Lord Canning accordingly established the Bengal Legislative Council on January 18, 1862, and requested the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to nominate twelve, Councillors for the new Legislative Council, subject to the approval of the Governor-General. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, therefore, nominated four officials and four non-official Europeans, and four Indians, of whom two were officials. The first members of the Legislative Council of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal for making laws and regulations were:

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Lord Canning gave his formal approval to the nomination of the above-named members for the new Legislative Council. The first meeting of the newly constituted Legislative Council was held on the 1st of February, 1862.

The Act tried to extend its operations in the newly acquired provinces, known as the non-regulation provinces, by introducing in those provinces the regulations which had been made for older countries. The Act also restored to the Bombay and Madras Presidencies the legislative powers which had been withdrawn by the previous Act of 1833. But the Legislative Councils of Bombay and Madras Presidencies were not constituted, but the provisions of making laws and regulations for those two Presidencies were given to the Bengal Legislative Council. All Acts passed by the local Councils were required to receive the assent of the Governor-General as well as that of the Governor. Thus the Governor-General was given "direct and personal control" over the legislatures in India. No bill could be introduced into any Legislative Councils without the previous sanction of the Governor-General, if it affected the public debt or revenues, the religious usages of the people, military discipline or foreign relations.

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"The addition of the native element has, I think, become necessary owing to our diminished opportunities of learning through indirect channels what the natives think of our measures, and how the native community will be affected by them. It is useless to speculate on the many causes which have conspired to deprive us of the advantages which our predecessors enjoyed in this respect, of the fact there can be no doubt, and no one will, I think, object to the only obvious means of regaining in part the advantages which we have lost, unless he is prepared for the perilous experiment of continuing to legislate for millions of people, with few means of knowing, except by a rebellion, whether the laws suit them or not.

"The durbar of a native Prince is nothing more than a council very similar to that which I have described. To it under a good ruler all have access, very considerable license of speech is permitted, and it is in fact the channel from which the ruler learns how his measures are likely to affect his subjects, and may hear of discontent before it becomes disaffection.

"I cannot think that the plan proposed will even in our presidency towns lead, as has been apprehended, to needless talking and debate, or convert our Councils into Parish vestries. It is a great evil of the present system that Government can rarely learn how its measures will be received or how they are likely to affect even its European subjects, till criticism takes the form of settled and often bitter opposition."†

Thus the terrible Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 brought home to many British people's minds "the dangers arising from the entire exclusion of Indians from association with the legislation of the country." It has been well said by Sir Bartle Frere that it was a perilous expreriment of continuing to legislate for millions of people, with few means of knowing, except by a rebellion, whether the laws suit them or not. That is the

* Quted in *Montagu-Chelmsford Report,* pp. 40-41.

† *Ibid.,* p. 38.

main reason of the inclusion of Indian representatives—both official and non-official, to the new Council, created by the Indian Councils Act of 1861.

THE PRESS ACT OF 1857.

One of the Mutiny measures undertaken by Lord Canning was the enactment of the Press Act of 1857. On the 13th June, 1857, a Bill to gag the Press was introduced by Lord Canning in the Legislative Council and in the course of the same day it became Act XV of 1857. By a single stroke of the pen, whatever liberty had been granted by Sir Charles Metcalfe was taken away by Lord Canning. It prohibited the keeping of any Printing Press without a Government license. The Government reserved the right of granting licenses or revoking them at any time at their sweet will. The conditions of the granting of licenses were as follows :

"That no book, pamphlet, newspaper, or other work printed at such press, or with such materials or articles, shall contain any observations or statements impugning the motives or designs of the British Government either in England or India, or in any way tending to bring the said Government into hatred or contempt, to excite disaffection or unlawful resistance to its orders, or to weaken its lawful authority, or the lawful authority of its civil or military servants :

"That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper or other work shall contain observations or statements having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion, among the native population of any intended interference by Government with their religious opinions and observances :

"That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper or other work shall contain observations having a tendency to weaken the friendship towards the British Government of native princes, chiefs or States in dependence upon or alliance with it."

According to the provisions of this Act, the Government could prohibit the publication or circulation of newspapers, books or other printed matters. The duration of the Act, forunately, was limited to one year and it expired on the 13th of June 1858. Though it was applicable to the whole of India, practically it was directed against the Press in Calcutta, where there was a large number of newspapers.

The redeeming feature of this Act was that it made no distinction between the English and Vernacular Press. Lord Canning, the father of this Act, in introducing the Bill, had observed that he saw no reason, and did not consider it possible in justice, to draw any line of demarcation between European and Indian publications. This "Gagging Act"—as it was sometimes called—had roused a storm of protest from the European section of the Press. It had warned European papers like *The Friend of India* for "remarks of a dangerous nature" in the article "The Centenary of Plassey" and the *Hurkaru* as well as Indian papers like the *Durbin*, the *Sultan-ul Akhbar*, the *Samachar Sudhabarshan* and the *Gul-shan-i-nau-bahar*.

THE INDIAN PENAL CODE.

The Indian Penal Code passed through several stages before it was enforced as law throughout British India. It was first drawn up by Lord Macaulay, the first Indian Law Member, well-known for his deep ill-feeling against Indians. From 1837 to 1860, the code underwent several changes at the hands of several jurists. At last the code was passed into law on the 6th October, 1860, and it was provided

The Dhar State asked for help from the Indian Government, "constant applications for assistance were forwarded to the British authorities. Assistance, however, did not come".

What was the result? The Ranee was forced to enter into an agreement with the troops "stipulating the pardon of the *fakeer*, pay enforcement of claims, in short, such terms, as a mutinous soldiery will exact." The Ranee sent a copy to the British Agent and again, when the troops threatened to sack the town, implored assistance from the British. At last the long expected help came, and "after ten or twelve days' siege, the mutineers evacuated the place by night."

What was the treatment meted out to the Dhar State? We are told:

"The Agent demanded the keys of the treasury, they were handed over to him. He required that the minister a *protege* of the British Government, who held a *jagfieer* under its guarantee,—and other persons, should be put in arrest. It was done. For seventeen days that the British troops remained at Dhar, they were supplied with artificers, and every thing that was required."*

Not only this, more punishment was to follow. The British Lion wanted to forfeit the State of Dhar in return for the faithful services rendered by the State. We read:

"On the 14th February, 1858, a Mussalman, Meer Mohammad Shahamat Ali, appeared at Dhar, bearer of two letters to the Ranee and the young Prince from the Agent for Central India. Their contents must have been the same as those of a Proclamation which came with them, dated like the letters 19th January, 1858 and which was issued under the signature of the same Meer Shahamat Ali as officiating Superintendent. It declared that the "infidelity and ingratitude" of Dhar could not possibly "be overlooked," that the prince "having forfeited the Government of Dhar would never be reinstated," that arrangements would be made for the maintenance of himself and the Ranee. The Proclamation then concludes in the following strain,– which, from the pen of a Mussalman, must have touched every Rajput's pride to the quick: "This Proclamation has been issued for your information. It is incumbent on you to understand its contents and conduct yourself accordingly, and with sincere and complete submission to be obedient to the officer who had been appointed to the charge of the affairs of the State, in consequence of the treaty owing *to the unpardonable miscoduct of the Dhar Durbar.*"

The country was, therefore, provisionally sequestrated,--the treasure in the privy purse of the young prince was confiscated,—the state property of elephants, camels, horses, etc., put up to auction, only a few horses being reserved for the use of the young chief. The minister's *jagfieer* was confiscated. The lands assigned, by Mahratta custom, to the *Ranee* for charitable purposes, amounting in value to £5,000 a year, were placed under sequestration. Meer Shahamat Ali took charge of the State as Superintendent, and the young prince was not allowed to sit on a chair in public."†

That was the return the State of Dhar got for all the services rendered during the Munity. This annexation of the principality of Dhar—even temporarily—is nothing but "a flagrant outrage upon all justice." The British Government afterwards tried to undo the previous "outrage" by restoring the principality to the Ranee and her adopted son.

Thus writes Mr. J. M. Ludlow on the Dhar affair:

"Now it is most true Dhar has been restored. But has English morality sunk so low as this, that a flagrant outrage upon all justice should be deemed atoned for by simple restitution? The treaty

* *Ibid.*, p. 159.

† *Ibid., pp.* 159-160.

with Dhar of 1819 binds the Raja of Dhar to act "in subordinate co-operation with the British Government" (Act. 2); binds the British Government "to protect the State of Dhar and its dependencies." In what had the State of Dhar omitted to fulfil its part of the treaty? How did the British Government fulfil it, when after receiving all the help that Dhar could give, it left that State so long without the protection stipulated at the mercy of the mutineers? And then, forsooth, it must take advantage of its own wrong, without the shadow of a judicial investigation, without notice, without so much as a specific charge;—only those vague ones "enmity and opposition" "which are the very resource of despots in want of an excuse—to declare the treaty abrogated, to annex, temporarily at least, the territory of an ally, to bully a woman and a child,—Hindoos by the hands of a Mussalman,—to confiscate private property, to outrage the feelings of a whole people through those sales by auction of their chief's goods and chattels which invariably prove so deeply galling. Restitution indeed, after such proceedings as these! Why, if you doubled the Dhar territory it would be barely compensation enough to the State,—let alone the individuals, the Minister for instance, who declares that before the outbreak of the troops their mutinous disposition was more than once communicated by him to the British authorities, and their aid implored. If this be the way our friends are treated after such a crisis as that of 1857, Heaven preserve us from any other."*

RE-ORGANISATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY

With the Sepoy Mutiny British rulers began to consider the question seriously: whether they would keep the existing strength of the Indian army or reduce its strength. After the Sepoy Mutiny was put down the British statesmen thought it desirable to reduce the strength of the Indian army, as they saw that there was no knowing when the Indian army would again rise in rebellion. The policy of the British rulers was then to reduce the strength of the Indian army and increase that of the British army in India.

Accordingly on 15th July, 1858, Her Majesty appointed a Commission "to inquire into the organisation of the Army lately serving in the pay of the East India Company". The following gentlemen were appointed to serve in the Committee:

(1) General Peel, (2) Duke of Cambridge, (3) Lord Stanley, (4) Marquess of Tweeddale, (5) Viscount Melville, (6) Sir H. G. Smith, (7) Sir G. A. Wetherall, (8) Major-General Patrick Montgomery, (9) Major G. H. Hancock, (10) Colonel Burlton, and (11) Colonel T. F. Tait.

The Commission were to report on the following questions:

1. The terms on which the Army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown.

2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in Indian Provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquility.

3. The proportion which European should bear to native troops in Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery respectively.

4. How far the European portion of the Army should be composed of Troops of the Line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only.

5. In connection with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion and of securing the efficiency of the latter.

* *Ibid., pp.* 160-161.

6. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what Regiment would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company.

7. Whether there should be any admixture of the European and Native Forces, either regimentally or by Brigade?

8. Whether the Local European force should be kept up by Drafts and Volunteers from the Line or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?

9. Whether it would be possible to raise any Regiment in the colonies either for temporary or permanent service in India?

10. Whether the Native Forces should be Regular or Irregular or both; and if so in what proportion?

11. Whether any Native Artillery Corps should be sanctioned?

12. Whether cadets sent out for service with the Native Troops should, in the first instance, be attached to European regiments to secure uniformity of drill and discipline?

These were the terms on which this Army Commission were to base their Report. They were asked to examine army experts as witnesses and were also authorised to call for any Government Papers that might be necessary for coming to any definite conclusion on the above questions.

The trend of thought as betrayed by the above questions certainly points towards the consolidation of the European Forces in India. With this comes another question: whether any Native Artillery Corps should be sanctioned. Before the Sepoy Mutiny, the Indians were freely admitted to the British Indian Artillery Corps. The Indian Government now wanted to exclude the Indian soldiers from the Artillery section of the Indian army.

After examining the witnesses, the Commission drew up their Report, which they submitted to the Government of Her Majesty on 7th March, 1859. They categorically gave their considered opinion on all the questions raised.

The substance of their Report is as follows :

1. The 56th Clause of the Act for the Better Government of India assures to the Indian Army the same pay and advantages as they enjoyed in the service of the East India Company.

2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in Indian Provinces should depend on internal disturbances or external aggressions of India. The force, according to the Commission, should be about 80,000, that is, 50,000 for Bengal, 15,000 for Madras and 15,000 for Bombay.

3. The proportion of European to Native troops in Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery should not be greater than 2 to 1 for Bengal, 3 to 1 for Bombay and Madras. The Artillery should be a European Force except in such stations as are peculiarly detrimental to the European constitution.

4. There was no unanimity in evidence as to whether the European portion of the Army should be Troops of the Line or Troops for service in India only. The majority, however, holds that should it be ultimately decided to leave vested

interests undisturbed at present, the present proportion of Line Regiments to Local Corps should not be diminished.

5. The priodical relief of the former may be effected as before, but their tour service in India should not exceed twelve years. The efficiency of the latter may be secured by the establishment of depot battalions.

6. Exchange from one branch of service to another would be advantageous, if it could be effected without prejudice to existing rights.

7. Such admixture of European and native troops regimentally would be detrimental to the efficiency and discipline of both ; by brigade it would be most advantageous.

8. It may be partially kept up by volunteers from the Line Regiment returning to England. Recruiting in England should be carried on in the same way as for Regiments of the Line, by officers of the Local Force.

9. It would not be advisable to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India.

10. The irregular system is best for the Native Cavalry in India, each regiment having one Commandant, one Adjutant, one European officer per squadron and a Medical officer.

11. No, but every consideration should be given to native corps of Artillery, which proved their loyalty in the Rebellion.

12. Such cadets should be thoroughly drilled and instructed in their military duties in England.

These were the main points from the Report of the Army Commission. Besides these, among others, they recommended :

1. That the Native Army should be composed of different nationalities and castes and as a general rule mixed promiscuously through each regiment.

2. That all men of the regular Native Army should be enlisted for general service.

The Report of the Army Commission substantially changed the character of the Indian Army. After the Sepoy Mutiny, the Indian Government were not willing to depend mostly on the goodwill of the Indian troops. They, therefore, wanted to increase the number of European troops in India, by substantially decreasing the strength of Indian troops. They also did not want to keep the Artillery in the hands of the Indian soldiers. The recommendations of the Army Commission were that the Artillery should be a European Force, except in such stations as are peculiarly detrimental to the European constitution. Again, in reply to the question : Whether any Native Artillerv Corps should be sanctioned, they recommended : No, but every consideration should be given to native corps of Artillery which proved their loyalty in the Rebellion.

Thus the fate of Indian troops, specially in the Artillery section, was decided and the Indian soldiers were debarred from joining the Artillery section.

About the re-organisation of the Indian army, the Duke of Argyle says :*

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* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 127.

"A reconstruction of the Army of India has been another consequence of the great Mutiny. The necessity of *maintaning* for the future a *much larger proportion of European troops,* was the first conclusion which every man drew instinctively from that event. Under the impulse of feelings natural after so narrow an escape, the tendency was to overestimate the change which was really needed. Eighty thousand men was the number to which opinion pointed as the minimum required for safety, and at the present moment we have nearly 72,000 (in 1863). We have seen that when Lord Dalhousie left India the British Force had been reduced to 45,300 men. Whatever doubt there might be as to the exact figure at which it should stand in future, *there could be no doubt that it had been dangerously reduced and must be largely reinforced.*"

With this question, however, also came the question of Finance. The Duke of Argyle says :

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Though the Indian Councils Act of 1861 contained the germs of future constitutional development, it gave but few privileges to the *Additional* nominated members of the Council. They could only advise the Government in making laws and regulations for India, but they had no voice over the Budget or the Executives. The principle of election was not yet recognised, all the additional members were to be nominated. The Act had made one important change, namely, the inclusion of Indians as members of the Council. We, therefore, find men like Babu Ram Gopal Ghose, Babu Rama Prasad Roy being nominated as members of the Council. And why? Because, the Sepoy Mutiny acted as an eye-opener to the British rulers in India. They thought it inadvisable to make laws for the people of India, without giving a hearing to their representatives. The reason for the admission of representatives of Indian opinion in the new Council has been fully explained in the following passages from the minute of Sir Bartle Frere, 1860:

"The addition of the native element has, I think, become necessary owing to our diminished opportunities of learning through indirect channels what the natives think of our measures, and how the native community will be affected by them. It is useless to speculate on the many causes which have conspired to deprive us of the advantages which our predecessors enjoyed in this respect, of the fact there can be no doubt, and no one will, I think, object to the only obvious means of regaining in part the advantages which we have lost, unless he is prepared for the perilous experiment of continuing to legislate for millions of people, with few means of knowing, except by a rebellion, whether the laws suit them or not.

"The durbar of a native Prince is nothing more than a council very similar to that which I have described. To it under a good ruler all have access, very considerable license of speech is permitted, and it is in fact the channel from which the ruler learns how his measures are likely to affect his subjects, and may hear of discontent before it becomes disaffection.

"I cannot think that the plan proposed will even in our presidency towns lead, as has been apprehended, to needless talking and debate, or convert our Councils into Parish vestries. It is a great evil of the present system that Government can rarely learn how its measures will be received or how they are likely to affect even its European subjects, till criticism takes the form of settled and often bitter opposition."†

Thus the terrible Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 brought home to many British people's minds "the dangers arising from the entire exclusion of Indians from association with the legislation of the country." It has been well said by Sir Bartle Frere that it was a perilous experiment of continuing to legislate for millions of people, with few means of knowing, except by a rebellion, whether the laws suit them or not. That is the

* Quted in *Montagu-Chelmsford Report*, pp. 40-41.

† *Ibid.*, p. 38.

main reason of the inclusion of Indian representatives—both official and non-official, to the new Council, created by the Indian Councils Act of 1861.

THE PRESS ACT OF 1857.

One of the Mutiny measures undertaken by Lord Canning was the enactment of the Press Act of 1857. On the 13th June, 1857, a Bill to gag the Press was introduced by Lord Canning in the Legislative Council and in the course of the same day it became Act XV of 1857. By a single stroke of the pen, whatever liberty had been granted by Sir Charles Metcalfe was taken away by Lord Canning. It prohibited the keeping of any Printing Press without a Government license. The Government reserved the right of granting licenses or revoking them at any time at their sweet will. The conditions of the granting of licenses were as follows :

"That no book, pamphlet, newspaper, or other work printed at such press, or with such materials or articles, shall contain any observations or statements impugning the motives or designs of the British Government either in England or India, or in any way tending to bring the said Government into hatred or contempt, to excite disaffection or unlawful resistance to its orders, or to weaken its lawful authority, or the lawful authority of its civil or military servants :

"That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper or other work shall contain observations or statements having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion among the native population of any intended interference by Government with their religious opinions and observances :

"That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper or other work shall contain observations having a tendency to weaken the friendship towards the British Government of native princes, chiefs or States in dependence upon or alliance with it."

According to the provisions of this Act, the Government could prohibit the publication or circulation of newspapers, books or other printed matters. The duration of the Act, forunately, was limited to one year and it expired on the 13th of June 1858. Though it was applicable to the whole of India, practically it was directed against the Press in Calcutta, where there was a large number of newspapers.

The redeeming feature of this Act was that it made no distinction between the English and Vernacular Press. Lord Canning, the father of this Act, in introducing the Bill, had observed that he saw no reason, and did not consider it possible in justice, to draw any line of demarcation between European and Indian publications. This "Gagging Act"—as it was sometimes called—had roused a storm of protest from the European section of the Press. It had warned European papers like *The Friend of India* for "remarks of a dangerous nature" in the article "The Centenary of Plassey" and the *Hurkaru* as well as Indian papers like the *Durbin*, the *Sultan-ul Akhbar*, the *Samachar Sudhabarshan* and the *Gul-shan-i-nau-bahar.*

THE INDIAN PENAL CODE.

The Indian Penal Code passed through several stages before it was enforced as law throughout British India. It was first drawn up by Lord Macaulay, the first Indian Law Member, well-known for his deep ill-feeling against Indians. From 1837 to 1860, the code underwent several changes at the hands of several jurists. At last the code was passed into law on the 6th October, 1860, and it was provided

that it should take effect from the 1st of May, 1861, throughout British] India. Later on, the operation of the Act was postponed till 1st January, 1862. The first code of Criminal Procedure came into effect by Act V of 1861.

Sir Henry Maine, the celebrated jurist and author of *Ancient Law*, had also some part in the revision of the Indian Penal Code. We read about him :

"He lost not a moment, however, in mastering the intricacies of native law, and at Lord Elgin's instigation became associated with Mr. H. B. Harington in the revision of our Indian Penal Code—a colossal undertaking well worthy of the energies of two such untiring jurists."

The Indian Penal Code has this great defect that it does not observe the principle of equality of all in the eye of law throughout. It gives the Britisher the right to claim trial as a British-born subject in the Court of a British judge.

THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT

A statute, passed on the 6th Agust, 1861, empowered the Crown to establish by Letters Patent, a High Court at Calcutta. Thus the Supreme Court and the Sadar Courts were abolished and their place taken by the High Court, which by its extraordinary original and appellate jurisdiction, controls all the other courts of justice within the limits defined by the Letters Patent issued on 14th May, 1862. The Calcutta High Court began its sitting from the 1st July, 1862. Mr. Thurlow thus writes of the Calcutta High Court :

"The new High Court was constituted under principles most calculated to render it a popular institution. Its rank absorbed civilians like Messrs. Seton-Karr and Campbell, of tried and eminent ability, for whom executive appointments equal to their claims could not at the time be found. Its doors were also open to barristers from home, and on its bench two new and startling precedents had been adopted. Natives were to be appointed to this high tribunal, with power to judge our countrymen in criminal as well as civil cases: and, for the first time, natives of high rank became entitled to the same emoluments as their English colleagues. The effect of this was quite electrical, and throughout Bengal the native public prints teemed with praise at the happy omen. It was clear, however, that as regards the native question, the chances of success or failure depended on the men selected. The Statutes of the court had been thus liberally framed, bearing in view a man of proved integrity and parts. Rama Persad Roy was a name, at the very sound of which corrupt vakeels or pleaders quitted court. He was without price, and the office had been made for him ; but ere the Letters Patent had reached Calcutta he had died. Sumbhoonath Pundit] Ray Bahadur indeed was found to reap the honours invented for another ; but the new High Court went forth shorn of its greatest ornament."*

The posts of High Court Judges seemed to be reserved for English Barristers and Civi Servants ; only as an act of grace Sambhoonath Pundit was appointed to one such post.

RICKETTS RETRENCHMENT COMMITTEE

In the early days of the India Government under the Crown, the officers were highly paid. Even sometimes the Board of Directors objected to the high salaries of their

* *The Company and the Crown*, pp. 13-14.

officials. The Act of 1853, therefore, considerably reduced the salaries of officials like the Commander-in-Chief and members of the Council of India. The Act also fixed "the salaries of members of Legislative Council not holding any other office, at Rs. 50,000 per annum."

Again two years after in July 1855, the President of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India brought to the attention of the Court of Directors "the numerous discrepancies to be found in the salaries of corresponding officers under the different Presidencies." The Court of Directors forwarded the same letter to the Government of India with the remark that these discrepancies are so numerous and apparently anomalous, as to lead to the conclusion that the scale of remuneration for the same services had not been regulated on any uniform principle. They, therefore, insisted that a general revision in the scale of remuneration was necessary. They ordered a general revision of the salaries of all civil appointments throughout India without any further delay.

The Government of India acted upon the orders of the Court of Directors and appointed Mr. H. Ricketts, B. C. S., as Commissioner of the revision of civil salaries and establishments throughout India. Mr. Ricketts submitted his report on 3rd June, 1859.

When the report was submitted, the Government of India examined the recommendations of Mr. Ricketts. They sent a despatch, reviewing the whole report, to Lord Stanley, the Secretary of State for India. The Despatch was signed by the Viceroy Lord Canning, General Sir J. Outram and Mr. B. Peacock. In expressing their opinion on the principles on which Mr. Ricketts had conducted the revision (letter, 1st September, 1858) they hold them "generally to be unobjectionable." They, however, take exception to the measure 'by which Mr. Ricketts proposes to open certain appointments to all classes of servants and award the same salary to the incumbents without reference to class, whether they be civilians or military officers, East Indians or Natives." Here lies the pinch. The Government of India, therefore, gave separate recommendations along with those proposed by Mr. Ricketts. They held that in the allotment of salaries proposed by the Government of India, recommendations are made solely from a consideration of what appears to be suitable for the offices as they are now filled. To give an example: The Government considered the salaries of officers of the Presidency College to be "unnecessarily high." Thus while for the Principal of the Calcutta Presidency College, the Commissioner had proposed Rs. 15,600, the Government proposed Rs. 12,000. Again for the Principals of the Madras and Bombay Colleges the Commissioner's recommendations were Rs. 12,000 each, the Government proposed Rs. 10,800 each, thus making a saving of Rs. 6,000 per year. In the case of the Professors of Presidency Colleges, the Government accepted the recommendations of the Commissioner, which showed a saving of Rs. 7,200.

Here is the table* :

Annals of Indian Administration, Vol. IV, p 140 ff.

	Existing Scale.		Scale suggested by Commissioner.	
Calcutta.				
5 Prof. at 8,400	... 42,000		4 at 7,800	... 31,200
1 „ „ 4,800	... 4,800		2 „ 5,400	... 10,800
2 „ „ 3,600	... 7,200		2 „ 3,600	... 7,200
Madras.				
2 „ „ 6,000	... 12,000		2 „ 6,600	... 13,200
2 „ „ 4,800	... 9,600		2 „ 4,800	... 9,600
1 „ „ 3,600	... 3,600		1 „ 3,600	... 3,600
Bombay				
2 „ „ 7,200	... 14,400		2 „ 6,600	... 13,200
2 „ „ 6,000	... 12,000		3 „ 4,800	... 14,400
1 „ „ 4,800	... 4,800		1 „ 3,000	... 3,000
1 „ „ 2,400	... 2,400			
Rs.	... 1,12,800			Rs. ... 1,05,600
Rs.	... 1,05,600			
Saving Rs.	... 7,200			

Mr. Buckland thus writes about the revision of Civil Salaries :

"The principles on which Sir H. Ricketts conducted the revision were considered generally to be unobjectionable; *Government accepted the measure by which he proposed to open certain appointments to all classes of servants, and award the same salary to the incumbents without reference to class, whether they were Civilians or Military officers, East Indians or Natives.* Whereas Sir H. Ricketts had recommended reductions in salaries amounting to Rs. 11,20,435 a year as compared with existing salaries, the Government recommended a reduction of Rs. 10,33,423. Sir H. Ricketts proposed a reduction of 12.15 per cent in the agregate pay of the officers of the Judicial and Land Revenue Departments in Bengal. Including proposed improvements in many Departments, his recomendations would have resulted, on the whole, in an annual increase of Rs. 9,81,457 per annum. I can trace no comprehensive orders on this report, and have always understood that no orders were passed on it as a whole."*

The Scheme of Sir H. Ricketts was shelved only because he had recommended the throwing open of certain posts to Indians also !

INDIGO DISTURBANCES

The cultivation of indigo in Bengal gave rise to serious trouble to the Government. The raiyats and the European planters could not pull on well about the cultivation of indigo. The disputes between them assumed a serious form. Both began to complain to the Government, which had a very anxious time over the qaestion. The trouble began in 1859, when a planter in the district of Barasat 'complained of a general disinclination among the raiyats to cultivate indigo.' This feeling was attributed by the planter to the hostile attitude of the district Magistrate to the interests of indigo cultivation. Again, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal received numerous petitions from the raiyats of the Nadia district complaining of the acts of violence committed by the planters on them. Thus both sides began to complain to the authorities.

* *Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors* I., p. 31.

At last a deputation from the Indigo Planters' Association waited upon Sir Johu Peter Grant, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and asked for the removal of mistaken impressions from the minds of the raiyats and for a special law for the enforcement of indigo contracts.

The Government tried to satisfy the planters by issuing a notification to remove erroneous ideas from the minds of the raiyats. They also passed the Act XI of 1860 on the 31st of March, 1860—namely "An Act to enforce the fulfilment of indigo contracts and to provide for the appointment of a Commission of inquiry."

When this Act reached Sir Charles Wood, he wrote:

"In regard to the first point, it is to be observed that the authority of the Magistrate is to be called into action on the complaint of the planter for the enforcement of Indigo contracts, under specified penalties, in the event of a failure to perform the same. The provision of the Act, by which a violation by a raiyat of a civil contract, of the nature specified in the Act, is made the ground of criminal prosecution by the planter, appears to the Home Government to be open to serious objection."

Accordingly, this temporary Act of 1860, passed on the 31st of March, ceased to be in operation on the 4th of October, 1860.

The crisis came in the autumn of 1860. Lord Canning also realised the gravity of the situation, when he wrote:

"I assure you that for about a week it caused me more anxiety than I have had since the days of Delhi, and from that day I felt that a shot fired in anger or fear by one foolish planter might put every factory in Lower Bengal in flames."

The following passage from the minute of Sir J.P. Grant (of 17th September, 1860) also shows the signs of approaching crisis. He wrote:

"I have myself just returned from an excursion to Sirajganj on the Jamuna river where I went by water for objects connected with the line of the Dacca Railway and wholly unconnected with indigo matters. I had intended to go up the Mathabhanga and down the Ganges: but finding, on arriving at the Kunwar, that the shorter passage was open, I proceeded along the Kunwar and Kaliganga, which rivers run in Nadia and Jessore, and through that part of the Pabna district which lies south of the Ganges.

"Numerous crowds of raiyats appeared at various places, whose whole prayer was for an order of Government that they should not cultivate indigo. On my return a few days afterwards along the same two rivers, from dawn to dark, as I steamed along these two rivers for some 60 or 70 miles, both banks were literally lined with crowds of villagers, claiming justice in this matter. Even the women of the villages on the banks were collected in groups by themselves: the males who stood at and between the river-side villages in little crowds must have collected from all the villages at a great distance on either side. I do not know that it ever fell to the lot of any Indian officer to steam for 14 hours through a continued double street of suppliants for justice: all were most respectful and orderly, but also were plainly in earnest. It would be folly to suppose that such a display on the part of ten thousands of people, men, women and children, has no deep meaning. The organisation and capacity for combined and simultaneous action in the cause, which this remarkahle demonstration over so large an extent of country proved, are subjects worthy of much consideration."*

In 1860, the Bengal Government gave lengthy answers to the charges brought by the Bengal Indigo Planters' Association. The indigo excitement spread from the

*Quoted in *Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors*, I., p. 192.

Nadia and Rajshahi Divisions to Faridpur. There was fear of breach of peace, but it was averted by timely precautions.

Thus indigo cultivation seems to have been doomed in Bengal and it did not flourish in Lower Bengal later on. In a despatch on the 1st of April, 1861, the Secretary of State considered a Bill "to provide for the punishment of breaches of contract for the cultivation, production, gathering, provision, manufacture, carriage and delivery of agricultural produce." In that despatch Sir Charles Wood wrote:

"The question of making breaches of contract for the cultivation and delivery of agricultural produce punishable by criminal proceeding is not one which now for the first time presents itself for consideration. It has been maturely considered, and the deliberate judgement of the Indian Law Commissioners, of the Legislative Council, of the Secretary of State in Council, of the majority of the Indigo Commissioners, of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and even, as it appears to me, of our own Government, has been recorded against any such measure. I am not prepared to give my sanction to the law which you propose, and to subject to criminal proceedings matters which have hitherto been held as coming exclusively under the jurisdiction of the civil tribunal; and I request that the Bill for the punishment of breaches of contract recently introduced by you into the Legislative Council may be withdrawn."*

Thus the special law for which the indigo planters were clamouring was disallowed by the Secretary of State for India.

What was the real cause of the indigo trouble ? Why did such a bad feeling exist in Bengal between the raiyats and the planters ? Sir J. P. Grant in his indigo minute tried to make an exposition of the character of the Bengal indigo system and find out the real cause of estrangement of feeling between the raiyats and the planters. He wrote:

"It will be asked, how then has it happened that the general renouncement of Indigo *raiyati* cultivation, which has just occurred, when things in this respect are better than they were? I believe the answer is found in a combination of various circumstances. The improvement of the police which has checked affrays has, I believe, driven those to whom some means or other of forcing cultivation unprofitable to the cultivators was a matter of necessity to other methods of inducement more harassing, on the whole, than an occasional terrible example. The stoppage of all competition amongst planters for raiyats must, of late years, very greatly have increased the weight bearing down the individual raiyats; and the withdrawal from him of such protection as he before obtained from Zamindars not being indigo planters must have had a like effect. There have been less friction, fewer stoppages and less noise of late years, and the pressure of the machine must have been more effective in concurrence. There is reason also to infer from the evidence that the demand in some places at least has been severe of late upon the raiyat in the quantity of indigo cultivation required of him, and in the labour required in weeding and tending the crop, than was formerly the case. But the greatest aggravation of all is due to the late rise of prices. It is evident that all agricultural produce has risen in value within the last three years so as to double or very nearly double its former price, and that day labour and the cost of the maintenance of cattle have increased in price in the same way, as the single root of all that was at any time wrong in the Bengal indigo system is that the manufacture did not pay the cost of the plant and as there has been no increase in the price paid for this one crop since the above-mentioned extraordinary rise of prices generally, the above is a cause which must have doubled all the evil of the cultivation to the raiyats. The direct

* *Ibid., p.* 196.

money loss was doubled and as that was the cause of all the other evils it seems reasonable to assume that they also were increased in the same ratio.

"It is indeed in itself an all-sufficient exposition of the character of the Bengal indigo system to state what is denied by none that, whilst within a few years the prices of all agricultural produce have doubled, the price paid or normally paid for indigo plant has not been raised by a single anna; and that until the raiyats had, as it were, declared open war it is not shown that a single planter, for several years past, had ever entertained thought of any increase of price.

"Whilst the pressure had in this manner become intolerable, the improved administration which, by an increase of subdivisions, gave the raiyats access to Magisterial Courts, showed them that practically the protection of the law was no longer hopeless; and they came to realise the fact that in the matter of contracting to grow indigo, they were in truth, forced agents. The case of the Jessore planter, to be found in the indigo records, lately published, is instructive enough on this point. The planter in question had strenuously objected to the head-quarters of one of the new subdivisions being placed near a factory of his, where he said he had a *raiyati* cultivation of 2,000 bighas, on the ground, amongst others, of the proneness of natives to litigation "with the means at their doors." Whilst the question of fixing the head-quarters remained in abeyance, the Joint-Magistrate, on going to pay an accidental and private visit to the factory, was appealed to on his way by a villager who alleged that certain persons were confined there. On instant search being made by the Joint-Magistrate, several men (three at least, for so many prosecuted successfully) were found confined in a godown, having been so confined, it would appear, there or in other places about two months; and the planter being prosecuted was fined for the offence, whilst five of his *amla* were sentenced to both fine and imprisonment for it.

Sir J. P. Grant thus concludes remarks on the subject:

"The Indigo Commission, as has been said, report that the crisis which occurred in 1860 might have occurred in any other year. The combined effect of all the foregoing considerations upon my mind is, that no human power exerted in defiance of the law in support of the system could have upheld it much longer: and that, if the Government had disregarded justice and policy so far as to make the attempt, it would have been speedily punished by a great agrarian rising, the destructive effects of which upon European and all other capital no man can calculate."*

THE INDIGO COMMISSION

The oppression of the Indigo planters in several districts of Bengal over the ryots created a great sensation throughout Bengal. The ryots, unable any longer to bear the tyranny of the planters, tried to fight out their case against the planters, who were in many cases helped by the District Magistrates. The public sympathy in Bengal went to the side of the poor ryots and even the missionaries sympathised with them. Babu Dina Bandhu Mitra, in his well-known drama *Nil Darpan*, portrayed a vivid picture of the tyranny of the planters over the ryots.

When the public feeling ran to a crisis, the Government of Bengal tried to interfere and thought of appointing a Commission to go into the whole question. Thus under Act XI of 1860, the Indigo Commission was appointed "to inquire into and report on the system and practice of Indigo planting and the relation between Indigo planters and the ryots and holders of land in Bengal." The following were appointed members of the Commission:

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* *Ibid., pp.* 245-246.



Dina Bandhu Mitra

1. W.S. Seton-Karr, Esq., President. 2. R.Temple, Esq. (appointed by Government.) 3. W.F. Ferguson, Esq., (nominated by Indigo Planters' Association) 4. Rev. J. Sale (Representative of the Missionaries) 5. Babu C. M. Chatterji (of the British Indian Association.)

The Commission began its sitting publicly from the 18th May to 4th August, 1860. They examined 134 witnesses, of whom 15 were officials, 21 Planters, 8 missionaries, 13 Zamindars, and 77 ryots.

The Report was submitted on 27th August, 1860, but unfortunately it was not an unanimous Report. It was signed by the President, W.S. Seton-Karr, Rev. Sale and Babu C.M.Chatterji and with a reservation by Mr. Temple, who wrote a separate minute in which Mr. Ferguson concurred, though he had also another minute of his own.

The Commission carried on their investigation on the following points :

1. The truth or falsehood of charges made against the system and the planters.

2. Changes to be made in the system as between the manufacturer and cultivator such as can be made by the head of concerns themselves.

3. Changes in the laws or administration such as can only be originated and be carried out by the Legislative and Executive authorities.

In discussing these questions, they held :

"All the defects of the system, all the faults which justly are to be laid at the door of either planter or the ryot by their respective opponents, may be traced originally to one bare fact, the *want of adequate remuneration*: it is this that brings out into strong relief the well-known defects of the national character of the Bengali that sharpens his cunning, aggravates his indolence, tempts him to procrastinate and fosters his proneness to concealment ; it is this, in short, that renders the whole relation between the two parties one prolonged and unhappy struggle in which Anglo-Saxon energy, promptitude, and pertinacity are often almost baffled by that subterfuge and evasion which are the proverbial resources of the weak."

But, why in this Report of Indigo Enquiry, is this invective against the national character of the Bengali? Why did Babu C.M. Chatterji, being a Bengali himself, become a party to the statement against his own nation? Is it because the Bengalis did not easily submit to the Indigo planters that the President, with a bias towards the Indigo planters, made this indictment against the Bengalis? He perhaps wanted to imitate Lord Macaulay in his attack on the Bengalis.

The majority Report considered Indigo to be "one of the most important articles of export from India and that produced in Lower Bengal is probably the finest in the world." The annual out-turn of indigo was 1,05,000 maunds, worth two millions sterling. They became nervous at the prospect of the loss of the Indigo cultivation. They said : "The loss or diminution of such a valuable item of export would be seriously felt in England and India. In a political aspect, too, the presence of the planters is highly valuable." It was with such a bias in favour of the planters that the Commission wrote the Report!

It is because the Hon'ble Mr. Ashley Eden took the side of the poor ryots that the British public in Bengal became indignant. As the Magistrate of Baraset, he issued the following order :

"Since the ryots can sow on their lands whatever crop they like, no one can without their consent and by violence sow any other crop; ordered, therefore, that the original petition be sent to the Deputy Magistrate of Mitterhaut, in order that he may send policemen to the ryot's land to prevent any disturbances that are likely, to ensure from any compulsory cultivation that of the ryots, not to allow anyone to interfere with it. If the ryots wish to sow indigo or anything else, the policemen will see that there is no disturbance."

About the activities of the missionaries during the indigo trouble, the Commission said: "That ryots should ask these gentlemen for advice and even for asistance, is, in our opinion, perfectly natural. They mix freely with the people. It would have been ungenerous and even unmanly for Mr. Blumhardt and his colleagues to turn a deaf ear to the complaints of such ryots, especially when these very complaints appeared to them to form some hindrance to the attainment of the avowed objects of missionary calling. We have, too, the distinct denial of these Reverend gentlemen, that they have, by words and deeds, added any fuel to the excitement."

The recommendations of the Commission were the following:

1. Contract should be of the simplest possible kind compatible with a due definition of the engagement and liability. There should be a strict annual adjustment of account. The contract should be drawn out for 12 months and should not be renewed if the ryot shows himself incapable of meeting his engagements

2. The stamp paper should be provided at the expense of the factory.

3. The land for indigo should be selected by the planter and ryots mutually and the size of the bigha should correspond to the Government bigha of 14,400 sq, ft. or to the local Zamindari bigha.

4. The expense of delivering the plant should be borne by the factory and not by the ryots.

5. Means should be taken to ensure a fair measurement or account of the plant delivered by the ryot.

6. The ryot should be charged nothing for the seed.

7. The ryot should be allowed to sow cold weather crop after the indigo or to grow seed from the stumps.

8. The account of rent should be kept separate from the account for indigo, wherever practicable.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAWS

The Commission do not recommend the expediency of vesting planters or zamindars with the powers of Honorary Magistrates. The remedy, they suggest, is to multiply subdivisions and magistrates as the Government may think fit. The reform of police can only be a work of time.

About the Act X of 1859, they said, that if ever any practical inconvenience should arise from any portion of the land, as regards the punctual collection of rents, the payment of the revenue and the consequent security of landed property, "it is likely to arise in connection with section XI and we would respectfully suggest that the working of this section and of section VI should be carefully watched."

They added: "The majority are unable to recommended the appointment of a separate committee or of a special class of officers with powers different from those exercised by the ordinary tribunals and authorities for the settlement of indigo disputes, we think that the want which that office is intended to supply would be better met anywhere by more numerous sub-divisions, a well organised police and an active executive officer at the head of the whole district."

The majority conclude their report thus: "However highly we may value the presence of Europeans in the interior of this country or deeply regret the injury which seems to threaten a large amount of property or urgently desire to meet the wishes of the manufacturers of a valuable staple, we still feel that there are two considerations which are paramount to all mercantile interest, to all political expediency and to all material advance, however specious in theory or imposing in effect. These are the simple considerations of justice and truth, of justice to the population whose complaints demand a hearing; and of truth, because we desire that the real facts should be clearly stated and widely known. We, the majority, feel that we owe a duty to the Government that has appointed us, to the body of peasants who have been working on an unsound system, to the calm and thoughtful members of the English community, but especially to a large portion of the natives, who, we are told, look with some anxiety for our Report."*

Besides this majority Report, Temple submitted a separate minute in which Fergusson concurred. Temple holds that judicious concession is the best policy for the planter to adopt towards the ryot; that the police should be throughly reformed; that Act XI of 1860 should be made permanent with certain modifications; that a breach of a registered contract to cultivate indigo should be made punishable by a Magistrate and that a special committee should be appointed.

Fergusson also dissents from the majority report on the ground that the language and tone of it tend to give a colouring and to lead to conclusions not proved from the facts. He also holds that when the question between the planter and ryot is put on a more satisfactory footing, not only Europeans but also native gentlemen should be appointed Justices of the Peace with limited jurisdiction.†

MINUTE BY SIR J. P. GRANT ON THE REPORT OF THE INDIGO COMMISSION

When the Report of the Indigo Commission was published, Sir J. P. Grant, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, wrote a Minute on the same on the 17th December, 1860. He shows that the system has been long unsound. He says:

"The records of Government show that the system of indigo manufacture in the province of Bengal proper has been unsound from a very early time. Whilst in all other trades all parties concerned have been bound together by the usual commercial ties of mutual interest, in this one trade, in this one province, the indigo manufacture has always been a remarkable exception to this natural

* A. I. Admst., pp. 443-458.

† *Ibid.*, p. 459.

and healthy state of things. It would be doing injustice, both to the present race of planters and to the administration of later years, not to admit, at the outset of any discussion of the case between the indigo manufacturer and the producer of the raw plant, who are now at issue, that there has been in later years a gradual, but what is now a marked and great diminution of the gravest and most striking cases of abuse and oppression, as well as of the most serious sorts of affray, connected with this business. But, substantially, the system at the beginning of the present year was as false as ever it had been.

"In the year 1810, the licenses granted to four planters to reside in the interior of the country were withdrawn, on account of the severe ill-usage of the natives proved against them: and the Governor-General-in-Council found it necessary to issue a circular in that year, of date the 13th of July, from which the following is an extract:—

'The attention of Government has recently been attracted in a particular manner, to abuses and oppressions committed by Europeans, who are established as indigo planters in different parts of the country.......'

"I have said that grave crimes connected with indigo have much decreased in frequency; but it can not be said that the character of the abuses to which the system of Bengal indigo manufacture is subject is essentially altered now from what it was 50 years ago; seeing that the published records of Government show examples that have occurred within the last 18 months of each one of the four heads under which the offences connected with indigo, as prevalent in 1810, are classified in the above-cited Resolution.

"When he (raiyat) stood in the midst of rival manufacturers, many of them at feud with each other, he had some refuge from oppression or vexation under any one; and there was some check upon planters in their relation with raiyats, which has now ceased to exist. It is only this system of local indigo *seignories* that made it possible for the planters to commit the fatal error of insisting upon indigo plant at the old price, in the last few years, when the prices of agricultural produce have doubled, or nearly doubled.

"When the raiyat has a zamindar, who is not an indigo manufacturer, he has some protector in indigo matters. When the same man is indigo manufacturer and zamindar, or zamindar's representative, the raiyat has no such protection.

"Thus we see that 50 years ago, as now, there was a demand by the indigo manufacturer for a special law in his own favour, to punish criminally a breach of contract by one party, and only by one party, in a commercial bargain, that then, as now, the demand was pronounced to be one which it is impossible in justice or policy to grant.

"The Commission talked of more than a quarter of a century ago has now sat. It has laid bare the radical unsoundness of the system; and has shewn incontestably that the break-up of such a system was a mere question of time, which might have occurred at any moment, from the slightest of causes.

"On the actual question of fact as to the dislike of raiyats to indigo cultivation on the old system, the Report of this Commission is conclusive as to the intensity of the feeling. Indeed the Report, which in the mildness of its tone is admirable, can give but a faint impression of the intensity of the feeling on the raiyat's part, compared to that which a reader will derive from a perusal of the appended evidence of the raiyats themselves, and of the missionaries who, living in unconstrained private intercourse with the raiyats around them, know the feelings of the whole class of raiyats better than any other Europeans do.

"This is the great point of political bearing in the whole question, and it can not be too attentively considered by all who have any responsibility for the tranquility of the country, and the strength of the British Government within it. If any one thinks that such a demonstration of strong feeling, by hundreds of thousands of people as we have just witnessed in Bengal has so meaning of

greater importance than an ordinary commercial question concerning a particular blue dye, such a person, in my opinion, is fatally mistaken in the signs of the time.

"On the whole, my conclusion on this point is, that setting aside individual cases having no connection, or at least no necessary connection, with the indigo system, that system is fairly chargeable with a very notable portion of those classes of offence, the peculiar prevalence of which in Bengal has been from the first a blot on our Administration. In my opinion it is rather the system than the planters individually who are to be blamed. It is to the unprofitableness of the cultivation of indigo, at the extremely inadequate price given for it under the system, necesstiating either a forced cultivation, or the abandonment of the manufacture from Bengal raiyati plant, that this and every other evil connected with indigo is attributable. An individual manufacturer, could not live upon a fair and free system, surrounded on all sides by competitors who get their raw produce without paying nearly its full value. That a whole class did not spontaneously reform itself from within is not surprising. The chief fault was in the defective, and, I fear I must say, the not impartial, administration of the law, which allowed such a vicious state of things to exist, where our fellow countrymen were concerned ; a state which very certainly would have been put down with a high hand if only native gentlemen had been concerned."*

THE "NIL DARPAN" CASE

The sequel to the indigo troubles is what is known as the *Nil Darpan* Case. It was a drama written, as is well-known, by Babu Dinabandhu Mitra. In 1861, its English translation, made under the supervision of the Rev. J. Long, was circulated from the office of the Secretary of the Government of Bengal, with the sanction of Mr. W. S. Seton-Karr, the Secretary. In the introduction to the play it was pointed out that it was "the annals of the poor" and it "pleads the cause of those who are the feeble ; it describes a respectable raiyat, a peasant proprietor happy with his family in the enjoyment of his land till the indigo system compelled him to take advances, to neglect his own land, to cultivate crops which beggared him, reducing him to the condition of a serf and a vagabond : the effects of this on his home, children and relatives are pointed out in language, plain but true ; it shows how arbitrary power debases the lord as well as the peasant ; reference is also made to the partiality of various Magistrates in favour of planters and to the Act of the last year penally enforcing indigo contracts."

The publication of the English translation caused great excitement among the planters. The Land-holders' and Commercial Association through their Secretary, Mr. W. F. Fergusson, addressed the Government on the subject and brought action in the Courts. Mr. Manuel, the printer, was fined and Revd. Mr. Long was fined and imprisoned for a month. His fine was instantly paid by Babu Kali Prasanna Singha.

The whole question was discussed by Sir J. P. Grant in his Minute of the 19th June, 1861. He wrote:

"The words charged as libellous, I understand, are not in the play, but in a preface by the author prefixed to the play.

"The issue of the pamphlet in question in any manner was not by my order, or with my knowledge, and I never saw it, or knew a word that was in it, until it had been circulated in the manner described by Mr. Fergusson.

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* *Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors*, p. 254.

"The issue was made through a very unfortunate error of the late Secretary : Mr. Seton-Karr, several months ago, mentioned to me that he had been informed that a curious Bengali play had been written, the subject of which was indigo,—a genuine native production,—a translation of which might be made by a private hand, and some copies printed off at a trifling cost. I wished to see the work, partly as a curiosity, and partly because I thought it likely that it would show what the real popular feeling was on the subject better than anything else . . .

"I do not believe I ever heard a word more about the matter till a copy of the printed publication was sent to me at Parasnath without any accompanying letter. . . .

"On my first interview with the Secretary . . . I found that he had been under some impression that the translating was to be a Government act paid for by Government, which impression I immediately corrected. I found also that the pamphlet had been circulated, and circulated under official frank, which was past remedy.

"The occurrence is extremely unfortunate, and has distressed me beyond measure. It has excited irritation, when it was an object to allay irritation. But before I was made aware of it, the mischief was done."

Mr. Seton-Karr offered an explanation to the public in a letter to the *Englishman*, and in another letter of 29th July, 1861, to the Government of Bengal, admitted the responsibility of giving sanction to the circulation of the translation. He wrote:

"Nor can I refuse to admit that this course may seem to place the Government of Bengal in the position of having acted apparently without due consideration for the Government of India, and that His Excellency the Governor-General in Council may find in this grounds for grave complaint. This is a subject of deep regret to me, but I cannot do otherwise than take the blame of this proceeding, and of its consequences, entirely on myself. . . .

"I must urge that the duty of bringing such publications as the *Nil Darpan* or any other such publication to the notice of Government is one which it behoves every officer not to neglect, and that in the situation of Secretary I should not have been justified in disregarding the work. My error lay in not examining it more carefully before issue; and in issuing it, in the manner I did, without the knowledge of the Lieutenant-Governor."

Lord Canning in his Resolution of the 8th August, 1861, condemned the step taken by Mr. Seton-Karr in circulating the translation. He wrote :

"The proceeding, however, was not only unauthorised by, but unknown to His Honour, and remains the act of the Secretary, and one for which Mr. Seton-Karr admits that he, and he alone, is responsible.

"Mr. Seton-Karr now expresses his regret that the Government of Bengal should, by his unauthorised circulation of the pamphlet, have been placed in the position of having acted apparently without due consideration for the Government of India ; but no explanation or apology is offered by him for having ommitted to impart to the latter Government information which he regarded as of paramount importance to it, and the preparation of which in an English form had been justified by him, and very properly justified, on that ground. He is, therefore, chargeable, not only with an unwarrantable assumption and indiscreet exercise of an authority which did not belong to him, but with a neglect of duty which it is difficult to reconcile with the motives that led him to such an assumption.

"The Governor-General in Council could have wished that the errors had been noticed by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor with the gravity which they deserve, as very serious infractions of the Secretary's duty. His Excellency in Council is fully sensible that to have caused, even by inadvertence, a great public scandal ; to have thereby embittered the strife of parties and classes ; to have wounded, however unintentionally, the feellings of many of his fellow-countrymen ; and to have involved others in criminal prosecution and punishment, are of themselves penalties

as severe as can well be suffered by a zealous and high-minded public servant who has at heart the honour of that Govetnment, which for many years he has served with the highest credit, and which has lately placed him in the foremost rank of its public functionaries."

Lord Canning was not satisfied with this. He imposed the following penalty upon Mr. Seton-Karr. He wrote :

"And in this view it is decidedly the opinion of the Governor-General in Council that, when Mr. Seton-Karr shall no longer have to discharge the duties of his present position in the Legislative Council, he should not be allowed to return to the office of the Secretary to the Government of Bengal."*

The "great public scandal," as Lord Canning called it, came to an end, when, on the 12th August, 1861, Mr. Seton-Karr submitted an apology to the Government of India for failing to impart to that Government such information as he thought of paramount importance to it. Lord Canning accepted the apology willingly.

* *Ibid.*, p. 205.

CHAPTER III

LORD ELGIN I

1862-1863.

Lord Elgin succeeded Lord Canning as the Viceroy of India. Lord Elgin used to say, "I succeeded to a great man and a great war, with a humble task to be humbly discharged." He was the first Viceroy directly appointed by the Crown.

Lord Elgin was the class-fellow of his predecessors, Lord Canning and Lord Dalhousie. In one of his Indian speeches in speaking of his two predecessors, he said :

"Both of these distinguished men were *my contemporaries*, both, I believe, I may without presumption say, *my intimate friends*. It is a singular coincidence that three saccessive Governors-General of India should have stood towards each other in this relationship of age and intimacy. One consequence is, that the burden of governing India has devolved upon us respectively at different periods of lives. Lord Dalhousie, when named to the Government of India, was, I believe, the youngest man who had ever been appointed to a situation of such high responsibility and trust ; Lord Canning was in the prime life, and, I, if I am not already on the decline, am at least nearer to the verge of it than either of my contemporaries who have preceded me."*

Though the army had been reorganised, yet there was a huge army—consisting of the Indian and European forces. Lord Elgin sometimes felt what was the use of a large Indian army ? On this point he says :

"When I ask why so considerable a native army is required, I am told that the native must bear a certain proportion to the European Force ; that Europeans *cannot undertake cantonment duties*, or, speaking generally, any of the duties which the military may from time to time be called to render in support of the civil power, during peace ; that in war again they are admirable on the battlefield, but that they cannot turn their victories to account by following up a discomfited foe unless they have the aid of native troops, nor perform many other services which are not less indispensable than great battles to success against an enemy who knows the ground and is inured to the climate."†

He then raises the question : Rebellion has been crushed, why then maintain a large European army ? He says:

The answer which I invariably receive is this : "You cannot tell what will happen in India. Heretofore you *have held the Sikhs in subjection by the aid of the Sepoys, and the Sepoys by means of the Sikhs*. But see what is happening now. The Sikh soldiers are quartered all over India. They are fraternising with the natives of the South, adopting their customs and even their faith. Half the soldiers in a regiment lately stationed at Benares were converted to Hindooism before they left the holy place. Bewar e, or you will shortly have to cope in India with a hostile combination more formidable than any of those which you have encountered before."

Lord Elgin thus lays down his military policy. He says :

"I am aware that for many reasons we must now entertain, and probably shall long find it

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* Letters and Journals of James, Eighth Earl of Elgin, p. 430.

† *Ibid.*, p. 409

necessary to entertain, a large army, native and European, in India. Practically, what we have to do is to endeavour, by a judicious system of recruiting, organisation and distribution, to render our army as serviceable and as little a source of peril as may be. But I do think that they go far to prove that, notwithstanding our vast physical superiority to anything which can be brought against us, *we should find it a difficult task to maintain our authority in India by the sword alone* ; and that they justify a very jealous scrutiny of all schemes of expenditure for military objects which render necessary the imposition or maintenance of taxes which occasion general discontent, or deprive the Government of the funds requisite for carrying on works of improvement that have the double advantage of stimulating the growth of wealth in the country, and increasing the efficiency of the means of self-defence which we possess."*

THE MURDER OF A "NATIVE"

Readers of newspapers sometimes come across cases of murder of Indians by Europeans, who are let off with little punishment. In 1862 took place such an event and it came to the notice of Lord Elgin, who writes about it on June 22, 1862:

"I have had, this week, a very painful matter to deal with. A man of the name of Budd, a soldier who had obtained his discharge in order to accompany an officer of the name of ---- to Australia, killed a native in the Punjab some months ago under the following circumstances. He was desired by ---to procure a sheep for him. He went to a native, from whom he appears to have procured sheep before, and took one. The native protested against his taking this particular sheep, because it was with lamb, but said he might take any other from the flock. Budd paid no heed to this remonstrance, put the sheep on the back of another native and marched off. The owner followed, complaining and protesting. On this Budd first fired two barrels over his head, then threw stones at him and finally went into the house, brought out another gun, fired at him, and killed him on the spot. Besides imploring that this sheep might be restored to him it does not appear that the native did anything at all to provoke this proceeding."

As "the perpetrator of this outrage" was a European, the case could not be tried on the spot and had to be transferred to Calcutta at a distance of 1,000 miles at the public expense.

Lord Elgin continues the story thus:

"The trial came on a few days ago and the jury, much to their honour, found the prisoner guilty. On this an agitation was got up to obtain a commutation of the sentence of death, which had been passed by the judge. A petition, with a great number of signatures, was presented in the first instance to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal; but he was advised that the crime having been committed in the Punjab he had nothing to do with the case. It was then transmitted to me There was quite enough doubt as to my power of acting to have justified me in referring the case to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. But I felt that the delay, and, above all, the appearance of a desire to shrink from the responsibility of passing a decision on the case, which this step would involve would be so mischievous, that having obtained from the Advocate-General an opinion that I had the requisite authority, I determined to take the matter into my own hands. The verdict was clearly borne out by the evidence. The sentence was in accordance with the law and the Judge, to whom I referred, saw no reason to question it. The decision of the Governor-General in Council was, that the law must take its course."

Thus Lord Elgin had the courage to allow the law to take its own course and punish the offender accordingly.

Ibid., p. 410.

Lord Elgin concludes this letter thus:

"It is true that this murder was not committed with previous preparation and deliberation. It had not, therefore, the special quality of aggravation. But it was marked by an aggravation of its own, not less culpable, and unfortunately only too frequently characteristic of the homicides perpetrated by Europeans on natives in this country. It was committed in wanton recklessness, almost without provocation, under an impulse which would have been resisted if the life of the victim had been estimated at the value of that of a dog. Any action on my part which would have seemed to sanction this estimate of the value of native life, would have been attended by the most pernicious consequences.

"It is bad enough as it is. The other day a station master, somewhere up-country, kicked a native who was, as he says, milking a goat belonging to the former. The native fell dead, and the local paper, without a word of commiseration for the family of his victim, complains of the hardship of compelling the station master to go to Calcutta in this warm weather, to have the case inquired into. Other instances in which the natives have died from the effect of personal chastisement administered by Europeans have occurred since I have been here.

"I have gone at some length in this case, both because you may hear of it, and also because it exemplifies what is really our greatest source of embarrassment in this country--the extreme difficulty of administering equal justice between natives and Europeans."*

In India, as pointed out above by Lord Elgin, "the extreme difficulty of administering equal justice between natives and Europeans" is really the "greatest source of embarrassment" to many European bureaucrats. Lord Elgin had courage enough to hold the balance in this case and punished the offender according to the law. The observation of Lord Elgin would be read with profit by those high priests of justice who would have to deal with similar cases in the future.

HIS AFGHAN POLICY

Lord Elgin accepted a policy of non-interference in the case of Afganistan. In a letter to Sir Charles Wood, he says:

"I am very much averse to any interference on our part in the quarrel which is now on foot in Afghanistan; and indeed, I do not very well see my way as to how any such interference can be managed without entailing responsibilities which we may regret at a later period. You are doubtless aware that we have no agent with the Dost. He particularly requested that no one should be sent to his Court in that capacity, and we assented to his views on this point. All we know of what is going on there is derived from the reports of a native vakeel, who reports more or less faithfully what he hears and sees, but who is not, and I apprehend, could not be employed to speak on our behalf to the Ameer. In order, therefore, to communicate with him, we must either send a special agent or write."†

He concludes his letter thus:

"I own that I am strongly of opinion that our true policy is to leave these kinds of neighbours as much as possible alone; to mix ourselves up as little as may be in their miserable intrigues, which generally entail obligations which bind us and not them, and not unfrequently lead to most unexpected issues. We should only speak when we have *a case of self-interest* so clear that we can speak with determination, and follow up our talk, if necessary, with a blow."§

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 416-417.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 417-418.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 418.

POLICY TOWARDS INDIANS

Lord Elgin made a frank statement in the following passage as to the British policy towards the people of India. In a letter to Sir Charles Wood he wrote:

"Situated as we are in this country—a small minority ruling a vast population that differs from us in blood, civilisation, colour and religion, *monopolising* in our own territories *all positions of high dignity and emoluments,* and exercising even over States ostensibly independent a paramount authority—it is manifest that the qnestion of how we ought to treat that class of natives who consider that they have a natural right to be leaders of men and to occupy the first places in India, must always be one of special difficulty. If you attempt to crush all superiorities, you unite populations in a homogeneous mass against you.* If you foster pride of rank and position, you encourage pretensions which you cannot gratify, partly because *you dare not abdicate your own functions as a paramount power* and partly because you cannot control the arrogance of your subjects of the dominant race. Scindia and Holkar are faithful to us just in proportion as they are weak, and conscious that they require our aid to support them against their own subjects or neighbours; and among the bitterest of our foes during the Mutiny were natives who had been courted in England."*

Lord Elgin truly observed that the British in India "monopolise all positions of high dignity and emolument" leaving only the humblest posts to Indians. The British cannot attempt to crush the Indians, because that would "unite populations in a homogeneous mass" against the British Indian Government. They also "dare not abdicate their own functions as the paramount power" in India. They, therefore, keep the positions of high dignity to themselves as much as they can, giving only a few to those who serve them best. They use those high posts as baits to attract Indians of influence to their own side.

RAILWAYS AND LORD ELGIN

In speaking of Railways, Lord Elgin maintained that he was not in favour of a system of Government guarantees, though his class-fellow, the Marquis of Dalhousie, "had nursed the East Indian Railway and guided it through its first difficulties." On 7th February, 1863, at a Railway dinner given in celebration of the opening of the Railway from Jamalpore to Benares, he spoke about the future of Indian railways. He also expressed his opinion against the system of Government guarantees to the Railways. He said:

"But, Gentlemen, however! interesting it may be to refer to the past and to dwell upon the present, the most important questions which we have to answer relate to the future, and the most important of all in my opinion is this—to what agency are we henceforward to look if we would desire to extend as widely as possible, to all parts of India, the benefit of this potent instrument of modern civilisation ? I have no hesitation in affirming at once, in answer to this question, that *we must not look to an indefinite extension of a system of Government guarantees* for the accomplishment of this object. In the first place, it would be *wholly unjustifiable* for any one object, however important, *to place such a strain upon our finances as this Policy would involve.* In the second place, however justifiable and necessary a system of Government guarantees may be in certain circumstances, *it is essentially an expensive one,* because by securing to share-holders a minimum rate of interest on their capital it weakens in them the motives to economy, and because

* *Ibid.*, p. 142.

by dividing the responsibility for expenditure between Government and Railway officials, it diminishes in the latter the sense of responsibility. Moreover, the indefinite extension of a system of Government guarantees is wholly incompatible with the endeavour to bring private enterprise largely into play for the execution of these works; while there is an unlimited call for capital for works enjoying the protection of Government guarantees, it is not to be expected that capital will be forthcoming to any extent for similar works which have not that protection. For the accomplishment, therefore, of the great object to which I am referring, we must henceforward, I apprehend, *look to private enterprise*; not perhaps to private enterprise wholly unaided by the State, but at any rate *to private enterprise not protected by Government guarantees.*'"*

Thus he spoke against the system of Government guarantees as favoured by his predecessors, Lord Dalhousie and Lord Canning. About the future of Railways in India, he says:

"But if so, what are the conditions which will entitle railway enterprises of this class to the countenance and encouragement of the Government ? I lay it down as a fundamental principle, that we ought to look to the eventual establishment of one uniform railway gauge for the whole of India. The experience of England is conclusive as to the inconvenience of a double or conflicting railway gauge. After the expenditure of an untold amount of money in Parliamentary conflicts, the broad gauge of England has been compelled to take the narrow gauge on its back, and the whole capital expended upon the former may be said to have been thrown away. But what does this resolution in favour of an uniform gauge imply ? It will, I think, be admitted that the main object of an uniform railway gauge is to enable the several railway lines to exchange their plant in order to avoid transhipment of freight. But if the plant of the subsidiary line is to be transported along the main lines, it must be sufficiently well finished to be fitted to travel in safety at high speed; and if the plant of the main lines is to travel along the subsidiary lines, the latter must have rails sufficiently heavy, and works of construction sufficiently substantial, to support it. Moreover, where streams or rivers are encountered they must be bridged. In short, the subsidiary lines must be built in a manner which would make them nearly as expensive as the main lines; in other words, railways must not be introduced into any part of India where we cannot afford to spend from £ 10,000 to £ 15,000 a mile upon them. I am not prepared to accept this conclusion.... There are many districts where railways costing £ 3,000 or £ 4,000 a mile might be introduced with advantage, although they would not justify an expenditure of from £ 10,000 to £ 15,000 a mile."†

In another place, he stated :

"We must look for the further development of our railway system to *bona fide* private enterprise, aided, perhaps, where circumstances require it, by Government, but not to the extension of Government guarantees."§

TRANSFER OF CAPITAL

Lord Canning wanted to transfer the capital of the Government of India from Calcutta to some other city, centrally situated like Allahabad. But his proposal had not been given effect to. Lord Elgin was not in favour of the 'entire abandonment of Calcutta.' He wrote:

"As to the seat of Government question, I am strongly of opinion that the proper thing to do at present is to give practical effect to the provision in the Indian Councils Act, which authorises the

* *Ibid.*, pp. 431-432.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 432-433.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 448.

Governor-General to call his Council together in other parts of India besides Calcutta. This would give to the Supreme Government a more catholic character than it now possesses, and perhaps in some degree diminish the jealousy of Calcutta influence which obtains so extensively.

"I do not see my way towards recommending the entire abandonment of Calcutta. It is an important place, and has certain traditional claims which it is not quite easy to set aside. Moreover, although the Calcutta community may have its faults and wayward tendencies, it is an influential element in our body corporate and politic, and a Government which knows its duty may effect a great deal of good, and derive no little benefit, by coming into contact with it. For the present, therefore, I think that Calcutta should continue to be the head-quarters of the Government ; but that we should meet from time to time at other places for legislative purpose, so as to qualify Calcutta local associations with other local associations." *

About this removal of the capital, Mr. Thurlow in his book, *The Company and the Crown,* makes the following observation :

"Such was the immediate removal of the seat of Government to some unknown region situate in Central India watered by some as yet unnavigable river, on whose banks, according to Lord Canning, all grew that white men want, and beneath whose soil both coal and marble should abound to an extent unknown. His arguments and eloquence were such that the Council, fully acquainted with the evils of Calcutta, remained dumb-founded, all save its President, Lord Elgin, who, at all times eager to arrive at knowledge, naturally solicited more accurate details before consenting to transplant to a mythical land the whole machinery of Government. Such an exodus for a site but vaguely dreamt of could only have embarrassed all and most of all Sir Charles Trevelyan. the very existence of whose department was dependent on Bengal." †

NOMINATIONS TO THE COUNCIL

Lord Elgin was the class-fellow of Lord Canning. So like his worthy predecessor, Lord Elgin followed the practice of giving rewards to his favourites in the shape of nomination to the Council. In those days very few Indians could get a seat in the Viceroy's Legislative Council, and those who were nominated to the Council were in the good books of the Government. Lord Elgin also tried to use this nomination as a bait to many influential Indians. Thus he nominated the Rampore Nawab as a member of his Council. About this Nawab, Mr. Thurlow says:

"The Rampore Nawab owed his elevation to other and far different causes. Mahomedans are proverbially fond of learning -he was everything that is most Mahomedan without bigotry, and perfect as a representative of his creed. Possessed of a singularly fertile country, his hereditary policy had taught him to dread the incursions of his jealous native neighbours, whilst the English he regarded as his natural protectors. More than once, when danger threatened, he has cast in his lot with ours, and never have we had occasion to regret the confidence we placed in him."§

So, the nomination of the Rampore Nawab by Lord Elgin to the Legislative Council may be regarded as due to his loyalty to the British Government—his "natural protectors."

Another case in which Lord Elgin used his right to nomination—not to the Legislative

* *Ibid.*, pp. 448-449.

† *The Company and the Crown* : By the Hon'ble T. J. Hovell-Thurlow, Allahabad Reprint, pp. 16-17.

§ *The Company and the Crown*, p. 46.

Council this time, but to the Senate of the Calcutta University—was that of Abdul Latif Khan. We read about him:

"Moulvie Abdul Latif Khan Bahadoor, a Mahomedan, as his name denotes, had won distinction as a classic jurist and *supporter of British institutions* in Bengal, and Lord Elgin had availed himself of an early opportunity to appoint him to the Senate of the Calcutta University in the Faculty of Law."*

Thus Abdul Latif Khan got his nomination for the seat in the Senate of the Calcutta University from Lord Elgin, because he was a "supporter of British institutions in Bengal."

WAHABEE OUTBREAK

The last years of Lord Elgin's rule witnessed the outbreak of certain Wahabee fanatics of the frontier district in the Upper Valley of the Indus. Though Lord Elgin was a class-fellow of Lord Dalhousie,. yet he was not in the beginning willing to begin warlike operations against them. Even in the preceding year, he had prevented a Sitana expedition. At last he decided to attack the fanatics. He writes to Sir Charles Wood:

"The overt acts charged consist in the return of the fanatics to Sitana, whence they were driven out by us some years ago ; and the frontier tribes in question are held to be guilty because they have allowed them to return to this place, although bound by treaty with us to refuse to admit them. On a review of all the circumstances, and looking to the well-known character and designs of the Sitana fanatics, I came to the conclusion that the interests both of prudence and humanity would be best consulted by levelling a speedy and decisive blow at this embryo conspiracy.' †

In India, as Lord Elgin says, the "rising officials are instinctively in favour of a good row," and those rising officers wanted to postpone the expedition until the spring, but the Viceroy would not brook delay and like his friend Lord Canning proceeded at once to the business. He thus wrote:

"I wish by a sudden and vigorous blow to check this trouble on our frontier while it is in a nascent condition. The other plan would give it several months to foster and to extend itself ; and if there be among the Mohammadan populations in these regions the disposition to combine against us which is alleged, and which is indeed the justification of the measure proposed, how far might not the roots of the conspiracy stretch themselves at that time ? The Afghans in their distracted state might furnish sympathisers, we should be invited to interfere in their internal affairs, in order to oppose among them those who were abetting our Mohammadan adversaries ; in short, there is no end to the complications in which this postponement of active operations might involve us. Everything is more or less uncertain in such affairs ; but in the absence of any very palpable blunder, what we actually propose to do would appear to be a prettry safe proceeding. The main purpose is to expel the fanatics from Judoon ; and it is hardly possible that we should fail in this, as they are within easy reach of us there. The further object of punishing other tribes, and destroying the refuge of fanatics at Mulka—may be abandoned, if it be deemed advisable, without any loss of prestige, though of course with some abatement of the completeness of the movement. I, therefore, thought it necessary to adhere to my original resolution."§

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* *Ibid.*, p. 50.

† Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin, pp. 453-54.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 454.

THE GRAND DURBAR AT AGRA

While on tour through Northern India, Lord Elgin held the grand Durbar at Agra on the morning of the 17th of February. It is said that it was a grander gathering than even the great one held by Lord Canning in 1859. Lord Elgin observes:

"The vast concourse of chiefs and retainers,' combining so many of the attributes of feudal and chivalrous times with the picturesqueness in attire and gorgeousness in colouring which only the East can supply, produced an effect of fairyland, of which it was difficult to divest oneself in order to come down to the sterner realities of the present. These realities consisted mainly in receiving the chiefs at private and public Durbars exchanging presents and civilities with them, and returning their visits. The great Durbar was attended by a larger number of chiefs than ever before assembled on a similar occasion."

This grand Durbar—'this display of jewels, gold and glitter, gorgeous dresses and splendid uniform'—must have cost the poor tax-payers of India a great deal. What was the object of this display of magnificence and splendour? To convey to the princes and chiefs of India, in the words of Lord Elgin, 'the assurance of deep interest which Her Majesty takes in the welfare of the chiefs of India.'

Lord Elgin also took pride in reminding the chiefs and the princes of India that domestic treason had been crushed and foreign enemies had been taught to respect the power of the arms of England.

Like a Dalhousie or a Canning, he told the princes assembled:

"As representing the paramount power it is my duty to keep the peace in India. For this purpose Her Majesty the Queen has placed at my disposal a large and gallant army; which, if the necessity should arise, I shall not hesitate to employ for the repression of disorder and the punishment of any who may be rash enough to disturb the general tranquillity."*

Thus Lord Elgin wanted to rule India with the help of a large and a gallant army, caring perhaps not much for the goodwill of the governed.

THE DEATH OF LORD ELGIN

Of the Indian Viceroys, it was Lord Elgin who died in harness in India. Another Viceroy, Lord Mayo, was assassinated in the Andaman Islands. The story of the death of Lord Elgin has been narrated by Arthur Stanley, Dean of Westminster, in the *North British Review*, from which we quote the following:

"Although he had suffered often from the unhealthy and depressing climate of Calcutta during the summer and autumn of 1862, and thus, to the eyes that saw him again in 1863, he looked many years older than when he left England, yet it was not, till he entered the Hills, that any symptom manifested itself of the fatal malady that was working under his apparently stout frame and strong constitution. The splendid scenery of those vast forests and snow-clad mountains inspired him with the liveliest pleasure; but the highly rarefied atmosphere, which to most residents in India is as life from death, seemed in him to have the exactly reverse effect.

"It was on the 12th of October that he ascended the Rotung Pass, and on the 13th he crossed the famous Twig Bridge over the river Chandra . . . Lord Elgin was completely prostrated by the effort, and it may be said that from the exhaustion consequent on this adventure he never rallied. . . . There he was joined, on the 4th of November, by his friend and medical adviser, Dr. Macrae,

* *Ibid.*, p. 438.

who had been summoned from Calcutta, on the first alarming indications of his illness . . . On the 6th of November, Dr. Macrae came to the conclusion that the illness was mortal. This intelligence, which he communicated at once to Lord Elgin, was received with a calmness and fortitude which never deserted him through all the scenes which followed. It was impossible not to be struck by the courage and presence of mind with which, in the presence of a death unusually terrible, and accompanied by circumstances unusually trying, he showed, in equal degrees and with the most unvarying constancy, two of the grandest elements of human character – unselfish resignation of himself to the will of God, and thoughtful consideration, down to the smallest particulars, for the interests and feelings of others, both public and private.

"When once he had satisfied himself, by minute inquiries from Dr. Macrae, of the true state of the case, after one deep earnest, heart-felt regret that he should thus suddenly be parted from those nearest and dearest, to whom his life was of such inestimable importance, and that he should be removed just as he had prepared himself to benefit the people committed to his charge, he steadily set his face heavenward. He was startled, he was awed; he felt it "hard, hard, to believe that his life was condemned;" but there was no looking backward. Of the officers of his staff he took an affectionate leave on that day. "It is well," he said to one of them, "that I should die in harness" And thenceforth he saw no one habitually except Dr. Macrae, who combined with his medical skill the tenderness and devotion at once of a friend, who had rendered him the most faithful services, not only through the period of his Indian Viceroyalty, but during his last mission to China; and her who had shared his every thought, and whose courageous spirit now rose above the weakness of the fragile frame equal to the greatness of the calamity, and worthy of him, to whom, by night and day, she constantly ministered.

"On the following day, the clergyman whom he had ordered to be summoned, and for whose arrival he waited with much anxiety, reached Dhurmsala, and administered the Holy Communion to himself and those with him. 'We are now entering on a New Communion' he had said that morning, 'the Living and the Dead' and his spirit then appeared to master pain and weakness, and to sustain him in a holy calm during the ceremony, and for a few hours afterwards. 'It is a comfort,', he wishpered, 'to have laid aside all the cares of this world, and put myself in the hands of God,' and he was able to listen at intervals to favourite passages from the New Testament. That evening closed in with an aggravation of suffering. It was the evening of the anniversary of his wedding day.

"On the following morning, Lady Elgin, with his approval, rode up to the cemetery at Dhurmsala to select a spot for his grave, and he gently expressed pleasure when told of the quiet and beautiful aspect of the spot chosen, with the glorious views of the snowy range towering above, and the wide prospect of hill and plain below.

"...Every care had been taken for the public interests, and for the interests of those still nearer and dearer to him. He had laid the most solemn charge on his faithful Secretary to conduct Lady Elgin home on her mournful and solitary voyage. He had given to Dr. Macrae, with the tenderest mark of affection, a turquoise ring: 'we have had a long struggle together; keep this memory of it.' He had dictated a telegram to the Queen resigning his office, with a request that his successor might be immediately appointed.

"With this exception, public affairs seem to have faded from his mind. 'I must resign myself to doing no work. I have not sufficient control over my thought. I have washed my hands of it all.' But it was remarkable that, as the end drew nearer, the keen sense of public duty once more flashed up within him. It was on the 19th that he could not help expressing his wonder what was meant by his long lingering, and once, half wondering he whispered, 'If I did not die, I might get to Lahore and carry out the original programme.' Later on in the day he sent for Mr. Thurlow, and desired that a message should be sent, through Sir Charles Wood, expressive of his love and devotion to the Queen, and of his determination to do his work to the last possible moment. His voice, faint and inaudible at first, gained strength with the earnestness of the words which came forth as

if direct from his heart, and which, as soon as pronounced, left him prostrate with the exertion. He begged, at the same time, that his 'best blessing' might be sent to the Secretaries of the Indian Government, and also a private message to Sir Charles Wood in England.

"These were his last public acts. A few words and looks of intense affection for his wife and child were all that escaped him afterwards. One more night of agonised restlessness, followed by an almost sudden close of the long struggle, and a few moments of perfect calm, and his spirit was released.

"His death was on the 20th of November, and on the 21st he was privately buried. at his own request, on the spot selected beforehand."*

SERVICES OF LORD ELGIN

About the services rendered by Loid Elgin, Dr. A. Stanley says :

"On Lord Elgin's death it was thought that a career intimately connected with so many critical points in the history of the British Empire, and containing in itself so much of intrinsic interest, ought not to be left without an enduring memorial. The need of this was the more felt because Lord Elgin was prevented, by the peculiar circumstances of his public course, from enjoying the familiar recognition to which he would else have been entitled amongst his contemporaries in England. For (if I may use the words which I have employed on a former occasion) it is one of the sad cosequences of a statesman's life spent like his in the constant service of his country on arduous foreign missions, that in his own land, in his own circle, almost in his own home, his place is occupied by others, his very face is forgotten ; he can maintain no permanent ties with those who rule the opinion, or obtain the mastery, of the day ; he has identified himself with no existing party ; he has made himself felt in none of those domestic and personal struggles which attract the attention and fix the interest of the many who contribute in laige measure to form the public opinion of the time. For twenty years the few intervals of Lord Elgin's residence in these islands were to be counted not by years, but by months ; and the majority of those who might be reckoned amongst his friends and acquaintances, remembered him chiefly as the eager accomplished Oxford student at Christ Church or at Merton."†

* *Ibid.*, pp. 458-464.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 458-464.

CHAPTER IV

LORD LAWRENCE—THE FIRST CIVILIAN VICEROY

1864-1869.

At the unexpected death of Lord Elgin, Sir William Denison, the senior Governor in India, "in virtue of the Indian Councils Act" became the Viceroy. His short term of office was "mainly remarkable for studied inaction: and if we except a cricket match, to fight which a Madras eleven was ordered up post haste, no measure of importance marks this period."*

He was succeeded by Lord (then Sire John) Lawrence, who was the first Civilian raised to the highest "imperial appointment." No one else of the "Heaven-born Service" has been the recipient of such high honour. Mr. Hovell-Thurlow remarks:

"The first Civilian Viceroy inherited his office by an accident, and whether the experiment will merit repetition must depend entirely on the measure of its success."*

The subsequent history showed that Lord Lawrence proved a failure and hence no more experiment was made of appointing men of the "Heaven-born Service" as Viceroy again.

His appointment was not welcomed by all classes of the people. We read:

"Some complained of the new Viceroy as a commoner, others as a Civilian, others as a Punjabi, others as a proselytiser and a Puritan, others again as a Dalhousie, etc., who would be likely to reverse Lord Canning's policy and return to the era of annexations."†

One of the first acts of this Civilian Viceroy was to put a restriction on the contact between the Europeans and Indians. Thus writes the Hon'ble Mr. T. J. Hovell-Thurlow in *The Company and the Crown*:

...and, strange to say, it remained for one of Indian antecedent and of known philanthropy, of cast-iron faith in native virtue and deepest sympathy with missionary enterprise—in a word to Sir John Lawrence—to trace a line and say, "Thus far shall the native come in contact with ourselves, and no farther."§

Mr. Hovell-Thurlow thus comments on the above action of the Civilian Viceroy:

The step thus taken by Sir John Lawrence at the outset of his viceroyalty, whether right or wrong, was retrograde, and as such affords cause for great regret. It was a blow struck at the native social character, in such a manner as to go home to those most intimate with Europeans, and most partial to the aspect of a white man's court. And in every eye it assumed the more significance as coming from a friendly quarter, from one whom natives deemed allied to them by every instinct engendered by the daily commerce of more than thirty years. Though the pride of the dominant race might be flattered by watching the shadows as they formed on the down-cast heads of the high-born natives, excluded from their presence, and turned away from Government House,

* *The Company and the Crown*, by T. J. Hovell-Thurlow, p. 8.

† *Life of Lord Lawrence*, by Bosworth Smith, p. 472.

§ P. 9.

somewhat roughly perchance, by a white policeman, who took coarse pleasure in his ungrateful task; yet the reflecting element could but regard with sorrow as an evil omen society thus officially divided, and recast according to its primitive colours, by the fiat of a former servant of the Company."*

Sir John Lawrence was regarded with envy by many members of the "Heaven-born Service", because they thought that he had superseded them. So he could not always get that support and co-operation of the members of the "Steel-Frame Service." Mr. Bosworth Smith thus writes:

"The disadvantages under which a Viceroy labours who has risen from the ranks of the Civil Service are obvious enough... Even if he is supported loyally—as Sir John Lawrence was, and always acknowledged that he had been, by the great bulk of the Civil Service—it is likely that he will be regarded with envy or with jealousy by some few of the older and more important members of the Service, whom he had so hopelessly distanced. They are able to thwart him in ways which it is easy to understand; but which it is not so easy for him to take notice of, to check, or to repress."†

Sir John Lawrence had passed his earlier days in the Panjab, specially during the Sepoy Mutiny. His antecedents in the Panjab have been narrated by Major Basu in his *Rise of the Christian Power in India* and in his *Consolidation of the Christian Power in India.*

HIS APPROVAL OF "COOPERISM"

Sir John Lawrence had approved of "Cooperism" when he was the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab. What was this *Cooperism*? It is a new word introduced into the annals of Indian history by the act of Mr. Frederick Cooper. As a new word it requires some explanation. Mr. Ludlow explains this newly coined term in his *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India* (pp. 180-181). See also Major B.D. Basu's *Consolidation of the Christian Power in India.*

LORD LAWRENCE—A DALHOUSIE-ITE

Sir John Lawrence belonged to the school of Lord Dalhousie. When the annexation policy of Lord Dalhousie seized upon the Panjab, Lord Dalhousie appointed Sir John Lawrence as a member of the Panjab Board, along with his brother Henry Lawrence and Charles Greville Mansel, to pacify the land of the Five Rivers. Lord Dalhousie always took a keen interest in the activities of his favourite, Sir John Lawrence.

When in 1850, Sir John Lawrence became seriously ill, his boss wanted to see his lieutenant recover very soon, and asked him to pass his time with him at Simla. He had written: "I wish for your presence with me." Lord Dalhousie's anxiety for the illness of his lieutenant may be seen from the following letter written on October 21:

"I have not plagued you with any letter since I heard of your illness. I need not say how deeply and truly I am grieved to learn the severe attack you have suffered, and how anxious I shall be to learn again that you are improving during your march, and that you are not foolishly impeding your recovery by again returning to work. I am terrified at the thought of your being compelled

* *The Company and the Crown*, by T. G. Hovell-Thurlow, pp. 9-10.

† *Life of Lord Lawrence*, by Bosworth Smith, p. 473.

to give up work and go home for a time, and I plead with you to spare yourself for a time as earnestly as I would plead to save my own right hand. Two of you have been working hard enough, Heaven knows, for the third; let the other two now take their turn of working for you. Keep enough work in your hands to employ you, but don't take so much as to burden you."*

The letter shows that Sir John Lawrence was a great favourite of Lord Dalhousie, who "when he realised the full danger to which his lieutenant had been exposed, insisted that he should spend the next hot season, not in the fever-stricken furnace of Lahore, but amidst the cool breezes (?) of Simla." Such was the interest taken by Lord Dalhousie !

Sir John Lawrence was at the beck and call of Lord Dalhousie, "so kind, so considerate and so friendly a master" of his. At the instance of Lord Dalhousie, he met Ghulam Hyder Khan, the son of the Amir, and concluded a treaty with him. For this act, his master wanted to reward him.

Here follows the letter which Lord Dalhousie wrote to "the ablest of his lieutenants," proposing a reward for him :

Ootacamund, May 1, 1855.

My dear John,

Your treaty arrived yesterday, and I lose no time in expressing to you the great gratification with which I have looked upon it in its complete form, and in acknowledging the obligations under which you have laid me by the successful conclusion of a treaty which I conceive will be regarded as of much importance both in India and in England, and which, consequently, will be viewed as honourable to my administration. I have recorded my opinions and feelings in language strong and sincere, and I hope that you and your coadjutor will feel that the Government has really appreciated your exertions, and has wished to do full justice to your services.

"The additional claim which you have thus established to the approbation of the Crown and my personal gratitude renders this a fitting moment for asking you a question which my approaching relinquishment of the office of Governor-General would not have allowed me to delay much longer.

"Your services in India have been so pre-eminent, that you cannot fail to be conscious of the fact, or entertain a doubt of my feeling it to be as much a personal duty as a personal pleasure to obtain for you some *fitting recognition of your merits by the grant of honours from the Crown.*

"The question which I have to ask you is as to the form in which such honours would be most acceptable to you—whether you would prefer the grant of a Baronetcy or the Star of a Knight Commander of the Bath. The former is so far a higher honour that it is hereditary, but many persons would question the advantage of that quality in it, unless ample fortune could be handed down with the honour.

Whichever you shall prefer, it shall be my most earnest duty and endeavour to obtain for you before I leave India. You know, of course, that I cannot *guarantee* your getting either. But I can *assure you of my resolution to move heaven and earth to accomplish your wishes* for you, and I think they can hardly refuse it to your claims and my solicitations.

Always, my dear John,
very sincerely yours.
Dalhousie."†

* *Life of Lord Lawerence* by Bosworth Smith, p. 189.

† *Life of Lord Lawrence,* by Bosworth Smith, p. 241.

When it was announced that Lord Canning was to be the successor of Lord Dalhousie, John Lawrence wrote to his master expressing his sorrow at the coming departure of his master. He wrote thus to Lord Dalhousie:

"Still I must say that your Lordship's loss will be sincerely felt. A stimulus has been given to the general administration of India, and a general vigour infused into all departments, which, if only carried on, must wipe out the reproach under which the Government formerly laboured.

"To myself, personally, the change will be great. I can hardly expect to have so kind, so considerate, and so friendly a master....

"To your Lordship, the ruturn to your own country will probably be a subject of unmixed pleasure, but to the friends you leave behind, among whom I am one of the sincerest, it cannot fail to be a cause of real regret."*

Though Lord Dalhousie desired so much to reward his "sincerest friend" for his services, yet he could not do so before his departure from India. "Much to Lord Dalhousie's *disappointment*, the Gazette did not arrive from England in time to give to him the peculiar pleasure of conferring, and to John Lawrence the peculiar pleasure of receiving at his hands, the Knight-Commandership of the Bath." In the absence of this honour, Lord Dalhousie tried to reward his faithful lieutenant in another way. "It was during the farewell visit that Lord Dalhousie drew up a Minute recommending that the Panjab should be raised to the dignity of a Lieutenant-Governorship, and that as a matter of course, its Chief-Commissioner (John Lawrence) should become its first Lieutenant-Governor." At last the home news at Ceylon showed John Lawrence's name in the Gazette as K. C. B. That was the reward which he expected from his *friendly master* Lord Dalhousie for his services and merits.

It is, therefore, no wonder that Sir John Lawrence would belong to the school of Dalhousie and should have an eye on Mysore and Bhutan. He was a thorough Dalhousie-ite and tried to follow in his foot-steps as much as he could.

SIR JOHN LAWRENCE AND THE PANJAB

It has been often maintained that the Panjab saved India during the Sepoy Mutiny. Those who make the above-quoted statement, forget that the European soldiers had been brought in large numbers to the Panjab, even leaving some places in great risk. Many want to give credit to Sir John Lawrence for keeping the Panjab tranquil during the troublesome days of the Mutiny. About his work in the Panjab during the Mutiny, Mr. J. M. Ludlow writes in his book, *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India*:

"Waiving then all questions of justice,—I quite admit, and am thankful to do so, that the annexed Punjab has been and is most admirably governed by Sir John Lawrence. I quite admit, and am thankful to do so, that Sir John Lawrence and his Sikhs saved India at the outset of the rebellion. But I cannot overlook the cost of his doing so. I cannot forget that an able and earnest writer, in perhaps the most remarkable pamphlet which the rebellion has brought forth, (*Thoughts of a Native of Northern India on the Rebellion, its Causes and Remedies*, Dalton, 1858, Edited by M. W., p. 3) has not hesitated to say, that "our North-Western Provinces owe all this rebellion and anarchy to the very Punjob;" alleging that the pouring into the Panjab of the whole European force (or nearly

* *Ibid.*, p. 243.

so) of the Bengal Presidency, and the depriving of the North-West of all its best civil officers, have been the means by which the Panjab has been made a model province, at the risk of the whole Indian empire. I cannot forget that to the hour of my writing this, it has not been possible to spare Sir John Lawrence out of the Panjab, either for the Governor-Generalship or for the Council at home. I cannot forget that in spite of the efficient services rendered to us by the Sikhs in the rebellion, or rather because of those efficient services, the most serious fears were entertained at one time as to their fidelity, that there are upwards of 80,000 of them in our pay ; that they have openly boasted on many occasions that they had fought against us once and might fight against us again ; and "who knows where the *raj* will be ?" I cannot forget that the Maharaja of Putteeala, our worthy Sikh ally, has warned us of the danger of trusting in his countrymen, has written—so Mr. Russel related in one of his letters—in express terms to an officer that "the Sikhs, if left idle, will be worse than the Hindostanees." I cannot forget that actual Mutiny was on the point of breaking out in the latter half of 1851 at Dera Ismail Khan, in the 18th Punjab Infantry, who were to have risen and murdered their officers and I cannot help asking myself whether it would be safer for us to have at Lahore a faithful native ally than the ablest of English Governors."*

SIR BARTLE FRERE AND LAWRENCE

Another favourite of Sir John Lawrence was Sir Bartle Frere, the Chief Commissione of Sind. It was during the Sepoy Mutiny that Sir John Lawrence was in constantr communication with Sir Bartle Frere. At this time he was writing to Lord Canning that every European soldier would be required to save the country if the whole of the native troops turned against the Europeans. John Lawrence had asked help from Bartle Frere. We read about Bartle Frere:

"But Frere, without waiting to be asked, or even to get leave from Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, at once and upon his own responsibility, sent off such reinforcements as he could spare, or could hardly spare, to what he conceived to be the chief point of danger. With only two weak European regiments and one troop of Horse Artillery to hold in check his province of two million inhabitants and four native regiments, he sent off at once two hundred Fusiliers to Mooltan. He saw that it was on the Punjab and not on Sind that the safety of India would, in the long run, depend, and, just as John Lawrence was resolved to denude the Punjab of troops in order to push the siege of Delhi, so, on a smaller scale, but to the utmost limit of his means, was Frere resolved to strip Scinde in order to reinforce the Panjab."†

Bartle Frere wrote to Lord Elphinstone:

"When the head and heart are threatened, the extremities must take care of themselves. The 1st Bombay Fusiliers, 1st Beluch Battalion, 2nd Beluch Battalion, were despatched, in rapid succession, to the Punjab, and that such all-important points as Mooltan and Ferozepore were firmly held, in spite of all the danger which threatened them, was due, in part at least, to his unstinted aid."

John Lawrence thus expressed his appreciation of the services rendered by Bartle Frere. He wrote to him thus:

"Many thanks for your notes and all your care for us. The two hundred Europeans for Mooltan will be a grand aid. With the European artillery, one hundred strong, they will make all safe. The sooner they arrive the better; as it will enable us to employ a corps of Punjab infantry who have come here from Dera Ghazi Khan."

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* *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India* by J. M. Ludlow. (Allahabad Reprint) pp. 168-70

† *Life of Lord Lawrence*, by Bosworth Smith, p. 309

Not satisfied with this, John Lawrence recommended the services of his favourite to the notice of the Government. He thus wrote of Bartle Frere in his "Mutiny Report.":

"From first to last, from the first commencement of the Mutiny to the final triumph, Mr. H. B. E. Frere has rendered assistance to the Punjab administration just as if he had been one of its own Commissioners... The Chief Commissioner believes that probably there is no civil officer in India, who, for eminent exertions, deserves better of his Government than Mr. H. B. E. Frere."*

When in 1858 Sir John Lawrence retired from the post of the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, the name of Bartle Frere was among those who were the likely successors of Sir John Lawrence. Sir John Lawrence then wrote to Lord Canning thus about Frere:

"Next to Montgomery, I think Mr. Frere would probably make the best civil governor for the Punjab. I do not know him personally, but he bears a high character for administrative ability. He is a Bombay civilian, and therefore would be hardly so acceptable to Bengali officers as one of this Presidency."†

But after his coming back as the Viceroy and Governor-General of India Lord Lawrence could not maintain this friendly attitude towards Sir Bartle Frere. Whether Lord Lawrence forgot the assistance rendered by Sir Bartle Frere during the Mutiny, we do not know. The biographer of Lord Lawrence maintains that "towards Sir Bartle Frere he also cherished a strong feeling of gratitude for the unstinted help which he had given him in the Mutiny." Still, the official friction "between Sir John Lawrence and Sir Bartle Frere, the Governor of Bombay, continued till March 1867, when Sir Bartle Frere "bade a final farewell to India, after thirty years of hard work, in which, whatever his failings, he had managed to attach all classes to himself, and had done brilliant and disinterested service to the State alike in the Deccan and Sattara, in Scinde, at Calcutta and at Bombay."§

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* *Ibid.*, p. 30.

† *Ibid.*, p. 452.

§ *Ibid.* p. 485.

CHAPTER V

MYSORE AFFAIRS

MYSORE AND LORD CANNING

After the defeat and death of Tipu Sultan, "a lineal descendant of the ancient House of the Rajahs of Mysore" was placed on the throne of Mysore. Though the infant Raja's elevation was opposed at the time by several of Lord Wellesley's advisers, and by none more than by Sir Thomas Munro, yet a separate Government for Mysore was created and Poornia, the able Brahmin who had been Tippoo's chief officer of finance, was appointed Prime Minister.

The Raja after a few years took up the direct charge of the Government. During his rule, a charge of mal-administration was brought against the Mysore Raj. We read:

"Within a few years of his accession, this young prince squandered upwards of two millions sterling of accumulations, while the revenue and public debt had both increased until all classes bordered on despair. The country then assumed by treaty has since been held and governed for that country's good, the Raja being treated with great financial liberality and the political consideration to which he is entitled."*

Mysore was taken away from the young Prince Sri Krishnaraja Wadiyar Bahadur III on the plea of mis-government, but the financial chaos which prevailed in the country was due to other causes than the mismanagement of the Raja. Thus Major Evans Bell in his *The Mysore Reversion* says :

"A few years after the Rajah assumed the direct Government, and while Poorniah's accumulations still supplied ample funds for the expenditure of the court, the public revenue began to fall off, and serious financial difficulties began to make themselves felt ; but these difficulties had their origin in other causes than the mismanagement of the native functionaries."†

In 1829 Sir Thomas Munro, the Governor of Madras, visited Mysore and "warned the Rajah, that if the disorder in his affairs were not checked, the direct interference of the British Government would soon become unavoidable."

As matters began to go from bad to worse, Lord William Bentinck acted on the advice of Sir Thomas Munro "and despatched to the Rajah an intimation, couched in terms of great severity, that, under the provisions of the Treaty of 1799, the British Government had determined to take into its own hands the management of Mysore."

Thus Mysore passed into the hands of the British Government. This step was anything but right, Major Evans Bell thus says :

"The summary substitution of direct British management was a somewhat *harsh remedy* for any administrative abuses, when the treaty gave us the power of dictating and enforcing the acceptance of such ordinances, as might have removed all cause of offence."

Lord William Bentinck himself had certain doubts as to "the legality and the justice"

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* *The Company and the Crown*, By F. J. Hovell-Thurlow, p. 107.

† *Ibid.*, p 17.

of the step taken. In a despatch to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated the 14th of April, 1834, he wrote:

"The Treaty warrants an assumption of the country with a view to secure the payment of our subsidy. The assumption was actually made on account of the Rajah's mis-government. The subsidy does not appear to have been in any immediate jeopardy. Again the Treaty authorises us to assume such *part* or *parts* of the country as may be necessary to render the funds which we claim efficient and available. The whole has been assumed, although a part would unquestionably have sufficed for the purpose specified in the treaty; and with regard to the justice of the case, I cannot but think that it would have been more fair towards the Rajah had a more distinct and positive warning been given him that the decided measure since adopted, would be put in force, if mis-government should be found to prevail."*

As regards the Mysore affair, Lord William Bentinck "felt that he had been deceived and misled. He acknowledged his error, and he regretted it to the last hour of his life. It is well-known that after his return to England, he repeatedly declared that the supersession of the Raja of Mysore was the only incident in his Indian administration that he looked back upon with sorrow."

The Raja tried to get back his throne from the Company's Government, and there was a regular correspondence between the Raja and the Governors-General. Major Evans Bell says:

"We have seen, then, that from 1834 to 1847 the Rajah never ceased to claim his restoration; that three Governors-General, Lord William Bentinck, Sir Charles Metcalfe and Lord Hardinge, admitted that his abrupt supersession was inconsiderate, unduly severe, and of doubtful legality: that neither the Supreme Government nor the Home Authorities ever rejected or contested his claim, but only postponed their assent to a more convenient season, placing before him the prospect of reinstatement as soon as an orderly administration for the country had been effectually established. And I may add, that in no despatch of the Home Government, or of the Government of India, during that period, was any intention of permanently retaining the management of Mysore ever expressed or implied."†

But with Lord Dalhousie, "new views of policy" began to prevail. The authorities now began to tighten their grasp on Mysore. Lord Dalhousie began his policy of annexation. "The reign of terror for Hindoo Princes had commenced and Nagpore and Jhansi were annexed in 1854. The smaller principalities of Jalaun, Ungrol, Jeitpore in Bundelcund, Bughat, Sumbhulpore, Boodawal and Chota Oodeypoor were also absorbed during Lord Dalhousie's tenure of office." It is, therefore, no wonder that he should be anxious to annex Mysore also. In one of his Minutes of 16th January, 1856, he wrote:§

"The treaty under which Lord Wellesley raised the Rajah, while yet a child, to the musnud, and the treaty which was subsequently concluded with himself, were both silent as to heirs and successors. No mention is made of them; the treaty is exclusively a personal one....

"I trust, therefore, that when the decease of the present Rajah shall come to pass, without son or grandson, or legitimate male heir of any description, the territory of Mysore, which will then have

* *The Mysore Reversion*, by Maior Evans Bell, p. 22.

† *Ibid.*, p. 35.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

lapsed to the British Government, will be resumed, and that the good work, which has been so well begun, will be completed."

This Minute, says Major Evans Bell, was one of the legacies that Lord Dalhousie left behind him for the instruction and guidance of his successor, Lord Canning. "For the first time," continues the writer, "a Governor-General had now placed on official record, although in a secret document, a statement of his desire and design to incorporate Mysore with the British dominions, on the death of the reigning Rajah."

When the terrible Sepoy Munity broke out during the rule of Lord Canning, the Raja of Mysore and his subjects remained loyal to the British. The Commissioner of Mysore thus wrote to Lord Canning:

"To no one was the Government more indebted for the preservation of tranquility than to his Highness the Rajah, who displayed the most steadfast loyalty throughout the crisis, discountenancing everything in the shape of disaffection, and taking every opportunity to proclaim his perfect confidence in the stability of the English rule."

In acknowledging the faithful services of the Raja, Lord Canning wrote to him on 28th June, 1860:

"I was well aware that from the very beginning of those troubles, the fidelity and attachment to the British Government, which have long marked your Highness's acts, had been conspicuous upon every opportunity.

"Your Highness's wise confidence in the power of England, and your open manifestation of it, the consideration and kindness which you showed to British subjects, and the ready and useful assistance which you rendered to the Queen's troops, have been mentioned by the Commissioner in terms of the highest praise.

"I beg your Highness to accept the expression of my warm thanks for these fresh proofs of the spirit by which your Highness is animated in your relations with the Government of India."*

Even as the return of his loyal services during the Mutiny, the Raja did not get back his throne, but another danger faced him. Since 1832, the management of Mysore had been under the Governor-General, but now it was proposed to transfer Mysore to the superintendence of the Government of Madras. Thus Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, in a despatch to the Governor-General wrote on 26th of January, 1860:

"It appears to me, therefore, that it is advisable, partly with the view of relieving your Government, and partly with the object of placing the Superintendence of Mysore and Coorg under the Government which, from its position, can most conveniently exercise it, to revert to the arrangement which was originally made, on our first assumption of the administration of Mysore, *viz.*, that the superintendence should be exercised by the Government of Madras."

To the Raja and his friends this order "seemed to denote the beginning of the end, to be the preliminary measure of annexation.' Even Sir Mark Cubbon, the Commissioner of Mysore, scented something wrong in the order and sent his resignation to the Government. In his private letter he writes:

"I have just had a little talk with—(a native) and find that the late order is regarded as a great breach of public faith, as the first step towards the final extinction of the State of Mysore and

* *Ibid.*, p. 48.

its incorporation with Madras, and consequently tending to produce the most fatal of all results, the destruction of all confidence in the sincerity of the Queen's Proclamation."

The Raja also addressed a strong *Khureeta* or letter to Lord Canning. The letter, according to the Commissioner of Mysore, was most forcibly put and was almost certain to cause a sensation, if read in the House of Commons. In the course of the letter the Raja said :

"The transfer of the management of my country from the Supreme to a Subordinate Government, without any reference to me, as if I had no longer any interest in the matter, or any rights to uphold, fills my mind with apprehension and alarm.

"I cannot, my Lord, see how my interests, or those of my country, are to be bettered by this transfer. Perfect tranquility reigned in my country at a time when a word of mine, or disaffection on the part of my people, would have thrown Southern India into a blaze; but my conduct, and that of my people during that dreadful period, exhibit the complete success of the administration as at present carried on.

"Moreover, my Lord, I have grave fears that such a measure as this, if introduced, would possibly interfere with the claims that I and my heirs have for the restoration of the Government of my country, as it is evident that the contemplated change is with the view of introducing alterations in the form of Government, which would render it difficult for me or my successor to conduct the administration hereafter with a native agency; and the recent conduct of the present Governor of Madras adds cogency to my fears on this point."

"I do not, moreover, my Lord, hesitate to state...that the condition of Mysore at this moment would contrast favourably with any other Province on this side of India. The revenue has increased.... There is comparatively little crime.... The judicial system founded upon that most cherished by natives of all their institutions, the Panchayet, operates with the utmost suceess, and I specially deprecate any innovation in the native system of judicial administration at present in force; the most sacred rights and privileges of the people are respected, and the utmost confidence exists in the minds of all that such will continue so long as the present system lasts."*

The Raja concludes with a significant sentence. He adds :

"I am an old man, and have suffered much; and you, my Lord, will, I feel assured, save me from this crowning indignity."

As the result of this strong letter, Lord Canning informed the Raja and the Commissioner of Mysore that for the present no change would be introduced. He also forwarded the Raja's application to the Secretary of State with a covering letter in which he said :

"But the question now to be considered is, how the appeal of the Rajah is to be dealt with, and I feel it to be impossible, in the face of such an appeal coming from so venerable and loyal a Prince, and couched in terms so dignified, but so respectful, to persist in the immediate execution of your orders without submitting the case for your consideration."†

Lord Canning believed that "that Prince possessed a very strong claim to have his wishes and feelings considered by us, and that we should do that which was both ungenerous and impolitic, if we set these aside."

He put the case of the Raja nicely in the following words:

"I am, therefore, not surprised that the Rajah of Mysore should speak of the declared measure

* *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

† *Ibid.*, p. 54.

as being a degradation of himself in the eyes of all natives, especially in those of his own subjects, and an indignity."

Lord Canning also acknowledged the help rendered by the Raja during the Mutiny thus:

"It is unnecessary for me to say, that the Rajah's allusions to the loyalty of himself and his people, and to the example and aid thereby given to the native subjects of the Crown in Southern India, are quite just. Mysore was traversed in all directions during 1857 and 1853 by Mahratta and Brahmin emisssaries, but the people of that country remained tranquil."

He was not in favour of the proposed change, when he observed:

"...I cannot think that the nearness of supervision, or any other convenience which would result from a transfer of the superintendence of that system to Madras, is worth purchasing at the cost of offending and alienating the sovereign of the country; especially when, by a little patience, the desired end will, in all human probability, be attained without any such consequences."

Lord Canning wanted to take over the State of Mysore in another way—by means of a voluntary bequest from the Raja of Mysore. He wrote to the Secretary of State for India:

"The Rajah of Mysore is an old man, past sixty, and of a family notoriously short-lived. He has no son, and has adopted no heir. It has been supposed that *he will bequeath his kingdom to to the British Government.* I say 'supposed,' because there is no formal or official evidence of his purpose; but I know for certain that such was his intention, because early in 1858, and whilst upper India was still in rebellion, the Rajah seized an opportunity of conveying to myself, through an entirely private channel, not only the strongest protestations of his loyalty, gratitude and devotion to the Government, but a distinct and earnest declaration, more than once repeated, of his wish that everything that he possessed should at his death pass into its hands."

But immediately in the next paragraph, he told a different tale. He wrote:

"I beg you to compare this declaration with the passages in his letter now enclosed, in which the Rajah expresses grave fears that the measure announced from England will interfere with the claims which he and his heirs have for the restoration of the Government of his country."

On this point Major Evans Bell remarks as follows:

"And certainly, if the supposed declaration and the actual claim be compared, they will be found to be directly contradictory. The only wonder is that this utter incompatibility of the colloquial concession with the written claim before his eyes -a claim consistent with all the Rajah's authentic declarations before or since,—did not suggest to Lord Canning that there must have been some strange misunderstanding in 1858, some mistake in reporting the Rajah's private conversation, some wrong interpretation of his words, some mis-translation of his oriental compliments to that *entirely private channel* through which his supposed "wish" was conveyed to the Governor-General. If the Rajah's alleged message appeared to the Governor-General to be of any public importance, it was surely his duty to make some further enquiry about it. Instead of that, the very incident which we noticed in Lord Dalhousie's minute of the 16th January, 1856, so typical of the moral weakness and legal nullity of these acquisitive apologetics, is exactly reproduced. No question is asked, no confirmation is required of the vague expressions informally translated and informally reported. After having been treasured up for two years, the Rajah's deferential protestations are brought forward by Lord Canning,—as a rumour of his desponding soliloquy was by Lord Dalhousie,—to prove his Highness's indifference to the rights of his family and the future existence of his State, at the very time that he was contending for them."*

* *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

Lord Canning repeats his fond hope of getting Mysore as the bequest from the Raja. He wrote in the despateh :

"It may be very little desirable that more provinces should be added to those which are already under the absolute rule of the Queen in India ; but the case of Mysore, lying in the midst of the Madras Presidency, and already bound to us in a way which is not convenient or satisfactory, is quite exceptional: and the bequest of that country in full sovereignty to the Crown, by the free will of the ruler and in a spirit of loyal attachment to the British power, is a consummation which, in the interest of all concerned, no one would wish to see defeated."

The comment of Major Evans Bell on the above is worth quotation. He says:

"For my part I do most positively declare, that if the Rajah ever had any such intention, which I do not believe, I should have wished to see it defeated. I believe that we cannot afford to lose Mysore as a dependent native State, and that we cannot afford to take it as an additional British Province. Mysore is indeed 'an exceptional case.' It stands as the last barrier against a policy of despair and defiance. It ought to be made our model Principality. But if Mysore be annexed,—if in defiance of Her Majesty's Proclamation, the rapacious system is to be reopened, our promises and counsels will never be believed or trusted, and any suggestion of reform, or offer of administrative assistance, will spread consternation and rouse opposition throughout every native State."

Fortunately for the Raja, the episode of the transfer of Mysore came to a happy end and the Raja was saved from the crowning indignity. Lord Canning in a letter dated the 28th June, 1860, informed the Maharaja that "it had been determined by Her Majesty's Government that the orders directing the transfer should be cancelled." Thus the Raja for the time being heaved a sigh of relief and Sir Mark Cubbon continued as Commissioner of Mysore only to breathe his last next year.

But there was yet no hope of restoration of his State. The Raja's letter to Lord Dalhousie of 8th August, 1848, still remained unanswered. He, being encouraged at the success of his last venture, addressed another letter to Lord Canning on 23rd February, 1861. In this letter he traced the whole history of Mysore from 1799 when the English stormed the fortress of Seringapatam and Lord Welleseley "rescued me, then an infant, the rightful heir to the throne of Mysore .. .from captivity and restored me to the *musnud* of my ancestors." He described how by virtue of an Article in the Treaty between the British and the Raja the kingdom of Mysore was taken over by Lord William Bentinck in 1831. After describing the hopes that were held out by some Governors-General and his constant attempt at restoration, the Raja appealed :

"The universal desire of people, and justice to my own character, require that I should now solicit the restoration of my severeign rights, of which I was deprived, as has alreadv been stated, as a temporary measure ; in proof of which, should proof be required in a matter so notorious, I beg to refer your Lordship to Lord William Bentinck's despatch to the Court of Directors, the Court's answer to Lord Auckland, also the Court's despatch... ....What I ask, my Lord, is not much; the country is acknowledged to be mine ; all I ask, then, before I die, is that I may be restored to the position I formerly held, that the stigma which now attaches to my name may be removed, and that I may appear once more before my own subjects and the Princes and people of India as the sovereign of Mysore in fact as well as in word."†

For thirteen months Lord Canning did not care to vouchsafe a reply to this solemn

* *Ibid.*, p. 58.

† *Ibid.*, p. 62.

appeal of the Raja. Just on the eve of his departure from India (on 11th of March, 1862), Lord Canning addressed his last letter to the Raja, in which all the hopes of restoration were shattered to pieces. In this long letter Lord Canning tried to examine all the grounds put forward by the Raja and give his own crushing reply to them.

In reply, Lord Canning wrote as follows:

"It is your Highness's request that the last mentioned *khureeta* may be submitted to Her Majesty's Government, and that it may be accompanied by my support of the claim therein advanced--that claim being that the management of the country of Mysore should now be restored to your Highness.

"This demand, based upon argument which will hereafter be noticed, is one which it is as little my inclination as my duty, to treat lightly, or to set aside without the most patient and impartial consideration; and I regret the disappointment which may be caused to your Highness, when I now inform you of my inability to support your claim, or to admit the grounds on which it is founded, and which I regard as mistaken and untenable."

Lord Canning also charged the Raja with not having rendered any service to the Commissioner of Mysore. He said:

"Sir Mark Cubbon has left on record opinions of an entirely contrary character. He has stated that any improvements which had taken place had been effected *in spite of the counteraction he had met with on the part of your Highness and your partisans,* and that the conduct of your Highness during your suspension from power, would afford no security that the crisis which had induced your suspension would not recur in the event of your restoration."

But we should remember that in his despatch of the 2nd June, 1860, Sir Mark Cubbon acknowledges "the cordiality observed by the Rajah for a good many years towards the existing administration."

Lord Canning's letter continues:

"Your Highness observes that the Marquis of Wellesley rescued you when an infant from captivity,—this is true; but the Marquis of Wellesley, when he released you from a *hereditary prison,* and placed you on the throne of Mysore, *far from waiving any right of conquest, asserted and maintained that right* in all its integrity and in a threefold manner. In the first place, after the fall of Seringapatam, and the death of Tipoo Sultan, the territory thus conquered was made the subject of a Partition Treaty, in which your Highness was not otherwise a party concerned than as the notified future recipient of the liberality of the British Government. *The contracting parties were the Governor-General and the Nizam.* The details of the partition of the Territory were prescribed by Lord Wellesley, *the conquest having been effected by British arms.* This was Lord Wellesley's first and chief assertion of the right of conquest, and in it your Highness had no share whatever as a principal."

"In the next place, *ancillary to the partition treaty of Mysore,* was the grant, on certain conditions, of that portion of the territories conquered from Tipoo Sultan which the Governor-General thought proper to assign to your Highness. The instrument was styled the subsidiary Treaty, *its subordinate relation to the partition treaty* being thereby indicated. The cession of territory in favour of your Highness, which comprised districts annexed by Hyder Ali, over which your ancestors had never ruled, *was based distinctly upon the British Government's right of conquest......Therefore, your Highness's title to authority in Mysore rests solely upon the cession made to you by the British Government......"*

"Lastly, the forth and fifth Articles of the subsidiary treaty show that *far from waiving the rights derived from conquest,* Lord Wellesley, in a very signal manner, *kept those rights alive* in the

conditions which he attached to the cession. By the fifth Article, a wide discretionary power is retained to the Governor-General to assume, whether your Highness consents or not, the management of the territories, and to provide for the effectual protection of the country and the welfare of the people."

On these points Major Evans Bell writes :

"Lord Wellesley, while unquestionably maintaining the rights of conquest,—not of British arms alone, but of the Company and the Nizam,—still respected and relied upon the antiquity and legitimate title of the Hindoo family. And this is recorded in the Partition Treaty and in all the contemporary documents, as one principal reason for the Rajah's elevation."*

He also says:

"The subsidiary treaty, by which the Rajah was placed in possesion of his Principality, was undoubtedly 'ancillary' and 'subordinate' to the partition treaty. That is the strongest part of the Rajah's case. The cession or grant in favour of his Highness was not made by the subsidiary, but by the partition treaty, and therefore, is *not* 'based dintinctly upon the British Government's right of conquest.' The Rajah was placed on the throne by the chief officers of the Allied Powers after the partition treaty was signed, but eight days before the subsidiary Treaty was concluded."

Lord Canning concludes his uncharitable letter thus :

"Your Highness has pressed upon my consideration your advanced age, and your desire that the stigma which attaches to your name might be removed by a restoration to the position you formerly held. These are pleas to which in themselves I desire to show respect and all practicable indulgence, but accompanied as they have been by pretensions based upon erroneous assumptions, and leading as they had led to an imputation upon the fair dealing of the British Government, it has been incumbent on me to correct the errors into which your Highness has fallen ; and to put on record, that in my opinion your Highness was very ill-advised, when upon the grounds of assumed ancestral and hereditary rights which have no existence, and of admissions and promises which never were made, you permitted yourself to forget the generosity of the British Government, in order to call in question its good faith and justice."†

We quote below the opinion of Major Evans Bell on this ungenerous letter :

"This letter is well-known not to have been of Lord Canning's composition, though he sanctioned and signed it at the last moment, when enfeebled by illness, and glad to dispose in any way of an irritating and perplexing subject that had long pressed for settlement, and which he felt ought not to be handed over to Lord Elgin, after a year's delay, in an undetermined state. The Calcutta Secretariat could not forgive the Rajah for having so signally discomfitted their confident anticipations of the forthcoming bequest of the principality, 'in free will and full sovereignty,' and 'in a spirit of loyal attachment,' by its 'venerable Sovereign,'—more than sixty years of age, and a family 'notoriously short-lived.' From this source seems to have been infused that otherwise unaccountable acrimony which pervades the whole letter."§

Captain W. J. Eastwick writes as follows in his Minute of Dissent:

"It thus appears, that, while we believed that the Maharaja intended to give his country to the British Government, he had entire liberty to bequeath it 'in full sovereignty,' but when this illusion is dispelled, we found out that he had not the right to bequeath it to any one, even to a natural or adopted heir. In the same spirit we appeal to the conditions of the Treaty when we wish to divest

* *Ibid.*, p. 66.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

the Rajah of his dominions; and we ignore the Treaty when called upon under its conditions to restore the country to the Rajah."*

Thus Lord Canning seems to have taken the hint from the despatch of his class-fellow and predecessor Lord Dalhousie as to the uncharitable way in which to treat the claims of the Raja of Mysore, though the latter had helped Lord Canning during the troubled days of the Sepoy Mutiny. Lord Dalhousie could not apply the notorious Doctrine of Lapse to the Mysore State, because the old Raja was still then living—or rather outliving the age-limit of his family, which was notoriously short-lived. In the very face of the Queen's Proclamation, Lord Canning was ignoring the claims of the Raja for the restoration of the State, and trying to find out an opportunity for annexing the kingdom. Though Lord William Bentinck had held out hopes to the Raja, Lord Canning completely dashed those hopes to the ground. The Raja was told definitely in the last letter that restoration was out of the question.

LORD ELGIN AND MYSORE

The Raja of Mysore did not give up all hopes of restoration. When the new Governor-General Lord Elgin came, he sent an appeal to the Secretary of State for India against the decision of Lord Canning. For a year and a half, no reply came from England. At last Mr. Bowring, the Commissioner of Mysore, informed the Raja of the "unfavourable decision" which had come, regarding the restoration of the State of Mysore.

Meanwhile the death had taken place of Lord Elgin, who was succeeded by Sir William Denison. He addressed a letter to the Raja, in which he said:

"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the assumption of the administration of your Highness's Territories in 1831, was in accordance with the provisions of the Subsidiary Treaty; that your Highness cannot, as of right, now claim its restoration; and that the reinstatement of your Highness in the administration of the country is incompatible with the true interests of Mysore.

"I am, therefore, commanded by Her Majesty's Government to inform your Highness, that her Majesty's Government have determined not to interfere with the decision which was communicated to your Highness by Earl Canning and confirmed by Lord Elgin, and that the administration of Mysore shall continue to be conducted as at present by the British officers."†

The opinion of Major Evans Bell on this letter again are well worth quoting. He says:

"In terms more guarded and courteous than those used in Lord Canning's letter, the Rajah's title to the territories of Mysore is said to rest solely upon exercise by the British Government, in his favour, of an undoubted right of conquest. To this, after again observing that the conquest and the cession were made not by the British Government solely, but by the British Government and its ally the Nizam, I can only once more append the question,—what better title could the Rajah possibly have? The Rajah certainly desires no better title than the cession of 1799 and has never repudiated his obligations to the British Government, although he alludes with very natural pride to the antiquity of that legitimate title which Lord Wellesley himself professed to respect, and which is recorded in the partition treaty."*

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, quoted in the *Mysore Reversion*, by Major Evans Bell, p. 77.

† *Ibid.*, p. 78.

Inspite of the British Government's repeated refusal to restore the State of Mysore to the Raja, the Rajah announced before Mr. Bowring, the Commissioner of Mysore, his "determination to adopt a son, in conformity with the Hindoo law and the long established usages of my ancestors, to be the representative of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore."

SIR JOHN LAWRENCE AND MYSORE.

The expectations of the two successive Governors-General that the Raja of Mysore would never adopt a son, however, did not bear any fruit. It was on the 18th June, 1865, that the Raja publicly adopted a son at the Mysore Palace in the presence of Major Charles Elliot, C. B., the Superintendent of the Mysore Division, and a large number of his subjects. He also sent a letter to Sir John Lawrence, the Civilian Viceroy. He wrote:

"I have this day, the 18th June, 1865, according to Hindoo law, the usage of my ancestors and in virtue of Her Majesty's Proclamation, adopted a son as successor to all my rights under the Partition treaty of 1799 between the East India Company and the Nizam, and under my Subsidiary Treaty of the same year with the East India Company, both of which are in full force."

The adoption by the Raja of a boy of two and a half years of age, named Cham Rajendra Wadiyor, made the whole situation more complex. Major Evans Bell observes:

"The question of the Rajah's reinstatement has thus become complicated with one of much higher and more lasting importance, that of the future destiny of the ancient Hindoo State of Mysore of which His Highness is the reigning representative, and his adopted son the lawful heir."†

When the Calcutta authorities learnt of the adoption of a son by the Raja the Foreign Office of Calcutta (No. 333, 29th March, 1864) wrote to him:

"The Rajah has a full right to adopt so far as his private property is concerned; but his Highness must be distinctly informed that no authority to adopt a successor to the Raj of Mysore has ever been given him, and that no such power can now be conceded to him."

The British Government wanted to show that the adoption publicly made by the Raja was illegal. Major Evans Bell remarks:

"But no such concession is necessary to give legal effect to the adoption. It is true that no copy of the Circular of 1860 permitting the Hindoo Princes to adopt a successor, was sent to the Rajah of Mysore; but this arbitrary or accidental exclusion is of no disinheriting effect, by any law or custom, Asiatic or European, Municipal or Imperial."§

Lord Canning himself in his Adoption Despatch of 1860 said:

"We have not shown, so far as I can find, a single instance in which adoption by a sovereign Prince has been invalidated by a refusal of assent from the Paramount Power."

He also adds:

"I believe that there is no example of any Hindoo State, whether in Rajpootana or elsewhere, lapsing to the Paramount Power by reason of that power withholding its assent to an adoption."**

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

† *Ibid.*, p.83.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

** Quoted in *The Mysore Reversion, p. 85.*

A peculiar situation had arisen out of this Mysore question. Major Evans Bell says:

"Yet by a singular series of gradations, the Mysore question has come to this unhealthy complexion at last and if the declared intentions of the Calcutta authorities are approved and confirmed at home, the British Government will be openly committed to the violation of two Treaties, to the destruction of another friendly State, and to a direct contradiction of both the Queen's Proclamation and Lord Canning's Adoption Despatch."*

There were a few Britishers like Sir Frederick Currie who took the side of the Raja in this struggle for restoration. Sir Frederick Currie in his minute of dissent on 17th July, 1863, said:

"I think the decision impolitic, also, as likely to lead, when the permanent exclusion of the Maharaja from the possession of Mysore is promulgated, to inconvenient questions with the Nizam, whose treaty-rights in Mysore, though kept out of sight in this despatch, and the proceedings of Lords Dalhousie and Canning referred to in it, cannot be ignored."†

The Raja was persistent in pressing his claims for restoration. In another letter addressed to Sir John Lawrence, the Civilian Viceroy, on the 25th January, 1865, he pointed out that the refusal on the part of the British Government to restore His Highness would *lead to inconvenient questions* with the Nizam. He argued that the conquest of Tippoo's dominions was the joint conquest of the Company and the Nizam, that the cession to himself of his territories was the joint cession of the same parties, and that if those territories should ever "lapse," they would not lapse to the British Government alone, but to the Allies who shared in the conquests and arranged the partitions of 1799. The Raja continues:

"I claim for my heirs the same rights as I shall have died possessed of; and should I have no heirs, then, for the first time, those who gave me my dominions will become absolutely entitled to them."§

Sir John Lawrence also was anything but sympathetic to the persistent claims of the Raja of Mysore. He tried to 'overturn the embarrassing obstacle thus raised by the Raja's remonstrances' by a sweeping statement. In the course of his reply of the 5th May, 1865, Sir John Lawrence says:

"I must point out to your Highness that in treating the conquest of Mysore as the joint conquest of the British Government and the Nizam, and the cession thereof as the joint cession of both parties, Your Highness has allowed yourself to fall into an error which it is my duty to correct. The Nizam at that time alluded to, was in the condition of a purely dependent ruler, and in a state of subordinate alliance with the British Government."**

"As to the Nizam having been" a dependent ruler "in 1799," argues Malor Evans Bell,

"it may be sufficient to reply that in 1853 Lord Dalhousie declared him to be "an independent Prince." (*Papers relating to the Nizam, 1854*, p. 39.) There is no foundation or pretext whatever in Indian history or diplomacy for asserting that the Nizam was either dependent or subordinate; unless,

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* *Ibid.*, p. 85.

† *Mysore Papers, p.* 25, quoted in *The Mysore Reversion, p.* 97.

§ *Mysore Papers*, p. 67.

** *Mysore Papers*, p. 69.

indeed, mere inferiority of material strength could degrade an ally into a position of dependence and subordination."*

Sir John Lawrence addressed another letter to the Secretary of State on the 5th May, 1865, "in which he endeavours to make out the Nizam's subordination and dependence from the larger numbers of the British army engaged in the campaign, and from Lord Wellesley having exercised 'plenary powers' throughout the expedition and in the settlement of the conquered territories."

Sir John Lawrence continues in his Despatch:

"Lord Mornington with plenary power controlled the proceedings of the expedition. The conquest was, therefore, really a British one; and although from courtesy and view of expediency, the Nizam's Government was spoken of as conjoint in the operations against Tippoo, and was allowed to share with the British Government in the advantages accruing from the successful termination of the contest, yet such phraseology was conventional, and misled no one, and least of all the Nizam. For the Governor-General, whilst prepared to treat his subordinate ally with the utmost liberality, resented any pretension at interference in or with his arrangements, and, dictating to the Nizam the terms of the Treaty of Mysore, intimated, with stringent plainness, that if the Nizam should object to the basis and fundamental principles of the Treaty, Lord Mornington was perfectly prepared to carry the new settlement into effect by the aid of British arms alone."†

In the same Despatch, Sir John Lawrence asserted :

"It has been shown that the acceptance of the Treaty of Mysore was a distinct admission on the part of the Nizam that the sovereignty of Mysore rested with the British Government."

The Raja's hopes were thus frustrated by the despatches of the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence. That the Raja had no claim to the throne of Mysore, all the Viceroys were determined to prove.

On the 18th March, 1866, Sir Henry Rawlinson called for the papers relative to the claims of the Raja of Mysore to be restored to the Government of his territories, and to be allowed to adopt an heir. These Parliamentary Papers were printed by the order of the House of Commons. They contain also the Minutes of Dissent by five members of the Council of India—Sir George Clerk, Sir Frederick Currie, Sir John Willoughby, Sir Henry Montgomery, and Captain W. J. Eastwick—all of whom supported the Raja's claims to restoration.

Sir John Willoughby in his Minute says :

"The present decision is in contradiction of the public records, which in a continuous stream indicate the intention to restore the administration of Mysore to its native rulers at some future but hitherto undefined period. The Maharajah has never ceased to urge his claim to the restoration of his sovereign rights, and until now has never been peremptorily refused. On the contrary, on more than one occasion hopes have been held out to the Maharajah that restoration would ultimately be made to himself personally."

In a foot-note, he adds:

"In the year 1844, he urged his appeal no less than five times; namely, 15th February, 10th April, 9th May, 11th August and 7th September. He again appealed in June, 1845, and again on the 8th August, 1848, and lastly, and more urgently than ever, on the anticipated retirement of

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* *Ibid.*, p. 98.

† *Mysore Papers*, p. 55.

Sir Mark Cubbon, on the 23rd February, 1861. In these appeals the Maharajah asks many perplexing questions; such, for instance, as, who was to be the judge of when the conditions for restoration prescribed by the Court of Directors have been fulfilled? Had it ever been before heard, that because a Prince or individual had been in his youth extravagant, he should therefore be disinherited? Have not disturbances occured in the Company's territories, as they have done in those of Mysore, without blame being imputed to the governing authorities? Have not the best and most upright of Governments incurred, as he had done, debts? What proportion does my debt bear to the revenues of my country? Finally, he strongly contends, and I think with success, that the original assumption of the administration of Mysore was not justified by the Treaty of 1799. *Vide*, in particular, his letters dated 7th June, 1845, and 8th August 1848, in the last of which he claims the fulfilment of Lord Auckland's promises made in 1836."*

Sir Henry Montgomery in his minute says:

"It is impossible to deny that it has throughout been the professed purpose of the Home authorities to restore to the Rajah the administration of the country; and that they regarded the direct management of it only as a temporary measure. It is said in the Secretary of State's Despatch (17th July, 1863) that 'the state of the finances was such as to afford no security for the punctual payment of the Subsidy; whereas, up to that very period the Subsidy had been paid punctually in advance, and Lord William Bentinck had subsequently recorded his belief that it was at no time in jeopardy."†

In the Despatch of 17th July, 1865, we are told by the Secretary of State that no authority to adopt a successor to the Raj of Mysore had ever been given to the Raja and that no such power could now be conceded.

A reply to the above would be found in the Minute of Dissent of Sir George Clerk, who says:

"This new doctrine regarding adoption is so novel and unjust, so opposed to all customs and religions in India, and so utterly inconsistent with the course of administration as previously exercised during the paramountcy of Hindoos, Mohamedans and ourselves, that I can only conceive it to be the result of wild counsel prompting an indiscriminate gratification of selfish policy which it is endeavoured to veil under a plea of expediency."§

Again, Sir John Lawrence, the Civilian Viceroy, tried to make out that the Maharaja was not a Sovereign Prince, having no rights whatever beyond those conferred upon him by the Subsidiary Treaty.

To this point, Captain Eastwick replied in his minute of dissent. He said:

"With regard to the Maharajah not being a Sovereign Prince, we have never discovered this until lately. It is only since the absorption of Mysore has been contemplated, that we have changed our style of address to the Maharajah, and have adopted language more convenient for our purposes. Up to a very recent date the soveriegnty of the Maharajah has been uninteruptedly acknowledged by the representatives of the British Government and by the Home authorities."**

About these minutes of dissent Major Evans Bell remarks:

"When Sir Henry Montgomery is seen to accuse his own Government of '*a breach of good faith*,' when Sir John Willoughby denounces '*the flagrant injustice*' of the decision; when Sir

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 27.

† *Ibid.*, p. 194.

§ *Mysore Papers*, p. 71

** *Ibid.*, p. 194,

Frederick Currie declares it to be *'unjust and illegal, and a violation ot special treaties, which the British Government have bound themselves to maintain inviolate;'* when Sir George Clerk condemns it as *'the result of wild counsel, prompting the indiscriminate gratification of a selfish policy unworthy of a great nation,'* neither *'honest nor dignified,'* and regrets that *'so loyal a Prince'* should be made *'the victim of such extreme measures'*; and when Captain Eastwick asserts that the treatment of the Rajah *'cannot be justified by our treaty obligations, nor by the law and practice of India'*; what can we expect to be said and thought on the subject by the dependent Sovereigns of India and their advisers and adherents ?"*

It is said that Sir John Lawrence had been favourably disposed towards the Raja, when he was a member of the Council in the more pure and free atmosphere of London. But since his return 'to the attitude of Calcutta,' he changed his views and followed in the footsteps of Lord Canning in refusing the restoration to the Raja.

Unfortunately for the Raja, the 'the five successive occupants of the Viceregal chair,' Dalhousie, Canning, Elgin, Sir William Denison and Sir John Lawrence, all returned adverse replies to his numerous petitions and refused to restore him to his State. At last the old unfortunate Raja died in March 1868, petitioning even to the last the powers that be for "the restoration to me of the Government of my own country, of which I have been temporarily relieved."

Now, what was the effect of this persistent refusal to comply with the just claims of the Raja ? Says Major Evans Bell:

"Such a refusal would not only lower the credit of the Government of India more than could possibly be done by reversal of their decision, but would carry discredit into more remote and vital regions of the States: it would dishonour Her Majesty's Government; it would sully the Crown."†

* *Ibid.*, p. 190:

† Preface, pp. VIII—IX, *The Mysore Reversion.*

CHAPTER VI

THE EVANGELICAL MOVEMENT IN INDIA AND LORD LAWRENCE.

Lord Lawrence took an interest in the Evangelical Movement in India. In this connection it will be interesting to review the policy followed by the British rulers of India towards the spread of Christianity since the foundation of the British Empire in India.

At the very outset it should be mentioned that the East India Company did not encourage the idea of spreading Christianity in India. On the other hand, they at times even refused passports to many missionaries coming to India. So a critic observes that an antagonism was maintained by the East India Company against Christianity with a view to keep their Indian subjects in good humour. A few of the English Governors like Clive and Vansittart were on friendly and even intimate terms with the missionaries in Bengal. But the Company very soon made up its mind and determined not to encourage the spread of Christianity in India. About the close of the eighteenth century, a pressure from without began to swell up around the Company and a new influence or, as Sir Robert Peel would have described it, "the force of existing circumstances," began to operate on the Company's rule. The Company made very strict rules as to the entering of the Christian missionaries into the Company's lands. The law was as follows:

> "Be it further enacted, that if any subject or subjects of his Majesty...not being lawfully licensed or authorised shall at any time or times, directly or indirectly, so sail or repair to be found in the East Indies,...all and every such person and persons are hereby declared to be guilty of a high crime and misdemeanour; and being convicted thereof, shall be liable to such fine or imprisonment, or both fine and imprisonment as the Court in which such person or persons shall be convicted, shall think fit." (33 Geo. III Ch: 52, See. 13.)*

Such was the law passed against the coming of the Christian Missionaries to India. They were first of all to apply to the Court of Directors for permission to come out to India. But it was a known fact that an application to the Court of Directors would meet with a positive refusal.

There had been a great revival of evangelieal work and the Baptist Mission Society had been formed in England. They wanted to send Carey and other Christian missionaries to India. As they thought that they would not get the permission of the Court of Directors, they tried to sail off without their leave. The Captain of the ship, *Earl of Oxford,* agreed to take them on board his ship without leave of the East India Company. The Court of Directors came to know about it and ordered the missionaries to disembark. With the help of Bron Princessa Maria, who was on her way to the Danish settlements in India, Carey was at last brought in a Danish man-of-

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* *The Calcutta Review,* 1858, p. 85.

war to India. As no Christian missionary was allowed by the Company to reside in British India, Carey had to go and settle in the Danish settlement of Serampore.

But the advocates of Evengelical work in India were not idle in England. They tried to put pressure on the Company to make a move for the allowing of mission work in India at the time of the renewal of the Charter in 1793. These advocates, the foremost of whom was Mr. Wilberforce, had the following resolution passed in the House of Commons:

"That it is the peculiar and bounden duty of the legislature to promote, by all just and prudent means, the interest and happiness of the inhabitants of the British dominions in India and that for these ends, such measures ought to be adopted as may gradually tend to their advancement in useful knowledge and to their religious and moral improvement."

But Mr. Wilberforce was not satisfied with this only. He even 'ventured on specific resolutions with a view to establish School Masters and Chaplains throughout India.' In this he was not fully successful, because the Court of Directors proved too strong for him. He said: "But the Court of Directors met and strongly reprobated." He also wrote to Mr. Gisborne; "The East India Directors and proprietors have triumphed. All my clauses were last night struck out in the third reading of the Bill with Dundas' consent!"

Although Mr. Wilberforce was disappointed, he began to champion the cause of the Christian Missionaries, destined to be sent out to India. In 1797 he presented a petition on behalf of R. Haldane, D. Boigne and G. Ewing to the Court of Directors asking permission to sail to India as missionaries. This time also Mr. Wilberforce failed and the petition was refused. The following was the reply sent:

Gentlemen,

The Court of Directors of the East India Company have had under consideration your letter of the 29th ultimo, requesting permission to proceed to India with your families, and reside in the Company's territories for the purpose of instructing the natives of India in the knowledge of the Christian religion; and I have received the Court's commands to acquaint you, that however convinced they may be of the sincerity of your motives, and the zeal with which you appear to be actuated in sacrificing your personal convenience to the religious and moral purposes described in your letter, yet the Court have weighty substantial reasons which induce them to decline a compliance with your request. I am, gentlemen,

Your most obedient
and humble servant,
William Ramsay,
Secretary.*

With the East India Company, the Christian missionaries could not gain much favour. This refusal of permission rather upset the party of Mr. Wilberforce. They found out that 'in pamphlets, periodicals and pastoral effusions, men, both Civil, Military and Clerical, evinced a most bitter hatred to true Christianity.' "It was said at the time," says Dr. Bennett, "that one of the Directors declared he would rather see a band of devils in India than a band of missionaries."†

* *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.
† *Ibid.*, p. 89.

The East India Company had fixity of purpose; they did not want to interfere with the religions of their Hindu and Moslem subjects. They, therefore, had decided on a policy of not encouraging Christianity in India or a *non-religious* policy, as some would put it. They feared that the spread of Christianity in India would bring about a rebellion of the Indian army. They were, therefore, very particular about not allowing any Christian missionary in India. When the Mutiny of Vellore broke out on July 10, 1806, it was ascribed to the attempt on the part of the Indian Government to convert the soldiers into Christianity. After the Vellore Mutiny, the Madras Government tried to show they had nothing to do with the Evangelical movement in India.

On the 3rd of December, 1806, the Governor of Madras issued the following proclamation :

"The Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council having observed that, in some late instances, an extraordinary degree of agitation has prevailed among several corps of the native army of this coast, it has been his Lordship's particular endeavour to ascertain the motives which may have led to conduct so different .... From this enquiry, it has appeared that many persons of evil intentions have endeavoured for malicious purposes to impress upon the native troops a belief that it is the wish of the British Government to convert them by forcible means to Christianity. The Governor in Council, therefore, deems it proper in this public manner, to repeat to the native troops his assurance, that the same respect which has been invariably shown by the British Government for their religion and for their customs will be always continued : and that no interruption will be given to any natives, whether Hindu or Mohamedan, in the practice of his religious ceremonies."*

The East India Company, therefore, continued to show 'the same respect which had been invariably shown by the British Government for their religion and for their customs.

But the advocates of evangelical work in India were not idle by this time. In 1813 the Charter of the Company had to be renewed and at that time "no question bulked more largely in the House than free ingress to interlopers and missionary workers." The people friendly to the religious instruction and moral improvement of India, held a meeting in London and decided to present two petitions to both the Houses of Parliament.

At last, the evangelists succeeded in introducing a resolution into the Charter on the subject of religion, with the help of Lord Castlereagh, who described it as a thing "necessary for the sake of decency." Some members of the house even went so far as to take the whole matter of religious instructions from the hands of the Directors of the Board of Control, and Mr. Wilberforce complained that the resolution of the House of 14th of May, 1793, relative to the religious improvement of India, had not been attended to. He was unwilling to leave the same power in the hands of the Directors for twenty years to come, "who had set their face against the introduction of preachers into the country for twenty years past."

Another enthusiast was the Marquis of Wellesley, who said in the House of Lords that he "had thought it his duty to have the scripture translated into the languages of the East, and to give the learned natives the advantages of access to the sacred fountains

* *Ibid.*, p. 89.

of divine truth. He thought that a Christian Governor could not have done less, and knew that a British Governor ought not to do more."

As the Court of Directors had again and again refused permission to many Christian missionaries to come out to India for the enlightenment of the Indian subjects, their conduct has been characterised by some as "the ignominious tyranny of Leaden Hall Street." As the result of the policy of the Directors, they argued that "atheism reigned at each of the Presidencies."

Another batch of missionaries attempted to enter British India. The party included Messrs. Robinson, Johns and Lawson, who came from America and landed at Calcutta. But the East India Company detained the ship and ordered it to proceed to England. Afterwards the missionaries were asked to sign an agreement to embark at once. Mr. Lawson refused to sign the agreement and was sent to the prison, though released later on. Of the party Johns alone returned and other missionaries abandoned missionary work.

It was followed by another attempt. In 1814 the Baptist Mission Society applied to the Court of Directors for allowing Mr. Yates to proceed to India for missionary work. The permission was peremptorily refused. The second application also met with the same fate. At last, on application to the higher court, the permission was granted.

The Company, down to the time of Lord Canning, followed the same policy of non-interference with the religion of Indians. Lord Canning repeated this policy of the Company in a proclamation issued just before the outbreak of the Sepoy Mutiny. He said :

> He knows that endeavours are made to persuade Hindoos and Mussalmans, soldiers and civil subjects, that their religion is threatened secretly, as well as openly, by the acts of the Government, and that the Government is seeking in various ways to entrap them into a loss of caste for purposes of its own.
>
> Some have been already deceived, and led astray by these tales.
>
> Once more, then, the Governor-General in Council warns all classes against the deceptions that are practised on them.
>
> The Governor-General has invariably treated the religious feelings of all its subjects with careful respect. The Governor-General in Council has declared that it will never cease to do so. He now repeats that declaration and he emphatically proclaims that the Goverment of India entertains no desire to interfere with religion or caste, and that nothing has been done before or will be done by the Government to affect the free exercise of the observances of religion or caste by every class of the people."

That was the policy followed by the East India Company during the many years of its rule. In commenting on this policy of the East India Company a writer in the *Calcutta Review* says :

> Such is a brief outline of the non-religious policy of the Company; a resolute opposition to Christianity characterised it from its origin to its close; not indeed the courage which arises from calculation, but the courage which springs from sheer indifference. To the Company it has been nothing that the growing Puritanism of England has loudly condemned their policy. Never perhaps was a policy more determinedly opposed with smaller effect in irritating the temper of those by whom it was upheld.*

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* *The Calcutta Review*, 1858, p. 93.

The friends of evangelical work in India naturally could not see eye to eye with this anti-missionary spirit of the East India Company. They strongly criticised this policy and tried their best to change it. The result of their persistent and continuous agitation was the incorporation in the Charter Act of 1813 of two provisions, (1) granting selected missionaries license to come to India to preach, and (2) providing for the establishment of a Bishop at Calcutta (for all India) and an Archdeacon for each of the Presidencies.*

Thus a small measure of freedom was granted to the Church of England Missionaries to begin evangelical work in India. Later on this jealous vigilance was gradually relaxed, and other Missionary Societies of England and America and belonging to different church organisations were allowed to come to India and do evangelical work unhampered by the Government of India, the Church of England alone receiving official patronage. This is the present state of affairs.

Indians have nothing to be thankful for to the East India Company for their anti-missionary spirit. One of the motives which prompted this spirit of the early British rulers of India was the fear of criticism and exposure to the public in England and Europe of their misrule by their own countrymen, the missionaries, who, imbued with the true Christian spirit, were expected to be just and fair-minded. We cannot understand why, if the tea-planters, indigo-planters and jute merchants were allowed to come and inaugurate their *mammon raj* over the poor peasants and sometimes do Satan's work, the Christian missionaries were stopped from coming, who were expected to do God's work. Educating the people being one of the most important part of their evangelical work the missionaries did much of the pioneer work in spreading English education in India and then set the government of the country on the road to follow suit. The Christian Missionary Societies thus contributed and are still contributing largely to the spread of English education in India.

If the early British rulers erred on the side of extreme antagonism to Christian Missionaries, the post-Mutiny British Government in India, however, erred on the side of extreme partisanship, which harmed rather than helped the cause of Christianity. The extreme partisanship and the evangelical zeal shown by the Punjab Government under Colonel Edwardes, the lieutenant of Sir John Lawrence, the Viceroy, which went against the letter and spirit of the Queen's Proclamation, did much harm to make both Christianity and the British Government unpopular. Colonel Edwardes failed to grasp the fundamental fact that partisanship of a Government for any particular religion in a country where many other religions exist, only serves to antagonise public feeling against that particular religion ; for Government advocacy for a religion brings in an idea of force or compulsion, whether it is actully used or not ; and though force might have won converts, it never popularised a religion in the world.

Sir John Lawrence took an active interest in Christian mission work, but the zeal and open partisanship of his lieutenant Colonel Edwardes, the Chief Commissioner in the Punjab, far exceeded his master's. Although the gallant Colonel happened to be

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* *Growth of the Indian Constitution*, by N. N. Ghosh, p. 49.

Sir John Lawrence's friend, whom he mentioned in his dispatch to Lord Dalhousie in 1853 in terms of the most affectionate intimacy, yet he could not sanction *in toto* his favourite programme of purifying the Punjab. Colonel Edwardes advocated the inclusion of the 'Bible and of Christian teaching in Government schools.' The reprehensible part of the Colonel's programme was that he advocated

(1) that native religions ought not to be taught in Government schools, and native religions should not be endowed by the public revenue, and (3) the recognition of caste, (4) the observance of native holidays in public offices, (5) the administration by the English of Hindu and Mohammedan law, and (6) the publicity of Hindu and Mohammedan processions should be stopped."*

Sir John Lawrence, although he was in general sympathy with the spirit of the programme, accepted only a small, non-controversial part of the scheme, and crticised and rejected the rest. Edwardes' programme, Sir John Lawrence said, "would have upset the coach. It would have been essentially unjust, and as such, it must infallibly have retarded the spread of Christianity." And it was this conviction which led Sir John Lawrence some years afterwards, when it was his business as Governor-General to select a candidate for the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab, "to postpone the otherwise paramount claims of Edwardes to those of the more *cool-fieaded* (italics are ours) Donald Macleod."†

* See Colonel Edwardes' Memorandum on The elimination of all un-Christian principles from the Government of India.

† *Life of Lord Lawrence*

CHAPTER VII

LORD LAWRENCE (*continued*)

THE GREAT DURBAR AT LAHORE.

Before the great Durbar took place at Lahore, the Viceroy was welcomed by Sir Robert Montgomery, the successor of Sir John Lawrence as the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. They followed almost the same policy. Sir Robert Montgomery reminded the Viceroy:

"We were school-fellows together in Ireland, as were also his distinguished brothers, Henry and George Lawrence. We separated for many years, and did not meet again until the annexation of the Punjab, when I saw that the strong will of the boy had ripened into the determined man—clear, vigorous and energetic, just and impartial. He was feared and respected by all, and his administration became a model for other provinces."

It is to be seen that Sir John Lawrence did not forget his school-fellow, who had followed his policy in the Punjab. He said:

"Sir Robert has told you that we were school-fellows forty years ago. I wish he had left out the forty years. .. Well, it is quite true that we were at school together forty years ago, at a place very famous in history, Londonderry, celebrated for defending itself against great odds. .. But, gentlemen, I think that whatever I may have done, my lieutenant, Sir Robert Montgomery, did almost more.... Six years ago, I left this country with a shattered constitution, after many years' hard work. But I left it in the hands of Sir Robert Montgomery. My mantle could not have fallen upon better shoulders. And when I look around me and see the smiling, happy faces of a contented people, and the material improvements which have been made under his guidance, it sometimes seems to me that it would have been well had the mantle fallen upon him sooner."

Such words of mutual praise passed between the two class-fellows—the master and the lieutenant.

In the Durbar, Sir John Lawrence addressed the chiefs in Hindustani, 'that *lingua franca* which everybody in India understands or ought to understand.' In the course of his address, he said:

My friends ! It is now more than eighteen years since I first saw Lahore. For thirteen years I lived in the Punjab. For many years my brother, Sir Henry Lawrence, and I governed this vast country. You all knew him well, and his memory will ever dwell in your hearts as a ruler who was a real friend of its people. I may truly say that from the day we exercised authority in the land, we spared neither our time, nor our labour, nor our health, in endeavouring to accomplish the work which we had undertaken. We studied to make ourselves acquainted with the usages, the feelings, and the wants of every class and race ; and we endeavoured to improve the condition of all. There are few parts of this province which I have not visited, and which I hope that I did not leave, in some degree, the better for my visit. Since British rule was introduced taxation of all kinds has been lightened, canals and roads have been constructed, and schools of learning have been established. From the highest to the lowest, the people have become contented, and have proved loyal. When the great military revolt of 1857 occurred, they aided their rulers most effectively in putting it down. The chiefs mustered their contingents, which served faithfully, and thousands

of Punjabi soldiers flocked to our standards, and shared with the British troops the glories, as well as the hardships of that great struggle.

He also gave the following advice to the Rajas assembled :

"If it be wise for the rulers of a country to understand the language and appreciate the feelings of its people, it is as important that the people should have a similar knowledge of their rulers. It is only by such means that the two classes can live happily together. To this end, I urge you to instruct your sons, and even your daughters." *

HIS FINANCIAL POLICY

Sir John Lawrence gave his attention to the financial condition of the Government of India. In the winter of 1864—1865 there were sad anticipations of a general drought. The great military works under contemplation were to cost the enormous sum of ten million pounds sterling ! There was a demand for a general rise of salaries, and every item of expenditure in every branch of the service was steadily increasing.' He, therefore, wanted to effect economy in every Department. About his financial policy, he writes :

Our financial prospects are very gloomy indeed. The *furore* for expenditure is excessive. A considerable sum must be laid out in building new barracks and improving the old ones. But the tendency is to overdo the matter. I would limit this, if I could hope for any support, but this I do not see. Sir Hugh Rose and Napier have no regard for financial considerations, and Frere is worse than anybody. It was only the other day that he wanted to pay four lacs of rupees for twenty acres of land on which to construct a lunatic asylum near Bombay ! He has also allowed buildings to be erected at Kurrachi for the Telegraphic Department, which will cost two and three quarter lacs of rupees by the time they are finished. I really believe that it is not practicable to add much to our income in India. You know that I have often said this, long before there was ever any expectation of my coming out. It is most difficult to raise revenue by indirect taxation, and direct taxation necessitates inquiry, which again engenders opposition and discontent.†

The financial policy of Sir John Lawrence was directed towards increasing "*our income in India.*" He, therefore, wanted to "limit" the expenditure in British India, so that there might be a good saving. But in economy, he could hope for no support from anybody.

THE ABYSSINIAN WAR

When the Abyssinian War was going on, Indian troops had been sent out to fight for the British there. A proposal was made that the cost of those Indian troops should be met by the Indian Government. Sir John Lawrence did not agree to this proposal, In protesting against it, he said :

"I am very sorry to hear of the decision that India is to continue to pay for the ordinary expenses of the troops employed from this country in Abyssinia. It does not appear to me to be a fair arrangement, and I fully anticipate that it will create a good deal of excitement and, perhaps, some indignation; the more particularly as our finances are now at a very low ebb. Surely this is neither a question of hiring or lending, but simply one of payment by the country which employes the troops. I believe that I am right in saying that all the expenses of the British troops employed

* *Life of Lord Lawrence*, p. 495.

† *Ibid.*, p. 499.

in the Mutiny who came from England, were paid out of the revenues of India. I recollect very well that, in 1859 and 1860, India was even charged for the cost of an unreasonably large number of men who were accumulated in the depots in England, nominally for the Indian service. Then again, in the last China war, *all* the pay, and all the expenses of the troops sent from India to China, were charged to England. In the war with Persia in 1855-56, the expenses of the campaign were divided between India and England, because it was considered that both countries were interested in the objects of the war. In the present case, India has no interest whatever in the Abyssinian expedition, and it appears therefore to me that she should pay none of its cost."*

Sir John Lawrence was quite right in saying that as India had no interest whatever in the Abyssinian expedition, she should pay none of its cost.

THE ORISSA FAMINE (1866-67).

The Orissa Famine was the most intense India had seen. It caused great distress in Orissa. This Famine in Orissa almost stood alone in the intense distress caused by it. The causes leading to this great Famine were noted by the Famine Commission of 1878. The Commission wrote :

This drought (of 1865) fell with far greater intensity on Orissa in Bengal, whereas no such calamity had occurred in the whole province for nearly a century. It had to be dealt with by a body of officials necessarily ignorant of the signs of its approach, unprepared to expect it, and inexperienced in the administration of relief measures : nor were the inhabitants of Orissa in any respect more aware of what was coming on them than the British Officers. The area most affected was about 12,000 sq. miles, with a population of about 40,00,000. The rainfall of 1865 was scanty and ceased prematurely, so that the out-turn of the great crop of winter rice, on which the country mainly depends, was reckoned at less than a third of the average crop. Food stocks were low, both because export had been unusually brisk of late, and because the people had not been taught by precarious seasons to protect themselves by retaining sufficient stores at home. When the harvest failed, so totally new to them was the situation that no one realised its meaning and its probable results. The Local Government and officials not taking alarm and misconceiving the gravity of the occasion abstained from making special inquiries, prices long remained so moderate that they offered no temptation to importers, and forced no reduction in consumption on the inhabitants, till suddenly the province was found to be almost bare of food. It was only in May 1866 that it was discovered that the markets were so empty that the jail prisoners and the Government establishments could not be supplied. But the southern monsoon had now begun and importation by sea or land became nearly impossible. Orissa was at that time almost isolated from the rest of India, the only road, leading to Calcutta across a country intersected by large rivers and liable to inundation, was unmetalled and unbridged, and there was very little communication by sea ; for what trade there was had hitherto been a purely export trade carried on in the months of fine weather. No relief could be obtained from the south, where lay the district of Ganjam, itself severely distressed. By great exertions and at an enormous cost the Government threw in about 10,000 tons of food grain by the end of November, and this was given away gratuitously, or sold at low rates, or distributed in wages to the starving population, saving no doubt many thousands of lives. But meanwhile the mortality among those whom this relief did not reach, or reached too late, had been very great ; and it was estimated that about a third of the population, or nearly 10,000,000 persons, had died. Nor did the troubles of Orissa cease with this. The rainfall of the year was so heavy as to cause great floods in the Mahanadi, and while the harvests in all the higher lands were excellent, in all the low lands the inundations drowned the crop. In the ensuing year, 1867, after a

* *Ibid.*, p. 513.

brief respite during which hopes were entertained, which were not to be realised, that the distress had come to a close, the work of relief had to be taken up again. Then, as an apparent result of the reaction following the want of foresight and activity in affording help in the preceding year, the relief operations were marked by a profusion and absence of check hitherto unexampled. Altogether about 40,000 tons of rice were imported, of which even the lavish use made of it could not dispose of half; and while it cost four times the usual price, the residue had to be sold for almost nothing when the monsoon of 1867, followed by an unusually fine harvest, had altogether put an end to the famine in 1868. The total amount of money expended in Orissa was about Rs. 1,45,00,000, so that in this famine the relief seems to have been at once less efficient and more costly than that given on any previous occasion."

Thus wrote the Famine Commission of 1878. A Commission composed of Mr. George Campbell (afterwards Sir G. Campbell), as President, Colonel W. E. Morton, R. E. and Mr. H. L. Dampier as members, was appointed in December, 1866, by Sir John Lawrence, with instructions to report on the causes, circumstances and, extent of the famine, and to suggest remedial measures against the recurrence of a similar disaster. They submitted their report on 6th April, 1867.

Now, the question is: Who was responsible for not taking preventive measures in due time? Who should be held responsible for the loss of 10,000,000 human beings in Orissa?

Both Sir John Lawrence and Sir Cecil Beadon (the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal) tried to defend themselves. Sir John Lawrence put the blame on Sir Cecil Beadon. In his despatch Sir John Lawrence wrote:

"The question on which Lord Cranborne more especially asked our opinion is that of the judgment to be passed on the conduct and policy of the Local Government of Bengal in dealing with this great calamity. It is with very deep regret that, after a careful review of that conduct and policy—a review which we trust we have made with the deliberation demanded not only by the high official position, but by the long and distinguished services of Sir Cecil Beadon--we find ourselves unable to speak with satisfaction or approval of the mode in which the emergency was met by the Lieutenant-Governor."

Again, in another place he says:

"We are convinced that, if the extent and imminence of the danger had been brought home to the Lieutenant-Governor, no officer in the service of Her Majesty would have been more forward in exertions or personal sacrifices for the sake of mitigating or averting it. But it would appear that until comparatively late in the history of these events, the Head of the Bengal Government labored under what may be described as an incapacity to believe in disaster; and we think that the result of this frame of mind was that he neglected warnings which were not obscure, and wasted valuable opportunities, both of inquiry and of action. We, of course, admit it to be uncertain what number of lives which have been lost could have been saved by human efforts promptly applied. The records of similar calamities would seem to show that, under any circumstances, there must have been very great loss of life. But we have the satisfaction of knowing that, on the occasion of those calamities, the foresight and diligence exhibited by the local representatives of the British Government were not unworthy of the emergencies which had arisen. We regret that we cannot make the same statement of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, so far as relates to the latter month of 1865 and the earlier months of 1866. At the same time we cordially

join in the tribute paid by Lord Cranborne to the activity and zeal displayed by the Lieutenant-Governor as soon as the true condition of the people of Orissa was understood."*

Sir Cecil Beadon thus tried to defend his own policy during the Orissa Famine. In his Minute, he wrote :

It is also, I think, very much to be regretted that the Government of India should have felt themselves obliged to pass judgment on the conduct of individual officers without giving them an opportunity of explaining it.

".. in the middle of October, 1865, as soon as the failure of the principal rice crops gave indications of approaching scarcity, the Board were desired to make a comprehensive Report on the state and the prospects of the country ...This report and my orders thereon were submitted to the Government of India on the 11th December, and it is to me a matter of exceeding regret that neither then nor subsequently on receipt of my official communications of the 19th December, 8th January, 5th and 20th February, and 28th March (all showing the wide extent of the scarcity and the means taken to relieve it), nor again when I returned from Orissa in February, and related to the Governor-General what I had seen there and the impressions I had derived from my visit, did the Government of India, though having experience of Famines which neither I nor any of the officers or inhabitants of Bengal or Orissa, had, utter a single word for our guidance, or even warn me that the consequences of the impending famine might be more serious than then seemed probable, or that the measures taken to avert them might not be sufficient."

"The Government of India are pleased to consider that I laboured under an incapacity to believe in disaster. I fully believed in the disaster that was likely to be caused by the failure of crops of 1865, and did all that a Government could do to avert it ; but I did not believe nor did any one else believe, that there would not be food enough in the province to feed the people or that the stock of old rice (which the Commission admit to have been considerable, and which were far from exhausted when their enquiry was held), supplemented by private importation, would not suffice for all."

Sir Stafford Northcote, the Secretary of State for India, in his Despatch of the 25th July, 1867, tried to find out who was really responsible for the disaster and censured the Government of Bengal for 'want of foresight and of energy.' He wrote:

"It is hardly necessary for me to say how deeply Her Majesty's Government, and indeed all classes of people in this country, have been affected by the heavy calamity with which it has pleased Providence to visit that portion of the British Empire. Such a visitation, even if we could console ourselves with the reflection that every available means had been used to avert and to mitigate it, must necessarily be felt as a severe misfortune ; and I deeply regret that on the present occasion that consolation is denied to me. I am reluctantly brought to the conclusion that, though the melancholy loss of life which the Commissioners report may be due mainly to natural and inevitable causes, there has been a most unfortunate want of foresight and of energy on the part of those who were charged with the administration of the Province where it occurred ; and that some grave errors of judgment have been committed.

"It appears to me, after an examination of the Report and of the evidence on which it is founded, that it would not be just to throw the blame of the failure, which is but too clearly brought to light, exclusively upon any particular individual. The prominent position of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and his immediate and direct responsibility for the proper administration of his Presidency, cannot fail to attract the closest attention to his conduct, and to expose him to the strictest criticism, and I am bound to add, to some animadversions the justice of which cannot be disputed. But it would be wrong to judge Sir C. Beadon by the light of subsequent events,

* Quoted in *Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors,* Vol. I., p. 369.

without taking into consideration the circumstances in which he found himself placed, and the amount of assistance which he received from those on whom he had a right to rely for information and advice. His conduct, when he at last became fully alive to the magnitue of the calamity, affords sufficient proof that his previous incapacity was due not to indifference, but to an imperfect apprehension of the facts of the case ; and it is fair to inquire how far that imperfection is attributable to his own failure in energy or in sagacity, and how far to the nature of the report which he received from others.

The Secretary of State did not even spare Sir John Lawrence for not exercising his influence in favour of a more vigorous policy. He wrote in the same despatch:

"While expressing my regret at this error on the part of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, I cannot but say, that I think it unfortunate that the Government of India, although their attention appears to have been especially called to the subject, did not exercise their influence in favour of a more vigorous course of action. The close relations between the Government of India and that of Bengal and the opportunities which exist for personal communication with the Lieutenant-Governor would naturally bring a question of this importance continually under your notice, and you were, no doubt, cognizant of most of the proceedings with respect to it. I learn from your Minute of the 25th April last that your Excellency was personally of opinion, at an early period of the distress, that it might become desirable to import food. That opinion was not shared by the Members of your Council, and was not acted upon. The amount of information actually in possession of the Government at that time was, perhaps, hardly sufficient to justify so exceptional a measure, but it was, I think, enough to have awakend the most serious apprehensions and to have induced your Government to urge the Lieutenant-Governor to undertake an immediate and searching inquiry."

Then the Secretary of State throws the blame upon the Board of Revenue. He says:

"Had the Government, as soon as their attention was called to the subject, instituted a strict inquiry into the actual condition of the district, and made public the result, there can be little doubt that supplies would speedily have been sent there, or that, if private enterprise had failed to provide them, the Government would have seen their way to supplement it by their own action. But this was not done; and it must be asked why it was not done.

"The responsibility for the omission appears to me to rest chiefly upon the Board of Revenue."

Again, the Secretary of State takes up the case of Sir Cecil Beadon and says:

"It becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire whether the imperfections of Sir C. Beadon's personal investigations are to be attributed to his own fault or to the faults of others. It appears to me, after careful consideration, that they are to be attributed partly to the one and partly to the other. Undoubtedly, he had been misled by the representations which had reached him through the Board of Revenue, and had come with preconceived views, which he could not readily lay aside. Undoubtedly, too, those who accompanied him, and who ought to have been peculiarly well qualified to form a judgment,--I refer to Mr. Cockburn and Colonel Nicolls,—shared his belief that matters were in a much better state than, unfortunately, they really were. Still after making allowance for all these considerations, I am obliged to say that Sir C. Beadon did not, upon this occasion, show the energy or the sagacity which might have been expected from an officer of such high distinction and such well-deserved reputation. It was to be expected that, having undertaken this visit, he would have made a minute personal inquiry into the real state of the district, and would not have been satisfied with the general statements of the local officers, but would have questioned them closely, demanded explanations of their alarming telegrams and other representations, and would have tested their evidence both by cross-examination and by comparing it with that of others. Such an examination would probably have started them from their security, and brought them to a

proper appreciation of the facts of the case. It is, therefore, the more lamentable that this, the last chance of amelioration, should have been lost."

On the 2nd August, 1867, a debate took place in the House of Commons on the Orissa Famine. The general tendency of the debate was to hold Sir C. Beadon responsible and to exculpate Sir John Lawrence and the Government of India. Sir Stafford Northcote as the Secretary of State for India in winding up the debate said:

"This catastrophe must always remain a monument of our failure, a humiliation to the people of this country, to the Government of this country, and to those of our Indian officials of whom we had been perhaps a little too proud. At the same time, we must hope that we might derive from it reasons which might be of real value to ourselves, and that out of this deplorable evil good of no insignificant kind might ultimately arise."*

Now, for this monumental failure, this terrible Famine in Orissa, both Sir John Lawrence and Sir C. Beadon were responsible, though each tried to put the blame on the other. It has been observed by Sir Richard Temple that the Famine in Orissa probably caused Sir John Lawrence more grief than any other event during his rule. Sir John Lawrence thus wrote about his policy during the Orissa Famine:

"The weak point, as regards the Government of India, is, no doubt, the circumstance that we did not interfere early in the day, and insist on the Lieutenant-Governor importing food. I myself wished to do so simply as a measure of security. But my council was against me, and I had no data which would have warranted my overruling them. No doubt, I ought to have done this irrespective of all considerations. But it is difficult to act decisively when there is no certainty what may be the view the authorities will take of an act of this kind."

Again, Sir John Lawrence thus wrote of the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir C. Beadon:

"Sir C. Beadon is a man of decided ability and kindly nature. But all the best years of his life have been passed in the Secretary's office, and hence he has learnt to depend on others for information, and not to seek it out himself. These circumstances, and his general bad health of late years, account to me for the mistakes he made. In any other way, I cannot understand how he could have gone to Orissa and not have discovered the miserable condition of the people and the calamity which was impending over them."

On the 12th February, 1867, a public meeting was held in Calcutta to raise funds in aid of famine relief in Orissa. The gravity of the situation in Orissa may be understood from the following speech of Sir John Lawrence, who presided over the meeting. He said:

"I will here remind you that in 1865 there was a general failure of the crops in the three districts of Orissa, followed by very indifferent harvest in 1865, while in the autumn of that year a large part of the province was also inundated. The floods of the Mahanadi and other rivers broke through their embankments and submerged extensive tracts of land in their vicinity. All the crops in these localities were spoiled, and property which had escaped the famine was carried away or destroyed. What the drought had spared was engulfed in the wide vortex of water. In this way half the district of Cuttuck alone, extending over an area of 1,500 miles, has been devastated. From the most reliable accounts it is estimated that from ⅕th to ¼th of the population of the province has already perished. What Famine and starvation began, diarrhœa and pestilence have completed. It is estimated that we may have to import into the province not less than 1,200,000 *maunds* of rice, equal to about 27,000 tons. We have already arranged for the introduction of half the quantity by

* *Ibid.*, p. 386.

the 1st of April, and the rest will follow as rapidly as may be found necessary. There were already 1,500 orphan children to be provided for, which might increase to 2,000 more, and 10 lakhs of rupees, or £100,000, would be required for their maintenance."

The Viceroy headed the list of subscriptions with Rs. 10,000, and eight other persons subscribed Rs. 2,500 each on the spot.

But the famine relief work in Orissa was anything but satisfactory—the whole thing was grossly mismanaged by the Government officials. A large sum of money was squandered away. Thus writes the Famine Commission of 1878 about the Famine management of 1867 :

"It is a melancholy reflection that, while a larger sum of money was spent on this Famine than had ever been spent before, it should be associated in history only with the memory of a greater mortality than had ever been recorded. But the cause of this is not hard to find. The measures taken in 1867 were a violent reaction from the policy of 1866: and no expenditure was thought too large to incur in shutting the stable-door, although the steed was irrecoverably lost. The officers who administered the charitable funds were mainly impressed with the necessity of forcing relief upon the people and making it so attractive to them that no one could refuse it: and hence the cost of this relief was abnormally large. Whether in the relief-houses, on light labour, or in the employment given to spinners and weavers, the wages and the food amounted to far more than a bare subsistence allowance, and there can be little doubt that many were tempted by these high rates to accept relief who were not in absolute need. So again, no experienced person can read the account of the village relief system without seeing that the officials were too few and too new to the work, and the time was too short for them to acquire any real knowledge as to the condition of the people who clamoured for relief; they were obliged either to accept all comers, or to be guided by the rudest of all tests, that of outward appearance, in their admissions and rejections. Still, the destruction of property and comfort, and the moral shock to the whole population in the preceding year, had been so terrible that there can seldom have been a country in which the employment of tests to keep off the undeserving was less necessary: and, though many who were relieved cannot have been in severe want, they can hardly have been altogether free from want. The main evil of the lavish and somewhat indiscriminate relief became evident in the tone both of the public and the official mind in 1873, when with a far less serious calamity to the crops, the same determination was shown to make relief pleasant and acceptable, and the same ruinous system was adopted of paying the pauper at a higher rate of wage or food than could be earned by the independent labourer.

"As to the policy of importing grain, it seems to have been mainly a mistake. Mr. Schaich's investigations were of the most summary and superficial character: his estimates of the area and population of the inundated tracts, and of the extent of the injury done to the crops, were but rough approximations, and his calculation that the crop saved would supply food for only half the population of these tracts was a guess which was proved erroneous by the event. No information seems to have existed as to the extent to which private trade was active, or could have been stimulated to activity. The resolution to import grain seems to have been come to, as if that had been the universal practice of all time—a proceeding which required neither defence nor argument; and it is so accepted by the local officers, who assume that it is the only way in which the necessities of their relief measures can be supplied. It is very probable that some measures were inevitable to place supplies ready for the carrying on of charitable and labour relief; but it never seems to have occurred to any one to inquire whether the required quantity could not have been supplied by the process of giving advances to trading firms on the spot rather than by expensive agency of Government officers. In any case, it is clear that the quantity imported was enormously in excess of what was required. The Relief Committee used less than a third of the million maunds imported at so great a cost; of the rest a small quantity only was sold to a necessitous public, and the

balance had to be parted with for next to nothing. Of the total sum spent in 1867 on this object, at least two-thirds, or 28 lakhs of rupees, were absolutely thrown away."*

The total amount of money spent by the Government for the purpose of famine relief in Orissa was Rupees 1,45,00,000, out of which, according to the estimate of the Famine Commission of 1878, 28 lakhs of rupees were absolutely thrown away.

THE BHUTAN WAR.

Though the Queeen's Proclamation solemnly declared, "We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions," yet we find the British Government occupying a strip of land from the kingdom of Bhutan. Sir John Lawrence could not check his "earth hunger," and it became manifest in his fights with the Bhutanese.

The Government of India without much difficulty found out a cause for quarrelling with the Bhutanese king. In the proclamation of the 12th of November, 1864, they declared :

> For many years past outrages have been committed by subjects of the Bhutan Government within British territory, and in the territories of the Rajas of Sikhim and Kuch Bihar. In these outrages property has been plundered and destroyed, lives have been taken, and many innocent persons have been carried into and are still held in captivity....
>
> In 1863 the Government of India, being averse to the adoption of extreme measures for the protection of its subjects and dependent allies, despatched a special Mission to the Bhutan Court,... but the British Envoy was insulted in open *darbar* and compelled, as the only means of ensuring the safe return of the Mission, to sign a document which the Government of India could only instantly repudiate.
>
> For this insult the Governor-General in Council determined to withhold for ever the annual payments previously made to the Bhutan Government on account of the revenues of the Assam Duars and Ambari Falakata, which had long been in the occupation of the British Government, and *annexed those districts permanently to the British territory*. ..
>
> The Governor-General in Council has therefore reluctantly resolved to occupy permanently and *annex to British territory the Bengal Duars of Bhutan*, and so much of the Hill territory including the Forts of Dalingkote, Pasaka and Dewangiri, as may be necessary to command the passes, and to prevent the hostile or predatory incursions of Bhutanese into the Darjeeling District or into the plains below.

Thus began the "earth-hunger" of the India Government under Sir John Lawerence.

About the cause of the Bhutan War, the Secretary of State, Sir C. Wood, writes in his Despatch of the 1st February, 1866 :

> On his arrivat at Punakha, Mr. Eden (the British envoy to Bhutan) was subjected to such gross insults and indignities at the hands of certain high officers of the Bhutan Government, that it became impossible for your Excellency to refrain from exacting reparation from a State that had so outraged the British Government in the person of its Envoy. Accordingly, a military expedition was equipped for service in Bhutan in the cold season of 1864.

The result of this military expedition into Bhutan was the conclusion of a treaty between the Bhutan and British Governments. About the terms of the treaty Sir C. Wood writes :

> The Bhutan Government agreed to surrender all British subjects and all subjects of Kuch Bihar

* *Ibid.*, pp. 391-392.

and Sikhim detained in Bhutan against their will, and subscribed to 'articles for the mutual extradition of criminals, the maintenance of free trade between the two countries, and the arbitration by the British Government of all disputes between rhe Bhutan Government and the chiefs of Kuch Bihar and Sikhim.

They were further required to cede, in peipetual sovereignty, to the British Government the whole of the plain country known as the Duars, not only those which had been for some time in British occupation, but also the Western Duars adjacent to Bengal, which had not been so occupied before the commencement of hostilities (making in the aggregate 18) together with certain hill posts protecting the passes into Bhutan. The country thus ceded was estimated to yield an annual revenue of about a lakh and a half of rupees, or £15,000 per annum."*

Here follows the apology of the Secretary of State of the Queen Victoria, who had declared in her Proclamation to the people of India that she desirsd no extension of her territories in India. Sir Charles Wood wrote thus :

Although the British Government had no desire to extend its frontiers by taking possession of the Duars, it was necessary that you should mark your sense of the misconduct of the Bhutia rulers in the most palpable and lasting manner ; and still more was it necessary for the due protection of the inhabitants of the British provinces on the borders of Bhutan and also of the people of Sikhim and Kuch Bihar, that after the experience of so many years of rapine, the Duars should be occupied by the British Government. But it was necessary, and I concur in opinion with your Excellency's Government that it was not desirable to impoverish the Bhutan State, by absorbing the entire revenues of the country which you had determined to annex, and which yielded a large part of the public income of Bhutan. To have alienated from its former Government the whole of those revenues would have seriously weakened the power of the Bhutan authorities, and this might have led to a continuance of the anarchy within the territories of the Bhutia Rajas, and those continual maraudings and depredations across the frontiers, which have rendered necessary the intervention of your Government. The existence of a stiong Government in the neighbouring States, and the prosperity of their subjects, are among the best securities for the permanent peace of our frontiers. To deprive the Government of a contiguous country of the means of enforcing its authority over its chiefs and functionaries and of compelling them to execute the engagements which it has entered into for the maintenance of the peace and security of our frontier, can in no case be sound policy. In this view, it would not be advisable to impair the resources of the Bhutan State to the extent that must have resulted from the abstraction of the entire revenues of the Duars."†

During the first encounter in this Bhutan War, the British had succeeded in taking the Fort of Dewangiri. But the Bhutanese attacked Colonel Campbell, who was in charge of the British troops at Dewangiri. The retreat of Colonel Campbell from Dewangiri has thus been described by an English writer :

Taking fresh courage now, they (the Bhutanese) took possession of the mouth of the pass, thus cutting off Campbell's communications with Assam, and began to erect a stockade within 600 yards of his camp. At this point the Bhutanese were 5,000 strong, each matchlockman carrying a flask of powder, a bag with 100 bullets, six pounds of rice, and twenty stones, each sufficient to stun a man (Calcutta *Englishman*).

It was now deemed impracticable, with the small force in Dewangiri, to dislodge the enemy from their position before it, and water was imperiously required. Hence Campbell contrived to dispatch a messenger to Brigadier Mulcaster, urgently requesting aid, but was told that the force he had with him was sufficient to hold Dewangiri, which commanded the five great passes into the mountains ; yet Darungah, the great central one, was now in possession of the enemy,

* *Ibid.*, p. 311.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 311-12

Ammunition, which he at least expected, failed to reach Colonel Campbell, who finding his position a desperate one, resolved, on the night of the 4th of February, to abandon it, and endeavour to reach the plains of Assam by a valley in the hills known as the Libia Pass. Secretly and quickly he made all his preparations. Of the 43rd he told off 250 men to carry and escort the sick and wounded, fifty to carry two twelve-pound howitzers, while the remainder of his force (only 200 bayonets) formed the advance and rear guards.

In silence—for their lives depended upon it—the troops began their downward march, amid darkness, at one o'clock on the morning of the 5th ; but the enemy were aroused, and the march had to be covered by a fire from the pickets; and soon the extreme difficulty of such a retreat became apparent, as it was made amid pitchy gloom, among the wildest and most stupendous mountain ranges in the world. The main column lost its way, and a panic ensued. The cannon had to be abandoned, and, by order of Captain Cockburn, of the Royal Artillery, they were hurled over a tremendous cliff, where, however, they were found by the Bhutanese. After many perils and much suffering, Campbell's troops reached Mulcaster's head-quarters ; but all their baggage was taken, together with the wounded, who, instead of being butchered, as all expected they would be, were fed, kindly treated, and all sent in, each man with a small present, by order of old Tongso Punlow, who was then suffering from a bullet in his chest.*

As the result of the Bhutan War, "the whole of the Bhutia possessions in the plains thus became British, and a slip of British hill territory was interposed between Bhutan and Sikhim, whereby it became practicable to open a direct route into Tibet without passing through any intermediate foreign territory." In respect to the Duars, which, thanks to the earth-hunger policy of Sir John Lawrence, now was annexed by the British, the India Government agreed to pay to the Bhutanese Government Rs. 50,000 during the *good conduct* of the Bhutia Government.

SIR JOHN LAWRENCE -A FAILURE

That the rule of the first Civilian Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, was a failure, is admitted by many writers. Thus Babu Kristodas Pal, in reviewing the administration of Sir John Lawrence, said :

He was every inch a routine governor. He originated nothing important, carried out nothing grand. He has followed and not led his councillors. His whole administration is characterised by masterly inactivity. His past experience, his knowledge of the Indian character and acquaintance with the details of Indian Government have conferred no special benefit on the people. Of course the country has progressed during the five years that he has ruled over us, but nothing can stay its progress. The tide is rolling on and no Canute can command it back. The genius of the English Government and of the English institutions which have been introduced here, and of English civilisation, will not permit retrogression. It would have been a merit in Sir John if he, as the head of the Government, taking advantage of the onward march of time, had given it a great impetus. But his whole administration had been unhappily characterised by what is called *masterly inactivity*. If is said Sir John has not, at any rate, done any positive mischief, but that is a negative merit and we have yet to know that for that a ruler deserves a statue. We can believe that Sir John meant well but it is only the Almighty that can dive into the heart.

At the very beginning of his administration, Sir John Lawrence estranged the people of India on two occasions. He issued orders excluding the Indians from attending Viceregal balls and entertainments. Commenting on this action, Mr. Thurlow writes :

Cassell's *Illustrated History of India*, II, p. 369.

"The step thus taken by Sir John Lawrence at the outset of his viceroyalty, whether right or wrong, was retrograde, and as such affords cause for great regret. It was a blow struck at the native social character, in such a manner as to go home to those most intimate with Europeans, and most partial to the aspect of a white man's court."*

This step made him rather unpopular with the I .dians.

Another question which roused the indignation of Indians, was the burning-ghat question. The Government wanted to stop the practice of throwing dead bodies of men and beasts into the river Hughli and also the practice of burning the dead within the limits of the town or on the banks of the river Hugli, because the practice was considered to be a nuisance to the populous neighbourhood. This burning-ghat notification gave great offence to the Hindu public of Calcutta.

The part played by Sir John Lawrence during the terrible famine in Orissa was also unfortunate. The Secretary of State remarked about the Government of India :

"I think it unfortunate that the Government of India, although their attention appears to have been especially called to the subject, did not exercise their influence in favour of a more vigorous course of action."

Sir John Lawrence was also not a man of strong character. He could not carry his council with him. He himself said :

"The weak point, as regards the Government of India, is no doubt, the circumstance that we did not interfere early in the day, and insist on the Lieutenant-Governor importing food. I *myself wished to do so* simply as a measure of security. But *my Council was against me*, and I had no data which would have warranted my overruling them. No doubt, *I ought to have done this* irrespective of all considerations."

This fact was also noted by the Secretary of State when he wrote :

"I learn from your Minute of the 20th April last that your Excellency was personally of opinion, at an early period of the distress, that it might become desirable to import food. *This opinion was not shared by the members of your Council, and was not acted upon.*"

Again, Sir John Lawrence was not sympathetic to the proposal of the employment of Indians in higher services. The Secretary of State ordered for a careful review of the question of the prospects which should be offered to native officers of ability in the public service, and of the expediency of modifying the existing state of things, which practically set a bar to their aspirations by the limited promotion which was accessible to them. Sir John Lawrence in a resolution dated 19th August, 1867, 'admitted the urgent political necessity created by the progress of education for opening to the natives a more important, dignified, lucrative sphere of employment than had hitherto been open to them in the administration of British India'. But, he thought that nothing need be done for the Regulation Provinces, because a Bengali gentleman had obtained admission to the Civil Service. So the Government of India thought that 'what remained to be done was to open a field for the legitimate ambition of deserving natives in the Non-Regulation Provinces.

But the Secretary of State did not accept the proposal of the Viceroy and wrote strongly to him. He remarked that the 'principle of opening up to natives of ability

* *The Company and the Crown*, pp. 9-10.

and character a more dignified and lucrative sphere of employment in the administration of the country might, it appeared to him, be carried out not only in the Non-Regulation, but also in the Regulation Provinces, as, besides the more important and the responsible appointments in the latter which were reserved by law to the covenanted Civil Service, there was a large class of appointments scarcely less honourable and lucrative than the other, to which the natives of India had a preferential claim.'

It is strange that the Government of Sir John Lawrence should be faced with the vexed question known as the 'shoe' question. The question betrays the mentality of those British rulers of India who belong to the "Heaven-born Service." It is rather derogatory for a Viceroy to come out with a Government Resolution declaring that 'all natives of India wearing boots and shoes of European fashion may appear thus habited before all the servants of the Government, in all places within the Bengal Presidency and its dependencies, on all official or semi-official occasions, including darbars of all descriptions.'

It was during his rule that the country was visited by some of the severest of natural visitations, namely, the famines in Orissa and Bihar, and the dreadful cyclone of 1864.

Sir John Lawrence was against the restoration of Mysore to the boy-king and tried his best to reject the appeals of the king for the restoration of the Mysore throne. His superior, the Secretary of State, Lord Cranborne, overruled his objections and restored Mysore to the boy-king after nobly vindicating his Mysore policy in Parliament.

Sir John Lawrence left three unpopular taxes on the shoulders of the Indian tax-payers, namely, the police-tax, license tax and the increased stamp duty. He was also responsible for the annual exodus to the Simla Hills and for introducing this expensive luxury for the Government of India.

He was also criticised for his foreign policy. He tried to defend his foreign policy by declaring that 'he had never shrunk from war when honour and justice required it, but pointed out that to have continued the wars in Bhutan and Hurara, after their purpose had been answered, would have been neither wise nor merciful.' He might thus try to defend his foreign policy, but there is no use gainsaying the fact that he was actuated by *earth-hunger* in annexing the Bengal and Assam Duars from the kingdom of Bhutan. This conquest of the Duars after the solemn pledge of the Queen's Proclamation was nothing but a violation of that pledge.

His policy towards Afghanistan was characterised by some "as masterly activity" "The administration of Sir John Lawrence," says one writer, "was marked by an earnest advocacy of open Christian course in the Government of India, and especially of making the Bible a class-book in all Government schools, but allowing the attendance of the native pupils to be completely voluntary." Be it said, that even in this respect he failed signally.

Mr. Thurlow in his *Company and the Crown* remarked about Sir John Lawrence :

"The first civilian Viceroy inherited his office by an accident, and whether the experiment will merit repetition must depend entirely on the measure of its success."*

* *Ibid.*, p. 8.



Keshub Chunder Sen

India Under the British Crown

And we have seen how the whole administration of Sir John Lawrence was devoid of any success whatever. His rule proved a failure, and hence there was no more experiment of appointing civilians as Viceroys.

LORD LAWRENCE AND KESHUB CHANDRA SEN

Keshub Chandra Sen, the leader of the Brahma Samaj, was a favourite of Lord Lawrence. Keshub Chandra's lecture on "Jesus Christ—Europe and Asia" attracted the attention of Lord Lawrence, who was then in Simla. He invited Keshub Chandra to visit Simla and remitted him rupees five hundred to defray his expenses. Lord Lawrence helped Keshub Chandra, because he thought that Keshub would help him in the Christianisation of India. It was Lord Lawrence who suggested to him the idea of visiting England. In his *Life of Keshub Chandra Sen,* Mr. P. C. Mazumdar says:

"The misunderstandings and evil report caused by the lecture were painful enough, but they were not without their advantage. They drew upon him the attention of great officials, chief among whom was Lord Lawrence, then Governor-General of India. Lord Lawrence was on the hills at the time, but he was so much pleased with the lecture, a copy of which had been sent him by the late lamented Mr. Norman, a Judge of the High Court, that the Viceroy's Private Secretary wrote him a letter intimating His Excellency's wish to make the lecturer's acquaintance when the Government returned to the plains in the cold weather."*

In another place, Mr. Mazumdar says:

"With a band of devoted followers, friends and co-workers, Keshub Chandra Sen left Monghyr in August, 1868, to spend a few months at Simla on the Himalayas, whither Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy, whose acquaintance he had made in the previous year, had invited him. They had met by appointment at Bankipur. So Keshub left for the hills with his family and friends, and Lord Lawrence not only accommodated him in the extensive range of buildings at Boileaugnge, generally set apart for distinguished Native guests, but sent him a private present of Rs. 500 to defray his necessary expenses."†

Writing to Lady Durand, Sir Henry Durand says in April, 1870:

"I am rather disposed to think that Babu Keshub Chunder Sen will consider that he has made a convert of you and will enroll you as a leading member of the Brahma Samaj! ..What a pity we never thought of hearing him in Calcutta. Curious that you should learn more of him and his sect and be more alive to its merits in a few days on board the *Mooltan,* when leaving India, than you have been during all these years of residence in India."§

Keshub Chandra Sen had a magnetic personality—and his speeches, as is usual with those of persons with highly developed spirituality, had a mystic fascination and a telling effect on the soul. His message of the New Dispensation has for its votaries thousands of highly educated men all over India to-day, though the major portion are Bengalis. The following passage in the reminiscences and anecdotes of Great Men of India by Ram Gopal Sanyal is interesting.

"He (Lord Lawrence) entertained a very high respect for the late lamented Babu Keshub Chunder Sen, and was so much fascinated by his deep religious enthusiasm and marvellous power of oratory, that he attended several times his public lectures at the Town Hall and went to his house."

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* *Life of Keshub Chandra Sen,* by P. C. Mazumdar, p. 180.

† *Ibid.,* 201-202

§ *Life of Sir Henry Durand,* pp. 408-409.

SIR JOHN LAWRENCE AND THE SUPREME LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

Sir John Lawrence was opposed to the progress of self-government in India. His politics was Toryism. He did his best to curb the independence of the Supreme Legislative Council constituted under the Act of 1861. Wrote the *Calcutta Review* in 1872 :

"...This hostile action of the Council against the executive, Sir John Lawrence appears to have looked on almost in the light of a mutiny. Orders were issued forbidding any official to correspond demi-offciallv with the members of the Council ; it was therefore made impossible for them, to gain the further information required and when the Council again met in Simla the Government was of course in possession of a majority."

The Civilian Viceroy's narrow reactionary policy is best illustrated by the following trifling incident which appeared in the *Friend of India* of November, 1868:

"Lord Lawrence excluded Native gentlemen from the balls held at Government House, and the London Press, notably the *Westminister Review*, took up the matter in such right earnest that his Lordship, it is believed under instructions from the Secretary of State, immediately corrected his mistake."



Lord Mayo

CHAPTER VIII.

LORD MAYO

1869-1872

Richard Southwell Bourke, sixth Earl of Mayo, was appointed by the Queen as the fourth Viceroy and Governor-General of India. When the rumour about his appointment had gone abroad on the eve of the dissolution of the Disraeli Ministry, a storm of opposition was raised by his political opponents. Many critics characterised it as an indefensible party job. Lord Mayo had his experiences of Ireland, but his gross ignorance about India and her problems led many to criticise the action of the Cabinet. Many journals recommended Mr. Gladstone to recall the Conservative Viceroy.

About the Press criticism on the appointment of Lord Mayo as the Viceroy, Hunter remarks:

"A tempest of censure accordingly arose in the Press, and spent its fury with equal force on Lord Mayo's colleagues and on himself..."*

"Lord Mayo felt the hostility of the Liberal journals the more keenly, as in Irish matters (his real business in life) he had been half a Liberal himself. But, as usual, his vexation was less for himself than for the Ministry which stood publicly responsible for the appointment. 'I am sorely hurt,' he wrote to Sir Stafford Northcote, 'at the way in which the Press are abusing my appointment. I care little for myself, but I am not without apprehension that these attacks may damage the Government, and injure my influence if ever I arrive in India. I am made uneasy, but not daunted.' Again : 'I did not accept this great office without long and anxious consideration. I leave with a good confidence, and hope that I may realise the expectations of my friends. I was prepared for hostile criticism, but I thought that my long public service might have saved me from the personal abuse which has been showered upon me. I bear no resentment, and only pray that I may be enabled ere long to show my abusers that they were wrong.' Rancour or revenge never for a moment found lodgement in that well-poised mind."†

When Lord Mayo arrived at Calcutta, he was thus advised by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce :

"......But we are confident that, if circumstances arise to endanger the peace of the country, your Excellency will apply the resources of the Government with an irresistible power, and uphold the authority and supremacy of the Crown."

Again, the Calcutta Trades' Association also advised him in the same strain :

"But should there, unfortunately, arise in any portion of India commotions engendered in misguided hostility to the British Government, we are satisfied that the prudence, firmness and energy which characterised your Excellency's course of procedure during the recent unhappy disturbances in Ireland will in like manner be manifested in sustaining the honour of Great Britain in the East."

In reply to the addresses presented to him, Lord Mayo promised every possible

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* *Speeches in England and India of Earl of Mayo,* p. 26.

† *Life of the Earl of Mayo* by W. W. Hunter, pp. 107-8.

assistance to the cause of British trade and commerce. To the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, he said :

"I shall always be prepared to give the most careful consideration to all proposals that may be made for the development of the great commerce, of which the capital of India is the centre ; and to encourage any effort that may be made for rendering more available for all the purposes of trade, the great natural capabilities of this noble river."

To the Landholders and Commercial Association, he said:

"In India, national safety and advancement depend mainly on agricultural prosperity. It will, therefore, be my duty to support any measures that will encourage the *investments of capital* in developing the resources of the soil—that will guarantee to the owner the complete security of his property, and ensure at the same time to the labourer, just remuneration for his toil, and alleviate as far as possible, the hardships that are incident to his condition."

HIS FOREIGN POLICY

Lord Mayo's first act was to modify the non-interference policy of Lord Lawrence. The frontier question had given trouble to many British Indian statesmen. On the 4th January, 1869, Lord Lawrence sent a dispatch to the Secretary of State, which has been described by Sir W. Hunter as 'the political testament of the wearied Viceroy.' In that *political testament* he said:

"We think that endeavours might be made to come to a clear understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its projects and designs in Central Asia, and that it might be given to understand in firm, but courteous language, that it cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan or in those of any State which lies contiguous to our frontier. Then we think that our relations to the Court of Teheran should be placed entirely under the Secretary of State for India, and, that we should be empowered to give to any *de facto* ruler of Kabul some arms and ammunition and substantial pecuniary assistance, as well as moral support, as occasion may offer, but without any formal or defensive alliance."*

This policy did not appeal to the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Northcote, who said:

"I cannot bring my mind to the proposal that we should subsidise first one, and then the other according as accident brings up Sher Ali or Abdur Rahman to the head of affairs."

The Times in supporting Lawrence wrote thus :

"It is asserted that Sir John Lawrence has lately seen reason to modify the absolutely neutral policy which he has observed during the lengthened contest in Afghanistan. It is unfortunate that he should be *replaced by an inexperienced successor* at a moment when a comprehensive knowledge of Asiatic politics is more than ever required by the rulers of India. For the present, the Russians in Bokhara and the adjacent regions have given no cause of offence to the Indian Government, nor is their mighty power, at as great a distance from their resources, likely at any time to be formidable. It is only in dealing with disaffected subjects or turbulent neighbours that the vicinity of a second European power might lead to complications."†

Lord Mayo did not like the *masterly inactivity* of Sir John Lawrence. He reversed his old policy towards the frontier tribes and States. Thus remarks Mr. Strachey :

* Hunter's *The Earl of Mayo* (R. I. Series)., pp. 123-4.

† Quoted in Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, II., p. 375

"This chronic state of turbulence and disorder, destructive of ancient land-marks, and boundaries and producing only weakness and disintegration, both provokes and invites annexation. It ruins commerce, destroys the productions of the soil, scares away peaceful traders who have an interest in the preservation of order and settled government, creates a permanent class whose interest it is to perpetuate anarchy, and produces isolation, jealousy and distrust in countries that suffer from its course ....To apply a radical remedy to these evils was the main object of Lord Mayo's foreign policy ....By assisting rulers of these States to strengthen their internal Government and by bringing both his own personal influence and the moral support of the British Government to bear in putting down rebellions and revolutions, he endeavoured to establish a firm, just and merciful Government. By the encouragement and development of trade, he hoped to break down the barriers which isolate those countries from us and to create both within and beyond our frontier a permanent interest in the maintenance of good order. By free and friendly intercommunication, he desired to remove that ignorance as to our policy and that jealousy as to our intentions which in past years have been so fruitful of mischief. And lastly, by endeavouring through frank and amicable discussion with the Russian Government to secure the adoption on their part of a similar policy in the countries on the Russian Frontier in Asia, which are subject to Russian influence, it was his hope that he would be instrumental in securing some degree of peace and prosperity to the exhausted countries of Central Asia and in removing the causes of disquietude as to the designs of England and Russia, which have been so prominent in the public mind in both counties."

Lord Mayo wanted to consolidate the British power in India by extending a friendly hand to the Amir Sher Ali. Thus in March 1869, he held a Durbar at Ambala to receive the Amir, who had come over to India. In welcoming the Amir, Lord Mayo said :

"I trust that this visit may be the commencement of many years of amity between Her Majesty and yourself and a mutual confidence and good will between the natives which Her Majesty rules in India and all the subjects of your Highness."

About the visit of Sher Ali, Sir W. Hunter says :

"Sher Ali came to India with five distinct objects in view. He desired, in the first place, a treaty. In the second place, he hoped for a fixed annual subsidy. In the third place, for assistance in arms or in men, to be given, not when the British Government might think fit to grant, but when he might think it needful to solicit it. In the fourth place, for a well-defined engagement, 'laying the British Government under obligation to support the Afghan Government in any emergency ; and not only that Government generally, but that Government as vested in himself and his direct descendants, and in no others.' Finally, he cherished a desire that he might obtain some constructive act of recognition by the British Government in favour of his younger son, Abdulla Jan, whom he brought with him, and whom he wished to make his heir, to the exclusion of his elder son, Yakub Khan, who had helped him to win the throne."*

But the Amir was not successful in gaining his objects. Lord Mayo had already settled his Afghan policy thus :

"We have distinctly intimated to the Amir that under no circumstances shall a British soldier cross his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious subjects. That no fixed subsidy or money allowance will be given for any named period. That no promise of assistance in other ways will be made. That no treaty will be entered into, obliging us under every circumstance to recognise him and his descendants as rulers of Afganistan. Yet that, by the most open and absolute present recognition, and by every public evidence of friendly disposition, of respect for his character, and interest in his fortunes, we are prepared to give him all the *moral* support in our

* Hunter's *Earl of Mayo*, p. 225.

power ; and that, in addition, we are willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, Native artificers, and in other ways whenever we deem it desirable so to do".*

In assuring the Amir of British support Lord Mayo remarked :

"Although as already intimated to you the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as ruler of Kabul and rekindle civil war and it will further endeavour from time to time by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honors of which you are the lawful possessor."

Lord Mayo thought that this course of policy had been eminently successful and he said : "If its success continues, it will secure peace in Central Asia."

Lord Mayo followed the policy of the consolidation of the British power in India. Hence his Ambala Darbar, after which he wrote:

"Surround India with strong, friendly and independent States, who will have more interest in keeping well with us than with any other Power, and we are safe."

Again, he wrote :

"Our influence has been considerably strengthened, both in our own territories and also in the States of Central Asia, by the Ambala meeting ; and if we can only persuade people that our policy really is non-intervention and peace, that England is at this moment the only non-aggressive Power in Asia, we should stand on a pinnacle of power that we have never enjoyed before."†

LODR MAYO AND THE FEUDATORY STATES

The policy of ruthless annexation followed by Lord Dalhousie was given up by the Crown, and we have now the policy of consolidation towards the Native States. Thus says Sir W. W. Hunter:

"One result of the Mutiny of 1857 was to profoundly modify the attitude of the British Government to the Native Princes. The East India Company had regarded them as semi-foreign allies ; of whom the more powerful were to be bound tightly by treaties and overawed by subsidiary troops ; while the weaker should be absorbed into the British dominions whenever a just occasion arose.... When the Queen assumed the direct control of India, her first act was to reverse that policy. In solemn words she assured the loyal Princes and Chiefs of her desire to maintain their rule over their own States. The Feudatories became thenceforward an integral part of the British Empire of India, with a clearly defined position, intermediate between the Sovereign and the native nobility in our own provinces.

In a private letter to H. M. Ministers dated the 23rd November, 1870, he laid down his policy towards the Native States. He wrote thus :

"Our relations with the native Feudatory States are, on the whole, satisfactory, though they are by no means defined. We act on the principle of non-interference, but *we must constantly interfere. We allow them to keep up armies, but we cannot permit them to go to war.* We encourage them to establish Courts of Justice, but *we cannot hear of their trying Europeons. We recognise them as separate sovereigns, but we daily issue to them orders which are implicitly obeyed.* We

* *Ibid.,*: p. 125.

† *Ibid.,* p. 128.

depose them, as in the Tonk case, when the ruler permits or sanctions a grievous crime; or create an administration for them as in the Alwar case, when a chief misgoverns or worries his subjects. With some, we place political agents; with others, we do not. With some, as with Jeypore, Bhopal and Patiala, we are on terms of intinacy and friendship; others such as Dholpore and Alwar, we scarcely even address, except to find fault with them for some gross neglect of duty. In fact all our actions with regard to these petty despotic States are governed by the circumstances of the time and the character of the ruler, and it must be so, if we are to influence them for good."*

This is the frank admission of the policy pursued by Lord Mayo towards these feudatory or "petty despotic States," as characterised by his Lordship. In principle, Lord Mayo acted on the policy of non-interference, though he declared at the same breath that "we must constantly interfere." Though he kept his hand "unstained by a single annexation," yet he often interfered in the affairs of the Native States, particularly in the case of Alwar.

About Lord Mayo's policy regarding the Native States, his biographer says:

"Lord Mayo discerned, therefore, the evil as well as the good of our Feudatory system. He was often sorely hurt by the spectacle of Native mal-administration, which our principles of non-interference rendered him powerless to amend. He found that the system sometimes allowed of petty intermeddling, but often precluded salutary intervention -straining at the gnat and swallowing the camel. His mind was attracted to the possibility of developing a scheme which would secure to the Indian feudatories their present independence, and at the same time arm the suzerain power with adequate checks on its abuse. For example, while he counted many warm friends among the Princes of the Rajput blood, the apathy and misgovernment of others of them stood as a barrier between him and the better government which he laboured to secure for the Rajput people."†

Lord Mayo himself thus expressed his opinion about the Feudatory States in Rajputana in a letter to a noble Duke on the 7th February, 1870:

"In Rajputana it will be seen that things are not in a satisfactory state. Improvement of every kind goes on very slowly. The power of the ruling princes over their *thakurs* (barons) is not greater than it used to be, and though the *darbars* (Native courts) pretend that they do what they can to suppress violence and banish crime, the treaty obligations and the regulations of the Paramount Power are frequently neglected or evaded. The remedy for this state of things is not to be found in the exercise by Political Agents of their great powers in an arbitrary and a dictatorial manner, by vexatious interference in minor matters, or by constant threats of deposition or sequestration of revenue. It is rather to be found in a policy which would exalt the dignity, strengthen the authority, and increase the personal responsibility of these Families; and, at the same time, by showing them that that which they really value above every thing, *viz.*, the support of the British Government in securing the permanency of their rule, is only to be gained by the exercise of justice, by the certain punishment of crime, and the encouragement of those who support our recommendations. I believe that more is to be done with these people by personal influence and oral advice, by visiting them in the way they think most suitable to their dignity, and in conformity with ancient usage; and by exalting them in the eyes of their subjects; than by the best letter-writing or the wisest orders.

"While most parts of the Empire are rapidly advancing they (Rajputana and Central India) are going back. While *we have weakened the authority of many of the Native Rulers by the establishment of the international Courts or Vakils and various other measures, we have given them no new source of internal power.* The semi-independent *thakurs* or petty barons are more

* *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10.

† Quoted in Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, II, pp. 381-82.

mutinous and insubordinate than ever; at this moment, in Jodhpur, Alwar, and several of the smaller states, a state of chronic disorder prevails.

"To begin what must be the work of many, many years an *entire change of policy* must be adopted. The present mixture of "*laissez faire*" and higgling interference must be abandoned, and the Chiefs must be told what they will be allowed to do, and what they will not be allowed to do."*

Lord Mayo held that nothing was more injudicious than perpetual meddling in the affairs of Native States. In his public dealings with them, Lord Mayo accepted the three following principles:—

I. Non-annexation, and a fixed resolve that even the misrule of a Native Chief must not be used as a weapon for aggrandising our power.

II. But a constant feeling of responsibility attached to the British Government, as suzerain, for any serious misrule in Native States; and a firm determination to interfere when British interference became necessary to prevent misgovernment. Such interference to consist not in annexing the territory, but in displacing the Chief, and administering by British officers or a Native regency in the interest of the lawful heirs.

III. Non-interference, and the lightest possible form of control, with Chiefs who governed well.

Lord Mayo tried to make the Indian Feudatories feel that it rested with themselves to decide the degree of practical independence which they should enjoy, and that that degree would be strictly regulated by the degree of good government which they gave to their subjects.

KATHIAWAR AND LORD MAYO

In the case of Kathiawar, Lord Mayo, 'while recognising the necessity for reform and the contingency of future intervention, abstained from interfering.' It should be borne in mind that there are 187 Native States in the province of Kathiawar, administered by a Political Agent. When Lord Mayo came, he found that though the policy of reform in the province

"had produced some excellent results, it had failed to eradicate certain deep-rooted evils; and that five years of good government had not obliterated the effects of fifty years of British *laissez faire* and five centuries of Native misrule. He found many conflicting claims to the soil, and a number of ancient communities, each with a vested right in depredation. The 'ex-ruling classes,' representatives of old houses forcibly dispossessed, or of younger brothers of Chiefs unable to live on their slender share of the inheritance, 'predatory tribes,' and 'dangerous communities,' whose hereditary means of livelihood was plunder; 'aboriginal races', penned into the hills by successive waves of invaders,—all these elements of anarchy still fermented in the population of Kathiawar."†

Now, what did Lord Mayo do to check these elements of anarchy? He practically did nothing. Thus says his biographer:

"Lord Mayo saw, therefore, many things in the Kathiawar papers that came before him which he thought capable of further improvement. But he also saw that a vast amount of good work had been effected under the auspices of the Bombay Government during the preceding few years, and that that work was still bearing fruits. Had he lived, he intended to visit Kathiawar, and the

* *Life of Lord Mayo*, Vol. I., pp. 10-11.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 218-19

great question of reforming the Gaikwar's contingent would have come up. But meanwile, he contented himself with closely watching the progress of good government, and heartily acceding to all measures required for its development. One of the richest and most important States in Kathiawar fell into the hands of a minor during his Viceroyalty. An experienced Native minister and a picked member of the Civil Service were selected by the Bombay Government as its joint rulers, and they quickly converted it into a model of prosperity and firm administration. Another measure in which Lord Mayo took a keen interest was the formation of a school for the sons of the Chiefs. The rank of those boys had hitherto confined them to a private education, under the indulgent influences of the *zenana*. Lord Mayo thought that, whether in Rajputana or in Kathiawar, it was vain to expect the Chiefs to discharge their responsibilities as men unless they were properly trained as boys. Both in Kathiawar and in Rajputana a school for their education was established during his rule, and these Native Etons are now among the most promising institutions of their respective provinces.

"Lord Mayo was not one of those reformers who think they can change the customs and habits of thought of a people in a day. He realised that the process by which an Indian State casts its old skin of anarchy is a slow one, and that the operation is not helped by perpetual interference from without. Where he saw real improvement going on, he was willing to wait. He thought, moreover, that until everything had been done to render the English surveillance in a Native State as efficient as possible, he had no right to complain of the Chief. He held that the Suzerain Power was bound to see that the misrule of a Feudatory arose in no part from a vacillating or weakly officered British Residency; and that before blaming a native chief for governing ill, it was necessary first to see that the Indian Foreign Office placed him in the best possible circumstances for governing well. This view took a firmer hold of his mind as his Indian experience increased; and being dissatisfied with certain matters in Rajputana, he contemplated, not direct interference with the Chiefs, but an improvement of the British supervision. He thought that the existing mechanism required strengthening, and (I quote the words of his Private Secretary) 'one of the measures which he wished to bring about was the amalgamation of the Central India and Rajputana Agencies under a high officer of the Crown, with the status of a Lieutenant-Governor.'"*

LORD MAYO'S VIEWS ON THE ALWAR MISRULE

When the news came that the people in Alwar had risen against the Prince, Lord Mayo recorded his personal opinion as follows :

"After carefully considering this case, I am of opinion that our *interference* is now become a *matter* of *necessity*. I must here express my dissent from the policy advocated in the letter of...... which seems to imply, if the rule of a Feudatory Prince does not contribute to the contentment of the people, that that is no valid reason for our interference. Neither can I assent to the proposition, on the other hand, that if commotions arise in a Native State, the Chief can under no circumstances expect the assistance of the British Government in putting them down.

"I hold a contrary opinion......I believe that if in any Feudatory State in India, oppression, tyranny, corruption, wastefulness, and vice are found to be the leading characteristics of its administration, it is the imperative duty of the Paramount Power to interfere, and that we evade the responsibility which our position in India imposes upon us, and avoid the discharge of a manifest duty, if we allow the people of any race or class to be plundered and oppressed."

Lord Mayo was in favour of helping the Chief in his distress. He continued :

"On the other hand, I am equally of opinion that, should a well disposed Chief, while using his utmost endeavours to establish good government within his State, be opposed by insubordinate petty barons, mutinous troops, or seditious classes of his subjects. it is then our duty to support his authority and power.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 220-22

"Further, I believe that under no circumstances can we permit in any State in India the existence of a civil war, and that on such an occasion as this it is plainly our duty to interfere, at first by every peaceful means which we have at our disposal ; but that, in the event of arbitration and mediation failing, it will be our duty to stop by force of arms anything approaching to open hostilities between large classes of the people and their Chiefs."

He would not tolerate civil war in any State in the presence of British authority. He, therefore, said :

"I dissent altogether from the opinion that nothing would do more good in Rajputana than the example of a successful revolt ; and nothing will tempt me to stand by with folded arms and see in that uncivilised and benighted country state after state plunged into all the horrors and barbarities which are certain to accompany a Native civil war. As is well stated in these papers, whether Chiefs or Thakurs are right, the burden of the war and all its severities will fall upon the cultivators, who probably know little of, and care less for, the causes of the quarrels.

"I should like to find an officer of very high rank and great experience who could be sent to Alwar almost immediately. I cannot think there would be much difficulty in inducing the Maharrja and the Thakurs to consent to his arbitration. I think the confiscation of lands for the non-attendance of the horsemen was a harsh and unnecessary step.

"I should therefore recommend that an arbitration be offered in such a way that it must be accepted and that the Alwar Chief should be told that the arbitration cannot be limited in scope or amount ; that a general inquiry should be held into the grievances of his discontented subjects, with a view to their remedy.

"If I can find an officer of sufficient rank and experience to go down and arbitrate in this matter, I would be inclined to ask the Maharaja of Jaipur to assist in the arbitration. He is a member of our Legislative Council ; though a Rajput of Rajputs, he is an enlightened prince, and I cannot but think that it would have a great effect in Rajputana were we to call in, for the settlement of a very dangerous dispute, the assistance of one of the oldest and most respected of their own chiefs.

"If the Maharaja is asked to go, we can only associate with him an officer superior in rank to the Governor-General's agent, and one with whom the Maharaja could be properly asked to consult.

"I would send this officer with such state and dignity as becomes his rank, with a large escort and a suitable camp.

"Upon their joint report I would be inclined to act without binding the Government absolutely to agree to and sanction all their proposals.

"I think this could not fail to show that while we are prepared to maintain peace and order at all hazards in Rajputana, we are perfectly prepared to listen to all just complaints ; and while putting down with a high hand rebellion and sedition, we are prepared to remedy all just and proved grievances."*

About Lord Mayo's interference in the administration of Alwar, we read :

"But early in 1870 the Earl of Mayo had tidings that the people of Alwar had risen in arms, and that 2000 of them were in the field against their prince. One half of the *thakoors* were loyal to him ; but the other half were with the rebels, whom his misrule had exasperated, as he had confiscated to his own uses the public lands assigned for the support of his troops and the relief of the poor, and had proudly and vindictively rejected all the counsels of our political agent.

"Terms between the contending parties seemed impossible, though a last chance was given the prince by Lord Mayo, who summoned him to name a committee for the management of affairs. As he neglected to this, the Viceroy created a native council at Alwar, the capital (which stands at the base

* *Ibid.*; pp. 225—228.

CHAPTER VIII.

LORD MAYO

1869-1872

Richard Southwell Bourke, sixth Earl of Mayo, was appointed by the Queen as the fourth Viceroy and Governor-General of India. When the rumour about his appointment had gone abroad on the eve of the dissolution of the Disraeli Ministry, a storm of opposition was raised by his political opponents. Many critics characterised it as an indefensible party job. Lord Mayo had his experiences of Ireland, but his gross ignorance about India and her problems led many to criticise the action of the Cabinet. Many journals recommended Mr. Gladstone to recall the Conservative Viceroy.

About the Press criticism on the appointment of Lord Mayo as the Viceroy, Hunter remarks:

"A tempest of censure accordingly arose in the Press, and spent its fury with equal force on Lord Mayo's colleagues and on himself..."*

"Lord Mayo felt the hostility of the Liberal journals the more keenly, as in Irish matters (his real business in life) he had been half a Liberal himself. But, as usual, his vexation was less for himself than for the Ministry which stood publicly responsible for the appointment. 'I am sorely hurt,' he wrote to Sir Stafford Northcote, 'at the way in which the Press are abusing my appointment. I care little for myself, but I am not without apprehension that these attacks may damage the Government, and injure my influence if ever I arrive in India. I am made uneasy, but not daunted.' Again : 'I did not accept this great office without long and anxious consideration. I leave with a good confidence, and hope that I may realise the expectations of my friends. I was prepared for hostile criticism, but I thought that my long public service might have saved me from the personal abuse which has been showered upon me. I bear no resentment, and only pray that I may be enabled ere long to show my abusers that they were wrong.' Rancour or revenge never for a moment found lodgement in that well-poised mind."†

When Lord Mayo arrived at Calcutta, he was thus advised by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce :

"......But we are confident that, if circumstances arise to endanger the peace of the country, your Excellency will apply the resources of the Government with an irresistible power, and uphold the authority and supremacy of the Crown."

Again, the Calcutta Trades' Association also advised him in the same strain :

"But should there, unfortunately, arise in any portion of India commotions engendered in misguided hostility to the British Government, we are satisfied that the prudence, firmness and energy which characterised your Excellency's course of procedure during the recent unhappy disturbances in Ireland will in like manner be manifested in sustaining the honour of Great Britain in the East."

In reply to the addresses presented to him, Lord Mayo promised every possible

* *Speeches in England and India of Earl of Mayo*, p. 26.

† *Life of the Earl of Mayo* by W. W. Hunter, pp. 107-8.

assistance to the cause of British trade and commerce. To the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, he said :

"I shall always be prepared to give the most careful consideration to all proposals that may be made for the development of the great commerce, of which the capital of India is the centre ; and to encourage any effort that may be made for rendering more available for all the purposes of trade, the great natural capabilities of this noble river."

To the Landholders and Commercial Association, he said:

"In India, national safety and advancement depend mainly on agricultural prosperity. It will, therefore, be my duty to support any measures that will encourage the *investments of capital* in developing the resources of the soil—that will guarantee to the owner the complete security of his property, and ensure at the same time to the labourer, just remuneration for his toil, and alleviate as far as possible, the hardships that are incident to his condition."

HIS FOREIGN POLICY

Lord Mayo's first act was to modify the non-interference policy of Lord Lawrence. The frontier question had given trouble to many British Indian statesmen. On the 4th January, 1869, Lord Lawrence sent a dispatch to the Secretary of State, which has been described by Sir W. Hunter as 'the political testament of the wearied Viceroy.' In that *political testament* he said:

"We think that endeavours might be made to come to a clear understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its projects and designs in Central Asia, and that it might be given to understand in firm, but courteous language, that it cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan or in those of any State which lies contiguous to our frontier. Then we think that our relations to the Court of Teheran should be placed entirely under the Secretary of State for India, and, that we should be empowered to give to any *de facto* ruler of Kabul some arms and ammunition and substantial pecuniary assistance, as well as moral support, as occasion may offer, but without any formal or defensive alliance."*

This policy did not appeal to the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Northcote, who said:

"I cannot bring my mind to the proposal that we should subsidise first one, and then the other according as accident brings up Sher Ali or Abdur Rahman to the head of affairs."

The Times in supporting Lawrence wrote thus :

"It is asserted that Sir John Lawrence has lately seen reason to modify the absolutely neutral policy which he has observed during the lengthened contest in Afghanistan. It is unfortunate that he should be *replaced by an inexperienced successor* at a moment when a comprehensive knowledge of Asiatic politics is more than ever required by the rulers of India. For the present, the Russians in Bokhara and the adjacent regions have given no cause of offence to the Indian Government, nor is their mighty power, at as great a distance from their resources, likely at any time to be formidable. It is only in dealing with disaffected subjects or turbulent neighbours that the vicinity of a second European power might lead to complications."†

Lord Mayo did not like the *masterly inactivity* of Sir John Lawrence. He reversed his old policy towards the frontier tribes and States. Thus remarks Mr. Strachey:

* Hunter's *The Earl of Mayo* (R. I. Series)., pp. 123-4.

† Quoted in Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, II., p. 375

"This chronic state of turbulence and disorder, destructive of ancient land-marks, and boundaries and producing only weakness and disintegration, both provokes and invites annexation. It ruins commerce, destroys the productions of the soil, scares away peaceful traders who have an interest in the preservation of order and settled government, creates a permanent class whose interest it is to perpetuate anarchy, and produces isolation, jealousy and distrust in countries that suffer from its course ....To apply a radical remedy to these evils was the main object of Lord Mayo's foreign policy ....By assisting rulers of these States to strengthen their internal Government and by bringing both his own personal influence and the moral support of the British Government to bear in putting down rebellions and revolutions, he endeavoured to establish a firm, just and merciful Government. By the encouragement and development of trade, he hoped to break down the barriers which isolate those countries from us and to create both within and beyond our frontier a permanent interest in the maintenance of good order. By free and friendly intercommunication, he desired to remove that ignorance as to our policy and that jealousy as to our intentions which in past years have been so fruitful of mischief. And lastly, by endeavouring through frank and amicable discussion with the Russian Government to secure the adoption on their part of a similar policy in the countries on the Russian Frontier in Asia, which are subject to Russian influence, it was his hope that he would be instrumental in securing some degree of peace and prosperity to the exhausted countries of Central Asia and in removing the causes of disquietude as to the designs of England and Russia, which have been so prominent in the public mind in both counties."

Lord Mayo wanted to consolidate the British power in India by extending a friendly hand to the Amir Sher Ali. Thus in March 1869, he held a Durbar at Ambala to receive the Amir, who had come over to India. In welcoming the Amir, Lord Mayo said :

"I trust that this visit may be the commencement of many years of amity between Her Majesty and yourself and a mutual confidence and good will between the natives which Her Majesty rules in India and all the subjects of your Highness."

About the visit of Sher Ali, Sir W. Hunter says :

"Sher Ali came to India with five distinct objects in view. He desired, in the first place, a treaty. In the second place, he hoped for a fixed annual subsidy. In the third place, for assistance in arms or in men, to be given, not when the British Government might think fit to grant, but when he might think it needful to solicit it. In the fourth place, for a well-defined engagement, 'laying the British Government under obligation to support the Afghan Government in any emergency ; and not only that Government generally, but that Government as vested in himself and his direct descendants, and in no others.' Finally, he cherished a desire that he might obtain some constructive act of recognition by the British Government in favour of his younger son, Abdulla Jan, whom he brought with him, and whom he wished to make his heir, to the exclusion of his elder son, Yakub Khan, who had helped him to win the throne."*

But the Amir was not successful in gaining his objects. Lord Mayo had already settled his Afghan policy thus :

"We have distinctly intimated to the Amir that under no circumstances shall a British soldier cross his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious subjects. That no fixed subsidy or money allowance will be given for any named period. That no promise of assistance in other ways will be made. That no treaty will be entered into, obliging us under every circumstance to recognise him and his descendants as rulers of Afganistan. Yet that, by the most open and absolute present recognition, and by every public evidence of friendly disposition, of respect for his character, and interest in his fortunes, we are prepared to give him all the *moral* support in our

* Hunter's *Earl of Mayo*, p. 225.

power; and that, in addition, we are willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, Native artificers, and in other ways whenever we deem it desirable so to do".*

In assuring the Amir of British support Lord Mayo remarked:

"Although as already intimated to you the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as ruler of Kabul and rekindle civil war and it will further endeavour from time to time by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honors of which you are the lawful possessor."

Lord Mayo thought that this course of policy had been eminently successful and he said: "If its success continues, it will secure peace in Central Asia."

Lord Mayo followed the policy of the consolidation of the British power in India. Hence his Ambala Darbar, after which he wrote:

"Surround India with strong, friendly and independent States, who will have more interest in keeping well with us than with any other Power, and we are safe."

Again, he wrote:

"Our influence has been considerably strengthened, both in our own territories and also in the States of Central Asia, by the Ambala meeting; and if we can only persuade people that our policy really is non-intervention and peace, that England is at this moment the only non-aggressive Power in Asia, we should stand on a pinnacle of power that we have never enjoyed before."†

LODR MAYO AND THE FEUDATORY STATES

The policy of ruthless annexation followed by Lord Dalhousie was given up by the Crown, and we have now the policy of consolidation towards the Native States. Thus says Sir W. W. Hunter:

"One result of the Mutiny of 1857 was to profoundly modify the attitude of the British Government to the Native Princes. The East India Company had regarded them as semi-foreign allies; of whom the more powerful were to be bound tightly by treaties and overawed by subsidiary troops; while the weaker should be absorbed into the British dominions whenever a just occasion arose.... When the Queen assumed the direct control of India, her first act was to reverse that policy. In solemn words she assured the loyal Princes and Chiefs of her desire to maintain their rule over their own States. The Feudatories became thenceforward an integral part of the British Empire of India, with a clearly defined position, intermediate between the Sovereign and the native nobility in our own provinces.

In a private letter to H. M. Ministers dated the 23rd November, 1870, he laid down his policy towards the Native States. He wrote thus:

"Our relations with the native Feudatory States are, on the whole, satisfactory, though they are by no means defined. We act on the principle of non-interference, but *we must constantly interfere.* *We allow them to keep up armies, but we cannot permit them to go to war.* We encourage them to establish Courts of Justice, but *we cannot hear of their trying Europeons. We recognise them as separate sovereigns, but we daily issue to them orders which are implicitly obeyed.* We

* *Ibid.*, p. 126.

† *Ibid.*, p. 128.

depose them, as in the Tonk case, when the ruler permits or sanctions a grievous crime; or create an administration for them as in the Alwar case, when a chief misgoverns or worries his subjects. With some, we place political agents; with others, we do not. With some, as with Jeypore, Bhopal and Patiala, we are on terms of intinacy and friendship; others such as Dholpore and Alwar, we scarcely even address, except to find fault with them for some gross neglect of duty. In fact all our actions with regard to these petty despotic States are governed by the circumstances of the time and the character of the ruler, and it must be so, if we are to influence them for good."*

This is the frank admission of the policy pursued by Lord Mayo towards these feudatory or "petty despotic States," as characterised by his Lordship. In principle, Lord Mayo acted on the policy of non-interference, though he declared at the same breath that "we must constantly interfere." Though he kept his hand "unstained by a single annexation," yet he often interfered in the affairs of the Native States, particularly in the case of Alwar.

About Lord Mayo's policy regarding the Native States, his biographer says:

"Lord Mayo discerned, therefore, the evil as well as the good of our Feudatory system. He was often sorely hurt by the spectacle of Native mal-administration, which our principles of non-interference rendered him powerless to amend. He found that the system sometimes allowed of petty intermeddling, but often precluded salutary intervention—straining at the gnat and swallowing the camel. His mind was attracted to the possibility of developing a scheme which would secure to the Indian feudatories their present independence, and at the same time arm the suzerain power with adequate checks on its abuse. For example, while he counted many warm friends among the Princes of the Rajput blood, the apathy and misgovernment of others of them stood as a barrier between him and the better government which he laboured to secure for the Rajput people."†

Lord Mayo himself thus expressed his opinion about the Feudatory States in Rajputana in a letter to a noble Duke on the 7th February, 1870:

"In Rajputana it will be seen that things are not in a satisfactory state. Improvement of every kind goes on very slowly. The power of the ruling princes over their *thakurs* (barons) is not greater than it used to be, and though the *darbars* (Native courts) pretend that they do what they can to suppress violence and banish crime, the treaty obligations and the regulations of the Paramount Power are frequently neglected or evaded. The remedy for this state of things is not to be found in the exercise by Political Agents of their great powers in an arbitrary and a dictatorial manner, by vexatious interference in minor matters, or by constant threats of deposition or sequestration of revenue. It is rather to be found in a policy which would exalt the dignity, strengthen the authority, and increase the personal responsibility of these Families; and, at the same time, by showing them that that which they really value above every thing, *viz.*, the support of the British Government in securing the permanency of their rule, is only to be gained by the exercise of justice, by the certain punishment of crime, and the encouragement of those who support our recommendations. I believe that more is to be done with these people by personal influence and oral advice, by visiting them in the way they think most suitable to their dignity, and in conformity with ancient usage; and by exalting them in the eyes of their subjects; than by the best letter-writing or the wisest orders.

"While most parts of the Empire are rapidly advancing they (Rajputana and Central India) are going back. While *we have weakened the authority of many of the Native Rulers by the establishment of the international Courts or Vakils and various other measures, we have given them no new source of internal power.* The semi-independent *thakurs* or petty barons are more

* *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10.

† Quoted in Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, II, pp. 381-82.

mutinous and insubordinate than ever.; at this moment, in Jodhpur, Alwar, and several of the smaller states, a state of chronic disorder prevails.

"To begin what must be the work of many, many years an *entire change of policy* must be adopted. The present mixture of "*laissez faire*" and higgling interference must be abandoned, and the Chiefs must be told what they will be allowed to do, and what they will not be allowed to do."*

Lord Mayo held that nothing was more injudicious than perpetual meddling in the affairs of Native States. In his public dealings with them, Lord Mayo accepted the three following principles:—

I. Non-annexation, and a fixed resolve that even the misrule of a Native Chief must not be used as a weapon for aggrandising our power.

II. But a constant feeling of responsibility attached to the British Government, as suzerain, for any serious misrule in Native States; and a firm determination to interfere when British interference became necessary to prevent misgovernment. Such interference to consist not in annexing the territory, but in displacing the Chief, and administering by British officers or a Native regency in the interest of the lawful heirs.

III. Non-interference, and the lightest possible form of control, with Chiefs who governed well.

Lord Mayo tried to make the Indian Feudatories feel that it rested with themselves to decide the degree of practical independence which they should enjoy, and that that degree would be strictly regulated by the degree of good government which they gave to their subjects.

KATHIAWAR AND LORD MAYO

In the case of Kathiawar, Lord Mayo, 'while recognising the necessity for reform and the contingency of future intervention, abstained from interfering.' It should be borne in mind that there are 187 Native States in the province of Kathiawar, administered by a Political Agent. When Lord Mayo came, he found that though the policy of reform in the province

"had produced some excellent results, it had failed to eradicate certain deep-rooted evils; and that five years of good government had not obliterated the effects of fifty years of British *laissez faire* and five centuries of Native misrule. He found many conflicting claims to the soil, and a number of ancient communities, each with a vested right in depredation. The 'ex-ruling classes,' representatives of old houses forcibly dispossessed, or of younger brothers of Chiefs unable to live on their slender share of the inheritance, 'predatory tribes,' and 'dangerous communities,' whose hereditary means of livelihood was plunder; 'aboriginal races', penned into the hills by successive waves of invaders,—all these elements of anarchy still fermented in the po,ulation of Kathiawar."†

Now, what did Lord Mayo do to check these elements of anarchy? He practically did nothing. Thus says his biographer:

"Lord Mayo saw, therefore, many things in the Kathiawar papers that came before him which he thought capable of further improvement. But he also saw that a vast amount of good work had been effected under the auspices of the Bombay Government during the preceding few years, and that that work was still bearing fruits. Had he lived, he intended to visit Kathiawar, and the

* *Life of Lord Mayo*, Vol. I., pp. 10-11.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 218-19

great question of reforming the Gaikwar's contingent would have come up. But meanwile, he contented himself with closely watching the progress of good government, and heartily acceding to all measures required for its development. One of the richest and most important States in Kathiawar fell into the hands of a minor during his Viceroyalty. An experienced Native minister and a picked member of the Civil Service were selected by the Bombay Government as its joint rulers, and they quickly converted it into a model of prosperity and firm administration. Another measure in which Lord Mayo took a keen interest was the formation of a school for the sons of the Chiefs. The rank of those boys had hitherto confined them to a private education, under the indulgent influences of the *zenana*. Lord Mayo thought that, whether in Rajputana or in Kathiawar, it was vain to expect the Chiefs to discharge their responsibilities as men unless they were properly trained as boys. Both in Kathiawar and in Rajputana a school for their education was established during his rule, and these Native Etons are now among the most promising institutions of their respective provinces.

"Lord Mayo was not one of those reformers who think they can change the customs and habits of thought of a people in a day. He realised that the process by which an Indian State casts its old skin of anarchy is a slow one, and that the operation is not helped by perpetual interference from without. Where he saw real improvement going on, he was willing to wait. He thought, moreover, that until everything had been done to render the English surveillance in a Native State as efficient as possible, he had no right to complain of the Chief. He held that the Suzerain Power was bound to see that the misrule of a Feudatory arose in no part from a vacillating or weakly officered British Residency; and that before blaming a native chief for governing ill, it was necessary first to see that the Indian Foreign Office placed him in the best possible circumstances for governing well. This view took a firmer hold of his mind as his Indian experience increased; and being dissatisfied with certain matters in Rajputana, he contemplated, not direct interference with the Chiefs, but an improvement of the British supervision. He thought that the existing mechanism required strengthening, and (I quote the words of his Private Secretary) 'one of the measures which he wished to bring about was the amalgamation of the Central India and Rajputana Agencies under a high officer of the Crown, with the status of a Lieutenant-Governor.'"*

LORD MAYO'S VIEWS ON THE ALWAR MISRULE

When the news came that the people in Alwar had risen against the Prince, Lord Mayo recorded his personal opinion as follows :

"After carefully considering this case, I am of opinion that our *interference* is now become a *matter* of *necessity*. I must here express my dissent from the policy advocated in the letter of...... which seems to imply, if the rule of a Feudatory Prince does not contribute to the contentment of the people, that that is no valid reason for our interference. Neither can I assent to the proposition, on the other hand, that if commotions arise in a Native State, the Chief can under no circumstances expect the assistance of the British Government in putting them down.

"I hold a contrary opinion......I believe that if in any Feudatory State in India, oppression, tyranny, corruption, wastefulness, and vice are found to be the leading characteristics of its administration, it is the imperative duty of the Paramount Power to interfere, and that we evade the responsibility which our position in India imposes upon us, and avoid the discharge of a manifest duty, if we allow the people of any race or class to be plundered and oppressed."

Lord Mayo was in favour of helping the Chief in his distress. He continued :

"On the other hand, I am equally of opinion that, should a well disposed Chief, while using his utmost endeavours to establish good government within his State, be opposed by insubordinate petty barons, mutinous troops, or seditious classes of his subjects. it is then our duty to support his authority and power.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 220-22

"Further, I believe that under no circumstances can we permit in any State in India the existence of a civil war, and that on such an occasion as this it is plainly our duty to interfere, at first by every peaceful means which we have at our disposal ; but that, in the event of arbitration and mediation failing, it will be our duty to stop by force of arms anything approaching to open hostilities between large classes of the people and their Chiefs."

He would not tolerate civil war in any State in the presence of British authority. He, therefore, said :

"I dissent altogether from the opinion that nothing would do more good in Rajputana than the example of a successful revolt ; and nothing will tempt me to stand by with folded arms and see in that uncivilised and benighted country state after state plunged into all the horrors and barbarities which are certain to accompany a Native civil war. As is well stated in these papers, whether Chiefs or Thakurs are right, the burden of the war and all its severities will fall upon the cultivators, who probably know little of, and care less for, the causes of the quarrels.

"I should like to find an officer of very high rank and great experience who could be sent to Alwar almost immediately. I cannot think there would be much difficulty in inducing the Maharrja and the Thakurs to consent to his arbitration. I think the confiscation of lands for the non-attendance of the horsemen was a harsh and unnecessary step.

"I should therefore recommend that an arbitration be offered in such a way that it must be accepted and that the Alwar Chief should be told that the arbitration cannot be limited in scope or amount ; that a general inquiry should be held into the grievances of his discontented subjects, with a view to their remedy.

"If I can find an officer of sufficient rank and experience to go down and arbitrate in this matter, I would be inclined to ask the Maharaja of Jaipur to assist in the arbitration. He is a member of our Legislative Council ; though a Rajput of Rajputs, he is an enlightened prince, and I cannot but think that it would have a great effect in Rajputana were we to call in, for the settlement of a very dangerous dispute, the assistance of one of the oldest and most respected of their own chiefs.

"If the Maharaja is asked to go, we can only associate with him an officer superior in rank to the Governor-General's agent, and one with whom the Maharaja could be properly asked to consult.

"I would send this officer with such state and dignity as becomes his rank, with a large escort and a suitable camp.

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"I think this could not fail to show that while we are prepared to maintain peace and order at all hazards in Rajputana, we are perfectly prepared to listen to all just complaints ; and while putting down with a high hand rebellion and sedition, we are prepared to remedy all just and proved grievances."*

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"But early in 1870 the Earl of Mayo had tidings that the people of Alwar had risen in arms, and that 2000 of them were in the field against their prince. One half of the *thakoors* were loyal to him ; but the other half were with the rebels, whom his misrule had exasperated, as he had confiscated to his own uses the public lands assigned for the support of his troops and the relief of the poor, and had proudly and vindictively rejected all the counsels of our political agent.

"Terms between the contending parties seemed impossible, though a last chance was given the prince by Lord Mayo, who summoned him to name a committee for the management of affairs. As he neglected to this, the Viceroy created a native council at Alwar, the capital (which stands at the base

* *Ibid.*, pp. 225—228.

of a steep hill, seventy-five miles from Delhi), with the British agent as President; and under their care the principality rapidly emerged from its troubles, though the prince clung to his worthless favorites, and, at a state Darbar held on the Queen's birthday, publicly insulted his nobility."*

Sir W. Hunter goes on to remark:

"Lord Mayo, however, still adhered to his resolve to govern Alwar by means of its own native council, rather than by any expedient which might bear the faintest resemblance to annexation. 'I fear this young chief is incorrigible,' he wrote early in 1871, 'but we must pursue the course of treatment we have laid down, firmly and consistently. The whole action of this chief is that of a mischievous and wily creature, who finds himself over-matched, tightly bound, and unable to do further harm.' Lord Mayo plainly told him that the only chance of 'his being ever freed from the council' would depend on his showing 'symptoms of repentance, and a determination to reconcile himself with his subjects.'

"But this amendment was not to be. The Native Council of Management went on with its work of improvement and reform. The Chief held himself sullenly aloof, and sank deeper and deeper into the slough of evil habits, until he died, a worn-out old man of twenty-nine, in 1874."†

Sir W. Hunter admits that this was *the most serious case of Native misrule* during Lord Mayo's Viceroyalty, and the only one in which he had to push interference to the point of superseding the hereditary Prince. Not only this but 'another instance of maladministration was visited with a severe rebuke, which the Chief resented, and refused to take his proper place at a Viceregal darbar in the seat below the head of the ancient Udaipur house.'

It is remarked by Sir W. Hunter that on Lord Canning and Lord Lawrence devolved the heavy task of consolidating the Native States under the changed regime. He also mentions that the task of conciliation remained for Lord Mayo to accomplish. But it is not the task of conciliation which remained for Lord Mayo, but rather the task of even more firmly consolidating the British power in the Native States. Of his policy towards the Native States, he also spoke before the Ajmer Darbar. He said:

"I, as the representative of the Queen, have come here to tell you, as you have often been told before, that the desire of Her Majesty's Government is to secure to you and to your successors the full enjoyment of your ancient rights and the exercise of all lawful customs, and to assist you in upholding the dignity and maintaining the authority which you and your fathers have for centuries exercised in this land.

"But in order to enable us fully to carry into effect this our fixed resolve, we must receive from you hearty and cordial assistance. If we respect your rights and privileges, you should also respect the rights and regard the privileges of those who are placed beneath your care. If we support you in your power, we expect in return good government. We demand that everywhere, throughout the length and breadth of Rajputna, justice and order shall prevail; that every man's property shall be secure; that the traveller shall come and go in safety; that the cultivator shall enjoy the fruits of his labour, and the trader the produce of his commerce; that you shall make roads, and undertake the construction of those works of irrigation which will improve the condition of the people and swell the revenues of your States; that you shall encourage education, and provide for the relief of the sick.

"Be assured that we ask you to do all this for no other but your own benefit. If we wished you to remain weak, we should say: Be poor and ignorant and disorderly. It is because we wish you to be strong that we desire to see you rich, instructed and well-governed. It is for such objects that

* *Ibid.*, p. 382.

† Hunter's *Earl of Mayo*, p. 110.

the servants of the Queen rule in India; and Providence will ever sustain the rulers who govern for the people's good.

"I am here only for a time. The able and earnest officers who surround me will, at no distant period, return to their English homes; but the Power which we represent will endure for ages. Hourly is this great Empire brought nearer and nearer to the throne of our Queen. *The steam-vessel and the rail-road enable England, year by year, to enfold India in a closer embrace.* But the coils she seeks to entwine around her are no iron fetters, but the golden chains of affection and of peace. The days of conquest are past; the age of improvement has begun."

But it is for the native princes to say whether the coils England seeks to entwine around the Native States are iron fetters or 'the golden chains of affection and of peace.' But when they remember the words of Lord Mayo, "We allow them to keep up armies, but we cannot permit them to go to war. We encourage them to establish Courts of Justice, but we cannot hear of them trying Europeans. We recognise them as separate sovereigns, but we daily issue to them orders which are implicitly obeyed. We depose them, as in the Tonk case, when the ruler permits or sanctions a grievous crime; or create an administration for them, as in the Alwar case, when a Chief misgoverns or worries his subjects," they fully realise whether it is the chains of iron fetters or the golden chains of affection and of peace.

The foundation of the Mayo College at Ajmer was also a wrong step. He wanted it to be "*a purely aristocratic College* for Rajputana, where the sons of the Rajput Princes and noblemen would be brought into direct contact with European professors and European ideas, and under the healthy influences of physical and moral training." In his Ajmer Darbar speech, Lord Mayo said :

"And, now, let me mention a project which I have much at heart. I desire much to invite your assistance to enable me to establish at Ajmer a school or College which should be devoted exclusively to the education of the sons of the Chiefs, Princes, and leading Thakurs of Rajpootana. It should be an institution suited to the position and rank of the boys for whose instruction it is intended, and such a system of teaching should be founded as would be best calculated to fit them for the important duties which in after life they would be called upon to discharge. It would not be possible on this occasion to describe minutely the different features of such an institution, but I hope to communicate with you shortly on the subject and I trust you will favour and support an attempt to give to the youth of Rajpootana instruction suitable to their high birth and position."*

Accordingly, the Mayo College was established at Ajmer and the Native Chiefs contributed no less than £70,000 sterling for this College. This aristocratic College under European professors and European ideas rather tries to Europeanise the young princes of Rajputana than fit them for their duties as *Indian* rulers.

LUSHAI EXPEDITION

Though it has been claimed that Lord Mayo kept his hands 'unstained by a single annexation,' yet he sanctioned the Lushai expedition. About this expedition, he wrote:

"It is with great reluctance that I have to express the opinion that it will be necessary to send, in the ensuing cold weather, an armed force into the country of the Lushais. The cruel

* *Speeches in England and India of Earl of Mayo*, p. 76.

raids that have been made for years upon various parts of our territory, more especially on the tea gardens of the Cachar district, and the *very unsuccessful and inefficient means* which have been hitherto taken for the protection of our frontier, together with the partial mismanagement, or want of success, which have attended almost everything which we have done, have doubtless imparted to these savages the impression that we are either unable or unwilling to take active measures, and to punish the perpetration of such crimes."*

In 1871 the Lushai Expedition was sanctioned by Lord Mayo. The Lushai tribes "occupy the then *terra incognita* which stretches from the Cachar Valley to the Chittagong District on the Bay of Bengal; and from Hill Tipperah on the west to the great watershed which pours its eastern drainage into the rivers of Burma."

About the conduct of the expedition, Lord Mayo wrote:

"The affair should be conducted with as little parade, noise and fuss as possible. It must not be looked upon as a campaign, for no formidable resistance is anticipated. It should be looked upon more as a military occupation and visitation of as large a portion of the Lushai Districts as possible, for the purpose of punishing the guilty where they can be traced and found, but more particularly for showing these savages that there is hardly a part of their hills which our armed forces cannot visit and penetrate."

About the punishment of the Lushais, Lieutenant Woodthrop, in his *Lushai Expedition*, tells us 'that the tribes on the north-eastern frontier of India have ever been a cause of anxiety and expense to the British Government. Every district in that quarter has the same characteristics and history;—bordered by, or forming part of, a range of hills inhabited by fierce and roving tribes, for ever engaged in armed inroads on their neighbours, plundering the villages and leaving them in flames, while bearing off to slavery all whom they did not kill or disable. The rights of the hill-men, real or fancied, were always respected carefully when we annexed any district, losses sustained by them were made good, and every means were taken to conciliate them; but after the annexation of Cachar, which we wrested from the Burmese in 1824 (after they had conquered it in 1774), it became necessary to secure the peace of the frontier, and enable the peaceful tea-planters to follow their avocations unmolested, and this was the object of Lord Mayo in dispatching the Lushai Expedition in 1871-72.'

But this expedition began to destroy villages on their way. In his despatch of 23rd of December, 1871, Brigadier General Brownlow reported that the army under Colonel Macpherson had destroyed a large village named Lalpoethal and that Major Macintyre had destroyed two others, 'which had been strongly stockaded, with all their rich granaries, estimated at 8,000 maunds.'

As soon as the news of these outrages reached Calcutta, there were indignant protests against them from all sides. Writing on the 5th of January, 1872, the London *Times'* correspondent says:

"Intelligence from the Lushai expedition shows that no time has been lost since the troops arrived in the enemy's country, in striking at the resources of the tribes; and already there has been *an outcry here* (at Calcutta) *that the war is cruel*—about the most absurd outcry ever raised in relation to military operations. The demand for the expedition was general; men confessed on all

* Quoted in Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, II, p. 382.

hands that these successive raids must be checked, or our Cachar tea-gardens deserted. Yet how we were to reach the tribes was a problem not to be solved theoretically. If they stood, there would be no difficulty; if they rose, there would be no means of punishing them save by the destruction of their stores. The fighting so far has been very slight, as running has been the order of the day. Well, *we have destroyed what stores the fugitives left behind*, and they have systematically destroyed all they have been able to destroy before retreating. Their scouts and sharpshooters have hung around both columns ever since the arrival of our troops in the thick jungle country. Our men have been fired upon from every hill-top. And yet there are people who blame them for destroying stores—and blame them in India, too, where military feeling is supposed to be so strong, and where it cannot be weak without entailing disastrous consequences. I refer to the subject lest the same unjust outcry should be raised in Britain. Our officers have been sent to do an unpleasant duty; their orders are so simple and definite that almost everything which has occurred was foreseen long before the expedition was entered upon. The forbearance of the Indian Government has been most marked. You will remember that even after the visit of 1868 there was a general hesitation about following the raiders. Instead of an expedition, Lord Mayo sent a mission of peace, used every argument to persuade the tribes to enter into peaceful relations with the men of the plains, and exchange visits with them yearly for festive intercourse and trade. But it was of no avail, and as a last resource the expedition was organised."*

LORD MAYO'S FRONTIER POLICY

Lord Mayo was against the policy of 'our prestige on the frontier.' He was of opinion that the Government was bound to preserve the peace in the frontier, but not by vindictive measures. He laid down his policy thus :

"The whole recommendation comes to this—that in the early part of spring a large force should be assembled at different points within the hills; and that this force, being placed absolutely at the disposal of the officers who believe that the burning of crops and the destruction of villages by British troops are indispensable to the maintenance of the peace of the frontier, should, at the least appearance of robbery or raid, advance into the hills and commence the old system of devastation."

Lord Mayo points out that such a force "might find itself involved in serious military operations, upon the character, justice, or necessity of which the Governor-General in Council never had an opportunity of expressing an opinion." He objected to authorise action which might cause such serious results.

He proposed "to substitute, as far as possible, for surprise, aggression and reprisal, a policy of vigilant, constant and never-ceasing defence of those parts of our frontier which are by their position liable to be attacked by foreign tribes." To those who objected that this policy 'must act as a constant menace to the tribes,' Lord Mayo replied :

"I cannot see the force of this objection. The presence of a policeman is indeed a standing menace to the thief; and a sight of the gallows may be a salutary reminder to the murderer. It is, I fear, too much the habit to adopt what is doubtless the view taken by the mountaineers themselves of these affairs. They look upon them as acts of war and justifiable aggression. We have to teach them that assassination, the attack of a defenceless village by night, and killing people in their beds, are not acts of war, but are esteemed by civilised nations to be acts of murder. The sooner we teach these people this the better. We have already taught it to millions who are less intelligent than the Pathans of the Hazara frontier."†

* Quoted in Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, II., p. 387.

† *Life of Lord Mayo*, I., pp. 235-237.

Lord Mayo was not willing to fight for 'our prestige on the frontier.' He wrote :

"*I object to fight for prestige.* And even those who may still think that killing people for the sake of prestige is morally right, will hardly assert that the character and authority of the British arms in India are affected one way or the other by skirmishes with wild frontier tribes. But there are other considerations connected with the subject, of wider and greater import than the punishment of a few mountain savages and the vindication of a local officer's prestige. Every shot fired in anger within the limits of our Indian Empire reverberates throughout Asia ; gives to nations who are no friends to Christian or European rule the notion that amongst our own subjects there are still men in arms against us ; and corroborates the assertion that the people within our frontier are not yet wholly subjected to our sway, and that British power is still disputed in Hindustan."

Lord Mayo again insists on a policy

"of constant vigilance and defence, the maintenance of a force sufficient at threatened quarters to summarily punish the perpetrators of any act of outrage ; the severest chastisement of all people caught in the act, treating them as persons engaged in murder, rapine, or robbery, and not in war."*

It is very significant that Lord Mayo objected to fight for *prestige* like other Anglo-Indian statesmen. He refused to send any force to the frontier in vindication of a local officer's prestige, because by that Government might find itself involved in serious military operations upon the necessity of which he would never have an opportunity of expressing an opinion. He pointed out that 'every shot fired in anger within the limits of the Indian Empire would reverberate throughout Asia.'

About the Lushai Expedition, Lord Mayo thus expressed his opinion :

"I cannot think that the expedition ought to partake of the character of those which have, from time to time, been undertaken on the North-West frontier for the chastisment of a particular tribe or clan. It does not appear that whole villages or whole tribes take part in these Lushai attacks. It is difficult to trace particular tribes—the Howlongs, the Sylus or others...This state of things renders the precise object of the expedition rather difficult to define. It would be impossible to send a force into the Howlong Country, for instance, with orders to burn right and left, destroy villages, and root up crops,—a course which might be justifiable if we were punishing an Akazai or Waziri village."

Lord Mayo never favoured any 'measure of *pure retaliation*' against the Lushai tribes. He continued :†

"I, therefore, agree with the Lieutenant-Governor, and am opposed to any measure of pure retaliation. If our advance into the country is met by opposition, our opponents must, of course, be severely punished. But besides this, it will be necessary to give the expedition a definite object ; and here lies the difficulty. The restoration of the captives might be one ; the infliction of a fine on certain villages whose inhabitants took part in the raids would be another ; the carrying off of hostages as pledges of good behaviour, a third ; the surrender of undoubtedly guilty parties, such as leading chiefs and others, who were known to have taken part in the raids, a fourth ; the immediate destruction of any village, with the surrounding crops, which offered any resistance, a fifth. But the main object would be to endeavour to enter into relations of a permanent character with the savages ; to make them promise to receive in their villages, from time to time, Native Agents of our own ; to show them the advantages of trade and of commerce ; and to demonstrate to them effectively that they have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by placing themselves in a hostile position towards us.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 237-38.

† *Life of Lord Mayo*, I., pp. 240-42.

"The affair should be conducted with as little parade, noise, and fuss as possible. It must not be looked upon as a campaign, for no formidable resistance is anticipated. It should be looked upon more as a military occupation and visitation of as large a portion of the Lushai districts as possible for the purpose of punishing the guilty where they can be traced and found, but more particularly for showing these savages that there is hardly a part of their hills which our armed forces cannot visit and penetrate. According to my view, the operation should be conducted very much as Major Macdonald describes, namely, that small picked bodies of men should be continually in motion keeping up communication with each other, showing themselves suddenly at different points, and so giving the Kukis an idea that their country is invaded by a very much larger force than it really is."*

LORD MAYO'S POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN

The results of Lord Mayo's policy in Afghanistan are summed up in a Minute by one of his councillors thus:

"It had taken many years to obliterate the memory of the disastrous policy of 1839-42, and to convince the Afghan nation that the British power was not a neighbour whose aggression or interference was to be feared. The friendly meeting at Ambala came at the right time to remove the mistrust which had prevented British influence from being effectually exercised in Afghanistan; to bring home to the Amir's mind the conviction that the British Government had no desire to extend its dominions; and to pave the way for the acceptance of what was to the Amir the still stranger lesson, that his highest wisdom was to abstain from interfering in the affairs of his neighbours, and to play his part in the difficult task of restoring some measure of peace to the wasted regions of Central Asia. This advice, repeated in writing from time to time as opportunity offered, the Amir has not been slow to accept. To the insidious counsels of those of his subjects who have occasionally prompted him to overstep the limits of his dominions, and adopt an aggressive policy in retaliation for injuries received, real or fancied, the Amir has ever turned a deaf ear. In accordance with the advice which had been given him by the late Viceroy, he has enjoined on his frontier officers a policy of watchful defence and of abstinence from aggression, and has endeavoured to settle his difficulties by diplomatic action, in a manner which has not only astonished his own people, but has excited the admiration of the Russian Government. These results have been carried out without any help from the British Government, beyond strong moral support and continued advice. Since 1869 the Amir has received no subsidy or material assistance. At no time were the relations of the Amir with his neighbours more peaceful and friendly than at present."†

POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA

It appears that any consolidation of British relations with trans-frontier States towards Central Asia rendered Russia suspicious that a rival so strenuous and so fortunate had not yet done with conquest. And so it came to pass that the Ambala Darbar of 1869, and the establishment of a firm Government in Afghanistan under British friendship, created a ferment of distrust at St. Petersburg."

In 1869 Lord Mayo stated his policy to be 'the establishment of independent and friendly Powers between our own frontier and the regions of Central Asia.' He wrote:

"I hope that sensible men will not continue to advocate the extreme line of inaction, or the worse alternative of meddling and interfering by subsidies and emissaries."

Again, he wrote to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburg thus:

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* *Life of Earl of Mayo*, pp. 263-65.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 270-73.

"We cannot view with any feelings of alarm the advance in Asia of a civilised Christian Power, and the establishment of its influence over wild and savage tribes. If Russia could only be brought to act cordially with us, to say that she would not obstruct our trade, that she would not encourage any hostile aggression or intrigue against Afghanistan, Yarkand or the territories lying on our frontier, and that she would stop with a strong hand the internecine feuds among those nations over whom she possesses influence, she would find that her mission in Asia would be facilitated and that the civilisation of the wide districts of Central Asia and the complete establishment of her power would be greatly hastened."

It is pointed out that this friendly attitude of Lord Mayo did not proceed from any apprehension regarding 'our own power.' After studying the whole situation, Lord Mayo remarked :

"I am rather inclined to believe that Russia is ignorant of our power. She seems to forget that we are in possession (if inclined to exercise it) of enormous influence, great wealth, and complete organisation ; that we are established, compact and strong in Asia, whilst she is exactly the reverse ; and that it is the very feeling of this power which justifies us in assuming that passive policy which, though it may be occasionally carried too far, is right in principle."*

Lord Mayo, remarked Dr. Hunter, approached the question of Russian invasion by two separate lines of advance – by negotiations at St. Petersburg, and consolidating the British relations with the Frontier States.

With reference to a projected Afghan aggression on Bokhara, Lord Mayo remarked :

"We have now done all that lies in our power to maintain peace on the frontier of Afghanistan, and though we shall steadily adhere to our policy, and continue to maintain an attitude of constant watchfulness, we can do no more. It rests with the Czar's Government, by adopting the same course with regard to those countries which are beyond the Russian possessions in Central Asia, as we have taken in Afghanistan, to permanently secure peace throughout the wide districts which are influenced respectively by the Government of the Queen and of His Imperial Majesty. In view of the success of the efforts we have made to prevent aggression, in the countries to the south of the Russian frontier, and all interference with Russian interests in Central Asia, we consider that Her Majesty's Government has a right to suggest that the Government of the Czar should promise to use all its influence to save from menace and attack the territories of the present Amir of Afghanistan, and to observe that policy of peace which Russia professes to be her aim, and which we believe to be as essential to the consolidation of her own power as it is to the interest of humanity and civilisation in Turkestan." *

After the negotiations of 1869, Lord Mayo wrote :

"It has given me the greatest satisfaction to hear that the Emperor had expressed himself gratified with the course which I have felt it to be my duty to adopt since I came to India. I cannot think that, if we only understand each other, Russian interest in Asia ought to be at variance with our own. The course which we have taken is sound, honest and just. And I am certain, that if Russia does not take a similar course, she will lay up for herself much trouble and danger, the extent of which she is probably not so cognisant of as I am."

HIS PERSIAN POLICY.

Persia also engaged the attention of Lord Mayo, who had a plan for defining the entire eastern boundary of Persia and of strengthening the British diplomatic

* *Ibid.*, pp. 275-76.

position at Teheran. The following is from a confidential programme of Lord Mayo's Persian policy :

"I appreciate to the fullest extent the importance of the establishment of friendly relations and a firm alliance with Persia. I believe that when her eastern frontier demarcation is settled, a source of jealousy and embarrassment as between her and ourselves will have ceased to exist ; and I am happy to think that a portion of this important work (the Kilat line) is now finished. But in securing the independence and good will of the intermediate States lying immediately on our border, I in no way underrate the importance of maintaining the nationality of Persia, and of strengthening her power. Sir Henry Rawlinson points out with great truth that extension of territory would be to her perilous. It is, therefore, with peculiar satisfaction that I look forward to the definition of her entire eastern boundary, and trust that before next April (his own death took place in February) a line will be drawn, from Lash Jowein to the Sea at Gyadhr, which will form the acknowledged frontier of the Empire of the Shah.

"I concur with Sir Henry Rawlinson as to the absolute necessity of an immediate change in the relations of the Indian Government with the British Mission at Teheran. I heartily subscribe to every word he says as to the good influence which an able and energetic Anglo-Indian statesman would exercise over the mind of the present sovereign of Persia. The Indian Government could always supply an officer well fitted for the responsible duties which he would have to perform ; and seeing (as I constantly do) the enormous influence that a straight-forward, courteous, able and accomplished English gentleman can obtain in very little time over the minds of Asiatic rulers, I cannot but believe that the recommendation which has been repeatedly made by the present Indian Government would, if carried out, meet with certain success."*

Lord Mayo continues :

"I believe that if such an officer as I could readily name (many of whom we possess in this service) were stationed at the court of Teheran, we should have little difficulty in showing to the Shah that the British influence in the Gulf is one of the best securities which His Majesty possesses for the integrity of his dominions and for the maintenance of peace. In the same way, I believe that nothing would be more fatal than that English influence should induce the Shah to make a movement northwards, and so bring himself into collision with Russia. It would be almost a crime on our part, for the purpose of attaining a temporary ascendancy in Persian politics, to urge her on so perilous a course as to attempt to extend her dominions, either in a north-westerly direction, or by encroachments upon Afghanistan or its feudatory tribes. We should also advise her to leave the affairs of the Gulf alone, to define her boundaries, and endeavour, by something approaching to a decent and honest Government, to strengthen herself internally.

"I have great doubts as to the expediency of the suggested employment of Indo-British military officers in the Persian service. I do not believe that British officers can directly and permanently serve Asiatic powers either with credit to themselves or with benefit to those States. The ways of such States are not as our ways; and in peace as well as in war, officers placed in such a position must be cognisant of deeds, and participators to some extent in actions, of which no man of honour can appove. If British officers cannot be in supreme command, they should not enter on such service.

"If English officers were sent to Persia, other European Powers might press to be allowed to do the same thing, and we might soon find British officers struggling in the Persian ranks for supremacy with Russians or Frenchmen. In our present relations with Russia we should view with great suspicion the employment in military commands in Persia of a number of the officers of the imperial army. A similar proceeding on our part would probably call forth a strong remonstrance from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. I am not blind to the fact that Russia does exercise considerable inflnence in Persia. The oriental character of her diplomacy enables her to employ means and influences which probably are beyond our reach. But I believe this can only be met, and a counter influence obtained,

* *Ibid.*, pp. 290-291.

by the employment of able and experienced agents, men who have spent their lives in studying the oriental character, and who will represent their sovereign in her capacity as Ruler of Hindustan."*

RESULTS OF LORD MAYO'S FOREIGN POLICY.

Lord Mayo's foreign policy was directed towards creating a cordon of friendly and well-governed States on our western and northern frontier, from Baluchistan on the Persian Gulf, round by Afghanistan, to eastern Turkistan. Thus says his biographer:

"He acted in the same spirit to his neighbours along the north-eastern and south-eastern borders of the British dominions. Towards Nepal he maintained an attitute alike firm, friendly and dignified, and consolidated the satisfactory relations which he found existing with that State. On the north-east of Bengal he may be said to have created a frontier, and the Lushai Expedition has given to those long distracted regions a period of quiet and peace. Proceeding farther south, we find him equally busy in Burmah, suppressing the warlike propenisities of the king, developing trade relations, and enforcing respect for the British Power. But, the hard work of his foreign policy lay on the western and north-western frontier."†

Sir John Strachey thus sums up the results of Lord Mayo's foreign policy:

"There is hardly one of the kingdoms that border on our Indian Empire of which it may not truly be said, that peace and settled government have been unknown in it for ages. The history of one and all of them, from Oman to Yarkand, is a record of wars, revolutions and dynastic changes, succeeding each other with such rapidity as to leave in the mind of the reader only a confused feeling of bewilderment. This chronic state of turbulence and disorder, destructive of ancient landmarks and boundaries, and producing only weakness and disintegration, both provokes and invites annexation. It ruins commerce, destroys the productiveness of the soil...and produces isolation, jealousy and distrust in the countries that suffer from its curse. It was this state of things in India which forced on the extension of the British Empire to the mountains beyond the Indus. It is this state of things more than lust of conquest that has extended, in spite of herself, the dominion of Russia in Asia.

"To apply a radical remedy to these evils was the main object of Lord Mayo's foreign policy. Honestly proclaiming and showing by his acts that the spectre of annexation was laid for ever, he taught our neighbours that they have nothing to fear from us. By bringing about a common understanding between the countries on our frontier as to their mutual boundaries, he sought to remove every pretext for war and aggression. By assisting the rulers of these States to strengthen their internal government, and by bringing both his own personal influence and the moral support of the British Government to bear in putting down rebellions and revolutions, he endeavoured to establish firm, just and merciful government. By the encouragement and development of trade, he hoped to break down the barriers which isolate those countries from us, and to create, both within and beyond our frontier, a permanent interest in the maintenance of good order. By free and friendly intercommunication, he desired to remove that ignorance as to our policy and that jealousy of our intentions which in past years have been so fruitful of mischief. And, lastly, by endeavouring through frank and amicable discussion with the Russian Government to secure the adoption on their part of a similar policy in the countries on the Russian frontier in Asia which are subject to Russian influence, it was his hope that he would be instrumental in securing some degree of peace and prosperity to the exhausted countries of Central Asia, and in removing the causes of disquietude as to the designs of England and Russia, which have been so prominent in the public mind in both countries."§

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 292,4.

† *Ibid.*, p. 305.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 306-7.

HIS FINANCIAL POLICY.

When Lord Mayo came to India, the country was groaning under a heavy financial deficit. It fell to him to stop the huge waste of money of the India Government and enforce economy in expenditure. The financial condition of India at this time has been described by Sir John Strachey thus :

"For many years before Lord Mayo became Viceroy, the ordinary financial condition of India had been one of chronic deficit, and one of the main causes of this state of affairs was the impossibility of resisting the constantly increasing demands of the Local Governments for the means of providing many kinds of improvement in the administration of their respective Provinces. Their demands were practically unlimited, because there was almost no limit to their legitimate wants. The Local Governments had no means of knowing the measure by which their annual demands upon the Government of India ought to he regulated. They had a purse to draw upon of unlimited, because of unknown, depth. They saw on every side the necessity for improvements, and their constant and justifiable desire was to obtain for their own Provinces and people as large a share as they could persuade the Government of India to give them out of the general revenues of the Empire. They found by experience, that the less economy they practised, and the more importunate their demands, the more likely they were to persuade the Government of India of the urgency of their requirements. In representing those requirements they felt that they did what was right ; and they left to the Government of India, which had taken the task upon itself, the responsibility of refusing to provide the necessary means.

"The Government of India had totally failed to check the constant demands for increased expenditure. There was but one remedy ; namely, to prevent the demands being made ; and this could only be done by imposing on the Local Government a real and an effectual responsibility for maintaining equilibrium in their local finances. There could be no standard of economy until apparent requirements were made absolutely dependent upon known available means. It was impossible for either the Supreme or Local Governments to say what portion of the provincial revenues was properly applicable to local wants. The revenues of the whole of India went into a common fund, and, to determine how much of this fund ought fairly to be given to one Province and how much to another, was impracticable."

Such was the impossible state of finance of the India Government on the arrival of Lord Mayo. There was very little of economy in the expenditure of the local Governments, so there was a state of chronic deficit with the India Government.

Major General R. Strachery thus writes :

"The distribution of the public income degenerates into something like a scramble, in which the most violent has the advantage. As local economy leads to no local advantage, the stimulus to avoid waste is reduced to a minimum. So, as no local growth of the income leads to an increase of the local means of improvement, the interest in developing the public revenues is also brought down to the lowest level."

Lord Mayo put an end to this *unprofitable state* of things and introduced strict economy in the finance of the Government of India. In his despatch to the Secretary of State for India on the 20th September, 1869, Lord Mayo assured the Duke of Argyle

"that notwithstanding the somewhat gloomy picture we have been obliged to draw the general aspect of affairs inspires us with the fullest confidence in the future prosperity of India. We entertain no apprehension of foreign invasion or domestic disturbance. For all purposes of defence and for the preservation of peace, our military and police organisations are strong and efficient. The splendid revenue of the Empire is contributed by a population which, compared with that of other countries, is lightly taxed. As was proved by the success of our late loan, the credit of India never

stood higher. The enriching and civilising effects of the great Railway and irrigation works which have, within the last twenty years, been constructed are beginning to be felt throughout the length and breadth of the land. By the blessing of Providence, with the reasonable and plentiful rainfall of the last few weeks, all danger of famine and of the continuance of the late severe distress has passed away. The steady rise which has taken place in the value of labour must ere long materially increase the wealth and contentment of the people. With us then, it rests by careful administration and by a strict adherence to those simple rules of prudence and economy which in the conduct of the affairs alike of nations and individuals are indispensable to the attainment of safety and success, to use to the utmost extent for the benefit of the people, the mighty resources of this great Empire."*

To put a stop to this chronic state of finance, Lord Mayo made heavy cuts, much to the disgust of the spending Departments. By one stroke of the pen, he reduced 'the over-grown grant' of Public Works by about £ 800,000. He also curtailed £ 350,000 from the grants of other Departments. But on the shoulders of the Indian tax-payers, he put a burden of £ 500,000—by increasing the income-tax from 1 to 2½ per cent. and raising the salt duty in Madras and Bombay.

In explaining his views to the Secretary of State for India, Lord Mayo wrote:

"While the accumulated deficits of the three years ending with 1868-69 have amounted to 5¾ millions, the cash balances in our Indian treasuries have fallen from £ 13,770,000 at the close of 1865-66 to £ 10,360,000 to the close of 1868-69, and notwithstanding our recent loan of £ 2,400,000, are at this moment lower than they have been at this season for many years. During the same period our debt has been increased by 6½ millions of which not more than 3 millions have been spent on reproductive works. Your grace has reminded us so to frame our estimates as to show a probable surplus of from half a million to a million sterling. We entirely agree with your grace in acknowledging the soundness of the policy. We have no doubt that, excluding charges for extraordinary works provided for by loan, our expenditure in time of peace ought to be so adjusted to our income as to leave an annual surplus of not less than one million. The necessary conclusion to which we are thus led is, that nothing short of a permanent improvement in the balance now subsisting between our annual income and expenditure of at least three millions sterling will suffice to place our finances in a really satisfactory condition. How, by reducing our expenditure and increasing our income, we can best obtain such a result, is the problem that we have now to solve.

"We are satisfied that there is only one course which we can properly follow. We must no longer continue to make good the deficit of each succeeding year by adding to the public debt. And we must determine, whatever be the difficulty of the task, that there shall henceforth be no room for doubt that, in time of peace, our income will always be in excess of our ordinary expenditure."

Lord Mayo considered the financial condition so serious that he once remarked in conversation: "We have played our last card, and we have nothing left in our hands to fall back upon, except to devise measures which will prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis hereafter."

To improve the financial condition, Lord Mayo effected what is known as the *decentralisation of the finances*, by the Government Resolution of 14th December, 1870. The object of this policy was to increase the powers and responsibility of the Local Governments in respect to the expenditure in some of the Civil Departments. The Government resolution runs thus:

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* *Speeches in England and India of the Earl of Mayo*, pp. 36-37.

"Under the present system, these (Local) Governments have little liberty and but few motives for economy in their expenditure ; it lies with the Government of India to control the growth of charges to meet which it has to raise the revenue. The Local Governments are deeply interested in the welfare of the people confided to their care ; and, not knowing the requirements of other parts of the country or of the Empire as a whole, they are liable, in their anxiety for administrative progress, to allow too little weight to fiscal considerations. On the other hand, the Supreme Government, as responsible for the general financial safety, is obliged to reject many demands in themselves deserving of all encouragement, and is not always able to distribute satisfactorily the resources actually available.

"Thus it happens that the Supreme and Local Governments regard from different points of view measures involving expenditure ; and, the division of responsibility being ill-defined, there occur conflicts of opinion injurious to the public service. In order to avoid the conficts, it is expedient that as far as possible, the obligation to find the funds necessary for administrative improvements should rest upon the authority whose immediate duty it is to devise such measures. This is the more important, because existing Imperial resources will not suffice for the growing wants of the country....

"The Government of India is accordingly pleased to make over to the Governments, under certain conditions to be presently set forth, the following departments of the administration in which they may be supposed to take special interest ; and to grant permanently from the Imperial revenue for these services the sum of £4,688,711, being less by £ 330,801 only than the assignments made for the same services in 1870 to 1871 :—Jails, Registration, Police, Education, Medical Services (except Medical Establishments), Printing, Roads, Miscellaneous, Public Improvements, Civil Buildings."*

The chief merit of this decentralisation of finances lies in the fact that Lord Mayo 'enlarged the responsiblities of the local administrations and gave them a new incentive to economy, without diminishing the authority of the Central Government, or loosening the unity of the British power in India.'*

As to the results of Lord Mayo's financial reforms, the Financial Secretary to the Government of India wrote :

"Lord Mayo's close personal attention to financial questions never flagged. He had by decisive measures established steady surplus for chronic deficit ; he had increased the working power of the Local Governments, while checking the growth of their demands upon the Imperial Treasury. He had established a policy of systematic watchfulness and severe economy. The time was now coming when the results of all his exertions and sacrifices were to be gathered ; when the Viceroy would be able to gratify his nature by granting relief from the burdens which he had reluctantly imposed. Lord Mayo was occupied with such questions on the very journey which ended so fatally. He had reason to hope that effective remission of taxation would soon be practicable, but he was still uncertain what shape it ought to take. It should never be forgotten that the welcome measures of relief which the Government subsequently found itself in a position to effect, were possible only in consequence of Lord Mayo's vigorous policy of retrenchment and economy.

"He found serious deficit, and left substantial surplus. He *found estimates habitually untrustworthy* ; he left them thoroughly worthy of confidence. He *found accounts in arrear, and statistics incomplete* ; he left them punctual and full. He found the relation between the Local Governments and the Supreme Government in an unsatisfactory condition, and the powers of the Local Governments for good hampered by obsolete financial bonds. He left the Local Governments working with cordiality, harmony and freedom, under the direction of the Governor-General in Council. He *found the financial Department conducted with a general laxity* ; he left it in vigorous efficiency. And if the sound principles be adhered to, which Lord Mayo held of such importance, and which in his hands proved so thoroughly effective, India ought not again to sink into the state from which he delivered her."†

* *Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors*, I, pp. 474-75.

† *The Earl of Mayo*, pp. 156-157.

MILITARY RETRENCHMENT.

Lord Mayo also carried out a heavy retrenchment in the Military Department. The Duke of Argyle, as Secretary of State for India, in his Despatch, urged the necessity of reform in the Military Department. He pointed out that 'notwithstanding the numerical decrease in the forces since the Mutiny, the expenditure on them had increased from 12¾ millions sterling in 1856-57 to over 16 millions in 1868-69. He also referred to the fact, that while a new and costly system of police had been organised, the expectations of army retrenchment based upon it had borne no fruit. The Despatch concluded with a hope that the Viceroy would devise means to bring down the army military expenditure in India by a million and a half sterling.'

This Army retrenchment was a delicate question and had been avoided by many British politicians.

On this question of retrenchment Sir W. Hunter says:

"Their previous efforts at military retrenchment had been directed partly to numerical reductions, partly to a more stringent economy in the staff and the various departments charged with the army administration. They now found that, as regards the latter class of charges, a vast saving might be effected by a better distribution of the duties and a more accurate adjustment of appointments to the actual amount of work to be done. But they also found that economy in administration, however stringent, would be wholly inadequate to meet the case; and that even if they suddenly cut down every such grant for the effective services in India by one-half, the saving would fall short of the one and a half million desired by the Secretary of State. It is hardly necessary to add that no measure of this sort was ever contemplated by the Duke of Argyle, for it would have left the army shattered and utterly disorganised."

But many British statesmen were not willing to touch the army at all, because they feared that the reduction of the number of soldiers would strike at the root of the British rule in India. They would rather have the number of Indian soldiers reduced than the number of British soldiers. Therefore, the army reform scheme of Lord Mayo was directed against the Indian troops. After the Sepoy Mutiny, there had been a heavy reduction in the number of Indian troops and now came the second blow on the Indian soldiers.

Thus, Lord Mayo himself in a private letter to one of Her Majesty's ministers writes:

"One thing, I implore, may not be done, and that is the removal of a single British bayonet or sabre from India. We can, I believe, reduce our military expenditure by a million, without giving up one of the little white-faced men in red."

Again, he wrote in his public Despatch a few days later:

"We are strongly impressed with the belief that we have not one British soldier too many in this country. We should most strongly object to any reduction of their number, because we are convinced that such a step could not be taken without endangering and weakening authority, one of the mainstays of British rule."

Thus Lord Mayo would not touch any 'white-faced men in red,' rather he would sacrifice the number of Indian troops. Sir W. Hunter says:

"Nevertheless, he proposed to reduce the charges for the European troops by half a million sterling. This, too, without decreasing the total rank and file by a man, or the pay of either officers

or men by a shilling. He proved that a chief cause of the increased military expenditure, of which the Secretary of State so justly complained, arose from the fact that European regiments in India had gradually declined from their full effective strength, so that a larger number of separate regiments were required to give an equal total of fighting men. He proposed by strengthening each regiment, to keep the same total of fighting men, and to reduce the number of separate regiments. He would thus get rid of the costly organisation of eleven extra European regiments and of the heavy drain on the Indian Treasury which the needless number of regimental headquarters involved.... The Indian military authorities believed that efficiency would not be lessened, while the abolition of the superfluous regimental headquarters and similar charges in the British cavalry 'and infantry alone would yield an annual saving of £297,220. A corresponding, but not quite identical, reform in the artillery would add a further saving of £271,542 sterling a year. Total saving in European troops, £568,762."*

In making this retrenchment "the rank and file (of the British troops) would be slightly increased." But in the case of Indian troops, no consideration was shown and the number of soldiers was ruthlessly decreased. Since the days of the Mutiny, it has been the accepted principle of the British rulers of India to exclude the Indians from the Artillery Section. 'Lord Mayo's Government followed out the accepted policy of dispensing with Native gunners, and his proposals were readily sanctioned by the Secretary of State.' By one stroke of the pen, Lord Mayo abolished two Bengal batteries, the Native Company of Artillery in Madras, and one Native Company of Artillery in Bombay—the abolition of these four batteries effected an annual saving of £17,003. Lord Mayo also proposed 'a reduction of one regiment of Bengal Native Cavalry, and one of Bengal Native Infantry, raising the rank and file in the other regiments so as to maintain the same total of rank and file in the Bengal Native army. Annual saving £27,200 a year.'

"The general scheme of the military retrenchment and reorganisations proposed by Lord Mayo's Government divides itself into four branches, and would have effected an eventual saving of close upon one million sterling. Thus:

1. Staff appointments	£46,065	
2. Army Departments, and reduction of the Governor-General's Body-Guard	32,940	
3. European troops		
Artillery—6 horse and 8 field batteries	271,542	
Cavalry—4 regiments Infantry—7 regiments	297,220	568,762
4. Native army		
Artillery—4 batteries	17,003	
Cavalry—4 regiments	59,009	
Infantry—16 "	224,474	300,486
Total saving		£948,253†

But the Secretary of State for India did not sanction the proposal of Lord Mayo as it stood. He sanctioned the first two sets of retrenchments, namely, in the Indian staff and the Army Departments. "But he did not see his way to adopt in their entirety either of the other two series of measures, namely, those which affected the British regiments serving in India, or the reductions of the Native

* *Ibid.*, pp. 160-61

† *Ibid.*, pp. 166-67

army. As regards the former, Her Majesty's Government reduced the British cavalry by two instead of four regiments, and the British Infantry by two instead of seven regiments; *but without the corresponding increase in the rank and file of the remaining regiments,* on which the Indian Government had so strongly insisted. As regards the Native forces, the artillery reductions were sanctioned; but the Secretary of State thought that the cavalry and infantry reductions bore too heavily on the Madras army. He proposed an alternative plan which would have broken up two regiments of Bengal cavalry, and one in each of the other Presidencies; with six regiments of Native infantry, two in each Presidency."

About the Madras army and its expenses, its Governor, Lord Napier, wrote: "In the Madras Presidency, it is my opinion that the cost of the army far transcends the wants of the country."

Writing on this army question, Lord Mayo said in 1870:

"*Every shilling that is taken for unnecessary military expenditure, is so much withdrawn from those vast sums which it is our duty to spend for the moral and material improvement of the people.* I admit to the full that a complete and an efficient military organisation is the base and foundation of our power here. We are bound to see that every officer and man is fit for immediate service, and that every arm and every military requisite is maintained in a state of the utmost efficiency. I believe that in the proposals which have been made, these principles have been strictly adhered to."*

Every Christian ruler of India should take into heart the following advice of Lord Mayo in framing his Budget estimate. In the last despatch of Lord Mayo on army reform, he said:

"*We cannot think that it is right to compel the people of this country to contribute one farthing more to military expenditure* than the safety and defence of the country absolutely demand."

Though Lord Mayo made some reasonable retrenchments in the military, Public Works and other Departments, he imposed the terrible burden of income-tax on the poor tax-payers of India for three consecutive years.

THE STATE RAILWAYS.

Lord Mayo was not in favour of the Government guaranteed system of Railways, which was initiated by Lord Dalhousie and followed by Lord Canning, Lord Elgin and Lord Lawrence. But this system had not made sufficient progress. From 1853 to the beginning of 1869, there were only about 4000 miles of railway opened in India. The Duke of Argyle was also not in favour of this system. He observed:—"The money was raised on the credit and authority of the State, under an absolute guarantee of five per cent., involving no risk to the shareholders, and sacrificing on the part of Government every chance of profit, while taking every chance of loss." In the absence of any inducements to economy, remarked Sir W. Hunter, the guaranteed railways had cost £17,000 a mile, and were worked under a system of double supervision—expensive, dilatory and complicated. So he thought that it had become evident that the costliness of this plan rendered an adequate development of railways in India financially impossible.

Lord Mayo, therefore, gave up the old policy and adopted the policy of State railways. Under this new system,

"The Indian Government borrowed its railway capital at four per cent., thus saving £100,000 yearly on every ten millions. The old system involved double management, with a cost of construction that averaged £17,000 for every mile; under the new there was but one controlling power. Government

* *Ibid.*, p. 170

had the work done by contract, and hence the cost of construction, on the narrow gauge State lines, was less than £6,000 per mile. While Lord Mayo thus inaugurated a new railway system for India, he carried out with vigour the schemes which had been formed by such predecessors as the Marquis of Dalhousie and Lord Lawrence."

Lord Mayo thus lays down his Railway policy:

"The alternative, as regards India, is this cheap railway or none; and I would rather do without railways altogether than incur the future risk of that annual increase of expenditure, and consequently of taxation, which I have stopped, and which is our only real danger in India. It is true that the people are lightly taxed; and so they ought to be. We are an alien power, ruling at enormous disadvantages, principally by the force of character and by administrative skill. As long as the natives of Hindostan believe that whatever power might follow us, native or European, will tax them more heavily than we do, we are safe. Should the other feeling prevail, we will lose our hold on the country. There is no real patriotism in India. The great mass of the Hindus have always been accustomed to be ruled by a foreign power. If the foreign power is just and wise, it is the form of government that suits them best. In our circumstances in India, we cannot therefore dig deeply into people's pocket. Therefore, I say, let us have railways that will pay, or nearly pay; or no railways at all, if their effect will be to add £100,000 or £150,000 every year to the permanent burdens of the State. But we can make railways that will add little or nothing to the burdens of the State; and we can also make railways at £5,000 a mile that will not only pay, but do all we want ..With regard to the breadth of gauge, we adhere to our former opinion. We do not believe that for many years we can hope to obtain any amount of traffic that would justify the extra outlay of £2,000 a mile for standard gauge; and further, we feel that if we do not adopt a narrow gauge now, all hope of getting cheap railways for India would be closed for ever. I believe the evils of the breadth of gauge on long lines, where light traffic can only be anticipated, are exaggerated; that as far as native passenger traffic is concerned, no evil whatever will result; and that as regards corn, oil-seeds, coal and salt, the inconvenience will be small, and the expense of transhipment will hardly exceed the cost of twelve miles of haulage. For the carriage of soldiers and horses there will be no difficulty, as after long railway journeys they must eat and rest, which they can always do at the change. There will undoubtedly be some difficulty as to munitions of war and all military stores; but it will be absurd to suggest that we should spend two millions of money for this object only. What we should aim at is the provision of such railway communication as will provide for present wants, with a power of such increase as will give facility for considerable augmentation if it is hereafter found necessary. This, I believe, we have done, and more than this we ought not to do."*

Lord Mayo thus expressed his opinion against the guaranteed system of railways, because of the huge cost the system entailed. The following table will show the system cost the Government up to the year 1861 :†

Railway.	Length.	Total cost	Average cost per mile.
		£	£
East Indian .	1,364	23,000,000	16,862
Great Indian Peninsula ...	1,266	12,000,900	9,476
Madras	850	8,500,000	10,000
Bombay and Baroda ...	310	4,000,000	12,900
Scinde	114	1,600,000	14,000
Punjab	252	2,500,000	10,000
Delhi and Punjab ...	280	8,000,000	10,700
Eastern Bengal	110	1,500,000	13,636
Great Southern ...	78½	600,000	8,000
Calcutta and South Eastern ...	29	380,000	13,450
	4,653½	57,520,000	...
Average cost upon whole system	£12,367 per mile.		

* "Quoted in Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, II, p. 400.

† *Annals of Indian Administration*, Vol. p. 434.

About this Guarantee System, we also read:

"The Government of India decided that the system has been a *most costly one*, and that the control over its exercise has been insufficient, owing to practical difficulties in expenditure, and to the fact that there can be no real control where there is no direct authority over the staff, extending to dismissal, if necessary."

Though the Government of India admitted that the system had been a *most costly one*, yet they would not admit that the system proved a failure, because, again, we are told:

"But the Government of India did not subscribe to the view that the system of constructing Public Works in India through the agency of foreign companies, with money raised virtually by an absolute guarantee, had proved a failure."*

Lord Mayo, however, was against this policy, as it added a great burden on the over-taxed population of India.

But Lord Mayo was also alive to the advantages the extension of railways would bring to the merchants of his own country. Thus, at the time of the Goalundo Extension of the Eastern Bengal Railway, Lord Mayo reminded the English merchants:

"Well, gentlemen, when we think that this railway terminus is placed here on this point, where it is likely to catch the trade that comes down the Ganges on one side and the Brahmapootra on the other—we must bear witness to the sagacity and prudence of those enlightened gentlemen, the servants of the Eastern Bengal Railway Company, who never ceased to press upon the Directors and the public the immediate completion of this extension. Since the Eastern Bengal Railway was first contemplated a great commerce has grown up in these provinces. The rapid development of the jute trade of Eastern Bengal is one of the most remarkable events in modern commerce...It is interesting to hear that in 1850-51, the exports of raw jute were only 584,000 cwts. of a value of £197,000; in last year (1869) the export of that article had risen to nearly three millions and a half cwt., value for more than two millions of money. Besides this, there has also been a considerable export trade developed in the manufactured article to an amount of something like £712,000 so that really, during the past year, the value of jute, raw and manufactured, exported from India, touched nearly upon two millions and three-quarters sterling. This shows what facility of communication, what industry and what prudence can do for this country when, by the exertions of a few gentlemen pursuing commercial occupations in Calcutta, aided by the Railway and the splendid water-carriage which nature has provided, such a magnificent trade as that can be developed in little more than 17 or 18 years. Gentlemen, this extension, completed to-day, will give additional stimulus to this great trade, and it must be a satisfaction to us to know that, as far as this Railway has been pushed, it now provides all the ingenuity that man can do, for a cheap, easy and rapid transit for this great staple from the places where it is produced to the point of embarkation..."†

About the new State railways, Lord Mayo said at the Jubbulpur banquet, given on the occasion of the opening of a through line of railway communication between Calcutta and Bombay:

"We have the example before us of the great works undertaken and completed by guaranteed companies. I should be the last person to say a single word against what has been done in India in past days, but I believe firmly that the great arterial lines having now been made through the intervention of the great companies, we shall be able to conduct the less important works

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* *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, p. 93.

† *Speeches in England and India by Earl of Mayo*, II, pp. 18-19.

in a cheaper manner, and in a manner more conducive to the interests of the country than heretofore. I believe that, in doing so, we shall experience no jealousy and no opposition from those who manage the great existing lines. As far as we have gone, we have found that those who are interested in their management have given us every assistance in the construction of those which will be their feeders, and I believe that this great congeries of lines, though its construction will extend over a long series of years, will form a system of Railway communication equal to any in the world. It will have this great advantage that the whole Railway system of India will be conducted on one uniform principle, and that we shall work up to one well considered laid down plan. That plan being adhered to, we shall be able to keep a steady and well-defined object in view. Gentlemen, I believe that years hence, when these great works are completed, we shall have implanted our footsteps deeply on Indian soil."

Lord Mayo frankly confessed the object of making these railways when he said:

"Every stone we lay on the Railway, increases our influence and consolidates our power, and the most substantial of our works is a fit emblem of the permanency of our rule." *

So it has been said :

"They found that by the gradual process of good government, the same efficient police referred to by the Duke (of Argyll), *the development of that railway system* which had been a pet scheme of the Marquis of Dalhousie, and the improved rifles now in the hands of the troops, India could be controlled and guarded with a less costly army in 1870 than in preceding years." †

INCOME TAX

The imposition of the income tax commenced from the time of Lord Canning. Lord Mayo also continued the imposition of this tax and for three years, 1869, 1870 and 1871, Lord Mayo had to pass the Indian Income Tax Bill. In defending the policy of his Government, Lord Mayo said in 1869 :

"I am quite aware that the step we have taken is most unusual, but it is not unprecedented. If history is examined and enquiry made into occurrences that have taken place in countries where a representative system of Government is in full force, it will be found that, on special occasions, a similar proceeding has been adopted."

Again, he said :

"Some slight foreboding was certainly expressed in one or two quarters. It was said that by the premature disclosure of the real financial state of the empire, we should run the risk of damaging national credit and throwing a general air of discredit upon the whole proceedings of the Government.

"I, in common with my colleagues, took a different view, which I think the result has shown to be the right one ; for though the statements which were made have been now for a considerable time before the public, we have found that the financial credit of the country has not been seriously damaged, but that the public, knowing the worst, and feeling and appreciating the efforts of the Government to deal with the difficulty, have seen that these difficulties can be surmounted, that there is no real danger to the permanent financial position of the empire, and that administrative reforms and strict adherence to the ordinary rules of econonmy and prudence, are all that is necessary to place our fiscal affairs on a sound and healthy basis."§

* *Ibid.*, p, 31.

† Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, II, p, 395.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 103, 104.

In 1870, when Lord Mayo again proposed the imposition of the Income Tax, there was much opposition to his proposal. In meeting the opposition, Lord Mayo remarked :

"I am not surprised at the various criticisms that have been made, and made with great ability and force, on the proposals which have been submitted to this council. It is very easy to find fault with the imposition of any new or additional tax, but it is not so easy, in the face of great financial difficulty, to propose an efficient substitute ; and in considering this question, we must bear in mind the fact that the finances of this great Empire, with which we are trying to deal, and which we are endeavouring to put upon a sound basis, have been and are up to this moment, in an unsatisfactory condition. It has been repeatedly stated, but a great truth cannot be stated too often, that from the year 1866 to the present time, we have been plunged in a chronic state of deficit. We have spent on ordinary expenditure in those years upwards of 6½ millions more than we ought to have done. I would beg to remind the Council that by the prompt action which we took at Simla last year, we have been able to reduce the deficit of this year to something like a sum of £652,000. The course of events has completely justified the *somewhat arbitrary course* then adopted. If we had not taken that step we should probably have been obliged last Saturday to announce to the public an actual deficit of upwards of a *million and a half* sterling."

Lord Mayo also referred to the objections taken to the financial proposals of the India Government. He said :

"Two or three of my colleagues appear to entertain the opinion that there are other means by which the finances of the country could be improved than those which have been adopted by the Government. I believe that there are other means and very good means too, but I do not think that any of those particular measures which have been suggested would tend to the desired effect. One hon'ble member proposes *that in the matter of salaries and allowances we should begin from the top instead of the bottom.* If this means a general reduction in the pay and allowances of the Indian servants of the Crown, then I say that *I am not at present in favour of such a measure.* But I am not aware that any satisfactory proposals have been made for the decrease of salaries, great or small."*

In 1871 Lord Mayo came out with his old impost of the Income Tax and his old story of defence for his policy. He said :

"I am not going to fight the old battle over again as to whether we were right or not in imposing a high Income Tax. Everything has been said that can be said on the point, and I will only repeat that, having considered the matter most carefully, we declined to terrify the people by new forms of taxation ; we refused to lay additional imposts upon industry and commerce, or to increase the burthens of the poor. We endeavoured to extricate the Empire from a great difficulty by the only mode which we considered possible, and we asked the comparatively well-to-do to contribute to the revenue about one million of money for one year, by means of an enhanced Income Tax. The effect of all these measures exceeded our anticipations and the result was a surplus for the past year of £900,000."

When the Hon'ble Mr. Inglis told the Council of his experience of the working of this Income Tax and of tales of oppression, the Council expressed its surprise. Lord Mayo was rather "alarmed" at the account given and spoke as follows :

"I was much struck the other day by the very strong observations that were made by my Hon'ble friend Mr. Inglis, who is intimately acquainted with the circumstances of the North-Western Provinces. He presented to the Council his experience of the working of the tax. *His account was*

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* *Ibid.*, p. 117.

alarming. It is impossible to overlook such a statement made by so eminent an official. We are about, therefore, to request the North-Western Government to furnish us with a catalogue of the cases which have directly or indirectly come to their knowledge, showing either oppression or maladministration as connected with the levy of the income tax. We are also about to ask that Government to supply us with the names of the individuals concerned, and the officers to whom this information has been conveyed. We shall ask who the subordinate officials are that were referred to, and what were the reasons why the Administration is unable to control or to prevent the abuses described. We shall further ask whether these alleged evils are demoralization, are supposed to be confined to the assessment and collection of the Innome Tax only, or extends to the collection of other branches of the revenue. We shall further ask him whether, if these evils are found to exist with regard to the collection of this and other branches of revenue, any remedies can be suggested to prevent their recurrence. I can hardly conceive that a more important series of questions could be put to a Government; and I have no reason to doubt that the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West will give his most earnest attention to them. I make this statement to show that the Government will never turn a deaf ear to *representations of oppression and evils* connected with the administration of our revenue, come from what source they may, but will ever be ready to make the most stringent enquiry, and, if evils are proved to exist, to administer at once an effective remedy."*

Another member had referred to this imposition as "crushing taxation." Lord Mayo thus replied to him :

'The Hon'ble gentleman who sits beside me (Mr. Robinson) drew the other day a gloomy picture of the future of the people of India as regards taxation. It is true, and we must recognise the fact, that as civilization and wealth spread, so must the burdens of the people increase, not in proportion to increased riches, but to a certain extent. But my hon'ble friend used the term "crushing taxation" on that occasion, which I think requires some notice. I admit the comparative poverty of this country, as compared with many other countries of the same magnitude and importance, and I am convinced of the impolicy and injustice of imposing burdens upon this people which may be called either crushing or oppressive."†

LORD MAYO ON FOREIGN CAPITAL IN INDIA

Lord Mayo was in favour of introducing Foreign capital in India. He thought that the introduction of Foreign capital would benefit India. Dr. Hunter writes :

"He (Lord Mayo) believed that the safe increase of the Indian population, and the possibility of raising the Indian revenues to the level required for efficient government, depended on extension of private enterprise, especially of undertakings conducted by English capital. His Viceroyalty witnessed the final breakwater established between any lingering tradition of official jealousy of 'the interloper,' and the *free opening of India to British enterprise under the Crown.*

"His belief in the need of such enterprise, however, made him the more hostile to spurious imitations of it ; and would have rendered him the more resolute to do justice in any conflict between Indian and English interests. He thought that the system of Guranteed Railways, among other bad features, falsely bore the name of private enterprise, and was not its reality, but its sham. He believed that the cheap labour of India, instead of being a danger to the British manufacturer, would prove a new field for his energy. He looked forward to the day when the true interest of Manchester will be understood ; and when the jealous manipulation of a powerless Dependency's tariff, will seem an incredible episode in the history of a city which taught the language of free-trade to the world. The English cotton-spinners are at this moment learning the lesson which the English landed classes have practised......

* *Ibid.*, pp. 132-33.
† *Ibid.*, p. 133.

"At no distant date, manufacturers will accept the necessity of sending out their sons to the British Dependency, where a small capital, guided by previous training, goes furthest in their own industry; precisely as the English squire and the English farmer, in their different lines, have accepted this necessity, and in other colonies acted upon it. As well might the Cheviot laird look askance at the sheep-runs of Australia, or the Lothian agriculturist feel jealous of the Tasmanian wheat fields, as the Lancashire magnate dread the rivalry of the Bombay cotton-mills. The colonies, once feared as competing producers in the staples of the soil, have proved a great safety-valve for the classes, whether owners, or occupiers, or tillers, who live by the English land. The function which the colonies have thus performed for the growing population of England, India is capable of discharging for her accumulating capital. What Canada and New Zealand have been to the landed classes, India may yet prove to the manufacturing; and so the whole circle of requirements for the nation's safe increase, alike in numbers and in wealth, be fully provided for. Lord Mayo did not live to see it, many of us may not see it, but *the day will come, when the two great currents of English capital and Indian Labour will at length freely meet*, and in meeting flash out a new force for the world."*

Lord Mayo thus looked for 'the free opening of India to British enterprise under the Crown,' and dreamt the dream of the day 'when the two great currents of English capital and Indian labour will at length freely meet.'

NEED FOR A DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Lord Mayo felt the need of creating a Department of Agriculture. He wrote to Lord Napier in 1869:

"I really think that the time is come when we ought to start something like an agricultural department in the Government of India, with branches in the Presidencies and the Lieutenant-Governorships. Agriculture, on which every one here depends, is almost entirely neglected by the Government. I have seen enough already in my wanderings to know that there is an enormous field, not exactly for the reform, but for the investigation of husbandry in India."

In another letter he writes:

"Every day the want of a Department for agriculture and trade is more keenly felt, and I believe that the establishment of a separate Department of the Government for this object would be one of the most useful measures which could at present be taken into consideration."

Lord Mayo was against the suggestion of introducing any expensive kind of manure to the Indian farmers. He said once:

"I do not know what is precisely meant by 'ammoniac manure. If it means guano, super-phosphate or any artificial product of that kind, we might as well ask the people of India to manure their ground with champagne."

In another Viceregal Note, he writes:

"In connection with agriculture we must be careful of two things. First, we must not ostentatiously tell native husbandmen to do things which they have been doing for centuries. Second, we must not tell them to do things which they can't do, and have no means of doing. In either case they will laugh at us, and they will learn to disregard really useful advice when it is given."

Again, in one of his official Despatches, Lord Mayo wrote:

"For generations to come the progress of India in wealth and civilisation must be directly dependent on her progress in agriculture. Agricultural products must long continue the most important part of her exports; and the future development of Indian commerce will mainly depend upon the

* *A Life of the Earl of Mayo*, Vol. II, pp. 341-43.

improvement in the quantity and quality of existing agricultural staples, or on the introduction of new products, which shall serve as materials for manufacture and for use in the industrial arts. *The efforts of the Government of India and of English enterprise have, doubtless, been beneficial.* Thus, important progress has been made in regard to cotton. Large sums of money were spent in former years in attempts to improve its cultivation, but with little result, owing to the mistaken system under which they were made...... Renewed attention has been more recently given to this subject with much better effect. The success of our tea, coffee and and cinchona plantations, shows what has been and may be done in introducing into India new and valuable products. Jute, which not long ago was hardly used, has become an article of first-rate commercial interest. The world derives from India nearly the whole of its supply of indigo.......We have within the last few months taken special measures for improving and facilitating the preparation of rhea fibre."*

Lord Mayo maintained that the Government of India had to take interest in all these agricultural questions because it is *not only a Government, but the chief landlord.* Lord Mayo was anxious to create the Department of Agriculture, because he thought :

"Throughout the greater part of India, every measure for the improvement of the land enhances the value of the property of the State."

The new Department, Lord Mayo thought, would take steps towards improving the "breeds of horses and cattle. The Government studs have hitherto done little in this respect for the benefit of the country at large. They have been maintained primarily for military purposes, and have been *managed on a very costly system,* under which little advantage has been obtained for the agricultural or other interests Measures are also urgently required for preventing and alleviating the destructive murrains which so frequently occur in this country, and which are lamentable and ruinous causes of injury to Indian agriculture."

Again he says :

"Our attention has recently been directed to the fisheries of India. This is a subject which has hitherto been little cared for, but which appears likely to prove of considerable economic importance."

The Government of India is not only the chief landlord, but *a great forest proprietor.* The forests of India had been in the hands of the Public Works Department 'in the absence of any special branch of the administration to supervise' them. "Lord Mayo resolved that their efficient management should be one of the distinct duties of his new Department."†

The Indian Government is also *a great mineral proprietor.* "Lord Mayo devoted close attention to the labours of the Geological Survey, and supplemented them by special researches, conducted with a view to ascertaining the marketable value and the commercial capabilities of the ores and coal-fields."

Lord Mayo wanted that the "inexhaustible stores of the three elements of mineral enterprise, coal, iron and lime," should be tapped for the advantage of British Capital. "But he also saw that such enterprise in India is surrounded by a set of problems unknown in England, and which had deterred Anglo-Indian capitalists from entering the field.... Lord Mayo perceived that the first problem which Indian mineral enterprise on a large scale has to solve is that of carriage : for instance, how to bring

* *A Life of the Earl of Mayo,* Vol. II pp. 321-22.

† *Ibid.,* pp. 325-26.


Sisir Kumar Ghose


Matilal Ghose

the limestone of the Son (Soane) Valley to the coal and iron ores of Raniganj. It must be remembered that it is the return freight to England which pays for an Indian voyage, so that metals come out from Liverpool at low rates.... Lord Mayo, therefore, applied himself to the development of mineral lines, roads, and canals, and insisted on the railway mineral rates being fixed on the lowest possible scale."*

About this new Department, Lord Mayo's biographer says :

"From the first, Lord Mayo insisted on his new Department being a Department of Commerce as well as of Agriculture...India at the time of Lord Mayo's accession, had no Board of Trade, nor anything corresponding to it. He determined, in forming his new Department, to create a nucleus of such a Board. His original proposal was that its head should bear the title of 'Director-General of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce'."

Lord Mayo remarked :

"We are convinced that, if there had been a Department, the special business of which was to make itself thoroughly acquainted with all facts of importance regarding the commercial transactions of India, to observe intelligently the operations of external and internal trade, and to watch the effect produced on the commerce of the country by our fiscal system, our legislation would have been very different from what it has actually been. If such a Department had existed, we doubt whether the export duties which we now levy on some of the main staples of agricultural produce, and even on articles of Indian manufacture, would have been imposed or maintained. If such a Department had existed, it would never have tolerated the continuance of duties such as those which are still levied on sugar from the North-Western Provinces across the Indian Customs line. These duties are transit duties of the worst description, levied on one of the most important articles of agricultural produce in Northern India."†

Lord Mayo continued :

"Such a Department would not only deal with questions of commercial taxation, but with all branches of the statistics of trade, both external and internal ; the development of our growing branches of manufacturing industry, the law of patents, the mineral resources of the country, questions relating to the census and to emigration, and all other kindred subjects connected with the development of the material resources of India."

Dr. Hunter says :

"The primary functions of the new Department were therefore to be : First, those discharged by the Departments of Agriculture in France and in all European countries. Second, those discharged in England by the Board of Trade. To these were added, in the third place, the administration of certain branches of taxation, such as opium, salt, inland customs, and other sources of the national income which in India are technically called 'Separate Revenue.'§

LORD MAYO'S INTEREST IN MUHAMMADAN EDUCATION

In his Convocation address, Lord Mayo said before the Calcutta University:

"At the same time, I am not without hope that, perhaps in the establishment of the school, the college and the University, we may be weaving a golden band which may bind in closer union the subjects of our Queen, be they dark or fair, whether they reside in the East or the West, or all members of those communities which are now bursting into life in the islands of the Southern Seas."

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 329-330.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 332-33.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

Yet, he was not in favour of the spread of education among the Bengalees. He wrote:

"I dislike this filtration theory. In Bengal we are educating in English a few hundred Babus at great expense to the State. Many of them are well able to pay for themselves, and have no other object in learning than to qualify for Government employ. In the meanwhile we have done nothing towards extending knowledge to the million. The Babus will never do it. The more education you give them, the more they will keep to themselves, and make their increased knowledge a means of tyranny. If you wait till the bad English, which the 400 Babus learn in Calcutta, filters down into the 40,000,000 of Bengal, you will be ultimately a Silurian rock instead of a retired judge. Let the Babus learn English by all means. But let us also try to do something towards teaching the three R's to 'Rural Bengal'."

Lord Mayo began the policy of giving special favours to the Muhammadans. "Returns proved that in Bengal there were only 14,000. Muhammadan scholars, against 100,000 Hindoos; and experience showed that the former would not submit to Hindoo teachers. Hence Lord Mayo suggested that as no Muhammadan is deemed a gentleman until he has acquired a certain knowledge of Arabic, Persian and Oordoo learning, we should aid these by opening classes and scholarships in the college for the Muhammadans."

The Governor-General-in-Council, therefore, desired "to call the attention of local Governments and administrations to this subject, and he directs that this resolution be communicated to them, and to the three Universities of Bengal, the North-Western Provinces and the Punjab, with a view of eliciting their opinions as to whether, without infringing the fundamental principles of our educational system, some general measures in regard to the Mohammedan education might not be imaugurated, and whether more encouragement might not be given in the University course to Arabic and Persian literature. A resolution of this kind would be justified by the circumstances of the case, and would have an excellent effect on the feelings of the Mohammedan population at this moment."*

Mr. E. C. Bayley, Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University, in his convocation speech of 1872, referred to Lord Mayo's special measure for the education of the Moslems. He said:

"In regard to the special question of the encouragement of education among the Mahomedan community, it is, I believe, not generally known that Lord Mayo took the most active and leading part. It is perhaps no longer any breach of confidence to say that he himself first drew attention to this subject, and that the resolution of Government in which it was recently discussed, and to which I have already alluded, proceeded word for word from his pen; nor need I, perhaps, hesitate to add that in other more general measures, intended for the benefit of the Mahomedans he took an equal interest, and that this portion of the community have lost in him not only a most powerful but a most sincere friend."†

Dr. Wilson of Bombay also spoke thus about his interest in Mohamedan education:

"I know that of late he showed very great anxiety also to do justice to a class of the community comparatively neglected—I mean those who are most accustomed to use the Persian and the Arabic

* *Ibid.*, p. 406.

† *Speeches in England and India*, By the Earl of Mayo., p. 41.

languages. He caused a circular to be sent to the Universities requiring them to direct their attention to matters which might induce that class of the community I have now in my eye to come forward and more liberally to avail themselves of the advantages of a European education than they have hitherto done."*

LORD MAYO'S POLICY ABOUT MUHAMMADAN EDUCATION

Lord Mayo began giving special attention to the education of the Muhammadans of India. His policy has thus been explained by Sir W. Hunter:

"He (Lord Mayo) found...that the Muhammadans of Bengal stood aloof from the system of public instruction, and were rapidly dropping out from among the educated classes. As a natural consequence, they fell behind in the race of life, and were being practically excluded from Government employ and the more lucrative professions, by the Hindus. He also found that the Muhammadans were intensely dissatisfied with this state of things, and that their discontent assumed in Bengal the form of active disaffection. A fanatical camp on the North-Western border of India was fed by recruits and remittances from the Lower Provinces of Bengal. This camp stood as a permanent menace to our frontier, and had more than once involved costly expeditions against it. Lord Mayo was the last man in the world to palter with rebellion, and he went sternly to the root of disaffection whenever he found it. By substituting a provident knowledge of the facts for the old mixed system of *laissez-faire* and surprises, he withdrew the Wahabi movement from the operations of war into the calm, persistent action of the Courts. A series of criminal trials sent its leaders across the sea for life, and cowed and dispersed their followers. The British Government permitted to no traitor the honors of a political execution, nor to any fanatic the glory of martyrdom, and Wahabi disaffection was stamped out, never since to reappear in an overt form, without a drop of blood being shed by the Courts.

"But the stern suppression of active disloyalty formed only a small part of Lord Mayo's policy. He found our system of public instruction was not one which the Muhammadans could, with a proper regard to their religious sentiments and national traditions, avail themselves of. He therefore set himself earnestly to study their requirements, and the causes which rendered our system unsuited to them."†

In one of his notes, Lord Mayo writes:

"There is no doubt that, as regards the Muhammadan population, our present system of education is, to a great extent, a failure.

"We have not only failed to attract the sympathies and confidence of a large and an important section of the community, but we have reason to fear that we have caused positive disaffection."

Lord Mayo pointed out that in the province of Bengal, there were 14,000 Moslem scholars against 100,000 Hindus, *i.e.*, the Muhammadan students formed less than one-seventh of the attendance in the schools. He also pointed out the 'lamentable deficiency in the education of a large mass of what was, not very long ago, the most powerful race in India.' Lord Mayo continues:

"Assuming then that, after the experience of years, we have failed to attract the mass of the Muhammadan people to our system of education, and have, moreover, created a cause of disaffection, inasmuch as they find themselves unable to participate in the material advantages which Government education has conferred on the Hindus, it remains to be seen what remedy can be applied.

"All that Mr.—and others have said, confirms the view set forth in the Secretariat Memorandum, and shows, first, that a Muhammadan is not a gentleman until he has acquired a certain amount of

* *Ibid.*, p. 41.

† *A Life of the Earl of Mayo*, Vol. II, pp. 306-7.

Arabic and Urdu learning. Second, that he will not come to a Hindu school to be taught by a Hindu teacher. Third, that we must, therefore, give way somewhat to their national prejudices, and allow to Arabic, Persian and Urdu, a more prominent place in many of our schools and examination tests: That we should aid Urdu schools as we do Bengali schools, open out classes and scholarships in our colleges for Muhammadans, and in every way give them a more equal chance of filling those lucrative positions which are now almost monopolized by Hindus.

"A very small change in the *educational tests* will, I believe, effect much of the desired object.

"I think a Resolution, brief and carefully worded, might with safety issue. It would be scarcely prudent to enter into details, or to found the Resolution, as suggested by my honourable colleague, on the first six pages of the Secretariat Note, able and excellent as it is I would rather substitute something like the following :

'The condition of the Muhammadan population as regards education has of late been frequently pressed upon the attention of the Government of India. From statistics recently submitted, it is evident that in no Province, except perhaps in the North-Western Provinces and the Punjab, do the Muhammadans adequately, or in proportion to the rest of the community, avail themselves of the educational advantages that the Government offers. It is much to be regretted that so large and important a class, possessing a classical literature replete with works and profound learning and great value, and counting among its members a section especially devoted to the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge, should stand aloof from active co-operation with our educational system, and should lose the advantages, both material and social, which others enjoy. His Excellency in Council believes that secondary and higher education conveyed in the vernaculars, and rendered more accessible than heretofore, coupled with a more systematic recognition of Arabic and Persian literature, would be not only acceptable to the Muhammadan community, but would enlist the sympathies of the more earnest and enlightened of its members on the side of education.

'The Governor-General in Council is desirous that further encouragement should be given to the classical and vernacular languages of the Muhammadans in all Government schools or institutions. This need not involve any alterations in the subjects, but only in the mode of instruction. In avowedly English Schools established in Muhammadan Districts, the appointment of qualified Muhammadan English teachers might with advantage be encouraged. As in vernacular schools, so in this class also, assistance might justly be given to Muhammadans by grants-in-aid to create schools of their own.

'His Excellency in Council desires to call the attention of local Governments and administrations to this subject, and he directs that this resolution be communicated to them and to the three Universities of Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, and the Panjab, with a view to eliciting their opinions as to whether, without infringing the fundamental principles of our educational system, some general measures in regard to Muhammadan education might not be inaugurated, and whether more encouragement might not be given in the University course to Arabic and Persian literature.'

"A resolution of this kind would be justified by the circumstances of the case, and would have an excellent effect on the feelings of the Muhammadan population at this moment."

Lord Mayo tried to satisfy the Musalmans in this way. This special measure of Moslem education, we are told, 'had been hailed as a boon by the Musalman population.' Another effect was : 'The Muhammadan petition and complaint have ceased to be a constantly recurring difficulty in the administration of Bengal, and Muhammadan disaffection has at the same time dropped out of the cognizance alike of our armies and our Courts.'

AMBEYLA CAMPAIGN

In the Ambeyla Campaign of 1863, the British Army of 7,000 men under General Sir Neville Chamberlain moved out with a train of artillery. On the 19th October,

1863, a column of the British army entered 'the defile overgrown with brushwood and overhung by trees, disastrously known as the Ambeyla Pass.'

The following quotation from the Journal of an officer would give an idea of the disasters:

"The 20th, after recalling their outlying parties, retired, fighting the whole way into camp, which they did not reach till long after dark. The enemy were in some strength, and tried to force their way into the lines; but by this time every one was ready for them, and they were met by a sharp file-fire from the Enfield rifles, and grape from the mountain-train guns. The night attack formed a curious and picturesque scene, the dark line of the jungle to the front, and right and left the two port fires of the mountain-train shining like stars, whilst between them a dim line of Infantry stretched across the valley. Suddenly, comes a wild shout of Allah! Allah! the matchlocks flash and crack from the shadows of trees; there is a glitter of whirling swordblades, and a mob of dusky figures rush across the open space, and charge almost up to the bayonets. Then comes a flash and a roar, the grape and canister dash up the stones and gravel, and patter amongst the leaves at close range. The whole line lights up with the fitful flashes of a sharp file-fire, and as the same clears off, the assailants are nowhere to be seen; feeble groans from the front, and cries for water in some Pathan *patois*, alone tell us that the fire has been effectual. Presently comes another shot or two in a new direction. A few rolling stones on the hill inform the quick ears of the native troops that the enemy is attempting to take us in flank, and they push up to meet them at once: and so the line of fire, and sharp cracking of our rifles, extends gradually far up the dark and precipitous hill-side; and the roar of battle, multiplied a thousand-fold by the echoes of the mountain, fills the long valley from end to end. Then there is another shout and charge, more grape and musketry, which ends as before; but this time a dark group, which moves slowly through our line, and carries tenderly some heavy burden, tells us that their shooting too has told.

"Presently from near the centre of the line comes a voice so full of command, that all stop to listen and prepare to obey. The order is, 'Cease firing; let them charge up to the bayonet, and then—' The rest is lost, but every soldier knows well how the sentence ended and stays his hand, waiting in deep silence, which contrasts strangely with the previous uproar, for what is to follow. High up on a little knoll well to the front we see the tall form of the General towering above his staff, and looking intently into the darkness before him. Apparently, however, they had had enough, and but a few straggling shots from time to time told that an enemy, of whose numbers we could form no idea, still lay in the jungle before us. Presently these also ceased; but long afterwards we could hear their footsteps, and the stones rolling on the hills as they retired, and judged that they must be carrying off their dead and wounded, or they would have moved more quietly." (*The Calcutta Review*, Vol. lxxix. p. 201).*

Dr. Hunter continues the story:

"Every day's delay encouraged the hopes and strengthened the fanatical zeal of the enemy. Inspite of the reinforcements, our General found it impossible to advance. The *British Army lay for weeks, to all appearance cowed, within the Pass*, not daring to advance into the Chumla Valley, where the enemy, now swollen with the Bajour tribes, threatened us simultaneously in front, on our left flank, and our rear communications. The Punjab Government anxiously inquired on the 8th November, if the General, on receiving a reinforcement of 1600 Infantry, would advance to destroy the Fanatic Colony at Mulka. On the 12th the answer came that 2000 Infantry and some guns would be needed in order to render any forward movement practicable, and with the dispiriting intimation that the General deprecated any advance on Mulka until the intermediate tribes could be brought to terms.

"The whole Frontier was now in a flame. On the 4th of November the Panjab Government found its military line so dangerously stripped of troops, that it borrowed a part of the escort

* Quoted in *Indian Musalmans*, pp. 31-33.

belonging to the Viceroy's Camp, and hurried forward the 7th Fusiliers to the Frontier...By the 14th November things have assumed a still more serious aspect, and the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in India hurried up to Lahore, and assumed the direction himself.

"The truth is, that *the plan of the Campaign had completely failed.* The original idea was, by a sudden march through the Pass to occupy the open valley beyond. The Imperial Government had owned that the whole operations should be completed by the 15th November. On the 14th, however, our Army still found it impossible to advance ·····On the same day the Panjab Government begged that an additional Brigade of 1500 men should be sent to the Frontier; and on the 19th a telegram from General Chamberlain gave rise to most serious apprehensions as to whether the reinforcements would not arrive too late. On the 18th the enemy had attacked us in force, taking one of our pickets, and driving us back with a loss of 114 men, killed and wounded, besides officers. Next day the enemy again captured a picket, subsequently retaken after a bloody struggle·········The General's telegram of the 19th concluded as follows: 'The troops have not been hard worked both day and night for a month, and having to meet fresh enemies with loss is telling. We much need reinforcements. I find it difficult to meet the enemy's attacks and provide convoys for supplies and wounded sent to the rear. If you can give some fresh corps to relieve those most reduced in numbers and dash, the relieved corps can be sent to the plains and used in support. This is urgent.'

"A great political catastrophe was now dreaded. Our Army, wearied out with daily attacks, might at any moment be seized with a panic, and driven back pell-mell, with immense slaughter, through the Pass. Such a misadventure, although costing fewer lives than a single great battle, would have ruined our power on the Frontier, and entailed political disasters, the end of which it was impossible to foretell."*

General Sir John Adye in his *Recollections of a Military Life* also speaks of the Ambeyla Campaign in the chapter on 'Hard Fighting in the Mountains.' He says:

"......the storm soon gathered again, and important events followed each other in rapid succession. General Chamberlain, in his despatch of October 31, reports 'that the Akoond has joined and has brought with him upwards of 100 standards from Swat, each standard representing probably from twenty to thirty footmen.'......He goes on to say: 'It is necessary that I should place the state of affairs thus distinctly before His Excellency, in order that he may understand how entirely the situation has altered since the force entered the Umbeylah Pass.' And he goes on to explain that with his present numbers he could only stand on the defensive. During the early part of November vigorous efforts were made to strengthen our outposts and to improve the communication to the plains of Eusofzye; but the confederate tribes jealously watched our movements and incessantly attacked us day and night; and on the morning of the 13th succeeded a second time in capturing the Crag Picket. General Chamberlain in his despatch said: 'I was in the camp when the picket fell into the hands of the enemy, and my attention having been accidentally drawn to the unusual dust and confusion caused by the rush of camp followers down the hill, I felt convinced that some reverse had occurred, and immediately sent forward Her Majesty's Royal Bengal Fusiliers.' Lieutenant-Colonel Salisbury was in command of the regiment, and his orders were to push on and retake the position at any cost. The ascent was long and steep, but the Fusiliers never halted, and in five-and-twenty minutes the key of the position was recovered.

"...As some delay must occur before sufficient reserves could arrive, so as to enable Chamberlain to resume the offensive, he determined to abandon the gorge and also the pickets on the mountain to his left and to concentrate his whole force on the slopes of the Mahabun... The movement was quietly carried out during the might of November 17. The vigilance of the tribes for once failed them, and when daylight broke on the 18th, to their astonishment the Eagle's Nest and all the pickets on that side were silent and empty. Exasperated by the success of our manœuvre, and imagining probably that it was the precursor of a general

* *Indian Musalmans*, pp. 30-35.

retreat, the enemy swarmed up the Mahabun ridges, and before our troops were well settled in their new positions, attacked them fiercely, and for the moment with some success, but were finally driven off. General Chamberlain, writing at the time, said: 'We much need reinforcement...'

"The confederate tribes...were now in such numbers that the hill sides literally swarmed with them; and although they had failed in their efforts to capture the position, they had not lost heart, but again made a vigorous effort; and on November 20 advanced on the Crag Picket, coming boldly up to within a few feet of our breast works; and at length, after a desperate hand-to-hand encounter, for the third time took possession, amidst shouts of triumph from the Afghans on the hills all round. Victory, however, did not long remain with them. The 71st Highlanders, who had taken a full share in every action of the campaign, were selected, with a regiment of Goorkhas, to retrieve the fortunes of the day, and they were not wanting in this hour of need. Our lost ground was thus recovered, but at the cost of two distinguished men, the first and second in command, who were rendered unable to take any further part in the war. Our losses up to this time had been considerable...making a total of 731 casualities, and so far as the original object of the war was concerned, we had as yet really accomplished nothing."*

THE SIMLA EXODUS

The Simla Exodus has been criticised by many writers, both Indian and European. As early as 1878, we find Mr. Routledge writing thus in his *English Rule and Native Opinion in India:*

"In July 1870 Lord Mayo and his Government were at Simla for the hot season, after the manner of Indian Governments, and Calcutta professed to be very nearly disloyal. Why, it was asked for the hundredth time, should the Government be enjoying life in the Himalayas while merchants, missionaries, and officers civil and military, were compelled to stay on the plains all the year through? Did not Lord Canning remain in Calcutta in a crisis, as previous rulers had all the year through?"†

Again he writes:

"Of the residence of the Government at Simla during eight months of the year, I never heard any reasonable defence. The effect of it is injurious in several different ways. It is, to native minds, an assertion that Englishmen cannot live on the plains, and hence cannot take root in India. It converts the more prominent members of the Government and their families into a series of little cliques, practically all-powerful in all cases of public employment, of honours and distinctions, and even in social life, dividing them from the mercantile community as thoroughly as if they belonged to another race. It is also a real injustice to the lower grade of officials, who are compelled to keep two houses without any increase of salaries. A holiday, of whatever reasonable duration, would be beyond criticism. It is the habit of removing the whole machinery of the Government that is assailed. The political effect of the removal is the strongest feature of the case. The fact that the Governor-General and his principal officers can only live during the hot season on the mountain tops is an ominous circumstance in view of future contingencies. The argument on the opposite side is that the Government work is better done at Simla than in Calcutta; but then the work lies in Calcutta and, in many cases of direct influence, cannot be effectively done elsewhere."§

THE KUKA RISING

The Kukas were a new Sikh sect well-known as the defenders of the cow. It was during the rule of Lord Mayo that they rose in rebellion. The Kuka rising may be traced to earlier events of 1870.

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* *Recollections of a Military Life*: By General Sir John Adye (London, 1895), pp. 199-203.
† P. 32.
§ Routledge's *English Rule and Native Opinion in India*, p. 40.

Mr. Routledge in his *English Rule and Native Opinion in India* traces the earlier events leading to the Kuka rising thus :

"In the middle of 1870 several Mohammadan cow butchers were murdered in the Punjab, under more than ordinarily suspicious circumstances, from the fact that the crimes were almost simultaneously committed in different parts of the country, and appeared to be induced by a new Sikh sect known as the Kookas, pre-eminently defenders of the cow. Several of the Kookas were summarily executed, and an impression was created that the roots of the uprisings were deeper than merely the defence of the sacred cow."*

It was followed by another rising in June or the beginning of July, 1871, when "a Mahommedan butcher at Amritsur wantonly threw a bone into a Hindoo well. There was an instantaneous rising and some loss of life; and the spirit of Hindoo revenge spread rapidly to nearly all the chief stations in the Panjab. The wildest proposals were made and applauded. A Hindoo vernacular paper begged the Government to stop all slaughter of cows. "Such outrages on cows," it said, "we can no longer bear."†

Then came the final rising against the Malad Fort. Mr. Routledge tells the story of the rising thus :

"In January, 1872, there was a deed done which made the ears of nearly all who heard of it to tingle. On the 16th January tidings arrived in Calcutta to the effect that an attack had been made on what was known as the Malad Fort, in the small native state of Kotla, in the neighbourhood of Loodiana, and 235 miles from Delhi, where Lord Napier of Magdala was in camp with a splendid force of 16,000 men of all arms. Nothing more absurd ever was known in the history of rebellion. The one idea in the minds of the 'rebels (numbering perhaps 300, including women) was that at the Malad Fort, owned by a chief not favourable to the Kookas, arms might be seized, but to what purpose the arms, if seized, were to be applied, seemed a problem. The wildness of the attempt was abundantly shown. Ram Singh, chief and prophet (Gooroo) of the Kooka sect, had warned the Government that some design was on foot. Lord Napier was at hand with a force powerful enough to march through India. And finally the rebels who tried to fasten with cords, instead of killing, the people they attacked—after being driven away from the fort, went rambling about the fields, without an aim or a leader, till they were hunted down by the men of the neighbouring chiefs, Puttiala and Nabha, and by the police. The remnant of these 'desperate fanatics,' in many cases wounded, were led away in a body to prison. The attack on the fort was made on the 15th January, and was repulsed, with the loss of about three men killed and wounded on the side of the defenders, and about six on that of the assailants. On the 16th January all was at an end. Ram Singh and others, unconcerned in the outbreak, were quietly apprehended at their homes. Another body of Kookas, who had taken arms, hastened to disperse. A force from Lord Napier's camp at Delhi was stopped on its march, and ordered to return to camp. These are the bare leading facts of the Kooka outbreak in January, 1872. That there was no fear of the prisoners being rescued, or of the riot spreading, everything testified."§

This is the short account of the Kuka rising in 1872. What steps did the local officers take to put down this rising ? Mr. Routledge continues the story :

"On hearing of the attack, Mr. Cowan, Deputy Commissioner at Loodiana, went at once, with

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* Pp. 96-97.

† *Ibid.*, p. 98.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

the district superintendent of police and the district surgeon; to the scene of the disturbances. On the 16th he telegraphed to the Punjab Government for permission to summarily execute four prisoners—Mr. Cowan not himself having power to take life.' Mr. Forsyth, Commissioner at Umballa, who possessed power of life or death, wrote to Mr. Cowan, directing him to send the prisoners to Shirpore.—Mr. Forsyth afterwards said he added, 'for trial.' Mr. Cowan said that the letter contained no such words as 'for trial,' the letter itself was lost."

What did Mr. Cowan do to settle whether the prisoners were to be sent "for trial" or not ? Mr. Routledge tells us what course he took :

"On the 17th, before the answer of the Punjab Government arrived, Mr. Cowan had, without any semblance of trial, begun at Maler Kotla, to blow forty-nine prisoners from the cannon's mouth ; and the execution was carried out to the bitter end. One man had been cut down in advance. Fifty in all were killed. In the midst of this carnage, the details of which were heart-rending, a letter from Mr. Forsyth arrived, directing procedure according to law. The executions, however, were continued. On the 18th Mr. Forsyth wrote his full and unqualified approval of what Mr. Cowan had done, and also approved of some like acts of the Kotla officials.*

That was the British sense of justice: the prisoners were blown off from the cannon's mouth without any semblance of judicial trial. It may be asked, what step did the higher authorities take over this execution ? Mr. Routledge says:

"The Indian Government, however, took a different view of the proceedings. After a long investigation, a masterly minute, which recapitulated the facts of the case with judicial exactness, declared Mr. Cowan dismissed from the service, and Mr. Forsyth removed from the Commissionership of Umballa, and incapacitated from again exercising jurisdiction where human life might be in question. The order was made public on May 9th, 1872, after the death of Lord Mayo, by the temporary Government of Lord Napier and Ettrick, but the decision had, I believe, been come to previously. At the same time the order fully admitted Mr Cowan's previous good services, and in particular his humane care for the people in a time of great distress. Mr. Cowan's case remains as it was. Mr. Forsyth was soon afterwards sent by Lord Northbrook on an important embassy, and was knighted—to my view a political error of the first magnitude."†

WAHABI STATE TRIAL OF 1864

Much information has been collected by Hunter in his *Indian Musalmans* about the Wahabi State Trial of 1864. About this famous trial Dr. Hunter remarks :

"The trial of 1864 was the natural outcome of the disastrous fanatic war in 1863. Unlike the judicial proceedings of previous years, it was no longer a few sepoys of a Native Regiment, or an isolated preacher of sedition, whose treason had to be inquired into, but a widely ramified conspiracy spread over distant provinces, and furnished with ample machinery for secrecy and self-defence. In July 1864, Sir Herbert Edwardes, as Sessions Judge at Amballa, delivered judgement in a State Trial which had occupied the Court during nearly twenty sittings. Eleven Musalman subjects of the British Crown had been charged at the bar with high treason. Among them were representatives of every rank of Muhammadan Society: priests of the highest family, an army contractor and wholesale butcher, a scrivener, a soldier, an itinerant preacher, a house-steward, and a husbandman. They had been defended by English Counsel, they had had the full advantage both of technical pleas in bar and of able pleadings on the merits of the case. Six of their countrymen had sat as Assessors with

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* *Ibid.*, p. 100.

† *English Rule and Native Opinion in India*, By James Routledge (London, 1878), pp. 100-101.

the Judge on the bench ; and the trial ended in the condemnation of eight of them to transportation for life, and of the remaining three to the last penalty of law."*

As to how this conspiracy was found out, we are told that to a Punjabi Sergeant belongs the whole credit. "In May 1863, while on his rounds one morning, he descried four foreigners proceeding along the Great North Road. Their diminutive stature, dingy complexion, and puny beards, reminded the old soldier of the Bengali traitor he had seen amid the dead on the battle-field in 1858. He got into conversation with them, worked himself into their secrets, and at length elicited that they were Bengali emissaries from Mulka, on their way back to their native province to arrange for the forwarding of fresh supplies of money and men." They were arrested and sent up before the Magistrate, who, however, released them. "There can be little doubt, if that officer had at once committed these four Bengalis, the whole conspiracy would have been detected."

At this the Punjabi Sergeant sent his son among the Wahabis. The son "completely deceived the Wahabis, joined in their descent upon Sittana" and came back to his father's hut charged with the secret 'that Munshi Jaffir of Thaneswar, whom men call Khalifa, was the great man who passed up the Bengalis and their carbines and rifles.'

The chief conspirators were : Yahiya Ali, the chief Priest, Abdul Ghaffar, the bursar of the propaganda at Patna, Jaffir, the scrivener of Thaneswar, and Muhammad Shafi, the meat supplier to the British forces.

Of these conspirators, "the private history of Jaffir, scrivener in the market town of Thaneswar, is full of interest. Born in a very humble rank, he raised himself by force of character to headman of his township. One day he chanced to stop and listen to the discourse of an itinerant Wahabi preacher. The religious feelings of the prosperous townsman were awakened. He pondered upon the corrupted ceremonial of the mosques, and after passing through a deep spiritual darkness, not unlike that which John Bunyan experienced, he openly professed himself a Wahabi, and threw his whole nature into the work of religious reform."

His religious experiences are set forth in *Counsels of Jaffir*, in which he wrote :

"I commence writing this book on Tuesday, 18th Zilhijja, 1278 Hijra (June 1862). The completion is in the hand of God. I have not followed any particular method, but simply note down the events, both relating to the Faith and to the world, in which I have from time to time taken part...As a boy I took no thought of learning, and used to wander about as a vagabond but when I got a little sense, I commenced reading.

"Associating myself with the Petition-writers in 1856, it came to pass that all the Vakils and Petition-writers consulted me as to the Rules, Regulations and Acts of the Legislature, and I came to be above them all."

About Jaffir's character, Sir Herbert Edwardes in delivering sentence said :

"It is impossible to exceed the bitter hostility, treasonable activity and mischievous ability of this prisoner. He is an educated man, and a Headman in his village. There is no doubt of his guilt and no palliation of it." (Record of the Ambala State Trial in 1864 ; official papers)

Next comes Yahiya Ali, the chief priest. About him Sir Herbert Edwardes remarked in passing sentence of death upon him :

* *Indian Musalmans*, p. 84.

"It is proved against the prisoner Yahiya Ali, that he has been the mainspring of the great treason which this trial has laid bare. He has been the religious preacher, spreading from his mosque at Patna under the most solemn sanctions, the hateful principles of crescentade. He has enlisted subordinate Agents to collect money and preach the Moslem Jihad (War against the Infidel). He has deluded hundreds and thousands of his countrymen into treason and rebellion. He has plunged the Government of British India, by his intrigues, into a Frontier War, which has cost hundreds of lives. He is a highly educated man, who can plead no excuse of ignorance. What he has done he has done with forethought, resolution and the bitterest treason. He belongs to a hereditary disloyal and fanatical family. He aspires to the merit of a religious reformer ; but instead of appealing to reason and to conscience, like his Hindu fellow countrymen in Bengal, of the Brahma Samaj, he seeks his end in political revolution, and madly plots against the Government, which probably saved the Muhammadans of India from extinction and certainly brought in religious freedom."*

Muhammad Shafi, the Army contractor, was "the right hand of the conspiracy." He had agencies in all the large cities of Hindustan, and held the meat contracts for the seven chief British cantonments along the Great North Road. He was connected by blood or by commercial ties with the richest trading houses of the Panjab ; he formed the centre of an ever widening circle of dependants, who were spread all over upper India. He yearly received many hundred thousand pounds from the British Government in his dealings ; he was punctual, and obedient to servility ; and he so hoodwinked the Commissariat officers, that he obtained a renewal of his meat contracts for the troops even after he had been charged with treason to the Queen.

Dr. Hunter says :

"The widespread influence which he thus acquired as our servant, he applied to our destruction. He was the banker of the conspiracy, and skilfully used the conveniences for transferring money, which Government granted to him as an Army contractor, to aid and succour the Rebel camp of other conspirators. The Judge, in passing sentence upon them, said :

'It is proved against the prisoner Rahim, that at his house these treasons have been carried on. In his premises the Bengali crescentaders gathered and were lodged. It was his servant who kept the treasure, fed the recruits, and remitted the subscriptions to the fanatics, and it was his brother-in-law, Yahiya Ali, who preached treason at the door of his *zenana*. ...

'It is proved against Ilahi Baksh, that he has been the channel through which the Patna Maulavis forwarded the funds they collected up-country to Jaffir at Thaneswar, to be passed on to Mulka and Sittana.

'It is proved against Husaini of Patna, that he is a servant of Ilahi Baksh, that he has been employed by him in effecting remittances for treasonable purposes ; that a large sum of gold muhars was received by him from Abdul Ghaffar, under order from Yahiya Ali ; that he sewed them up in a jacket, and so brought them up-country from Patna to Delhi, where he delivered them, as he had been ordered, to the prisoner Jaffir. ...

'It is proved against Kazi Miyan Jan, that he preached and recruited for the Crescentade in Bengal, and that he has been an active agent for the Patna conspirators and the fanatics in the hills, collecting and remitting funds, forwarding letters, etc. ...

'It is proved against Abdul Karim that he was the confidential agent of Muhammad Shafi (the meat supplier) in cashing the Patna money orders for treasonable purposes. ...

'It is proved against the prisoner Husaini of Thaneswar that he was a confidential agent and go-between of the prisoners Muhammad Jaffir and Muhammad Shafi in these treasons, and that he was seized in the act of conveying 290 pieces of gold from Jaffir to Muhammad Shafi. ...

'It is proved against Abdul Ghaffar, No. 2, that he was a disciple of Yahiya Ali at Patna.'..."

* *Ibid.*, p. 93.

About the conspicuous features of this trial, Dr. Hunter has said:

"The three most conspicuous features of the conspiracy which the trial disclosed, were the admirable sagacity with which so widely spread a treason had been organised; the secrecy with which its complicated operations were conducted; and the absolute fidelity to one another which its members maintained. Its success depended to some extent upon an ingenious system of *aliases*, and upon the secret language. ... But it is impossible to resist the conviction that the conspirators, with the exception of the Army contractor, were actuated by a conscientious zeal for what they believed to be the cause of God, and by a firm resolve to abide steadfast to the death. The British authorities took the wise revenge of denying even to the most treasonable of them the glory of martyrdom. The highest Court of the Province, after a patient hearing in appeal, confirmed Sir Herbert Edwardes's finding as to their guilt, but modified the capital sentence in the three most flagrant cases to transportation for life."*

Dr. Hunter continues to remark on the effect of this Wahabi trial:

"The State trial of 1864 proved as little effective as the retributive campaign of 1863 to check the zeal of the traitors. Their internal dissensions kept them quiet for a few years on the Frontier, but meanwhile the Holy War was vigorously preached within our territory."†

THE WAHABI MOVEMENT

During the year 1868-69 Government came to learn that 'an active movement of some kind was taking place among the Muhammadans of the Wahabi sect in several districts of Bengal.' Mr. J. H. Reily was deputed to make an investigation into the affair. From his enquiry, "it appeared certain that a *jihad* or religious war, against the British power, had for some time been preached, and collections in aid of the Hindustani fanatics on the frontier made on a regularly organised system."

Mr. Reily tried to 'trace out the chain of agents through whom reinforcements of men and supplies of money were sent to the North-West Frontier.'

About his enquiry, Mr. Buckland says:

"It was found that this movement was extensively ramified and that there were agents stationed in different and distant parts of the country. Several of the leading agents, against whom strong presumptive evidence was discovered, were held under detention, pending the final decision of Government. A number of arrests were made of persons suspected of complicity in the efforts of the Wahabi fanatics to excite a *jihad*, and they were detained under Regulation III of 1818."§

Various charges of waging war against the Queen or attempting to or abetting to wage war against the Queen, were framed against the persons arrested. Some were discharged but others were punished by the British Law Courts. Even on appeal, the High Court confirmed the conviction of Amir Khan and Tobarak Ali.

Another writer observes:

"A series of criminal trials ensued; but Lord Mayo's Government wisely did not permit any fanatic to fan the religious flame by achieving the glories of martyrdom, for all were transported as rebels beyond the seas, without one being put to death, as many might have been, in pursuance of

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

† *The Indian Musalmans.* By W. W. Hunter, (London, 1871), p. 99.

§ *Bengal under the Lieutenant Governors*, I., p. 433.

a sentence from the courts; but the Musalmans' fanaticism found a terrible culmination in the barbarous assassination of the Chief Justice of Bengal."

The assassination of Chief Justice Norman and later on that of the Viceroy—are connected by some with this Wahabi movement.

THE MURDER OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

On the 20th September, 1871, the officiating Chief Justice of the High Court, the Hon'ble John Paxton Norman, was murdered. About this murder, Mr. Buckland gives the following facts :

"At 11 o'clock on Wednesday morning, the 20th September, the officiating Chief Justice having alighted from his carriage under the portico of the Town Hall, where he was about to sit to hear appeals, turned round on the uppermost of a flight of 8 stone steps leading into the Hall, to give some order to his coachman. On the instant, a man who was standing concealed behind the doorway, rushed out and stabbed the Chief Justice in the back under the left shoulder with a long broad-bladed dagger, the knife dividing the eighth rib and passing through the diaphragm."

Sir G. Campbell, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, thus wrote about the deceased Judge :

"The late Chief Justice Norman was a man who never had, and could not have had, an enemy. He was murdered in the most public place possible, where he was surrounded by crowds, by an assassin (named Abdulla) who made and could make no attempt to escape. The man died on the scaffold without giving any intelligible account of his motives. He neither showed any feeling for his own situation nor attempted any bravado; he would only say that he was enraged or excited and felt impelled to the act. The crime was of course the subject of much investigation and anxious inquiry. Rumours and suspicions of political conspiracy were rife, but the closest inquiry failed to show any grounds for such suspicion."*

THE MURDER OF THE VICEROY

It was followed by the assassination of Lord Mayo, the Viceroy, in the Andamans. Many had warned the Viceroy that his life was in danger. Says his biographer :

"Many months had elapsed since, in far-off Simla, the authorities received hints that the Viceroy's life was in danger, a warning to which the assassination of the Lord Chief Justice of Bengal gave a terrible significance. Lord Mayo had sternly stamped out the Wahabee disaffection, and in doing so made bitter enemies of a small fanatical gang. One of them struck down the Chief Justice, who had given decision, in appeal, against their ring-leaders; but Lord Mayo's immense popularity among the natives of all ranks and creeds led to timely warnings being sent to those who were accountable for his safety. During the following months a heavy responsibility devolved on Lord Mayo's staff. They had strengthened the guards round Government House, dexterously managed the relays on the Viceroy's progress through the hill states, so as to prevent him changing horses in any village, altered his route at the last moment, and without his knowledge, through the thronged streets of the northern cities where any danger was supposed to lie. All this had somewhat annoyed Lord Mayo, an utterly fearless man, with a spirit and courage as infectious to those about him as his untiring energy in work, or his happy laugh. He always maintained that such precautions were of small use. As a matter of fact, they had proved ample against whatever perils threatened him in India, from the traitors and fanatics whose wrath he had personally directed to himself by his stern scattering of their leaders. Only a couple of days before reaching the Andamans, he had said, in connection with the Chief Justice's murder,

* *Ibid.*, pp. 498-499.

that 'these things, when done at all, are done in a moment, and no number of guards would stop a resolute man's blow.' However, to satisfy his brother (Major the Hon. Edward Bourke, then Military Secretary) and his private secretary, he accepted from them a weighted stick, which he had carried for several months, and which he was swinging in his hand as he now walked down to the beach."

While he had gone to inspect the penal settlement in the Andaman islands Lord Mayo met with his death. It was evening, "the state launch awaited the party of Lord Mayo. ... Stepping before the rest, he was about to descend into the boat, when a noise was heard—a noise described by those who were present as like the rush of some wild animal—and a descending hand and knife were suddenly seen in the torch-light; a blow next was heard, and the Viceroy fell over the pier into the water alongside, while at the same moment the torches went out."

CHAPTER VIII

LORD NORTHBROOK

1872-1876

After the murder of Lord Mayo, Lord Napier, the Governor of Madras, acted as the interim-Viceroy till the arrival of Lord Northbrook, 'long known to political fame as Sir Francis Baring,' in February 1872. Before coming out as the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, Lord Northbrook had served as the Under-Secretary of State for India from June 1859 to January 1861. This connection of his with the India Office had ingrained in him all the principles of Anglo-Indian statesmanship. It was, therefore, possible that he would follow the training which he had received as Under-Secretary of State for India.

Lord Northbrook was no stranger to Indian affairs. He had both hereditary and personal connexions with India, to which he referred in his Calcutta speech. He said:

"From my first entrance into public life I have taken a great interest in questions relating to the administration of H. M.'s Indian territories, both in consequence of the opportunities afforded me by my official duties, and from the circumstance that my family have for many years been connected with India. My great grand-father, Sir Francis Baring, was chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company during an eventful period of Indian history. My grand-father, Sir Thomas Baring, was in the Civil Service of the Company in this Presidency, and my father was born in this city."

He also became 'acquainted with the administration of India by his service under Lord Halifax, both at the old Board of Control as Private Secretary and at the India Office as Under-Secretary of State.' In referring to his part in Wood's Educational Despatch, Bernard Mallet says:

"It was a satisfaction to him to find that the principles laid down nearly twenty years before had been adhered to, and that it was his duty to carry on the work which he had had no small share in inaugurating as Sir Charles Wood's Private Secretary in 1854. That he had the privilege under the instructions of that statesman of drawing up the despatch which has been described as the charter of Indian education, was, he observed, one of the 'most gratifying recollections of his life'."*

Lord Northbrook was a man of peace observing, as far as possible, strict non-interference in political and administrative affairs. His policy should more deservedly win the name of "masterly inactivity" than that of Sir John Lawrence. "The main object of my policy was to let things go quietly on—to give the land rest," wrote the Governor-General home in 1873. His non-interfering, peace-loving nature is evident in the famoms Educational Despatch referred to above which he had a large hand in drafting as Private Secretary to Sir Charles Wood. The Despatch, among other things, enjoins strict neutrality in the religions of India—even excluding all religious instruction including the Bible from Government schools and colleges. The Despatch says :

* Pp. 58-59.

"The policy of the Government has been based on the principle of perfect religious neutrality, in other words, on an abstinence from all interference with the religious feelings and practices of the natives, and on the exclusion of 'religious teaching from the Government schools. As a necessary part of this policy, the Holy Scriptures have been excluded from the course of teaching, but the Bible has a place in school libraries, and the pupils are at liberty to study it, and to obtain instruction from their masters as to its facts and doctrines out of school hours, if they expressly desire it. This provision is displeasing to many of those who have interested themselves in the education of the people of India, and some of the missionaries especially are much dissatisfied with it, and are desirous that direct instruction in the Bible should be afforded in the Government schools as a part of the regular course of teaching. Some of the greatest friends of native education, however, who are warmly interested in missionary operations, declared themselves, before the Parliamentary committee of 1853, to be averse to any change in the established policy of Government in this respect. The main argument of these gentlemen rested on the alarm and distrust which would probably be excited by the introduction of religious teaching into the Government schools, even if attendance in the Bible classes were declared to be voluntary. But it was further observed, that it would not be honest to accept the consent of the people themselves to attend the classes, and that it was not probable that the assent of the parents would be given ; and it was pointed out that most of the masters in the Government institutions are natives, and that instruction in the facts and doctrines of the Bible, given by heathen teachers, would not be likely to prove of much advantage."

The Government, however, were not in favour of the introduction of Bible teaching in schools. The Despatch says :

"It would certainly appear that the formation of a class for instruction in the Bible, even if attendance on it might be voluntary, would at any time be a measure of considerable hazard, and at best of doubtful countervailing advantage ; more especially at the present time *the introduction of change in this respect might be found peculiarly embarrassing.* The proclamation of Her Majesty, on assumming the direct control of the Government of India, plainly declared that no interference with the religion of the people, or with their habits and usages, was to take place. Now, though in this country there might seem but a slight difference between the liberty enjoyed by the pupils to consult their teachers out of school hours with regard to the teaching of the Bible, and the formation of a class for affording such instruction in school hours to such as might choose to attend it, it is to be feared that the change would seem by no means a slight one to the natives of India, and that *the proposed measure might, in a political point of view, be objectionable and dangerous, as tending to shake the confidence of the native community in the assurances of a strict adherence to past policy in respect to religious neutrality, which Her Majesty has been pleased to put forth.*"

The Despatch continues :

"The free resort of pupils of all classes to Government schools, even at times when unusual alarm has been excited in the minds of the natives; is a sufficient proof of the confidence which is felt in the promises of Government, that no interference with religious belief will be allowed in their schools, and this confidence Her Majesty's Government would be very reluctant to disturb by any change of system which might give occasion to misapprehension. They are unable, therefore, to sanction any modification of the rule of strict religious neutrality as it has hitherto been enforced in the Government schools, and it accordingly remains that, the Holy Scriptures being kept in the library, and being open to all the pupils who may wish to study them, and the teachers being at liberty to afford instruction and explanations regarding them to all who may voluntarily seek it, *the course of study in all the Government institutions be, as heretofore, confined to secular subjects.*"

RUSSO-PHOBIA

The advance of the Russian powers towards India roused the alarm of the British politicians of India. They became afraid of the safety of their vast Indian possessions. This Russo-phobia actuated the policy of the Indian Viceroys, specially of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook. Thus says Sir Richard Temple in his *Men and Events of My Time in India :*

"All this time the rapid development of Russian power in Kokand and Bokhara inspired the public mind throughout India with alarm. Sensible and reflective men did not grudge Russia any advantage she might acquire in that quarter, provided that she stopped there. They feared, however, that her conquest there would prove but the prelude to movements towards Afghanistan with the view of indirectly menacing India. Indeed they could not conceive why Russia, having dominions already more vast than she could manage or even adequately occupy, should persist in making these fresh acquisitions at a greater financial cost that her embarrassed treasury could afford -unless there were some ulterior object. This object must, they supposed, relate to India, and therefore they became uneasy. Invasion was not dreaded by them, but much of Russia's conduct seemed unfriendly and they felt themselves obliged to regard her as a possible enemy that was gradually sapping and mining towards the Indian citadel, though the assault would not be delivered yet awhile, or might perhaps be put off indefinitely. They did not suggest that the Government of India should make any counter movements in Afghanistan : for they believed that it had better stay within its own borders and that to enter into Afghan entanglements would make matters worse. But they hoped that the Government in England would see to this, and would arrive at some understanding with Russia, to be sustained, not by vague or insufficient promises, but by definite assurances which could hardly be broken or evaded.

"Others there were who thought they discerned in certain emissaries and a few soldiers who had shewn themselves at certain points on or near the Oxus, the videttes of an approaching Russian army on its march for Caubul. Information to this effect used to be disseminated in India, nobody knew how; it perhaps came from one or other of the contending factions in Afghanistan in order that the British might be stirred to interfere in the contentions. These extreme opinions were ridiculed by most people and the apprehensions founded thereon were easily shown to be futile.

"Some authorities made light even of the moderate fears which were entertained regarding ulterior contingencies rather than immediate danger. They would say that in the first place Russia would probably never push her border forwards till it met the British Indian limits ; and that even if she did so, such an event would not really be injurious to India. This view, however, did not commend itself even to the most sober-minded classes. The truth seemed to be that those who held such a view were really at fault (as well they might be) respecting what ought to de done to counteract the danger. They apparently sought to decry the said danger, trying to shew first that it would never happen, and that even if it happened its consequences would not prove serious. If this really were the idea, then it was a manifestly unsatisfactory recommendation for the treatment of a national difficulty." (Pp. 340-342).

Lord Lawrence belonged to the latter category of the so-called sober-minded men. He was, therefore, criticised by many politicians. Mr. John Wyllie, who had the charge of official papers of Afghanistan, "wrote an interesting article, subsequently avowed as his, in the *Edinburgh Review* of January 1867, on the foreign policy of John Lawrence. In that article he stated that respecting Russia this policy tended towards "a masterly inactivity." Seldom has a phrase been so caught up for praise or blame as this was at the time, though the blame preponderated. It may have comprised something of truth and of political expediency ; still it had an admixture of error, and was sure to be

misconstrued by the majority of the public. "Wyllie afterwards by an article in the *Fortnightly Review* defended his use of the expression."

Lord Mayo, however, wanted "to approach what was really the root of the whole question, namely, the establishment of an understanding between England and Russia regarding their respective limits of actual possession, or political control in Asia. He virtually advocated the plan which has since been termed the international delimitation between the two empires." The visit of Mr. Forsyth to St. Petersburg was able to dispel for the time being the Russo-phobia from the minds of the British rulers of India.

Russo-phobia . assumed serious form again during the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook. In 1873 a Russian Expedition marched against Khiva ; the Khan asked for the support of the British power in India. Lord Northbrook refused any help to the Khan of Khiva ; he could only 'reply by advising that prince to comply with the just demands which a civilised power can always prefer against a barbarous, restless and aggressive neighbour.'

The Russians without any serious difficulty occupied Khiva and imposed a fine of 2,200,000 roubles on the Khan. A portion of this war indemnity was imposed upon a tribe of Turkomans. About the fate of this tribe, Captain Burnaby writes in his *A Ride to Khiva*:

"The Russian Commander-in-Chief was in a hurry, and sent out Golovatcheff to ascertain what chance there was of the payment being made. This general, in order to discover the intentions of the Turkomans, gave an order to his soldiery not to spare either sex or age. Men, women and children at the breast, were slain with ruthless barbarity. Houses with bedridden inmates were given up to the fiery element ; women—aye, and prattling babies—were burned alive amidst the flames. Hell was let loose in Turkoman ! And this, the Russians would have us believe, was done to further Christianity and civilisation. This is the sort of Christianity which some people wish to see established in Constantinople."*

When a treaty was dictated to Khiva by General Kauffmann, the *Times* wrote :

"It is easier to understand General Kauffmann's policy than to reconcile the Khiva treaty with the assurances which were conveyed through Count Schouvaloff. The interests, however, of Britain in the East, could only be affected by the partial or total annexation of Khiva, if the aggrandisement of Russia in that part of Central Asia should affect the relations between England and Russia."

That the Khan of Khiva also suspected the Russians of a design against the British Indian Empire is shown by Captain Burnaby in his book *A Ride to Khiva.*

"He relates a very interesting conversation with the Khan, who reiterated the prevailing opinion that Russia was advancing, by degrees, on India. Captain Burnaby assured him that the statement that Britain feared Russia was as ridiculous as it was false ; that Britain had beaten Russia before, and could easily do so again ; *'but that we were a peaceable nation, and never wished to interfere with our neighbours,* so long as they did not interfere with us.' After a pause, the Khan, through his interpreter, suddenly asked, 'Why did not England help me when I sent a mission to Lord Northbrook ?'

"This was a question, which, under all the circumstances, made Captain Burnaby feel

* Quoted in Cassel's *Illustrated History of India,* II., p. 417.

uncomfortable, but he answered diplomatically, that he was only a traveller, and not in the secrets of his Government."*

The Russian invasion of Khiva affected British-Indian politics also. Says Sir Richard Temple in his *Men and Events of My Time in India*:

"It was not until after Lord Mayo's death that anxiety was aroused by the Russian expedition against Khiva in 1873, and the arrangements consequent thereon, which really made the Khivan chief a vassal of the Czar. Thereupon the Amir of Caubul shewed much alarm, and wondered whether, if Russia having thus absorbed Khiva were to compass the absorption of Afghanistan, there would be anything really to stop her. It was then that he first began to swerve from the fidelity which he had promised to Lord Mayo."

Let us now refer to "the dangerous and impolitic Russo-phobia which Lord Beaconsfield's proceedings in the near East and in Asia had rekindled in England." About Lord Northbrook's opinion on the Russian question, Mr. Mallet says:

"Lord Northbrook had never viewed with alarm the advance of Russia in Central Asia which he believed to be in the main conducive to the interests of civilisation. He had no sympathy with the anti-Russian ideas which had so largely inspired the Indian policy of Lord Beaconsfield's administration; and he looked with apprehension on the rivalry which seemed to be driving the two countries into war and reprobated the dangerous talk which assumed it to be inevitable. Just before the fall of the conservative government he had specially alluded to the matter in the House of Lords (February 20, 1880).†

"To any one who looks beyond the events of the moment there is something appalling in the position of the British and Russian Empires in Asia. These two gigantic forces which have hitherto moved each in its own sphere over countries which were formerly the prey of anarchy and rapine appear now by some fatal attraction to be about to meet in deadly conflict. It is the duty and the privilege of statesmen at the head of affairs to foresee and to avert such calamities."

Lord Northbrook said on another occasion:

"If we give up the dreams of certain persons as to crumpling up the power of Russia in Central Asia by an advance from India, I do not see why we should not be on the best of terms with her."§

In another place the biographer of Lord Northbrook says:—"Anxiety as to the expansion of Russia in Central Asia was in the beginning confined to Government and newspaper circles at home. As early as 1873 I find Lord Northbrook writing to Lord Halifax, "we are quite comfortable in India, but England is all in a flutter," and again in 1875 he writes to Sir Louis Mallet:

"All the spirited foreign policy notions come from Frere and Company at home. Here we are very quiet and steady people and see no reason to depart from the principles upon which our relations with Afghanistan, &c., have been founded, at least since 1804. The difficulty of the political situation is great in theory, practically I am so complete a disbeliever in Russia wishing to attack us that I am not afraid—I mean *via* Afghanistan...My fear up to the present time has been that we have not told Russia distinctly our position towards Afghanistan and the importance to us of any disturbance of the Afghan frontier. Complete frankness seems to me the best security for peace."**

INCOME TAX AND LORD NORTHBROOK

The question of the retention or remission of the Income-Tax came up with the arrival of Lord Northbrook. Sir Richard Temple, the Finance Member, was in favour

* *Ibid.*, pp. 417-18.
* P. 370.
† *Earl of Northbrook*, p. 158.
§ *Earl of Northbrook*, p. 159.
** *Ibid.*, p. 99.

of the retention of the tax, which he had already four times recommended during the rule of Lord Mayo and . Lord Napier. But the popular feeling was against the retention of the tax. Says Sir Richard Temple :

"The natives, no doubt, disliked the tax, and among them none dreaded it more than the Zemindars or landlord class of Bengal, who objected to any sort of direct taxation on their income from the land, as being an infringement of the Permanent Settlement. They were able to make themselves heard, and thus they lent a voice to any native discontent which existed, fanned the flame of agitation, and formed a solid centre of opposition. The real lead in the opposition was, however, taken by the European part of the community, and English utterances were the loudest. The Europeans would have willingly borne the tax had it been imposed for war expenses as in Wilson's time, or for any emergency. But although there was a necessity of another kind in this case, they failed to recognise it. The fact was that for some years past the demands of a progressive age had caused the expenses of the country to rise to a scale which might be reduced but could not be materially altered without national detriment ; on the other hand, several temporary causes had depressed the revenues below expectation. European opinion had been more disposed than any other section of public opinion to demand improvement. Despite efforts for economy, deficit had gone on for three years, and the income tax was necessary in order to substitute equilibrium or surplus. The Europeans, however, did not perceive this ; they thought that the Government, had it been so minded, might have avoided this alleged necessity. They failed indeed to show what alternative could have been wisely adopted ; though remedies of all sorts were propounded. It was said that we might have made a higher estimate of the opium revenue, or made a lower estimate of some items in the expenditure or charged more of the public works to capital, or virtually transferred, under the guise of financial technicalities, some of the burdens from the present to the future ; in short, we might have done anything except impose an income-tax."*

Not only this, but 'in various ways popular dissatisfaction became more and more aggravated ; and the clamour against the financial conduct of the Government was sustained for many months.'

There was now a cry against the income-tax and for economy. Thus says Sir Richard Temple :

"From that time, however, one change for the better in public opinion began to be perceptible. Formerly Europeans had been foremost in urging the Government to improve the country and the administration. Beneficent improvement is always commended with plausible effect by those who have not to bear the expense. Now, however, public opinion came to the aid of Government in suggesting economy and in counting the cost of every suggested reform."†

Lord Northbrook is said to have 'possessed a greater knowledge of finance, and the several subjects cognate to it, than any Governor-General who ever landed in India.' When the question again arose as to whether the income-tax should be retained, Sir Richard Temple again advocated its retention. He showed that during the five years, the income-tax was obtained thus after deducting cost of collection :

1869-70	£ 1,068,523
1870-71	2,028,034
1871-72	795,675
1872-73	561,000
Total	£ 4,453,232

* *Men and Events of My Time in India*, pp. 353-54.

† *Ibid.*, p. 354.

It demonstrates, says Sir Richard Temple, that if national solvency was to be secured by the counterbalancing of deficit by surplus, the income-tax was absolutely essential, notwithstanding all that may have been said at the time against its necessity. But Lord Northbrook was 'much impressed with the objections which had been urged against the tax from so may quarters' and asked Sir R. Temple to remit the Tax. This remission 'brought to his Government much popular approval among the European community and the middle as well as the upper classes of the Natives.'

INCOME TAX

Soon after his arrival, Lord Northbrook discovered an "uneasy and dissatisfied feeling" in the country. About this feeling, he thus wrote :

"Probably it has arisen from increase of taxation and certain improvements in the laws, &c, which have perhaps been pushed forward a little too fast. It is most unfortunate that the income tax was raised in 1870 and that local taxation was increased in 1871, and what is more, I do not believe that either was necessary."*

When the question of the re-imposition of the income tax arose, Lord Northbrook, therefore, decided against the proposal. On this question Mr. Mallet writes :

It was,......not without his usual careful and conscientious examination of all the evidence he could obtain by inquiry and observation that Lord Northbrook decided on the non-renewal of the income tax. His own prepossessions, perhaps inherited from his father, were opposed to an income tax as a source of revenue, and he agreed with Mr. Gladstone and with some of Sir Richard Temple's predecessors in the post of Financial Member of Council, whose opinions he quoted in his important and ably reasoned minute upon the question, that the income tax was unsuitable to Indian conditions. He felt strongly, as he told the Duke, "the inequalities, the evils and the difficulties which attended a permanent income tax in India"; he considered with some justice that the real assessment of the commercial classes was "next to impossible"; and he pointed to the admitted evasion of the tax by the native traders, evasion which was not open to the landholder, the Government servant, and the holder of securities, as creating a "glaring inequality in the incidence of the tax upon the different classes." Taken alone, such coniderations as these pointed rather to reform in the administration than to the abolition of the tax, but the essential and governing fact of the actual situation was, in Lord Northbrook's opinion, the discontent excited by the tax among certain classes of the population. "You know my opinion," he wrote to the Duke, "that undeniable discontent has been caused by certain measures of the last few years, be they right or wrong; and that it is important to do some thing to allay that feeling. Few people will dispute that the cessation of the income tax" (which the surplus made it possible to spare without the imposition of fresh taxation) "is more likely to effect this than any other one act that can be done by the Government." Some act, in short, was required which would strike the imagination of the people and produce (in the words of the minute) a "salutary political effect over the whole of India"; and if Lord Northbrook's decision is open to serious criticism on general economic grounds, it would be rash to assert that it was not justifiable on grounds of policy. It illustrates at all events a certain directness and simplicity in his point of view as a practical statesman. As he told Sir George Grey: "My duty seemed clear and I have done it." A little later he is writing : "I believe the effect has been good; certainly in Calcutta I have succeeded in bringing the leading men among the educated natives more into harmony with the Government than has been the case for many years."†

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* *The Earl of Northbrook*, pp. 65-66.

† Mallet's *Earl of Northbrook*, pp. 67-69

The Duke of Argyle in expressing his opinion about the abolition of the income tax wrote to him:

"In the contest between a reform of the salt tax and the abolition of the income tax, my feeling is that you have chosen to relieve the richer class, which is also the most powerful and the most clamorous." That was "the sound opinion of the school of practical fiscal reformers represented by Sir John Strachey and Sir Richard Temple."

Lord Northbrook, perhaps, did not like the agitation of the richer class "which is also the most powerful and the most clamorous." So his policy was to keep down expenditure. About the result of his policy, Mr. Mallet says:

"The repeal of the income tax, abandonment of the non-agricultural cess in Bombay and of the house tax in Madras, the disallowance of the Bengal Municipalities Bill and the modification of the Pandhari tax (a sort of local income tax) in the Central Provinces, had, in the words of a leading native journal, "a most soothing effect on the popular mind."

Lord Northbrook's reasons for cutting down expenditure ruthlessly were given in a letter to Lord Dufferin. He wrote:

"India is a poor country, and economy in expenditure is in my opinion the foundation of successful Indian administration. You will find, at any rate at first, plenty of pressure for increased expenditure, but if you resolutely say 'no' for a few times you will find the pressure gradually cease and by the normal increase of the revenue you will find also, if you have no famines or wars, that much can be done."

Lord Northbrook also introduced economy in other branches of administration, specially in the Public Works Department. Mr. Mallet says :

The Public Works Department in his time was, as Sir Louis Mallet described it, with its "weary round of loans, railways, and irrigation schemes, a bottomless pit of expense and waste," and Lord Northbrook soon found it necessary to say "no" to certain expenditures on canals which were going on faster than the State could afford, thus saving something like ten millions. An important Government Resolution of October 8, 1874 dealing with Bengal irrigation gave what it was hoped at the time would be a death-blow to elaborate and very costly schemes of irrigation devised by irrigation engineers alone, and inaugurated a system of cheap irrigation based on local requirements and local knowledge. Military works were similarly restrained. The result was, to quote from Lord Northbrook's speech on the Indian Tariff Bill of 1875, a clear and masterly summary of his four years' administration of the finances of India, that during those four years there was a surplus of ordinary revenue over expenditure of not less than a million sterling, notwithstanding an expenditure of £ 6,306,673 for famine which had been charged against revenue."*

TRIAL OF THE GAEKWAR OF BARODA

In 1874, the Gaekwar of Baroda, Mulhar Rao, was charged by the British Government with "notorious misconduct" and "gross misgovernment" of his kingdom. He was also informed that "in consequence of his barbarous cruelties and general misgovernment of his State, he would be deprived of all authority therein, unless a thorough change took place." Later on, the Gaekwar is said to have made an attempt to poison the Resident, Colonel Phayre. He was, accordingly, put under arrest on the 14th of January, 1875, 'at a time when it was greatly feared that the people of the Deccan might sympathise with him.'

* *Earl of Northbrook*, pp. 70-71.

An extraordinary Court of Inquiry was formed at Baroda on the 24th February to try the Gaekwar for his alleged crimes. The Court was composed of Sir Richard Couch, the Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta, the Maharajas of Gwalior and Jeypore, General Sir Richard Meade, Sir Dinkar Rao and Mr. Melville.

The trial was opened by the clerk of the Commission by the reading of the royal proclamation. Mr. A. R. Scoble, the Queen's Advocate, represented Her Majesty and Sergeant Ballantine, the well-known Barrister, appeared for the defence. At first there were four charges against the Gaekwar, which were later on reduced to two. The first charge was that, through his servants he tampered with those of the Residency ; "and secondly, that he directly and by his servants instigated them to commit the serious crime of attempting to poison their master, Colonel Phayre, the British Resident."

The serious charge was the deliberate attempt to poison the Resident. About this we read :

"That attempt was discovered by Colonel Phayre on the 9th of November 1874, although it appears (as stated) that two previous attempts had been made on the 6th and 7th of the same month. The persons by whom the poison was to be administered was Ramjee, the havildar, and the method for administering the poison was this : Colonel Phayre was in the habit every morning either of walking or riding directly he rose. On his return he used to proceed to his office, adjoining the main building of the Residency. In this he had dressing accommodation, washstand, dressing-table, etc. It was the duty of Abdullah, one of his servants, to prepare a tumbler of sherbet made from pomegranates. ...He used to place it on a table in an inner room, and leave it there. On the morning in question – the 9th of November –Abdullah prepared this sherbet as usual. Although the havildar had no immediate occupation in the small room, yet he was in the habit of going in to purloin a pen or piece of paper, or to make some minor arrangements. The position which he occupied at the hall of Colonel Phayre was on the verandah, outside the private office, where there was a bench for him, and from which position he could see so much of the inner room as was occupied by the table on which the sherbet was placed. Upon the morning in question, it will appear from the havildar's own statement, he saw introduced the poison which was so nearly fatal to Colonel Phayre. The method adopted for securing the due administration of the poison was this : The arsenic was mixed with some water, and a solution made, and they were shaken well together, so that the poison would mix. He then poured it from a small bottle into the sherbet. That there was poison in this sherbet there cannot be the slightest doubt. Colonel Phayre came in from his walk, took two or three sips from it, but it seemed strange to him ; possibly he thought the sherbet made from bad pomegranates, and threw a portion away."*

On drinking it, the Counsel for prosecution argued, the Colonel felt unwell and noticed some sediment in the sherbet, which on examination by Dr. G. E. Seward, Resident Surgeon at Baroda, was proved to be "composed partly of arsenic, and partly of a glittering substance, which he suspected to be diamond dust." This opinion was confirmed by Dr. Gray, the Government Chemical Analyst at Bombay. About the diamond dust, the prosecution Counsel said : "Although this material has no place in Taylor's *Medical Jurisprudence*, it is widely believed in India as a potent poison at the present day."

The defence was then made by Sergeant Ballantine, whose defence occupied fully sixty-one columns of the *Times of India.*

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* Quoted in *Cassel's Illustrated History of India*, II., p. 442.

"He drew the attention of the Court to the fact that the Baroda Police exercised a great authority over the witnesses, that they were mysteriously brought together in every 24 hours when just in the humour to disburden their minds and even contrary to law, the Police took depositions. He went on to say that the evidence produced was that of accomplices and was inadmissible in any English Court of Law unless corroborated. He dwelt long on the nature of the corroborative evidence and contended that there was none whatever. He thought it improbable that the Gaekwar, who had preferred certain charges against the Resident in a *Kharita* to the Viceroy asking His Excellency to to remove Col. Phayre, should attempt the life of the very man who would have to explain matters that formed the ground of complaint. He laid special stress on the technical pleas that the English law has provided for sifting evidence and characterised those technicalities as the bulwark of the liberty of the subject in a free country. He reviewed the evidence at great length and came to the conclusion that no witness had proved that the Gaekwar had any motive in acting as it was alleged he had done. Sir A. Scoble tried to show that the Gaekwar had a motive in attempting to poison Colonel Phayre. He believed that Colonel Phayre would prevent the recognition of Luxombai's son, as he had refused to recognise the marriage and that the Resident would receive the support of the Government in this matter. The Gaekwar had admitted in his *Kharita* that he regarded Colonel Phayre as an uncompromising opponent and a persecutor. Sergeant Ballantine concluded with an eloquent tirade against those newspapers that had ventured to comment on the trial and to influence by their writings the opinions of the Commissioners to the prejudice of the Gaekwar. Sir A. Scoble ended with a forcible peroration saying that the witnesses had in the main told the truth, that the Gaekwar's guilt was established, that it would be the painful duty of the Commission to regard him not as a persecuted prince but as a criminal worthy of condign punishment. He finally prayed to God that the deliberations of the Commission might be brought to a just and righteous conclusion."

Now came the *finale* of the Baroda drama. The guilt of the Gaekwar was not proved. The Indian Members of the Commission decided in favour of the Gaekwar, while the European members gave verdict against him. As the guilt of the Gaekwar was not proved, Lord Northbrook could not proceed against him on that ground. He, however, found enough ground to dethrone him for his alleged misrule in Baroda. Thus Lord Northbrook on very trifling grounds deposed the Gaekwar Mulhar Rao from the sovereignty of the Baroda State; he and his issue were also precluded from all rights, honours and privileges of the Baroda State.

British statesmen no longer dared to follow the policy of annexation enunciated by Lord Dalhousie. Lord Northbrook deposed Mulhar Rao, but he thought it would be anything but wise to annex the State of Baroda. Ia the proclamation, he said:

"Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen in re-establishing a native administration in the Baroda State being desirous to mark her sense of the loyal services of His Highness Khande Rao Gaekwar in 1857 has been pleased to accede to the request of his widow Her Highness Jumnabai that she may be allowed to adopt some member of the Gaekwar House whom the Government of India may select as the most suitable person upon whom to confer the sovereignty of the Baroda State."

About the Gaekwar affair, Lord Northbrook thus wrote to the Secretary of State on June 28, 1875:

"It would be difficult to bring together so many concurrent circumstances of doubt and difficulty as were crowded together in the story. The incapacity of the Residents at Baroda for many years, Phayre's conduct, the trouble with the Bombay Government, the poisoning case, the trial, the agitation, which I am more and more convinced was mainly the result of money, the division of opinion in the Commission, the attitude of the English press, and lastly the difficulty

of finding a successor to Mulhar Rao, combined to bring a series of the most awkward questions for decision which for the most part admitted of no delay. *I am not presumptuous enough to suppose that mistakes have not been made,* but I think the result on the whole has not been unsatisfactory."*

Mr. Mallet in his biography of Lord Northbrook admits that the procedure adopted by the Viceroy was rather unfortunate. Lord Northbrook himself also said that he was not presumptuous enough to suppose that mistakes had not been committed in the whole affair. Mallet thus says :

"For the course of events which led up to the alleged attempt on the part of the Gaekwar to poison the Resident, Colonel Phayre, and which brought to a head the whole question of the misgovernment of the State (a Commission of inquiry into which had previously been ordered by the Viceroy), the Bombay Government were primarily responsible. To deal with the crisis which then arose Lord Northbrook, in his anxiety to treat the Gaekwar fairly and to respect the rights of the feudatory princes, devised a wholly novel and, as the event proved, *unfortunate procedure* and appointed a Commission to investigate the charges, presided over by the Chief Justice of Bengal and composed of three English and three native members, the latter being the Maharajas of Gwalior (Scindia) and Joypur, and a prominent native minister, Sir Dinkur Rao."†

The verdict of the Commission, however, proved embarrassing to the Government. They did not find it to their favour. Says Mr. Mallet :

"The attempt to associate the native princes with the Government in a great act of justice performed upon one of their own hierarchy turned out a failure as regarded the immediate object in view. The English members declared in favour of all the charges against the Gaekwar, including the attempted poisoning, while the native Commissioners found them not proved, Jeypore even declaring Mulhar Rao to be "not guilty." *This verdict naturally proved in the highest degree embarrassing to the Government,* for, although the Commission had been appointed only to inquire and report, it was inevitable that it should have the appearance of a jury, and that the decision which the Government were forced, both by their belief in the truth of the poisoning charge and by the Gaekwar's maladministration, to take in the teeth of a *negative finding* should be attributed in certain quarters to preconceived prejudice against a native prince. The solution adopted by the Cabinet at home was to cut the knot by proclaiming the deposition of the Gaekwar "not based on the report of the Commissioners" nor assuming that the result of the inquires proved the truth of the imputation against him ; but on the grounds of his 'notorious misconduct, gross misgovernment, and incapacity to introduce reform'."

This decision "inevitably excited violent criticism in the native papers and some strong feeling among the natives." The excitement in Baroda became very tense and the Resident had to take special precautions to remove the Gaekwar safely from his capital. Thus writes Lord Cromer :

"It was necessary that the deposition should be carried out rapidly. The town of Baroda was in a state of great excitement, neither was it occupied by any British garrison. The operation was, therefore, one of some delicacy. At that time Sir Lewis Pelly was the Resident at Baroda. Acting under Lord Northbrook's instructions the telegraph wire from Baroda to Simla was joined up so that no necessity arose for any transfer of messages at intermediate stations. About 8 o' clock one evening I got into direct telegraphic communication with Sir Lewis Pelly. The result of a brief conversation between us was that a special train was prepared, and that

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* Mallet's *Earl of Northbrook,* pp. 92-93.

† *Ibid.,* pp. 93.

Mulhar Rao was arrested and at once removed. When the people of Baroda awoke next morning, their former ruler was half-way on his journey to Madras." *

VETOING OF THE MUFFASSIL MUNICIPAL BILL (1872)

In 1872 a Bill was introduced in the Bengal Legislative Council to "give the people that measure of self-government and local freedom to which both their old traditions, and their modern education alike point."

This measure of self-government did not find favour with the Viceroy. The Bill was introduced in the Council in December 1871. Sir George Campbell in speaking of the Bill said that he was "a great believer in Local Self-Government. Under free constitutions nothing tended so much to keep the people free, and under constitutions which were not politically free, nothing did so much to help the people to some of the benefits of freedom, as decentralised local municipalities in all parts of the country. In such a country nothing so much tended to prepare the people for a measure of gradual freedom —*nothing so much emancipated them from the burden of despotic rule*, as the constitution of free municipalities. It is one of the main objects—he might say *the* main object—of the Bill which the Hon'ble Member would shortly explain to the Council, to foster those self-governing institutions. It might be doubtful whether these wonderful indigenous institutions, so well known in other parts of India, these little republics, these village communities, which remained intact when empire after empire fell to pieces, whether they ever existed to any very large extent in Bengal : it might be doubtful whether there were any such institutions so perfect here as there were elsewhere ; but though the people of Bengal have not the same experience of these institutions as the people of some other parts of the country, he believed that they are the most advanced in point of modern education and, therefore, his sanguine hope was that they are more prepared to accept municipal institutions as they are now constituted on western models. The efforts of Government should, therefore, be to create self-acting municipalities where they do not now exist. The education which had been given to the upper and middle classes of this country might or might not be the best in system, but His Honour thought that it had really created a very intelligent class of men—a class in many respects capable of self-government ; and he hoped and trusted they would find in various parts of the country many enlightened and public-spirited men who would devote themselves to the good of the country in making the most of these self-governing institutions to which he had alluded."

Lord Northbrook, however, could not approve of this Bill. It was vetoed by him on the 3rd January, 1873, on the grounds that

"The measure was calculated to increase municipal taxation in Bengal, and such increase was unnecessary and inexpedient at the time : that *he was unable to assent to those portions of the Bill which allowed the provision of elementary education to be made obligatory* upon first and second class Municipalities : that he also objected to a provision enabling Town Municipalities to give relief to the poor in time of exceptional scarcity and distress : that he thought the time had

* *Earl of Northbrook*, pp. 94-95

not come when it was desirable to create the machinery for the Government of villages proposed in the Bill."

So one of the main reasons why Lord Northbrook vetoed the Bill was that he did not like that elementary education should be made obligatory upon the great cities and towns of Bengal. If the Bill had been passed, it would have successfully solved the problem of elementary education in Bengal to a great extent.

Sir George Campbell and his Government were much astonished when the measure was vetoed by Lord Northbrook. Sir George Campbell wrote later on :

"Lord Northbrook's dread of taxation wrecked our Municipal Bill, and the progress of Local Government in Bengal, I may almost say in India, was thrown back many years. There was nothing for it but to abandon the hope of doing much in that direction. And I must say that with that hope went also the hope of doing much more in the way of reform in any direction under Lord Northbrook's *regime*."†

BENGAL-BIHAR FAMINE OF 1873-74

Famines in India had become the order of the day. During the rule of Lord Lawrence there was the terrible Famine in Orissa which carried away an appalling number of human beings. At that time, the Government had failed to do their duty properly. Again, during the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook another famine visited Bengal and Bihar in 1873-74.

The history of this famine is to be found in the Report of the Famine Commission of 1878-30.

"The monsoon of 1873 was not abnormal during the three months, June, July and August, but n northern Bengal it ceased prematurely in September; and much of the winter rice crop, which ripens in November, was consequently lost. The Bengal Government, from inquiries instituted for the purpose, was led to believe that the inevitable effect of this loss would be to involve the inhabitants of a large part of the province in a severe famine; it accordingly set about making preparations with the utmost energy to carry out relief measures on a scale and with a thoroughness which had never been equalled before. *The principles adopted by the Government were very different from those accepted on any former similar occasion.* It was considered that the operations of private trade could not be relied on, and therefore that it would be necessary to accept the responsibility of providing the distressed districts with the whole quantity of food likely to be required. After elaborate estimates had been framed, it was decided, with the approval of the Government of India and the Secretary of State, to import 480,000 tons of rice; and the greater part of this stock was purchased for the Government in Burma, sent up-country by railway, and distributed to depots scattered over the famine area by the agency of Government officers. The estimates provided against every possible contingency—the failure of contractors, murrain among the cattle, the recurrence of drought in the ensuing monsoon. Relief was administered mainly in the form of employment on works and of gratuitous assistance to the infirm; but *under rules which in their details were very different from those previously followed.* Tests were not to be stringently enforced in localities where the distress was excessive and widespread. In place of the self-acting test which on previous occasions had been held to be useful and to some extent necessary, *reliance was placed on personal knowledge, on the part of the relieving officer,* of the applicant's condition and want."

The result of this new system was a huge waste of public money. The Report proceeds :

* *Ibid.*, pp. 523-24.
† *Ibid.*, p. 525.

"A large special establishment of inspecting officers was appointed, and the country subdivided among them, in the hope that, with the help of the resident zamindars and leading raiyats, they might obtain such personal knowledge of the condition of every village and its inhabitants. The intention having been formed of *preventing loss of life at any cost,* so far as practicable, *tests or restrictions were relaxed* in respect of the wages, the amount of work done, and the character of the work offered ; and sufficient money or grain for their sustenance was allowed to all comers who were *prima facie* in want. Cultivators were invited to take loans of money or rice repayable without interest. About 340,000 tons of grain were disposed of in the relief operations, a quantity sufficient to provide sustenance for not less than 3,000,000 people for 7 months. The famine area was estimated at 40,000 sq. miles, and the population affected at 17 millions. Of these 735,000 were employed on works for 9 months, 450,000 received gratuitous relief daily for 6 months, and 3,200,000 bought grain at low rates enough to support them for 7 months, or received advances of grain or cash a large part of which was repaid to the Government. When all pressure had passed away *the surplus stock of grain left on the hands of the Government amounted to more than 100,000 tons. This had to be sold at a great loss, adding not a little to the total cost of the relief measures, which reached £6,500,000 sterling, or as much as the total expenditure on all past famines in all parts of India from the beginning of the century up to that time.*"*

The position of Sir George Campbell was rather peculiar ; as the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, he wanted to adopt a cautious policy, which was not approved of by Lord Northbrook. Sir George Campbell says :

"My position was one of peculiar responsibility. Not only was I responsible for the safety of an enormous population, but, as an expert who had inquired into former famines, and sat in judgment on others, that personal responsibility was much accentuated. At the same time one of the things I had learned was the extreme difficulty of making a sure forecast, especially where statistical information was so very imperfect as in Bengal. I knew, too, that the reaction after the failure on the occasion of the Orissa famine had caused a tendency towards too much rather than too little alarm, and that my function must be almost as much to moderate and keep within bounds, as to take care that there was no neglect of the symptoms of approaching famine. When the reality of the failure was known, I was almost too well served by the Press...Perhaps my caution in the matter, compared to the less restrainted statements in the Press, *induced the Government of India to entertain some anxiety, if not some distrust,* and caused Her Majesty's Government at home to be almost in advance of ourselves in suggesting immediate extraordinary measures in the way of importing food from a distance. The sensitiveness, too, on the subject of famine after the Orissa failure led to the instruction that *we were on no account to permit any human life to be lost,* which could by any means be saved, an instruction which involved some anxiety to those who knew the difficulty of certainly forecasting what might occur."†

About the administration of the fund for famine relief, Sir George Campbell says :

"The supply of funds to meet famine on a large scale rested wholly with the Government of India, so that I could have done little without their sanction. But on the alarm becoming serious Lord Northbrook hurried down from Simla, and we were able to arrange matters by personal consultation between the Governments of Bengal and India. Sir Richard Temple, who was understood to be my probable successor in the Government of Bengal, paid me a visit at Belvedere, and we all united our efforts to avert calamity."

When Sir George Campbell made the proposal of stopping the export of rice, it did not find favour with the higher authorities. Sir George Campbell thus writes :

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* Quoted in *Bengal under Lieutenant-Governors,* pp. 556-57.

† *Ibid.,* p. 558.

"In addition to the provision of work and a supply of food for the labourers, I proposed that the export of rice should be prohibited. The experience of Orissa and elsewhere showed how slowly trade is diverted from its accustomed channels, and in this emergency I wished so far to anticipate private action. There was no doubt that under the existing law the Viceroy in Council was expressly empowered to take such action, and native opinion was all in favour of such a course. At first my expression was prohibition of export from "India",... but within a few days I confined the recommendation to export from Bengal, and it was on that basis that the question was argued."

Now, what was the result of this discussion ? Says Sir George Campbell :

"*I have no doubt that in any other country than a British-governed country it would have been done.* Still, it was a proposal contrary to many English ideas, and I could not have been surprised if the Viceroy, on due consideration, had rejected it. I think he went farther than that : he would not listen to or discuss such a proposal for a moment. *Lord Northbrook, bred in the strictest sect of English free-traders, looked on my proposal as a sort of abominable heresy*—was as much shocked as a Bishop might be with a clergyman who denied all the 39 articles. The Government at home supported the Viceroy. However, the result of telegraphic communications was that Her Majesty's Government approved the decision of the Government to meet the emergency by the purchase and import of food rather than by prohibition of export, and so it was settled. The Government of India undertook to obtain supplies from Burma and elsewhere, and that course was followed out on a very large scale. I have often thought over the matter, and to this day I am not convinced that the decision was right. *I still incline to the belief that millions of money were sacrificed to an idea,* and great efforts and labour were rendered necessary, when a very simple order prohibiting exports would have done almost all that was required by a self-acting process. *The position of the Government of India seems to me to have been somewhat illogical.* I can understand non-interference with trade ; but in this case the enormous Government imports amounted to an artificial interference with trade quite as great as the prohibition of exports."*

About the distribution of relief to the people, Sir George Campbell said :

"The question of prohibiting exports put out of sight, I was fortunate enough to find that I was quite in accord with Lord Northbrook and his advisers in regard to the system of relief to be followed. Public works were at once set agoing to give employment to the able-bodied, and, as the pressure became greater, we went further and further in regard to measures of relief, and brought work nearer and nearer to the doors of the people. *Our system may be described as a liberal and indulgent one. In that sense our measures were subsequently a good deal criticised, and I may say caricatured,* and that criticism led to a much more severe system in the next great famine in India The questions underlying the difference of opinion in this respect are much the same as those involved in controversies regarding the respective merits of out-door and in-door relief. We felt, too, very much that, if we were to *fulfil the injunction to save human life at any cost,* there were large classes of the population whom it was absolutely necessary to approach at their homes, and who would certainly have died in very large numbers if tests and rigid rules had been applied to bar too easy applications for relief. The Government of India supplied funds liberally. *I thought it rather hard that when, with much care and saving, I had accumulated a sort of Bengal nest-egg (under the local finance arrangement). I was required to sweep it away and spend it on famine* - for famine was not one of the things for which the Local Government had been made financially liable ; but that was soon gone, and after that the Government of India found the money for the measures necessary to save the lives of the people, provided the measures adopted were approved by them. We set to work then in thorough earnest to carry out the instruction that no life should be lost which could in any way be saved." †

* *Ibid.*, p. 560.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 561-62.

To help the Government of Bengal in famine operations, Sir Richard Temple was appointed as Famine Delegate. We read :

"I have alluded to Sir R. Temple as famine delegate. Early in 1874, when the famine operations were becoming very large, and the work of all kinds was almost more than I could undertake, Lord Northbrook proposed that Sir Richard should assist me by going to the distressed districts to superintend the operations as famine delegate, acting under the Government of Bengal, and also possessing the confidence of the Government of India ; and I quite willingly accepted the arrangement."

As to his relation with Lord Northbrook, Sir George Campbell says :

"It seemed to be supposed that Lord Northbrook and I were not so much in accord ; but that was not really so. As I have already said, he and I were quite agreed as to the methods of dealing with the famine (the export question apart), and so long as I was in India I was allowed to manage matters in a way which gave me no reason to suggest that anything was wanting. No doubt the Government of India, which had to find the funds, were quite entitled to exercise a control over their expenditure. *I only felt that there was perhaps some excess of supervision.* With my special experience in regard to the question of famine, and with the assurance that I was not disposed to excess, *it might have been more generous to have more completely trusted me.* At a friendly conference I did to some degree complain that very complete responsibility was thrown upon me without complete discretion. It was not that anything which I required was denied, but *I was placed in a kind of dilemma*—if what I asked for proved to be too little, a very great responsibility for failure would be thrown on me ; if, on the other hand, I asked for more than proved to be necessary, the blame of extravagance and miscalculation would rest upon me. Still, that was only a personal matter ; in the main there was no difference of policy, so long as I administrated the Government of Bengal."

Again he says :

"As regards the famine, I must think that as matters turned out, it does seem that, if the Viceroy had been willing to trust me more completely, the objects we all desired might have been attained with much less expense, with less labour and dislocation, and without incurring the prejudice which was to some extent caused when it turned out that the measures of relief were somewhat in excess of the need. As it happened, my estimates proved to be pretty accurate, and would just have sufficed without leaving much margin beyond. But again I say, that these things must always be uncertain ; and there was probably much of accident in the coincidence between my estimates and the reality. One very serious result, however, followed that sort of prejudice to which I have alluded, *viz.*, another oscillation of public and official opinion, and a second reaction against too liberal relief, just as there had been a reaction in favour of very liberal relief after the Orissa famine. Serious mortality having been avoided, it was impossible to measure the degree of the evil which was averted ; and the fickle opinion of some people then inclined to minimise that evil. This is an ungrateful world—and so it was that our very success caused our efforts to be depreciated."

During this famine, Sir George Campbell was forced to resign his office of Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal owing to ill-health. Lord Northbrook in accepting his resignation appreciated his services in connection with the famine work in the following terms :

"Sir G. Campbell has been obliged, on account of the state of his health, to resign the office of Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and it is the gratifying duty of the Government of India to acknowledge the zeal and ability with which his Honour has from the first devoted himself to the arduous task of conducting the operations for the relief of distress. The Governor-General in Council desires

particularly to record his high appreciation of the manner in which Sir G. Campbell personally directed and supervised the relief organization on the occasion of his recent visit to north Bihar.

"The Governor-General in Council further desires to take this opportunity of expressing his entire concurrence in Sir G. Campbell's acknowledgment of the obligation of the Government to Sir R. Temple for the great energy and administrative power which he has shown in co-operating with the Lieutenant-Governor for the purpose of completing the arrangments to meet the famine."*

This famine relief has been rightly characterised as the most expensive famine operations undertaken by the Government of India. Money was spent like anything for the transportation of the grains, against which Sir G. Campbell had protested. How money was spent like water would appear from the following passages written by Sir R. Temple :

"On entering the northern part of Behar at the end of January 1874, I was struck by the difficulties affecting the transport of grain in large quantities during the dry season which had already begun, and would become drier still as the months rolled on. The traffic of the country was ordinarily carried by boats on the many navigable streams which flow from the Himalayas to join the Ganges ; but these streams were now almost devoid of water. Wheeled carriage for commercial purposes did not exist in any considerable quantity, and thus trade was for a time paralyzed. The only persons, possessing carts and draught bullocks in large numbers, were the European indigo planters who used these vehicles for their manufacturing work. Their bussiness was so slack, partly by reason of the famine, that they could spare their *carts*, which *were accordingly hired by tens of thousands*, and the transport of the Government grain was so far secured... ...But as the security of the transport was vital, it was decided *to construct a temporary railway from the Ganges to every one of the points where distress threatened most.* This work was, under the vigourous supervision of Captain Stanton of the Engineers, constructed at the rate of a mile a day. Further, a special transport train, consisting of carts, bullocks, mules and ponies, was obtained from Northern India and organized by Mr. Harry Rivet Carnac of the Civil Service with much promptitude and ability."†

Not only this, the Government had bought such a huge quantity of grain, that much of it remained unused even after the Famine and that had to be sold at a great loss. Even Sir R. Temple admits it when he says :

"The greater part of the grain procured by Government was used, *but a considerable portion remained unused.* This was the reserve, which had been provided in event of the rains failing for the second time, a failure which, though at one time apparently imminent, had been mercifully averted. The reserve grain then had to be sold, as by that time the new harvest was coming in abundantly. The sale proceeds proved to be but a small recovery as against the cost which had been incurred.

"Some angry criticism soon arose upon the fact of this grain thus having to be sold, as proving that, from some faults in the original calculations, there had been an excess provision. It was immediately shewn that there had been no error whatever, but that as a matter of deliberate policy a reserve had been provided. This reserve, indeed, was not wanted owing to the happy course which events had taken. But if any objections were urged against the policy of adopting this essential precaution, in a case where the lives of millions of people were at stake, they were hardly deserving of refutation."§

Again, he tries to defend the Government policy thus:

"Despite success which owing to the mercy of Providence had been unique in the history of Indian Famines, and exceeded any hopes we ever dared to entertain, *there emanated from some*

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 568-69.

† *Men and Events of My Time in India*, pp. 399-400.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 403-4.

quarters an *unaccountably bitter criticism,* directed chiefly against the expense. By an irony of fate it was actually argued that the danger of Famine could not have been extremely urgent because it had been successfully overcome. This argument was hardly worth considering in the face of the patent, indeed the notorious, facts of the time as known to a host of witnesses. It were bootless perhaps to divine the reasons of that hostility ; the criticism possibly arose from the disappointment felt by some traders who thought that if the Government had not interposed so effectually some further opportunities might have presented themselves to trade."*

ILBERT BILL

Lord Northbrook had also something to do with the well-known controversy which raged over the Ilbert Bill. It was vehemently opposed by the British section of the public and they carried on an agitation against the Bill. Mr. Mallet says :

"The object of this Bill was to remove a race distinction embodied in a compromise which had been agreed to, against the advice of some of the highest practical Indian authorities, by Sir J. F. Stephen when the Criminal Procedure Act of 1872 was passed. That Act, while extending to Englishmen the jurisdiction of certain local Courts, disqualified native members of the Civil Service from exercising this jurisdiction. In accordance with the principle of the equality of all races before the aw which had prevailed since 1833, which had been solemnly asserted by the Proclamation of 1858 and acted upon by successive Governors-General of India, Englishmen had long been made subject to all the Civil Courts of the country ; and *Lord Ripon's reform, a mere extension of this principle, and a small matter in itself, was entirely on the lines which had long been recognised as fundamental in Indian administration.*"†

It is strange that the authors of the Bill did not anticipate the agitation. Sir Henry Maine, then a member of the India Council, had given a warning, which escaped attention. "Lord Northbrook, who was fully alive to the fact that 'men who really sympathise with the natives do not grow on the hedges in the official hierarchy,' was himself surprised by *the passion of panic and resentment* which the measure aroused, and by the '*abominable feeling towards the natives,*' as he expressed it, which it revealed in the Anglo-Indian community."

As to the cause of this agitation we are told :

"Lord Ripon's well-known liberal tendencies and his supposed desire to 'radicalise' the Government of India were already highly unpopular in certain sections of Anglo-Indian society, especially in Bengal and Calcutta ; and the possibility that an Englishman might be tried by a native official, however well qualified, was enough, aided by the incitements of the Anglo-Indian press and the *Times* newspaper in England, to send them entirely off their balance."§

As to the part played by Lord Northbrook in this crisis, which 'was one to try the nerve of statesmen,' his biographer says :

"Lord Northbrook, though in no sense responsible for the introduction of the measure, showed equal courage and loyalty by the manner in which he came to the defence of the Indian Government ; and in speeches at Bristol ("The people at Bristol were very patient, but I must have bored them pretty considerably," he wrote to Sir E. Baring, Nov. 16, 1883) and later in the House of Lords, he argued their case with sincere conviction, and with a moderation of statement which was in striking contrast to the diatribes of Lord Ripon's opponents. He showed also his knowledge

* *Ibid.,* p. 405.

† *Earl of Northbrook, p. 160.*

§ *Ibid.,* p. 161.

of his countrymen when he maintained that the outcry of London society did not represent the opinion of the country. What troubled him most in the whole unpleasant incident, and he looked on the bad feeling produced by the agitation as a serious misfortune –'I abominate all excitement in India, with so much gunpowder lying about, loose sparks are dangerous things'—was the prejudicial effect he feared it would have on Lord Ripon's much more important measures towards 'self-government' in India."*

HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDIANS

While discussing the agitation over the Ilbert Bill, Lord Northbrook in a letter to Lord Dufferin (in 1884) spoke of his attitude towards Indians. He wrote:

"The very troublesome Ilbert Bill has put Ripon out of touch with the non-official Anglo-Indians, and to some extent, I fear, with the Civil Service. You will not find it difficult to re-establish relations with both. But you will soon see that the Anglo-Indians know little or nothing of what is really India; and that the Civil Service with all their magnificent qualities have strongly ingrained in their minds, except some of the very best of them like Mountstuart Elphinstone and George Clerk of old, and Aitchison, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab now, that no one but an Englishman can do anything. So that, unless I am mistaken, you will find a good deal of quiet opposition to any efforts you may make to employ largely educated natives.

"This, however, is an absolute necessity, as Natives acquire an education nearly equal to ours, go to our Universities and are called to our Bar; *there must be serious discontent if we do not manage to satisfy their legitimate ambitions* by giving them a fair share in the Government of their own country. Ripon's main lines of policy in these respects have my cordial support."†

Lord Northbrook had the courage to assert that 'there must be serious discontent if we do not manage to satisfy their legitimate ambitions by giving them a fair share in the Government of their own country.' But unfortunately the British administrators of India could not realise the importance of this piece of advice of Lord Northbrook. He repeated this statement in the address, given in the Town Hall of Birmingham on October 29, 1880. He said:

"Our dealings with the native princes must be strictly governed by the treaties and agreements which we have made with them; *we must show our sympathy with the nobler and educated classes and associate them with us as much as we can in the government of their country*; we must cherish and reward our native soldiers and officers; we must rule the people with patience, remembering how far they are removed from ourselves in education; and we must be cautious and deliberate in the introduction of changes in their institutions and habits. Above all, we must keep India at peace."§

Perhaps 'there is nothing, it will be said, very original in all this', but he added:

"Never forget that it is our duty to govern India not for our own profit and advantage but for the benefit of the natives of India."

About the proposal of granting "self-government" in India, Lord Northbrook had written thus (September 1881):

"I hope you will before long be able to do something which will show that you intend to associate the educated natives with the Government. Some plan of giving a certain number of them

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 161-62.

† *Ibid.*, p. 133.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-35.

in each Presidency, &c., the title of Councillor and of consulting them upon all legislative measures affecting the country would be worth working out and considering. Men of good judgment were in favour of it in my time. If something in this direction is not done soon, I expect there will be considerable discontent."*

This plan afterwards materialised in Lord Ripon's Self-government proposals.

It may, however, be asked that if Lord Northbrook was in favour of granting local self-government in India, why did he veto the Bengal Muffasil Municipal Bill, which was meant for the same purpose?

CHARGE OF BEING AUTOCRATIC

Lord Northbrook was charged by several writers with being autocratic. But Lord Cromer, his Private Secretary, would have us believe that he was not so. He says:

"The charge of being autocratic is the stock accusation which is always brought, more especially by the glib newspaper scribe who delights in generalities, against any one who in any degree stands prominently before the public....As regards the particular case of Lord Northbrook, I had the very best possible opportunities of judging whether his tendencies were autocratic or the reverse. It depends rather on what is meant by the word 'autocrat.' If by this term it is intended to convey that the individual concerned is a man of strong character, that he is obliged by the nature of his office to form definite opinions on certain points, to act on these opinions when formed and neither to shirk the reasonable exercise of the powers conferred on him by law nor to exceed the limits which the law assigns to those powers, then Lord Northbrook was an autocrat, and any one in his position would be failing in his duty if he did not incur a similar charge.

"But if by an autocrat is meant a self-willed man possessed of large powers who obstinately exercises those powers, not only without consultation with qualified councillors, but at times in direct and unreasonable opposition to their views, then all I can say is that no man was ever less of an autocrat than Lord Northbrook. He was very deeply convinced of the dangers inherent in any bureaucratic form of government. He did whatever he could to minimise them."†

"A FAULTY JUDGE OF MEN"

Lord Northbrook has been described by his Private Secretary as a faulty judge of men. Mr. Mallet says:

"One of those who knew him best, Lord Cromer, describes him as *a faulty judge of men*, a defect which he attributed to the genuine simplicity of Lord Northbrook's character. It may be therefore that in spite of the care he took his appointments were not always the best that could have been made; he was too apt to assume that others were actuated by the same lofty and unselfish ideals as those which inspired his own conduct, and it may have happened that his confidence in, and loyalty and forbearance towards, his colleagues and subordinates was carried too far and was sometimes absued. He afterwards indeed confessed as much when, in warning his successor of the danger of placing or leaving in high office any man whom he did not consider to be the best man for the office in India, he blamed himself for not having been harder in a particular instance in which, out of consideration for rank and past services, he had put a man in a place of importance where he had afterwards failed."§

VISIT OF PRINCE OF WALES (1875-76)

During the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook, the then Prince of Wales (afterwards King-Emperor Edward VII) visited India in the cold weather of 1875-76. "At four

* *Ibid.*, p. 162.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 127-28.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

o'clock in the afternoon of the 8th of November the Prince of Wales landed from the *Serapis* at Bombay, where he was received by the Governor of that Presidency, Sir Philip Wodehouse, K. C. B., and Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy." During the five miles' drive the line of procession has thus been described : "On each hand were dense throngs of natives, not in the cold grey dresses to which we are accustomed in England, but in the picturesque white costumes of the East." At Bombay, the Prince received the Indian princes, inaugurated the Sailors' Home and laid the foundation-stone of the Elphinstone Dock.

From Bombay, the Prince of Wales went to Baroda—a journey of 260 miles 'was performed by a night-train.' Thence he visited Ceylon, the land of living Buddhism. From Madras, the Prince came to Calcutta. "The wonderful scene presented by the illuminations of Calcutta followed; and to view them the Prince made a circuit of the city, escorted by the Viceroy's Body Guard and a squadron of the Scinde Horse. Everywhere he was received by clapping of hands; but this—the only greeting an Indian crowd can accord—was sometimes varied by a hearty cheer from an occasional group of Britons, and in this the Hindoos sometimes joined."

The Prince halted at Cawnpur when *en route* from Lucknow to Delhi and drove to the Memorial Church and also paid a visit to the Memorial Garden. "A full moon had risen in a cloudless sky when he started for these historic places," says a correspondent. "The first place to which we drove was the well, situated in the centre of magnificent gardens. . . . I cannot trust myself to give expression to the feelings which we experienced as we looked at the astonishing scene in the bright moon-light."

When visiting Nepal, "it was on the 21st of February (1876) that the greatest hunting expedition took place." "According to the best authority," says Dr. W. H. Russell, "there never has been, at any rate in recent times, such a bag of tigers made in Nepaul as there was today, save on one occasion, when eight, instead of seven, fell to the rifle; but I believe the Prince of Wales is the only sportsman who ever shot six tigers in one day in this country."

After touring through the whole of India and visiting the important towns and sights, the Prince sailed away from Bombay on the 13th of March 1876. From board Her Majesty's ship *Serapis*, the Prince of Wales addressed the following letter to the Viceroy :

"My Dear Lord Northbrook,

I cannot leave India without expressing to you, as the Queen's representative of this vast empire, the sincere pleasure and the deep interest with which I have visited this great and wonderful country.

"As you are aware, it has been my hope and intention for some years past to see India, with a view to become more intimately acquainted with the Queen's subjects in this distant part of her empire, and to examine for myself those objects of interest which have always had so great an attraction for travellers. I may candidly say that my expectations have been more than realised by what I have witnessed, so that I return to my native country most deeply impressed with all I have seen and heard. The information I have gained will, I am confident, be of the greatest value to me, and will form a useful foundation for much that I hope hereafter to acquire. The reception I have met with from the princes and chiefs, and from the native population at large, is most

gratifying to me : as the evidence of loyalty thus manifested shows an attachment to the Queen and to the throne, which, I trust, will be made every year more and more lasting.

"It is my earnest hope that the many millions of the Queen's Indian subjects may daily become more convinced of the advantages of British rule, and that they may realise more fully that the sovereign and the Government of England, have the interests and well-being of India sincerely at heart. I have had frequent opportunities of seeing native troops of all branches of the service, and I cannot withhold my opinion that they constitute an army of which we may feel justly proud. The 'march past' at Delhi of so many distinguished officers and of such highly disciplined troops was a most impressive sight, and one which I shall not easily forget. I wish also to state my high appreciation of the Civil Service; and I feel assured that the manner in which their arduous duties are performed tends greatly to the prosperity and the contentment of all classes of the community.

"I cannot conclude without thanking you and all those in authority for the facilities which have enabled me to traverse so rapidly so large an extent of country; and, rest assured, I shall ever retain a grateful memory of the hospitality tendered by yourself and by others who have so kindly received me.

Believe me, my dear Lord Northbrook,
Yours very sincerely,
Albert Edward."*

RESIGNATION OF LORD NORTHBROOK

In 1876 Lord Northbrook resigned his post as the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. About his resignation, we read :

"On the 4th of January it was publicly announced in London that Lord Northbrook was to retire from the Government of India, after fulfilling the important duties of Viceroy for four years. At the close of the preceding summer his lordship had intimated that he did not feel able to fulfil the heavy labours of his office during another season in India. He thus withdrew from his onerous post, not because he had any difference with the Home office, but simply for the reason stated. Appointed to the Viceroyalty within a fortnight of Lord Mayo's assassination, his term would have expired in 1877; but the climate and the anxieties of ruling had overtasked his strength; and when he did return his services were fully recognized. His predecessor had entered heart and soul into the great work set before him..... Called suddenly to succeed him, Lord Northbrook found the East a land with which his services at the Board of Control had rendered him not unfamiliar; thus, he did not approach his new duties unprepared. Yet, the ordeal he had to pass through, with the famine and all its unforeseen emergencies, was a severe one; and it should always be borne in mind, says a journalist, in judging of a modern Viceroy's career, that he is subject to influences which did not exist before the electric wire stretched to his remote abode. Day by day, for good or ill, the Home Government and British opinion, such as it is, exert an ever-increasing force upon the ruler of India. He is no longer what he was in the era of Wellesley or Hastings, still less in the days of Dalhousie. His actions come under the almost hourly review of the India Office, and the temptation to give and seek advice is powerful on both sides. If the Viceroy is a strong man, he runs the risk of falling into collision with the Secretary of State; if he is made of yielding material, he has two masters—one the Civil Service, the other at Westminister. Under such severe conditions, an Indian Viceroy is fettered as he never was before the Mutiny and the difficulties of his position are proportionately increased."†

LORD NORTHBROOK'S POLICY

On his resignation he was promoted to an Earldom. Returning home he continuously busied himself with useful public affairs in his own quiet way. Cautious and unostentatious, he, however, knew his own mind and possessed considerable independence of judgment.§ His policy was one of political and commercial *laissez-faire*. In political matters his policy has been fitly called 'masterly inactivity'. The doctrine of *laissez-faire* pervaded him so much that even when India was suffering from an acute famine, Lord Northbrook firmly refused the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir George Campbell's proposal to close the ports against the export of grain so as to keep the good Bengal rice to feed the hungry folk of Bengal.

* Cassels' *Illustrated History of India*, Vol II, pp. 506-7.
† Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, Vol. II, p. 491.
§ *Roberts*, p. 419.



Lord Lytton



Lord Dufferin

CHAPTER IX

LORD LYTTON
1876-1880

On the resignation of Lord Northbrook on the 12th of April, 1876, Edward Robert Bulwer, Lord Lytton, was appointed his successor. He was a writer, poet and diplomatist of some standing and was the only son of the famous novelist, dramatist, statesman and orator of the same name. Educated at Harrow, and at Bonn in Germany, at the early age of eighteen he joined the diplomatic service of his country in 1849. In the diplomatic service, he was at Florence, Paris, the Hague, St. Petersburg, Belgrade, Constantinople, Athens and Madrid.

The appointment of Lord Lytton to the Viceroyalty of India caused some surprise in England. Justin McCarthy writes:

Mr. Disraeli gave the country another little surprise. He appointed Lord Lytton Viceroy of India. Lord Lytton had been previously known chiefly as the writer of pretty and sensuous verse, and the author of one or two showy and feeble novels. In literary capacity he was at least as much inferior to his father as his father was to Scott or Goethe. All that was known of him besides was, that he had held several small diplomatic posts without either distinction or discredit. The world was certainly a good deal astonished at the appointment of such a man to the most important office under the Sovereign; an office which had strained the intellectual energies of men like Dalhousie and Canning and Elgin. But people were in general willing to believe that Mr. Disraeli knew Lord Lytton to be possessed of a gift of administration which the world outside had not had any chance of discerning in him. Not much, it was remembered, was known of Lord Mayo's capacity for the task of governing India when he was sent out to Calcutta; and Lord Mayo's administration had undoubtedly been successful. There was no reason why Lord Lytton should not turn out a born administrator. There was no reason why he should not suddenly prove the possession of unexpected gifts, like another Cromwell, Clive, or Spinola. There was something, too, which gratified many persons in the appointment. It seemed gracious and kindly of Mr. Disraeli thus to recognise and exalt the son of his old friend and companion in arms. There was a feeling all over England which wished well to the appointment and sincerely hoped it might prove a success.*

After taking over the charge of the Government of India from the retiring Viceroy, Lord Lytton, 'contrary to the general custom of his predecessors, addressed the Council of India.' He remarked that on assuming that high office he became "the inheritor of a great duty bequeathed to him by great men, whose manner of discharging it had made their names a part of British history."

He went on to say:

"The vast development which has lately been effected in the means of intercommunication, the recent and rapid march of events, both in Asia and Europe, the ever-increasing proximity of the Eastern and Western worlds—all these things have undoubtedly rendered more complex, and therefore more laborious and more anxious than of old, the duties of the Government of India; but what our

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* *A History of Our Own Times* From the Accession of Queen Victoria to the General Election of 1880: By Justin McCarthy, M. P., Vol. IV, 1881, pp. 440-41.

position has thus lost in simplicity it gains, I think, in grandeur, as the interests affected by it become more numerous, and its influence more widely felt."

Lord Lytton wished to exercise economy in the administration. He said:

"Aided by your advice, and relying on your trusted experience, it will be my unremitting endeavour to keep a strict watch over the economical management and cautious progress of our administration.

"Such economy and caution are, indeed, especially imposed upon us by the unprecedented disturbance of our currency at the present moment, but I shall also claim your co-operation in providing with unflinching firmness for the safety and repose of the empire.

Again, in reply to the address presented by the Simla Trades Association, Lord Lytton "vindicated the policy of the Indian Secretary (the Marquis of Salisbury) regarding the cotton duties, and said that their abolition, or reduction, at the cost of adding to taxation, was never intended ; and he spoke with warmth of the Marquis's assiduous devotion to the interests of India. For himself, he added that *nothing would ever induce him to tax the people of that country for any exclusive benefit to their British fellow-subjects.* At that time, however, the smallness of the surplus, and the constantly increasing expenditure, with the unforeseen consequences of the depreciation of the currency, rendered it impossible to make the smallest reduction in the country's limited sources of income."

About this time "a great public meeting was held in Bombay to denounce the Revenue Jurisdiction Act, which was generally condemned by the Indian Press ; and a resolution was passed to memorialise the Secretary of State against it ; while the refusal of the Government to grant the use of the Town Hall for the meeting produced much bitter comment."

While the Prince of Wales was on his Indian tour, the House of Commons, by a majority of 105, passed, on the 16th March 1876, "The Royal Titles Bill" by which Her Majesty the Queen was declared to be "Empress of India"—'a fact which has now passed into the history of the nation.' About the assumption of this title, the *Quarterly Review*, speaking on behalf of the Conservative party, which was responsible for the "Royal Titles Bill," said :

"It declares to all the world, that she is the personal head of a great Asiatic empire, and that the position is, emphatically, one which can never with honour be abandoned. Her position towards the native princes cannot be better expressed than by the title of 'Empress'—a title which indicates a supremacy over other sovereign rulers, and, as such, was assumed by the King of Prussia to mark his supremacy in Germany. The attempts made during the recent discussions (on the Titles Bill) to establish an analogy between India and the colonies showed, we think, a complete misapprehension of the position of both."*

INDIAN TEA TRADE

In presenting an address to Lord Lytton, the tea-planters of Kangra urged him "to afford them further facilities for the transmission of specie through the Government treasuries, as it would seem that, during the preceding ten years since 1866, the quantity of tea exported from British India had risen to 28,126,100 lbs.···The quantity now grown is but a small part of what India, if called upon, could produce, as she possesses every

* Quoted in Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, II., pp. 519-20.

advantage of soil and climate for the growth of Tea, and might, if needed, supply all the wants of Britain in that respect, and perhaps the wants of all the world beside."

Lord Lytton gave a very sympathetic reply to the address of the tea-planters, because he thought that the industry was 'eminently creditable to the British character' and also 'conducive to the stability of the British Raj.' He said in reply:

"In the excellent results of the tea-plantations of the Kangra Valley, which have been fostered and encouraged by the Government of India, I recognise imperial benefits so considerable as to entitle the authors of those benefits to a special claim on the consideration of the Government. Your undertaking has afforded lucrative employment to thousands of the population of this district. The effect of its example, no less than its results, is not merely local; and so far as its social and political influence extends, besides being *eminently creditable to the British character*, it is also *conducive to the stability of the British Raj.*"

The tea-planters got encouragement not only from the Viceroy, but also from their own countrymen in England. At a meeting of the Indian section of the Society of Arts in London, it was stated that

"India now produced, and was capable of producing in any quantity, teas which were of a quality, strength, flavour and purity, not only equal to, but superior to those of China or any other Eastern country, and which were adapted to all tastes, the plainest or the most fastidious, and at moderate prices" and one speaker urged all who heard him, "in their own interests as consumers, and as a *duty they owed to their countrymen in India—men who had long toiled and struggled to meet their wants, without as yet any adequate profit in their investments*—to a more direct and extended use of Indian tea, thereby *affording a fair harvest of profit* to the cultivators, for which nothing was wanting but an increased consumption of their produce in this country."*

INDIAN FINANCE

In replying to the address of welcome presented by the Chairman of the Municipality of Shikarpur, Lord Lytton referred to the financial condition of the Government of India. He said:

"It is a cause of as much regret to myself as it can be to you, that the financial exigencies of the moment have compelled the Government of India to temporarily withhold those loans which under other circumstances, they have so freely accorded to municipalities. It is averred, however, by one of the proverbs of our Afghan neighbours, that the cloud which thunders much rains little. And, though I cannot disguise from myself or you the dark colour of the cloud which still obscures our otherwise bright financial horizon, and obliges us, like wise husbandmen, to reckon the rainy day, I have much confidence in the truth of our own English proverb that 'every cloud has its silver lining'; and I trust that a patient and conscientious study of the phenomena to which this cloud is attributable, may ere long enable us to disperse it, and thus, whilst duly regarding the general and imperative financial interests of this varied Empire, to comply with representations which command my sympathy and shall receive my careful consideration."†

THE CYCLONE OF 1876

On the 31st October 1876, there passed a severe cyclone and storm wave over Backergunge and Noakhali in Bengal. It was estimated that in an area of 3000 sq. miles, out of 1,062,000 persons suddenly thrown into danger, 215,000 must have

* Cassel's *Illustrated History of India*, Vol. II, p. 531.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 531-32

perished. On visiting the affected areas, Sir Richard Temple, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, thus wrote in his Minute:

"There was a severe cyclone in the Bay of Bengal on the night of the 31st October, 1876. But it was not the wind which proved so destructive, though that was terrible enough. It was the storm wave, sweeping along to a height from 10 to 20 feet, according to different localities; in some places, where it met with any resistance, mounting even higher than that.

"In the evening, the weather was somewhat windy and hazy, and had been unusually hot, but the people retired to rest apprehending nothing. Before 11 o'clock the wind suddenly freshened, and about midnight there arose a cry of 'the water is on us,' and a great wave several feet high burst over the country. It was followed by another wave, and again a third, all three waves rushing rapidly onwards, the air and wind being chilly cold. The people were thus caught up before they had time even to climb on to their roofs, and were lifted to the surface of the surging flood, together with the beams and thatches of their cottages...."

"The bodies of the lost were carried to considerable distances, where they could not be identified. The corpses began to putrify before the water cleared off the ground, so they were left unburied in numbers all over the country....

"Most of the local native officials were drowned,—Deputy Magistrates, Police Inspectors, Native Civil Judges, Notaries and others. There were few resident landlords and few land-agents on the spot.

"The loss of cattle, cows and bullocks, was utterly disastrous. Some part of the large herds of buffaloes was saved, these animals being excellent swimmers.

"...Thus cholera set in soon after the disaster. A little later there came a storm of wind and rain (the ghost, as it is called, of the cyclone), suddenly lowering the temperature of the atmosphere and sorely chilling the houseless people. This fresh misfortune aggravated the choleraic plague, and left the people in a state of deep depression. It seemed as if the survivors of the cyclone wave would slowly perish by pestilence. Every arrangement which forethought could suggest has, however, been carried out by the local authorities."

It may be naturally asked: what protective measure did the Government take for future calamities? Sir Richard Temple says:

"This question will be duly considered; but at present I know not how to devise such safeguard, nor have I seen any one who can suggest anything. The area to be protected would be too great to be encompassed with protective works. If embankments became breached in such a storm, they would afterwards do more harm than good, for they would prevent or retard the running off and the subsidence of the waters. Perhaps the people might build perches for themselves on platforms and the like; but the trees which invariably surround the homesteads serve this purpose admirably, and it is to them that the survivors mainly owe their escape. Another means of protection would be the construction of a large mound some 30 feet high in the midst of each village, to which the people might fly on emergency. But this could hardly be managed unless the scattered hamlets should be much more concentrated into villages than at present; and it would involve a considerable change in the mode of habitation, a change in which the people would probably not acquiesce. They will, I fear, be found unwilling to undertake troublesome and expensive precautions, seeing that these disasters, though not unfrequent somewhere or other in a less severe form, do not visit the same locality in such intensity save at long intervals of time."*

AFGHAN POLICY

When the Amir refused to receive an English mission, Lord Lytton thus wrote in his Minute of June, 1876:

* *Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors,* Vol. II, pp. 674-678.

"I understand the policy of those of my colleagues who are unable to adopt my own point of view to have been correctly described, by those whose description of it is most authoritative, as 'a waiting policy'.

"It is obvious that a policy of waiting for ever on the course of events, without the slightest attempt to control it, would be no policy at all....

"The policy of passive expectation has been tried with great patience for many years past; and I cannot find that it has been productive of a single result that is not eminently unsatisfactory. Not in all the official correspondence to which it has given rise is there one solitary expression of opinion that this policy has improved the character of our intercourse with the Afghan Government, or increased our control over its conduct....

"I am of opinion that there is no sufficient reason to anticipate from 'the waiting policy' in the future any better results than those whereby it must be condemned, if judged by the past."

Lord Lytton maintained that the situation had changed and the enemy he feared was not Afghanistan, but Russia. He said:

"While we wait upon the bank, the stream is bearing from us what we wish to keep, and to us what we wish to avoid. The circumstances of 1876 are essentially different from those of 1869. The neighbour we have now to fear is not Afghanistan but Russia. And the danger with which we are most immediately menaced by Russia is not the loss of territory, but the loss of that political influence or prestige which is the most pacific safeguard of territory. Sher Ali may wish to remain stationary; but the Russian power in Central Asia cannot remain stationary. Its position is too weak. Small bodies gravitate to great ones. If Afghanistan does not gravitate towards the British, it must gravitate towards the Russian Empire. And between bodies of equivalent gravity the attractive force of the one that is in movement will always exceed that of the one which is motionless.

"Our own position, as regards Sher Ali, seems at the present moment, to be this—that, whilst His Highness is in no wise bound to help *us* against Russia, we are under an admitted obligation to help *him* against her; that he is practically free to negotiate with Russia whenever he pleases; and that *we* are practically unable to negotiate with *him*. Such a position is not only undignified; it is, in our present circumstances, positively dangerous."*

After considering carefully whether Sher Ali's rejection of the proposed mission was tentative or final, Lord Lytton "came to the conclusion that it was fairer to His Highness, and more advantageous to ourselves, to regard his reply as a tentative one, and to give him the opportunity of reconsidering his decision."

At last the Amir's reply came on July 8, 1876 and it "contained the suggestion that our native agent at Kabul, who had long been acquainted with the wishes of the Amir, should be summoned to his own Government, to expound to them the state of affairs at Kabul, and hear from them all their desires and projects, returning then to Kabul to repeat to the Amir the result of such intercourse".

This proposal was accepted by the Government of India and the British native agent reached Simla on October 6, 1876.

In the Memorandum which was sent to the Amir, the Viceroy wrote:

"I authorise the agent to tell the Amir that, if His Highness wishes to make me his friend, I will be a warm and a true, a firm and a fast friend to him....

"I am willing to give him, if he wishes it, a treaty of friendship and alliance, to afford him assistance in arms, men and money, and to give to his heir the public recognition and support of the British Government. But we cannot do these things unless the Amir is, on his part, equally willing

* *Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, pp. 70-71.

to give us the means of assisting him in the protection of his frontier, by the residence of a British agent at Herat or such other parts of the frontier....I do not wish to embarrass the Amir...by carrying out any such arrangement until after the signature of a treaty of alliance on terms which ought to satisfy His Highness of the perfect loyalty of our friendship, nor until after he has had the means of satisfying his people that the presence of a British agent on his frontier signifies our firm support of himself and his Heir Apparent with all the power and influence of the British Government. Nor have I any wish to urge upon the Amir the reception of a permanent British Envoy at his Court, if His Highness thinks that it would be a source of embarrassment to him."

Referring to the above Memorandum, Lord Lytton wrote in 1880:

"Neither to Sher Ali nor to Yakub Khan did I ever propose, much less did I ever urge on either of them, the establishment of a Resident British Mission at Kabul. I sincerely believe that such an arrangement would have been extremely beneficial to the two Governments, had they mutually desired it. But it could not be advantageously pressed on a reluctant prince. Our view was that, if Sher Ali no longer desired to draw closer to the British Government, there was nothing to be done."*

TREATY WITH THE KHAN OF KHELAT

Before the arrival of Lord Lytton, Major Sandeman had been sent out on a mission to Khelat. When Lord Lytton heard of it, his original intention was upset. "The character of Major Sandeman's mission was so much at variance with the principle which Lord Lytton desired to adopt as the basis of his foreign policy—*viz.*, 'that of treating all frontier questions as parts of a whole question, and not as separate questions having no relation to each other'—that he telegraphed and wrote to Lord Northbrook on his way to Calcutta, 'urging him to suspend the mission of Major Sandeman, who had not then entered the Khelat territory,' until his assumption of office." But this suggestion was not accepted and Lord Lytton had to send his Military Secretary, Colonel Colley, with instructions to Major Sandeman.

In a letter to the Queen on November 15, 1876, Lord Lytton wrote:

"The assured co-operation or allegiance of the State (Khelat) in case of war is therefore essential to our means of defence or aggression. Six months ago Khelat was seething with civil war; the conduct of the Khan had been so unsatisfactory that we had broken off relations with His Highness, and no power remained in the State strong enough, or friendly enough, to control the predatory border tribes, who had rendered all the trade routes impassable, and were with impunity incessantly devastating our own territory and plundering our own subjects. Some of the most experienced political officers of your Majesty's Indian Government advised the Government to *depose* the Khan and take forcible possession of his country; others proposed that we should enter into separate relations with the tribes...The first of these two proposals appeared to me injudicious, and indeed impracticable. The second proposal also seemed to me pusillanimous and unworthy of a great empire. I have now, however, the satisfaction of being able to inform your Majesty that the Khan of Khelat has agreed to sign with me a treaty, the terms of which will make us virtually the masters of Khelat, not by annexing the country, but by re-establishing the Khan's authority on conditions which secure his implicit allegiance."†

The Treaty with the Khan was signed on December 8, 1876. Lord Lytton gives a description of the ceremony in a letter to Sir Henry Norman:

"Early in the morning, after my arrival, I received in a great public durbar, the Khan and all his

* *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

Sirdars, not one of whom was absent. The little Khan was obviously very nervous or very much alarmed, and trembled violently when I led him to his seat. The durbar was most picturesque and uncouth. Immediately afterwards I made him a return visit, which was purely complimentary ; and after luncheon, as soon as the English levee was over, I had a private interview with the Khan, his chief Sirdars and Ministers, Thornton, Munro, Sandeman, Burne and Colley only. The Treaty was then signed quite privately, without any salvoes or public demonstrations, as I think it best not to publish it immediately ; and I addressed both the Khan and the Sirdars at some length in explanation of their mutual obligations to each other and to us, under the terms of it. To these injunctions and warnings the response from both sides was all that could be wished. Both Khan and Sirdars appeared to understand every clause of the Treaty thoroughly, and to be equally delighted with it."*

Thus, as Lord Lytton pointed out, the British became virtually the *masters of Khelat,* though they did not annex it in contravention of the Queen's Proclamation.

Major Sandeman was appointed the representative of the British Government at the Court of the Khan. Lord Lytton addressed this letter to Major Sandeman:

"I must congratulate you cordially on the complete success of your difficult and anxious mission, and ask you to accept my thanks for the services you have rendered to my Government, and to India, by enabling us to effect a satisfactory reorganization of our relations with Khelat, which I think likely to become ere long much more important than they have ever been before."

Lord Lytton then continued :

"But I feel so strongly that just at present, and, indeed, so long as our relations with Russia and Afghanistan remain in their present ambiguous and critical position, your continued presence and influence in Khelat are so absolutely necessary to secure and confirm the results of the recent Treaty, that I anxiously trust it may be compatible with your convenience not to withdraw them till matters are a little more settled....I anticipate that Quettah will henceforth be the seat of our most important Intelligence Department in regard to trans-frontier politics ; and, indeed, as soon as the pacification of Khelat is completely assured, the main work of your diplomacy in that Khanate will be to extend our influence quietly, peacefully, but if possible, rapidly from Quettah in the direction of Kandahar."†

Thus Lord Lytton's policy not only 'intended to rescue Baloochistan from horrible anarchy', but also 'to extend our influence quietly, peacefully, but if possible, rapidly from Quettah in the direction of Kandahar'.

DELHI ASSEMBLAGE

The Queen had taken the title of Empress of India, which was translated into the Indian vernacular as Kaisar i-Hind. It was decided that "the new title should be announced at a great assemblage on the historical plain near Delhi, on January 1, 1877—in the presence of the heads of every government in India ; of 1,200 of the noble band of civil servants ; of 14,000 splendidly equipped and disciplined British and native troops ; of seventy-seven of the ruling chiefs and princes of India. . . . ; and of 300 native noblemen and gentlemen besides."

Lady Balfour in *The History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration* thus describes the Delhi Assemblage :

* *Ibid.,* p. 102.

† *Ibid.,* pp. 103—104.

"Three large pavilions had been specially erected for the occasion, at some distance outside, and overlooking an extensive plain to the north of the city of Delhi. The largest of these pavilions, which was semi-circular in form, about 800 feet long, facing the Viceregal throne, was occupied by the Governors of Madras and Bombay, the ruling chiefs present at Delhi, with their principal attendants, and the various high officers of Government, all of whom were seated in such a manner that the native chiefs were intermingled with the high officials. The two other pavilions, erected to the rear, right and left, of the Viceroy's throne, were occupied by a large concourse of spectators, including the Governor-General of the Portuguese settlements in India, the Khan of Khelat, the Foreign Envoys and Consuls, and European and Native noblemen and gentlemen from all parts of India. The British troops, European and Native, were drawn up in a vast circle in the plain around.

"The Viceroy arrived at the place of assemblage a little after noon, and was received with a royal salute from the troops assembled...

"His Excellency, wearing the collar, badge, and robes of the Star of India, was received by the whole assembly standing, the massed bands drawn up close by playing the National Anthem until he had taken his seat on the dais. The Proclamation formally declaring Her Majesty the Queen to be Empress of India was then read in English by the Chief Herald and afterwards in Urdu by the Foreign Secretary. At its conclusion 101 salvoes of artillery, intermingled with *feu de joie* from the assembled troops, were fired; the Royal Standard was hoisted, and the bands again played the National Anthem. After a brief pause the Viceroy then rose and addressed the assemblage. At the close of his address he read aloud the telegraphic message which the Queen-Empress had that day sent in her Royal and Imperial name.

"At the conclusion of this address the whole assembly spontaneously rose and joined the troops in giving repeated cheers. Many of the chiefs present attempted to offer their congratulations, but were unable to make themselves heard. The Maharaja Scindia was the first to rise. He said: 'Shah-in-Shah Padshah (Monarch of Monarchs), may God bless you! The Princes of India bless you and pray that your sovereignty and power may remain steadfast for ever'."*

The new title proclaimed at Delhi "was welcomed throughout India by the people as well as by the chiefs; its proclamation was received with every possible demonstration of loyalty. Throughout the whole of the British districts food and clothing were gratuitously distributed to thousands of poor, whilst many of the wealthy zemindars and municipalities gave liberal grants towards works of public utility. The durbars held simultaneously at the capitals of the native chiefs and princes were equally characterised by unmistakable evidences of good feeling."

About the expenses of the Durbar, Lady Balfour says:

"Enormously exaggerated statements were made in the English papers as to the cost of the assemblage. In the Viceroy's opinion a great saving was accomplished through the policy of enlisting the hearty co-operation of the native princes, who all attended this great ceremony at their own expense. Most of the English troops came in the ordinary course of relief movements. The Viceroy entertained all the members of his own Council at his personal expense, and the heads of local administrations similarly entertained their own guests."†

PESHAWAR CONFERENCE (1877)

On December 18, 1876, the news came that the Amir had consented to send his Minister to meet the British Envoy on the Frontier. "This appeared to be a virtual, though reluctant, acceptance of the Viceroy's proposals, but the Amir did not reply to

* *Ibid.*, pp. 127-28.

† *Ibid.*, p. 132.

the Viceroy's letters, and took no notice of the invitation which had been sent him to the Imperial assemblage at Delhi."

The Afghan Envoy arrived at Peshawar on January 27, 1877 and he was met by Sir Lewis Pelly. From the very beginning of this Peshawar Conference, "it was doubtful whether the Envoy was authorised to accept the *sine-qua-non* condition that British officers should reside on the frontier of Afghanistan to watch outside events. Ultimately, after much fencing, he rejected it. Sir Lewis Pelly then broke off the conference on the ground that if the basis on which alone any discussions were to take place was not accepted, he had no authority to open negotiations. He consented, however, to refer to the Viceroy what the Envoy had said, and to await His Excellency's reply."

The Afghan Envoy had contended "that by Lord Mayo's written assurance at Umballa and Lord Northbrook's verbal one at Simla, the British Government were already bound to protect the Amir, not only against foreign aggression, but also against internal revolt.'

In repudiating this false position, Lord Lytton wrote to Sir Lewis Pelly:

"The [Envoy's] argument would be perfectly sound if its premises were true. But unfortunately for the Amir, they are fundamentally erroneous. The only obligations ever contracted on behalf of each other by the British and Afghan Governments are embodied in two treaties, of which the first was signed in 1855 and the second in 1857."

After examining the terms of the treaty of 1855, Lord Lytton comes to this conclusion :

"It is clear, therefore, that under the terms of the Treaty of 1855, the British Government has contracted no liabilities whatever on behalf of the Amir. Moreover, although the British Government has assuredly no desire, or intention, to take advantage of the fact, it nevertheless *is* a fact, that the territories recognised by that Treaty as belonging to the Amir did not include Afghan Turkistan."*

Again he says :

"It is, therefore, certain that there is in the seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857 absolutely nothing whatever to preclude the British Government from pointing out, at any time, to the Amir the advantage, or propriety, of receiving a British officer as its permanent representative at Kabul ; nor even from urging such an arrangement upon the consideration and adoption of His Highness, in any fair and friendly manner. But it so happens that the British Government has not proposed, and does not propose, or intend to propose, that arrangement. Consequently, the Envoy's remarks on the Treaty of 1857 are not to the point, and need not be further noticed."

About Lord Mayo's utterances on March 31, 1869, Lord Lytton wrote :

"It is self-evident, in the first place, that whatever their meaning, and whatever their purpose, they were not intended to have the force of a Treaty."

Again, about the statement made by Lord Northbrook in 1873 to the Amir's Envoy at Simla, Lord Lytton said :

"It is sufficiently apparent that this personal assurance committed the British Government to no pledges which were not carefully guarded on every side by positive conditions with which the Amir has of late evinced no disposition to comply. On receipt of it the Envoy left Simla, apparently disappointed, and observing that the Amir was not likely to derive from it much comfort or support."†

* *Ibid.*, p. 142.

† *Ibid.*, p. 149.

Again, the Viceroy wrote:

"It would appear, however, from the whole tone of the Envoy's language to you, and from the statement so carefully made by His Excellency (at whose request it has been submitted to me), of the Amir's present views and sentiments, that His Highness now no longer desires our alliance and protection. The British Government does not press its alliance and protection upon those who neither seek nor appreciate them. This being the case, it only remains for the Viceroy, to withdraw, at once, the offers made to the Amir in the month of October last; and, in so doing, to express his deep regret that these offers, and the spirit in which they were made, should have been so completely misunderstood, and so grossly and publicly misrepresented, by His Highness."

He finally says:

"With these explanations and assurances you are now authorised to close those conferences with the Afghan envoy."*

Meanwhile the Amir was not idle. "While these protracted discussions with Syud Noor Mahomed (the Afghan Envoy) were in progress, intelligence reached India from Kabul that the Amir was straining every effort to increase his military force; that he was massing troops on various points of his frontier; that he was publicy exhorting all his subjects and neighbours to make immediate preparation for a religious war, apparently directed against his English rather than his Russian neighbours, both of whom he denounced, however, as the traditional enemies of Islam; . . . that he was tampering with the tribes immediately on the frontier, and inciting them to acts of hostility against us; and that for the prosecution of these objects he was in correspondence with Mohammedan border chiefs openly subsidised by the Indian Government."

In commenting on the above, the Viceroy wrote:

"The Amir throughout the whole course of the conference displayed, and subsequently continued to manifest without the slightest provocation, a marked hostility towards the British Government. Whilst his representative was carrying on friendly negotiations with the British Envoy at Peshawar, the Amir himself was publicly informing his subjects that the British Government had broken its engagements, and threatened the independence of his kingdom. On this mendacious pretext His Highness proclaimed a religious war against the British Government, and actively endeavoured, by every means in his power, not only to incite the border tribes against us, but also to tamper with the loyalty of our own subjects. All the letters addressed to him by the British Government calling for an explanation of this conduct have been left unanswered. Whilst continuing military preparations avowedly directed against this Government, His Highness has arbitrarily stopped the transmission of ordinary intelligence between Kabul and Peshawar. Such is the return made by the present Amir of Kabul for nine years of friendship and support on the part of the British Government. But if His Highness persists in the prosecution of his present faithless and unfriendly proceedings, all responsibility for the inevitable consequence of those proceedings must rest upon his own head."†

FRONTIER REORGANIZATION

After the Peshawar Conference, the Viceroy wanted to establish a new system of frontier organization and appointed Captain Cavagnari as the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar. The Viceroy wrote thus to Cavagnari:

"As regards our present relations with Sher Ali, the one thing to bear constantly in mind is the

* *Ibid.*, p. 153.

† *Ibid.*, p. 158.

importance of maintaining towards him an attitude of the most complete indifference and unbroken reserve.''

The new Deputy Commissioner was to supply information about Afghanistan to the British Government. Lord Lytton wrote :

"In working this Intelligence Department, I feel sure you will be careful to abstain from any word or sign which, if reported to the Amir, would convey to his mind the impression that we care three straws about what he may now do or not do, or that we have the least desire to re-open negotiations with him. I doubt if our present relations with His Highness will ever be satisfactory ; but the only chance of improving them is to let him first thoroughly realise the difficulties of the position in which he has now placed himself. *Me judice*, the radical defect in the conduct of our past relations with Sher Ali is that the *tone* of it has never been in wholesome accordance with the realities of our relative positions--the weakness of his position and the strength of our own. Thus, induced by our own conduct to believe himself a political necessity to *us*, and consequently a great political catch to the *Russians*, he has naturally sought his personal advantage in playing his two great neighbours off against each other."*

About these frontier tribes, Captain "Cavagnari heartily agreed that the independence of these tribes of the Amir of Afghanistan was a fact which had not been sufficiently taken into account by the British Government, but at the same time he warned the Viceroy that any active steps on the part of the British Government to secure their independence by the gift of arms or money would at once be resented by the Amir as an act offensive towards him, and should not, therefore, be resorted to while there was still any chance of patching up differences with Sher Ali."

About the complete change of policy to the frontier tribes, the Viceroy wrote :

"Our original Afghan policy was to regard these tribes as the political property of the Amir of Kabul, with a view to making him responsible for the control of them...But, owing to various causes, the policy has failed, and failed so irremediably that we cannot now set it on its legs again. The Amir has never been able to exercise authority over these intervening tribes in the sense contemplated by those who laid down the lines of the old policy ; what influence he does exercise over them is distinctly prejudicial and permanently inconvenient to us ; and meanwhile we, on our part, have never been able to exercise authority or influence over their Amir...Therefore I conceive that it is rather the gradual disintegration and weakening, than the consolidation and the establishment, of the Afghan power at which we must now begin to aim."

About the organization of the North-West Frontier of India, Lord Lytton pointed out in the spring of 1877 that there was an 'overwhelming concurrence of opinion' on three points. Firstly, "that our frontier administration was in need of adjustment, secondly, that the Government of Sindh should be severed from that of Bombay, and thirdly, that the line of demarcation between the Sindh or lower frontier and the Panjab or upper frontier should be readjusted according to the distribution of the races on the border ; so that the Belooch tribes (might) all come within one district and administration, and the Pathan tribes within the other."

After examining the various propositions of reform of the Frontier districts, the Viceroy wrote a minute on the frontier reorganization. Lord Lytton wanted to create a new frontier district beyond the Indus, and separate from Sindh and the Panjab. This

* *Ibid.*, pp. less 161-62

new district should be under a Chief Commissioner or an Agent to the Governor-General, who would deal with frontier business and transfrontier relations. He says :

"The Viceroy would, by means of this arrangement command the services of his own specially selected agent, in whose hands the threads of all our border, politics and tribal relations would be concentrated. The time of such an agent could be devoted almost entirely to purely frontier duties ; and he would be better able than any Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab can possibly be to visit with adequate frequency, freedom of mind, and singleness of interest all parts of the frontier ; thus making himself personally and thoroughly familiar with the social facts, individual characters, and local sentiments which claim incessant and concentrated attention in the successful administration of border politics. The political and administrative conduct of the frontier would be in the same hands and pass through the same channels. All division of responsibility and all antagonism of schools and systems would thus be eliminated."*

In reply to the objection that the frontier districts formed an integral part of the Panjab, the Viceroy said :

"The frontier districts are separated from the Punjab by almost every possible kind of distinction. They are separated geographically, historically, by race, by institutions, and by customs. The Indus, for a great part of its course, forms a natural and little traversed boundary between two essentially distinct territories."

The second objection raised was that the internal administration of these districts would suffer by separation. In reply to this Lord Lytton pointed out that the local officers

"were hardly in a position to form the soundest or most impartial opinon' on the general merits of an arrangement involving 'some reduction in the scope and power' of the particular Government with whose achievements and traditions they were justly proud to be associated."

The third objection was that

"our Frontier relations were best carried on through the Punjab Government. With regard to this Lord Lytton wrote : So long as our relations with the trans-frontier states are carried on by an officer of comparatively subordinate position, there may be reasons why he should communicate through the local Government rather than directly with the Government of India. But if the conduct of these relations be transferred to an officer whose official rank is little below that of the Lieutenant-Governor himself, it is in that case difficult to imagine what advantage could be gained by reserving to the Punjab Government any share in the conduct of them. All unnecessary links in an administrative chain admittedly weaken the strength of it. The frontier officer has all the local knowledge necessary to enable him to form and submit an opinion, or to frame a line of policy for the consideration of the Government of India. The Government of India reviews the information and opinions thus submitted to it with a knowledge of British and Imperial interests, as also of the military and financial conditions of India, wider and more accurate than that of any local administration. But what new light can the Punjab Government throw on the matter ? It has not the local knowledge of the Chief Commissioner on the spot, and it has no knowledge of the Imperial policy and political conditions which the Commissioner does not equally possess."†

The Viceroy also wanted to amalgamate the Panjab Frontier Force and the Sindh Frontier Force, "placing the whole under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. 'The time had come,' he thought, 'for the military force to take its proper place with the rest of the troops under the immediate orders of the Commander-in-Chief ; and for the civil Government to rely more directly under ordinary circumstances on its own

* *Ibid.*, pp. 167-68.

† *Ibid.*, p. 169.

force—the police. The intermixture of commands which has been so often pointed out as the great blot in our frontier military system would thus cease; and Peshawar, instead of being a separate command interposed between and interrupting the continuity of the frontier chain of posts, would take its natural position as the military head-quarters of the northern division."

Lord Lytton proceeded to lay down some general principles of frontier administration. He said :

"In the first place, then, I think it should be our aim to cultivate more direct and frequent intercourse than at present exists between ourselves and the tribes on our borders. I have already had occasion to observe more than once, that it is to the effect of the straightforward, upright, and disinterested action of English gentlemen, and to the influence which higher mental power and culture never fail to exert over those who are brought much in contact with them, rather than to superiority in fighting power and appliances that I attribute British supremacy in India, as well as the exceptional success of British rule in all quarters of the globe...For this, among other reasons, I propose the appointment of a Chief Commissioner at Peshawar, invested with exceptionally high powers, who can represent to the native mind more directly and personally than either the Lieutenent-Governor at Lahore or the still more distant Viceroy at Calcutta, the embodied power and dignity of the British Government. For this reason also I propose to increase the administrative staff of divisions and districts; so that the Commissioners and Deputy-Commissioners may have more time for visiting, and becoming personally acquainted with their troublesome, but not hopelessly unmanageable, neighbours....

"For the same reasons, I would be inclined to relax somewhat the restrictions now placed on district officers corresponding with Chiefs beyond the border, and on officers crossing the border... I believe that our North-Western Frontier presents at this moment a spectacle unique in the world; at least, *I know of no other spot where, after twenty-five years of peaceful occupation, a great civilised power has obtained so little influence over its semi-savage neighbours,* and acquired so little knowledge of them that the country within a day's ride of its most important garrison, is an absolute *terra incognita*; and that there is absolutely no security for British life a mile or two beyond our border....

"Next as regards our general system of frontier defence, and the punishment of offences committed by the independent tribes : I think, as already stated, that the time has come when the military force should pass under the Commander-in-Chief, losing somewhat of its police character, while the civil power should be more directly responsible for the protection of life and property. I propose, therefore, to increase somewhat the police force, giving it as good an organization as possible, and placing it directly under the district officers. The local militia also should be under the district officers; and ordinarily these civil forces should be sufficient to meet and punish any attempts from over the border....

"I have already, on several occasions, expressed my strong *disapproval of the system of small punitive military expeditions*; and I have twice, within my short tenure of office, refused to sanction them when they have been recommended. I do not for a moment suppose that these turbulent and savage tribes can be managed without occasional displays of power, and severe punishment. I object to it because it perpetuates a system of semi-barbarous reprisal, and because we lower ourselves to the ideas of right and might common to our barbarous neighbours, rather than endeavour to raise them to our own ideas;—because it seldom really touches the guilty, and generally falls most heavily on the innocent, because its natural tendency is to perpetuate animosity rather than lead up to good relations; because, as a rule, it leaves no permanent mark, and the tribes assailed by us can point triumphantly to our having evacuated their country after all; because there can be no more trying fighting for our own troops than that which obliges them ultimately to retire before an enemy increasing in strength and boldness: and it appears from the records of

these expeditions, which are not always successes even in the most limited sense, that the losses suffered by ourselves often exceed the losses we inflict. Finally, I object to this system because I think the confidence of the hill tribes and their warlike spirit are quite as likely to be raised as lowered by contests in which they generally fire the last shot at a retreating foe."*

Lord Lytton went on to say:

"In dealing with barbarous tribes, our object should be either to support and enforce tribal responsibility to the utmost wherever it already exists, or to reduce tribal cohesion to a minimum where no recognised authority can be found and used. The worst system of all is that which, while it gives us none of the advantages of tribal responsibility, yet unites the tribes against us when we seek to exact reparation for injuries inflicted."

In concluding the minute, the Viceroy wrote:

"The last point to which I attach special importance, is the gradual disarmament of the population immediately within our frontier. The old reasons for allowing and encouraging them to carry arms, namely, that they were required to participate actively in the defence of the frontier, have almost disappeared; and, in any case, I would entrust the protection of the frontier against violence to the police and military, rather than to the inhabitants themselves. One of the first steps towards civilization and social progress is the separation of the military from the agricultural and trading classes; and the sooner our subjects can be taught to confine themselves to peaceful pursuits, looking to the authorities for protection and redress instead of taking the law into their own hands, the better it will be for all concerned. Such a measure would require care and time for its extension; but whenever the inhabitants of a village or district have shown themselves troublesome, or specially quarrelsome, or slow to render assistance when called upon, the opportunity should be taken to deprive them of their arms. Meanwhile all who do carry arms should be to some extent organized; and the carrying of arms be clearly understood to carry with it certain responsibilities."†

FAMINE OF 1877

In the month of October in 1876, there were signs of scarcity in the Bombay Presidency owing to the failure of crops. In the following year, it proved to be "in respect of area and population affected, and duration and intensity, one of the most grievous calamities of its kind experienced in British India since the beginning of the century." The whole area affected by the famine was "about 200,000 square miles, containing a population of thirty-six millions."

From the very beginning, there was a great difference of opinion as to whether 'the relief measures should be mainly based on the system of employing the people on large or on small works.' The Bombay Governor advocated from the first the commencement of large public works. The Viceroy wrote to Sir Richard Temple on November 30:

"This calamity is an unforeseen and serious embarrassment. As the first intimation of it only reached me on the eve of my departure from Simla, and my reasons for visiting the frontier were urgent, I have left the conduct of all correspondence with the local Governments on this subject entirely to Norman and my colleagues, whose experience of such matters is, of course, much greater than my own. We are all of us agreed, however, firstly, *not to sanction the commencement, for purely relief purposes, of large, long, and costly undertakings* unless the public works of that kind proposed by the local Governments have been previously approved by the Supreme Government, as advantageous or necessary in themselves and compatible with the present state of our finances; and,

* *Ibid.*, pp. 175-76.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 178-79.

secondly, not to sanction, except on very clearly proved necessity,. any interference with the natural course of trade."*

The Viceroy's visit to Bombay and the subsequent conference of the Governors of Bombay and Madras with the Viceroy removed all misunderstanding between the Government of Bombay and the Government of India. The Viceroy writes:

"Had it not enabled me to bring the two Governors into personal conference with my own Council, I really believe that we should at this moment have found ourselves in an inextricable mess. The opportunity thus afforded furnished me with the only possible means of removing what threatened to be serious misunderstanding between the Government of India and the Bombay Government on questions of vital importance."

But the condition in Madras was quite different:

"The presence of the Duke of Buckingham at Delhi revealed a state of things at Madras which excited the gravest apprehensions in the mind of the Viceroy. The notion of dealing with the scarcity in that Presidency was apparently to keep down prices artificially by huge purchases of grain, 'not perceiving', writes the Viceroy, 'that the high prices, by stimulating import and limiting consumption, were the natural saviours of the situation. The result is that the Madras Government has not only shaken the confidence of a trade already shy enough, but has also created a pauper population, whose numbers are no test of the actual scarcity and whom it will be very difficult to get rid of."

It was therefore decided to appoint a Famine Commissioner. Lord Lytton says:

"We were unanimous that this must be stopped at once, and we have come to the conclusion that our best course is to send Sir Richard Temple in the character of our Commissioner, and with adequate power, to Madras. He will go there *via* Bombay, in order to strengthen his hands in dealing with the Madras Council by having first inspected some of the Bombay districts where similar phenomena are being successfully treated in accordance with the policy we have laid down. In the meanwhile we have forbidden the Madras Government to buy more grain as a trader, while authorising it in cases of necessity to purchase grain for grain wages, just as any Commissioner might do."†

During this famine also the Government of India reaffirmed the principle "that the Government would spare no efforts to save the population of the distressed districts from starvation or from an extremity of suffering dangerous to life: but they would not attempt the task of preventing all suffering and of giving general relief to the poorer classes of the community."

Sir Richard Temple "carried out his (Viceroy's) instructions at Madras with admirable tact, judgment and energy, and for the time being exerted a much-needed check on the expenditure of the Madras Government." But there was a relapse soon after the departure of Sir R. Temple.

The Viceroy wrote of it thus to Lord Salisbury:

"The whole action of the Calcutta grain trade was on the point of being paralysed by the conduct of the Madras Government and its pertinacious reticence on matters demanding the utmost and most prompt publicity. Complaints and expostulations from the trade were pouring in to us daily.

"The greatest distrust and uncertainty prevailed where it was of essential importance to establish

* *Ibid.*, pp. 190-91.

† *Ibid.*, p. 193.

confidence. All our representations to Madras on this subject had been ignored and disregarded. All the principal mercantile houses in Calcutta concurred in assuring us that so great was the mistrust that unless this impression were promptly removed all shipments of grain from Bengal would immediately cease. That would have landed us in a huge disaster, which neither we nor the local Government could cope with.

"The case was extremely urgent, and had we not instantly made the publication of which the Duke complains I think you would at this moment have been under the obligation of instructing us how to deal with a situation entirely beyond our own power of managing it. If there be one thing to which more than any other, in the history of this famine, I look back with unshaken satisfaction, it is the patient, persistent, and hitherto successfnl efforts made by the Government of India to prevent the Madras Government from stopping, by its most unwise proceedings, the action of the private trade in grain."*

The Madras affair became so deplorable by the end of July that the Viceroy decided to go there personally. In a letter to Lord Salisbury he gives a vivid picture of the existing state of things. He says :

"I fear it is impossible to exaggerate the gravity of the situation we have now to recognise, and, if possible, to deal with, in Madras and Mysore....When Temple inspected the relief works in Madras, he reported that the population employed upon them was a mere mob for want of adequate supervision. The total number of the population on relief work, or in receipt of charitable aid, was then, I think within half a million. It has now increased to one million and three-quarters, but the means of supervision have not been augmented in proportion ; nor, indeed, so far as I can make out, have they been appreciably augmented at all. If the relief gangs, when Temple inspected them, were an unregulated rabble, what must now be their condition ?"

The condition was as much bad in Mysore. The Viceroy says:

"In Mysore the state of things, though fortunately on a smaller scale, is even worse, as far as it goes. The returns given in last Saturday's "Gazette" are startling—

On relief work under revenue officers	26,158
" " Public Works Department...	24,275
Gratuitously relieved	120,251

"Thus, the number employed on public works, which was very small last May, has considerably diminished since then, whilst the number of persons in receipt of gratuitous relief has largely increased.

"Compare the corresponding returns from Bombay :

On relief works ...	295,514
Gratuitously relieved...	66,399

After comparing these figures, Lord Lytton remarks :

"Mysore is easier to deal with than Madras ; not only because the field of operations is smaller, but also because the Government of India has, at least, some power of control and direction over the local authorities, who cannot disregard its instructions with complete impunity. In Mysore I am hopeful that it may still be possible to effect a timely rescue by the appointment of a special Commissioner, carefully selected and furnished with adequate powers."

Lord Lytton asks:

"But in Madras what can we do ?...I believe that Temple's mission saved us from a great catastrophe : and nothing but the conviction that a great catastrophe was impending, and could not otherwise be averted, induced me, most reluctantly, to resort to that measure....But...as soon as his back was turned everything relapsed into the old bad groove....The situation in which we are now landed, with the prospect all around as black as night. is one of such difficulty that the boldest man might shrink from dealing with it."

* *Ibid.*, pp. 195-196

Referring to the situation in Madras, Lord Lytton wrote: "You see I am between Scylla and Charybdis." Lord Salisbury had suggested that "a dictator should be appointed for the management of famine affairs. It now occurred to the Viceroy that the Duke of Buckingham himself might be induced to occupy such a position."

Lord Lytton said:

"I would leave him freest possible play, suppress my own personality, suspend all interference on the part of the Supreme Government, and return to Simla as soon as the arrangement was concluded. If the Duke accepts my proposal he will have a very good chance of greatly distinguishing himself, and converting an enormous administrative failure into a remarkable success."*

At last Lord Lytton decided to start for Madras on August 17, 1877 to inspect the famine operations there. He says:

"My journey, therefore, to the famine-stricken districts of Southern India, and more especially my journey to Madras, is prompted by the hope that it may enable me to strengthen and augment the means on which His Grace the Governor of that Presidency is now dependent for the satisfactory solution of a problem as serious as any which has ever occupied the mind or taxed the abilities of an Indian statesman."

In a letter from Dhurmpore, the Viceroy writes:

"Here we were met by Patiala's peŏple, who have provided me with a table-cloth and a quilt so beautiful that I long to steal them."†

Fortunately, the meeting of the Viceroy and the Duke of Buckingham was productive of good results. In a letter to Lady Lytton, the Viceroy writes:

"Hurrah! I think that I may now safely inform you that everything has been satisfactorily settled between the Duke and myself.

"Briefly, these are the details of the arrangement now concluded:

"1st. Principles laid down in Viceroy's minute are to be carried out, all relief operations being transferred to Public Works supervision.

"2nd. Duke takes famine management into his own hands.

"3rd. An officer selected by Government of India to represent its views will be attached to the Duke as 'personal assistant' for famine affairs.

"4th. The officer to be General Kennedy.

"5th. All famine papers to be submitted to Duke by local Famine Secretary, through General Kennedy. Duke's orders upon these to have force of orders in Council without consultation of Council.

"6th. Members of Board of Revenue to act as travelling commissioners in the interior, reporting direct to Duke. Famine correspondence to be only communicated to Board for record, after action has been taken by the Duke.

"7th. Circles for supervision of gratuitous relief to be greatly strengthened by imported officers.

"8th. Ditto. Public Works staff.

"9th. All relief to be subsidiary and conducive to main object of getting people on big works with proper task."§

This arrangement satisfied all, even the Secretary of State, to whom the Viceroy wrote thus:

"I feel relieved of a great anxiety by your welcome telegram approving of the arrangements

* *Ibid.*, pp. 203-4.

† *Ibid.*, p. 207.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

concluded with the Duke of Buckingham at Madras. I think I can assure you that every provision has been made, and every precaution taken on behalf of those who have fallen out of condition and are quite unfit for work. Of such persons (putting aside the aged, the infirm, and the diseased) there is undoubtedly a large number; and the care of these should, I conceive, be the special function of the relief camps.

Of the condition in Madras, he says:

"In the first place, the alarming financial and social results of the famine management (or mismanagement) in Madras are clearly not attributable to the cause I had supposed. *I expected to find there a bad system at work; but what I found everywhere was the total absence of any system* at all. It is equally certain that this must be attributed to radical defects in the organisation of the existing administrative machinery—the ideal of a circumlocution office. Everyone, from the highest to the lowest—the Duke himself, the Government secretaries, the collectors, the Department of Public Works officers—acknowledged the evil, deplored it, and dwelt on the urgent necessity of administrative reform."

So much money had been wasted on famine operations in Madras that an officer told the Viceroy:

"*The famine has been a godsend to all the people you see here, and there is not a man, woman, or child in this camp who will not bitterly regret the cessation of scarcity.* Look at our sleeping and feeding arrangements! This class of population are never so comfortably lodged or so highly fed at home. In addition to the rations you have seen, those who are in delicate health receive fish and meat twice a week, and all receive sundry little condiments and spices to season their rice and *dal.* This prevents the diet from being monotonous, and keeps up a healthy appetite. You see we have no need of precaution against wandering from the camp. Our difficulty will be, by and by, to get the people out of it."*

It was also added:

"Tobacco is one of the little luxuries we allow them, poor fellows, and if we did not look sharp the whole camp might be burnt down."

The Viceroy added:

"All the camps (in Madras) I have seen are splendidly organized as regards sanitary and conservancy arrangements. *But they are treated like 'model farms,' regardless of expense.*"

From Madras the Viceroy went to Bangalore in September 1877 when "the famine was at its height, the number of people on relief was very large, and much the larger portion of them were in receipt of gratuitous relief. The conflict between large and small works had gone on here as elsewhere, but had taken a peculiar form. The engineers of the Public Works Department had an abundance of large schemes in hand, suited for the employment of great masses of labourers, but they contended that their business was only to take on able-bodied labourers... at the usual rate of pay, and that all persons who were unaccustomed to labour... should be employed by the civil officers on local, small works. ... The result was that in September, 1877, less than the usual number of labourers was employed on departmental works, a nearly equal number was employed under civil officers on small, scattered works all over the country, and the great majority were suffering under *the most demoralising form of public charity* —gratuitous relief distributed in the form of cooked food to paupers herded together in poor houses."

* *Ibid.,* p. 217.

It is strange to learn that "even the personal authority of the Viceroy failed to break down the Chief Engineer's objections to the wiser policy or to convince him of his error, and Lord Lytton had to remove him elsewhere, replacing him by Major (now Colonel Sir Colin) Scott-Moncreiff, R. E., whom he brought down from the North-West Provinces. At the same time he placed the administrative charge of the famine in the hands of Mr. (now Sir) Charles Elliot, to whom he gave the title of Famine Commissioner of Mysore."

The Viceroy thus describes the result of his journey in a letter to the Queen on October 11, 1877:

"The measures in which I was so fortunate as to secure the Duke of Buckingham's co-operation in Madras, and those which before leaving Bangalore I set on foot throughout the Mysore provinces, are already producing excellent results, and the weekly reports, both from Madras and Mysore, now show a steadily increasing diminution in the number of persons gratuitously supported by the State, as well as marked a improvement in the health of those put upon works and a reduction in the death rate....As regards Madras I think the improved condition of that presidency is mainly attributable to the ability with which General Kennedy is discharging his very difficult and delicate task there. ...It is entirely owing to his great foresight and energy that whilst the Madras famine has cost the Government of India over ten millions, the Bombay famine, under his management, has cost only four millions, although a much larger saving of human life has been effected in Bombay than in Madras."*

As regards public charity, "whilst admitting that private subscription had its use and place, the Viceroy continued to hold the view that any appeal to private charity in England was *'a dangerous folly'*, unless by previous arrangement a sphere of operation could be marked out for it which should not overlap the field already occupied by the Government's organization."

FAMINE INSURANCE

At the end of 1877 a measure was introduced by Sir John Strachey in the Legislative Council to provide for the future cost of famines.

In *The Finances and Public Works of India* by Sir John Strachey and his brother, we read:

"A nobler, more humane, or wiser programme was never devised by any Government for the benefit of a country than that put forth by the Government of India in 1878 for the protection of India against this most terrible and ruinous and far-reaching of all natural calamities; and until it is brought into far more complete operation than has hitherto been permitted, the most urgent of the duties of the British rulers of India to the vast population they have undertaken to govern will be left unfulfilled."†

In his speech before the Legislative Council, Lord Lytton thus laid down the principles of famine insurance:

"Of the countless suggestions made from time to time, and more especially during the present year, for rendering less bitterly ironical than it still seems, when read by the sinister light of recent events, that famous inscription on the huge granary built at Patna for *'the perpetual prevention of famine in these provinces,'* there are only three which merit serious consideration. They are, *firstly*, Emigration; *secondly*, Railways; and *thirdly*, Irrigation Works. Unfortunately for India, however,

* *Ibid.*, p. 225.

† Quoted in Lord Lytton's *Indian Administration*, p. 227.

the first of these three material factors in the practical solution of problems similar to those we are now dealing with is inapplicable, or only very imperfectly applicable, to the actual conditions of this country. The first condition requisite to render emigration available as a precaution against famine is a normal excess of the population as compared with the food-produce of the country ; the second condition is sufficient energy, on the part of the surplus population, to induce it to seek a higher standard of material comfort than that to which it is accustomed ; and the third condition is a foreign field of labour in which this higher standard may be reached. Now, none of these conditions are sufficiently developed in India to justify reliance upon emigration as an efficient auxiliary in our struggles with famine."

He continues :

"The uncomplaining patience of the Indian ryot has a profoundly pathetic claim upon our compassionate admiration. In no country of the western world could a national calamity, so severe and prolonged as that which has now for more than twenty-four months affected one-half of this empire, have lasted so long without provoking from the sufferings of an ignorant and starving population agrarian and social disturbances of the most formidable character."

After considering the question of emigration, the Viceroy says :

"For all these reasons, although emigration unquestionably claims our fostering encouragement, I fear that for many years to come we must practically exclude this expedient from the list of those on which we mainly rely as a means of insuring the population of India against the calamities of periodical famine. The conclusion thus arrived at forcibly confines our immediate efforts to the most rapid development, by the cheapest methods, combined with the most appropriate and efficient application, of the only two remaining instruments for increasing the produce of the soil, facilitating its cultivation, and thereby improving the general social condition, and augmenting the collective wealth, of the whole community. Those instruments are railroads and irrigation works."*

The Viceroy laid down the principle, which "involves the enlargement, with adequate precautions, of the financial, and consequently also of the administrative, powers and responsibilities of the local Governments." He said :

"For the attainment of this object the material appliances we intend to promote, by means of additional revenue, are cheap rail roads and extensive irrigation works....We therefore propose to entrust, in the first instance, to the local Governments the duty of framing a sufficient and carefully considered scheme of local railroads and irrigation works. We are prepared to provide them with the means whereby they may, from year to year, work systematically forwards and upwards to the completion of such a scheme. The funds locally raised for this purpose will be locally applied. But the provincial Governments will have to meet the cost of provincial famines out of provincial funds, to the fullest extent those funds can bear. They will find that thriftless expenditure in one year may involve the risk of diminished allotments in subsequent years ; and I cannot doubt that the unavoidable recognition of this fact will make them wisely eager to spend the requisite proportion of their annual income upon well planned and carefully estimated railway and irrigation works, which will be their best insurance against the losses of famine, and the postponement of all administrative progress which famine generally entails. It will be the special duty of the Public Works Department of this Government to keep those objects constantly in view of the local Governments, and to assist them no less constantly in their endeavours to give a rational preference to really useful and remunerative works over those more captivating, but less compensating, subjects of expenditure which in all comparatively small communities so powerfully appeal to provincial pride, professional proclivities, or popular pleasure."†

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* *Ibid.*, p. 230.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 231-32.

He proceeded to say :

"I can well imagine that many of those I am addressing may be disposed to say to me : 'Your good intentions are possibly sincere ; but the path to the nethermost pit is already paved with good intentions. Promise is a good dog, but Performance is a better ; we have often heard the bow-wow of the first : we have yet to see the tail of the second. *We have been told over and over again by the highest authorities that India is to be insured against famine in this way, or in that, but when famines come upon us we find that the promised way is still wanting.* The current claims upon the activities and resources of the Government of India are so numerous, so pressing, so important, official forces and imperial funds so necessarily limited, that when once the daily, hourly strain of a great famine has been removed from a wearied administration and impoverished treasury, its fearful warnings are soon forgotten ; its disquieting ghosts are quickly exorcised by the conventional declaration of some unexceptional principle ; its bitter memories decently interred beneath the dull *hic jacet* of a blue book ; and there, for all practical purposes, is an end of the matter'."

In reply to the above criticism, Lord Lytton pointed out the measures taken for insuring 'this country against the worst effects of future famine.' About those measures he said :

"I do not mean to say that the construction of such an extensive system of local rail roads and irrigation works as we propose to undertake will not be the gradual task of many years. But I *do* mean to say that, in the manner and on the principles already explained, we are now providing for the prompt commencement and uninterrupted continuation of this great and necessary task. We are systematizing a policy the principles of which have been repeatedly approved and proclaimed by our predecessors. We are associating with it the interests, the powers, and the duties of our local administrations. We are providing them with the means of permanently prosecuting and developing it, not without reference to our financial control, but exempt from the distressing uncertainty which has hitherto been inseparable from the practical execution of this policy, in consequence of the obligation which till now has rested on the Government of India, with the very limited funds at its deposal for the prosecution of public works, to choose from year to year between the conflicting claims upon its purse of the various and dissimilar localities of this spacious empire..."*

But these plans were not carried out until "the Report of the Famine Commission had restored public confidence in the really productive and remunerative character of these works."

INDIAN FAMINE COMMISSION

In May 1878 Lord Lytton proposed and obtained sanction for the appointment of the Indian Famine Commission. Their scope of enquiry was thus limited :

"They were directed to investigate the effect of famine on the vital statistics, and to report how far 'local influences, peculiarities of administration or tenure, climate, soil, water, density of population, system of cultivation, &c., have tended to mitigate or intensify its inevitable effects.' The character of the works on which relief was to be given, the need of a special system of village inspection, the restrictions under which gratuitous relief can safely by given ; the duty of the Government in respect of the supply, importation and distribution of food ; the benefit which might be expected from the extension of irrigation canals and railways, or from improvement in the system of agriculture, from encouragement of emigration, and from suspension or remission of the land revenue, and the relations to be observed with Native States in famine management, were among the chief topics expressly brought to their notice." †

* *Ibid.*, p. 234.
† *Ibid.*, p. 237.

This Indian Famine Commission finished its labours in July 1880 and their Report was at once adopted. Its recommendations enabled the Government to meet the famine of 1896-97 with great success.

HIS FINANCIAL POLICY

In a letter to Lord Salisbury (Sept. 24, 1876), Lord Lytton thus sums up the four chief heads of his financial policy :

"1. Equalisation of salt duties throughout India with a view to their early reduction, and abolition of the sugar duty.

"2. Extension of the system of provincial assignments, and its application to sources of income.

"3. Immediate and final abandonment of the present system of constructing extraordinary public works out of capital annually borrowed in England, and transfer from Imperial to provincial resources of the responsibility of carrying out works of acknowledged local utility.

"4. Abolition of the import duty on coarse cottons, with a distinct declaration that the duty on the finer cottons is to go also as soon as ever the condition of the finances will permit ; and enunciation of the policy of endeavouring to make India one great free port, open to the commerce of the whole world."*

SALT DUTIES

The salt duties in different provinces of India were different at the commencement of Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty. Sir John Strachey in his Budget speech on March 15, 1877, said:

"The circumstances under which the salt duties are levied vary greatly in different parts of India. Bengal and Assam, with sixty-seven millions of people, get nearly the whole of their supply from Cheshire...... Almost the only local source within easy reach from which Bengal can obtain salt is the sea; and the natural facilities for making salt on the northern coasts of the Bay of Bengal are not great...... In Madras and Bombay, on the other hand, containing together about forty-seven millions of people, the manufacture of salt from the sea is cheap and easy, and for these Presidencies as well as for the greater part of the Central Presidency and the Native States of Southern India, the sea is the great source of supply.

"Coming to Northern India, we find that the Punjab possesses inexhaustible supplies of rock salt, which is consumed by about fourteen millions of people. Throughout the North-West Provinces and Oudh, and a portion of the Central Presidency and of the Punjab, on the other hand,...... the home sources for the supply of good salt can never be sufficient. Forty-seven millions of our own subjects depend almost entirely for their salt on the Native States of Rajputana, or on places on the confines of those States.

"The system under which the duty is levied, and the rate of duty, vary in the different provinces. In Madras and Bombay the rate of duty is Rs. 1-13 per maund; in Lower Bengal the rate is Rs. 3-4 per maund; and is levied chiefly in the form of a sea-customs import duty. In the Upper Provinces the rate is Rs. 3 per maund. In the Punjab this is included in the selling price of the rock salt, which is the property of Government. In the rest of the Upper Provinces the duty is levied when the salt is imported from Rajputana."†

Sir John Strachey then describes the evils of this system. He says:

"For this purpose, and to prevent the ingress of salt taxed at lower rates, a customs line is maintained extending from a point north of Attock to near the Berar frontier, a distance of more than

* *Ibid.*, pp. 461-62.

† *Ibid.*, p. 464.

1,500 miles. Similar lines, some hundreds of miles in length, are established in the Bombay Presidency, to prevent untaxed salt from Native States entering British territory. Along the greater part of this enormous system of inland customs lines, which, if they were put down in Europe, would stretch from London to Constantinople, a physical barrier has been created comparable to nothing that I can think of except the Great Wall of China. It consists principally of an impenetrable hedge of thorny trees and bushes, supplemented by stone walls and ditches, across which no human being or beast of burden or vehicle can pass without being subjected to detention and search. It is guarded by an army of some 8,000 men, the mass of whom receive as wages Rs. 6 or 7 a month. The bare statement of these facts is sufficient to show the magnitude of the evil.

"Although I believe that everything is done which can be done under such circumstances to prevent abuses, it may be easily imagined what inevitable and serious obstruction to trade and annoyance and harassment to individuals must take place. I remember a graphic account of Sir George Campbell, in which he described the evils of the system and the instruments, of the nature of cheese-tasters, which are thurst into the goods of everyone whose business takes him across line....... In spite, however, of the evils inseparable from the existence of customs line, it is practically impossible to dispense with it so long as we levy our salt tax at different rates in different provinces, and have no means of controlling the manufacture and taxation of salt produced in Native States until the salt reaches the British Frontier."*

It was recognised as a great evil that the supply of this necessary of life should be restricted. So Sir John Strachey said:

"The great object at which the Government ought to aim is to give to the people throughout India the means of obtaining, with the least possible inconvenience and at the cheapest rate consistent with financial necessities, a supply of salt, the quantity of which shall be limited only by the capacity of the people for consumption."

To carry out the reform, two things were necessary: "first, the completion of the treaties with the Native States within whose territory salt was produced on a large scale; and, secondly, the improvement of the general financial position of the country."

To carry out the first object, Mr. A. O. Hume, C. B., was placed on special duty to negotiate with the Native States. Lord Lytton thus detailed his scope of enquiry:

"With regard to the salt works already in existence, it should be ascertained what is the annual out-turn, what is the cost per maund of production, what is the selling price, how the realizations are divided...what duty is levied by the State; what is the course of trade and area of consumption: what transit duties are levied on salt, and generally what interests would be affected by the works being placed under the control of the British Government—the assumption being that excise duties would be levied at the works before the salt was permitted to be removed, and that all other duties on salt of every description, including transit duties, would be abolished."†

The Viceroy continued:

"Having ascertained as nearly as possible the value, present and prospective, of the various salt sources in the hands of the Native States, the British Government will be in a position to determine the amount of compensation which might be paid to those States for the surrender of complete control over the manufacture of salt, and for aiding in the suppression of illicit manufacture."

After the completion of the enquiries by October 1, 1878, the chief sources of salt manufacture were taken over on lease, £54,000 being paid as compensation to manufacturers and others. "Annual payments of £84,000 were secured by treaty to the Native States—these payments being equivalent to the duty realised."

* *Ibid.*, pp. 465-66.

† *Ibid.*, p. 468.

At last "the door was now open for the equalisation of the salt duties throughout India, and for the accomplishment of the object which Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey had so ardently desired."

For the establishment of an equilibrium in the salt duty, Lord Lytton in his budget speech on February 9, 1878 said :

"We have raised the Madras and Bombay duties to Rs. 2-8 ; that is to say, we have increased them by 11 annas per maund ; but we have simultaneously lowered the salt duties in the Upper Provinces of Northern India by 4 annas per maund, and in the Lower Provinces by 2 annas per maund ; so that at the present moment the salt duty in the Southern Presidencies stands at Rs. 2-8, in Lower Bengal at Rs. 3-2, and in the Northern Provinces at Rs. 2-12 per maund."

It was asserted by some statesmen that the salt duties were a grievous burden on the poor ryots. To this Lord Lytton gave the following unsatisfactory reply :

"Sincerely as I desire to see the price of salt not only equalised, but cheapened throughout India, earnestly as I hope that it may be the privilege of this Administration to accelerate the arrival of the day when such a result may be attainable, still, I must frankly own that I feel unable to accept the dictum of those who assert that the present salt duties are a grievous burden to the long suffering back of the poor ryot. It may be in the power of the Government of India, and I hope, indeed, it may be in the power of the present Government of India, to lighten that burden, such as it is ; but it is my own belief that it will never be in the power of any Government of India to devise a substitute for it which will weigh less heavily on the poorer classes or be less sensibly felt by them. A salt tax of Rs. 2-8 per maund is a tax of less than three farthings per pound. It would be absurd to represent the pressure of such a tax as oppressive, the manner in which the tax is levied renders the pressure of it almost inappreciable. It is an indirect impost, distributed in minute daily instalments, over vast masses of population, and in all probability the majority of the millions who pay it are not even conscious of its existence."*

Then the Viceroy expressed his pious wish in these terms :

"I trust that our Administration may last long enough to achieve these long-deferred results ; and that my honourable friend, Sir John Strachey, may still be a member of it when we attain the Promised Land to which he first guided our progress, aud thus fulfil his eloquent prophecy of the day when the Government of India will have given to the people of India the means of obtaining, with the least possible inconvenience, and at the cheapest rate consistent with financial necessities, a supply of salt only limited by the people's capacity of consumption."

COTTON DUTIES AND FREE TRADE

The English merchants protested against the duty of 5 per cent. *ad valorem* levied on the imported cotton goods. In speaking on this subject, Lord Northbrook said in 1875 :

"Indian statesmen have never regarded customs duties as desirable for the purpose of protecting the products or manufactures of India. In India, equally as in England, protection has been regarded as an exploded doctrine, contrary to the general interests of the country which imposes protective duties."

In 1876 the Secretary of State decided "that the interests of India imperatively require the timely removal of a tax which is at once wrong in principle, injurious in its practical effect, and self-destructive in its operation."

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* *Ibid.*, p. 473.

But in 1877-78, no reduction could be made owing to the impending famine in Madras and Bombay. In the budget speech, Sir John Strachey declared his determination to abolish the duty at the earliest opportunity. He said:

"We are often told that it is the duty of the Government of India to think of Indian interests alone, and that if the interests of Manchester suffer it is no affair of ours. For my part, I utterly repudiate such doctrines. I have not ceased to be an Englishman because I have passed the greater part of my life in India, and have become a member of the Indian Government. *The interests of Manchester,* at which foolish people sneer, *are the interests not only of the great and intelligent population engaged directly in the trade in cotton, but of millions of Englishmen...*"*

When on July 11, 1877, the House of Commons adopted a resolution for the removal of cotton duties, the duty on certain coarse goods was removed, and the opportunity was taken to purge the tariff of twenty-six other heads which either produced very small amounts or affected the food of the poorer classes, leaving only thirty-five out of the sixty-two numbers of the Tariff Act of 1875."

This partial reduction did not satisfy the merchants of Manchester. The Secretary of State wrote:

"The impost is too much at variance with the declared policy of this country to be permanently upheld; but if the task of dealing with it be long postponed, it will be the subject of controversy between interests far more powerful and embittered than those which are contending over it at the present moment...I need hardly insist further on the danger of keeping open between two great communities of Her Majesty's subjects an *irritating controversy* which can be closed by one and only one solution. It is difficult to overstate the *evil of permitting an industry* so large as the cotton manufacture in India is certain to become to grow up under the influence of a system which a wide experience has proved to be *unsound,* and which is *opposed to the deliberate policy of England.*"

The reduction also caused embarrassment in the trade, to inquire into which, a Commission, with Sir T. C. Hope as President, was appointed. They reported that

"the only effective remedy is to treat similarly, whether by exemption or taxation, all cloths of the same texture, irrespective of the lengths and widths in which they happen to be made up or the names by which people may choose to call them."

So the Financial Statement for 1879-80 declared that

"the Governor-General in Council considers that the facts reported by the Commission...show conclusively that adherence to the tentative measures of the last year is not possible...No measure falling short of the exemption from duty of all cotton goods containing no yarn finer than 30's can be defended; and this measure can no longer be delayed. Its adoption will for the present, at least, remove the directly protective character of these duties....A Notification has accordingly now been published exempting from import duty all cotton goods containing no yarn of higher number than 30's."†

It cost the Government £150,000 in addition to the loss incurred in the previous year's reduction. The reasons advanced by the Government of India were:

"The pledges given from time to time in regard to gradual removal of the duties on cotton goods have always been made subject to the condition that their fulfilment must depend on the position of the Indian Finances. It certainly cannot now be asserted, in the face of the great and increasing

* *Ibid.,* p. 477.

† *Ibid.,* p. 480.

loss occasioned by the fall in the value of silver in relation to gold, that the financial condition of India is satisfactory, although every branch of the public revenue is prosperous, and with the exception which has been mentioned, no fresh causes for financial anxiety are apparent.

"The real question which the Governor-General in Council has had to consider is this : Ought the Government to look upon the fresh financial difficulties arising from the fall in the exchange as a sufficient reason for refusing to sanction any further remission in the duty on cotton goods ? And this question, His Excellency in Council considered, must be answered in the negative. The injury and loss which these duties are causing both to the English producer and to the Indian consumer, and to the true interests of Indian commerce and manufactures, are certain."*

In the Budget debate of 1880-81, the Government were unable to reduce the cotton duties any further. Sir John Strachey said :

"When last year, your Excellency decided that it was impossible to defend the maintenance of the duty on certain classes of cotton goods because it had a distinctly protective character, it was thought right to make a considerable sacrifice of revenue for its immediate removal...but the Government feels that it cannot at the present moment go further, or submit to loss of revenue beyond that which the measures of the last two years have rendered unavoidable. It is impossible to deny that the present state of things is anomalous and objectionable. The Government will give to this question in the future that constant attention which its importance demands, but it cannot at the present moment make the large sacrifice of revenue...The abolition of the remaining duties on cotton goods would cost us £600,000, in addition to the £250,000 which we have given up already."†

PROVINCIAL CONTRACTS

Lord Lytton also developed the system of provincial assignments, of which he thus wrote to the Queen :

"The new principles of financial decentralisation and provincial responsibility which, with the valuable aid of Sir John Strachey, I have been able to introduce and carry into partial effect this year, will eventually, I trust, afford considerable relief to the Imperial Treasury."

The system of provincial responsibility was first adopted by Lord Mayo, who "selected eight heads of expenditure in which the increase had been largest and most constant, with a fixed grant of money, out of which to meet all demands, and with power to utilise any savings which could be effected on other improvements of which the province stood most in need."

After six years of successful experience, it was now decided 'to develop the system and to extend it to an assignment of such sources of revenue as depend for their productiveness on good administration, and thus to bring the self-interest of the provincial Governments to bear on such improvements in administration.'

"It may be very wrong," said Sir John Strachey, "but it is true, and will continue to be true while human nature remains what it is, that the local authorities take little interest in looking after the financial affairs of that abstraction, the Supreme Government, compared with the interest which they take in matters which immediately affect people whom they have to govern."

About the result of this arrangement, Lady Balfour says in *The History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration* :

* *Ibid.*, p. 481.
† *Ibid.*, p. 484.

"In this way the original measures taken in 1870 had produced a saving of £330,000, and the new arrangements made with the Governments of Bengal and of the North-West Provinces and Oudh, which alone had been completed when the Budget of 1877-73 was brought in, were estimated to effect a saving to the Imperial Treasury of £145,700; and in 1878-79 the completed arrangements were estimated to improve the financial position of the Government of India by £400,000. In spite of this saving the transaction was calculated on so liberal a scale that in 1880, when the treasury of the Supreme Government was depleted by the cost of the Afghan war and the loss by the fall in exchange, the provincial treasuries were so overflowing that they were able to supply a contribution of £670,000 to the general needs of the Empire. Notwithstanding this large contribution, as the Viceroy pointed out in his speech in the Budget debate of 1880-81, 'the provincial balances of the local Governments will be actually larger by nearly half a million than the sum at which they were estimated at the beginning of the year.'

"Thus, with equal advantage to the supreme and to the provincial Governments, was carried out this great and far-reaching reform, which more than any financial measure of the time has set its mark on the administration of the country."*

EXTRAORDINARY PUBLIC WORKS

In 1876 Lord Lytton proposed the revision 'of the system under which the cost of the so-called Extraordinary Public Works was defrayed from borrowed money, and became an addition to the public debt, being kept outside the ordinary Budget'.

Sir John Strachey showed that the system required revision.

"Some of the works included in the programme—*e.g.*, the railways on the Punjab and Sindh frontier—were not, and could not be expected to be remunerative. They were no doubt very beneficial to the country through which they passed, but were undertaken, not on financial grounds, but because they were considered for political and military reasons to be essential to the service of the Empire. Works of this kind were to be classed as ordinary, not as extraordinary works, and were to be paid for out of revenue. The remaining works, which were expected to be really remunerative, were divided into two classes. The first were those undertaken for objects of such general utility that they might fairly be called Imperial. Such were the great trunk lines of railway, which not only confer immense benefits on the provinces through which they pass, but are essential to the wealth and prosperity of the Empire. The cost of constructing them might therefore fairly fall on the Empire at large. The second class were those great works of improvement which are primarily of provincial or local utility, undertaken for the special benefit of certain districts or places, with the object of increasing their wealth or protecting them against famine; the irrigation canals in Orissa, Behar, and the North-West Provinces, or the Northern Bengal and Tirhoot railways, may be cited as instances."†

FAMINE INSURANCE TAXATION

To provide for the relief of famines in future, it was necessary to have a margin of about fifteen millions every ten years or 1,500,000*l.* a year on an average. To this may be added a margin of half a million, making a total of two millions. Lady Balfour says :

"Of the £1,500,000 required for famine charges £400,000 had been provided by the measures of provincial decentralisation and there remained £1,100,000 to be raised. For this purpose new taxation was necessary, and it took the form of cesses on the land in Bengal, and the upper provinces, estimated to bring in £500,000, and a license tax on trades, which was to realise £700,000, and which fell on every trader having an income above Rs. 100 a year."

* *Ibid.*, pp., 487-88.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 489-90.

About this new taxation the Viceroy spoke on February 9, 1878, thus :

"We have felt that the two great classes of the community from whom we could most equitably collect our Famine Insurance Fund are the trading and agricultural classes....The necessity of a Famine Insurance Fund, and the duty of the Government to provide such a Fund, have been generally acknowledged. But equally general must be, I think, the acknowledgement that in our selection of the sources of this Fund, which are necessarily limited, we could not, with any show of reason or justice, have maintained the agricultural cess in Bengal had we shrunk from subjecting to a similar obligation the agricultural classes in other provinces in Northern India. Nor is it less undeniable that, from the same point of view and for the same reason, we could not justly maintain the licence tax upon the trading classes of the other provinces if we did not impose it also on the trading classes of Lower Bengal."*

Thus was created, remarks Lady Balfour, the famous Famine Insurance Fund, respecting which more misunderstanding has existed and more misrepresentations have been uttered than about any other question connected with the often misunderstood and misrepresented subject of Indian Finance. But that is not the Indian view.

It has been suggested that the Government should earmark the sum of 1½ million for famine relief only. But Sir J. Strachey corrected such an idea, saying :

"We start with the hypothesis that in every ten years the Government of India will have to spend 15 millions on the relief of famine. If we provide for this purpose a *bona-fide* surplus of 1½ million a year for ten years we shall have obtained our 15 millions. As we cannot keep our annual savings locked up in a separate box, it is inevitable that when the actual necessity for spending the 15 millions arises we shall have to borrow the money, so that what we have practically to do is this : we must reduce our debt by 1½ million year by year during the whole period. Then when the necessity for spending the 15 millions arises we can borrow that amount, and be no worse off than we were ten years before."

He then pointed out that the Government was pledged to borrow every year 2½ milllions for productive public works. He went on :

"It would be obviously absurd to pay off every year debt to the amount of £1,500,000, and simultaneously to incur fresh debt to the some extent ; what, therefore, we have to do in the actual circumstances of the case is, by applying to the construction of these works the proceeds of the new taxes, to reduce by £1,500,000 a year the sum which we might otherwise have borrowed."†

The sum of £1,500,000 is now set aside every year from the revenue of the Government of India under the head of 'Famine Relief and Insurance.'

The imposition of new taxes for Famine Insurance Fund "embittered a section of the native community, and has often been charged against Lord Lytton as a source of unpopularity and a blot on his general administration."

ERROR IN WAR ESTIMATES

A great blunder in the financial estimate in connection with the Afghan war occurred at the close of the rule of Lord Lytton. "It was discovered at a time when the Viceroy's opponents were only too glad to make political capital out of any blunder which they could lay at his door, and they even stooped to accuse those responsible for the Indian Government of wilful concealment and deception."

* *Ibid.*, pp. 494-95.

† *Ibid.*, p. 496.

The history of this blunder is thus told by Lady Balfour:

"In March, 1880, the war expenditure was calculated to be likely to stand at nine and a half millions, of which nearly four millions were the cost of the frontier railways leading to Quettah. It was, indeed, stated that 'the estimates must be to a great extent speculative,' but they had been prepared with great care by the Accountant-General of the Military Department, and their accuracy up to that time was supposed to have been highly creditable to him. In other words, Sir John Strachey and the Government of India, though the Finance Department were not the authors of the estimate, made themselves responsible for it. It was felt, therefore, as a crushing blow to the credit of the Government when it was discovered, at the end of 1880, that the expense of the war had been greatly underestimated. By the end of March five millions of actual outlay had occurred of which the Government was not aware at the time the Budget was prepared and published; and the total cost of the war (partly through its prolonged duration) was found ultimately to be seventeen and a half million pounds, or twelve millions in excess of the estimate. That the estimate of future expenditure should have been falsified was neither unusual nor surprising. No one anticipated in March 1880 that the operations beyond the frontier would continue till nearly the end of 1880; but the error made in failing to obtain even approximate information as to the expenditure which had actually occurred caused a widespread want of confidence in the soundness of the Indian financial system. The explanation of the mistake was that the Military Accounts Department, following an old and faulty system, took note only of the classified and audited accounts, not of the actual outgoings from the treasuries. In ordinary times the audit keeps pace fairly with the expenditure, but in war large disbursements have to be made under great pressure, and with little regard to form and technicalities, and the Audit Department falls into arrears and toils painfully behind. Thus it happened that the Military Accountant-General presented to the Financial Department of the Government figures which were altogether incorrect, and the system which they trusted having failed them, the Government were left in ignorance of facts of essential importance. But though the error was lamentable, a simple set of department orders sufficed to correct the system and to prevent the possibility of the recurrence of any similar mistake: and no evil results actually followed from the miscalculation."*

Lord Lytton himself thus wrote to Lord Cranbrook on May 11, 1880:

"All other revelations sink into insignificance before the tremendous discovery now made by the Financial Department, that the war estimates prepared by the Military Department, confidently recommended by it to the Financial Department, and adopted by the latter without misgiving, were utterly worthless and will be indefinitely exceeded....*The public scandal and reproach of it must, I fear, fall directly upon myself, and indirectly upon Sir John Strachey*; and although I hold that we are both of us blameless—for I am unable to conceive how either of us could have anticipated or prevented it—yet I can scarcely complain of the popular verdict I anticipated, for, of course, the external responsibility of the Government of India cannot be subdivided....Ever since the commencement of the first campaign in Afghanistan I have laboured without ceasing and under great difficulties to keep down military expenditure....But I have always carefully refrained from questioning or interfering with the final estimates framed and passed by the responsible departments for sanctioned charges. Any other course would have involved tampering with the public accounts by the head of the Government, and been destructive of that established sense of personal and departmental responsibility which is the best, and indeed the only, guarantee for the conscientious preparation and verification of estimates by the authorities properly charged with that task...I cannot help feeling, with considerable bitterness, that the powers of military darkness, against whom I have been maintaining single-handed for four years such a fatiguing, and till now not unsuccessful, struggle, have in the last

* *Ibid.*, pp. 499-500.

hours of my administration contrived to give me a *croc aux jambes* which no vigilance on my part could have prevented, aud which no explanations on their part or mine can now solve."*

VERNACULAR PRESS ACT

The Vernacular Press Act of Lord Lytton was directed against the entire Bengali journalistic press, specially against the *Amrita Bazar Patrika.* It reads like a romance how the *Patrika* was transformed into an English newspaper during the night by its editor Babu Sisir Kumar Ghose.

Even before Lord Lytton's rule, Lord Northbrook's Government issued warning in 1872 to the *Som Prakasha.*

"In 1875, the Secretary of State informed the Government of India that his attention had been drawn by writings in the "Pall Mall Gazette" and another paper to various articles in the native press 'which are not only calculated to bring the Government into contempt, but which palliate, if they donot absolutely justify as a duty, the assassination of British officers. He added that the unchecked dissemination amongst the natives of articles of this character could not be allowed without danger to individuals and to the interests of Government."

It was Lord Lytton who took upon himself the task of passing an Act for suppressing sedition in Bengal. In asking permission from the Secretary of State, he thus telegraphed to him :

"The increasing seditious violence of the native press, now directly provocative to rebellion, has been for some time pressed on our attention by the Local Governments, who, except Madras, which has no vernacular press of any importance, all concur as to necessity of early and stringent legislation. This is also the unanimous opinion of Council. We have for some months been contemplating repressive action, but, in opinion of my own and the other Governments, the language of the vernacular press, at all times mischievous, is specially dangerous now, when native community believes our power seriously weakened by events elsewhere. It is thus essentially necessary for Government in interest of public safety to take early steps for checking spread of seditious writing. While need for legislation is urgent owing to feeling of native community, opportunity is also peculiarly favourable owing to feeling of European community ; generally felt that seditious efforts of vernacular press, if not promptly repressed, will, under peculiar circumstances of present time, continue rapidly to increase."†

In summing up the debate on the passing of this Bill on March 14, 1878, Lord Lytton remarked:

"I cannot but regret the necessity which, by some irony of fate, has imposed on me the duty of undertaking legislation for the purpose of putting restrictions on a portion of the press of this country. I should have rejoiced had it fallen to my lot to be able to enlarge, rather than restrict, the liberty of the press in India ..But all the more is it incumbent on the Government of India to take due care that the gift for which it is responsible shall not become a curse instead of a blessing, a stone instead of bread, to its recipients."

The Viceroy proceeded to refer to the Bengali Press in the following terms :

"Written, for the most part, by persons very imperfectly educated, and altogether inexperienced ; written, moreover, down to the level of the lowest intelligence, and with an undisguised appeal to the most disloyal sentiments and mischievous passions - these journals are read only, or chiefly, by persons still more ignorant, still more uneducated, still more inexperienced than the writers of them ;

* *Ibid.*, p. 501.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 506-7.

persons wholly unable to judge for themselves, and entirely dependent for their interpretation of our action upon these self-constituted and incompetent teachers. Not content with misrepresenting the Government and maligning the character of the ruling race in every possible way and on every possible occasion, these mischievous scribblers have of late been preaching open sedition; and, as shown by some of the passages which have today been quoted from their publications, they have begun to inculcate combination on the part of the native subjects of the Empress of India for the avowed purpose of putting an end to the British Raj. This is no exaggeration. I have here under my hand a mass of such poisonous matter extracted from the various organs of the Vernacular Press."*

Such was, in the opinion of his lordship, the condition of the Vernacular Press, although others would rightly pay tribute to the Vernacular Press for educating the mass of the population. The Viceroy continued to say :

"It is not in the spirit of resentment for injuries that we propose to legislate. It is in the firm conviction that the maintenance of our Raj is for the good of the people that we seek to save the people from the ruin in which they would involve themselves by seditious agitations against it. We have no desire to resort to fine or imprisonment, but what we do desire, and what we regard as the plain duty of the Government, is to prevent the open preaching of sedition and rebellion amongst the most ignorant, excitable, and helpless portion of its subjects."

In answering the objection that the Act drew a line of distinction between the Indian and English Press, the Viceroy said :

"It may, and by some persons it probably will, be regarded as an objection to this measure that it draws a distinction, and apparently an invidious distinction, between the native and the English press. It may be said with perfect truth, that the very words which we regard as innocuous in an English paper will be deemed seditious in a vernacular journal, and that the native editor may be ruined for repeating what the English editor has published with impunity. Well, this seems a very strong indictment against the Bill, but the briefest examination of the circumstances for which we are legislating will suffice to dissipate the force of it. In the first place, let the real distinction be observed. The distinction is not between Englishmen and natives, or between the English press and the native press, for many natives publish the newspapers in English, and in very good English too. Some of the native newspapers thus published contain excellent and valuable comments on public affairs. Some of them are also edited by men of acknowledged ability and culture, who certainly do not hesitate to criticise the English Government with an asperity and hostility which no other Foreign Government in the world would tolerate for a moment. With these papers we do not interfere. Being written in English, they are *ex vi termini* addressed to a more or less educated audience, and a class that has at least the power even if it has not always the will, to choose between the false and the true, between the evil and the good. From them we apprehend no political danger; and we can trust to their improving education, as time goes on to render their criticism fairer, and their judgment more according to knowledge. *It is not then, against native papers, as such, that our legislation is directed.* We confine our measures of restriction purely to the papers written in vernacular languages; and we do so because, as I have said before, they are addressed solely to an ignorant, excitable, helpless class--a class whose members have no other means of information, no other guide as to the action and motives of their rulers; and who, if such action and motives be persistently misrepresented to them, are likely to give vent to their excited feelings in acts of disaffection, which cannot but be fraught with disaster to themselves."†

It was not true that all the vernacular papers were written and edited by men

* *Ibid.*, pp. 512-13.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 515-16.

of inferior education and calibre, nor that they were "addressed solely to an ignorant, excitable, helpless, class." Many of the veruacular journalists, *e. g.*, Pandit Dwarakanath Vidyabhushan of the *Som Prakash* and Babu Sisir Kumar Ghose of *The Amrita Bazar Patrika*, were as able as those who conducted the English papers, and the vernacular papers were read by many who read the English papers. As the Act was not directed against Indian papers in general, but only papers written in the vernacular languages, so Babu Sisir Kumar Ghose took advantage of this loop-hole and transformed his paper *The Amrita Bazar Patrika* nto English to escape from the operations of this Act.

Lord Lytton himself admitted that his Act would not be liked by many. He said :

> "We must of course expect that by those people whose minds are governed by phrases, and who look upon the liberty of the press as a fetish to be worshipped, rather than as a privilege to be worthily earned and rationally enjoyed, this measure will be received with dislike, and the authors of it assailed with obloquy."

He also expressed a desire that the Act might not be thought necessary in the near future. He said :

> "It is my hope, however, that the gradual spread of education and enlightenment in India may insure and expedite the arrival of a time when the restrictions we are now imposing can with safety be removed."*

Though one Secretary of State (Lord Salisbury) had approved of the introduction of this Bill, the next Secretary of State, Lord Cranbrook, considered the Act in a different light. Lady Balfour says :

> "On May 31, 1878, Lord Cranbrook addressed a long despatch to the Government of India reviewing the history of the Act, sharing the regret expressed by the Viceroy and his Council at having to fetter the press, but, having regard to the overwhelming weight of authority in favour of it in India, and to the soundness and sufficiency of reasons put in suppcrt of such an Act, he could not but leave it to its operation. *One section of the Act*, that which allowed editors to contract themselves out of the security clause by consenting to come under a censorship, *was objected to*, and the Viceroy was further advised that the Act should be executed in accordance with the spirit of the explanation attached to sec. 124A of the Penal Code to the effect that 'no criticism of Government or its measures should be discouraged if there is reason to think that it has been dictated by an honest desire for improvement,' rather than with the object of spreading disaffection, and he wound up with a hope that the vernacular newspapers might so improve that 'special legislation for any class of publication' might be found in no long time to be unnecessary."†

It should be noted that "three members of the Secretary of State's Council recorded minutes of dissent, *viz.*, Sir William Muir, Sir Erskine Parry and Colonel Yule. The dissents traversed the necessity for any repressive legislation, attributed the unanimous approval on the part of the Indian authorities to their own over-sensitiveness to attack, fastened on the distinction between the English and the vernacular press as an unpardonable flaw, objected strongly to the hurried manner in which the bill had been passed into law, and most of all to the fact that the Secretary of State's Council had had no opportunity previously of considering the proposals."

* *Ibid.*, p. 517.

† *Ibid.*, p. 518.

INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE

Should the Indians get into the Indian Civil Service? That was a very grave problem to many Anglo-Indian statesmen. "The problem," says Lady Balfour, "which Lord Lytton had to solve was how to secure for the natives of India a proportion of the higher appointments exclusively reserved for the covenanted civil service."

Indians, of course, could compete in the examination for the recruitment in London. Two laws also tried to deal with the question. "The first was the Act of William IV which merely amounted to a pious opinion that birth or colour did not disqualify any one from holding any appointment, but left the question for practical purposes very much where it was; the other was adopted nearly forty years later, and was aimed by the Duke of Argyll directly at the legal difficulty involved by the statutory reservation of the appointments in question to the covenanted civil service. The matter had been urged on Lord Lawrence's attention as far back as 1867, but with little practical result. Lord Mayo took it up, but pointed out the necessity of legislation to remove the legal obstacles, and in 1870 the Duke of Argyll accordingly introduced and passed an Act (33 Vict. c. 3), by which the Indian authorities are enabled, notwithstanding any previous law, to appoint natives of India to any office in the civil service, but subject always to such rules as might, from time to time, be prescribed by the Governor-General in Council, and sanctioned by the Secretary of State."

Lady Balfour says:

"Subject always to such rules. The Act would not work without the rules, and it was for the Government of India to make the rules. The Secretary of State waited meekly for two years, and then ventured to inquire if any rules had been passed. In October 1872 he wrote again more urgently suggesting that the rules should fix a definite proportion of appointments to be given to natives of India, that these should be mainly judicial rather than executive posts,...and finally that the salary should be less in the case of Indians so appointed than in the case of covenanted civilians .."

The rules were at last passed in 1873.

Lord Lytton prepared an elaborate Note on this question on May 30, 1877.

"He had perceived that though the legal claims of the covenanted civil service no longer interfered with the freer employment of natives, their moral claims remained where they were. These men had through the door of competitive examination entered a close service, which was their profession for life. They had reason to expect a certain definite rate of promotion to increased salaries and higher position. Every native that was appointed under the law of 1870 would *pro tanto* diminish those prospects, and disappoint reasonable expectations . ...

"The overpowering necessity of more largely employing native agency in the civil administration was justified in the Note, apart from the question of pledges, by the political advantage of associating the subject races in the government of the country, and by the financial duty of employing the cheapest agency available.

"The solution to which Lord Lytton pointed in the Note was to be found in the reduction for the future of the number of admissions to the covenanted civil service, and in the establishment of a *close* native civil service which should have a monopoly of the appointments removed from the list of those hitherto reserved to the covenanted service, together with a portion of those now held by the uncovenanted service. It proposed that the appointments should be made not by competition but by nomination, and that the new service should be remunerated on rates of pay less than those of the covenanted service, but should be equal to it in status and position."

After due consideration of the Viceroy's Note, a despatch was sent by the Government of India on May 2, 1878. It justified the 'expediency from a political point of view of associating' the Indians in the work of the Government. It also pointed out that it was 'essential that such men should be trained for the work from the beginning and should find therein an influential and honourable career.' But we also read :

"The despatch suggested that if this scheme were carried out it would be expedient to *exclude natives of India from the competitive examination* for the covenanted civil service in London : but this, it was pointed out, would require legislation, and the Government of India did not insist on it as an essential part of their scheme."

Was it a move to exclude the Indians from competing in the I. C. S. Examination ?

Lord Lytton thus wrote to Lord Cranbrook :

"Up to the present moment not a single effort has been made to modify the regulations which everybody perceives to be incompatible with the fulfilment of these promises." 'He then shows that his scheme will not involve any financial responsibilities, and that there was no danger of alienating the existing class of native officials.' "Such a danger might be incurred if we offered this class, in exchange for all it now gets, something else and something different. But what we propose is to continue to it all it now gets, with the addition of a great deal more which it cannot now get. You ask me if I really think the difficulties of employing natives are at present such that a revolution is needed...My reply to this question is that the present system has had an unlimited trial with increasingly unsatisfactory results, and that no one has yet been able to show any reason why it should succeed better in the future than it has succeeded in the past. Under the present system we are practically bound by law and custom to appoint Europeans to all the higher posts. To appoint a native to any such post is an altogether exceptional act, for which we are obliged to show very special reasons or obtain special authority. What I say is—shift this condition, at least in regard to a certain number of high appointments which have been ascertained and are acknowledged *communi consenser* to be safely open to natives. The number of such posts must always be comparatively small, but it is sufficient for the fair discharge of our unredeemed pledges."*

He thus summed up :

"The principal cause of the acknowledged failure to fulfil the promises given lies in the vagueness of the promises themselves...The result is that the pettiness of the prizes open to them, and the extreme uncertainty of their prospects in our service, prevent that service from offering any attraction to the class of natives whom we most desire to associate with it."

Lord Cranbrook, however, declined to sanction the scheme and directed that 'a smaller scheme should be drawn up, confined to appointing every year to the civil service of India any such number of natives as may be determined on, and proportionately decreasing the number of recruits for the covenanted civil service.'

The amended rules of May 1879 provided that 'a proportion not exceeding one-fifth of the total number of civilians appointed by the Secretary of State to the civil service in any one year should be natives selected by the local Governments ; that each selection should be subject to the approval of the Governor-General in Council, and that the selected candidates should ordinarily be on probation for two years.'

Lord Cranbrook sanctioned these rules in August 1879. Thus Lord Lytton by his scheme of a *close native civil service* tried to "exclude natives of India from the

* *Ibid.*, pp. 531-32.

competitive examination for the covenanted civil service in London." While the Indians were agitating for a simultaneous civil service examination in India, Lord Lytton was trying to exclude them by creating a close native civil service.

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR

A Scientific Frontier for India

As soon as it was known that the Russian Envoy had been received at the Amir's Court, Lord Lytton wrote to the Secretary of State :

"It is now almost exactly a year since we addressed to your predecessor a despatch about Merv, which elicited from the India Office a somewhat sarcastic reply. We were then told that our warnings were witless ; our anxieties, nightmares ; our calculations, the crude excursions of an untutored fancy ; our conclusions, airy fabrics, raised by unreasonable fears, from a foundation which whilst we were building on it, had already vanished from the region of fact. High authorities at that time impressed on me that 'the complete collapse of Russia as a great military power' rendered practically impossible any serious danger to the land-frontier of India from that quarter."

"I venture to think that our political foresight will stand comparison with that of our critics, and that subsequent events have better justified our alarm than their confidence. Within the year now closing, Russia...has made greater strides towards India than were then 'dreamed of in our' repudiated 'philosophy'."*

He then went on to speak of a scientific frontier for India. He says :

"But our present frontier line, which, if closely approached, would leave in the hands of our great and energetic rival all the outer *debouches* of the passes leading into India is a hopelessly bad line. The great *natural boundary* of India to the north-west is the watershed formed by the range of the Hindukush and its spurs ; and that range, with such outposts as may be necessary to secure the passes, ought to be our *ultimate boundary*."

Lord Lytton also spoke of the *defensive line* of India. He said :

"I think it possible to give to India a magnificent defensive line—perhaps the finest in the world. To the left, our flank rests on the Persian gulf, of which we have the command, and is covered by the sandy deserts of Western Beloochistan. Our occupation of Quettah fulfils all the requisites of a strong military position on that side . In fact, I look upon our frontier from Multan to the sea as now so well guarded by our position at Quettah that it leaves almost nothing to be desired, and, from a *military* point of view, should certainly much regret any circumstance which compelled us to advance to Kandahar...

"Turning now to our extreme right, we are there protected by the great Himalayan ranges and the deserts of Tibet....

"The question of our *central* line of defence, or ultimate boundary from Quettah to Chitral, is a much more difficult problem."

"I had advocated the continuation of the Hindukush, and its spurs, to Herat as our main line, with outposts at Balkh, Maimena and Herat, and the Oxus as our visible boundary, in accordance with the understanding arrived at between the British and Russian Governments."†

Though pledged to a policy of not extending the British conquests any further, Lord Lytton was anxious to have a scientific frontier for India and looked upon the Hindukush as the natural and ultimate boundary for India. It showed the desire of the British Government to advance up to the Hindukush. Lord Lytton also advocated the

* *Ibid.*, pp. 247-50.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 252-53.

breaking up of Afghanistan or the conquest of the kingdom. In speaking of the *frontier policy* he said :

"I state these three courses in a sequence which indicates what seems to me their relative merits :

'(1) To secure, by fear or hope, such an alliance with the present Amir as will effectually and permanently exclude Russian influence from Afghanistan.

'(2) Failing this, to withdraw, promptly and publicly, all countenance from the present Amir ; *to break up the Afghan Kingdom* (which I think we can do, if so minded, without much difficulty), and to put in the place of its present ruler a sovereign more friendly to our interests and more dependent on our support.

'(3) *To conquer and hold so much of Afghan territory* as will,...be absolutely requisite for the permanent maintenance of our North-West Frontier.'*

BRITISH MISSION TO KABUL

The reception of the Russian Envoy at the Amir's Court upset Lord Lytton. He now wanted to send a similar British mission to Kabul. Thus he wrote to Lord Cranbrook :

"The present most injudicious action of Russia fortunately affords us a convenient opportunity for making, without loss of dignity and under somewhat more favourable conditions, another—and, as I conceive it must be, a *last*—attempt to establish more satisfactory relations with the present Amir.

"I propose, therefore, in accordance with your sanction, to send a British Mission to Kabul as soon as it can be properly organised ; and to precede it by a message, through a native agent, informing the Amir that it is on its way to him, and that he is expected to receive it (like the Russian one) with all becoming honours, &c. Our British Envoy, whilst instructed to use every endeavour to conciliate and convince the Amir, will be armed with a formidable bill of indictment against His Highness ; setting forth all his inimical and hitherto unpunished acts towards us, his attempts to stir up a holy war against us, his systematic maltreatment of our subjects, &c., and the culminating insult of his reception of Russian officers at his capital after his flat refusal to receive there our own officers, &c."†

About the effect of the visit of the Russian Envoy, Lord Lytton wrote (dated, Sept. 4, 1878) :

Neither the withdrawal of the Russian mission nor any assurances on the part of Russia will cancel the fact a Russian mission has been well received at Kabul, after one from us had been refused ; and that Russian officers have had full opportunities of instilling into the minds of the Amir and his councillors distrust and dislike towards England, belief in Russia's power and destiny, and hopes of assistance against us from that country.§

After receiving the Viceroy's letters, the Amir said

"that the Russians had come with his permission though not at his request, and that his country being exposed, and he quite estranged from the English, he was obliged to let them come on after they had crossed the Oxus ; that if the British mission advanced at once it would be resisted, but that, if conciliatory letters were sent to the Amir and his dignity studied, all might be arranged."**

* *Ibid.*, p. 255.

† *Ibid.*, p, 256.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 266-67.

It was also reported that the Amir said:

"He was so disgusted with the British Government that he could not bear to see any one connected with it, not even the mission."*

Lord Lytton's letter to the Amir about the British mission had been accompanied by a friendly letter of condolence on the death of the heir-apparent. That letter was not answered by the Amir. The Viceroy says:

"So long as the Viceroy's letter of condolence remained unanswered (after reasonable time had been allowed for a reply to it), so long did the British Government and its Envoy remain in the eyes of our native subjects and neighbours suffering under a tolerated affront."†

The British mission did not prove successful, because the Amir refused to receive the mission and even desired to oppose its passage. We read:

"Major Cavagnari said to the Sirdar: 'We are both servants, you of the Amir of Kabul, I of the British Government. It is no use for us to discuss these matters. I only came to get a straight answer from you. Will you oppose the passage of the mission by force?'

"The Sirdar said: 'Yes, I will: and you may take it as kindness, and because I remember friendship, that I do not fire upon you for what you have done already.' After this we shook hands, and mounted our horses; and the Sirdar said again, 'You have had a straight answer.' (*Narrative of Events in Afghanistan*)§

ULTIMATUM TO THE AMIR

At last on November 2, 1878, Lord Lytton sent an ultimatum to the Amir of Kabul. He wrote thus:

"Nevertheless you, having received my letter, did not hesitate to instruct your authorities on the frontier to repel the mission by force. For this act of enmity and indignity to the Empress of India, in the person of her Envoy, your letter affords no explanation or apology, nor does it contain any answer to my proposal for a full and frank understanding between our two Governments.

"In consequence of this hostile action on your part, I have assembled Her Majesty's forces on your frontier, but I desire to give you a last opportunity of averting the calamities of war.

"For this it is necessary that a full and suitable apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank.

"Furthermore, as it has been found impossible to maintain satisfactory relations between the two states unless the British Government is adequately represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that you should consent to receive a permanent British mission within your territory...

"Unless these conditions are accepted fully and plainly by you, and your acceptance received by me not later than November 20, I shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you as a declared enemy of the British Government."**

But no reply came from the Amir. The Viceroy writes:

"The Amir has not condescended to make any reply at all to our ultimatum. The latest hour fixed for the duration of the time within which his answer to it would be awaited, and if received considered, expired, strictly speaking, at sunset yesterday, the 20th. For the Mahomedan day ends at sundown. It was not, however, till 10 p. m. last night that I received from Peshawar, by telegraph, a message that no communication from the Amir had been received at our outposts."

So the Military operations against the Amir began on November 21, 1878.

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* *Ibid.*, p. 267.
† *Ibid.*, p. 273.
§ Quoted on p. 280. (*Ibid.*)
** *Ibid.*, pp. 293-94.

FLIGHT OF SHER ALI

The success of General Roberts frightened Sher Ali, who fled into the Russian territory on December 1, 1878. Lord Lytton, writing on the 24th December, says:

"My latest information received, three days ago, on my way is that on receipt at Kabul of the news of General Roberts' victory at Peiwar Khotal, the Amir's authority instantly collapsed, and the remainder of his army began to desert *en masse.* Thereupon he apparently decided to release Yakub Khan ('that ill-starred wretch,' as he calls him in his last letter) and to fly into Russian territory, in company of the three remaining officers of Stoletoff's mission. With this information a pensioned Ressaldar has reached Jellalabad, now in our hands. The Ressaldar had been furnished by the Amir with a letter stating that, on the advice of his Sirdars, he (Sher Ali) was proceeding to St. Petersburg to lay his case before 'Congress'! and that any communication we might desire to address to him would be considered there (at St. Petersburg)."*

Before leaving Kabul the Amir issued a *firman* to his subjects. In that *firman* he quoted a letter from the Russian Emperior :

"The English Government is anxious to come to terms with you through the intervention of the Sultan, and wishes you to take his advice and counsel. But the Emperor's desire is that you should not admit the English into your country ; and, like last year, you are to treat them with deceit and deception until the present cold season passes away; then the will of the Almighty will be made manifest to you - that is to say, the Russian Government having repeated the Bismillah, the Bismillah will come to your assistance."†

Commenting on the *firman,* the Viceroy says:

"I affirm that Russian interference in Afghan affairs did not commence with the Russian mission to Kabul, and that it did not cease with the withdrawal of that mission. I affirm that Sher Ali had ceased to be the friend and ally of the British Government, and that for all practical purposes he had become the friend and ally of the Russian Government, at least three years before I had any dealings with His Highness or any connection with the Government of India. And, finally, I affirm that the real and the only cause of the Afghan war was an intrigue of long duration between Sher Ali and the Russian authorities in Central Asia, an intrigue leading to an alliance between them for objects which, if successfully carried out, would have broken to pieces the Empire of British India."§

DEATH OF SHER ALI

Sher Ali died in 1879 and his son Yakub Khan thus responded to the overtures made by the British Government:

"I write in accordance with former friendship, to inform you that today, Wednesday the 4th of Rabi-ul-awal (February 26, 1879), a letter was received by post from Turkestan announcing that my worthy and exalted father had, upon Friday, 29 Saffar, obeyed the call of the Summoner, and throwing off the dress of existence, hastened to the region of the divine mercy. Since every living being must relinquish the robe of life, and must drink the draught of death, I remain resigned and patient, under this heavy calamity and misfortune. As my exalted father was an ancient friend of the illustrious British Government, I have out of friendship sent you this intimation."**

TREATY OF GUNDAMUK

The Viceroy now opened negotiations with Yakub Khan, who invited Major Cavagnari to Kabul so that 'the real concord on both sides might be declared and proved face to face.'

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* *Ibid.,* pp. 304-5.
† *Ibid.,* p. 307.
§ *Ibid*, pp., 308-9.
** *Ibid.,* p. 313.

On April 6, 1879, the Viceroy telegraphed to the Secretary of State the terms of treaty with Yakub Khan :

"Please telegraph views of Cabinet on following substance of treaty to be negotiated with Yakub. First two articles formal. Third, amnesty for assistance to us during the war. Fourth, Amir agrees to conduct his foreign relations in accordance with advice and wish of British Government, will enter into no engagements or war with foreign states without concurrence of British Government. Fifth, qualified recognition of heir. Sixth, permanent British Resident at Kabul (according to Yakub's suggestion) and right to depute agents to Herat and other frontier places. Seventh, their safety and honourable treatment guaranteed by Amir. Eighth, right to garrison Herat whenever we deem it necessary for frontier protection. Ninth and tenth, commercial facilities, protection of traffic, adjustment of duties, selection of open routes. Eleventh, telegraph line. Twelveth, restoration of Kabul territory now in our possession excepting Kurum, Pishin, and Sibi, as in draft proclamation. Amir renounces authority over tribes and passes mentioned in proclamation. Thirteenth, secures payment by Amir of customary allowances of certain special Sirdars. Fourteenth, subsidy to Amir, amount not yet settled."*

It was learnt that "all the foregoing articles were approved by the Cabinet except the eighth as to Herat, the prudence of which was questioned. On the other hand, the inclusion of power to occupy Kandahar was suggested."

To conclude the treaty, the Amir left his capital on May 3, 1879 and arrived at Gundamuk on the 8th.

Three days before the signing of the treaty, Major Cavagnari wrote thus to the Viceroy :

"Your lordship will have learned from my late telegrams that negotiations with Yakub have taken a favourable turn. We shall get a satisfactory treaty out of him, and the future must decide what sort of an Amir he will turn out. I am inclined at times to believe that he is likely to submit to the influence of the British Resident at Kabul, but sometimes I fancy that his intellect is weak, and he certainly is of a changeable temperament."

He continues :

"The idea that prevailed in England that Yakub Khan is everything that could be desired has of course made me most anxious to bring about a settlement with him, and this I may almost say is an accomplished fact. But I hold to the opinion that I have always held, that our true policy is to see Afghanistan broken up into petty states. I told Yakub Khan that it would be owing to him that Afghanistan continued on the map, and that if any one demanded from him what good he had gained by throwing himself into an alliance with the English, he could reply to the above effect."†

The Treaty of Gundamuk was at last signed on May 26, 1879,

"it having been first explained to the Amir that the withdrawal of our troops from Kandahar and other points of Afghan territory to be evacuated could not, for sanitary reasons, be immediate, an intimation that was very distasteful to Yakub Khan, who stipulated that his governors should nevertheless be at once placed in charge of the administration, and that interference by British officers should be prohibited."

In his despatch on the Treaty of Gundamuk, the Viceroy pointed out :

"The engagements thus concluded, at Gundamuk, with the Amir Yakub Khan represent and attest an important change in the whole condition of Central Asian affairs. The magnitude of this

* *Ibid.*, pp. 317-18.

† *Ibid.*, p. 323.

change will be best appreciated when our present position and influence beyond the frontier are compared with what they were during the greater portion of the preceding period between the Umballa Conferences and the recent Afghan War. We do not, however, profess to ascribe any talismanic virtue to written engagements on the part of Afghan princes. The late Amir Sher Ali, throughout the whole period of his reign, was under a formal treaty obligation to be the friend of the friends, and the enemy of the enemies, of the British Government; but that engagement in no wise prevented his adoption of a course which led him into inevitable rupture and open hostility with this Government. We regard the present treaty rather as the commencement, than as the confirmation, of a new and better era in our relations with Afghanistan."*

On the conclusion of this Treaty, the Viceroy was the recipient of congratulatory messages both from Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State, and Lord Beaconsfield, the Prime Minister, who remarked : "Whatever happens it will always be to me a source of real satisfaction that I had the opportunity of placing you on the throne of the Great Mogul."

CAVAGNARI'S MISSION TO KABUL

Major Cavagnari was sent as the British Resident to the Amir's Court. On July 24, 1879, the embassy entered the Afghan capital and was assigned quarters in the Bala Hissar. Major Cavagnari thus writes to the Viceroy :

"My telegram of today (July 24) will have amounced to your Lordship the arrival of the British embassy at Kabul. Nothing could have exceeded the hospitable treatment we have experienced since we left the Kurum Frontier, and our reception here was all that could be desired."

Only three days before the attack on the British embassy, Sir Louis Cavagnari thus wrote to the Viceroy :

"There is no doubt that his (Amir's) authority is most weak throughout the whole of Afghanistan. This is not to be wondered at after the years of misrule and oppression on Sher Ali Khan's part ..The difference, however, is that the people of Afghanistan are inclined to look to the British Envoy more than to their own ruler.......The agriculturists were always praying for the annexation of the country by the English, as they had heard of our light assessments and just rule."†

He also heard rumours about Yakub's treachery :

"I have been quite bewildered sometimes with the stories that have been brought me hinting that no trust should be placed in Yakub Khan, and that he is only temporising with us. Though he is not to be thoroughly trusted, any more than any other oriental, still if he has any game in hand I must confess to having not the slightest conception as to what it can be. His conduct of his foreign relations is apparently all that could be desired."§

He also refers to the unpopularity of Yakub Khan when he says :

"Even now there is a strong desire to intrigue to overthrow him (Yakub Khan), but no one will move in the matter without being sure that we were with them. A report the other day from Kohistan (even if untrue it shows the line of people's thoughts) stated that some defaulters of revenue assaulted the collectors, and said that if they brought a letter from me that they would pay up."

But still he has faith in Yakub Khan and says :

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 328-29.

† *Ibid.*, p. 348.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

"Notwithstanding all people say against him, I personally believe Yakub Khan will turn out to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements."

KABUL MASSACRE

But the faith put by Cavagnari on the Amir did not turn out well. Commenting on a telegram of his, on August 31, 1879, the Viceroy wrote :

"His telegram, however, is significant, and I think we must be on the look out for rocks ahead."

Two days after, the British Residency was attacked and the English officers killed.

Sir Alfred Lyall writes thus :

"The first news of the catastrophe came to General Roberts, who was awakened in his Simla house between one and two o'clock in the morning by his wife telling him that a telegraph messenger had been calling outside for some time with a telegram, which when read, said that three mutinous Afghan regiments had attacked the Kabul Residency, where the Englishmen were defending themselves. Of all the rumours and stirring news sent up to Simla during the last fifty years, from the various fields of war and politics surveyed by an Indian Viceroy, none have been more startling or more important than this message flashed from the army outposts beyond Kurum to the Himalayas."*

The Amir sent the following account:

"Troops who had assembled for pay at Bala Hissar suddenly broke out and stoned their officers, and then all marched to the Residency and stoned it, receiving in return a hail of bullets. Confusion and disturbance reached such a height that it was impossible to quiet it. People from Sherpur and country round Bala Hissar and city-people of all classes—poured into Bala Hissar, and began destroying workshops, artillery park, and magazine, and all troops and people attacked Residency. Meanwhile, I sent Daod Shah to help Envoy. On reaching Residency he was unhorsed by stones and spears, and is now dying. I then sent Sirdar Yahiya Khan and my own son, the heir-apparent, with the Koran to the troops ; but to no use. I then sent well-known Syuds and Mullahs of each clan, but of no avail. Up till now, evening, the disturbance continues. It will be seen how it ends. I am grieved by this confusion. It is almost beyond conception."†

The second message came to Simla on the 6th September 1879, announcing that the British Residency had been set on fire, and ending up with the words :

"I have lost my friend the Envoy, and also my kingdom. Am terribly grieved and perplexed."

Lady Balfour points out that 'in a letter written by the Amir at the same time to his uncle, the Governor of Zemindwar, he gave a very different account of the affair, only two regiments, both of the body guard, were said to have mutinied. Nothing was mentioned of any attempt at rescue, or participation of the people, and it was expressly stated no other injury was done, and that by evening everything was quiet.'

The Viceroy in commenting on a secret Memorandum on the Kabul massacre from Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, says :

"But, what staggers me in Wali Mahomed's statement is that it elucidates and confirms similar sinister assertions as to Yakub's treachery made by two or three other informants, who apparently can have no personal motive for incriminating the Amir. The majority of the survivors and spectators, of the assault of September 3rd all express a conviction that Yakub could have rescued the Embassy

* *Ibid.*, p. 355.

† *Ibid.*, p. 355.

had he chosen to do so; and all aver that he positively prohibited General Saif-ud-din Khan from going to the assistance of the Envoy."*

Thus the web of policy so carefully and patiently woven, remarked Lord Lytton, was rudely shattered. He was now to weave a fresh and a wider one, from undoubtedly weaker materials.

GENERAL ROBERTS' MARCH TO KABUL

On hearing the news of the attack on the Residency, the Viceroy asked General Massy to move at once to the Shutargardan. General Roberts also started towards Kabul with a force of 5,000 men. The Amir tried to delay the progress of the march on one pretex or another and finally he himself took refuge in the British camp. Lord Lytton writes :

"The Amir, his ministers, and all Sirdars then avowed there was a universal conviction at Kabul that it would be simply impossible for us to advance there in any force before the spring of next year ....."

About General Roberts, he says:

"Meanwhile General Roberts' force continued its advance towards Kabul .... On the 6th instant the reconnoitring parties sent out by Roberts reported that 'the enemy' was advancing in great force from the city; and soon afterwards the high range of hills intervening between Charasiab and Kabul were crowded with Afghan troops and people from the city; while parties of Ghilzais appeared on the hills running along both flanks of the camp, and the road along which General Macpherson was advancing (to Zahidabad) with large convoys of stores and reserve ammunition was reported to be threatened. Macpherson was immediately warned, and some cavalry sent to his assistance. But Roberts wisely recognised the absolute necessity of carrying the heights on his front before nightfall. This difficult task was entrusted to Baker, who commanded the advance guard. Baker at once sent Major White with a wing of the 92nd Highlanders, three guns, and some native infantry to take the right of the position; from which the enemy was dislodged, after an obstinate resistance, leaving twenty Afghan guns in possession of Major White's small force. Baker, meanwhile, making a turning movement to the left, was soon hotly engaged; but, carrying height after height, completely scattered the enemy in great confusion, capturing two standards. Our total loss was small--three officers wounded, but none killed. Enemy's loss not yet known, but believed to be very great."†

Thus, in little over a month, General Roberts

"made his triumphal entry into Kabul at the head of as fine a force as was ever put in the field, after having given the Afghans a severe thrashing at Charasiab, and captured two of their standards and 150 of their guns without the loss of a single European officer."

On October 12, General Roberts made his public entry into the city of Kabul with the Amir's eldest son. Yakub Khan had

"walked to General Roberts' camp, accompanied by only two attendants, and expressed his determination to resign the Amirship. He said he had intended doing so before going to Kushi, but had allowed himself to be overpersuaded. He was in very low spirits; said his life had been a miserable one; that he would rather be a grass-cutter in the English camp than ruler of Afghanistan, and begged that he might live in the camp till he could be sent to India or London or whevever the Viceroy might desire to send him."§

* *Ibid.*, pp. 358-59.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 363-64.

§ *Narrative of Events in Afghanistan*, p. 95.



Lord Roberts

On October 28, General Roberts issued the following proclamation:

"I, General Roberts, on behalf of the British Government, hereby proclaim that the Amir, having by his own free will abdicated, has left Afghanistan without a Government.

"In consequence of the shameful outrage upon its Envoy and suite the British Government has been compelled to occupy by force of arms Kabul, the capital, and to take military possession of other parts of Afghanistan.

"The British Government now commands that all authorities, chiefs and sirdars do continue their functions in maintaining order, referring to me when necessary. ...

"The British Government, after consultation with the principal sirdars, tribal chiefs and others representing the interests and wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of the people."*

Of the Russian influenee in Afghanistan, General Roberts thus wrote to the Viceroy on October 28, 1879:

"It is surprising to see how much more Russian than English Kabul is. Russian money, Russian crockery, Russian—or, as they call it, Bokhara silk, Russian-cut clothes, &c. The roads leading to Central Asia are not better, perhaps, than those towards India, but the Russians have certainly taken more advantage of their position than we have and have had apparently much more to do with the commerce of the country than we have had."†

Before starting for Kabul, General Roberts had received instructions from the Viceroy as to the course to be followed in Kabul. The Viceroy wrote:

"As soon as you shall have established yourself at Kabul you will institute a close investigation into all the causes and circumstances of the outrage which has compelled the British Government to occupy the capital of His Highness the Amir. Upon the question of punishment which, after due inquiry, it will be your duty to inflict as speedily as possible upon those who have abetted or participated in the perpetration of this outrage, His Excellency the Governor-General in Council desires me to commend to your careful attention the following observations:

"I am to point out, in the first place, that for an offence of this character the Afghan nation must be held to be collectively responsible. It was a totally unprovoked and most barbarous attack by the Amir's soldiery, and by the people of his capital, upon the representative of an allied state, who was residing under the Amir's protection in the Amir's fortress, in very close proximity to the Amir himself.......In the second place, I am to observe that the nature and magnitude of the outrage leave no room for doubt that it had its leaders and its instigators—that certain persons must have taken a prominent part in the attack on the Residency and in the murder of its inmates; while there is a strong presumption that such an outbreak must have been fomented and encouraged by persons of rank and influence."§

Accordingly a military tribunal was appointed by General Roberts 'to investigate the causes and circumstances which led to the outbreak of September 3, and further to undertake the actual trial of accused persons.' The military tribunal tried eighty-seven persons, who were executed.

The Kabul Commission collected evidence "for the purpose of determining whether, and to what extent, the outbreak was premeditated, and the responsibility which attached to the Amir Yakub Khan in connection with it."

Their conclusions were as follows:

* *Ibid.*, pp. 368-69

† *Ibid.*, p. 372.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 372-73.

"(1) That the massacre was not instigated by the Amir, or by his enemies, or by anyone else; but that its actual perpetrators proceeded altogether of their own motion; (2) that though the regiments that attacked the Residency had, like other regiments in the Amir's service, for some little time, and at all events since the arrival of the troops from Herat, entertained feelings of hostility towards the mission, the attack was in no way premeditated by them, but was the result of what may in a certain sense be termed accidental circumstances; and (3) that, though the Amir and his immediate advisers must be acquitted of complicity in the attack on the Residency, they were in a position to interpose effectively, when the attack began, and while it was going on, for the protection or rescue of the embassy; that they were at least culpably indifferent to the fate of the Envoy and his companions; and that they totally disregarded the solemn obligations which they had undertaken to protect the British embassy at Kabul."*

YAKUB KHAN LEAVES KABUL

On the report of the committee of inquiry, the Government decided that Vakub Khan's restoration was impossible. Accordingly instructions were issued for his removal to India. Yakub Khan arrived at Meerut on December 14, 1879, 'where he was placed under honourable surveillance.'

This departure of the Amir and his ministers was a signal for a general rising of the tribes round Kabul. Lord Lytton had forseen this danger. He wrote to General Roberts:

"My fear is that when the Afghan people and tribes have fully realised all that is involved in the Amir's abdication they may begin to form hostile combinations, likely ere long to increase our troubles."†

About this rising round Kabul, Sir Alfred Lyall says:

"Throughout the districts round Kabul the mullahs, or religious teachers, headed by one influencial and patriotic preacher (Mushk-i-Alam), proclaimed war against the infidel; and early in December there was a great mustering of the tribes, who threatened Kabul from various points, while true intelligence of their movements became ominously scarce."§

General Roberts describes the rising thus:

"It was at this critical moment that I appeared on the scene. Warned by the firing that an engagement was taking place, I galloped across the Chardeh Valley as fast as my horse could carry me, and on gaining the open ground beyond Bhagwana an extraordinary spectacle was presented to my view. An unbroken line, extending for about two miles, and formed of not less than between 9,000 and 10,000 men, was moving rapidly towards me, all on foot save a small body of cavalry on their left flank—in fact, the greater part of Mahomed Jan's army."**

Roberts, to save his guns, ordered the cavalry to charge.

"But the ground, terraced for irrigation purposes and intersected by dykes, so impeded our cavalry that the charge, heroic as it was, made little or no impression upon the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, now flushed with the triumph of having forced our guns to retire.

"The Afghans rushed on, drawing their knives for close quarters; one gun had to be spiked and abandoned in a water cut; and the artillery fell back, after another stand, until they were stopped 'by a ditch fully twelve feet deep, narrowing towards the bottom,' when one gun stuck fast, blocking the others, so that all four guns were for the time lost, and the cavalry could only retire slowly,

* *Ibid.*, pp. 375-76.

† *Ibid.*, p. 389.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 389.

** *Ibid.*, p. 390.

with great steadiness, by alternate squadrons. The consequence might have been more serious if Macpherson, who was out with a force not far distant, and who marched back at full speed toward the sound of cannon, had not arrived just in time to stop the enemy by throwing the 72nd Highlanders into a gap by which the road passed through the hills immediately overhanging Kabul city." *

This insurrection was put down by General Roberts, "and the country round Kabul subsided into sullen tranquility, although parties sent into the outlying tracts had to fight their way." Finally Kabul was re-occupied by the British troops.

The British Government could not settle finally the future policy in Afghanistan. On February 16, 1880, the Viceroy wrote to Mr. Griffin:

"I see no reason why you should not, as soon as you reach Kabul, set about the preparation of a way for us out of that rat-trap, by making known to all whom such knowledge chiefly concerns the cardinal points of our policy, *viz*:

'1st. Non-restoration of the ex-Amir.

'2nd. Permanent severance of Western from North-West Afghanistan.

'3rd. Neither annexation nor permanent occupation of the latter.

'4th. Willingness to recognise any ruler (except Yakub) whom the Afghans themselves will empower to arrange with us on their behalf, for the restoration of their country and its evacuation by our troops.'"†

ABDUR RAHMAN

While Lord Lytton was deliberating over the Afghan question, the appearance of Abdur Rahman offered the prospect of solution. This Sardar was the son of Mahomed Afzul Khan, Amir Sher Ali's elder half-brother, who ruled Kabul from May 1866 to October 1867. After his father's death, when Sher Ali established his authority in Kabul, he fled to the Turkestan districts and then to the Russians at Tashkend. At last in 1880, he obtained permission from the Russian Government to return and try his luck in Afghanistan.

Lord Lytton wanted to place Abdur Rahman on the Afghan throne under the British authority. Thus he wrote to the Secretary of State on April 12, 1880:

"You will remember that more than a month ago I urged the expediency of sending to (Abdur Rahman), while his strength was still weak and his position still uncertain, a public deputation from the Kabul Sirdars to offer him, with the open connivance of the British Government, the throne of Kabul, which we were then in a position to assign to him upon our own terms.

"The situation has within the last three weeks changed very considerably in favour of Abdur Rahman, and my present fear is that the wrecks and refuse of the Ghuzni faction will ere long rally to his standard, placing him in a position to appear suddenly before Kabul at the head of a united nation and dictate terms to us, instead of accepting them from us."§

At last the British messenger came back from Abdur Rahman with a letter from him. 'His letter, obviously dictated by Russian advisers, professed warm friendship with us, provided we did not impose on him conditions which he could not accept without apparent ingratitude to Russia, 'whose salt he had eaten,' and proposed that 'Afghanistan should be neutralised and placed under the joint protectorate of the British and Russian Empires."

* *Ibid.*, pp. 390-91.
† *Ibid.*, p. 408.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 413.

In commenting on the above, Lord Lytton says :

"I feel sure that Abdur Rahman's letter was composed for him in the belief that we should, according to our invariable custom, reply to it by indicating conditions which, if contested, would furnish matter for lengthened negotiation, and that we should haggle and barter about the terms of our future relations with him. This would have ended in his dictating his own terms and remaining master of the situation. Our position would have been that of gamblers sitting down at 10 o'clock to break the bank with the knowledge that, whether they win or lose, they must leave off playing at 12 o'clock."

Lord Lytton, therefore, was in favour of immediately informing Abdur Rahman that whilst,

"if he would not share the fate of Sher Ali, he must put out of his head both the acquisition of Kandahar, which we would never restore, and the Anglo-Russian protectorate, which we would never tolerate in a country acknowledged by Russia to be beyond the legitimate sphere of her action; on the other hand, we were ready to hand over to him *at once, without any provisions at all*, Kabul and all the rest of the country if he would come and receive it from us. But that our troops would in any case be withdrawn not later than October, when Kabul would probably be 'jumped' by the leader of the Ghuzni party if he were not previously on the spot to secure the reversion of it with our assistance."*

Lord Lytton tried to explain himself thus in a letter to Sir Donald Stewart on May 16, 1880 :

"Our position is, that having now completed our own arrangements for rendering our interests independent of such friendship, and having defeated every attack upon us, we are about to evacuate Northern Afghanistan without delay; and we give notice of this intention to Abdur Rahman, not because we have any bargain to drive with him about it, but in order that, if he wishes to take advantage of it in any manner not inimical to us, he may lose no time in doing so.

"The above mentioned arrangements are of course the irrevocable separation of Kandahar from the Kabul Power, and the permanent retention and strengthening of the frontier position secured to us by the Treaty of Gundamuk. Though these are doubtless known to Abdur Rahman, I think that the irrevocable nature of them should be in fairness distinctly explained to him. I consented with reluctance to Griffin's strong recommendation supported by Lyall to omit from his first letter to that Sirdar all reference either to these arrangements or to the date of our evacuation; but I cannot approve his allusions to the 'establishment of a friendly Amir at Kabul.' Our position is a strong one so long as we avow it plainly and act on it firmly. Otherwise it may become a very false one."†

While Lord Lytton was carrying on these negotiations, there was a change in the administration in England. The Government of Lord Beaconsfield was succeeded by that of Mr. Gladstone on April 28, 1880. The Marquess of Hartington became the new Secretary of State for India in the place of Viscount Cranbrook. "Lord Lytton's policy in India had been made the subject of bitter attack by the party who now came into power, and he therefore resigned office with his political friends." The Marquis of Ripon was sent out as his successor.

Lord Lytton was afraid that his Afghan policy would be reversed by the new ministry. He thus wrote to Lord Cranbrook on April 7, 1880 :

"If the new ministry breaks the pledges we have given Sher Ali Khan or swallows the bait likely to be laid for it by Abdur Rahman of a neutralised Afghanistan under joint guarantees, it will be an evil day for India and for England too."

* *Ibid.*, pp. 414-15.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 418-19.

CHAPTER X

LORD RIPON

1880-1884

On the assumption of power by the Gladstone ministry on April 28, 1880, Lord Lytton resigned his office and the first Marquis of Ripon was appointed as his successor. Soon after accepting the Viceroyalty, Lord Ripon started for India, though the Indian plains were, in the words of Lord Lytton, 'hotter than the furnaces of Nebuchadnezzar.' Both for party and political reasons, his presence became urgently necessary in India.

This immediate replacement of Lord Lytton has been the subject of much discussion. He himself 'professed great indignation at the unceremonious way in which he was replaced,' and Lady Betty Balfour, in her memoir of her father, even complains that he was 'treated with contempt.' In defending the Liberal Government, Lucien Wolf says :

"As a matter of fact, he was quite prepared for the action of the new Government, and was persuaded of its reasonableness, for he placed his resignation in the hands of Lord Beaconsfield before the General Election was over, and in subsequent letters to Cranbrook he even argued the case for his own prompt recall with convincing force."*

Lord Lytton wrote thus :

"I suppose that my successor, whoever he be, can scarcely reach India before June, which will be a very trying season for his journey, as well as for mine. But it is extremely desirable that he should relieve me without any avoidable delay. For the safe solution of the Afghan question now seems likely to depend on the management during the next two months of arrangements at Kandahar and negotiations at Kabul, which can neither be suspended nor postponed with impunity, nor yet satisfactorily conducted by a Viceroy notoriously destitute of the confidence and support of the Queen's constitutional advisers."†

A fortnight after Lord Lytton changed his mind. He again wrote :

"I do not think that my successor could, without serious risk to his health, come out earlier than next autumn, for till then the plains of India will be hotter than the furnaces of Nebuchadnezzar ; and if her Majesty's new ministers wish me to carry on this Government till I can personally transfer it to the new Viceroy, I shall deem it a public duty to do so, provided only that during the interval, which must be virtually a sort of interregnum, I am not required to carry out measures to which it would be obviously impossible for me to set my hand. Certainly there could scarcely be a worse or more dangerous moment than the present for any radical change of Government in India ; and, as in the conduct of this Government I have never had any other feeling than a most earnest desire to do my best and utmost for the interests of India and the service of the Crown, so I trust I should be sustained by the same motive if required to carry on the Government of India till the cool season is sufficiently advanced to enable my successor to relieve me of it without risking his life."§

Lucien Wolf continues in his defence of the Liberal Government :

"This offer was not calculated to commend itself to the impatient temper of the new men in

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* *Life of the First Marquess of Ripon*, II., p. 4.

† *Lytton's Indian Administratian*, p. 420.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 422-28.

Downing Street, even if it had not been irreconcilable with the urgency of the Afghan situation as depicted in the previous letter. It was, however, not destined to have any effect, for, before it reached London, Lytton had already been informed that Ripon would come out at once. Thereupon his anger blazed forth, and he telegraphed to Hartington protesting against the 'indecent haste' of the Government, and threatening a 'a grave scandal' if they should persist in it. The only result was to confirm the decision already arrived at. Hartington submitted the telegram to the Cabinet, and they came to the conclusion that Lytton 'should be left to do mischief for as short a time as possible.' Accordingly, Ripon was instructed 'to start on the day originally fixed.' "*

That is the story of the replacement of Lord Lytton in 'indecent haste.'

HIS FIRST TASTE OF TROUBLE

While coming out from England, Lord Ripon made an unfortunate selection of his Private Secretary in the person of Colonel Gordon. "Those who knew Gordon were not less astonished at his acceptance of the post than they were at Ripon's offer of it. There is reason to believe that on both sides some obscure mystical motives were at work. At any rate, Gordon seems to have as completely misunderstood the nature of the post he was undertaking as Ripon miscalculated his qualifications for it."

While at Bombay *en route* to Simla, Lord Ripon had the first taste of trouble: his Private Secretary, Gordon, sent in his resignation. Lord Ripon wrote to Lady Ripon thus:

"Yesterday evening just before dinner Beresford came to me with a letter in his hand and said that he had bad news for me. I immediately thought of you and Olly and my heart sank within me, but on opening the letter I found that it was one from Gordon resigning the Private Secretaryship. The announcement, therefore, which under other circumstances might have been disturbing, came to me as an absolute relief. He said in the letter that he found that the duties of the post were not in his line, and that he thought it better to resign at once.....

"I have made no attempt to keep him, first, because if the work is not congenial to him he would not do it well, and secondly, because it seems to me better that he should resign now before I have really entered upon my work rather than a few weeks or months hence, when it would be sure to be said that he had either disapproved of my policy, or found me out to be an impostor, or quarrelled about religion......

"It is of course a disappointment to me, and shows that I made a bad selection in offering the post to him......"†

HIS DISLIKE OF LORD LYTTON

Lucien Wolf, the biographer of Lord Ripon, thinks that Lord Ripon had his dislike of Lord Lytton, though in his letter to Northbrook Lord Ripon says otherwise. He says:

"You say that you think I must have had no very pleasant time of it with Lytton in my immediate neighbourhood. Not at all. I was determined to falsify his prophecies of 'scandal,' and I succeeded to my heart's content. He acknowledged in the fullest terms that he had been treated with every consideration; and, so far as I was concerned, he might have stayed here for ever if he had liked."

But Lord Ripon's biographer says:

"Ripon was certainly not disposed to do justice to Lytton. His letters about this time bear clear evidence of his dislike of the man, and even of some eagerness to find in his policy traces of

* *Life of the First Marquess of Ripon*, II., p. 5.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

downright dishonesty. It was a symptom of Radical prejudice which was much too common in the days of the fierce struggle against the Disraelians, and it is regrettable that Ripon, like Gladstone himself, never rose above it."*

LORD RIPON—THE ROMAN CATHOLIC VICEROY

Lord Ripon was a member of the Roman Catholic Church. About his religion, his biographer says :

"In setting forth on his Viceregal career, Ripon possessed one inestimable advantage in the religious peace which he had found through his conversion to the Roman Catholic Church."†

Again he continues to say :

"Thus were the fears of Exeter Hall disproved and Ripon's 'apostasy' had itself become 'the corner-stone of the building.' No one who has taken the measure of his character and abilities will doubt for a moment that the whole success of his Viceroyalty was governed by the moral and mental serenity he had found—rightly or wrongly—in the solution of his religious doubts."§

LORD LYTTON'S LEGACY

The Afghan question was the legacy received by Lord Ripon from his predecessor. In general, Lytton's legacy, says Mr. Wolf, was full of trouble for Ripon. He thus wrote to Hartington :

"The root of the evil appears to me to lie in the fact that Lytton has all along steadily shut his eyes to liabilities, political, military, and financial, in which he was involving himself ...The coercion of Sher Ali was to be an easy matter, the Treaty of Gundamuk settled everything. Cavagnari's murder was to be speedily avenged. Until at length, as the complications increased and the difficulties thickened, he became utterly sick of the whole business, and for some time his only desire has been to get out of the affair almost anyhow. You are perfectly right when you say in your letter of May 21 that 'he is more anxious to retire from Kabul and Northern Afghanistan without leaving behind him any settlement than we are.' "**

"ANNEXING THE MOON"

Lord Lytton had schemes of annexing Afghanistan. Lucien Wolf says :

"In the following February Ripon sent Hartington a set of very curious documents, showing that in 1876 Lytton and the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Frederick Haines) were discussing whether, in the event of a war with Russia, they should, or should not, annex the whole of Afghanistan. The idea seems to have been to attack Russia in Central Asia ; but the force proposed (30,000 men) was so palpably inadequate for the purpose that Ripon suspects, in Lytton's mind at least, the idea was to use the pretext of a Russian scare to cover the preparation of a force to conquer Afghanistan. 'No man who reads these papers,' he adds, 'can doubt that the annexation, virtual or actual, of Afghanistan was a foregone conclusion when Lytton came out, though he was anxious not to fix public attention on his schemes.'

"Nor was this all. Writing on Kashmir in April, Ripon says : ...what designs Lytton may have harboured with respect to Kashmir, I cannot tell. It would not surprise me to find that schemes were in preparation by the late Government for *the annexation of the moon*."††

* *Ibid.*, p. 12.
† *Ibid.*, p. 14.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 15.
** *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
†† *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

LORD RIPON'S AFGHAN POLICY

Lord Ripon laid down the principal points of his Afghan policy in a Memorandum dated, May 9, 1880 :

"1. Evacuation of Kandahar, so far as consistent with our pledges of the Wali.

2. Retention of Sibi and Pishin and construction of the railway to Pishin. (This railway had been sanctioned in 1879 and was now completed as far as Sibi.)

3. Evacuation of Kabul and establishment of a ruler (probably Abdur Rahman, but possibly Yakub, at that time a *detenu* in India), to be aided by grants of money and arms but not by troops. A native (not a British) agent to be kept at Kabul.

4. The ruler of Afghanistan to be allowed to take Herat if he can.

5. The policy of disintegration to be repudiated."*

We are told that Ripon carried out every point of this programme, and they were all substantially maintained by his successors 'up to the third Afghan War of 1919.'

Before Ripon's arrival, Abdur Rahman had asked the following questions :

"1. Would he get Kandahar ?

2. Would he be compelled to receive a European Envoy ?

3. What enemies would he be expected to repel, and what assistance might he expect from us ?"†

To this Lord Ripon directed Griffin "to reply that we were not prepared to discuss the return of Kandahar or of the territories acquired under the Treaty of Gundamuk : that we would not insist on a European envoy ; that there could be no question of relations with other foreign powers: and that if Abdur Rahman followed our advice in regard to external relations, we would help him against unprovoked foreign aggression."

In the meantime news came from Kabul, saying that Abdur Rahman was playing false and recommending the breaking up of the negotiations. "Ripon took the serious responsibility—in which his council supported him unanimously—of rejecting for a second time the advice of the men on the spot. He instructed Griffin to send Abdur Rahman a courteous reply, suggesting that he should come at once to Kabul, and hinting that we know all about his double game. Should he delay to reply, Stewart was given full power to break off negotiations and to take steps to enable the leaders of the party of the late Sher Ali to set up such Government as they could, but not to enter into any *engagement* with another candidate. The paramount object was to get the troops out of Afghanistan : to leave a settled Government behind was of secondary inportance."

Lord Ripon's step turned out to be successful. "Griffin's suspicions of Abdur Rahman were not justified, inasmuch as the latter replied frankly that he had to preserve a bellicose demeanour to satisfy the tribes, but that this did not represent his true attitude. He showed his good faith by starting for Kabul, and on July 19 he reached Charikar, about fifty miles from the city. On the 22nd a Durbar was held at Kabul, at which he was recognized as Amir with every sign of popular sympathy."

Lord Ripon's Government recognised this new Amir. "Apart from formal recognition, our support of Abdur Rahman consisted of a money gift of 15 lakhs (besides 9½ lakhs which had been left at Kabul by Yakub) and some guns."

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* *Ibid.*, p. 20.

† *Ibid.*, p. 21.

EVACUATION OF KABUL

Lord Ripon wanted the speedy departure of the British from Kabul. The new Amir also agreed to it. We read :

"It had been decided that the entire British force should retire as soon as the season admitted of this being done, with due respect for sanitary conditions. The Radicals at home were, of course, bent on the evacuation, and even the Lyttonites were scarcely less eager for it. Abdur Rahman wished us to go, so that his accession might be associated with the deliverance of his countrymen from English occupation. The return to India was conducted without a hitch. The population at this time were not unfriendly towards the English, especially as they were convinced that we were really going, and they showed no desire, as Lyall said, to 'tread on the snake's tail'."*

THE BATTLE OF MAIWAND

A disaster overcame the British army at the battle of Maiwand.

"On July 27 had occurred the battle of Maiwand. This disaster consisted in the rout of a brigade 2,500 strong, including one regiment of British Infantry, by an Afghan force estimated at from 15,000 to 16,000 men. It was speedily redeemed by Roberts, and had little effect on the ultimate course of events..."

We also read :

"On the 27th Burrows, marching to intercept Ayub, came upon him at Maiwand. The fight was commenced under unfavourable conditions, and the British were hopelessly outnumbered. Some of the native troops showed great unsteadiness, and the native cavalry refused to charge after, it is true, having been heavily punished by Ayub's artillery. The result was a complete rout."†

WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE ?

Opinion is divided as to who was responsible for the disaster at the battle of Maiwand. Was Lord Ripon responsible for it ?

Lucien Wolf says :

"In a note dated May 26 he (Haines) had recommended that, as soon as certain news was received of Ayub's intention to invade Kandahar, the Bombay reserve should be mobilized, and he had further stated that the garrison was too weak to admit of detaching a brigade to the Helmund. After the disaster, being pressed by high authorities at home, he not unnaturally quoted this document as clearing him from blame as regards the defeat."§

A STRANGE OVERSIGHT

He continues to say :

"It proved, however, on inquiry that the mobilization suggested in that document had actually been carried out in advance of news about Ayub, though by an oversight the Military Department had omitted to inform the Commander-in-Chief that this had been done."**

As regards Lord Ripon's share in the responsibility of the disaster, his biographer remarks thus :

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* *Ibid.*, p. 25.

† *Ibid.*, p. 29.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

"On the whole, it may be said that there is no question of Ripon having disregarded any recommendation of his military advisers. This was, indeed, the verdict of everyone in India and England who knew the facts. In two cases he might have done so with advantage—on July 4 he expressed an opinion that more European troops might be sent to reinforce Primrose, and, after the mutiny of the Wali's army, he proposed that Primrose should join Burrows, leaving a small garrison only in Kandahar. Here he certainly seems to have shown a better military instinct than Haines. Apart from bad troops, bad generalship, and bad luck, the prime cause of the disaster was the subordination of military to political considerations. How deeply Ripon felt the accusations levelled against him is shown by the length of his letters to Hartington, the Duke of Cambridge, and others explaining his case. In the middle of one of the letters to Hartington he breaks off :

"At this period of the Viceroy's letter the Secretary of State yawned and muttered to himself what an old prose that fellow Ripon is—a very true remark. But the Secretary of State should have remembered that the Viceroy's character is seriously at stake in these matters, and not only his political character but his accuracy and truthfulness."*

ROBERTS MARCHES TO KANDAHAR

It was Lord Ripon who suggested that Lord Roberts should march from Kabul to Kandahar. On September 3 Ayub's force was defeated by Roberts outside Kandahar. On September 5, Ripon wrote to Roberts :

"In my last letter to you I ventured in anticipation to say that your march would be famous in military history. It has more than fulfilled my expectations, and it seems to me to be one of the most remarkable exploits of the kind upon record. The criticisms upon the despatch of your force from Kabul have been noisy and confident, both in India and in England, but you have utterly refuted them and have confounded the prophets of evil."†

Again he writes to Northbrook on October 5, 1880 :

"I really believe that I may fairly take the chief share of the credit of having decided upon the policy of sending Roberts to Kandahar and simultaneously withdrawing Stewart from Kabul. Of course, both operations were suggested from various quarters ; but there was great difference of opinion with regard to their being carried out together, and in the end I made up my own mind on the morning of the 3rd August and carried the thing through. I have not said as much as this about my own part in the matter to anyone but yourself ; but after the attacks which have been made upon me, I hope I may be excused for telling a friend like you the real state of the case. The man who put the matter most clearly before me, in its double aspect political and military, was Griffin."§

EVACUATION OF KANDAHAR

The attention of the Ripon Government was now directed towards the question : whether Kandahar should be retained or evacuated. General Roberts advocated "our withdrawal from both these passes (the Khyber and the Kuram), coupled, it is true, with the two conditions that we should retain Kandahar and that we should guarantee the Kuram tribes against the imposition of Afghan rule."

About this and other proposals about Kandahar, Lord Ripon says:

"This puts us on velvet as regards the military aspect of the case...Roberts' present proposals are completely different from those which he formerly advocated, and I have some reason to think

* *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

that the change results from a wish on the part of Lytton and his friends to anticipate our probable policy, and be able to say that we were only following in their steps."*

In commenting on the above Wolf says:

"Here Ripon shows a misconception of the position of the Lyttonites. They were abandoning their Northern policy in Afghanistan which was the more vulnerable, in order to concentrate on the retention of Kandahar, where they had a much stronger case."

Lord Ripon proposed (and was supported by Col. East and Sir G. Wolsley) that the British should retire from Kandahar, retaining Pishin and Sibi. He thus explains:

"I am happy to say that I have no expectation of either a fresh Afghan war or a Russian invasion, but the language which, with your sanction, we have held to Abdur Rahman about foreign political interference in Afghanistan seems to me to make it necessary that, having the opportunity, we should maintain ourselves in a position in which we could without difficulty either support or control him, if occasion should arise. . . . . . If we give him Kandahar it will be necessary to have a treaty with him, and a strong position at Pishin would enable us to watch over the observance of that treaty from a vantage ground very favourable for the preservation of friendly relations with an Afghan ruler."†

In urging his proposal on Hartington, Ripon thus criticised the policy of a complete return to the old Sind Frontier:

"I will venture to say that if you go back to Sind, ten years will not elapse before we shall be fighting all over again the battle of the forward policy with a very fair prospect of being involved... in a fourth Afghan War, whereas, if you take up the position which I advocate, you may defy all the onslaughts of the few fanatics who would prefer the retention of Kandahar."§

Lord Ripon thus sums up the problem of Kandahar on September 30:

"It turns, in my opinion, entirely on the degree of importance which is to be attached to the idea, possibility, or danger of Russian invasion of India. If we are to look on Russia as a power which may, in some not remote period, undertake the invasion of India, I conceive that the strategic advantages of holding Kandahar...are enormous, and not to be overborne by the expense and inconvenience which would be incurred. But if we do not hold this to be a contingency to be seriously taken into our calculations, all the arguments about trade, prestige and so forth seem to me to be utterly inconclusive. I confess I am not as clear and positive on this vital point as Northbrook, Norman, and the other anti-annexationists; but on the whole I am inclined to think that the balance of opinion of reasonable men is on their side."**

Then came the final decision about the evacuation of Kandahar. Mr. Wolf says:

"The question of evacuation was eventually decided over the heads of the Government of India by the announcement, in the Queen's Speech at the opening of the 1881 session of Parliament, that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible. This 'satisfied our people' in England, and also enabled the Government of India to take their time with the question of Pishin and Sibi. The Council, however, were sore at not having had an opportunity of expressing their views, and a 'crop of minutes' sprang up, protesting against the decision of the Home Government."††

Now, Lord Ripon wanted to leave Abdur Rahman as the ruler of Kandahar also.

"On January 21, 1881, the Council accepted the Secretary of State's orders for evacuation and instructed General Hume accordingly, and on the 30th Ripon made the Amir a definite offer to hand

* *Ibid.*, p. 36.
† *Ibid.*, p. 38.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 39.
** *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.
†† *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

over Kandahar to him when we evacuated it in the early spring....Negotiations were difficult, as the Amir, when asked to send a confidential agent, replied that 'such persons do not exist in this country' and sent an envoy without powers to negotiate. However, he announced his intention to proceed to the occupation of the city."*

Accordingly, the British evacuation of Kandahar was completed on April 21, and it was handed over to the Amir's officers. But on July 27, the Amir's General was badly defeated by Ayub, who proceeded to occupy Kandahar. "At this stage Ripon insisted on a strict policy of non-intervention. The British forces having by this time retired behind the Khojak, he decided on no account to allow them to return to Afghanistan". The Amir, however, completely defeated Ayub and broke his power finally. "Having thus acquired Kandahar, he had no difficulty in adding Herat to his dominions, and the ideal of a 'strong and united Afghanistan' 'was realised'."

FORWARD POLICY ?

Lord Ripon denied in the press a rumour that he had been in favour of retaining Kandahar or of a "forward policy." He writes thus :

"I got a letter from Northbrook from which it was clear that he, usually so fair and just, had worked himself up into a state of mind which made him see a raving jingo in every one who hesitated about returning to the 'old Sind frontier'. So far as I am concerned there is only one thing connected with this subject which I resent, and that is, that my belief in the wisdom of retaining Pishin, at all events for the present, has anything to do with the slightest indication on my part to favour a forward policy....I have been chiefly actuated by the conviction that the retention of Pishin would tend to prevent complications which would afford an excuse for a resuscitation of a policy of interference in Afghan affairs....Anyhow, I am sure that it is fortunate that we are in strength now in those parts. If affairs settle down quietly in S. Afghanistan, and Abdur Rahman succeeds in holding his own through the summer, it will be greatly owing to the deliberate and gradual character of our withdrawal".†

HIS COUNCIL

About his own Council, Lord Ripon says :

"My task in managing Council, which is composed for the most part of men of very conservative tendencies, is not an easy one, and will probably become more difficult as the return of peace enables them to take up internal questions more vigorously. Hitherto I have got on very well...

"I find that Members of Council are frequently much more amenable after they have blown off their steam....The Council like to make a show of independence, they like to be treated with a certain amount of deference, but at last they can generally be got to do what is wanted. . I regard the check which the Council imposes on my arbitrary will as very valuable in a Government to so great an extent despotic as this Government necessarily is. There is a very strong desire to support the Viceroy, of which I have had many proofs..."§

ARMY REFORM

After the Afghan War, Lord Ripon busied himself with the Army question—'one of his oldest hobbies.' He submitted to the Home Government a series of recommendations, based on those of the Army Commission of 1879. He proposed the abolition of the

* *Ibid.*, p. 45.

† *Ibid.*, p. 48.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

Commanders-in-Chief in Madras and Bombay. He wanted to abolish the control of the Madras and Bombay Governments over the Army in their respective provinces. As to the disastrous effects of the system of divided control, he writes to Hartington: "The existence of the state of things I have been forced to describe, must be attributed, as it seems to me, to two main causes—to a system of double administration and divided responsibility, and to the exaggerated and false *esprit de corps* which that system had generated."

He complained of the incompetent officers selected by the Local Government: "One of the Brigadiers selected by the Bombay Government we had to remove because he lay in bed all day without sufficient cause—for the sake, he alleged, of warmth, his only apparent illness, as reported by the medical officer who examined him, being a very mild type of boils on the fingers."

Again, as for the *esprit de corps*, the people in Bombay

"seemed a great deal more anxious to fight the Bengal Army than the enemy" and "talked of Maiwand as if it had been a great victory, until I believe they they are really convinced that a great victory it was, just as George IV talked himself into a belief that he led a cavalry charge at Waterloo. They attribute all criticism to the malignant jealousy of 'Bengal' and refuse even to enquire into the meaning of so startling a phenomenon as the defeat at Maiwand."*

Lord Ripon spoke thus of the conservative element of the Government, who were against any reform :

"What is the use of a Liberal Government, so far as India is concerned, if it is to give itself up bound hand and foot to the guidance of a set of old gentlemen, whose energies are relaxed by age, and who, having excellent salaries, and no responsibility, amuse themselves by criticizing the proposals and obstructing the plans of those who have the most recent knowledge of the real state of India, and who have on their shoulders the whole responsibility for the good government of that country ?"†

To the objections of the Duke of Cambridge, who wished the dreadful Army Commission to be pigeon-holed on Lord Ripon's assuming office, Lord Ripon replied thus :

"The experience of the late war in Afghanistan showed to my mind conclusively that our present cadres were too weak....But if the strength of our European cadres ought to be increased, how is it to be done ? It is impossible for the finances of India to bear the burden of additional military expenditure. Every branch of our civil administration is already starved...and therefore, if our cadres are to be increased in strength, it can only be done by diminishing their number. But then your Royal Highness presses upon me that if we send home from hence batteries and regiments and battalions they will be disbanded. That I venture to say is not my business...If it is necessary for English objects to maintain a more expensive military organisation in India than India herself requires, then I say distinctly that England ought to pay for the extra cost. . I am quite ready that India should pay the whole cost of the military organization required by, and suited to, her circumstances and condition ; but I am not ready, if your Royal Highness will pardon me for saying so, *to be a consenting party to taxing the people of the country, who are a very poor people, merely to save the pockets of the richer tax-payers at home.*"§

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* *Ibid.*, p. 52.

† *Ibid.*, p. 53.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Unfortunately, his proposal for the abolition of the Presidency commands was hung up till 1893, when the necessary law was passed. His proposals for the reduction of expenditure were adopted, "so far as British troops were concerned, in part only, owing to the offence which would have been given to military susceptibilities at home. Ripon . . . resented strongly this subordination, as he thought, of Indian interests to those of English politicians and tax-payers."

CONTROVERSY WITH GLADSTONE ABOUT EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION

Lord Ripon resented the proposal that "India should bear the entire cost of the contingent sent by her to Egypt in 1882 to put down the Arabi rebellion. In this controversy he found himself in the painful position of having for his principal opponent Gladstone, whom on other occasions he always refers to as his most sympathetic supporter."

Lord Ripon thus wrote to Hartington :

"You say that Gladstone has some rather vague notions...that the British tax-payear is already enormously saddled with military expenditure on account of India, and that but for India large reductions could be made. I think I know what Gladstone means, and I am not at all sure that he is right. I imagine him to hold that the possession of a great dominion like India, where our power s ultimately based upon our military strength, tends to foster military ideas, to strengthen the power of the services at home, and to give a tone to the public mind unfavourable to economy. But however true this may be, what is there in it to justify you in making the ryot...pay an anna for military expenditure more than is absolutely necessary, I will not say for the maintenance of tranquility in India, but for the utmost needs of the English Government in this country ? ..The truth of the matter is, I fear, very simple ; you have got a Parliament at home, and you do not like either to ask it for more money or to face the outcry which would be raised against large military reductions ; therefore you impose a wholly unnecessary burden on the people of India, where there is no parliament to ask awkward questions or to make inconvenient resistance. This may be all very convenient to you at home, may help Childers to get over his difficulties with the Duke of Cambridge, and may make things pleasant in Parliament, but to my mind it is not *just*. The Cabinet, I admit, has got the giant's strength, and *it is using it like a giant*."*

It was afterwards "compromised by England paying India £500,000 or rather less than half the cost of the Indian contingent."

RUSSIAN MENACE

Russo-phobia was still in the air, specially with the Tories. Lord Ripon did not, like the Tories, believe the Russian menace to be formidable. He thus wrote to Hartington in 1882 :

"I believe that the fear of an invasion of India by the Russians, at all events in our days, is purely chimerical and I dismiss it at once for all political purposes ; but there is more plausibility in the notion that as the Russians approach our frontiers more nearly, they may when they are on bad terms with us try to stir up discontent and trouble by intrigues carried on within our dominions and the real question, therefore, is how can such intrigues be best met and defeated ? The Despatch of December 1880 gives the true answer—by good government and the development of the resources of the country. This is the work to which we ought to set ourselves with every energy which we

* *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

possess. It is a noble but a difficult task; there is a tide in the affairs of men here just now which if we seize it at the flood may enable us to do much in a comparatively short space of time; there are signs of progress throughout the country and evident indications of important changes, moral, intellectual and material, which are passing over the thoughts and lives of the people. Such a position of affairs is no doubt in many respects critical, requiring to be handled with much delicacy, but it is on the whole a hopeful one, if we only have the wisdom and courage to deal with it aright: a few years of just and righteous government may, in such circumstances, do a great deal to strengthen our hold on the people and to increase their confidence in us and their contentment in our rule. But we have a considerable leeway to make up; it is not easy to overstate the mischief which the whole tone of Lytton's Government produced among natives of all classess. ..The steady pursuit for some years of the policy upon which the present Government of India is endeavouring to act will place us in a better position to encounter Russian intrigues than the fortification of all the frontier towns of Afghanistan and the garrisoning of the whole of them with British troops."*

Lord Ripon also suggested that the British should enter into a treaty with the Russians. He writes:

"I am quite aware that no treaty will restrain an unscrupulous ruler if he thinks it his interest to break it; but I must, nevertheless, hold that a treaty is a very different thing from an understanding, and I cannot doubt that, if Russia were to sign now such a treaty as I have suggested, she would perfectly comprehend that it was a notice to her that no English Government would allow her either to interfere in Afghanistan herself, or to complain of any interference there in which we might think fit to indulge. To go to war for Merv appears to me to be impossible: to go to war because Russia refuses to demarcate the boundary of Persia appears to me equally, if not more, impossible; but to go to war because Russia, after having bound herself by a regular treaty not to interfere in the internal or external affairs of Afghanistan, had interfered in them, would be not only possible but in the highest degree justifiable."†

When in 1881 Russia took Geok Tepe and the Akhal territory, it was taken to be a new manifestation of the "Russian menace," and Hartington made a statement in Parliament that England would not allow foreign interference in Afghanistan. This induced Lord Ripon "to send home a memorandum on Central Asian policy, in which he formally advocated a definite treaty with Russia, under which we should acquiesce in her advance as far as Merv, while she should undertake not to interfere with Afghanistan."

Though at this time the Cabinet at home did not accept his proposal, in 1884 the British Government had to agree to a delimitation of the Russo-Afghan boundary.

About Persia, Lord Ripon did not want to revive the Disraeli policy. He wrote:

"My conviction is that if you put Persia into possession of Merv, her occupation of it would afford no protection against a Russian advance, if Russia were ever mad enough to think of striking at us through Afghanistan; while the presence of Persia at Merv would in ordinary times serve as a convenient screen behind which Russian intrigues in Afghanistan might easily be carried on. In brief, I hold to the old opinion that Persia is not to be trusted either as to ability or as to desire to resist Russia, and that therefore her advance in the direction of Afghanistan is not in accordance with our interests."§

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

† *Ibid.*, p. 60.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

When the Russo-Afghan Boundary Commission was appointed, he 'had the consolation of knowing that he had foreseen it.' He writes to Kimberley :

"If you had entered into direct communication with Russia in 1880 (1881 ?), you would have discounted the effect of her absorption of Merv, and have avoided the serious difficulties in which you are now placed."*

RIPON'S ECONOMIC POLICY

After the Afghan War, Lord Ripon laid down the programme of work, which included :

(a) Economic

Fiscal Reforms.
Land Reforms (including all measures based on the Famine Commission's Report).
Railway Policy.

(b) Political

Repeal of the Vernacular Press Act.
Local Self-Government.
Ilbert Bill.

In carrying out this programme of work, Lord Ripon felt a marked change in the relations between the India Office and the Government of India. He thus complains to Lord Aberdare :

"*In those times it was considered a great mistake to attempt to govern India from London.* It was held the business of the Secretary of State to lay down the general principles upon which India was to be administered, and then, so long as those principles were observed, to leave a large freedom to the Governor-General and to accord him a cordial support. Now-a-days, owing to a variety of causes, and among them to the telegraph and the increased facilities of communication of all kinds with England, a different system to a great extent prevails, and the interference of the India Office has largely increased. The result of a year's experience does not lead me to think that the change is advantageous."†

Sir John Strachey continued to be his Finance Minister inspite of the disaster of the "Missing Millions."

"MISSING MILLIONS"

Lucien Wolf gives the story of this blunder briefly as follows :

"In March 1880 an estimate of the cost of the war then in progress was put forward, which left out of account items of expenditure amounting to about five millions (*Lytton's Indian Administration*, p. 498). The explanation was that under the system then in force disbursements were only taken into account after they had been audited, and owing to the stress of work during the war, the audit had fallen a long way behind. The Finance Department, by accepting the faulty estimate from the Military Accounts Department, had made itself responsible, and though the military member (Sir E. Johnson) took upon himself more of the blame than he probably deserved (Letter to Hartington, October 4, 1830), Ripon was of the opinion that the responsibility of Strachey and Lytton was more than a technical one, since, but for their readiness to 'accept pleasant statements without enquiry,' they would have realized that the proffered estimates were impossibly low (to

* *Ibid.*, p. 63.
† *Ibid.*, p. 69.

Hartington, June 14, 1330). The above-mentioned letter to Hartington of October 4, 1830, is very damaging to Lytton and Strachey. They appear to have begged Johnson to take the blame. The letter is not referred to by Holland in his *Life of Hartington.*"*

The disaster of this "Missing Millions" had discredited Sir John Strachey, who wanted to resign at once, but stayed on till the arrival of his successor Major Evelyn Baring in December 1830. Though Lord Ripon had welcomed the appointment of Major Baring as his financial minister, "Baring's eagerness to force these good things (abolit ion of customs duties etc.) on a reluctant India led to difficulties with Ripon, who prided himself on not being a doctrinaire."

CONFLICT WITH BARING

The trouble arose when Baring in his Budget of 1882-83 proposed the abolition of all the import duties, except the "special duties" on liquors, etc., the reduction of the salt duty and the conversion of the existing 'License Tax' into an Income Tax. "Ripon saw clearly that Baring's proposed Budget was too heavily loaded with measures which were bound to offend Indian opinion—the Income Tax proposal being particularly dangerous." Lord Ripon, therefore, wanted to postpone it, but the conflict began when it was found out that Hartington "was inclined to back up Baring, and to 'make the plunge' at once."

Thus came a crisis in the administration of Lord Ripon, who felt that 'the public interest, and perhaps also his personal dignity, were at stake.' He even thought of resigning his post. He thus wrote to the Earl of Northbrook:

"I am convinced that the political effect would be deplorable if we were to give up all the cotton duties, to re-establish the Income Tax, and to be prevented by the Government at home from carrying out reductions of expenditure which were unanimously recommended...There is another reason for delay which weighs with me a great deal. We are going to repeal the Vernacular Press Act when we get to Calcutta. If at the very moment when we do so we bring forward a very unpopular Budget which the English Press are sure to attack vehemently and to accuse us of being 'dictated mainly in English interests,' what will the native Press do? They will repeat and exaggerate the charges of the English Press, and then the adversaries of the Liberty of the Press will cry out : 'This is exactly what we told you : You have unmuzzled the Vernacular Press, and see what is the result.' Is there anything in our financial position which makes it necessary to risk an injury of this kind to so great a political object as the freedom of the Press ?"†

To Hartington he put his case in this way :

"It must be remembered that it is the people who would be specially hit by Baring's taxation—the Bengal Zemindars, the native Bankers, merchants, etc., who influence chiefly the Press on the one hand and the native chiefs on the other." §

THOUGHTS OF RESIGNATION

As the result of this conflict, Lord Ripon even thought of resignation and thus wrote to the Earl of Northbrook on October 15, 1881 :

"If Baring and I ultimately differ, I do not at all know what line Hartington is likely to take.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71, note.

† *Ibid.*, p. 73.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

Baring's proposals will, I have no doubt, receive Mallet's support, and Mallet has great influence with Hartington upon questions of this kind....You will appreciate how difficult my position would be if I were to be overruled in such a matter. ..At .present I do not see how I should extricate myself from so false a position, although, of course, I am well aware that there are occasions in public life in which it is one's duty to support measures of which one may have great doubts as to the wisdom. If you find that the case which I am contemplating is likely to arise, please give me your advice as to what I ought, in your opinion, to do. It would cost me very little to go home ; my wife is not well, and I do not know how far it is the climate which is affecting her injuriously. I have been feeling the pressure of work somewhat of late, and if the Government at home does not want me out here any more, I should be far from sorry to return to my *lares* and *penates*; but at the same time, if it is thought I am any use here, I do not want to run away from my work. There are one or two directions in which I think that I might perhaps do some good, and, if so, I feel that I ought not lightly to abandon the task, but of course my power of usefulness depends entirely upon the support and confidence which I receive from the Secretary of State and the Government."*

Again he wrote to the Earl of Northbrook on Nov. 14, 1881 :

"On most points we [Baring and I] agree in principle. It may perhaps be said that the great distinction between us is that he is a Doctrinaire and I am not. I think a Doctrinaire policy is dangerous in India, and that in the circumstances of this country the Government ought to apply principles which are sound in themselves with a careful regard to the feelings and even the prejudices of those over whom they rule...He came out here with a cut-and-dried policy arranged between him and Mallet at the India Office without consideration of circumstances or of persons in this country... Mallet is a more utter doctrinaire than Baring and believes more than he does in the unredeemed wickedness of the Indian Civil Service...I suspect that Baring and Mallet thought that I was a much more colourless person, without opinions or a policy of my own, than I really am. They forgot, I imagine, that I have thought much about Indian questions all my life...."†

Happily, Lord Northbrook intervened and brought about an amicable settlement. He also wrote 'soothingly to the aggrieved' Viceroy :

"I hope and trust from my telegram that you have settled the Budget comfortably with Evelyn Baring, and that what I have written may have been of some little use in bringing two of my best friends together. I can quite understand your having thought that Evelyn Baring wanted to force your hand about the Budget, but I feel convinced from what he wrote to me that he had no such idea... You seem so fully to appreciate Evelyn's ability and good work that I cannot doubt that you will overlook his being a little impatient and anxious to get on.... My experience is, that real ability and good work is very rare and that it is a grand thing to find. You are a first-rate hand at managing people and I shall be surprised indeed if you do not find out very soon the best way of utilizing Evelyn's excellent qualities. ..I think you may be satisfied that, on any matter of importance, Hartington makes up his mind for himself ; in fact, I know of no one in Politics who has so clear and independent a judgment."§

Lord Northbrook was at last able to make a compromise. "The income tax was dropped, and the license tax left as it was, for the time."

HIS OPINION ON FREE TRADE

Though Lord Ripon was a Radical, his attitude towards Free Trade was not in accordance with that of 'Modern Radicalism.' He thus expressed his opinion in his Budget speech in 1882-83 :

* *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.
† *Ibid.*, p. 75.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

"I think that in India men have been apt to overlook the feelings which must naturally be entertained upon this subject by those who have all their lives been the earnest and conscientious advocates of the principles of Free Trade. No doubt it is perfectly true that when Manchester manufacturers ask for the repeal of the cotton duties, they are asking for something which will confer benefit upon themselves, but I venture to say that it is almost impossible for those who stood beside my friends, the late Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright in the great Free Trade controversies of the past, to understand how men can possibly accuse them of selfishness, because they desire to confer upon the people of India those benefits from which they and the people of England had derived so many blessings. And again, I think, that in England men have not understood that strong -I had almost said that vehement—dread which exists in this country in connection with the imposition of direct taxation. Neither, I think, have they adverted to the fact of the limited extent to which economic principles are either studied or understood here, and might have been made the subject of more and more misunderstanding between two great branches of the subjects of our Queen Empress, who ought to feel that they form but one people under the shadow of her august throne."*

HIS OPINION ON OPIUM REVENUE

Lord Ripon was not in favour of giving up the opium revenue. He said thus :

"My view on the subject of opium is a very simple one. I do not deny that there are objections of various kinds to the opium revenue. I do not deny that it is not a satisfactory branch of our revenue in many ways ; but I say distinctly that I will be no party to abandoning that revenue unless I can clearly see my way to replace it by some other form of taxation which would be neither oppressive to the people nor strongly repugnant to public opinion. Well, I can see nothing of the kind. I have considered the question very carefully. I have considered it with the utmost respect for the opinion of those excellent men who take a different view of this subject from that which I take, and who are moving at home in the matter, and I have been totally unable to discover the taxation by which our opium revenue could be replaced, and by which, without oppression, without incurring a great and, I may say, a just unpopularity, we should have the slightest chance of recouping ourselves if we were to abandon that revenue in whole or in part. As I said before, it is, in my judgment, the first duty of the Government of India to consider the interests of the people of India ; and it is from that point of view that I look at this question, and looking at it from that point of view, I can have no doubt that the course which the Government of India have determined to take—namely, that of maintaining our position with respect to the opium revenue, is a just and right one."†

THE RAILWAY QUESTION

Again, Lord Ripon came into collision with the Home Authorities over the Railway question. "His interest in railways was concerned chiefly with their efficacy in preventing famine. The supreme object of his policy on its economic side was, indeed, the defence of the country against famine, and perhaps the most important recommendation of the Famine Commission had estimated that at least 5,000 miles of protective railways were still required in India, and that two-thirds of this length could not be expected to yield a commercial return on the cost of construction. The amount available from the Famine Insurance Fund for the construction of these lines would only suffice for their completion in thirty years, and, in order to obtain funds for quicker construction, Ripon wished to employ that amount (£ 500,000) in guaranteeing interest to private firms who should undertake to construct them."

* *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

Writing on this subject to Lord Hartington, Lord Ripon said (November 12, 1881):

I wish I could convey to you my notion of the deep sense of responsibility which weighs upon me in regard to this question of famine prevention. It seems to me almost a test question for the English Government in India—a test of whether it is or is not beneficial to the people of the country. If with all our power and with all our knowledge and all our science we *cannot preserve them from dying of starvation* by hundreds of thousands every few years, how can we justify our domination over them? ...Is it a satisfactory answer to say that we are making our protective railways at the rate of £ 500,000 a year, and that, after some three or four more famines have passed by, we hope to have given our people reasonable security against their future recurrence."*

FIGHTING THE FINANCIAL PEDANTS

Though Lord Ripon put forward his scheme with great force, it was not accepted. "This time the pedants and doctrinaires prevailed and the scheme was rejected." Lord Ripon submitted another plan to the next Secretary of State, Kimberley. He wrote:

"I dare say that I seem utterly unprincipled to those who look at the matter either from a purely railway or a purely economical point of view, and so no doubt in their sense I am. I want these lines made; I believe it to be one of the very foremost duties of the Government to get them made; and I am ready to accept any practical scheme which will effect that object. In July 1881 we proposed a plan for this purpose to Hartington, which appeared to us to be in entire accordance with the principles laid down in a despatch of his [advocating the employment of private enterprise]. This plan was rejected, and we have offered another in its stead."†

Even Kimberley could not meet the demands of Lord Ripon. "A severe attack in the House of Commons by Edward Stanhope on the alleged extravagance of the Government of India—to which Baring wrote a crushing reply later—made it politically inexpedient to sanction any additional expenditure for the time. Kimberley had the question referred to a Select Committee, whose report, though deprecating Ripon's plan of hypothecating the famine fund for interest, did recommend an increased rate of expenditure on the 'protective' lines"

LAND QUESTIONS

Lord Ripon in writing to Gladstone spoke of the land question as the greatest of all problems, and in writing to Mallet, he referred to the question of land revenue assessment as "of far more vital importance to the primary interests of the great mass of the people than the question of local self-government."

In the report of the Famine Commission of 1876, the Commissioners "dealt exhaustively with every ascertainable cause to which these periodic disasters might be traced, and their proposals not only cover the entire field of Indian land policy but go to the roots of the whole system of Indian administration."

Accordingly the Department of Revenue and Agriculture, which had been abolished before Ripon's arrival was reconstituted. "To this department, and to the corresponding departments which were formed in the provinces, were entrusted all questions of an agrarian nature, including famine, the improvement of agriculture, the assessment and

* *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

† *Ibid.*, p. 81.

collection of land revenue, and the relations of landlord and tenant. The creation of a new system of revenue assessment, based on a survey kept always up-to-date, and not to be enhanced save for stated reasons, the publication of a Famine Code laying down the procedure to be adopted in case of scarcity, the construction of protective railways and irrigation works, and the improvement of agricultural methods were among the chief matters with which Ripon had to deal."

He also tried to deal with the question of the rights of the tenants as against the landlords in Bengal and brought in the Bengal Rent Bill, the main object of which was :

"Indeterminate though these rights were, they at least included the right of occupancy conditional upon the payment of the established rate of rent and the privilege of having that rate fixed by public authority. Under the Mogul Government the land tax was collected by farmers or contractors or rajas, sometimes mere nominees of the rulers of the day, sometimes possessing pre-existent rights of various kinds. The British Government converted this intermediate class into the Zamindars of the Permanent Settlement, and changed the land tax of the Moguls into the rents of the Zamindari estates. But the Zamindars, though termed actual proprietors of the land, were not absolute proprietors as against the Ryots. The latter possessed substantial rights which, at the time of the Permanent Settlement, though not then ascertained and defined, were saved in express terms, and the Government of 1793 reserved to itself the power......to ascertain and settle those rights at any future time when it might deem expedient to do so."*

To consider any change in the tenancy laws, Lord Ripon in 1879 appointed a Commission, which proposed the following principles :

"(1) To give the settled Ryot the same security in his holding as he enjoyed under the old customary law ;

(2) To ensure to the landlord a fair share of the increased value of the produce of the soil ; and

(3) To lay down rules by which all disputed questions between landlord and tenant could be reduced to simple issues and decided upon equitable principles."

About the Bengal Tenancy Bill, Lord Ripon said : "I must not conceal from you that any measure such as we have proposed will be very distasteful to the Zamindars," but, he said, "it will give the tenants no more than the rights to which they were entitled at the time of the Permanent Settlement," and pleaded for an early decision, as the question was more than ripe for settlement.

But the Bill did not receive any encouragement from the India Office. "The Secretary of State offered to allow a Bill to be introduced containing Ripon's proposal, but on the implied understanding that sanction to that proposal might eventually be withheld. Ripon naturally refused thus to put himself into a false position, and the Bill was introduced in March 1883 on the lines of the India Office proposal."

The biographer of Lord Ripon observes about the fate of the Bill :

"The subsequent history of the Bill is one of stubborn fighting between the Government of India and the Bengali land-owners. It was found necessary to make many concessions to the latter, but Ripon adhered steadfastly to the main principles of the Bill. In so doing he was risking unpopularity among the most influential class of natives, and the section whom he championed was the least articulate part of the population."†

* *Ibid.*, p. 84.
† *Ibid.*, p. 87.

Lord Ripon thus wrote to Tom Hughes :

"The Bill does not go quite as far as I could wish, as I could not screw Hartington up to the point of accepting a really complete measure, but he sanctioned just before he left the India Office a long step in the right direction, and with this we must be content. We shall, of course, meet with strong opposition from the land-owing interest, and as the Zamindars and others have the command of powerful associations and the special organs in the Press, while the Ryots can scarcely make their voices heard at all, you must expect to have your ears assailed with outcries, and to be told that I have lost all my popularity and am regarded with aversion. Popularity is worth nothing (although I do not pretend to dislike it) unless it can be used as an engine to enable the Government to do good works ; and if it is to be diminished, or to be lost in fighting the battles of the poor cultivators of the soil, it is not worth retaining for an hour."*

Thus there was a fear that Lord Ripon might lose his popularity over the Bengal Tenancy Bill. His biographer says :

"There was a serious danger that the Bengal Tenancy Bill might drive a wedge into the party of the educated Indians just at the time when the race-conflict aroused by the Ilbert Bill was at its height. On December 5, 1883, Ripon writes to A. O. Hume of a reported 'unholy alliance' between the Anglo-Indian Defence Association and the Zamindar party. Although this was not accomplished, Ripon became the object of much resentment on the part of the Zamindars. Sir A. Colvin reported to him : 'As to natives, the Zamindari section here...are very disinclined to show any good will towards you. The younger Bengal section, on the other hand, are enthusiastic and the two are at present casting about for a *modus vivendi*'."†

LAND QUESTION IN OUDH

Lord Ripon also interested himself in the land question in Oudh. In his farewell letter to Sir Stuart Bayley, he says : "My last petition to you is to look after the interests of the Oude tenants and to get Lord Dufferin to stand up for them against the India Office,"

Finally, both the Bengal and Oudh land questions were disposed of by Lord Dufferin, who, according to Lord Ripon's wish, successfully "stood up for the Oude tenants against the India Office."

In paying a tribute to Lord Ripon's economic policy, the Marquess of Hartington wrote thus (Dec. 11, 1882) :

"I will not say that I altogether regret the change, for, as I have already told you, I have long felt that the business of the India Office was more than I could contend with, and I much doubt whether, when very large questions have to be dealt with, such as some of those which are now under consideration, it is not more than any man, with much House of Commons work and much to do in the Cabinet with subjects of general policy, can attempt to manage ; and I have long felt that many of the subjects at which you have worked so hard and in which you have taken so much interest have been neglected and postponed in a way which was not fair to you, your colleagues, or India....Obstructive as you may have considered us sometimes at the India Office, there is only one opinion there as to the great zeal and ability of the present Government of India, and as to the excellent effect which has been produced in India by your administration. Only the other day Sir F. Halliday, who is one of the strongest opponents of your Bengal land policy, said, in

* *Ibid.*, p. 88.

† *Ibid.*, p. 88.

speaking to me of the strong opposition which he expected it would encounter, and the impossibility, as he considered it, of carrying such a measure in the face of public opinion in India : 'But Lord Ripon is so popular that there is no knowing what he could not carry.' And this popularity seems to me to have been earned in the most legitimate manner and entirely by the conviction which you and your colleagues have been able to bring home to all classes that you and your Government were devoting your whole energies to measures for improving the condition of the people and developing the resources of the country. I can only regret in leaving the office that I have not been able to do more to support you, and I can assure you that I have appreciated and sometimes been astonished at the immense amount of work which you have done and sent home to us. And notwithstanding some differences of opinion which have occasionally existed between us, I must thank you very heartily for the temper in which you have received instructious which you have not altogether approved, and the patience with which you have endured our delays. I do not think I can part from you with a better wish than that the end of your term of government may be as successful and prosperous as its commencement..."*

POLITICAL REFORMS

The best of Lord Ripon's achievements was his political reform in the domain of Local Self-government. He laid down the guiding principle of his political reforms in his memorandum on Local Self-government towards the end of 1882 :

"No one who watches the signs of the times in this country with even moderate care can doubt that we have entered upon a period of change : the spread of education, the existing and increasing influence of a free Press, the substitution of legal for discretionary administration, the progress of railways, telegraphs, etc., the easier communication with Europe, and the more ready influx of European ideas, are now beginning to produce a marked effect apon the people ; new ideas are stirring up ; new aspirations are being called forth ; the power of public opinion is growing and strengthening from day to day ; and a movement has begun which will advance with greater rapidity and force every year. Such a condition of affairs is one in which the task of government, and especially practically despotic government, is beset with difficulties of no light kind ; to move too fast is dangerous, but to lag behind is more dangerous still ; and the problem is how to deal with this new-born spirit of progress, raw and superficial as in many respects it is, so as to direct it into a right course, and to derive from it all the benefits which its development is capable of ultimately conferring upon the country, and at the same time to prevent it from becoming, through blind indifference or stupid repression, a source of serious political danger. Considerations such as these give great importance to measures which, though small in themselves, are calculated to provide a legitimate outlet for the ambitions and aspirations which we ourselves created by the education, civilization, and material progress which we have been the means of introducing into the country ; such measures will not only have an immediate effect in promoting gradually and safely the political education of the people, which is in itself a great object of public policy, but will also pave the way for further advances in the same direction, as that education becomes fuller and more widespread. It is only what ought to be expected by every thoughtful man that after 50 years of a free press and 30 years of expanding education, with European ideas flowing into the country on every side, and old, indigenous customs, habits, and prejudices breaking down all round, as caste is breaking down through the instrumentality of railways and other similar influences, changes should be taking place in the thoughts, the desires, and the aims of the intelligent and educated men of the country which no wise and cautious Government can afford to disregard, and to which they must gradually adapt their system of administration if they do not wish to see it broken to pieces by forces which they have themselves called into being, but which they have failed to guide and to control. And even if there were no such necessity as the present circumstances

* *Ibid.*, p. 90-91.

of the country create for meeting the needs and providing for the aspirations of a time of change and progress, it would always be an aim worthy of the English Government in India *to train the people over whom it rules more and more as time goes on to take an intelligent share in the administration* of their own affairs. Among the political objects attainable in India, I see at present none higher. The credit of having set that object before the Government of India belongs to a Conservative, not a Liberal statesman ; but it surely behoves the friends of liberal principles in the wide, not in any narrow party sense of the words, not to let Lord Mayo's policy become unfruitful in their hands, nor to allow it to be stifled beneath the stolid indifference or the covert hostility of men who cannot understand its meaning or appreciate its wisdom. There are, of course, always two policies lying before the choice of the Government of India. The one is the policy of those who have established a Free Press, who have promoted education, who have admitted natives more and more largely to the public services in various forms, and who have favoured the extension of self-government ; the other is, that of those who hate the freedom of the Press, who dread the progress of education, and who watch with jealousy and alarm everything which tends, in however limited a degree, to give the Natives of India a larger share in the management of their own affairs. Between these two policies we must choose ; the one means progress, the other means repression. Lord Lytton chose the latter. I have chosen the former, and I am content to rest my vindication upon a comparison of the results."*

Lord Ripon's policy was to train the Indians "to take an intelligent share in the administration of their own affairs." He, therefore, favoured the extension of local self-government in India. In writing to Gladstone, Lord Ripon said :

"India is governed by a Bureaucracy which, though I sincerely believe it to be the best that the world has ever seen, has still the faults and the dangers which belong to every institution of that kind ; among these faults is conspicuously a jealousy of allowing non-officials to interfere in any way whatever with any portion, however restricted, of the administration of the country."

EVOLUTION OF HIS SCHEME OF SELF-GOVERNMENT

In a letter to Hartington (July 13, 1882) Lord Ripon explains the genesis of his own scheme. He writes:

"From an early period after my arrival I turned my attention to the subject of Local Self-government. During my tour in 1880 the question was in various ways brought under my notice, and after I recovered from my illness at the end of that year I began to consider the subject carefully. I intimated to you at that time the direction in which my thoughts were tending ; but in answering my letter you did not touch on the point, and none of your subsequent letters contained any allusion to it. The question occupied my attention, however, a good deal from time to time, and after I came up here last year I began to collect information in regard to it. I cannot now recollect whether I spoke to Baring about it, or whether he took it up independently......but when he brought before me the draft of the Resolution on Provincial Agreements which was subsequently issued on 30th September last, I found in it to my great satisfaction clear proofs of his concurrence in the views which my examination of the subject has led me to form."†

About the evolution of the scheme, Lucien Wolf says :

"It was the quinquennial revision of the 'Provincial Contracts' which gave Ripon his first opportunity of putting forward his policy of extending the principle of local self-government. Under Mayo's scheme of Financial Decentralization, contracts were made between the Central and the Provincial Governments for the allocation of revenue and expenditure, and it had been the policy

* *Ibid.*, p. 93-95.

† *Ibid.*, p. 96.

when these contracts came up for quinquennial revision to enlarge the sphere of the Provincial Governments. When in 1881 these contracts came up for revision in due course, the Government of India announced (Resolution of September 30, 1881) that the time had come when these contracts 'should no longer ignore the question of Local Self-Government'......"

Lord Ripon thus explains his scheme in a letter to Tom Hughes:

"You will observe that the Resolution is so framed that while laying down a few broad general principles, it leaves a large discretion to Local Governments as to the mode in which those principles are to be carried out in different parts of the country. You will see that with regard to the election of members of local boards, we have not prescribed its immediate adoption everywhere. *My own feeling is that the elective system may be at once considerably extended*; but I quite admit that it is not at present equally applicable to all districts, and that its extension must be gradual. The Resolution leaves to Local Governments the widest choice as to the mode of election to be adopted. The ordinary system at present where election exists is the simple vote with an uniform suffrage, but I have a good deal of doubt whether this is really the best system for India in the existing condition of the people. I do not want to change it hastily where it is in operation, but I should like to see other plans tried in other places. I am inclined to think that election by caste or occupations would in many cases be more consonant with the feelings of the people than direct election, and more likely to lead to the right sort of men coming forward as candidates. The introduction of the cumulative vote, if it could be made intelligible to the native mind, would bring about the same result, though in a different and less direct manner. As regards the extent of the suffrage, though I am, as you know, radical enough on the subject at home, I do not think that India is yet fit for a low suffrage; I should, therefore, generally speaking, keep it moderately high at present. What I want to secure by the extension of Local Self-Government is not a representation of the people of an European democratic type, but the gradual training of the best, most intelligent, and most influential men in the community to take an interest and an active part in the management of their local affairs.

"But the point of the Resolution to which I attach most importance is that which relates to the position which, generally speaking, I desire to see occupied by the chief executive officer of the District, etc., towards the municipalities or local boards within his jurisdiction. The Resolution does not lay down any hard and fast rule on this subject, and I am quite aware that there will be districts in different parts of the country, where for a time at all events the local boards must be placed under the direct guidance of the District officer; but I am strongly impressed with the conviction that this arrangement, though it may be necessary in some cases, is not in itself desirable, either as regards Boards or as regards the Executive officers. If the Boards are to be of any use for the purpose of training the natives to manage their own affairs, they must not be overshadowed by the constant presence of the *Burra Sahib*, which may be freely translated 'big swell' of the district; they must be left gradually more and more to run alone, though watched from without by the Executive authorities and checked if they run out of the right course. Unless a certain freedom of action is allowed them, the best men are not likely to wish to be upon them, and they will be filled with a less reliable sort of persons, or will be, as they so often are now, mere shams. It also seems to me that the position of the executive officer outside the board......will be more dignified and more impartial than it would be if he, as chairman, had either dictated the proceedings or taken an active share in the controversies connected with them . ...But though for these reasons I am desirous to keep the chief executive officers as much as possible off the Local Boards, you will see that the Resolution reserves to the Government very full and complete powers of supervision and control, powers to oblige local boards to do their work efficiently, powers to prevent them from doing mischief. I hold it to be essential that the Government should possess these powers, and I should never hesitate to exercise them, whenever it might be necessary. Again, I should like you to understand that what I am trying to do is *not to impose an English system on India, but to revive and extend the indigenous system of the country*. That indigenous system we have done a great deal to destroy,

but the remnants of it exist to a greater or less extent in most parts of the country, and it is upon those remnants that I hope to build up my edifice of Local Self-government; that is why I prefer, as the Resolution indicates, small areas to large, as the unit of my arrangements; in small areas it will be more easy to make full use of what remains of the village system, and to let the superstructure of Local Self-government rise upon that ancient foundation."*

Lord Ripon did not like that these Boards should be 'overshadowed by the constant presence of the *Burra Sahib.*' He wanted non-officials as chairmen of these Boards. He says :

"No doubt there will be disappointment if it should turn out, as under the present circumstances is only too probable, that the Local Governments place the District officers at the head of most of the District Boards; but so long as it is seen that the experiment of control from without is being tried in good faith, here and there, the best men will be content to await the result of that experiment in the hope that, if it is successful, the system of external control will be gradually extended. I am quite aware of the dislike with which the educated Native is regarded by many persons, and especially by men who, like Sir Ashley Eden, have a strong Philistine element in their composition. I admit that our Western Education, in its present stage in India, does not unfrequently render its Eastern recipients vain and bumptious; but the best way to bring them to their true bearings is to put them to the test of practical work, and to afford them every opportunity which we can of learning the difference between superficial and solid knowledge, and between talking and doing."†

Eden was not in favour of the policy of 'control from without', and he said : "The magistrate should lead, and not drive." As Kimberley was also of the same opinion, Lord Ripon thus wrote to him :

"My name has been, through various circumstances, connected is a special manner with the Local Self-Government policy of the present Government of India, and that policy has obtained for me an amount of confidence, and I believe I may say, of attachment, on the part of the Natives throughout the country which has greatly surprised me."§

Lord Ripon also gave hints of resignation, to which Kimberley replied :

"The weapon you wield, when you say that you doubt whether you can conduct the Indian Administration with advantage, is so powerful with me, both on personal and political grounds, that I hope you will use it mercifully."

In comparing this Bill with the Ilbert Bill, Lord Ripon says :

"It would, I am confident, have a far less mischievous effect from a political point of view if we were to give up the Criminal Procedure Bill, than if we should recede from our policy of Local Self-government."

Again :

"It is one of the evils of the existing excitement that it interferes seriously with the progress of our Local Self-government arrangements, and of other measures of much greater real importance to the country than the Criminal Procedure Bill."

Thus he writes to Tom Hughes :

"Please keep steadily in your mind that our Local Self-government policy is of much more importance than Ilbert's Bill. The one is a policy looking onward to the future and intended to

* *Ibid.*, pp. 97-100.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

meet in time the great coming difficulty of our rule here ; the other is only a single measure, sound in its purpose and inevitable sooner or later, but which, except as witnessing to a principle, will have little practical effect."*

Lord Ripon was fortunate in getting the sympathy of the local provincial heads as well as of the subordinate 'bureaucrats.' Madras, Bengal and the Punjab coincided with Lord Ripon's views :

"The only serious opposition came from Bombay. The Presidency possessed already a fairly advanced system of Local Self-government, and the whole service, from the Governor to District officers, showed a strong resentment of Ripon's interference. The Governor, Sir J. Fergusson, was a man of a type unsympathetic to Ripon, who was always laughing at his action in prohibiting the use of Macaulay's essays on Clive and Hastings as text-books in the Bombay schools, lest they should prove subversive of loyalty....The Government of Bombay published a Resolution in which it stated that the Government of India 'insists on the introduction without delay of very radical measures' of self-government, and 'placed on record' its opinion 'that measures so extensive are premature.' To this 'very unseemly document,' as Kimberley called it, the Government of India sent a stiff reply, and Fergusson eventually 'yielded with a fair grace'."†

On the whole, the Local Self-government policy was favourably received in India. The educated Indians were enthusiastic ; it is, indeed, as the 'father of Local Self-government' that Ripon is still remembered. Even the Anglo-Indian Press was not hostile until the Ilbert Bill controversy led to the indiscriminate denunciation of all Ripon's measures. As regards the men who actually had to work the policy—the District officers—they seem on the whole to have accepted it loyally, despite the opposition in Bombay. Lyall told Ripon : "I believe our best District officers are heartily in favour of the policy of withdrawing the District Magistrate from the chairmanship when possible." Grant Duff said :

"I have now had an opportunity of discussing (the policy of Local Self-government) with some of our best men, and I am happy to say that, so far from finding any reluctance on their part to carry into effect your policy, they are ready to do so, not only as a matter of duty, but because they are persuaded that it is right and wise."§

It must be said to the credit of Lord Ripon, the Father of Local Self-government in India, that before his departure from India, the Local Self-government Acts had been passed for the majority of the Indian provinces. "They empowered the Local Government to extend the principle of election in Municipalities, District Boards and in Boards formed for the subdivisions of Districts, and to permit such bodies to elect their own chairmen when deemed advisable."

REPEAL OF THE VERNACULAR PRESS ACT.

The repeal of the Vernacular Press Act, observes Mr. Wolf, though not of great importance in itself, acquired an embittered prominence as a touchstone of what was held to be the vital difference between the Lyttonite and Riponite traditions.

With the Liberals coming to power, the repeal of the Act was a foregone conclu-

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* *Ibid.*, p. 103.

† *Ibid.*, p. 105.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 105-6.

sion. But Lord Ripon did not take any immediate step to repeal the Act. Thus he wrote to Hartington :

"I see that you have been asked questions in the House of Commons about the License Tax and the Vernacular Press Act...I have given some attention to [the latter] already, but not enough to say whether it would be wise to repeal it at once or not. Anyhow, it will require delicate management if the repeal is determined on, as the majority of the Legislative Council have committed themselves to its support, and their concurrence is necessary for its repeal."*

But Gladstone was "extremely anxious for repeal or modification, and on January 28, 1881, an official dispatch was sent to India, suggesting that the repeal might be considered, and that, if thought necessary, the clause in the Penal Code might be amended so as to facilitate the suppression of seditious writing by means of the ordinary law."

As to Lord Ripon's policy, his biographer says :

"It would have been possible for Ripon to proceed by administrative action alone, as, under the wording of the Act, he could have withdrawn all parts of India from its operations, but from this he was averse. The important thing was to get the Act off the Statute Book. The accomplishment of this was a signal example of Ripon's diplomatic skill....

"Ripon's first plan was to overrule his Executive Council and to fill up the existing vacancies on the Legislative Council with safe men, and propose to them that the Act should be repealed :

"If we are beaten in the Legislative Council by a majority of one, it seems that you would have an easier task in counselling patience, because you would be able to show that the Government at home and the Governor-General here had done everything in their power to get the Act repealed, and that by changes which would necessarily take place in the composition of the Legislative Council before the next Calcutta session, the success of a repealing Bill will be rendered certain."†

Again, he thus wrote to Hartington (Oct. 29,1881) :

"I telegraphed to you after the meeting of Council on Wednesday to say that we had decided to repeal the V. P. Act without attempting to tinker the Penal Code. This is a great satisfaction to me, and I hope now that in a very short time the Indian Statute Book will be cleansed from that wretched piece of legislation. Gibbs was the only member of Council who expressed any hesitation about the simple repeal. I did not expect to get the matter settled so easily, as the great majority of the Local Authorities consulted were in favour of some amendment of the Penal Code. The fact is that the Indian official regards the Press as an evil, necessary perhaps, but to be kept within as narrow limits as possible ; he has no real feelings of the benefits of free discussion."§

EDUCATIONAL POLICY

In 1881 Lord Ripon appointed a Commission to consider the educational policy of the Government of India. He wanted to appoint Mr. Ananda Mohan Bose as the President of this Commission. But Mr. Bose modestly shrank from such prominence and also thought that the recommendations of a Commission presided over by an Englishman would carry more weight with British statesmen and officials. So he advised Lord Ripon that an Englishman should be made the President of the Commission. Accordingly Mr. (afterwards Sir) W. W. Hunter was appointed its

* *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.
† *bid.*, p. 112.
§ *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114



Ananda Mohan Bose

president. Mr. Bose was one of the members. The Government Resolution appointing this commission directed that the actual working of all branches of the Indian educational system was to be considered. It pointed out that the principal subjects for the consideration of the commission should be "the present state of elementary education throughout the Empire and the means by which this can everywhere be extended and improved." And it proceeded to say that only by Indian men themselves taking the initiative in educational experiments will the Indian community "be able to ensure that freedom and variety of education which is an essential condition in any sound and complete educational system."

"It is not, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, a healthy symptom that all the youth of the country should be cast, as it were, in the same Government educational mould. Rather is it desirable that each section of the people should be in a position to secure that description of education which is most consonant to its feelings, and suited to its wants. The Government is ready, therefore, to do all that it can to foster such a spirit of independence and self-help. It is willing to hand over any of its own colleges or schools in suitable cases to bodies of native gentlemen who will undertake to manage them satisfactorily as aided institutions, all that the Government will insist upon being that due provision is made for efficient management and extended usefulness....Care must be taken that no unnecessary obstacles are thrown in the way of the upward progress of really deserving students of the poorer classes."

There has been in subsequent years a wide departure in the educational policy of the Government from the spirit of this Resolution. "This Commission reported in October 1883, and the report was submitted home and circulated to Local Governments. A year later the Government published an important Resolution, embodying generally the recommendations of the Commission; but Ripon's reign was then too near its close for him to take further steps to give effect to his policy. The work of the Commission, none the less, remains one of the signal monuments of his Viceroyalty." The admirable *resumes* of indigenous education which the Commission's Report contains make it an historical document of great value. Indian educational achievements are mentioned in it throughout in a tone of uniform respect.

INDIANS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE

As regards the admission of Indians to the Civil Service, Lord Ripon 'did excellent spade-work of a liberal kind.' In the dispatch of September 1884, the whole question was discussed. The Government of India

"desired to facilitate the entrance of Indians through the I.C.S. Examination by raising the age-limit and by including oriental languages among the subjects which might be taken, and they proposed to appoint annually to the superior service a number of Indians who, together with the number passing into the I. C. S., should make 18 per cent. of the total recruitment to the superior posts. These appointments were to be made by the Local Governments, who were to make their own rules for selecting candidates, subject to the approval of the Government of India. A certain standard of intellectual attainment was to be insisted on.*

THE ILBERT BILL

Another important event in the rule of Lord Ripon was the passing of what is popularly known as the Ilbert Bill, which raised a fierce storm in the political sky of

* *Ibid.*, p. 117

India. Though Lord Ripon did not attach much importance to this "Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Bill"—*i. e.*, the famous Ilbert Bill—several of his English friends remarked that he 'was going too fast in the matter of reforms.'

As to the origin of this Ilbert Bill, Lord Ripon thus wrote to Hartington (Sept. 8, 1882):

"We are about to send you...a Despatch upon an important subject to which I would beg you to give your early attention. The native members of the Civil Service—both those who have got in by competition at home, and those who are being admitted every year out here under the system established in Lytton's time—will ere long be rising to positions in which, although they are in all other respects on an equal footing with their English colleagues, they will, under the provisions of the existing law, be precluded from trying Europeans in the Mofussil. In the Presidency towns, by a strange anomaly, natives are allowed to exercise over Europeans a jurisdiction from which they are debarred outside the limits of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. It is clear that an invidious distinction of this kind between members of the same service cannot be maintained. When we were passing the Bill for amending the Criminal Procedure Code through the Legislative Council at Calcutta last winter, one of the leading Native members of the Council, Maharajah Sir Jotindra Mohun Tagore, was anxious to bring the subject forward and move amendments in the Bill with a view to giving Native Civil Servants jurisdiction over Europeans. The Bill was then in its last stage and I pointed out to the Maharajah, in a private conversation with him, that it would be impossible for the Government to make so important a change in the law at such short notice. I begged him, therefore, not to move his amendments, but promised that the Government would take the subject into its consideration without delay. Very shortly afterwards Sir Ashley Eden sent us a letter saying that in his opinion the existing law on the subject could not be maintained, and explaining the manner in which he thought it should be altered. We, therefore, sent a circular to Local Governments generally, asking their opinion on the matter, and they have all, with the insignificant exception of Coorg, decided in favour of an alteration to the present law. Sir Charles Aitchison, with whom I personally agree, would go somewhat further than the rest of the heads of Governments; but the majority of the Council prefer to adopt a course more in accordance with the views of the Local Governments. Baring agrees with Aitchison and myself...If the arrangements put forward in Hope's minute were to be adopted, and the power of trying Europeans were to be given only to Native District Magistrates and Sessions Judges, it would really confine the concession in practice to the latter only, as District Magistrates everywhere have as a rule too much to do with their administrative duties and appellate work to try original cases. The apparent concession would therefore be a practical sham; and in a case like this, in which we have to deal with very strong feelings, it is better to do nothing than to expose the Government to a charge of having pretended to do an act of justice to the Native members of the Civil Service while, in reality, leaving them in very much the same position as that which they occupy at present."*

The Government of India, therefore, made the following proposal:

"We propose to confine the office of justice of the peace, and with it the power of trying European British subjects, to those persons, whether European or native, who have received a training that may be presumed to guarantee the possession of the qualities required for the proper disposal of such cases. In this view we think that all district magistrates and sessions judges should be vested with the powers in question in virtue of their office, and by a definite provision in the law; and we would empower the Local Governments, outside the Presidency towns, to confer these powers upon those members (a) of the covenanted Civil Service, (b) of the Native Civil Service constituted under the Statutory Rules, and (c) of the Non-Regulation Commissions, who are already exercising first-class magisterial powers, and are, in their opinion, fit to be intrusted with these

* *Ibid.*, pp. 122-23.

further powers. We would make no distinction in the law between European and native officers. We consider that the care exercised in the selection of officers for the covenanted service, both in regulation and non-regulation Provinces, together with the subsequent training that they receive, warrants our amending the law in the manner proposed. As a fact, no officer would be eligible until he had passed all the departmental examinations, and been in training long enough to show the superior authorities whether he would be likely to use any powers conferred upon him with proper discretion. These proposals will completely remove from the law all distinctions based on the race of the judge. The limitations remaining on the jurisdiction of particular classes of magistrates will be based, not on any difference of race, but simply on differences of training and experience."*

As to the public opinion about this proposal of Lord Ripon, his biographer observes:

"At first everything seemed to promise a smooth passage of the Bill and its unruffled acceptance by the general public. What little criticism there was in the clubs and newspapers was casual, and wholly unimpassioned, while the officials everywhere were overwhelmingly sympathetic. Even the few who, for one reason or another, doubted the wisdom of the measure, had no suspicion of the depth of feeling it was destined to touch. This was the case even with the highest officials in Calcutta. It has already been mentioned that the opinions of the Local Governments were practically all favourable, but they did not stand alone. Ripon also circularized the heads of Local Governments unofficially, and quite frankly stated to them his personal opinion 'that all members of the covenanted service, whether European or native, ought to be placed on the same footing.' Again the replies were favourable. Sir C. Elliot did, indeed, sound a note of warning from Assam, but he made no mention of the possibility of an European agitation ....."

"When the Bill reached London, the experts of Whitehall were apparently very much in the same case as their colleagues in India. The Secretary of State in Council accorded his official sanction without reservation, and not a hint of any misgiving was communicated to Ripon."†

At last it was when the Bill was introduced in the Legislative Council by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, the new Law Member, on Feb. 2, 1883, that the storm broke out "with dramatic suddenness."

THE STORM BREAKS

The severe storm that broke out over this Ilbert Bill, may well be described in the words of Lucien Wolf, who says:

"Within a few weeks the whole of the British community in the Peninsula was swept by a tornado of violent denunciation of the Bill. A monster indignation meeting took place in the Calcutta Town Hall, at which the speeches were of an intemperance beyond all limits of decency. Similar meetings were held all over the Presidency, and the Anglo-Indian press—notably the *Englishman*—became utterly hysterical. An 'Anglo-Indian and European Defence Association' was formed, which became the official organization of the movement. Among other features of their campaign, the Volunteers were openly incited to resign in a mass, and certain persons even 'sounded opinions in the canteens'—in other words attempted to seduce the Army. The non-official community boycotted Ripon's levees, and there was a proposal to boycott the Government loan. On his return to Calcutta in the winter, the Viceroy was openly insulted in the streets by planters brought down from the Mofussil for the occasion. An emissary named Atkins was sent to England to arouse the British workingman against the Bill. The wife of the Chief Justice showed her appreciation of the responsibility attaching to her husband's official position by getting up a 'Ladies, petition' against the Bill. Ripon gives a quotation from the letters of a certain 'Britanicus' (*Sic* !) who wrote to the *Englishman* regularly on the subject: 'The only people who have any right

* *Ibid.*, pp. 126-7.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 127-28.

to India are the British : the so-called (*Sic* !) Indians have no right whatever.' The behaviour of the natives in the face of this campaign was, on the whole, surprisingly moderate, though of course the extreme newspapers on their side replied in kind to the European attacks."*

There was even a wild suggestion that Lord Ripon should be kidnapped by some of the Britishers in India, forcibly placed in a steamer and removed to England.

CAUSES OF THE CONTROVERSY

As to the real cause of this controversy, Lord Ripon says :

"The Bar have been very sore about the reduction of the Judges' pay and Mitter's appointment as Acting Chief Justice, and were only too glad of an opportunity to do the Government an injury if they could ; and the idea of an opposition to the Bill was started in the Bar Library by some of the English barristers. Communications were entered into with the *Englishman* office, and circulars in the shape of letters were sent to the Planters and settlers up-country suggesting their opposition to the Bill, and, I fancy, putting a strong fanciful case before them. They took the bait, and urged their correspondents and agents here to move in the matter, and hence the opposition took firm hold and prospered. The delay between the 2nd and 19th February, when the fiercer opposition broke out, is accounted for by the time it took to communicate with up-country and get replies before the matter could be prominently mooted in Calcutta. Once set off, it acquired force by moving, and its climax was reached on 28th February at the Town Hall."†

Another cause was set forth by Meredith Townsend of the *Spectator* in a letter to Tom Hughes :

"Would you like to live in a country where at any moment your wife would be liable to be sentenced on a false charge of slapping an Ayah to three days' imprisonment, the Magistrate being a copper-coloured Pagan who probably worships the Linga, and certainly exults in any opportunity of showing that he can insult white persons with impunity ?"

LORD RIPON'S DEFENCE

In a letter to Kimberley, Lord Ripon thus defended his policy, when the serious storm broke out :

"I feel, my dear Kimberley, that you may be very fairly inclined to blame me for not having foreseen what violent opposition our proposed amendment of the present law would excite, and I freely admit that any Government which makes a mistake of this kind cannot altogether be acquitted of blame. At the same time, it is due to myself that I should point out that the question was first brought officially under our notice by Sir Ashley Eden, who expressed his opinion that 'the time has now arrived when the native members of the covenanted Civil Services should be relieved, etc.,...or when *at least* [the italics are mine] Native Covenanted Civilians who have obtained the position of District Magistrate or Sessions Judge should have entrusted to them full powers over all classes, etc.' You know something of Eden by this time, and you have doubtless found out that there is nothing sentimental about him, and nothing particularly liberal in spite of the name he bears. He was for five years Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal ; he knew the Province intimately ; he was specially well acquainted with the feelings of the Indigo-planters and other Europeans in the Mofussil ; and he left India amid the plaudits of the men who are now our bitterest opponents. There is not, as you will observe, the slightest hint in the official letter which I have just quoted that the measure which he was recommending would meet any kind of opposition, and he never gave me either privately or officially any reason to suppose that it would. As you

* *Ibid.*, pp. 128-29.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 129-130.

know, when we got Eden's letter we sent it round to the other Local Governments to obtain their opinion upon it. These opinions are before you, and with the exception of Coorg, they are all in favour of the change proposed by Eden. It is true that the Madras Government was divided, but Mr. Carmichael's reference to Magna Charta is enough to show the extent of his historical and legal knowledge, and the whole tone of his Minute is ill calculated to give weight to the opinions expressed in it. The Bombay Government were, as I have ascertained from Fergusson, unanimous in the opinion that they expressed, and which was given at a time when that regular old Tory, Ashburner, was still a member of the Council. If there exists on the face of earth a cautious man, a man who sees every possible side of every question so clearly and strongly that it is often very difficult for him to make up his mind, it is Lyall. He passed through the Mutiny, and I have often observed how keen are his recollections of that terrible time, and yet on this matter he speaks with no uncertain voice, and recommends almost exactly the arrangements which have been ultimately adopted in our Bill. In Assam, where there are so many tea planters, Mr. Elliot, who has had two years of experience of the Province, says distinctly: 'The Chief Commissioner does not think this slight progress in the direction of equality is likely to excite any serious opposition on the part of the European community. The feeling which ten years ago it would have encountered is, he believes, gradually dying out ; and the experience which is being acquired of the efficiency with which Native officers administer justice is by degrees undermining it.' Sir Charles Aitchison, with his accustomed boldness, went further than the heads of any other Local Governments, and struck right at the heart of the matter, proposing a more extensive measure than we finally recommended to the Secretary of State, and Mr. Bernard in Burma, where there is an extensive European community, gave an unqualified approval to Eden's proposal."*

"A GREAT MISTAKE"

It is surprising that Lord Ripon thought that he had committed *a great mistake* in carrying on this agitation. He 'felt the responsibility for the blunder most keenly' as shown in his letters. He says :

"If I had known what would happen I should not have let myself in for this storm." (Written to Kimberley, March 4, 1883.)

Again he wrote to Lord Northbrook :

"That serious mischief has been done I cannot doubt. To what extent I ought to blame myself I find it hard to say ; that those who ought to have known the feelings of Anglo-Indians much better than I could possibly do, displayed as little foresight as I did, cannot be denied ; that I did not act hastily or without advice and consultation, it is true. But still, the fact remains that a *great mistake* has been made and that I, as head of the Government, must take my due share of responsibility for it."†

Lord Ripon even thought the measure not to be of sufficient importance or urgency to encounter the storm of Anglo-Indian opposition. He thus wrote to Gladstone on March 24, 1883 :

"I frankly confess that, if I had had reason to suppose that such an outbreak of violent feeling and of race hatred would have been excited by this bill, I should have hesitated to propose it at the present time ; the measure, though just in itself and required by administrative convenience, is not of sufficient importance or urgency to have made it necessary to encounter such a storm at a time when we have several other matters to deal with of greater magnitude and more general interest."

Lord Ripon also wrote thus to Kimberley on Feb. 26, 1883 :

* *Ibid.*, pp. 132-134.

† *Ibid.*, p. 135.

"I am not sure I should have moved in the matter just now, had I supposed that Englishmen in India had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing since the days when they threatened to drown Macaulay in the Hooghly."*

Lord Ripon also complained that no warning had been given by the India Office. He continues :

"You will know whether it [*i. e.*, the Bill] met with any opposition at the I. O. All I can say is that Hartington never told me that any opposition had been raised to it there, and I am certain that if any important Members of this Council had told him that the proposal of such a measure would be likely to stir up all the passions which have been in fact aroused, he would either have advised me to drop the matter or would at least have given some hint of the fears which have been expressed to him. He never did anything of the kind, and therefore I imagine that the Members of the India Council were gifted with no more foresight than the Local Governments in India or the Members of my Council."†

THE MISLAID MINUTE

But a definite warning had been given by Sir Henry Maine, who proposed that Lord Ripon should be privately warned of the "seriousness of an European explosion" and should be advised to consult European non-official opinion on the subject "say the Advocate-General and the European Members of the Legislative Council."

But unfortunately, Sir H. Maine's Minute never reached Lord Ripon, who wrote to Kimberley :

"I understand that Sir H. Maine sent Hartington a Memorandum for transmission to me ; but I never received it."§

How Sir Henry Maine's minute was mislaid was told by Kimberley in the following words :

"Hartington's speech at Accrington arose from the dissatisfaction which was expressed in the Council here, during the discussion of the Despatch to you on the 'Ilbert' Bill of Nov. 8th at Hartington's speech in the House of Commons, which the Council thought laid too much of the responsibility on them. They said that in assenting to the Despatch approving your proposals, they did so in the expectation that Hartington would convey to you privately the substance of a Memorandum by Maine, in which, while assenting to your proposed alteration of the law, he pointed out that on former occasions measures of this nature had excited great dissatisfaction among the Anglo-Indian community. Hartington unfortunately forgot to write this to you, and the Council consider that this omission on his part should have prevented him from using such pointed language as to the responsibility for the Bill. At their request I conveyed this to Hartington. Hence his speech…I told the Councillors that, if they really wished to convey a warning to you, they should have done so officially, and that private letters could not be appealed to as lessening official responsibility ; but their annoyance was perhaps not unnatural."**

"NO SURRENDER"

Though Lord Ripon was sorry that he had started the Ilbert Bill, he found it impossible to give it up. He thus writes to Tom Hughes on July 20, 1883 :

* *Ibid.*, p. 136.
† *Ibid.*, p. 137.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 139.
** *Ibid.*, p. 139.

"My Missus is very fairly well for her. The Anglo-Indian row has done her a world of good; she is as strong and bold as a lioness, and would soon recall me to a proper frame of mind if I were in the least inclined to waver."*

Again the opinions of the Local Governments and other prominent people were taken about the Bill. The majority were in favour of continuing the Bill. But in Bengal, the official opinion was in favour of withdrawing the Bill. Lord Ripon however got the support of the Cabinet, though *The Times* was against Lord Ripon. *Punch* "had a cartoon representing Ripon driving an elephant (India), while a party of Anglo-Indians threatened him and molested him from the howdah." It was called "The Anglo-Indian Mutiny—a bad example for the elephant".

Even Gladstone thus tried to set Lord Ripon at ease by writing the following letter to him (April 17, 1883):

"I hasten to set you at your ease with reference to your friendly anxiety on our behalf. There was an attempt to fret and fume in the House of Commons about the Ilbert Bill, but it was short-lived and futile...After reading what you very candidly say, I feel that an error may have been committed, but I am by no means sure that it has been committed. My son, Harry, whose judgment is, I think, very sound, takes exactly your view. No doubt it is generally true that a Government is not only bound to act according to reason, but also is responsible for provoking unreason. Yet unreason must and ought sometimes to be heard, and the only question is, was the occasion such as to render it worthwhile? This I have not knowledge enough to decide. The chief point against you, in my eyes, is your own judgment."†

"THE CONCORDAT"

At the next meeting of the Legislative Council, several amendments to the Bill were discussed and the Government of India accepted the bargain arrived at. Lord Ripon thus explains his motives to Kimberley:

"The arguments for refusing any further modifications at the present stage of the business were strong; but, on the other hand, I had to ask myself whether I should be justified in rejecting in December a proposal which I had myself made in August, if by accepting it I could really obtain security, not only against immediate active agitation, but against constant opposition to the Bill when passed, and the probability of recurring displays of race antagonism whenever an Englishman was brought up for trial by a Native Judge. The danger of prolonging the present state of tension was felt, as I have said, not only by Bayley and Gibbs, who have been somewhat thrown off their balance by the storm which has been raging round them, but by Colvin and Stewart, who are of firmer fibre and cooler heads. If I had resisted the opinion of a majority of my colleagues, a further reference to you would have been necessary, as in that case you only could have decided the matter, the question at issue being clearly of too doubtful a character to justify me in overruling my Council. On the whole, then, I came to the conclusion that I ought to accept their opinion, coinciding with that which I had myself formerly held, and allow the proposed arrangement to be carried through ..

"...I do not deny, however, that the great weakness of the Government for dealing with a European disturbance weighed with me as it did with my colleagues. I had no idea till I came to Calcutta that the European Police force at the disposal of the Bengal Government was so very small (between 60 and 70 men all told); in any riot, the least serious, we should have had at once to call out the troops, and I felt, and feel still, that to employ European soldiers against Europeans in this country would have been a step of the gravest kind. Whether there was any real chance of

* *Ibid.*, p. 141.

† *Ibid.*, p. 142.

disturbance must remain a matter of conjecture; but I am more inclined now than I ever was at the time to think that the danger was anything but imaginary; and certainly Harry Gladstone is of that opinion, and he has good means of judging. I still hold, as I have held from the beginning, that a vote of the House of Commons in favour of the Bill would have settled the questions as nothing else would. I could, I think, have kept the majority of the Council together upon the basis of an opportunity for such a vote, but when you decided against that course they began to look about for another way out of the difficulty. The way of escape on which they finally determined was one which I had formerly proposed, and to which therefore I could raise no objection on principle, and to have rejected it when pressed upon me by five of my seven colleagues and with no one but Ilbert and Hope to back me, on the sole ground that no attempt at a pacific settlement of the dispute ought to be made, would surely have been a course neither justifiable nor even possible. It is doubtless unfortunate for me that these facts cannot be fully explained in Parliament, but that is a difficulty to which one is constantly exposed in public life, and one can only accept the position quietly."*

In his speech before the Legislative Council on Jan. 7, 1884, Lord Ripon drew up the actual terms of the agreement known for no apparent reason as *"The Concordat."* He said :

"The Government undertook—

To agree in Select Committee on the basis of the modifications approved in the Secretary of State's despatch to the right being given to European British subjects, when brought for trial before a District Magistrate or Sessions Judge, to claim trial by jury such as is provided for by section 451 of the Criminal Procedure Code, subject to the following conditions :

(1) No distinction to be made between European and Native District Magistrates and Sessions Judges.

(2) Powers of District Magistrates under section 446 of the Code to be extended to imprisonment for six months or fine of two thousand rupees."

Lord Ripon goes on to defend his policy. He says :

"There was in this undertaking no sacrifice whatever of the principle of the Bill. It distinctly lays down as a condition of the acceptance by the Government of such a proposal in Select Committee and the extended right to a jury trial, that no distinction should be made between European and Native District Magistrates and Sessions Judges. Both under the arrangement will be placed in all respects on the same footing. All judicial disqualifications of Native Magistrates and Judges of of those grades will be removed. Europeans will be liable to appear equally in their Courts, and will be dealt with by them precisely in the same manner. The principle of the Bill will thus be entirely maintained. This arrangement also gives no sanction to the theory to which I have already referred that an Englishman possesses everywhere an inalienable right to be tried only before a magistrate of his own race, a right which, as my honourable friend Mr. Ilbert explained in his speech, is not recognised in other dominions of the British Crown, in Ceylon or in China, for instance—and which no Government since the passing of the Act of 1833, which distinctly contravenes any such claim, has ever been known to admit. But it was an arrangement which, as it seems to me, ought to be satisfactory to Englishmen in India, for it gives them in all serious cases a judicial security to which they are accustomed at home, which is peculiarly English in its character, and upon which they have been brought up to set a very high value."†

It has been observed that with the passing of this Bill, the educated native opinion was satisfied, and as time wore on it came even to recognise in the Ilbert Bill an historic effort to do full justice to India.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 144-46.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 146-47.

Lord Ripon added a noble epilogue to the whole story, saying:

"The Honourable Mr. Thomas, in a speech in which he did his utmost to stir up the bitterness of a controversy which was approaching a settlement and to fan again the dying embers of race animosity, has asked, was there ever a nation which retained her supremacy by the righteousness of her laws ? I have read in a book, the authority of which the Honourable Mr. Thomas will admit, that righteousness exalteth a nation, and my study of history has led me to the conclusion that it is not by the force of her armies or by the might of her soldiery that a great empire is permanently maintained, but that it is by the righteousness of her laws and by her respect for the principles of justice. To believe otherwise appears to me to assume that there is not a God in heaven who rules over the affairs of men, and who can punish injustice and iniquity in nations as surely as in the individuals of whom they are composed. It is against doctrines like this that I desire to protest and it is against principles of this description that the gracious Proclamation of the Queen was directed. So long, then, as I hold the office which I now fill, I shall conduct the administration of this country in strict accordance with the policy which has been enjoined upon me by my Queen and by Parliament. Guided by this policy, it has been the duty of the Government to refuse with firmness what could not be given without an abandonment of principle."*

LORD RIPON'S DEPARTURE

With the passing of the Ilbert Bill, Lord Ripon's work in India seems to have been done. There was a talk of Lord Ripon's retirement and in 1884 Lord Dufferin was appointed to succeed him. Lord Ripon felt the pressure of the work. He writes :

"The work has been telling upon me for some time, and, as is always the case when that begins to occur, I feel the strain more and more from month to month ; again, it will not be altogether a disagreeable change to escape from the unceasing torrent of lying abuse which is poured upon me continually by the Anglo-Indian Press."†

HIS POPULARITY

About his popularity, Sir Aitchison writes :

"Rajah Sir Sahib Dyal (Lord Lawrence's old friend and right-hand man) came to me one day and said : 'The natives have much confidence in Lord Ripon, and so love him that he is worth regiments of soldiers. I have watched the advance of the great Northern Power ever since Ranjit Singh's time...The crisis will not come in my day, for I am now a very old man, but come it will and when it does come, send for Lord Ripon. He will do more for you than regiments of soldiers, and our women will sell their jewels and lay them at his feet."§

Lord Ripon thus writes to Lord Northbrook :

"I have been overwhelmed with addresses since I left Simla, and the task of replying to them has been in many ways difficult."

The biographer of Lord Ripon thus writes :—

How solidly this popularity was deserved, and how permanent and beneficent was its influence on British policy in India, are shown in a strikingly practical way, by the testimony of his successor. Dufferin had only been a few days in Calcutta when he realised the vital necessity of making it clear that he had come out to continue Ripon's policy. He writes to Halifax In January, 1885 :

"Nothing would have been more fatal than if a suspicion had gone abroad amongst the natives

* *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 151-52

§ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

that I was disposed to abandon in any particular the friendly attitude he [Ripon] had so courageously maintained towards them. I sincerely trust that when he reaches England he will obtain the credit he deserves. No Viceroy has laboured so conscientiously or uninterestedly for the good of the millions entrusted to his care. I have already announced my intention of fostering to the utmost of my power the beneficent projects he instituted for the good of the people; and I shall be quite content if I can leave the country under the same honourable conditions which attended his departure."*

Lord Dufferin in another letter to Lord Ripon wrote:

"The only criticism that has ever occurred to me in reference to your proceedings has been that in rendering yourself so popular with the natives you have made the position a little difficult for your successor."†

AN ESTIMATE OF RIPON'S RULE

The biographer of Lord Ripon thus offers an estimate of Lord Ripon's Viceroyalty in India:

"Ripon's Viceroyalty may justly be described as epoch-making in the history of India. It is true that in recent years events have moved with a speed not anticipated in his day. Nevertheless the reforms he effected are remarkable, quite apart from the spirit which animated them, for no other Governor-General from Dalhousie to Curzon, accomplished so much in this field and went so far. And he accomplished it inspite of the fact that he suffered from constant and sometimes bitter obstruction from the Council at the India Office, while the Bureaucracy in India was, to say the least, not biassed in favour of his radical tendencies."§

He also observes:

"When, however, all is said, Ripon's Viceroyalty will always be memorable, not so much for any particular measure, as for the extraordinary hold which he acquired on the affection of the Indian population, and the loyal hopes with which he thus filled their political horizon. The consistency with which he kept their interests in view is shown not only by the great measures which are dealt with in the foregoing chapters, but in scores of smaller manifestations of delicate regard for their feelings and grievances--his measures to alleviate the aggravations inflicted on the Indian community by the unpopular, though necessary Arms Act; his efforts to get the age of admission to the Indian Civil Service raised in order that Indians might have a fair chance of competing; his selection of an Indian Judge to act as Chief Justice of Calcutta in the absence of Sir R. Garth. And these are only a few instances. Indians swiftly recognised the personal element in all this unwearing solicitude on their behalf. As Sir Erskine Perry says in a letter to him:

'I am sure you are making a great impression on the Native mind; they have discovered your possession of what you have in so large a measure, *Dil* (*Dil* means heart), and there is nothing Natives appreciate more'."**

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 154-5.

† *Ibid.*, p. 153.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.

** *Life of the First Marquess of Ripon*: by Lucien Wolf, Vol. II, pp. 165-166.

CHAPTER XI

LORD DUFFERIN

1884-1888

The Marquis of Dufferin and Ava was appointed to succeed Lord Ripon in 1884. His experience was varied and well-fitted him for the task of the Indian Viceroy. Sir Alfred Lyall in his *Life of Lord Dufferin* speaks thus of his experience :

"No Governor-General ever came to India so well equipped by antecedent experience for the work as Lord Dufferin. Lord Elgin, indeed, had preceded him in Canada, and in two missions to China he had proved his high capacity for dealing with oriental politics. But the appointments previously held by Lord Dufferin had been of such a kind that if they had been purposely undertaken as a course of preparatory training for the Indian Viceroyalty, a more appropriate selection could hardly have been made. In Syria, and long afterwards in Turkey, he had learnt the difficult art of dealing with Asiatic rulers and officials ; he had studied their weakness and their strength. At St. Petersburg and Constantinople he had represented the interests of England on the Eastern Question, and all the issues connected with the wider field of Central Asia were familiar to him. Lastly, in Egypt he had been entrusted with a task that has been continually imposed upon the English government in India—the task of reforming and reconstructing under European superintendence the dilapidated fabric of an Oriental State."*

In the beginning of December 1884, Lord and Lady Dufferin reached Bombay. In a letter to Lady Dartrey, Lord Dufferin writes :

"Our landing in Bombay was really a beautiful sight. We were asked to remain on board the ship until half past four in order that the troops and the spectators might not be inconvenienced by the sun. The fleet had been collected to add dignity to our *'avatar,'* and filled the bay with smoke and thunder."†

Soon after his arrival, Lord Dufferin was startled by the volume, importance and complexity of the work in India. He wrote to Lord Granville that in his new situation he felt "very like a man who has been suddenly pitched head foremost into a cauldron of hot water, who has risen to the top, choking and spluttering, and who finds it very difficult to keep his head above the rising inundation of business that pours in upon him from every side." Lord Dufferin, however, soon set everything right and declared his intention to continue the policy of Lord Ripon.

Lord Dufferin thus wrote to Lord Halifax in January, 1885 :

"I felt the necessity of being very wary in my first utterances but I lost no time in making every one aware that there was to be no dissolution of continuity between Lord Ripon's policy and my own."

Lord Dufferin thought that it would be very fatal, if a suspicion should go abroad among the people of India that he was disposed to abandon in any particular the friendly attitude which Lord Ripon had so courageously maintained towards them.

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* *The Life of Lord Dufferin* : by Sir Alfred Lyall, p. 359.

† *Ibid.*, p. 360.

Indians of all ranks found a true friend in Lord Ripon, whose policy did much to improve the condition of Indians. So, Lord Dufferin also desired to pursue the same policy towards the people of India.

Later on, Lord Dufferin thus wrote to Lord Ripon :

"In all my private letters, whether addressed to your political opponents or to your friends, I have invariably borne the most earnest and warm testimony to the ability, the industry, the conscientiousness and the noble and lofty spirit which characterized your control of affairs, as was evinced by every paper of yours that came under my eye. The only criticism that has ever occurred to me in reference to your proceedings has been that in rendering yourself so popular with the natives, you have made the position a little difficult for your successor."*

THE BENGAL TENANCY BILL

Lord Ripon had tried to readjust the relations between landlord and tenant in Bengal and in Oudh. But his proposals 'for the better protection of tenants in Bengal inevitably raised strenuous opposition from the most powerful body of landlords in India, but for two years Lord Ripon had been carrying on the contest, yielding ground here and there, yet steadily holding his main points, until he made over the reins of office to his successor.'

Sir Alfred Lyall holds that Lord Dufferin was well fitted to carry on this legislative work. He says:

"The new Viceroy was unusually familiar with almost all the issues raised by the Bengal Tenancy Bill. He had been Under-Secretary of State at the time when Lord Lawrence, as Governor-General by insisting on an investigation of the status of ryots in Oudh, set on foot a famous discussion, in which all the highest authorities in India and at the India Office took different sides. The active part which Lord Dufferin had constantly taken in discussions of the agrarian questions in Ireland, and the resemblance between those questions and similar problems in India, enabled him to preside over the debates of the Indian Council Chamber with weight and undeniable authority. No better training, in short, than that of the India Office and of Irish politics could have been given to a statesman who had to pass a Bengal Tenancy Bill within a few months after his arrival at Calcutta."

It has also been remarked that 'to a Viceroy of Lord Dufferin's antecedents the whole subject presented features of curious analogy and familiar characteristics; and he took an early occasion of publicly expressing his satisfaction at finding himself associated with the passing of the Act.'

Thus Lord Dufferin had to arbitrate between landlord and tenant upon this important agrarian question. About the passing of this important Bill, we read :

"The final decision of the Legislative Council was on some of these points in favour of the landlord; but the tenant's status, his hold on the land he occupied, and his safeguards against arbitrary dispossession, were all very materially strengthened by the Act as it was finally settled. The principle of the Act may be said to have been based upon a system of fixity of tenure at judicial rents; and its three main objects were—first, to give the settled raiyat the same security in his holding as he enjoyed under the old customary law; secondly, to secure to the landlord a fair share of the increased value of the produce of the soil; and thirdly, to lay down rules by which all disputed questions between landlord and tenant could be reduced to simple issues and

* *Ibid.*, p. 362.

decided upon equitable considerations. The maintenance of the principles of the Act was further safeguarded by a section which restricted the power of entering into contracts to defeat its fundamental provisions."*

Lord Dufferin also met with opposition from the zamindars of Bengal, but he "disallowed in very plain terms the main contention of the landlord party, that an interference between Bengal zamindars and their tenants amounted to an infringement of the Permanent Settlement made by Lord Cornwallis in 1798. As a matter of fact, the measure supplemented and fulfilled reforms that Lord Cornwallis had been contemplating, but was obliged to leave incomplete."

THE OUDH RENT ACT

It was again Lord Ripon who in 1882 had ordered for an enquiry into the condition of the tenants in Oudh and had submitted a scheme for protecting tenants from capricious eviction by the landlords. Unfortunately his scheme had not been accepted.

Lord Dufferin now took up this question, and his "experience, as a landlord and as a legislator, of similar difficulties and their remedies, invested him with great influence in bringing the whole matter to an amicable conclusion."

In Bengal, the zamindars had appealed to the Permanent Settlement of 1798, and in Oudh, the talukdars "were disposed to find their *Magna Charta* in a declaration made in 1866, that the Oudh tenant had been found to possess no right of prescriptive occupancy. Whether this meant that he must be left exposed in perpetuity to arbitrary ejectment or unlimited rack-renting, was the point at issue."

Sir Alfred Lyall thus speaks of the part played by Lord Dufferin in the passing of the Oudh Rent Act :

"Many years before this time Lord Dufferin, in his speeches on the Irish land question, had pointed out that when large estates are plotted out to small farms the farmers must make the improvements ; and he had insisted on the necessity of giving them security and a period of lease adequate for profiting by the investment of their money. The situation was very much the same in Oudh ; the evils to be cured were great insecurity of holdings and incessant competition among cottiers for the land ; and the remedy applied was to prescribe a statutory period of tenure and to place a check upon indiscriminate enhancement of rents. The steady support given by Lord Dufferin to these moderate amendments of the law so far overcame the natural opposition of the talukdars, that the Oudh Rent Act was finally passed with their acquiescence."†

This new Act affected the provisions of the former Act of 1868 and the condition of 1,800,000 tenants-at-will.

"It enabled tenants-at-will to make improvements on their holdings, and entitled them on ejectment to receive compensation for any subsisting improvements which they had made within thirty years preceding their ejectment. It declared every such tenant to be entitled to retain his holding for a period of seven years, from the date of his rent being settled in accordance with the provisions of the Act."

THE PUNJAB LAND TENANCY BILL

Another agrarian legislative enactment in which Lord Dufferin interested himself is the Punjab Land Tenancy Bill. When the Punjab came under the British rule the

* *Ibid.*, pp. 365-66.

† *Ibid.*, p. 367.

landlords had agreed that 'the tenants should share their responsibility for revenue payment by obtaining a sort of co-proprietorship in the land.' But when the property became more secure, there came the question of the proportionate division of the large profits of agriculture to be settled. A compromise had been effected about 1866, but it did not prove successful. So the question was taken up again in 1886.

The problem in the Punjab was "to distribute and define, as between these two very similar classes (landowners and tenants) the right of occupation and the profits of agriculture according to well-known usage and sentiment, especially in regard to prescriptive possession by length of tenure and to the reclamation of waste lands."

About the Punjab Land Tenancy Bill, Sir Alfred Lyall says :

"The object of the Bill of 1866 (1886 ?) had been to carry further this principle by supplementing and enlarging preceding laws ; it provided for the adjustment of rents in proportion to changes of the land-revenue demands ; it extended the period which must elapse between successive enhancements ; and it assessed on a more liberal scale the compensation payable to tenants for improvement, and, in certain cases for disturbance. The Act which was passed, after much discussion, in 1887, was accepted without discontent or friction by the country."*

Sir Alfred Lyall gives credit to Lord Dufferin for carrying out the land laws for Bengal, Oudh and the Punjab. Thus he says :

"In all these cases the way to final legislation was undoubtedly smoothed and straightened by the address, experience, and ability of the local officers. Nevertheless, when the general account of Lord Dufferin's government is made up, he may fairly be credited with the accomplishment of very material improvements of the land laws, to the benefit of the proprietary and cultivating classes in Bengal, in Oudh, and in the Punjab."†

RUSSO-PHOBIA

Anglo-Indian statesmen were long afraid of the Russo-phobia which exercised a great influence on the British policy in Afghanistan. Sir Alfred Lyall thus speaks of this nightmare of the Anglo-Indian politicians :

"The invasion of India by land has been the nightmare of Anglo-Indian statesmen from the time when Napoleon proposed to Russia, in 1808, his scheme for a joint expedition against India through Persia from Constantinople. Russian statesmen had always refused to bind themselves by any formal convention to stop short in the midst of the Central Asian plains, declaring with much reason that the conditions and circumstances of such a position would always be liable to unforeseen vicissitudes. Yet they had more than once made informal overtures to Great Britain for some such friendly understanding as would enable the two Powers to act in concert, and to accommodate differences. On our side it had become obvious that, upon the Frontier question at any rate, we should do well to agree with our adversary quickly instead of quarrelling with him. To safeguard the limits of our protectorate by sending troops into Afghanistan would be a costly and embarrassing operation, which might easily play into the hands of Russia. To make an offensive and defensive alliance with the ruler of Kabul would be to sign a bond with an unstable and untrustworthy partner, leaving Russia quite free to involve us in awkward complications whenever it might suit her to do so. Our true policy was to deal with a civilized and responsible government for whom public engagements meant a substantial obligation, not to be violated in the face of Europe without grave consequences ; and the only arrangement to which Russia could be expected to assent would be one

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* *Ibid.*, p. 369

† *Ibid.*, p. 369.

that should agree to her advance up to the Afghan frontier, on the distinct condition that she would bind herself to go no further."*

Accordingly, during the Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon (1884), a joint English and Russian Commission had met to agree to a convention for the joint demarcation of the Afghan Frontier, "so that a line might be drawn beyond which our guarantee would not extend, and which Russia could not overstep without a patent breach of formal engagements."

Unfortunately, when the Boundary Commissioners came to the Frontier, they found a Russian army pushing towards Panjdeh with the intention of occupying it. When Lord Dufferin had assumed the Viceroyalty of India, the Russians attacked and drove the Afghans with heavy loss from Panjdeh. The Russians now declared Panjdeh to be Russian ground.

THE GRAND DURBAR AT RAWALPINDI

Soon after his arrival at Calcutta, Lord Dufferin sent an invitation to the Amir Abdur Rahman to meet him in India to promote a "friendly understanding upon various eventualities and questions between the two governments, whose interests were now so closely assimilated. Of all these matters for discussion the dangerous entanglement of affairs on the north-western frontier of Aghanistan, where swords had been already half drawn to cut the knot, was imperatively the foremost."

The Viceroy met the Amir at Rawalpindi on March 31. Lord Dufferin writes about this visit :

"Unfortunately we have been deluged with rain ever since we came here, and it was raining hard when the Amir passed from the railway station to his quarters. Fortunately, we have put our guests into an excellent house instead of under canvas, so that everything was dry and comfortable for him, and like all Orientals, he looks upon rain as a good omen."†

The meeting of the Amir and the Viceroy was a remarkable sight. The Viceroy is described as an embodiment of diplomatic courtesy and refined culture; while, the Amir was "a strange strong creature, "as put by Lord Dufferin. The Amir was greatly pleased to see the Queen's son, the Duke of Connaught, waiting to greet him. About this interview, the biographer of Lord Dufferin says :

"The interviews that followed must have been of striking interest and novelty even to a diplomatist of Lord Dufferin's wide and varied experience. The Amir showed a clear and shrewd understanding not only of his own position, but also of its bearing upon the relations between Russia and England; and the discussion was proceeding satisfactorily when matters were suddenly brought to a sharp point by the news of the collision§ between Afghan and Russian troops at Panjdeh."

But he treated the incident with an equanimity almost amounting to indifference.

When Lord Dufferin proposed to send a British army for the defence of the fortifications of Herat, Abdur Rahman "replied in a very explicit and determined manner that, though he himself was grateful for the offer, he could not answer for his people ;" "they were ignorant, brutal, and suspicious: he had fought with them himself for four years,

* *Ibid.*, pp. 370-71.

† *Ibid.*, p. 374

§ *Ibid.*, p. 375.

and we must not suppose that he could control them, or move them about like pieces on a chess-board."

To this Lord Dufferin replied :

"...As you yourself seem to attach but little importance to Panjdeh, and admit that you have no real hold on the tribes of that district, it seems to me that the wisest thing you can do is to abate something of your territorial pretensions, and to come to such a settlement with Russia as will give you a little breathing time to strengthen your position at Herat, and to inoculate your people with your own views as to the value of our friendship and assistance. To this he replied with some eagerness that he was just about to make the very remark I had uttered...."*

Thus the Amir pursued for twenty years this policy, namely, the exclusion at all hazards of British troops and officers from Afghanistan. His policy towards the Russians was the same : he did not want that his country should be the battle-field of several foreign nations. He determined to fight the Russians if they made an attack on Afghanistan. "His people would see that a slow advance toward India through Afghanistan meant to them roads, occupation of fortified posts, demand for unprocurable supplies—in fact nothing less than famine, ruin, and absolute loss of independence ; they would never allow it."

According to the Amir, Afghanistan "was between two millstones, and it had already been ground to powder. It was a boat between two waves, where oars were of no avail, and it would founder."

Lord Dufferin gave an account of his conferences with the Amir in a letter to Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff. He says :

"The principal object I was anxious to attain was the freeing of the hand of Her Majesty's Government in relation to the delimitation of the Afghan frontier. When this subject was originally mooted, instead of asking him to point out what he claimed to be his frontier, we made the mistake of indicating it ourselves... It would take too long to tell you how the final result was reached, but after a second interview I had the satisfaction of telegraphing to Lord Kimberley that, as far as the Amir was concerned, he might run the line almost as far south as the Russians themselves required."†

Lord Dufferin gives his impression of the Rawalpindi Darbar in these words :

"So far then as words go, and as the impressions of the moment are concerned, things have gone off sufficiently satisfactorily. To what degree the Amir may be able or willing to make good his engagements is a totally different matter. I do not think he will ever prove actually false, for all his interests manifestly compel him to throw in his lot with us ; but unfortunately with an oriental two and two make five as often as four....Still on the whole, the betting is in our favour as far as the Amir and even his people are concerned."§

Lord Dufferin's assumption that occidentals are better than orientals is amusing.

Lord Dufferin thus wrote to Lord Northbrook about the Afghan conference :

"On the whole the row with Russia has been by no means an unmixed evil. On the one hand it was proved conclusively that all India, both princes and people, are fully aware that with all its imperfections the English domination is preferable to that of any other nation. In the next place,

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* *Ibid.*, p. 377.

† *Ibid.*, p. 379.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

it has brought into satisfactory prominence the enormous difficulty which Russia would have in advancing against our own proper frontier, which with a little hope you will approve of the policy I have adopted towards the Amir. It seemed to me that now there was only one mode of dealing with him. Under Lord Ripon's agreement we were bound to protect the integrity of his dominions. The time had certainly come when he was entitled to call for our assistance. Neither we nor he was anxious that this assistance should be given in troops. The only other alternative therefore was arms and money. I am accordingly in the course of furnishing him with breech-loaders, some heavy guns for Herat, and ten lacs of rupees. This of course is liberal, but by no means extravagant treatment....Our present policy is not to enter Afghan territory against the will of the people....Abdur Rahman is the strongest man in the country, and if we are to keep the Afghans with us, it must be through their government, and not by intriguing with the disaffected sections of the people...."*

LORD DUFFERIN'S POPULARITY

Lord Northbrook in a letter to the Viceroy spoke about his popularity in India. He writes :

"You would have been pleased if you had heard the warm terms in which a missionary from Allahabad, who breakfasted with me yesterday, spoke of you. He said your manner of treating both Europeans and natives is perfect, and that your influence is very great and in the best direction. He especially mentioned the effect produced by your reception of the Natives at Delhi. As this is not flattery, and I know the work is so heavy that a little encouragement don't come ill, I write it."†

Lord Dufferin was not well impressed with the summer capital of India. He thus writes of Simla :

"We have now come up to Simla, an absurd place situated on the narrow saddle of one of a hundred mountainous ridges that rise around us in labyrinthine complexity like the waves of a confused and troubled sea, composing the lower ranges of the Himalayas, whose silver peaks stand up against the horizon some fifty miles away. ..That the capital of the Indian empire should be thus hanging on by its eyelids to the side of a hill is too absurd..."§

THE 'BUFFER' POLICY

In a letter to Lord Randolph Churchill, Lord Dufferin made some comments on the inevitable risks and responsibilities created in the Buffer State of Afghanistan. He writes :

"I have never personally felt very cordially inclined to the 'Buffer' policy, and have often had misgivings as to the wisdom of the engagements into which we entered with the Amir under the auspices of my predecessor. In spite of the cautious wording of the agreement its obligations are very absolute and specific, especially as entered into by a Power like England with a weak and uncivilized government. Under this stipulation we are bound to assist the Amir to the best of our ability, though in whatever manner we may think expedient, in the event of the integrity of his dominions being threatened by a foreign power....Unfortunately in many instances some of our recommendations are naturally opposed to what he (the Amir) or any one else in his position might fairly consider to be advantageous to the maintenance of his own authority and independence. Even supposing that the ruler himself were to prove as docile as we could desire, his subjects consist of a conglomeration of insubordinate tribes, or else of alien races hating his rule, and ready

* *Ibid.*, pp. 382-83

† *Ibid.*, pp. 383-84.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 385-86.

to welcome the first comer who will advance to their liberation, while most of the lieutenants through whom he administers his provinces are either incompetent, disobedient, corrupt, or disloyal, and sometimes all these things at once. It is evident that an offensive and defensive alliance with a person so situated possesses every sort of uninviting characteristic; but when we have further to take into account the duplicity natural to every Afghan, the facilities for intrigue, and the consequent chance of all our friends' professions being insincere, the advantages to be derived from the 'Buffer' policy become very attenuated. And yet, for all that, I think it was very natural that Ripon should have desired to try it; and I am strongly of opinion that, once embarked on the experiment, it should be uninterruptedly pursued until its failure has become manifest. Nor am I at all convinced that its failure is certain. On the contrary, if only given a fair, and above all a patient trial, the betting is rather in favour of its success than otherwise. Even were this expectation to be disappointed, except so far as the loss of a few lacs of rupees is concerned, we shall not find ourselves in a worse position than if the experiment had not been made. The reasons for these conclusions are as follows: In the first place, with all its defects, the personal character of the Amir and his present frame of mind are not unsuited to the *role* we wish him to perform, and the ends we have in view. He is a good administrator; he is absolute master of his own house; he is energetic, brave, and, according to his lights, sagacious. Above all things, I believe that he wishes to run as straight as his own domestic interests will permit him. Everything that I have learned confirms the impression that he has determined to throw in his lot with us, always provided that we show no signs of a desire to interfere with his independence or to insist upon anything calculated to diminish his prestige or his authority over his subjects."*

The above letter was written on July 30, 1885. Later on (August 14, 1885) Lord Dufferin addressed another letter to Lord Randolph Churchill on the weak point in the 'Buffer' policy. He writes:

"The weak point in the 'Buffer' policy is that the frontier we have undertaken to assist in defending is too long, unprotected, and distant to be capable of protection, and above all that the Afghans are too little interested in these outlying provinces to be likely to fight for them with any heart. Herat is in some respects to Afghanistan what Khartoum is to Egypt...It brings no revenue to the Afghan treasury, and its inhabitants hate the Afghan domination. It is true I was always in favour even of Egypt holding Khartoum as long as she could do so with any prospect of success—a condition which existed until poor Hicks was driven into making his unfortunate expedition into Kordofan—and of course I am still more anxious that Afghanistan should maintain its hold upon Herat. At all events, if properly managed, I think the Afghans could be turned into far more effective and trustworthy *chevaux de frise* when lining the crests of the Hindu Kush than when fighting in the valley of the Hari Rud or along the fringes of the Turkestan desert. Far more reliance could be placed on their valour and efficiency when battling for their homes and native country than for their outlying dependencies. They would occupy the inner lines of the position, as well as a range of frontier of manageable and defensible dimensions; and as they would have had a good deal of their egregious vanity and self-confidence knocked out of them by their preliminary reverses, we should find them more manageable and docile than they are at present."†

Lord Randolph Churchill approved of the opinions expressed by Lord Dufferin on the Afghan question. He thus wrote to Lord Dufferin on August 28, 1885:

"I was so greatly impressed by the extremely lucid and impartial exposition of the advantages and disadvantages of the Buffer State policy contained in your letter to me of July 30 that I extracted it from the letter and circulated it among my colleagues, who will, by means of it, be better educated on the subject than they have been hitherto, and more capable of advising and deciding

* *Ibid.*, pp. 386-88.

† *Ibid.*, p. 388.

upon the course of Indian foreign policy. I concur entirely in all your conclusions, and I may perhaps be allowed to express my own opinion that judging by present results and from information from various sources, your diplomacy with the wayward Afghan has been so successful and happy that without undue over-confidence, we may fairly congratulate ourselves that he and his people are settling down into a groove favourable to British interests, and that the advice of the worker of this marvel should be most carefully followed by the government at home...This much is certain, that you can do more with the British public than any Viceroy has been able to do since the days of Lord Lawrence."*

These words of congratulation were showered on 'the worker of the marvel' of the Afghan policy, Lord Dufferin, who was also compared with the first Civilian Viceroy Lord Lawrence. But is the comparison for the part played by both the Viceroys in Afghan politics or for the extension of British dominions ?

On the same Russian question, Lord Dufferin wrote thus toward the end of his Viceroyalty :

"I am one of those who do not believe that Russia will actually invade India during the present century, unless indeed she should produce a hero with the genius and ambition of Napoleon or Alexander, and even then I think she would come to grief."†

THE TAJ OF AGRA

About the famous Taj Mahal, which Lord Dufferin saw during his tour, he writes :

"Here of course we have been busy with the usual sights. In the Taj I was not in the least disappointed, though from an architectural point of view it is the outcome of a period of art on the verge of degradation. It is in the state of a ripe pear which you must get up in the middle of the night to eat before it has turned rotten at the core by morning. As it is, it has just escaped, and is certainly lovely both in its general effect and in its details."§

One really fails to agree with the Viceroy how the beautiful and superb Taj, from an architectural point of view, could be the outcome of a period of art on the verge of degradation. If the Indian art at the time of the construction of the Taj, were on the verge of degradation, how was it possible for the artists of that period of degradation to produce such a beautiful masterpiece of art ?

MILITARY MANŒUVRES

In the winter of 1885, the Indian army was engaged upon "grand manœuvres" planned out by Lord Roberts. The object of this military manœuvre was to impress the twelve officers of the Foreign European armies with the superiority of the British Indian troops. The Viceroy thus writes on January 17, 1886 :

"I am on my way to Delhi to see an army of forty thousand men which has been collected there for what the foreigners call some 'grand manœuvres.' Randolph Churchill has sent us a whole lot of foreign officers with the view of convincing them of our strength. They will undoubtedly be surprised at the fine appearance of our troops and the high level of their efficiency, but for all that, I fear they won't return home terror-stricken, in spite of our having another army employed in conquering a kingdom elsewhere (Burma)."**

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† *Ibid.*, p. 370.
* *Ibid.*, p. 388-89.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 392.
** *Ibid.*, p. 393.

Writing on the same topic to the Secretary of State, he says :

"Though the glitter of the spectacle was dimmed, the sight was splendid.......

"The foreign officers were somewhat surprised at the fine physique and the efficiency of our native soldiers, but they all remarked on the paucity of British officers with the Indian regiments, which I could not but acknowledge was, as it still is, a weak point in our military organisation.*

About this military show, Sir Alfred Lyall remarks :

"The number, equipment, and martial appearance of the Indian regiments did indeed produce upon the foreign officers, particularly upon the Russians, something more than surprise at their efficiency. They were evidently not prepared to witness such a manifestation of the confidence placed by the British government in the loyalty and trustworthiness of our native fellow-subjects ; for no other European power has ventured to arm and discipline a formidable body of Asiatic soldiers drawn from the population under its dominion.......Yet that the British government should not have hesitated to rely so extensively, for the guardianship of their empire, upon the most warlike races of the country itself, led and commanded by so few British officers, was to our foreign visitors a striking novelty ; and it made upon them no light impression."†

But whatever British writers may say, the really weak point in the organization of India's army is that it is led by British officers and that Indians have been deprived of the right of taking the leading part in the defence of their country.

BURMESE WAR

Before the complications in the Afghan frontier were cleared up, a cloud was gathering in the south-east corner of India. It soon found the British power involved in a war with the kingdom of Burma. The Queen's proclamation did not intend to make fresh conquests. But in this case we find the Queen's pledge broken and a fresh conquest added to the British Indian Empire. About the policy of conquest maintained by the British Indian rulers, Sir Alfred Lyall says :

"It has always been the policy of the British-Indian Government to prevent any other European power from obtaining a foothold within the Asiatic States situated on the borders of our actual possessions. Just as a fortress or a line of entrenchments requires an open space around or in front of it, so it is manifestly advantageous for the security of a kingdom to be surrounded by a ring of territories with which powerful neighbours must not meddle. Upon this principle we place the adjoining States under our protectorate, whether they desire it or do not ; and thus our political influence radiates out beyond the line of our actual possessions, spreading its skirts widely and loosely over the lands adjacent. From the time when the British dominion was first established in India, the prosecution of this policy has been our leading motive of wars, annexations, and alliances."§

The English Government had long an eye upon the kingdom of Burma. In the nineteenth century the Burmese had lost much of their territory in two successive wars with the British Indian Government. In 1826 Lord Amherst had taken a long strip of sea-coast bordering upon the Bay of Bengal, and in 1854 Lord Dalhousie annexed Pegu, the maritime province at the mouth of the Irrawadi river. Since then the relations between the Burmese and the British Indian Governments were not at all happy. In 1879 the British Government found it advisable to withdraw from Mandalay the British

* *Ibid.*, p. 394.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 394-95.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 396.

Resident. In February 1885, "a report was passed up to headquarters from British Burma that king Theebaw had executed a Treaty with the French Government, under which special consular and commecial privileges were accorded to France. The news came at an awkward moment, for England and Russia were just then on the verge of a serious dispute over the Afghan boundary ; and it raised a question of extreme gravity."

Lord Dufferin thus wrote to the Chief Commissioner on the present situation :

"You will feel, as acutely as I do, that this would not be a propitious moment, even if other circumstances rendered such a course desirable, for India to embark in a military adventure up the Irrawadi. It is not advisable for her to make war at the same moment both in the East and in the West. If, however, the French proceedings should eventuate in any serious attempt to forestall us in Upper Burmah, I should not hesitate to annex the country ; and, as at present advised, I think that this mode of procedure would be preferable to setting up a doubtful prince."*

There was no prospect of peace in Burma. The Burmese king imposed "an unjust and ruinous fine upon a British Company trading in his dominions, and rejected a proposal of the Indian Government that the case should be referred to a special British Commissioner for arbitration." But why not also a Burmese Commissioner? Under these circumstances, the British Government sent an ultimatum to the Burmese king, who was required" to receive at Mandalay a British envoy, in concert with whom the outstanding disputes and grievances should be adjusted, to admit a permanent Resident at his Court, to agree generally that in future he would defer to the advice of the British Government in regard to his foreign relations, and finally, to send an immediate answer to these demands. The ultimatum was backed up by the assemblage at Rangoon of nearly 10,000 troops."

About this ultimatum Lord Dufferin wrote on October 19, 1885 :

"This attack upon the Burmah trade corporation seems to have originated in a desire of Theebaw's Minister, who is a savage brute, originally belonging to Theebaw's father's bodyguard, to obtain money for his master, the ladies of the harem, and himself, and it looks as though in their folly and ignorance the Burmese were determined to rush upon our bayonets. I have instructed our military authorities to get under way an expedition of 10,000 men ; for I am quite certain that nothing short of the presence of our troops in Mandalay itself will convince either the king or his advisers of the true nature of their position, and of the necessity of conforming themselves to its requirements. As to the relative advantages of placing a protected prince upon the throne, or of annexation pure and simple, I have no hesitation in saying that the latter is the better course."

Inspite of the pledge given by the Queen Victoria, the Viceroy seemed to think that annexation was the better course.

The story of the conquest may be told in a few words. We read :

"The Burmese Government not only refused to receive a British mission, but also issued a proclamation in a tone of undisguised hostility ; whereupon, in November 1885, the force assembled under General Prendergast at Rangoon was ordered to march upon Mandalay. The expedition had been organised by Lord Dufferin's government upon a scale that made opposition useless, the military operations and political procedure had been carefully laid down beforehand ; with the result that Mandalay was occupied within ten days ; the king surrendered himself a prisoner, and the immediate objects of the campaign were attained with little loss on either side."*

* *Ibid.*, p. 398.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 399-400.

After the defeat of the Burmese king, Lord Dufferin proceeded to Mandalay at the beginning of February 1886, accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts. After a comprehensive survey of the Burmese situation, Lord Dufferin became convinced "that annexation pure and simple, and the direct administration of the province by British officers, offer the best prospect of securing the peace and prosperity of Upper Burmah and our own imperial and commercial interests."

At last with the assent of Her Majesty's Government the British Chief Commissioner "was instructed to announce to the Burmese population, that the Queen Empress was now their sovereign, and that their welfare had become a matter of solicitude to a strong and powerful government, who would respect their customs, rights, privileges and religious institutions, and would effectually provide for the protection of life and property."

Thus the annexation of Burma by the British took place inspite of the solemn pledge given by Her Majesty the Queen Victoria and the announcement of the annexation took place in her name. The events leading to the invasion of Burma have been given here as narrated by British writers. The Burmese version is lacking.

Lord Dufferin thus gives his impression of Burma in a letter to Lord Dartrey. He says :

"I have just returned from Burmah. The expedition was a most interesting and successful one. Burmah is a delightful country and the Burmese people are extremely engaging, full of fun, jollity, and lightheartedness, and unlike our sombre Hindus. The women hold sway from one end of the land to the other, make their own marriages and their own divorces, retain their property, preside in the shops, and generally assert themselves in so cheerful and good-humoured a manner that no Burman need feel humiliated....

"The Burmese pagodas and monasteries are a wonderful nightmare kind of structures, all gold and carving, bristling with beautiful golden demons, fairies, and dragons in high relief, and topped in every direction with graceful pinnacles formed of Chinese-like pavilions super-imposed on one another, and contracting as they rise until they end in a single golden spire....The great monasteries peopled with enormous statues of silent Buddhas, all sitting cross-legged with their eyes on the ground in calm contemplation, are very solemn and religious, while you could not distinguish the shrines, with their golden images, flowers, candles, and Madonnas and child from those of a Catholic church."*

CHARGES AGAINST LORD DUFFERIN

Lord Dufferin now tried to pacify the conquered province. He could not get any help from the local Burmans. "It was impossible at first to organise an effective police or to enlist local regiments from among the population ; for the Burmese, unlike the people of India, have an ingrained repugnance to disciplined service of any kind. The whole work of suppressing disturbances, therefore, had to be done by soldiers and police recruited in India, with the English troops to support them."

Sir Alfred Lyall thus refers to certain charges against Lord Dufferin. We read :

"In this state of things marauding and rebellious outbreaks could not be at once put down, and the Viceroy found himself exposed to disparaging criticism, in England and elsewhere, on the supposition that his measures had been wanting in promptitude and energy ; while it was even

* *Ibid.*, pp. 401-2.

alleged that in order to keep down expenditure he had miscalculated the supply of men and money that would be indispensable for the enforcement of order."*

Lord Dufferin thus defends himself against the above charges. He says:

"Suddenly descending as we did into an arena which, for years, nay for centuries, had been the theatre of domestic anarchy and the playground of hereditary bandits, rebels, pretenders, and gang-robbers, can we expect its inhabitants in a few months, under the auspices of a strange and alien government, to subside into a condition of Arcadian tranquility? Lord Dalhousie was an energetic and vigorous ruler, and has never been accused of laxity or indecision, and in conquering and pacifying Pegu he was served by men of acknowledged ability, notably by Sir Arthur Phayre. Had the mere application of brute force in the shape of troops, money, and the multiplication of officials, been all that was necessary to secure tranquility, he would certainly have had the country quiet in a month or two. But as a matter of fact, it took him more than three years to complete the task. Though Rangoon was taken in April 1852, and Pegu annexed in December, even the town continued to be disturbed and threatened for the next year and a half. During the interval between April 1852 and the end of 1855, rebel chiefs continued to defy our authority, to attack our posts, to burn and ravage defenceless villages, and to surprise, and occasionally murder, our civil and military officers; nor did the province really begin to quiet down until 1856; yet, in spite of Upper Burmah, exclusive of the Shan States, being three times as big as Pegu, we have already got eleven districts pretty well in hand, have collected for the first year of our occupation more than half the revenue, and are every day extending wider and wider the area of our jurisdiction."†

Thus he wrote to Lord Roberts in July:

"I am very anxious that it should remain on record that from first to last we have not only not refused any demand which our officers in Burmah have addressed to us, but that we have actually forced upon them more extensive means for the subjugation of the country, in the shape of troops, etc., than they themselves demanded."§

Again, he thus writes to Sir W. Gregory on July 26, 1886:

"You ask me if I have less cause for anxiety than when we met. It seems to me that India is a kettle out of which the bottom is perpetually tumbling. You no sooner patch it up in one direction than the mess breaks out in another. Burmah is giving us a deal of trouble, and people in England are naturally getting impatient at the delay in quieting the country, little knowing what a job it is."**

In another letter to Lord Goschen (August 1886), Lord Dufferin again tries to defend his own policy in Burma:

"It is not, however, so much a question of men or money—it is time and the resources of civilization upon which we must place our chief reliance, Take the case of Ireland. In spite of an enormous army and a most efficient and numerous constabulary, it has been found impossible to suppress either the raids of moonlighters or the dynamite explosions; and if such a state of things is found so arduous to cope with in Ireland, where there are roads, railways, telegraphs, and a highly organized executive machinery, how much more difficult must it be to deal with a population of inveterate gang-robbers who have been reinforced by a disbanded army and the adherents of numerous pretenders, who inhabit a country covered with jungles and swamps, destitute not only of roads, but even of paths and of the simplest means of communication, and whom we are forced to

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* *Ibid.*, p. 405.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 405-6.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 406.

** *Ibid.*, p. 407.

control through the agency of a foreign police who neither speak their language nor are acquainted with their habits and devices."*

On the death of Sir Herbert Macpherson, the Commander of the British troops in Burma, Lord Roberts was asked to undertake the control of military affairs in that country "until a decisive impression has been made upon the existing elements of disturbance."

Lord Dufferin thus writes on the subject to the Secretary of State :

"It is a matter of great importance that there should be no delay in setting in motion the arrangements for the winter operations which for sometime past have been under such careful preparation, and Roberts has them all at his fingers' ends. Moreover, it is an advantage that at this particular juncture there should be at the head of our military affairs in Burmah a man who is personally on good terms with the head of the civil administration and the Brigadiers. A newcomer might act like a bull in a china shop, whereas Roberts will at once put all the wheels in motion without friction, and in the most intelligent and effective manner."†

The kingdom of Burma was soon pacified.

"Within two years a territory larger than France, which had been for generations a prey to lawlessness and intestine strife, has been reduced to peace and order, and furnished with a strong and efficient government, complete in all departments which minister to the security, the prosperity, and the comfort of the people. In no previous epoch of our government in India has it been found possible to achieve such results in such a brief period of time."§

About the effect produced by the occupation of Upper Burma on the countries of Eastern Asia, Sir Alfred Lyall observes :

"But the occupation of Upper Burmah had necessarily brought the Indian Government into closer contiguity with the great sovereignty that has dominated from time immemorial in Eastern Asia. The Kingdom of Mandalay was one of the blocks or barricades interposed, as are Nepal and Tibet, between the two empires of India and China ; and from these three States the Chinese emperor had been accustomed to claim certain formal acknowledgments of traditional allegiance, represented, in the case of the Burmese State, by the deputation of decennial missions to Pekin. The Nepalese relations with China have dwindled down to a ceremonious fiction , while in Tibet the suzerainty takes the form of a protectorate, that can be set up whenever it is useful as a diplomatic barrier. It was to be expected that our operations in Burmah should have been observed with active concern by the Chinese foreign office, from whom the British Government had just then extracted a reluctant consent to the deputation of a commercial mission to Lhasa."**

A COMMERCIAL MISSION TO TIBET

It had been decided to send a commercial mission to Tibet to examine whether a profitable trade might be opened up with Tibet. "But the preparations for this mission had unluckily been made on a scale that alarmed the Tibetan authorities." When it appeared certain that the Tibetan authorities would offer resistance to the proposed British mission, the Viceroy began to doubt the wisdom of sending the mission.

"The route out of India into Tibetan territory runs through Sikkim, a little independent State under British protection ; and on this part of the road at a point called Lingtu, a fort had been constructed

* *Ibid.*, p. 407.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 407-8.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 408-9.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 407-410.

by the Tibetans in July 1886, to prevent the mission from reaching the Tibetan frontier. After the mission had been withdrawn, the garrison of the fort remained and began to strengthen it, although the position was outside their own border. When representations made to the frontier officials and to the Chinese government had proved equally ineffectual, the Government of India had to decide between acquiescing in a permanent violation of Sikkim territory or resorting to strong measures for protecting it."

The following letter written by Count Bela Szechenyi to Lord Dufferin in November 1887 would prove interesting in this connection. He writes :

"For my part I take great interest in the opening of Tibet, as I travelled in some parts of it in the years 1870-80, trying to push forward on three different ways to Lhassa, but was always stopped by armed Lamas and the Tibetan militia in doing so. Since that time I have kept up my correspondence in those remote parts, and news is mostly given to me by missionaries, so that I am *'toujours au courant des faits'* concerning Tibet and China....

"Macaulay (who was to be in charge of the mission to Lhassa) during his stay at Pekin received from the Tsungli Yamen his passport for Tibet with the very best recommendation (just as I had), and was in the idea that the convention he carried through between his and the Chinese Government concerning the opening of English and Indian trade to Tibet would find its inauguration by his voyage to Lhassa *via* Darjeeling. The Chinese Government only asked for a delay of three months in order to win public opinion in Tibet in favour of his expedition.

"During these three months troops were levied in Tibet, and guns as well as over a hundred large boxes filled with European gunpowder were sent from China, and when in the month of May Macaulay arrived with his two hundred Sepoys on its frontiers, he found all the passes guarded by Lamas and Tibetan soldiers. No possibility of passing except by declaring war, which could not be the object of your government, having just at that time among other difficulties the Burmese question on its shoulders. And as you wanted for that reason peace with China, so I suppose (I may be wrong *car je ne vois pas le dessous des cartes*) Tibet was given up for the moment, and China got the declaration that you will not enter by force into Tibet if, on the other hand, China gives up its claims on Burmah.

"China has, however, not been faithful in her engagements, for it is known that the Viceroy of Yunan, 'Tsen Kong pao,' sent soldiers of the regular troops, disguised under the black flag, to fight the English in Burmah. As they had better arms it was they who killed your officers out of ambuscades.

"After Macaulay had retired with his Sepoys from the Tibetan frontier, the Lamas, soldiers, and the population massed on the passes, shouted 'Victory,' living in the idea that they had frightened the government of the Empress of India. Their boldness and audacity had no limits. They took our *protege*, the king of Sikkim, prisoner. In vain he cried for your help ; he was told that this question would be settled by diplomacy. The north of Sikkim lying under your protection was overrun by the Tibetans, who destroyed your built high-road, and even constructed a fortress in its neighbourhood.

"Are these questions also to be treated by diplomacy ? I think that your 'prestige' will suffer considerably by it, not only in Tibet, but also in India, for such affronts done to the mightiest Power demand an exemplary satisfaction."*

Though there was the question of the British 'prestige' suffering considerably, yet Lord Dufferin was not willing to enter into a struggle with Tibet. He replied thus to the above letter :

"In one respect, however, you have misconceived the situation. The Tibetans did not take the

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 412-13.

king of Sikkim prisoner, nor has he appealed to us for help. The fact is that, though his ministers are friendly to us, he himself is a Tibetan at heart, having married a pure Tibetan wife to whom he is very much attached ; and against both our remonstrances and the remonstrances of his people and ministers, he has been residing for the last two years within Tibetan territory on the plea that it suits his health better. Some time ago we expostulated with him on his removing outside of his own dominions, and when he paid no attention to us we stopped his subsidy. If he continues obdurate we shall probably make other arrangements."*

The Tibetan affair, however, did not stop here. The story may be continued thus :

"At last in the spring of 1888 the Government of India notified to the Tibetan officer in Lingtu that unless the place was evacuated he would be expelled by force of arms. The letter was returned unopened with a verbal message that the Tibetan Government allowed no communication with foreigners. As two more warnings failed to obtain the slightest acknowledgment the British troops captured the fort ; a large force that attacked them later was easily dispersed ; and the Tibetans were at last, in September 1888, driven out of Sikkim into their own country. Three months after, the long altercation had, in this manner, been determined, a Chinese official deputed from Pekin to represent the imperial mediation, announced his appearance upon the frontier."†

THE AFGHAN MISSION

At the end of October 1886, Sir West Ridgeway returned from Kabul after almost settling the Russo-Afghan boundary. The Viceroy publicly acknowledged the services rendered by Sir West Ridgeway and his staff in settling the Russo-Afghan boundary line. He said :

"Last, not least, however, I would desire to congratulate them on the auspicious circumstances under which they visited Kabul, as well as on the rapidity of their march from the capital of Afghanistan to the British frontier. That an English mission so constituted should be received as honoured guests by the Amir, and with the most hearty and friendly welcome at the hands of his subjects along their entire route, is in itself a remarkable and significant circumstance which cannot fail to have a most beneficial effect upon the future relations between the governments of India and Afghanistan."§

LORD DUFFERIN ON INDIAN EDUCATION

On the occasion of the conferring of the honorary degree of D. C. L. by the Punjab University on Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy touched upon the question of higher education in India. He said :

"In what manner your labours in the one hemisphere may most effectually supplement and commingle with the achievements of your fellow-workers in the other ; how you may best apply the products of your own past, so rich in everything that can warm the fancy, excite the imagination or exercise the speculative and metaphysical faculty, to the practical requirements of your future and the exigencies of our present hard and exacting age, is one of the principal problems with which you have to deal, and for which I have no doubt you will find a satisfactory solution."**

Lord Dufferin asked the Punjab University to solve the knotty problem of Indian education, but what solution did he offer as the head of the Indian Administration ?

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* *Ibid.*, p. 413.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 413-14.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 420.

** *Ibid.*, p. 421.

A CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

When Lord Dufferin received an address from a prominent society of educated men at Poona, in his reply he "explained the views and objects with which he had appointed a Commission to ascertain how wider employment and promotion might be given to Indians of proved merit and ability in the upper ranks of the Civil Service;" and he affirmed, most truly, that "no lessons had been more forcibly taught us by history than that institutions ought to keep pace with the progress of events and of a country's intellectual development."*

HYDERABAD AFFAIR

A trouble had arisen in Hyderabad between the Nizam and his Minister. The dispute was referred to the Viceroy, who tried to act as an arbitrator. Referring to this dispute, Sir Alfred Lyall says:

"But the relations between an autocratic ruler and a powerful subordinate are uneasy in all parts of the world; nor are instances wanting in the annals of India, where mutual jealousy, intrigue, and encroachments on either side have sometimes led to open conflict and even to dynastic changes. In Hyderabad the British influence had more than once been interposed to reconcile and pacify disputes of the kind; and on the present occasion Lord Dufferin appeared as arbitrator. Under his advice and injunctions the breach was for a time repaired; but the minister soon found his position, which had never been firm, so untenable that after a few months he escaped from it by resignation."†

MYSORE RESTORATION

After a long interval, the British Government had thought it fit to restore the Mysore State to the ruling dynasty. When Lord Dufferin visited the State, he thus spoke of the Mysore State administration:

"There is no State within the confines of the Indian Empire which has more fully justified the wise policy of the British Government in supplementing its own direct administration of its vast territories by the associated rule of our great feudatory princes. When I think that I myself was admitted to the familiarity of the heroic soldier, of whose early achievements Seringapatam and the surrounding country were the theatre and the witnesses, it is difficult to believe that the changes to which I have referred should have been the fruits of what I may call contemporary history. It has now been my good fortune to have passed through most of the native States of India, and to have come into personal, and I may state intimate, contact with their chiefs, and I have no hesitation in saying that though there may be differences between them, though some States may be more advanced than others, some rulers less sensitive than others to the weighty responsibilities imposed on them by Providence, on the whole my experiences have been eminently satisfactory and reassuring, and the Queen-Empress and the Government of Great Britain have the greatest reason to congratulate themselves on the general enlightenment, the desire to do their duty, and the conscientious application to affairs which is so generally prevalent amongst them."§

INDIAN POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS

Since the days of Lord Ripon, there had been an awakening among the educated Indians. They had begun to aspire for more political rights and privileges. Lord

* *Ibid.*, pp. 421-22.

† *Ibid.*, p. 423.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 423-24.

Dufferin in his letter to Lord Cross (January 18,1887) refers to the political aspirations of the educated Indians. He says :

"At one or two places, that is to say at Ahmedabad and I think at Tanjore, a minority in the Municipal Council wanted to introduce into their addresses one or two sentences in reference to the reform of the Councils and to the political aspirations of young India, to which their colleagues objected, and when they found themselves in a minority they sent me unofficially a copy of what they had wished to say in a separate paper, but even these people were effusively civil."

He then refers to his Poona speech in which he spoke about the Civil Service Commission. He goes on to say :

"I am glad that you approve of my speech at Poona. It was made on the spur of the moment, but it has undoubtedly had a good effect. Some of the older Indians, though agreeing in every word I said, seem to consider it unadvisable for the Viceroy to make any reference to public opinion as signified through the newspapers, and maintain that it ought to be loftily ignored. In this view I do not concur. I do not think we can afford to disregard it; for there are some papers, particularly on the Bombay side, that are conducted with moderation, and with a certain amount of political insight; and although it would be absurd to regard the Press as in any way representing the various and multitudinous populations of India, it does undoubtedy express the ideas of the educated class. Though this class is at present small and uninfluential, it is both wise and right to count with it, and we must remember that it is above all things a growing power."*

Lord Dufferin gives a good piece of advice to the ruling class when he says that it is both wise and right to count with the Indian Press, which does undoubtedly express the ideas of the educated class, and indirectly of the masses. He also thinks that the Indian Press is a growing power and in future would exercise great influence on Indian politics.

INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

We have seen that a Civil Service Commission had been appointed to consider the ways and means of opening the higher grades of the Civil Service to educated Indians,

"but to the leading advocates of Indian reforms, whose education had included a study of English constitutional history, this implied no adequate concessions ; they were pressing for an introduction of the representative system, and for other changes which would give them a substantial influence over the executive and legislative conduct of the Government. One step forward had already been taken in 1886 by the creation of a Legislative Council in the North-West Provinces, on lines similar to those existing in Madras, Bengal and Bombay. The views and aspirations of the advanced party of reform were embodied in an association, which had conferred upon itself the title of a National Congress, and held a session in Calcutta during the winter of 1886-87. The tone of their proceedings was loyal and friendly to British rule, though the discussions were tinged with some inevitable crudity and inexperience ; and the effect of some rather extravagant resolutions passed at the meeting was to arouse the instinctive conservatism, the traditional reluctance to disturb a settled order of things, that may be said to predominate among all classes in the general population of India."†

LORD DUFFERIN ON POPULAR DEMANDS

Lord Dufferin tried to measure the demands made by the educated Indians. He had seen the working of free self-government in Canada. "No statesman...knew

* *Ibid.*, pp. 424-25.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 425-26.

better than he did that if the English persist in continuing to pile up, after the high Roman fashion, the edifice of a great empire over a miscellaneous population, they cannot go on adding to the superstructure without disturbing the pressure of administrative responsibilities." Lord Dufferin thus expressed his views in 1886 on the demands made by the educated Indians :

"Now I think it is desirable that the Government should make up its mind as soon as possible in regard to the policy it is determined to pursue, for evidently India is not a country in which the machinery of European democratic agitation can be applied with impunity. My own inclination would be to examine carefully and seriously the demands which are the outcome of these various movements ; to give quickly and with a good grace whatever it may be possible or desirable to accord ; to announce that these concessions must be accepted as a final settlement of the Indian system for the next ten or fifteen years ; and to forbid mass meetings and incendiary speechifying. Putting aside the demands of the extremists ..the objects even of the more advanced party are neither very dangerous nor very extravagant...But it must always be remembered that though common sense and a certain knowledge of affairs and of the world may limit the programme of the leaders to what they think they have a chance of getting, the ideal in the minds of the major part of their followers is an India in which the British Army shall ward off invasion from without and preserve them from tyranny and usurpation of the native princes within, while they themselves shall have free scope to administer their domestic affairs untrammelled by the interference of white men, except perhaps in the person of a Viceroy and a limited number of high officials.

"Undoubtedly the most vital and important of the notions stated by the reformers is the change they propose in the Legislative Councils. I confess that soon after my arrival in the country it occurred to me that improvement might be possible in this direction, and personally I should feel it both a relief and an assistance if in the settlement of many Indian administrative questions affecting the interests of millions of Her Majesty's subjects, I could rely to a larger extent than at present upon the experience and counsels of Indian coadjutors. Amongst the natives I have met there are a considerable number who are both able and sensible, and upon whose loyal co-operation one could undoubtedly rely. The fact of their supporting the Government would popularise many of its acts which now have the appearance of being driven through the legislature by force ; and if they in turn had a native party behind them, the Government of India would cease to stand up, as it does now, as an isolated rock in the middle of a tempestuous sea, around whose base the breakers dash themselves simultaneously from all the four quarters of the heavens."*

Lord Dufferin speaks out the reason of associating able and sensible Indians in the Legislatures, because, he says, "The fact of their supporting the Government would popularise many of its acts which now have the appearance of being driven through the legislature by force."

The Viceroy then enumerates "the obvious risks and drawbacks inseparable from the introduction of the representative element into the organic constitution of such a government as that of India, where the mere number of the population (about three hundred millions) constitutes an enormous preliminary difficulty." Lord Dufferin then sums up his conclusion thus :

"In spite of the serious array of arguments which I have added against the change, my instinct rather propels me in the opposite direction, at all events so far as to try the experiment of liberalizing, if not the supreme, at least the subordinate Legislative Councils. Now that we have educated these people, their desire to take a larger part in the management of their own domestic affairs seems to be a legitimate and reasonable aspiration, and I think there should be enough statesmanship amongst

* *Ibid.*, pp. 427-28.

us to contrive the means of permitting them to do so without unduly compromising our Imperial supremacy."*

Thus Lord Dufferin was eager to satisfy the "legitimate and reasonable aspiration" of young India without unduly compromising the British Imperial supremacy.

THE DESPATCH OF 1888 FOR FURTHER REFORMS

The demand of young India for further constitutional concessions led Lord Dufferin to send to the Secretary of State a Despatch in November 1888, accompanied by a minute containing his views on further reforms. He writes in the minute:

"Having regard to the relation in numbers, in condition, in status, and in qualifications for government of what may be called the Europeanized or educated section of the Indian people as compared with the masses that constitute the bulk of the nation, I am convinced that we should be falling into a great error if, miscalculating the force and value of the Congress movement and the influence of its supporters and advocates, whether in the Press or elsewhere, we were to relax in the slightest degree our grasp of the supreme administration of the country. On the other hand, as long as we hold firmly on this principle, and remain fully alive to our own Imperial responsibilities, I believe that both with safety and advantage we can give full play to the legitimate and praiseworthy ambition of the loyal, patriotic, and educated classes in India, who are desirous of taking a larger share than hitherto in the transaction of the public business of their respective provinces. ..

"Fortunately, whilst the Government of India has been occupying itself in framing proposals for the reconstituting its provincial legislative councils, it has also, at the suggestion and with the approval of the Secretary of State, been perfecting very important arrangements for the still further decentralization of our financial system, and for handing over to provincial governments a more complete and independent control of the provincial revenues. At the same time certain powers of supplementing and increasing the local funds by provincial taxation is to be attributed to them. Thus the provincial councils will be admitted to a very large and important field of provincial administration, and ample scope and opportunities will be given to its members, both native and English (amongst whom an adequate number of representatives of the British mercantile interests should be certainly included), to display their statesmanship and their ability to provide for the wants and interests of the extensive communities over which their influence and jurisdiction will extend....

"In two respects I should desire procedure in the Governor-General's Council to be amended. Under the existing law it is only when a new tax is to be imposed that the finance member is required to submit his financial proposals to the legislative council, or that any opportunity is given to the members of that body to make observations in regard to them. When there is no new taxation the finance member merely publishes his budget in the form of a pamphlet. For my own part, I thing that a yearly financial discussion in the Viceroy's Legislative Council would prove a very useful and desirable arrangement, and a very convenient preliminary to the subsequent debate which takes place on Indian finances in the House of Commons later in the year. I do not by this mean that votes should be taken in regard to the various items of the budget, or that the heads of expenditure should be submitted in detail to the examination of the Council, but simply that an opportunity should be given for a full, free, and thorough criticism and examination of the financial policy of the Government....

"The second change in the procedure of the Supreme Legislative Council which I am inclined to recommend is, that, under proper restrictions to be laid down by the Viceroy, its members should be permitted to ask questions in reference to current matters of domestic, as distinguished from those of Imperial interest, that may have attracted public attention....Under existing circumstances the

* *Ibid.*, p. 428.

Government of India has no adequate medium through which it can explain its policy, correct a wrong impression, or controvert a false statement, and though up to the present time the consequences of the evils I have indicated may not have become very serious or widespread, they contain the germs of incalculable danger. Consequently it would prove as great an advantage to the administration as it would frequently be a satisfaction to the members of the Council and the public at large, if reasonable opportunities were afforded of communicating to those interested in the exact facts in regard to any questionable matter."*

The changes proposed by Lord Dufferin were carried out during the rule of his successor, the Marquis of Lansdowne.

JUBILEE OF QUEEN VICTORIA

On February 16, 1887 the Jubilee of Queen Victoria was celebrated throughout India. In reply to many loyal addresses, Lord Dufferin reviewed in broad outline the administrative policy of the Queen's rule in India during the last fifty years. "For the welfare and prosperity of the country," he said, "many things had been undertaken, much had been accomplished, but much more remained to be done, and for the work that lay before them he relied upon the co-operation of the leaders of native society everywhere, the representatives of education and enlightenment, in promoting the highest interests of the Indian people."

He went on to say :

"We are surrounded on all sides by native gentlemen of great attainments and intelligence, from whose hearty, loyal and honest co-operation we may hope to derive the greatest benefit. In fact, to an administration so peculiarly situated as ours, their advice, assistance, and solidarity are essential to the successful exercise of its functions. Nor do I regard with any other feelings than those of approval and goodwill their natural ambition to be more extensively associated with their English rulers in the administration of their own domestic affairs, and glad and happy should I be if, during my sojourn amongst them, circumstances permitted me to extend and to place upon a wider and more logical footing the political status which was so wisely given a generation ago by that great statesman, Lord Halifax, to such Indian gentlemen as by their influence, their acquirements, and the confidence they inspired in their fellow-countrymen were marked out as useful adjuncts to our Legislative Councils."†

Co-operation has been always understood to mean rendering subservient help to carry out British policy in India, *not* the collaboration of Britishers and Indians as equals.

In a letter to Lord Northbrook (March, 11, 1887), the Viceroy gives an account of the Jubilee celebration thus :

"Our Jubilee proceedings went off very well. Two days were set apart as holidays, and in Calcutta the programme was as follows: A salute of a hundred and one guns at daybreak, followed an hour or two later by a parade and march past of all the troops in garrison. Then I drove to the Cathedral, where a special service was held, and in the afternoon there was a great assembly on the Maidan, at which I received innumerable congratulatory addresses which had poured in from one end of the country to the other, and made a speech in reply. Immediately after this there was a grand display of fireworks, and on this occasion the natives were shown a pyrotechnic display far superior to any that they had ever seen before. The principal feature was the outline of Her Majesty's head, traced in lines of fire about 18 feet high, which unexpectedly burst

* *Ibid.*, pp. 429-30.

† *Ibid.*, pp.432-33.

upon the vision of the astonished crowd. In the same manner portraits of the Prince and Princess of Wales, on an equally gigantic scale, appeared from a fiery rose-bush. My wife and I were also honoured in the same way, and I thought I never looked so well. We also entertained 30,000 school children, native and European, and the day ended with a general reception at Government House."*

LORD DUFFERIN ON HIS OWN VICEROYALTY

It is interesting to learn the thoughts and occupations of a Viceroy ruling in India. Lord Dufferin speaks of his thoughts to Lord Grenville thus :

"I have now been two years and a half in this country, that is to say, one half of my term, and I feel now, and have always felt, like a man engaged in riding a very dangerous steeplechase over a course interspersed with horribly stiff fences and exceedingly wide brooks. So far I have scraped through and over a certain number of them, but I never feel sure that I may not have a cropper at one or other of those that lie before me, and, in any event, one feels that there can be neither rest nor peace nor breathing time until one has got safe past the winning-post at the end of one's five years. As one of Canning's successors, my thoughts naturally turn often to him and the anxious career he had here. Lady Canning's tomb is in the grounds of Barrackpore, a kind of country-house about fifteen miles from Calcutta, and scarcely a Sunday passes that I do not read the inscription Canning himself wrote on her monument. Knowing how dearly you loved him, I am sure you will be glad to hear that his memory and his fame are still alive and green in India, and that he is never mentioned, either by Europeans or natives, without respect and reverence."†

In another letter to Lord Arthur Russell, Lord Dufferin says:

"It (India) is a most wonderful and delightful place, and the climate, as distributed to us, quite enchanting and extremely healthy. In fact, both my wife and I have been better since we came here than at any time of our lives, as indeed have my children ; but the work and responsibilities are appalling. Happily when once I have left my desk I do not think of them, otherwise any one in my situation would go distracted. Nor do they trouble me at night, which is the critical period to many men. So far, matters have gone pretty well with us, though the task of administration is becoming every year more difficult and complicated, first on account of the pressure of a foreign government from outside, and secondly from the pressure amongst us of a very able, intelligent, and respectable educated class of natives, who naturally enough consider that they are entitled to a larger share in the administration of their own affairs."§

Lord Dufferin in a letter to the Secretary of State recounts the work done by the India Government at the Olympian heights of Simla. He says :

"On the whole I think the Government of India may be very well contented with the work it has accomplished during its sojourn in the hills. Though it is not our legislative season, we have passed two important Land Bills for the Punjab ; we have created a University at Allahabad, and brought Oude under the jurisdiction of the High Court of the North-West provinces ; we have completed all our arrangements for the civil administration of Burmah, including the Ruby Mine 'Regulation'; we have worked up our final plans for the frontier fortifications and for the harbour defences, and have got most of the works themselves well under way ; we have thrashed out pretty completely the various aspects of the Afghan question, political, financial, and strategical ; we have constructed a mobilization scheme of a very minute and effectual character ; and we have issued a good many important resolutions, especially one on sanitation. There is also another circumstance for which I think we may take some credit. Within the last few months the tone of the native press

* *Ibid.*, pp. 433-34.

† *Ibid.*, p. 435.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

has become far less offensive, or at all events far less hostile to the Supreme Government than was the case some time ago, thanks to the opportunities I was given when I was last on tour of putting myself into communication with all the principal persons of influence in different parts of India representing the educated section of the community ; and what is equally important, I have been able to establish friendly personal relations with all the leading chiefs, to whom I now write pretty constantly as to personal friends."*

THOUGHTS OF RESIGNATION

In October 1887, Lord Dufferin was thinking of resigning the post of Viceroy before the expiry of his full term. Thus he writes to Sir William Gregory:

"At the conclusion of your letter you ask me whether I would like to go to Rome. It is rather an odd coincidence, but it so happens that the other day I wrote to Lord Salisbury, and told him that if in a year's time there happened to be an embassy at his disposal I would be willing to take a four year's turn in India instead of five, as I found it was such a tremendous disadvantage being separated from my children just at the time it was most necessary I should be near them in order to start them on their respective careers, and I happened to mention that I should be very well content to go to Rome."†

In February 1888, Lord Dufferin was informed by Lord Salisbury that his appointment to the Roman Embassy would be made and that Lord Lansdowne would succceed him as the Viceroy in India.

HIS OWN ESTIMATE OF THE VICEROYALTY

Lord Dufferin in a letter to Lord Salisbury gives an estimate of his own Viceroyalty in India. He says (Feb. 5. 1888) :

"I shall be quite ready to leave in November, and by that time I shall have completed four years' service in India, which is as long a term as most of my immediate predecessors have remained. I have had a good many difficulties to contend with, especially on account of the great disturbance imported into our finances by the fall in silver, which has made me a poorer Viceroy by three millions a year than I was when I arrived in the country, but otherwise I hope that my administration has been fairly successful.

HIS SUCCESS

"We have now thoroughly subdued Burmah, and though for many a long day robberies and dacoities on a small scale will continue, there is no longer a shadow of resistance in any part of the province. All our frontier railways have been completed. Our five principal sea-ports are being fortified. The army has not only been increased, and Reserve initiated, but the condition of the native soldier has been greatly improved. The most vulnerable part of our north-west frontier has been rendered inexpungable, and a mobilization scheme has been worked out and partially executed, which will enable us to make any forward movement that may be necessary with rapidity and precision. Thanks to your own skilful management, the Russo-Afghan demarcation has been completed and Russia herself seems to have assumed for the present a less aggresive attitude in Turkestan. Our relations with the Amir are excellent, and by our recent settlement with Ayub Khan we have gathered up all the possible pretenders to the Afghan throne in the hollow of our hand. The chiefs of the independent tribes that rule the country between us and Afghanistan have recently visited me at Calcutta, as well as the two sons of the ruler of Chitral ; and we are making arrangements for placing our relations with all these wild men upon a more intimate and effective footing. We have

* *Ibid.*, pp. 443-44.

† *Ibid.*, p. 447.

organised an Intelligence Department for the whole of India. Two Commissions, one a Retrenchment Commission, and the other a Civil Service Commission, have thoroughly eviscerated these two important subjects. We have passed a gigantic Land Bill for Bengal, and got through some very satisfactory land legislation in Oudh and the Punjab, as well as in the south of India. We have given the North-West Provinces a University and a Legislative Council. We have done a good deal for the Mahomedans in different ways, and have put their pilgrim traffic on an excellent basis. Our relations with all the Native States are very friendly, and the animosity which at one time existed between the Anglo-Indians and the advanced natives has considerably calmed down, while the native Press during the last year, though now and then some insignificant paper indulges in a vicious or disloyal attack, has become more reasonable, and less abusive of the Government. This is all the more creditable to them, considering that on two occasions I have been forced to add to the taxes of the country, one of them being an income-tax."*

Lord Dufferin thus concludes this letter :

"The foregoing is certainly not a very brilliant record as compared with what has been achieved by some of my predecessors, but I never had any ambition to distinguish my reign by a sensational policy, believing as I did (and subsequent experience has only confirmed the conviction) that in the present condition of affairs it is best for the country that the administration should be driven at a low and steady pressure."†

It should be stated here that none of the three immediate predecessors of Lord Dufferin had served the full period of the term. He himself also did the same thing. He, however, tried to make it clear that he was not returning home through any difference with the Government, or in consequence of having lost the confidence of the Secretary of State.

THE COUNTESS OF DUFFERIN'S FUND

Lady Dufferin had tried, at the request of the Queen Victoria, to relieve the sufferings, in sickness and child-bearing, of Indian women. To attain this object, she proposed an association whose object should be to train up and otherwise provide women doctors, nurses and midwives. In August, 1885, the Association was inaugurated at Simla under the name of "The National Association for supplying Female Medical Aid to the Women of India." Lady Dufferin became the President ; the Viceroy, Patron ; and Queen Victoria, the Royal Patron. It was also decided that all contributions should be credited to "The Countess of Dufferin's Fund."

Presiding over the first general meeting at Calcutta in January 1886, Lord Dufferin said that he "regarded the meeting as one of the most important ever held in India, as upon its successful issue a vast amount of human happiness was dependent." The object of the Association, he said, was "to supply the women of the land from one end of it to the other, with proper medical advice and attendance, under conditions consonant to their own most cherished ideas, feelings and wishes. . .Our ambition is eventually to furnish every district, no matter how remote, if not with a supply of highly trained doctors, at all events with nurses, midwives, and female medical assistants, who shall have such an acquaintance with their business as to be a great improvement upon those who are now employed."

* *Ibid.*, pp. 448-49
† *Ibid.*, p. 449.

Lady Dufferin thus writes of the inauguration day in her Journal:

"This was a great day for me and rather a nervous one. I never felt so much anxiety at a public meeting before, but now this scheme is really started, and I trust it may go on as well as it has begun."*

The Association spread throughout the Indian Empire and is trying to do some useful work. In reply to an address presented on December 4, 1888, by the *purda-nashin* ladies of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, Lady Dufferin said:

"I am quite sure that no one in the fulfilment of a plain duty has ever received so great a reward as I have, in the sympathy and appreciation of those for whom I have tried to do something, and in the rapid progress and success of the work I undertook. That work is founded upon love and common sense, and built upon such sure foundations it cannot fail. If it has been my happy privilege to draw attention to the remediable sufferings and to the wants of the women of India, it is the quick response to that appeal emanating from the hearts and minds of their countrymen which has made the amelioration of their lot a reality and not a dream."†

HIS FAREWELL ADDRESS

In reply to the farewell addresses presented to him on March 23, 1888, in Calcutta, Lord Dufferin reviewed the main events of his Viceroyalty and acknowledged the assistance rendered by his colleagues in the Council. In conclusion, he asked for "co-operation" between the Indians and Europeans. He said:

"What can I say to you, Europeans and Natives alike, but this: Whatever you do, live in unity and concord and good fellowship with each other. Fate has united both races in a community of interests, and neither can do without the other. The rule of England maintains peace and justice within the borders of India, and secures its safety from outside dangers, but that rule cannot be exercised either effectually or acceptably without the loyalty and assistance of the native races. Therefore again I say, co-operate with each other in a generous and genial spirit. I confess I would rather see the Europeans, the Hindus and Mahomedans united in criticizing the Government, than that the Hindus and Mahomedans, the Europeans and the Natives should become estranged from each other by unworthy prejudices or animosities of race and religion. God forbid that the British Government should ever seek to maintain its rule in India by fomenting race-hatreds among its subjects....To those amongst my native friends who, imbued with the political literature of the West, are seeking to apply to India the lessons they have learnt from the history of constitutional countries, I would say, pursue your objects, which no one can pronounce to be unworthy, with temper, with moderation, and with a due perception of the peculiar circumstances of your native land. Found your claims, whatever they may be, upon what is real and true, and not upon what is baseless and fantastic..."††

It is not on record how these patronizing words of condescension addressed really to the "Natives" were received by them. It was certainly a pious wish when Lord Dufferin said: "God forbid that the British Government should ever seek to maintain its rule in India by formenting race-hatreds among its subjects."

HIS UNIVERSITY DEGREES

In a letter to Mr. Hepburn (June 22, 1888) Lord Dufferin speaks of the honorary degrees he got from various Universities. He says:

* *Ibid.*, p. 570.
† *Ibid.*, p. 571.
†† *Ibid.*, p. 454.

"By-the-by, you ask me if I am not an Oxford Doctor. This honour was granted to me when I came home from Canada, and I have now just been made a Doctor of Cambridge. Indeed few people—considering, as you unkindly remark, that I never took my Bachelor's degree, though I beg to remind you I passed the examination—are more Donnish than myself, for not only am I a Doctor of Harvard University in America, and of the Laval and Toranto Universities in Canada, and of Oriental Learning in the Lahore University, but also I have been made Chancellor of the Royal University of Ireland."†

REVOLT IN AFGHANISTAN

In August 1888, a serious revolt, headed by Ishak Khan, the Amir's cousin and the governor of the province of Northern Afghanistan, who had been summoned by the Amir to Kabul, broke out in Afghanistan. He declared himself the rightful Amir, defeated the forces of the Amir, who sought for British help. Ishak Khan was, however, completely routed and fled to Russia.

Lord Dufferin wrote about the Afghan situation thus to Lord Cross (Oct. 8, 1888):

"Matters are going on prosperously in Afghanistan, for now the Amir has reported the complete victory of his troops over Ishak Khan near Tashkurgan. As this affair seems to have been pretty decisive, I am in hopes we shall soon hear news of Ishak's complete disappearance, for I suppose he will fly to Russia. At one time I was made rather uneasy by learning that the Amir was filling the moat round the fort of Kabul with water, and gathering in supplies. It now appears that a refugee from the recent engagement had brought him a false report of the death of his general and the overthrow of his army, and it was not till three days afterwards that he received the truer and pleasanter account."†

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Lord Dufferin also tried to introduce certain changes in the administration of the army in India. In 1885 he had recommended to the Secretary of State that the abolition of what was known generally as the Presidential system should be made without any delay. Again in 1888, he submitted a complete scheme for military organization to the Home Government. In a long minute, he summarized the main points of the scheme and "showed that each of the four armies was to be commanded by a Lieutenant-General, aided by a strong military and departmental staff; while the Commander-in-Chief would be drawn into closer financial relation with the Government, and would command in reality as well as in name the whole of the military forces in India, being freed from the detailed executive business of the Bengal army."

He concludes the Minute thus :

"In conclusion, I desire to point out to my colleagues that these opinions are founded upon no mere theoretical considerations, but are based upon experience, for it has been my lot to overlook during my tenure of office considerable military operations, and to enter upon military questions of great magnitude and importance.

"No sooner had I arrived in India than we had to despatch a force to Suakin and to assist the Imperial Government with large reinforcements of transport; then came the war preparations of 1885, and following immediately on the heels of the latter the campaign in Burmah of 1885-86-87;

* *Ibid.*, p. 456.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 457-58.

while the period of my Viceroyalty is closed by the expedition to Sikkim and the coming campaign in Hazara. I have therefore had a large experience of the working of the military administration during the preparation for and conduct of campaigns ; and I do not hesitate to say that although, as in all human systems, there are defects which may be remedied, the Indian army and its military administration will bear comparison with any other army in the world. Many important changes have taken place within the army since 1885 ; the fighting material has been largely increased, regiments have been linked together, the reserve system has been introduced, the commands and staff of the army have been recognized, various beneficial reforms have been carried into effect, and the defences of the Empire are now, I trust, rapidly approaching a satisfactory completion. And lastly, I must mention the great measure of mobilisation, to which I gave my unqualified support from the first, under which it will be possible to put large forces rapidly into the field with less labour than was required a few years back to place on active service mere detachments of troops."*

RECEIVING A MARQUISATE

In September 1888, the Queen conferred upon the Viceroy a Marquisate. On the question of connecting it with his public career, the Viceroy thus wrote to a friend in England :

"I was very anxious to take the title of Quebec, for the town owes its preservation to me, as I saved its walls from destruction and rebuilt its gates, and without them it would have been a far less striking city than it is. Moreover, so many of my happiest associations are connected with it ; and I also think it sounds well. The Queen, however, though she did not actually refuse, demurred to the title of Quebec, and she intimated, and Lord Salisbury did the same, that I ought to take my title from some town in India, but this is quite impossible, for there is no town in India with which I am at all specially connected. In fact, people would very much resent if I called myself the Marquis of Agra, or Delhi, or Benares, or Lahore. Lord Salisbury suggested some place in Burmah but all the names in Burmah are horribly uncouth, and would sound like names out of one of Offenbach's operas or the *Mikado*. The only possible one is Ava, and we have been very much debating whether we should become the Marquis and Marchioness of Dufferin and Ava, with Earl of Ava for the second title."†

A DEFENCE OF HIS INDIAN POLICY

In a letter to Lord Cross, Lord Dufferin tries to defend his Indian policy (Sept. 17, 1888). He writes :

"Though I well know I might in many respects have done better, I am not conscious of having made any actual blunders in regard to the various difficult problems with which I have had to deal. Each successive year will, I have no doubt, prove that the annexation of Burmah was both a necessary, a desirable and a beneficent act, while every one will agree that the fortification of our north-west frontier and of our sea-ports, as well as our general policy in Afghanistan, have been steps in the right direction. With regard to internal affairs, the lamentable depletion of our income through the fall in silver has of course greatly curtailed one's power of doing good. Our land legislation is now generally regarded as having been salutary and successful, while we have laid the foundations for considerable improvement both in sanitation and in technical education. The Mahomedans also have certainly been brought much more into sympathy with the Government than they were before......My personal relations with all the Indian princes, with the exception perhaps of Holkar, whom I have scarcely seen before his accession,

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* *Ibid.*, p. 459-60.

† *Ibid.*, p. 461.

have been very friendly and intimate, and there is scarcely one of them who has not expressed his regret at my departure."*

INDIAN HOME RULERS

Lord Dufferin in a letter to Lord Arthur Russel thus wrote about the Indian Home Rulers :

"Before I leave (only this is strictly between ourselves) I shall hope to have formed a plan which will settle satisfactorily all the questions and difficulties raised by the native Home Rulers, if only it is applied with a little judgment, tact and firmness."†

In his farewell address on St. Andrews' Day, Lord Dufferin also touched on the above question :

"He reminded his audience that in a former speech he had made no secret of his earnest sympathy with the desire of the educated classes in India to be more largely associated with the administration of their country."

He proceeded to say :

"To every word which I there spoke I continue to adhere ; but surely the sensible men of the country cannot imagine that even the most moderate constitutional changes can be effected in such a system as ours by a stroke of the pen, or without the most anxious deliberations, as well as careful discussions in Paliament. If ever a political organization has existed where caution is necessary in dealing with those problems which affect the adjustment of the administrative machine, and where haste and precipitancy are liable to produce deplorable results, it is that which holds together our complex Indian empire and the man who stretches forth his hand towards the task, even with the best intentions, may well dread lest it should shrivel up to the shoulder. But growth and development are the rule of the world's history, and from the proofs I have already given of the way in which English statesmanship has perpetually striven gradually to adapt our methods of government in India to the expanding intelligence and capacities of the educated classes among our Indian subjects, it may be confidently expected that the legitimate and reasonable aspirations of the responsible heads of the Native society, whether Hindu or Mahomedan, will in due time receive legitimate satisfaction. The more we enlarge the surface of our contact with the educated and intelligent public opinion of India the better ; and although I hold it absolutely necessary, not merely for the maintenance of our own power, but for the good government of the country, and for the general content of all classes, and especially of the people at large, that England should never abdicate her supreme control of public affairs, or delegate to a minority, or to a class, the duty of providing for the welfare of the diversified communities over which she rules, I am not the less convinced that we could, with advantage, draw more largely than we have hitherto done on native intelligence and native assistance in the discharge of our duties. I have had ample opportunities of guaging and appreciating to its full extent the measure of good sense, of practical wisdom, and of experience which is possessed by the leading men of India, both among the great nobles on the one hand, and amongst the leisured and professional classes on the other, and I have now submitted officially to the home authorities some personal suggestions in harmony with the foregoing views"§

In commenting on the above St. Andrews' Dinner speech of Lord Dufferin, his biographer says :

"To the active leaders of the association in Bengal, which, under the ambitious title of a National Congress, was demanding for all India a government on the principles of the British constitution,

* *Ibid.*, p. 462.

† *Ibid.*, p. 465.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 469-70.

some passages in this speech were inevitably disappointing. The extreme reformers took small comfort from the prospect of concessions that were to be carefully limited. Here they were met by a plain *non possumus*: the British Viceroy shut the Parliamentary door in their faces and lectured them out of an upper window, to the applause of Scotsmen who were probably hardened Radicals in their own country. Although Lord Dufferin was well aware of the effect that was likely to be produced, the declaration was in his judgement necessary; and he even withheld such consolation as might have been afforded by the disclosure of the reforms that he had himself confidentially recommended."*

In his last letter (Dec. 3, 1888) to the Secretary of State, Lord Dufferin tried to defend his St. Andrews' Dinner speech thus:

"I considered that before I left it would be my duty to give some sign of the light in which I regarded such of the Congress demands and proceedings as are extravagant and reprehensible. Accordingly I took the opportunity of a Scotch dinner at Calcutta to make the speech which I am sending to you and to the members of your Council. It will of course make the Home Rule party in India very angry, and expose me to a good deal of obloquy and abuse just as I am leaving the country, the echoes of which may reverberate at home, but I thought it would clear the atmosphere and render Lansdowne's position easier and pleasanter. I might of course have neutralized what was unpopular in my speech by some hint as to the proposals we have submitted to you for liberalizing the Provincial councils, which is all that the reasonable leaders even of the most advanced section of young Indians dream of; but I felt that, though I was merely expressing my own personal opinions in an after-dinner speech, I had no right to breath a syllable which could in any way, even in a remote degree, commit the government at home or my successor to any policy of the kind, or raise expectations which might, after all, prove impossible of fulfilment."†

His biographer, in commenting on the above defence, says:

"The Viceroy's caution was justified by the event, for his very liberal proposals were not sanctioned in their entirety. Moreover, the speech had been long, and from the extracts telegraphed home to *The Times* it was misunderstood as being too decisive a pronunciation against the reforming politicians of India. Lord Dufferin, to whom this unmerited interpretation of his views, due partly to his self-denying reticence, gave real concern, took much trouble after his arrival in Europe to set public opinion right on this point by explanation and correspondence."§

These speeches and comments are of interest to Indians to-day only as showing from how long ago British statesmen have been in the habit of practically marking time by the utterance of pious platitudes and pompous magnifications of the difficulty of letting India have self-rule.

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* *Ibid.*, p. 471.

† *Ibid.*, p. 472.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 472.

CHAPTER XII

LORD LANSDOWNE (1888—1894)

On the 10th of December 1888, Lord Landowne assumed the charge of Viceroyalty of India from the hands of Lord Dufferin, who predicted for him universal popularity and acceptance. Like his predecessor, Lord Lansdowne had also previous training as an able ruler. As Governor-General of Canada, he had proved a great success. He had also served as Parliamentary Under-Secretary for India for a short period in Mr. Gladstone's second administration. As such he had been in touch with Indian affairs even before his coming out to India. "In replying to the address presented to him by some Indian gentlemen at Lord Northbrook's house he laid special stress on the fact that the India of to-day was essentially different from the India of 1833, that during the last 30 years India had made great progress morally and materially, and the changes that had come from the spread of education had made the supremacy of the British Crown to rest more on the sympathy and goodwill of the people than upon the mere exhibition of physical force." It may be doubted whether this continues to be true.

SIKIM AFFAIR

Mention has already been made of the attempt on the part of the British to open out a commercial route to Tibet through Sikim or the "New Palace" (known to the inhabitants as Rong and to Tibet as the 'land of rice'). Mr. Risley gives a vivid account of the British relations with Sikim and of the Tibetan aggression into Sikim and its repulse by the British in his Introduction to the official *Gazetteer of Sikim* (1894). After referring to Mr. Macaulay's mission, he says :

"Our expectations were signally disappointed. Not only did the Tibetans hold their ground at Lingtu with characteristic Mongolian obstinacy, but their refusal to receive letters or to enter into negotiations with us soon began to produce an alarming effect in Sikhim. When called upon to visit Darjeeling in June 1887 for the purpose of conferring with the Lieutenant-Governor concerning the affairs of his State, (with a view to induce him to modify his relations with Tibet and to return to his previous friendly policy towards this Government), the Rajah of Sikhim, after exhausting the standard oriental excuses, replied in so many words that he and his people had in 1886 signed a treaty declaring that Sikhim was subject only to China and Tibet. He was therefore unable to come to Darjeeling without the express permission of the Tibetan Government."

He then continues to say :

"Tibet had assumed an attitude of unmistakable, though probably cautious agression ; while the leaders of the Sikhim people, and Nepalese settlers with influence and property in that country, had begun to ask themselves seriously whether it might not be necessary for their ultimate safety to cast in their lot with the Tibetan party....Some months before representations had been made to China in the belief that her influence would suffice to bring about a peaceful settlement. But it is a far cry from Pekin to Lhassa ; the wheels of state move slowly in China, and no effecrive action appears to have been taken. In default, therefore, of any means of introducing the Tibetans themselves to civilized methods of settling international disagreements, it was decided to send an

ultimatum to the troops at Lingtu, warning them that, if they did not abandon the post by the 14th of March, they would be driven out by force of arms."

He tries to justify the British policy in Sikim and says : .

"The peculiar position of Sikhim renders it impossible for us to ignore it as we ignore Bhutan, or to treat it on terms of comparative equality as we treat Nepal. Sikhim cannot stand by itself and, if we withdraw our support, it must ultimately fall either to Tibet or to Nepal. But for our treaty obligations the latter consummation would hardly be one to be deeply regretted, but it is difficult to see how it could be brought about peaceably. The Tibetan party would certainly try to hold the country for themselves ; and, although the stronger races of Nepal would probably win in the long run, the period of transition would be one of intolerable anarchy. Once let our hold be relaxed, and Sikhim would become the Alsatia of the Eastern Himalayas, and such a state of things would react most formidably on the security of life and property in the great European settlement of Darjeeling."

Mr. Risley continues the story thus :

"Enough has perhaps been said to show that the obligation of driving the Tibetans out of Sikhim was imposed on us by the essential conditions of our policy towards the East Himalayan States ; that this policy is a just and reasonable one ; and that it involves the assumption on our part of no more authority than is necessary if we are to keep the peace in this particular corner of the Indian Empire. To maintain this policy by the cheapest and most effective means was the sole object of the military operations commenced in March 1888, and terminated by the engagement of the 24th September of that year."

ANGLO-CHINESE CONVENTION OF 1890

This Sikim affair ended with the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. Mr. Risley says:

"The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 secures the formal acknowledgement of our rights which the Gnatong victory entitles us to demand. At the close of a costly and vexatious campaign, carried on at an elevation never before reached by regular troops, and involving transport difficulties of the most serious kind, it was clearly essential to have something in the nature of a final settlement to show for our trouble."

About the effect of this convention, Mr. Risley says :

"But we can afford to be content with a distinct surrender of the indefinite claim to control the course of events in Sikhim which for the last 3 years has troubled the peace of our frontier and stopped all trade between Darjeeling and Tibet. Above all things, we have no call to irritate the Tibetans and possibly excite the jealous territorial susceptibilities of China by introducing stipulations granting to European traders or travellers the coveted right of exploiting the commercial and scientific treasures of the interior of Tibet. Traders would assuredly fall foul of the monopolies reserved to the monks of the great monasteries ; while scientific research, however modest in its aims, could scarcely fail to come into collision with some form of religious or social prejudice. Here surely is one of the cases where 'the half is more than the whole.' Be the treaty never so meagre, we anyhow remain in possession of the disputed tract, while the roads and bridges made during the campaign ensure us the command of the passes against Tibetan inroads. Our influence is predominant in Sikhim ; it has been vigorously asserted by the introduction of essential reforms in the government of the State, and we need not fear that it will hereafter be permitted to decline."*

THE INDIAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

The Indian Public Service Commission, appointed by the Government of Lord Dufferin, submitted its Report in January, 1888. The Government of India expressed their views

* Quoted in Buckland's *Bengal Under the Lieutenant-Governors*, II, pp. 842-52.

on the Report in a Despatch of the 9th October 1888. To this Despatch, the Secretary of State, Lord Cross, made the following reply on the 12th September 1889 :

"The scheme framed by the Commission does not suggest any very serious change in the main features of the existing system of administration. It proposes that, for the conduct of the higher branches of the Executive and Judicial work throughout India, there should continue to be, as at present, two distinct services. The first of these would be the existing Covenanted Civil Service, which the Commission has proposed to call the Imperial Service, recruited by competition in England, and open without distinction of race to all natural-born subjects of Her Majesty. Its numbers would continue to be regulated on a scale which would enable it to fill the majority of the highest civil offices, with such a number of smaller offices as will provide a course of training for the younger men. The second of the two services would be called the Provincial Service, and it is to the constitution of this Service that the principal recommendations of the Commission refer. It would be recruited in each province of India separately, and would hold the higher appointments of the existing Uncovenanted Service, together with a certain number of the appointments now ordinarily reserved by law or practice to the Covenanted Civil Service, which would be transferred to the Provincial Service. It is proposed that the two classes of appointments should be gradually amalgamated, and that recruitment should be effected provincially under various methods adapted to local circumstances. Among the appointments to be transferred to the Provincial Service are one-third of the offices of District or Civil and Sessions Judge, and one-sixth of the offices of Magistrate and Collector of a district, as well as others of both higher and lower rank. To facilitate this measure it is proposed that the transferred sppointments in the Regulation Provinces should be excluded from the schedule of the Statute 24 and 25 Vict., c. 54, and that the strength of the Covenanted Civil Service should be proportionately reduced. The Provincial Service would be open to all natural-born subjects of Her Majesty, but recent residence of at least three years in a Province and thorough knowledge of its language are recommended as among the essential conditions of admission to its Provincial Service. The Commission further proposes that the grades of pay in the Provincial Service, and the pay of appointments to be held by its members, together with the general conditions of that service as to leave and retiring annuity, should be fixed on independent grounds. The terms offered to the Provincial Service in these respects would be those which are necessary to secure locally in India the desired qualifications."*

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

Lord Lansdowne referred to the question of Local Self-government in India in his reply to the address presented by the Bombay Municipal Corporation, when he said :

"I did not fail to take note of what fell from you in regard to the success which has been achieved by the extension of a large measure of Local Self-government to your city. Municipal institutions are on their trial in the great cities of India, and I am prepared to find that the Municipal Corporation of Bombay has achieved results not likely to disappoint the most sanguine advocates of that great and salutary measure of reform."†

To the Calcutta Corporation, Lord Lansdowne expressed a wish to improve the condition of Local Self-government in India. He said :

"I may therefore perhaps join with you in expressing my earnest hope that, during my term of office, peace and security, such as that which you have invoked, may, under Providence, be vouchsafed to the Indian Empire of Her Majesty, and that those who are concerned in its government may find it within their power to address themselves, unimpeded by external or internal complications, to the task of wise and prudent legislation for the domestic advantage of the people,

* *Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors*, pp., 855-56.

† *Speeches by the Marquis of Lansdowne*, Vol. I, p. 8.

and to the introduction of such improvements in the machinery by which your public affairs are administrated as may, from time to time, be required by the altering circumstances of the country and its people."*

INDIAN RAILWAY SYSTEM

As to the future development of the Indian Railway System, the Viceroy said thus in reply to the address from the Bombay Chamber of Commerce :

"I shall, however, not fail to take note of what you have said in regard to the importance of continuing to develop the Railway System of India, both as a means of increasing the material resources of the country, and in order to diminish the risk to which it is liable from those periods of scarcity to which it has been from time to time exposed. I may mention that, on the eve of my departure, this view was strongly pressed upon me by an influential deputation from the Chamber of Commerce of Manchester—a city with which you are so closely connected. I feel with you, however, that at the present time all proposals involving an increase of public expenditure require the closest examination and scrutiny. There is nevertheless, I am convinced, no duty more incumbent upon your Government than that of extending the Railway communications of the country, and of bringing to light, and rendering available for human use, the wealth which is latent within it. Nor is there, I believe, any chapter of Indian history to which we have a right to refer with greater satisfaction than that which records our past achievements in this direction—achievements, the progress of which, I trust, not to be arrested during my connection with your Government."†

TECHNICAL EDUCATION

Lord Lansdowne said, he wanted to see the spread of technical education in India. In addressing the students of the Jubilee Technical Institute of Bombay, he remarked :

"I do not know that in any society, in any community, technical education deserves a greater amount of support than it does in your community. I look at the question from two points of view. You are endeavouring in India to extend the advantages of elementary education to as large a number as possible of the youth of this country, and when you have carried them through their school or college course, is it not true to say that you want some practical outlet for them as a vocation which they may follow in their maturer age ? And may we not say that no outlet is a better one than that which gives to an Indian youth an opportunity of employing himself in a useful and honourable manner in connection with any of the great industries of this country ? Then look at it from the opposite direction. Is it not true that the great industries require encouragement in India ? I think it is. I have seen it stated—that somewhere over seventy per cent. adult males of this country are engaged in agriculture, and if you add to this those persons who are indirectly connected with agriculture you come to this, that the great bulk of the population is engaged exclusively in agricultural pursuits. Now, I do not wish to say a single word in depreciation of the honourable position which agriculture has obtained for itself in the world as a profession but I do say that, in a community like this, you have a right to look forward to the time when your people shall be less exclusively engaged in agriculture, and when a larger space shall be given to other industries and professions. Nature has given to your country a great many advantages which only require to be developed. I saw when I arrived here, the tall chimneys of your great cotton factories in the city of Bombay. I saw on the other hand, accounts of railways and canals in progress, and of Government works of different descriptions being carried on all over India. Is it too much to ask that some of those natives of this country who have been educated in India should look forward to taking up for themselves an honourable position in connection with the direction and superintendence of works of this kind ?

* *Ibid.*, p. 16.

† *Ibid.*, p. 8.

I believe it is the case that up to the present time, when you have required the services of skilled foremen, you have been obliged to get them from Great Britain. I hope it will be the ambition of those whom I am addressing this afternoon to step into employments of this kind hereafter. I think I am justified in saying there is room for the work which your Institute has taken in hand."*

Lord Lansdowne spoke magnificently of the youth of India employing themselves in a useful and honorable manner in connection with the great industries of this country. It was an anti-climax, therefore, when by implication he wanted them only to fill positions no higher than those of skilled foremen. Neither he nor any succeeding Viceroy did auything remarkable to promote technical education.

INDIAN CURRENCY

Lord Lansdowne referred to the problem of Indian currency in his reply to the address presented by the Calcutta Trades' Association. He said :

"I observe the prominence which you have assigned to the great group of questions which have arisen in consequence of recent fluctuations in the gold value of your Indian currency, and I have referred with much interest to the statements contained in the memorial presented by your Association in 1886. I am glad to have the opportunity of expressing my sympathy with those to whom these changes have occasioned private hardship and suffering. The inconvenience which has been occasioned to the Government of India by the derangement of the finances, as well as by uncertainty in the rate of exchange, are so generally admitted that it is scarcely necessary for me to say that I am fully alive to the magnitude of the issues involved."†

MUHAMMADAN EDUCATION

Lord Lansdowne expressed his opinion in favour of the spread of Muhammadan education. He said thus to the members of the Mahommedan Literary Society :

"You desire above all to encourage the growth of education amongst your Mahomedan fellow subjects. The value of education to all classes of Her Majesty's subjects cannot be called in question. You have, however, admitted with a frankness which, I think, does you credit, that the community with which you are connected has, until lately, scarcely kept pace with modern progress in this direction, and that you find yourselves consequently in the disadvantageous position of having to recover ground which has been lost at the outset. Let me assure you of the entire sympathy with which I regard your efforts, and of my desire to encourage them, should any opportunity for so doing prove to be within my reach."§

LORD LANSDOWNE ON INDIAN EDUCATION

In his Convocation address before the Calcutta University on 19th January 1889, Lord Lansdowne pointed out the danger of turning out a large number of graduates, who could not be provided with any employment. He said :

"I am glad to hear excellent accounts of the success of your students in the Public Service, at the Bar, and on the Bench, and I believe it is the case that the area within which they are to be found occupying positions of responsibility is steadily increasing in extent. I am afraid, however, that we must not disguise from ourselves that if our schools and colleges continue to educate the youth of India at the present rate, we are likely to hear even more than we do at present of the

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

† *Ibid.*, p. 20.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

complaint that we are turning out every year an increasing number of young men whom we have provided with an intellectual equipment, admirable in itself, but practically useless to them, on account of the small number of openings which the professions afford for gentlemen who have received this kind of education. I will only make one observation in regard to this point, that I should be sorry to admit that a young man, who has received a sound education, and taken his degree, had wasted his time because he was unable to find a suitable career in one of the learned professions. I do not think that there is any vocation in life, however humble, in which an educated man is not better off than one who is ignorant, and it certainly seems to me that society in India has more to fear from a general dead level of ignorance, and from a dearth of education, than from a slight excess in the supply of higher education and of highly-educated candidates for employment.

"I should like to add a word with regard to the alleged danger to which we are exposed from having in our midst a number of highly-educated young men without employment suitable to their intellectual attainments. There is, I fancy, an impression in some quarters that Government is so much alarmed at this state of things that it has made up its mind to stint higher education of the means which it requires. I do not think there is the least likelihood that any such reactionary policy will be pursued either by the Government of India or by the Provincial Governments. We might no doubt, at the outset, have deliberately determined to keep the people of this country, as far as we were able, in a condition of ignorance—if it had been possible to keep in ignorance races, many of which have shown a great desire for the acquisition of knowledge and a singular aptitude for instruction. I am glad to think that we have taken the opposite line, and I have no doubt that we shall persevere in it. On the other hand, the facts to which I referred just now are not undeserving of attention, and, if experience has shown that our educational arrangements are not as well adapted as they might be to the practical requirements of the country, it is for us to consider whether we cannot remedy any defects which have been disclosed. There seems, for example, to be growing up in several parts of the Empire a widespread feeling that the existing system, whilst conferring great benefits, is too exclusively literary, and that we should endeavour to supply our students with a training which would serve their purpose in the event of their ultimately electing to adopt a profession in which literary attainments were not indispensable. I am informed that this feeling has found expression in a growing sympathy for the establishment of technical schools as a supplementary branch of education. Even in the bosom of the University, this feeling, I am told, already exists, but it is checked by a not unnatural apprehension that any change, even of a supplementary kind, in the existing curriculum would endanger the interests of that purely literary culture which will, I hope, never cease to be associated in our minds with University education. To find some means of obtaining the desired advantage without encountering the evil results which are feared, ought not to be a problem of insuperable difficulty, and I would commend it to the careful consideration of the University authorities."*

The Viceroy neither suggested nor applied any definite remedy for the state of things described by him.

MEDICAL HELP TO INDIAN WOMEN

At the annual general meeting of the National Association for supplying Female Medical Aid to the Women of India (7th February, 1889) Lord Lansdowne said:

"When we consider that there are more than one hundred millions of women in India, that of these all but a very insignificant minority would sooner face disease or death than allow themselves to be treated by a medical man, that the only attendance which they recieve is, as a rule, that of women so grossly ignorant of the primary conditions which are indispensable to health that their neglect would probably be less dangerous to the patient than their attention—we are driven irresistibly to the conclusion that the supply of properly-trained medical women is a matter of the most absolute

* *Ibid.*, pp. 34-36.

and urgent public necessity. If any of us have doubts upon this point, I commend to their attention the 'Record of three years' work' which Lady Dufferin has left behind her.

"But, ladies and gentlemen, we should, I think, show a very imperfect appreciation of the real significance of this movement if we allowed ourselves to believe that it would have no effects beyond those which it may produce by the alleviation of suffering and the proper treatment of sickness and disease. These are its immediate objects, but are we not justified in hoping that it may have remoter consequences even more important than these? May we not look upon the organisation which the Dufferin Fund is intended to provide as a bridge, slender perhaps as those light structures which span your northern ravines, but yet a bridge thrown across the gulf which at present divides the Indian and European communities in this country? I cannot help thinking that there must from time to time come over must of you, certainly over those who are connected with the government of this country, a feeling of dismay at the depth and the width of the barrier by which we are separated from our fellow-subjects in this part of the Empire—barriers not of our own erection, but built up by the most deep-seated convictions, the most cherished traditions and sentiments of the natives of this country."*

In opening the Dufferin Hospital at Patiala on 22nd October, 1890, Lord Lansdowne thus remarked on the above movement :

"I am glad to have this opportunity of expressing my acknowledgement of the generous manner in which the Lady Dufferin Scheme has been supported by the Princes and chiefs of this part of India. They were among the first to come forward when the movement was in its earliest infancy, and it is most satisfactory to find that many of them are now freely establishsng hospitals in their own dominions and making arrangements for the maintenance of those hospitals at the cost of their States. No better example of this generosity on the part of rulers of Native States could be found than that afforded by the hospital which I am now invited to open, and I am glad to say that a similar institution is now being built by His Highness the Raja of Kapurthala."†

In spite of sentiments like those expressed above, there have not been any adequate efforts made for the spread of general and medical education among Indian women.

RAILWAY EXTENSION IN INDIA

A deputation from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, which represents the great body of British exploiters of India's wealth, waited on Lord Lansdowne and pointed out the need of further railway extension in India, because that would mean further opening out of India for the British exploiters. Lord Lansdowne replied thus:

"If the Chamber has consistently advocated the extension of the railway communications in this country, I am within the mark in saying that successive Governments of India have not only supported such extensions in theory, but have carried them out in practice, until it has come to pass that the number of miles of railway, either open for traffic, or under construction in India, has risen from 400 miles, in 1857, to between 16,000 and 17,000 at the commencement of the present year. There may have been moments when the rate of progress achieved in this direction did not appear to be sufficiently rapid. I am glad, however, to know that, of the three projects specially referred to in your letter to the Marquis of Ripon as requiring speedy completion, two—I mean the Bridge over the Indus at Sukkar, and the Hooghly Bridge—have been since completed, while the third—namely, the Bengal Nagpur Railway—is making rapid progress. In regard to the two other points mentioned in that letter, I observe that you are diposed to insist upon the expediency of establishing what you speak of as 'a single and final authority in this country empowered to dispose

* *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

† *Ibid.*, p. 179.

expeditiously of these railway questions as they arise.' If it is your intention to convey to me by the use of these words that you desire to see the Railway policy of India entirely emancipated from the control of the Secretary of State, I am afraid that I cannot hold out hopes to you that your aspirations will be very speedily realised. The Secretary of State is responsible to the Imperial Parliament and I should be surprised if either you or I are able to persuade that assembly to abdicate the control which it now exercises over the larger questions of Indian administration. I may add that I do not believe that there is any difference of opinion in regard to the desirability of personal communication between the heads of the Railway administration and those directly engaged in the commerce of the country, and that you will find the Honourable Member in charge of the Public Works Department, and its principal officers, disposed to facilitate such communication to the best of their ability....

"Your next suggestion is that the Government of India should deal in a more liberal spirit with the matter of guarantees, and that these should be given, or withheld, not merely with reference to the prospective profit or loss of the undertaking. I am under the impression that, in the case of Famine Railway lines at all events, the indirect advantages to be derived by the community from the construction of new lines of railway have again and again been regarded as a sufficient justification, without reference to direct profit and loss. The question is, however, one which it is impossible to deal with within the limits of an answer, such as that which you will expect from me today, and I will only add that I am not without hope that you will think, as I do, that the Government of India should examine with the utmost caution any proposals for the extension of the system of sterling guarantees to new lines of railway—guarantees which, while the present state of uncertainty in regard to the rate of exchange continues, involve the assumption by the State of pecuniary obligations, the extent of which it is absolutely impossible to foretell."*

IMPOSITION OF A PATWARI RATE

On the 29th March, 1889, a Bill was introduced in the Legislative Council to authorise the imposition of a Patwari Rate in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh. In this connection the Viceroy said:

"If the imposition of a new tax is a matter worthy of discussion at this table, it is, I think, quite true, that, as he observed, the remission of an old tax is equally worthy of such discussion....It seems indeed, to me that, if a distinction is to be drawn,...the remission of an old tax may often require more careful discussion than the imposition of a new one. The imposition of a new tax is pretty sure not to be resorted to without sufficient consideration. The measure is bound to be unpopular with some one. It is sure to provoke criticism, and it will certainly be narrowly scrutinised, both by those who impose the tax, and by those upon whom it is imposed....

"The case of the Bill before us shows how much easier it is to surrender a source of income than to get it back again. The evidence adduced has demonstrated that the remission of the Patwari Cess failed to have the effects anticipated from it, while it involved the sacrifice of a large annual revenue. We have now to be content if we can recover for the public a part of the resources which we then abandoned. We shall also, I am afraid, be compelled to admit that, to some extent at all events, it may prove beyond our powers to distribute the incidence of the re-imposed burden between the land-lords and tenants with absolute fairness. It is difficult to disprove the statement that the new law may involve a certain degree of apparent hardship to those tenants who obtained no benefit from the remission of 1888, and who having, upon that occasion, failed to obtain any relief from the taxation to which they were than liable, may now find that, under this Bill, a new burden is imposed upon them."†

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 47-49.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 53-56.

CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC SERVICES

A system of "wide-spread corruption, encouraged, or deliberately connived at in his own interest, by an official high in the service" of the Bombay Government was discovered. This discovery formed the subject of much speculation. The witnesses who gave evidence in this case had to be given special pledge of protection and the *Mamlatdars' Indemnity Bill* had to be introduced in the Legislative Council on 19th September, 1889, and subsequently passed by it. On this occasion the Viceroy tried to give a short history of the whole affair. He said :

"The events which have rendered it necessary for the Government to legislate in reference to this subject are so familier to the public that it is scarcely necessary to offer a lengthened explanation of them....The Bill before the Council has been prepared with the object of enabling the Government of Bombay to redeem, as far as it can be properly allowed to redeem, the pledge which was given on its behalf to certain persons implicated by their own confession during the course of the proceedings connected with the recent prosecution of Mr. Crawford. It is, I think, very desirable that there should be no misunderstanding as to the circumstances under which this guarantee was given. The Bombay Government had satisfled itself that there prevailed within a part of the Presidency a system of widespread corruption, encouraged, or deliberately connived at in his own interest, by an official high in the service of Government. Holding this belief, it determined to strike a blow at the system by proving the guilt of the person who was believed to be mainly responsible for its existence and inflicting exemplary punishment upon him. The surroundings of the case rendered it highly improbable that the evidence necessary in order to obtain a complete disclosure of the facts would be obtained, unless those who were able to give such evidence received an assurance that they would be protected against the consequences of their own admission. *Prima facie*, and putting on one side for a moment the purely technical and legal aspects of the matter, I think the case was one in which it was entirely for the Government of Bombay to decide whether such an assurance was or was not indispensable. The object aimed at by the institution of these proceedings was one of such vast importance, and the necessity of purging the public service of abuses as flagrant as those of which the existence was suspected was so urgent, that it does not seem to me that any complaint can, as a matter of principle, be made of the Bombay Government merely upon the ground that, in order to secure the conviction of the person whom it regarded, and rightly regarded, if his guilt was to be assumed, as by far the most conspicuous offender, it was content to allow others, whose guilt was, upon this assumption, infinitely less serious, to escape the punishment which they deserved. A promise of indemnity under such circumstances was not, therefore, it seems to me, in the least reprehensible. Nor, on the other hand, was such a promise unusual, for cases must be familiar to us all in which such engagements are permitted to be given to lesser criminals in order to obtain the conviction of more serious offenders."*

The Mamlatdars' Indemnity Bill was discussed again in the Indian Legislative Council on the 17th October, 1889 and passed into law. "The Hon. Mr. Scoble, in moving that the Bill be taken into consideration, explained that a number of communications had been received from Bombay objecting to the Bill ; that public meetings had been held at which resolutions had been passed, and that articles had appeared in many vernacular newspapers urging that British honour and prestige required that the indemnity given by the Bombay Government should be maintained in its integrity, and that the adoption of any other course would be fraught with evil results." Mr.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

Scoble dealt at some length with these protests, and concluded his speech as follows :

"So far, therefore, as the persons affected by this Bill are concerned, I think substantial justice has been done. I am not surprised that the settlement is not considered satisfactory by some of the witnesses and their friends, and I am not astonished that there has been a good deal of fervid eloquence expended on the subject : but I think the public generally will be disposed to accept the solution at which we have arrived as just and reasonable, and will give the Government credit for having honestly attempted to reconcile the observance of a somewhat inconsiderate promise with the maintenance of that high standard of duty without which public employment, especially in oriental countries, is only too apt to degenerate into a means of practising oppression and extortion."*

PUBLIC MORALITY IN INDIA

The Viceroy in concluding his speech on the Mamlatdars' Indemnity Bill referred to the standard of public morality in India. He said :

"It appears to me that those who contend that the conduct of which these dismissed officials have been guilty is not conduct deserving of serious reprobation, or calulated to unfit them for the discharge of important judicial and administrative functions, are striking a serious blow at the standard of public morality in this country. The argument is, in fact, this, that what would be regarded in other countries as a complete disqualification for the tenure of a position of public trust, or responsibility, is not so regarded in India ; that public corruption is more tolerable here than it would be in England ; and the inference is suggested that Native public opinion is callous or indifferent upon this point, and that we ought to be content that it should be so. I cannot conceive any line of action more calculated to have an unfortunate effect on the public mind here and elsewhere. It has been the policy of the Government of India to increase, from time to time, the opportunities offered to the Indian subjects of Her Majesty for serving the State in important and responsible positions. I for one rejoice that this should have been the case, and it is for this reason that I should deplore any action on the part of persons representing themselves to be the friends and spokesmen of the Natives of India, which might lead to the belief that public opinion here was lukewarm in regard to this all-imporrant question of official purity. The Government of Bombay is given credit, and deservedly so, for the manner in which it attempted to deal with corruption when the person suspected was a high English official. I trust that the Government of India will at least not be censured for having declined to tolerate the continued presence in the public service of Native officials who have been shown beyond all doubt to be tainted with the same corruption."†

It is widely believed in India that there have been at least a few other high English officers whose cases ought to have been dealt with as Mr. Crawford's was.

OFFICIAL SECRETS BILL AND *THE AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA*

On the 17th October, 1889, the Official Secrets Bill was introduced and it was mainly directed against *The Amrita Bazar Patrika* and other journals. The Viceroy spoke thus on this occasion :

"It is scarcely necessary to enlarge on the consequences which must ensue if the kind of treachery which is involved in the disclosure of official documents and information, and in the procuring of such information by persons interested in publishing it, is allowed to remain unpunished ; and I

* *Ibid.*, p. 99.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 102-3.

believe that it is absolutely necessary for the Government of India to hold in its hand a weapon which can, if necessary, be used with exemplary effect against those who are guilty of such practices".*

Lord Lansdowne then referred to the case of *The Amrita Bazar Patrika*. He went on to say:

"I may perhaps be permitted to enforce what I have said by referring to a recent case in which a particularly scandalous disclosure of official information has taken place. A Calcutta journal, *The Amrita Bazar Patrika,* in a recent issue, published what professed to be the text of a document described as one 'the original of which His Excellency will find in the Foreign office,' and as containing 'the real reason why the Maharaja of Kashmir has been deposed.'

"The document purports to be a Memorandum submitted to the then Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, by Sir H. M. Durand, the Foreign Secretary, in May 1888, and runs as follows:

'*To His Excellency,*—I do not agree with Mr. Plowden, the Resident in Kashmir, in this matter. He is too much inclined to set Kashmir aside in all ways and to assume that if we want a thing done we must do it ourselves.

'The more I think of this scheme the more clear it seems to me that we should limit our overt interference as far as possible to the organisation of responsible military force in Gilgit. So far we can hope to carry the Durbar thoroughly with us. If we annex Gilgit, or put an end to the suzerainty of Kashmir over the petty principalities of the neighbourhood, and, above all, if we put British troops into Kashmir just now, we shall run a risk of turning the Durbar against us and thereby increase the difficulty of the position. I do not think this is necessary. No doubt we must have practically the control of Kashmir relations with those principalities, but this we already have. Indeed, the Durbar has now, since the dismissal of Luchman Das, asked Mr. Plowden to advise the Gilgit authorities direct without reference to them. If we have a quiet and judicious officer at Gilgit who will get the Kashmir force into thorough order and abstain from unnecessaey exercise of his influence, we shall, I hope, in a short time, have the whole thing in our hand without hurting any one's feelings.'

"Up to this the document is a substantially accurate reproduction of a Minute actually written upon the above date by Sir Mortimer Durand, so much so that there can be no doubt whatever that it must have been communicated to the Press by a person who had had an opportunity of copying, or committing to memory, a part at all events of Sir Mortimer Durand's Minute. A few words only have been misquoted, but they are not of material importance. I think the Council will agree with me in considering that there is nothing in the passage which I have read which could be legitimately construed as revealing iniquitous designs upon the State of Kashmir on the part of the Government of India. It will no doubt be within the recollection of Honourable Members that, at the time when the Minute was written, there had been considerable disturbances on the Gilgit frontier, that the chiefs of Hunza aud Nagar were in revolt against Kashmir, that Chaprot had been captured, and other places within the territories of the Maharaja threatened by the insurgents, who had defied the Kashmir authorities. .....

"Will it be believed that the whole of the portion of the Minute from which I have taken these extracts has been *omitted, or suppressed,* and that *in lieu* of it has been *inserted* the passage which I shall now proceed to read?—

'Altogether I think our first step should be to send up temporarily and quietly a selected military officer (Captain A. Durand of the Intelligence Department) and a junior medical officer. Both of them will have the support of the Durbar when and where it will be necessary, and they will not display any indiscretion, so that the Durbar may not have any hint of the work they are about to undertake, and they will have to obain the consent of the Durbar in matters concerning military difficulties. Once we can establish a belief that our undertaking is nothing but the welfare

* *Ibid.,* pp. 103-4.

of the Durbar, we are sure to attain our object. Time will show that my view is not a wrong one. In it lies, I venture to hope, the safe realisation of that object which was once contemplated in Lord Canning's time and afterwards abandoned after deliberation.'

"The extract, with the exception of the first line and a half, in which it is recommended that an officer should be sent up temporarily to Gilgit, is a sheer and impudent fabrication. Not only is it not to be found in Sir Mortimer Durand's Minute, but it misrepresents him in all the most essential particulars. It has thus come to pass that, on the one hand, important passages of Sir Mortimer Durand's Minute have been altogether suppressed, and on the other, words have been ascribed to him which he not only never used, but which convey a meaning absolutely inconsistent with those which he actually wrote.

"I have already called attention to the suppression of those parts of the Minute which most strikingly illustrate the moderation of the policy which found favour with the Foreign Secretary and which was approved by the Viceroy. When we come to the passages for which the writer has drawn upon his own imagination, we find a series of reckless statements expressed in language which those who are familiar with Sir Mortiner Durand's style would not for a moment mistake for his, and abounding in suggestions to the effect that our policy in regard to Kashmir was governed by motives of the most sinister kind. Of such a description are the passages in which it is said that the officers sent to Gilgit are to conduct themselves 'so that the Durbar may not have any hint of the work that they are about to undertake,' and the statement that 'once we can establish a belief that our undertaking is nothing but the welfare of the Durbar, we are sure to attain our object,'—an object which is subsequently described as that 'which was contemplated in Lord Canning's time, and afterwards abandoned after deliberation.'

"The newspaper version of the Minute ends with the following words :

'Eventually Major Mellis should go to Kashmir on the part of the Durbar and submit a mature scheme for the better administration of the State, which is at present very badly managed indeed. This scheme should include the outline of our arrangements for strengthening the Government policy.

'After the expiry of six months we will be in a position to decide as to the permanent location of a Political Agency at Gilgit, also a contingent of troops for the defence of the Frontier for which the Durbar have already agreed to put their resources and troops at the disposal of the British Government.

(Sd.) H. M. DURAND,
6th May.

"Very well.
(Sd.) DUFFERIN,
10th May."

"Upon these passages I have only to observe that the earlier portion is rendered with complete inaccuracy, Sir M. Durand never having recommended that Major Mellis should submit a scheme for the administration of the State, but merely that that officer should at a later date go to Kashmir in order to confer with the Durbar in regard to its offer of aid for the defence of the Frontier. The concluding sentence is a pure fabrication, none of the words after 'policy' appearing in the original Minute. The latter, I may add, will not be unworthy to rank with those great storehouses of learning which it is the privilege of Europe to possess."*

IMPERIAL RECORD OFFICE

Along with the Imperial Library, the Imperial Record Office was established for the preservation of the old records of the Government of India.

"The attention of the Government of Lord Lansdowne being directed to the neglected state of the records and the necessity for some plan for conserving them and rendering them available for

* *Ibid.*, p. 15.

historical research, it was resolved to obtain the sanction of the Secretary of State to the appointment of a special officer to organise a Central Record office. The sanction having been obtained, an Imperial Record office has, during the past four years, been established and the records of the Government of India systematically arranged in one general repository. Indexes, catalogues and calendars are in course of preparation, which will make available, to those who are now engaged in the task of administration, the experience of the able and eminent men who have preceded them, and will afford the student every facility for studying those original documents from which alone can be traced the history of the growth of our Indian Empire."

RESTRICTIONS ON TRIAL BY JURY

The Bengal Government tried to put certain restrictions on the system of Trial by Jury in certain districts of Bengal. This attempt of the Bengal Government was looked upon with suspicion by the people of Bengal. There was much protest from the public leaders of Bengal. In this connection Mr. Forrest says:

"But the restrictions imposed by the Bengal Government on trial by jury in certain districts of the provinces were unfortunately regarded, without sufficient foundation for the belief, as an attempt to abolish trial by jury, and led to public opinion being disturbed. The Government of India, taking into consideration the state of feeling in Bengal, and holding the opinion that the first steps towards a reform affecting the administration of justice throughout India must be tentative and capable of being varied, determined to appoint a Commission to thoroughly investigate the subject. They felt that a representative Commission would command the confidence of all classes of the community, and they trusted that their report would be a guide, in enabling them to extend, without defeating justice, the system of trial by jury to all parts of the Empire which do not now enjoy the privilege. As the Report of the Commission dealt with the jury system in the whole of India, the Government of India concurred in the proposal of the Government of Bengal, that the changes made in the list of offences triable by jury should be withdrawn, pending the consideration of the report and the drafting of a comprehensive scheme of reform. The opinion of the Local Governments and Judges of the High Court have been invited on the Report of the Commission."*

ANTI-COW-KILLING MOVEMENT

The Societies organised with the object of preserving the cow from cruelty began to exact compulsory contributions from the Hindus.

"By boycotting and intimidation attempts were made to enforce the rules of the Societies. Hot-headed religious propagandists and crafty political agitators roused the irregular and impulsive passions of a docile, industrious but ignorant and fanatical people. Religious passion created a desire to entirely suppress the slaughter of kine for food or sacrificial purposes and to effect this suppression by coercive and violent measures. The Mahomedans resented any attempt made to interfere with their customary ritual, and an increased bitterness of feeling arose between the two religious denominations, which produced fatal effects. For three days Bombay, the second city of the Empire, was a prey to anarchy, and riots resulting in serious loss of life took place in Bengal and the North-Western Provinces. By the prompt and vigorous action of the authorities the disturbances were suppressed, and Lord Lansdowne, in his reply to an address from the Municipal Board of Agra, proclaimed in the plainest language that the Government of India has no intention of permitting these exhibitions of lawlessness to be renewed. His Lordship said: 'Our policy is one of strict neutrality and toleration, but that toleration does not extend to disorder and crime, and, whoever is at the head of affairs in India, depend upon it that disorder and crime will be put down with a strong and fearless hand.' The Viceroy proceeded to point out that the Government of India is under a two-fold

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* *Ibid.*, p. 20.

obligation. 'We owe it,' Lord Lansdowne said, 'to the whole community, British and Indian, to secure the public safety, and to protect the persons and property of the Queen's subjects from injury and interference. We are also bound to secure to both the great religious denominations freedom from molestations or persecution in the exercise of their religious observances. The law secures to the Mahomedans the right of following the ritual which has been customary for them and for their forefathers, while it secures to the Hindus protection from outrage and insult, and, for this reason, forbids the slaughter of cattle with unnecessary publicity, or in such a manner as to occassion wanton and malicious annoyance to their feelings. Let both sides understand clearly that no lawless or aggressive conduct, on their part, will induce us to depart by an inch from a just and honourable policy. Do not let it be supposed that the slaughter of kine for the purpose of sacrifice, or for food, will ever be put a stop to: we shall protect the religions of both sides alike, and we shall punish, according to the law, any act which wantonly outrages the religious feelings of any section of the community. Let it also be clearly understood that we shall not permit any disturbance of the peace, and that, whenever violence is exhibited, we shall not be afraid to put it down by force."*

That was the sermon of Lord Lansdowne, which might prove useful to the Hindu and Moslem leaders even at the present day. In these days of riots between the Hindus and Moslems we do not meet with any clear-cut policy on the part of the authorities, as laid down by Lord Lansdowne.

Mr. Forrest continues to say :

"Lord Lansdowne, though prepared to put down violence by force and determined to punish acts of fanaticism according to the law, 'strongly deprecated,' to use his own words, 'any extensive or radical changes in the law until it has been demonstrated that the existing law is powerless to deal with these evils.' 'I would infinitely prefer,' his Lordship added, 'to rely upon the good sense and moderation of the people themselves and upon vigorous and determined executive action based upon the law as it now exists, than upon special legislation, and I am not without hopes that both sides have now realised the folly of their conduct, and will join us in discouraging similar exhibitions of sectional hatred and lawlessness.' In pursuance of this policy, the acknowledged leaders of the people have been invited to form conciliation committees for the various disturbed villages with a view to adjust their differences, to ascertain and record the customs with regard to the slaughter of kine and to adhere to them in the future without, on the one hand, giving unnecessary offence to the Hindus or, on the other, interfering with the liberty of Mahomedans. A great success has crowned these measures, and it does not appear oversanguine to estimate that in a short time there will be a cessation of the existing bitter feeling between the two great religious denominations."†

MILITARY POLICY

The military policy of Lord Lansdowne saw the passing of the Madras and Bombay Armies Act of 1893. The existing system of the Armies in India had by this time become an anomaly. In 1892 Lord Lansdowne urged upon the Secretary of State the urgency of abolishing the Presidential Army system :

"As Her Majesty's Government approved of the reform, a Bill was brought forward and passed by Parliament for giving effect to the proposals of the Government of India. When the Madras and Bombay Armies Act of 1893 comes into operation, the offices of Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, respectively, will be abolished, and the officers holding

* *Ibid.*, pp. 20-22.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

the offices of Commanders-in-Chief of the Forces in the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay will cease to be Members of the Council of the Governors of Madras and Bombay respectively. The Military control and authority exercisable by the Governors-in-Council of the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay will cease to be exercised by the Governors, and will be exercisable by the Governor-General of India in Council. In future there will be one Army for the whole of India organised in four large commands—Madras, Bombay, Bengal and the North-West Provinces and Punjab. These will be commanded by Lieutenant-Generals under the Commander-in-Chief. The Bengal Army will not cease to exist, but will be divided for administrative purposes into two commands."*

CLASS REGIMENTS

There was a controversy whether the regiments should be composed of class companies or of 'general mixture'. But it did not find much favour with the authorities. Thus says Mr. Forrest:

"It is obvious, however, that it would be difficult, as indeed it is undesirable, to apply any one system to the whole native army of India, composed as it is of men drawn from so many different races and professing different creeds. Thus, while in the Madras Army it might be perfectly safe to constitute class regiments composed of Tamils, Telugus, Pariahs, and people like the Moplahs or Coorgs, it might be impolitic and inexpedient to introduce a similar measure in other parts of India. Some of the best regiments in the Punjab are class regiments. On the other hand, there are many good regiments which are class company regiments; but the latest development has been the reconstitution of 16 battalions of Hindustani regiments into class regiments of Brahmins, Rajputs Jats, Mahomedans, and Gurkhas. The purely military advantages are undoubtedly on the side of class regiments; the comforts and welfare of the men are more assured in such regiments than in class company regiments; there is greater *esprit de corps*; and promotions can be more satisfactorily arranged. On the other hand, while from a political point of view it may be said that the Government know exactly what regiments they can employ in certain situations and how far such regiments can be used in particular parts of the country during particular disturbances, it may be quite true that a class regiment may be more rapidly infested by movements among people of their own class or creed, and there may be more difficulty in officers obtaining information as to what is going on in a class regiment than in a class company regiment, where there are so many different interests and jealousies. On the whole, it may be said that, while there is no real danger in applying the class regiment system to a considerable portion of the army in India, it would be impolite to constitute the whole army on this system."†

RECRUITMENT OF "WARLIKE" CLASSES

The Government of India wanted to recruit "warlike" classes in the Army in the place of those classes which have taken to peaceful pursuits.

"In the Bengal army, during Lord Lansdowne's administration, several infantry regiments have been reformed of northern races only, while in the Madras army seven battalions of infantry have been reconstituted by transforming battalions of military police composed of Gurkhas, Sikhs, Punjabis and other hardy and valiant races into local battalions for service in Burma. In the same way, in the Bombay army some of the less efficient classes have been replaced by the more warlike tribes of northern India, by converting two of the regiments into local corps for service in Baluchistan. But, in addition to these measures, the general improvement of the Madras and Bombay armies has been undertaken, the directions in which a change for the better will be made being in the system of recruiting, and the obtaining of the raw material, and possibly in forming

* *Ibid.*, p. 27.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

class company regiments— a system which has answered very well in the Bengal army—instead of what is known as the 'general mixture' system...the general result, however, of the substitution of better material for the less efficient classes, is to render the army a more perfect fighting machine, to obtain the desired result of being able to employ any portion of the army on any service, and to arrange its constituent parts so that when the field army is withdrawn the classes constituting the remaining garrison of India will fairly balance each other and none will be pre-eminently powerful."*

IMPERIAL TROOPS

The policy of the Government of Lord Lansdowne with regard to the troops of the Native States has been,

"on no account to accept the assistance of this kind (of army) from the Feudatory States, except in cases where there is the clearest possible evidence to show first, that the Ruler of the State in question is honestly and sincerely desirous of placing his troops at our disposal, and esteems it an honour to have these troops brought into a line with those of the Imperial Government; secondly, that such service will not impose too heavy a burden on the State, and that there is to be found amongst its people a genuine loyal desire to accept such service; and thirdly, that there exists in the troops themselves that military spirit so conspicuous in some of the races of India, which has given to our Native Armies some of the finest fighting material in the world. The essence of the whole scheme is that there should be no compulsion in the matter, and that only those States should be singled out, which are not only willing but anxious to bear their part with us in defending the Empire in the hour of need."

We further read:

"In pursuance of the policy laid down by Lord Lansdowne, the organisation of the Imperial troops was first begun in the Punjab States, Kashmir and Ulwar, and afterwards extended to the other Rajput States and Gwalior. The movement now also embraces the States of Bhopal, Rampur, Mysore, Hyderabad, Indore and Kathiawar. There are at present under training 8,348 cavalry, 8,887 infantry, 300 artillery, comprising the 1st and 2nd Kashmir Battery, 150 Srimour sappers, 500 Bikaneer Camel Corps, and 950 men belonging to the excellent Transport Corps in Jeypur and Gwalior. During the past five years the Imperial troops have reached a high state of efficiency. The discipline, both in the field on the Gilgit Frontier and in British territory when brigaded with our troops at camps of exercise, has been found admirable."†

MOBILISATION OF THE ARMY

The Government of India was very careful in maintaining a huge army out of the revenues of India. They spent a large sum of money in the mobilisation of the Army. We may form an idea as to the expenditure for the Army, when we learn that the whole army of India consisted at this time of about 180,000 Indian troops, including the reserves and Imperial Service forces, and about 100,000 British troops and volunteers, making a total of 280,000 men. Again, "mobilisation in India is a thousand-fold more difficult than mobilisation in a European continental country, because the troops forming the army cannot be distributed territorially in equal proportions throughout the Empire of India; they can not be located within certain small areas, but reliefs have to take place over great distances, and sanitary, military, and political considerations

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

† *Ibid.*, p. 82.

rather than the mere facilities for mobilisation govern the distribution of the troops. Notwithstanding these difficulties steady progress has been made so that about one-fourth or say, 70,000 men of the army of India could be put in motion for field service in India or beyond it without confusion and with reasonable regularity and despatch. Large quantities of transport, equipment and stores have been collected at various strategic points; all the corps composing this field army are annually warned and receive their equipment for active service or know exactly where to obtain it." Now, this policy of preparation means a lavish expenditure of the poor man's revenue.

DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE

Another item of heavy military expenditure is the defence of the Indian Empire. The Government of India ear-mark a large sum of money for this purpose every year. By a huge drainage on the revenues of the Government of India, "not only have the important ports of Karachi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Rangoon been completely defended, their fortifications adequately armed, and a defence squadron created, but on the north-western frontier the main lines of approach to India have been safeguarded by the completion of the defences covering Quetta against an advance by the western line of approach. The second line, including the great bridge-heads on the Indus at Sukkur and at Attock, has also been constructed, and the defences of the important strategic centre of Rawal Pindi barring an advance through the Punjab to the fertile plains of Hindustan, have been so far completed that they could at any time be finished with comparative promptitude. Rawal Pindi and Multan constitute what may be called the third line of defence, and a careful and detailed plan of defence for Multan has been prepared." All these expenses told heavily on the Indian revenues.

FINANCIAL POLICY

The financial policy of Lord Lansdowne received a rude shock from the constant fluctuations of the exchange, which resulted in a heavy deficit in the budget. Even before his accession, the four years from 1884-85 to 1887-88 left deficits of Rs. 5 millions. In the last Budget of Lord Dufferin, there was a surplus of Rs. 37,000. In the first three years of Lord Lansdowne's government, there was also a surplus of Rs. 6¾ millions. But in 1892-93, there was a deficit of Rs. 1 million and the original Budget of 1893-94 disclosed a deficit of over a million and a half. About the cause of this deficit we read :

"The cause of the deficits lay largely in the increasing burden of the Home charges due to the continued fall in the value of silver, and Lord Lansdowne was thus called upon to deal with a recurring and growing deficit, the prevention of which was beyond the power of Government. In the early part of 1892, His Lordship's attention was called by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce to the inconvenience and impediments to trade caused by the great and increasing fluctuations in the gold value of silver and the heavy fall in the exchange value of the rupee. The Chamber urged that as the United States had invited the Powers to another conference for the purpose of considering the monetary question, the Government of India should take advantage of the opportunity to promote an international agreement for the free coinage of gold and silver at a fixed ratio, and that failing any such agreement, steps should be taken to have the question of a gold

standard for India carefully and seriously considered by competent authorities. The views expressed by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce were in accord with those, which, owing to the state of the finances and the trade of the country, had presented themselves to Lord Lansdowne and his Council. In March 1892, the Secretary of State was addressed by the Government of India on the subject, and it was suggested that any proposals that might be put forward by the United States or any other Government for the holding of an International Conference should meet with the strongest support. In June 1892, the Government of India further suggested that if it became evident that an International Conference was unlikely to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, and if a direct agreement between India and the United States was found to be unattainable, the Indian mints should be closed to the unrestricted coinage of silver for the public and arrangements made to introduce a gold standard".*

THE INDIAN CURRENCY ASSOCIATION

To agitate for a reform in the Indian Currency owing to the rapid fall in the value of silver, the Indian Currency Association was formed with branches at several important centres. The Association represented to the Government "the injury caused to trade by the constant fluctuation of the gold value of the rupee and the essential need of steps being taken to remedy the evil. The Association also presented a memorial to the House of Commons, praying that if the International Conference to which the United States had invited the other Governments should fail, the Government of India should be allowed a free hand for the readjustment of its currency system by the adoption of a gold standard".

THE CURRENCY PROBLEM

In his speech on the Financial Statement on the 30th March 1893, Lord Lansdowne referred to the currency fluctuations in these terms:

"We find ourselves compelled to restrict as closely as possible our expenditure upon those useful works on which this country depends so much for the development of its vast resources, and we are within a measurable distance of new taxation. ...We are threatened with all these misfortunes, not because we have plunged the country into war, not because we have recklessly undertaken new expenditure, but because our medium of exchange is one the value of which is liable to violent and unforeseen fluctuations which we are entirely unable to control. ...

"...If these fluctuations were of an ordinary kind, if there were a reasonable prospect that an oscillation in one direction would be followed by an oscillation in another, we might well be content to find that, one year with another, our average income balanced our average expenditure during a term of years. Judged by this criterion, our financial history during the last four years is satisfactory enough. The Hon'ble Financial Member would be able to show that, taking the first four years of his own term of office as Finance Minister, he has had a net surplus of Rs. 5,685,000, an amount which would cover any deficit with which we can conceivably be confronted in his fifth year. Unfortunately for us, however, it is impossible to limit the questions in this manner. ......To make my meaning clear, I may explain that, whereas a fall of one farthing in the gold value of the rupee, when exchange is at *1s. 6d.*, involves a loss to the Government of India of 29¼ lakhs, a similar fall, when exchange is at *1s. 4d.*, means a loss of 37½ lakhs, while, if the same fall takes place at *1s. 2d.*, the loss rises to no less than 48¼ lakhs. No readjustment of taxation can keep pace with such a downward progress as this".†

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

† *Ibid.*, p. 549-551.

HARDSHIPS OF THE EUROPEAN OFFICERS

The Viceroy also referred to the "grievous hardships to which European officers in the services of the Government of India have lately been subjected, owing to the rapid fall of exchange which has taken place during the last two years." Lord Lansdowne also received at the Government House a Deputation from the services and told the members of the Deputation 'that the Secretary of State had left us in no doubt as to the sympathy with which Her Majesty's Government regarded their case.' He also did not expect that the sufferers would tolerate, 'for an indefinite period, the distress which they had borne with so much self-command for some time past.'

INDIAN CURRENCY COMMITTEE

Before the meeting of the International Conference at Brussels, a Committee, with the Lord Chancellor as President, was appointed by the English Government to "consider the proposals of the Government of India for the adoption of a gold standard for India, in case it was impossible to secure the international adoption of the double standard." The proposals made by the Government of India were :

"(*i*) the stoppage by legislative enactment of the unrestricted coinage of silver at the Indian mints ; and

(*ii*) the grant of power to the Government of India to declare by notification that sovereigns were legal tender in India at a rate not exceeding 1*s.* 6*d.* per rupee."

The Committee submitted their Report on the 31st of May, 1893.

"They came to the unanimous conclusion that, considering the serious evils with which the Government of India might at any time be confronted, if matters were left as they were, they could not advise the Secretary of State for India to overrule the proposals for the closing of the mints and the adoption of a gold standard. The Committe, however, considered that the following modifications of the proposals of the Government of India were advisable. 'The closing of the mints against the free coinage of silver should be accompanied by an announcement that, though closed to the public, they will be used by the Government for the coinage of rupees in exchange for gold at a ratio to be then fixed, say, 1*s.* 4*d.* per rupee ; and that at the Government treasuries gold will be received in satisfaction of public dues at the same ratio.' The Government of India accepted those modifications, and Her Majesty's Government approving of them, sanction was given for immediate steps being taken to give effect to the scheme."*

INDIAN COINAGE AND PAPER CURRENCY BILL (1893)

On the 26th June, 1893, the Indian Coinage and Paper Currency Bill, providing 'for the closing of the Indian mints to the unrestricted coinage of silver for the public', was introduced in the Governor-General's Legislative Council and passed the same day. Lord Lansdowne thus spoke on the Bill :

"It was, I think, pretty well understood that the Government of India had some time ago arrived at a conclusion both as to the extent of the danger and as to the proper means of encountering it. The scheme, however, which we are laying before you, does not rest upon our authority alone, and we are relieved from the necessity of justifying it, as we should have been expected to justify it, if it had been accepted by the Secretary of State merely upon our unsupported recommendation. We are in this position, that the proposal which we had laid before Her Majesty's Government a year ago

* *Administration of the Marquis of Lansdowne*, pp. 37-38.

is now accepted, not only by them, but by the Committee of experts for whose verdict we have been waiting so impatiently during the last few months.

"When the composition of that Committee is considered, when we remember how many different schools of economical science were represented upon it, when we recollect how confidently it was predicted, even up to the last moment, that its members could not possibly agree in their conclusions, the fact that they have found it possible to sign, with practical unanimity, the Report...shows, I cannot help thinking, conclusively how strong our case was, and gives to the recommendations of the Committee a weight and a force which may be described without exaggeration as overwhelming."*

The Viceroy took up the cause of the Civil Servants, who demanded extra allowance for the currency fluctuations. He said :

"The Report of the Committee will, in the first place, I think, render it no longer possible for any one to tell us, as we have sometimes been told, that this currency question was merely a grievance of the Indian services, or that the Government of India was interested in it, only because we desired to extricate ourselves from the embarrassment occasioned by the instability of our finances. The Report of the Commission has, once for all, shown that far wider issues than these are involved—issues affecting not merely certain interests and certain classes of the community, but every interest and every class throughout the Indian Empire.

"Upon the question of the effects of fluctuations in exchange upon the commerce of India, the Committee speak with no uncertain voice. They report that there seems to be a common agreement amongst those who differ in their views upon almost all other points, that trade is 'seriously harassed' by these fluctuations, and, after a careful examination of the arguments adduced in support of this view, they express their opinion that 'it cannot be doubted that it would be well if commerce were free from the inconvenience of fluctuations which arise from a change in the relation between the standard of value in India and in countries with which her commerce is transacted.' And with regard to the deterrent effect of these fluctuations upon the investment of capital in India, they observe 'that there can be no doubt that uncertainty as to the interest which would be received for the investment, and as to the diminution which the invested capital might suffer if it were desired to re-transfer it to this country, tends to check 'British investments in India.'"†

Lord Lansdowne and the British Committee on Currency were sorry that the fluctuations would tend to check British investments in India. India afforded to the British capitalists a safe field for investment. When they found that the fluctuations were affecting their sound investments in India, they raised a hue and cry over the currency muddle.

Lord Lansdowne continued :

"In another passage of the Report the Committee mention that the evidence before them points to the conclusion that during recent years the silver price of Indian produce has risen and they add that" if, as experience shows, wages respond more slowly to the alteration in the value of the standard, this rise in the price of produce must have been prejudicial to the wage-earning classes.' They sum up this part of the case in these remarkable words :—"The above facts give reasons for believing that the recent fall in silver, coupled with the open Mint, has led India to import and coin more silver than she needs, and the worst of the evil is that it is a growing one. Every unnecessary ounce of silver which has been, or is being imported into India, is a loss to India, so long as silver is depreciating in gold value, for it is, *ex-hypothesi*, not needed for present use, and it can be parted with only at a sacrifice. So far as the open mints attract unnecessary silver to India, they are inflicting a loss upon the people of the country, and benefiting the silver producing countries at the cost of India...."

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* *Speeches by the Marquis of Lansdowne*, Vol. II., p. 568.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 569-70.

"I think then that I may sum up this part of the case by saying that it has now been established almost beyond controversy, that to leave matters as they were meant, for the Government of India, hopeless financial confusion; for the commerce of India a constant and ruinous impediment; for the tax-payers of India, the prospect of heavy and unpopular burdens; for the consumers of commodities, a rise in the prices of the principal necessaries of life; and for the country, as a whole, a fatal and stunting arrestation of its development."*

Lord Lansdowne then explains the scheme prepared by the British Committee :

"The scheme of the Committee may be described as being, not so much an alternative to our own, as a modification of it. It is our scheme, with the addition of safeguards and precautions—safeguards and precautions which appear to us to be wisely conceived. The feature which both schemes have in common is the essential feature of both; both are based on the closing of the Mints to free coinage, with the object of eventually introducing a gold standard into India, upon terms as equitable as can be devised in the interests of all concerned, and with a minimum of disturbance to the business of the country.

"I may say, too, that both schemes have for their main object the prevention of a further fall in the value of coined silver, rather than the enhancement of its value greatly beyond the present level. The difference between the Government of India and the Committee may be said to be mainly in this, that the Committee have given more prominence than we had given to this aspect of the case. The keynote, so to speak, of the Report, is to be found in the opinion recorded in paragraph 135, to the effect that 'to close the Mints for the purpose of raising the value of the rupee is open to much more serious objection than to do so for the purpose of preventing a further fall'."

"It is then mainly with the latter object that the Committee advocate putting a stop to the free coinage of silver. That is a view which will, I cannot help thinking, be generally accepted as a just and reasonable one. The step recommended by the Committee will not produce any violent disturbance of values. It will, to use the words of Messrs. Farrer and Welby, 'not materially alter the present relations between debtor and creditor, but, on the contrary, prevent those relations being altered in the future by a further fall."

"It has also this further advantage, that it provides an automatic means whereby it will be possible to prevent the closing of the mints from leading to a sudden and violent disturbance in the rate of exchange. I refer of course to the provision that any person may hereafter bring gold to the mints, and obtain for it rupees, at the rate of *1s. 4d*, per rupee, and that gold may be tendered in payment of Government dues, at the same rate, which is equal to one sovereign for Rs. 15. I need scarcely explain that the effect of this will be that, should exchange show a tendency to rise in the open market beyond the rate originally fixed, should it, for example, rise to a ratio, giving, let us say, *1s. 4½d.*, as the equivalent of the rupee, or something less than Rs. 15 for the sovereign, it will at once become advantageous to bring gold to the mint and to exchange it at the full rate of one sovereign for Rs. 15. In this manner, by a self-acting process, a rise beyond the level which has been provisionally indicated will be rendered impossible so long as that limit remains in force.

"These precautions will, I hope, go far to allay the apprehensions of those who mistrust the idea of any attempt by Government to increase artificially the value of its currency. Upon the other hand, the provisional ratio which the Committee has recommended, and which may, should circumstances hereafter require it, be raised, is sufficiently high to afford the Government of India immediate and substantial relief from its most pressing difficulties. Had the ratio been fixed lower in the first instance, I do not see how it would have been possible for us to avoid adding to the taxation of the Empire."†

In conclusion, the Viceroy warned his audience against the following points :

"First, although we propose to introduce a gold standard, no attempt is to be made to get rid

* *Ibid.*, pp. 570-71.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 573-75.

of the silver currency to which the people of this country have been so long accustomed. The experience of other countries, as to which the Report has much to say [and there is no part of it which is better worth reading], has, the Committee tell us, shown that it has been found possible, by the adoption of different systems, to maintain a gold standard and a substantial parity of exchange with the gold-using countries of the world without a gold circulation, without a large stock of gold currency, and even with a silver currency not legally convertible into gold. The Committee admit, with the fairness which characterises their Report, that in no one of the countries of which they have cited the example has silver been so largely and so exclusively used as in India, and there can be no doubt that, as Sir Thomas Farrer and Sir Reginald Welby have put it in their separate report, the effect of this measure will be to give us a token currency of unparalleled magnitude. The Committee sum up this part of the case by the very reasonable observation that, although the cases of Scandinavia, Holland, Canada, the Dutch East Indies and the countries of the Latin Union, are not in all respects applicable as precedents to the case of India, the experience derived from the currencies of those countries is not without value as bearing on the questions which we have to consider.

"In the second place, it will be observed that, for the present, no attempt will be made to fix the legal tender price for gold. In this respect, also, the proposals of Lord Herschell's Committee differ from ours, for reasons which have been explained by the Hon'ble Financial Member.

"Thirdy, it will be seen that the ratio recommended by the Committee is fixed provisionally, and not permanently and that the provisional ratio is well within the limits of recent variations.

"...It is true that our responsibility in this matter has been, as I said at first, to some extent diminished by the fact that the measure before the Council has not only our support but that of Her Majesty's Government, and that of the Members of the Herschell Committee, but we do feel, nevertheless, very deeply the gravity of the step which we are about to take. For myself, I may say that I hold very strongly that all attempts to give a fictitious value by legislation to money, or commodities, are, upon principle, to be deprecated. The less Government has to do with such enterprises, the more we can trust to the ordinary influences of demand and supply, and to the open traffic of the markets, the better for all concerned. But a time may come when inaction is no longer possible, and when a Government would be unworthy the name of a Government if it were to stand aside and leave things to take care of themselves. We believe that such a time has come in India; we believe with Lord Herschell's Committee that a further fall in the gold value of silver is probably imminent, and that such a fall would have disastrous effects for this country if we were still to allow its mints to remain open for the receipt and coinage of any quantity of a depreciated and discredited metal. We know that other countries have discarded that metal, and have prospered, and we see no reason why we should be precluded from following their example."*

With the passing of the above Act VIII of 1893, orders were issued :

"Providing (1) for the receipt of gold coin and gold bullion at the mints in exchange for rupees at a ratio of *1s. 4d.* per rupee; (2) for the receipt of sovereigns and half sovereigns of current weight at treasuries in payment of Government dues at the rate of fifteen rupees for a sovereign and seven and-a-half rupees for a half-sovereign; and (3) for the issue of currency notes in Calcutta and Bombay in exchange for gold coin or gold bullion at the rate of one rupee for *1s. 4d.*"

But after so much discussion and the sitting of so many committees gold was not made a legal tender and the "intention to take power to declare sovereigns legal tender at any rate not exceeding *1s. 6d.* per rupee" was also abandoned. Even at the present day the ratio question has not yet been settled and whether gold would be made a legal tender remains to be seen.

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 575-77.

EXCHANGE COMPENSATION ALLOWANCE OF THE EUROPEANS

A deputation of the European members of the various services of the Government of India waited upon Lord Lansdowne on the 31st January, 1893, with a view to representing the distress caused to them in consequence of the fall in exchange. In reply to their address, Lord Lansdowne said:

"The only point upon which I am called upon to express an opinion today is your main proposition, that in which you affirm that the European officers of the Government of India, as a body, have been heavy losers by the recent fall of exchange, and that their loss has been so heavy as to render the position of some of them one of the most extreme difficulty and distress. That proposition you have certainly made good, but when I say this, I should like to add my assurance that it did not need the powerful arguments which you have added in order to convince me that the fall in the gold value of the rupee has been the cause of very great suffering to those of our officers whose emoluments are drawn in rupees, and whose liabilities are, to a considerable extent, due in sterling."*

The Viceroy concluded by saying:

"We feel that it is to your cordial co-operation that the successful working of our Indian system of administration has been due in past years and it is a source of poignant regret to us to know that your arduous duties have of late been discharged under conditions so trying and so mortifying as those to which you have, in too many cases, been subjected. It would be a grave misfortune for India if, in years to come, the service to which you belong were to be discouraged by the inadequacy of its remuneration, or if the same class of men by which it has hitherto been filled were no longer to be attracted to its ranks".†

The result of this Deputation and the sympathetic reply of Lord Lansdowne was the grant of exchange compensation allowance to the Europeans in the services. The Indians were excluded from this allowance, though they were serving in the same grade and service. In considering the Financial Statement for 1894-1895 in the Supreme Council, Dr. Rash Behari Ghose said on this question:

"And this brings me to another question, the exchange compensation allowance, which involves the diversion of taxes raised for the purpose of protecting the people from famine, to the increase of the salaries of the European servants of Government. I find that the Hon'ble Mr. Westland in his speech in introducing the Tariff Act said: 'There is another serious burden, arising from this same fall in the value of the rupee, which we have to bear, namely, the compensation which we have to pay to our European services for the fall in the exchange value of their salaries. The necessity for this had been pressing itself upon the Government for some time and it was only with some hesitation that the Government decided when the Budget Estimates last year were under consideration, that the decision on the question must be put off until the settlement of the currency measures then under consideration of the Hershell Committee. When these measures were settled, the announcement was made that an allowance would be made to the class of Government officers to which I have referred, of which the amount would be equivalent to the remittance of half their salaries (up to a maximum of £1000), at an exchange of *1s. 6d.*

'In justification of the necessity and policy of this measures of limited compensation I wish to quote two or three weighty opinions, carefully guarding myself against any mere official utterance, which might under the circumstances be considered to be affected by personal considerations. The first is an extract from the address of the spokesman of the dedutatian to Lord Lansdowne of

* *Ibid.*, p. 503.

† *Ibid.*, p. 508.

February 3rd, 1893, which declared itself as representing merchants, traders, shipowners, bankers, landowners, producers, manufacturers, importers and exporters, and which certainly did not contain a single European official member.'

"My Lord, we freely confess to a strong feeling of sympathy with the servants of Government who find their incomes daily dwindling. But we are strongly convinced that the adjustment of salaries and all other adjustments can only be properly effected by the reform of a currency system which has gradually, but with increasing rapidity, brought the country to the present pass. As the members of the Currancy Association pointed out in their recent address to the Viceroy, a reform in the currency system ought to put an end to the demand for exchange compensation by the European servants of the Government.

"It must also be remembered that the Indian public are not in favour of granting any compensation. And I shall here, with the permission of the Council, read a passage from a memorial submitted to Government by the Poona Sarvajanik Association. After pointing out that the supply of educated men in England has increased considerably since the salaries of European servants in this country were settled on their present basis, the Association goes on to say :

'The Committee would further submit that the present scale of the salaries of the European officials in this country was fixed at a time when it took six months to go from here to England and when those that came out to India had practically to live the life of exiles, when periodical trips to England could not be thought of, and when, owing to the absence of railways and other conveniences, the Europeans serving in this country had to live for the most part in complete isolation from one another. All these unfavourable conditions of life have, however, now changed for the better. In these days of cheap communication when railways and steamers have annihilated distance, residence in India can not be so irksome or costly to the European as it must have been in old times. Under these circumstances, privileged rates of remittances constituted nearly the whole of the indulgence which European officers of Government who had to make such remittances could claim equitably. The present scale of Indian salaries, in the higher grades especially, as compared with the English and colonial scales, is again so excessively high that even with silver low as it is, these salaries cannot fail to be a great attraction to English youths. As a matter of fact, competition for Indian posts has not been found to be less keen than ever it was before.

'The Committee of the Sabha would, therefore, respectfully pray that, for the reasons stated above, His Excellency the Viceroy in Councial will be pleased to reconsider these rules with a view to introduce such modifications in them as would (*i*) prevent retrospective effect from being given to them ; (*ii*) limit the privilege to actual remitters up to a certain amount and (*iii*) lastly, that His Excellency the Governor-General in Council will order that no officer who has entered Government service during the last five years, or who may enter it hereafter, should be entitled to the special privilege secured by these rules.'

"The suggestions formulated in the memorial do not seem to be very unreasonable. It is not, however, necessary to discuss them, as the question now is not whether the Government of India can fairly turn a deaf ear to the appeals of their servants for compensation for the loss sustained by them owing to the fall of the rupee, or whether such appeals are in themselves from an abstract point of view just and reasonable. That is not the quastion ; that is not the issue now before us. The question is whether, having regard to the present condition of our finances, when, in the words of Mr. Westland, we must follow a programme of retrenchment and of vigilance, intended to tide us over a transition period, the Famine grant should be suspended, even for one year, instead of the compensation allowance. The question now is whether in order that such an allowance might be paid, all administrative improvements should be suspended and money wrung from the Provincial Governments out of the fruits of careful administration. In other words, the question is whether, in view of the imperious necessity of filling up the 'yawning gulf' in our finances, the compensation allowance should not either be abolished, reduced or modified, or at least suspended during the

period of transition, in preference to the mode which has been adopted for restoring the equilibrium of our finances."*

DADABHAI NAOROJI ON CURRENCY QUESTION

It is interesting to consider the opinion expressed in England by Dadabhai Naoroji on this currency question. He submitted a statement to the Currency Committee, which was published in *India*, July 1st, 1893. He first examines the political aspect of the question and expresses his opinion against the introduction of the gold currency. He says :

"The political aspect entails upon British India the compulsory remittance of about £ 16,000,000 to this country every year (which will now be £ 19,000,000, as no more railway capital will be forthcoming to be used here instead of drawing on India). I am not discussing here the righteousness or otherwise of this state of affairs. It is the loss caused by the fall in exchange in the remittances of these (now) £ 19,000,000 which is the point under consideration. Otherwise the question of exchange would have no significance, as I have shown in my letters to *The Times* in September 1886.

"The proposal to introduce a gold currency in India is based on the argument that it would save all present loss to the people of India from the fall in exchange. It will do nothing of the kind. It will simply inflict greater loss and hardship on the wretched Indian taxpayer. I explain :

"The Indian taxpayer, at the time when exchange was 2*s*. per rupee, was sending produce to England worth 16 crores of rupees to meet the payment of £ 16,000,000. Now taking exchange, say roundly at 1*s*. per rupee, he has to send produce worth 38 crores of rupees to meet the (present remittance of £ 19,000,000 or at a double rate. To avoid the confusion of ideas that prevails through the present controversy, I would eliminate silver altogether from the problem and put it in another form—that when one rupee was equal to 2*s*. the Indian taxpayer sent, say, one million tons of produce to meet the £ 19,000,000 of Home charges—when a rupee is 1*s*., he has to send two millions tons of produce to meet the same demand. Whether the currency be gold or silver or copper or lead will not be of the slightest consequence. The Indian taxpayer will have to send to this country as much produce, and not one ounce less, as would purchase £ 19,000,000—the only difference in the quantity of produce to be sent will depend solely on the rise or fall in gold. Only there will be on the poor taxpayer this additional infliction—that he will be saddled with the heavy cost of the conversion of the currency in gold; and gold becoming so much more in demand will still further rise, and the tax-payer will have to send so much more produce to meet the additional rise in the value of gold. All talk of saving to the Indian the present loss by fall in exchange is pure imagination.

"Again, suppose a ryot is paying Rs. 10 as land tax. When gold currency is introduced, what will Government take from him in place of Rs. 10 ? Will Government demand at the supposod rate of 1*s*. per rupee—*i. e.*, ten shillings only—or will Government demand arbitrarily in its despotic power at the rate of the fictitious value of a rupee as two shillings and will take £ 1. or any amount at any higher rate above the intrinsic value of the rupee ? Taking the gross revenue comprehensively, the total gross revenue is Rs. 850,000,000, what will Government take from the tax-payer when gold currency is introduced ? Will it take at the present supposed rate of 1*s*. per rupee, *viz*. £ 42,500,000, or will it arbitrarily impose a double revenue at the rate of 2*s*. per rupee, so that from his present poor produce the tax-payer must sell double the produce to meet the demands of Govrenment. If the latter, what a precious benefit will this be to the Indian tax-payer from the gold currency !

"When gold currency is introduced what salary will be paid to the European official ? Suppose he has a salary of Rs. 1,000 per month, will Government give him at the rate of 1*s*. per rupee, *i. e*., £ 50, and will the official accept £ 50 for the rupees 1000 ? Is not all the present strong agitation of the Anglo-Indian a clear reply that he will do nothing of the kind, but will continue his agitation till he

* *Speeches By Dr. Rashbehary Ghose*, pp. 127-129. (Calcutta, R. Cambray & Co. 1915)



Dadabhai Naoroji

gets £ 100 or something near it for his Rs. 1000: or, in other words, get his salary doubled at a stroke, at the expense of the starving ryot? And has not Government already shown that it will yield to such agitation, and will be readily liberal to European demands at the sacrifice of the Indians? It has already yielded to the demands of the uncovenanted Europeans and has given them a fixed exchange of *1s. 9d.* for rupee for their furlough, no matter whether exchange is *1s.* or even less, say *6d.* Now the whole European service is agitating to get them *1s. 9d.* or some other high fixed exchange, even to the extent of half their salary. Do these Anglo-Indians really want to exact from the starving ryot such high exchange when the rupee is worth perhaps a shilling or even six pence? Who will pay this difference? of course an arbitrary Government may oppress a people as much as they like, but will the British people and Parliament allow such a thing?

"On the top of all this comes the merchant with his agitation for the gold currency, that he may be saved, at the sacrifice of the ryot, from his risks of trade. The profits of trade are for his pocket, but risks of a commercial disturbance must be met by the ryot! The poverty-stricken ryot must protect the well-to-do trader! God save India!

"I do not need to trouble the Committee with any further remarks as to the effect of the introduction of a gold currency on the condition of the people, who, according to Lord Lawrence's testimony, are living on scanty subsistence, and who, according to Lord Cromer, are already extemely poor. Our friends the Anglo-Indians have to bear in mind that they are taking already from the mouths of the poor Indian about Rupees 150,000,000 or more every year as salaries. allowances, pensions, etc., to the so much deprivation of the provision of the children of the soil. Will they never understand or consider this, and what evil that means to India?*

Dadabhai Naoroji then proceeds to consider the proposal of stopping the Mint to free coinage of silver. He is also not in favour of this proposal. He says:

"A word about the proposal to stop free coinage of silver. Now we know that a trade, internal or external, especially internal, requires abundant currency in a country like India; the curtailment of the coinage of the rupee will dislocate and cripple the free action of the trade of the country, especially, internally, and will inflict serious injury and create some new complications. Secondly, the rupee being thus artificially raised to a fictitious value by being made scarce, will depress the price of produce, and the ryot will be obliged to part with more of his poor produce to meet the demands of Government. Will this be a benefit to him? Further, by this restriction of coinage the wretched Indian tax-payer will not be relieved on a single ounce of produce in his forced remittances for the Home Charges of £19,000,000 –in gold. Whatever the exchangeable value of gold is in relation to produce will have to be paid by the poor ryot, be the forced artificial exchange or the fictitious value of the rupee what it may. By restricting the coinage of silver—the price of silver in relation to produce being artificially enhanced—the tax-payer will have to pay the salary of all the European and other officials in such higher priced rupee, with so much more produce to part with! Which, in short, will in effect be a far heavier burden, by increasing the *whole* salary of the officials of all the services both Indians and Europeans, at so much greater sacrifice of the wretched ryot.

"The agitation for stopping coinage of silver or introducing gold currency, far from relieving the Indian tax-payer from the present loss by fall in exchange, which in all conscience is very heavy indeed, will actually inflict greater injury upon the helpless fellows. All attempts at artificial tampering with currency will, besides injuring the people, recoil upon the perpetrators of the mischief. They can no more raise the value of silver fictitiously than they can suspend gravitation.

"The evil of the present loss from exchange does not arise from the fall in exchange, but from the unfortunate, unnatural, political and economic condition of the British India. Were there no compulsory remittances to this country (any ordinary free transactions of business or loans between two countries not mattering beyond the usual risks of business), there would be no evil or emba-

* *Speeches and Writings of Dadabhai Naoroji* (Madras), pp. 127-29.

rassing loss to Government such as we are considering. The excessive European services are the cause of all such calamity upon the Indians. Any other silver-using country—for instance, China—has no problem like that which at present embarrasses the Britise Indian Government".*

Dadabhai Naoroji then considers the commercial aspect of the currency question and remarks :

"Coming to the second branch of the question, *viz.*, the effect of the fall in exchange on international trade (for it is in such trade or business only that exchange is concerned), the best thing I can do is to give below the letter I wrote to *The Times* in September, 1886, and some other letters....

"The step which the Government has now taken will, I am afraid, produce much mischief, and inflict great injury on the taxpayer, crushingly heavy loaded as he already is. The utmost that the Government might have done would have been, as I was afraid they were determined to do, to give some fixed exchange to the officials for their remittances to this country—to as much as half the salary. This would have been bad enough, but the course the Government have adopted, and for which there was no great necessity, will, I fear, prove far more injurious."†

DADABHAI NAOROJI'S LETTER TO THE "TIMES"

The following is the letter referred to above, written by Dadabhai Naoroji and addressed to *The Times* on September 9, 1886:

"Sir,—I hope you will kindly allow me to make a few observations upon Indian exchange. I shall first describe the mode of operation of an export transaction from India. In order to trace the effect of the exchange only, I take all other circumstances to remain the same—*i. e.*, any other circumstances, such as of supply and demand, etc., which affect prices.

"I take an illustration in its simplest form. Suppose I lay out Rs. 10,000 to export 100 bales of cotton to England. I then calculate, taking exchange into consideration, what price in England will enable me to get back my Rs. 10,000 together with a fair profit—say, 10, per cent—making altogether Rs. 11,000. Suppose I take exchange at 2*s.* per rupee, and find that 6*d.* per lb., will bring back to me in remittance as much silver as would make up Rs. 11,000. I then instruct my agent in England to sell with a limit of 6*d.* per lb., and to remit the proceeds in silver, this being the simplest form of the transaction. The result of the transaction, if it turned out as intended, will be that the cotton sold at 6*d.* per lb. will bring back to me Rs. 11,000, and the transaction will be completed.

"Now, I take a transaction when exchange is 1s. 4*d.* instead of 2*s.* per rupee. I lay out Rs. 10,000 for 100 bales of cotton, all other circumstances remaining the same, I calculate that I can get back my Rs. 10,000, and 10 per cent profit, or Rs. 11,000 altogether, if my cotton were sold at 4*d.* per lb. Then I instruct my agent for a limit of 4*d.*, which being obtained, and silver being remitted to me at the reduced price, I got back my Rs. 11,000.

"The impression of many persons seems to be that, just as I received 6*d.* per pound when exchange was 2*s.* per rupee, I get 6*d.* also when exchange is only 1*s.* 4*d.* per rupee, and that, silver being as much lower, I actually get Rs. 16,500. instead of Rs. 11,000. This, however, is not the actual state of the case, as I have explained above. When exchange is at 2*s.* per rupee, and I get 6*d.* per lb. for my cotton, I do not get 6*d.* per lb. When exchange is only 1*s.* 4*d.* per rupee, but I get only 4*d.* per lb ; in either case the whole operation is that I laid out Rs. 10,000 and received back Rs. 11,000. When exchange is 2*s.* I get 6*d.* of gold ; when exchange is 1*s.* 4*d.* I do not get 6*d.* of gold, but 4*d*, of gold, making my return of silver, at the lower price, of the same amount in either case—*viz.*, Rs. 11,000.

"I explain the same phenomenon in another form, to show that such alone is the case, and no

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* *Ibid.*, p. 9-10.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.

other is possible. Supposing that, according to the impression of many, my cotton could be sold at 6*d.* per lb. When exchange is only 1*s.* 4*d.*—that is to say, that I can receive Rs. 16,500 back for my lay out of Rs. 10,000, why my neighbour would be only too glad to undersell me and be satisfied with 40 per cent. profit in place of my 50 per cent. profit, and another will be but too happy and satisfied with 20 per cent. and so on till, with the usual competition, the price will come down to the natural and usual level of profits.

"The fact is, no merchant in his senses ever dreams that he would get the same price of 6*d.* per lb. irrespective of the exchange being either 2*s.* or 1*s.* 4*d.* Like freight, insurance, and other charges he takes into consideration the rate of exchange, and settles at what price his cotton should be sold in order that he should get back his layout with the usual profit. This is what he expects, and he gains more or less according as the state of the market is affected by other causes, such as larger supply or demand, or further variation in exchange during the pendency of the transaction.

"Taking, therefore, all other circumstances to remain the same, and the exchange remaining the same during the period of the completion of the transaction, the effect of the difference in the exchange at any two different rates is that when exchange is lower you get so much less gold in proportion, so that in the completion of the transaction you get back in their case your cost and usual profit. In the cases I have supposed above, when exchange is 2*s.* and price is 6*d.* per lb., then when exchange is 1*s.* 4*d.* the price obtained or expected is 4*d.* per lb. in both cases there is the return of Rs. 11,000 against a cost of Rs. 10,000."*

INDIAN AND ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES

In his Convocation address at the Calcutta University on the 23rd January, 1892, Lord Lansdowne tried to make a comparison between the Indian and English Universities. He said :

"This University is, as we all know, an examining University. Our students have to satisfy us that they have attended lectures at one of the affiliated institutions, and they are required to pass an examination which shall prove that their studies have provided them with a certain amount of knowledge, and we thereupon bestow upon them an academical title. This is, I am afraid, the beginning and end of our connection with them. We do not attempt to take charge of them in any sense during the time which they spend in preparing for their degree, we are not responsible for their health, for their surroundings, and we do not seem to exercise any supervision over their private life. In some of the affiliated institutions no doubt some attempt may be made in this direction, but this affects only a very small minority of the students. The great bulk of them are, save for the fact that they attend the classes of a school or college during a few hours of the day, absolutely uncared for.

"The result is that we have some six or seven thousand young men between the ages of 17 and 29 turned loose in the wilderness of a city, exposed to its temptations and dangers without any precautions to ensure that their lives shall be healthy, or happy or respectable. The picture is one which it is impossible to contemplate without the deepest misgivings. The position of the lads who come here from the Mofussil must, at all events when they first arrive here, be one of the greatest isolation. They are, perhaps, separated by hundreds of miles from their friends aud relations, and Heaven knows what sort of friends and what sort of connections they will form here if they are left to their own devices. No contrast could be sharper than that between the condition of the young men who take their degree in the Calcutta University and that of the students of one of our old English Universities. In the latter case you have the college with all its comforts and resources, its social life, its strict discipline and supervision ; you have the intercourse of student with student, the *esprit de corps* which makes a young man proud of his college, the intimacy of teacher and pupil, and the influence of the former over the latter ; the pleasant associations of the cricket fields

* *Ibid.*, pp. 120-22.

and the river—all these build up a life, which has its social and domestic side, amidst the healthiest of moral and material surroundings. All these conditions are absent here. A young man coming in Calcutta from a distant town is a mere drop in this great sea, uncared for, exposed to every temptation and every comfort, unknown perhaps to his fellow students—perhaps even to his teachers. Can we be surprised if many of them do not pass through the ordeal without the worst results alike to body and mind?"

Lord Lansdowne referred to this same question in his last Convocation speech on 28th January, 1893. He said .

"Some of you may recollect that when I addressed you last year, I spoke with some anxiety of the position in which a great many of the students of the University find themselves when they come up to Calcutta to prosecute their studies. I dwelt upon the difficulties encountered by a merely examining University in dealing with a question of this sort, and I expressed a hope that some efforts might be made to provide for the moral supervision of the students, for the improvement of their surroundings and for the promotion of healthy physical exercises and recreation. I expressed my approval of an Association which some friends of the University had lately created for the promotion of the higher training of young men. The subject is full of difficulty, and it was not to be expected that much would be achieved by this Society or any other within a short time".†

UNIVERSITY AND POLITICS

Lord Lansdowne in his last Convocation speech also referred to the right conferred on the University of electing an additional Member to the Bengal Legislative Council. He discussed the relation of the University with the Legislative Council. He said:

"I have sometimes heard it said by strict educationists that it was desirable that educational institutions should have as little to do as possible with politics, and that it was consequentiy a grave mistake to allow Indian Universities to enter the political arena. That is no doubt, on the face of it, a plausible view, but it is one which a closer examination of the subject has led me not to accept. In the first place, it seems to me most important that what I may speak of as the literary class of the Indian community should not be unrepresented upon the reconstituted Councils, and I know of no quarter to which we can have recourse for this purpose with more likelihood of success than the Universities. I feel sure that they will exercise their choice with circumspection, and will give us members likely to enhance the reputation alike of the Councils and of the Universities. As for the objection to encouraging members of the University to meddle in political questions, I have a shrewd idea that nothing which we can do, or leave undone, will prevent them from interesting themselves in such questions, and that every one will gain, if we give them a regular and legitimate opportunity of making themselves felt as political factors".§

While Lord Lansdowne saw no objection in encouraging members of the University to meddle in political questions, Lord Curzon tried to banish politics from the field of education.

In this connection, it would be interesting to quote the opinion expressed by the University Deputation (which waited upon Lord Lansdowne on the 23rd January, 1894) as to the right conferred by him upon the University. They remarked that the Viceroy "was also pleased to confer on the Graduates of the University a substantial right which considerably raised their status, by permitting the senior members of their body to select two of their

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* *Speeches by the Marquis of Lansdowne*, II., pp. 394-96.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 499-500.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 499.

own number, and recommend them for nomination as Fellows of the University. The franchise thus conferred in 1890 has since been enlarged, for in the past as well as in the present year the Graduates were permitted to make three nominations".

The Deputation also remarked that they

"are indebted for the great and valued privilege of representation on the Bengal Legislative Council. When Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India had occasion to frame new regulations with reference to the constitution of the Legislative Councils of this country, Your Excellency was pleased to propose that we should be allowed to select one of the Members of the Local Legislative Council....We not only enjoy the privilege today of electing a Member to the Local Council, but that we have already had one opportunity of exercising this privilege".*

COMMUNAL STRIFE

In reply to the address from the Municipal Board of Agra on the 10th November, 1893, Lord Lansdowne again referred to the question of communal strife in India. He said :

"It is not my intention, upon an occasion of this kind, to attempt to distribute the blame amongst those who have been concerned in these occurrences. There is a familiar English proverb, which says that it takes two to make a quarrel, and it is fair to suppose, and indeed, all the evidence points to this conclusion, that it is, in some cases, the Mahomedans, and, in others, the Hindus, who have been to blame for the conflicts which have taken place, in different parts of the Empire. It would, indeed, probably be difficult to find a case in which the fault was entirely on one side. But, on whichever side it may be proved to lie, we shall not be afraid of bringing the offenders to account, because of the accusations of partiality which we may thereby draw upon ourselves.

"Let me tell in the plainest language that the Government of India has no intention of permitting these exhibitions of lawlessness to be renewed. Our policy is one of strict neutrality and toleration, but that toleration does not extend to disorder and crime, and whoever is at the head of affairs in India, depend upon it that disorder and crime will be put down with a strong and fearlesss hand.

"The Government of India is under a twofold obligation. We owe it to the whole community, British and Indian, to secure the public safety, and to protect the persons and property of the Queen's subjects from injury and interference. We are also bound to secure to both the great religious denominations freedom from molestation or persecution in the exercise of their religious observances. The law secures to the Mahomedans the right of following the ritual which has been customary for them and for their forefathers ; while it secures to the Hindus protcction from outrage and insult, and for this reason, forbids the slaughter of cattle with unnecessary publicity, or in such a manner as to occasion wanton and malicious annoyance to their feelings. Let both sides understand clearly that no lawless or aggressive conduct, on their part, will induce us to depart by an inch from this just and honourable policy....

"Do not let it be imagined that, under the pressure of an agitation like that which has lately taken place, we are going, in face of these sanctions, to take away from one side, or the other, the rights which they possess under the law, or that we shall allow one creed to persecute, or to terrorise another, merely because it happens to be numerically the strongest in a particular part of the country....

"I appeal then earnestly to those gentlemen whose position in the Indian community enables them exercise influence over their neighbours, and I would implore them to impress upon those who are less well informed than themselves the folly and the disastrous consequences of such acts as those which have lately taken place in these Provinces and elsewhere. ..

"I appeal, in particular, to the Editors and Proprietors of newspapers, whether British or Vernacular, whether written for Hindu, or Mahomedan, or English readers, to show a calm and temperate

* *Ibid.*, pp. 659-660.

spirit, both in their comments upon these disputes, and in their published descriptions of the facts, or what are supposed to be the facts, which have occurred. Let the Press remember that a great power for good, as well as a great power for evil, is in its hands, and that it enjoys in this country a measure of freedom which, beyond all question, would be denied to it under any Government other than that of the Queen. It is not too much to ask of it that it will use with prudence and moderation the privileges which have been accorded to it, and that it will avail itself of them, not for the purpose of disseminating incendiary matter among an ignorant and inflammable population, but for that of counselling forbearance, of exposing exaggeration and falsehood, and of bringing about the cessation of strife and the renewal of kindly feelings where these have been interrupted.

"Those who follow this wise course, will certainly deserve well of the Government of India, which desires, above all things, that this country should enjoy that peace without which prosperity is unattainable. I can find no words strong enough to denounce the wickedness of those who have told you that the Government of India encourages these quarrels, in order to sow dissensions between class and class; a miserable falsehood which is not believed by those who circulate it, and which has, I am convinced, found little credence in this country."

The Viceroy spoke in ignorance of what Indians believed. He continued :

"I would, therefore, say to the Mahomedans—'Do you, in the exercise of your religious duties, take thought for the susceptibilities of your Hindu fellow-countrymen; perform your religious rites, but perform them reverently, unobtrusively, and in such a manner as not to wound the feelings of your Hindu neighbours' : while to the Hindus I would say—'By all means organise your Societies for protecting cattle from ill-treatment, spare no pains to secure that they shall be treated humanely and protected against the horrors of a lingering death when they are old and worn out; but, on the other hand, do not allow your *Sabhas* to be converted into Associations for organising the intimidation of your neighbours, and for spreading the poison of class hatred throughout your peaceful and industrious villages. And to both Hindus and Mahomedans I would say—'If you will bring to our notice any partiality on the part of our officials, or any deliberate violation of our laws and regulations, you may depend upon the fairness of our Courts, and upon the support of the Executive Government.'*

The ideals set forth by Lord Lansdowne are good. But it connot be claimed that they have been generally followed by officers of the Government, or by certain sections of the people.

FOREIGN POLICY

Lord Lansdowne's foreign policy may be divided under two heads : (*a*) his policy towards the Feudatory Chiefs and (*b*) his policy towards foreign powers beyond the limits of Hindustan.

In his following speech delivered at Hyderabad, Lord Lansdowne laid down his policy towards the Feudatory Chiefs :

"I have always recognised the advantages of the arrangement under which a considerable portion of the Indian Empire continues to be governed by its hereditary rulers, and to be subject to forms of administration, differing, to a considerable extent, from our own, but inspired by our proximity and stimulated by our example. No one would be more averse than I should be to any changes in our relations with the Native States inconsistent with the measure of local autonomy which they now enjoy. It is because I entertain these feelings so strongly that I am anxious to see the government of these States carried out upon sound principles, and in such a manner as to place it beyond the power of any one to say that the Government of India, in arresting, as it has striven to arrest, the

* *Ibid.*, pp. 601—605.

process by which the greater part of the territories of India were passing under the direct rule of the Crown, showed itself unmindful of the welfare of the millions of people who still remain outside the limits of British India."*

In spite of what Lord Lansdowne and other Viceroys have said, the people of many Indian States continue to complain of misgovernment and oppression and of the indifference of the paramount power to their welfare.

Lord Lansdowne visited several Native States, including Nabha, Patiala, Alwar, Ajmer, Oodeypore, Jeyore, Gwalior, Bhopal and Jodhpoor. At Jodhpur, he said:

"The finances of the State, the condition of which must at one time have occasioned your Highness some uneasiness, have been placed in order. Crime and outlawry have, I understand, been put down, and your Highness's Durbar has bestowed much attention upon the wise project for colonising the criminal tribes."

About Kashmir we read:

"Almost from the time of his arrival in India the affairs of Kashmir had constantly engaged the thoughts of the Viceroy. Early in 1889 the Maharaja tendered his resignation of all active participation in the State, and the administration was placed in the hands of a Council consisting of the Maharaja's brothers and certain officials selected from the Indian services. During the year 1890 the Council effected some substantial reforms. The Viceroy, desirous of satisfying himself upon the spot of the extent of these reforms, and whether any measures could be taken towards restoring, to a certain extent, the powers of the Maharaja, accepted the invitation of His Highness to visit the State. While at Srinagar His Excellency announced to the Maharaja that some of the powers which he had resigned would be restored to him, and His Highness became President of the Council."†

About the Begam of Bhopal, Lord Lansdowne said:

"She has shown herself to be a wise and sagacious ruler, and she has contributed largely towards the welfare of the State by her generous support of many very good and useful works. She has assisted liberally in the development of the railway system of this part of India, she has constructed roads, built hospitals, secured for the people of Bhopal an invaluable supply of good water; and only today she has intimated to me her desire that the Government of India should take advantage of an offer which she had made some time ago to place a part of the military forces of her State at the disposal of the Government for the purpose of Imperial defence."§

While at Hyderabad, Lord Lansdowne advised the Nizam "to look carefully to his finances," and to turn his attention towards reducing the number of the badly trained irregular troops, which are a heavy burden on the exchequer of the State.

INTERFERENCE WITH THE NATIVE STATES

During the rule of Lord Lansdowne, the British Government twice interfered with the administration of Native States: the first with Manipur and lastly with Khelat. Lord Lansdowne laid down the principle that

"while the British Government is anxious to continue the protected sovereignty of the Native States, and is in no way desirous to interfere with their internal administration, it cannot tolerate anarchy, and is bound to insist that the government be conducted for the interest and good of the people. During the past five years the Government of India has twice been compelled to give effect to these principles, but though it has been forced to interfere with the administration of the States, it has taken the utmost care to preserve their autonomy."

† *The Administration of Lord Lansdowne*, pp. 39-40.
* *Ibid.*, p. 44-45.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

MANIPUR

The story of the interference on the part of the British Government of India in the affairs of Manipur has thus been told :

"In September 1890, in the small hill State of Manipur, situated on the borders of Assam, the reigning chief was deposed by his brother, the Senapati or Commander-in-Chief, a cruel scoundrel who had been in exile for two years for one of his brutal murders, and a Regent placed on the throne. As the Maharaja had proved a weak and incompetent ruler, the Government of India came to the conclusion that it would be to the interest of the State to acknowledge the Regent, but that the Senapati to whom the revolution was due, should be sent into exile. To have allowed him to enjoy the fruit of his rebellion would have been an acknowledgment that the British Government tolerated anarchy in Native States. The Government of India ordered the Chief Commissioner of Assam to proceed to Manipur to carry out the decision, and he was directed to take with him a sufficient force to overawe the conspirators. On the 7th of March 1891, the Chief Commissioner, with an escort of 400 men, started for Manipur. On arriving within a stage of the capital, he was met by the Political Agent, and a long conference took place between them. They then settled that a Durbar should be held to announce the intention of the Government of India to place the Regent on the throne, and to call upon him, as ruler of Manipur, to banish the Senapati. It was also determined, as the Senapati was known to be a most violent and dangerous man, to arrest him in case he declined to submit to the decision of Government. The Chief Commissioner on his arrival at Manipur ordered the Durbar to be held. The Senapati refused to attend, and the attempt made on the 24th of March 1891 to arrest him in his palace was resisted by the Manipuris, and led to open hostilities. The fighting continued till sunset, when the British troops were withdrawn into the grounds of the Residency, which had already been attacked by the rebels. In the course of the evening the Chief Commissioner and a few British officers were inveigled, on the pretence of a conference, into the palace, and were treacherously assassinated. These cruel and foul murders were swiftly avenged. British troops at once occupied the country, and took possession of the capital. The Senapati and five others who took a prominent part in the murders of the English officers were tried, and found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed. A punitive fine was inflicted on the State, but it was determined not to annex Manipur. A child, a member of the ruling family, was raised to the chiefship. During his minority the administration of the State is conducted by a Political Resident, and considerable progress has been made in introducing a more civilised and efficient government. Measures have been taken to abolish slavery, and the system of forced labour is no longer permitted.*

KHELAT

The Manipur affair was followed by the Government of India's interference in the State of Khelat. About Khelat we read:

"Another instance in which the Government of India has during the past five years been compelled to interfere in the government of a Feudatory State has been that of Khelat. At the end of 1892 His Highness the Khan of Khelat had, in order to avenge the loss of some money which had been stolen from his treasury, caused five women and a man to be put to death, and two other men to be mutilated in a most brutal manner. In the following March, His Highness barbarously put to death his Wazir and the Wazir's father and son. He also threw into prison the heirs of the Wazir. When the news reached the Agent of the Governor-General as to what had taken place, he called upon the Khan to surrender the prisoners and to proceed to Quetta to explain his conduct. The request was complied with, and an enquiry was held into the facts of the case. The Khan defended his conduct by stating that the Wazir had attempted to shoot him, and he had in consequence, as a punishment,

* *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

put him to death, as well as his son and his father. The son was a lad of about nineteen years of age, and the father, a bed-ridden and helpless cripple, had reached the patriarchal age of ninety-four. The Sardars of the State, on being consulted with regard to the conduct of the Khan, recommended that he should be deposed, and the Khanship bestowed on his son. The Khan, knowing how strong the feeling against him was in the State, voluntarily tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the Supreme Government. His son has been duly recognised as Khan of Khelat."*

POLICY TOWARDS FOREIGN POWERS AND "SPHERE OF INFLUENCE"

Besides the Native States, there were the neighbouring independent States, with which the Government of India were forced to maintain friendship for self-interest.

"To consolidate our friendship with the independent kingdoms, to define our sphere of influence over the petty States, and wild tribes that border our Empire, and to distinctly demarcate the boundaries which separate us from our neighbours, have been important features of the external policy of Lord Lansdowne, and much has been accomplished during the past five years in all these directions. As Lord Lansdowne stated in the address to the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce which signalised the close of his administation, we can no longer afford to be indifferent to what passes within the territory of petty chiefs on our border. 'Russia on the one side, France on the other and China on the third, have steadily advanced. Russia has of late displayed much activity in the extension of her Asiatic Railway system, in establishing advanced frontier posts, and in claiming hitherto unclaimed tracts in close proximity to the passes of the Hindukush. France, on the other side, has, we all know, moved forward to the Mekong, and is now separated from us by the very flimsy barrier which the so-called (buffer) State will provide. China has made considerable advances. Nor have we altogether stood still, for on the eastern side of British India the annexation of upper Burma has completely altered our position, and has given us a new interest in the Chin-Lushai country, which has become an enclave in British territory, and territorial claims extending up to, and even beyond, the river Mekong, the left bank of which has, as we know, lately passed under the control of a great European power.

"Is it not obvious that under these circumstances, our interest in the intervening country is enormously increased ? In political geography, Nature abhors a vacuum, and if one thing is certain, it is that, under present circumstances, any spaces left vacant upon our Indian frontiers will be filled up by others if we do not step in to fill them up ourselves. And thus it has come to pass that districts which we could afford to regard with indifference as 'no-man's land,' or as border Alsatias, with which we need have no concern, have suddenly become of vital importance to us as forming part of the marches of the Empire.

"Under these circumstances there has grown up the idea of that which is conveniently described as 'a sphere of influence—a sphere, that is, within which we shall not attempt to administer the country ourselves, but within which we shall not allow any aggression from outside.' Lord Lansdowne laid down the following principal conditions as necessary in dealing with the tribes and petty States that fall within the limits of such a sphere of influence. First, that within that sphere, we should ourselves hold direct relations with the tribes, but allow them to hold relations with no other powers ; secondly, that we should reserve to ourselves the right of free access and the right of making roads, and if necessary, posts for the protection of those roads ; thirdly, that we should respect the independence of the tribes, and not attempt to interfere in the management of their internal affairs or to bring them within the operation of our Courts and Codes. 'The policy is,' His Lordship said, 'I believe, the right one under the political circumstances which now confront us, and it is less likely in the long run to involve us in trouble and expense than the old policy of punitive expeditions, followed by a precipitate and complete withdrawal, a policy which

* *Ibid.*, p. 51.

Lord Lytton very aptly described in a speech delivered in Council, as one of alternate vengeance and inaction."*

To extend the sphere of influence Lord Lansdowne took special care. Thus he brought the Lushais and Chins under subjection.

"On the Eastern frontier the large enclave of hilly country lying between Assam, Chittagong and Burma, and inhabited by the Lushais and other barbarous tribes who frequently raided on the neighbouring districts, has been brought into subjection and roads through it have been opened up. Beyond the east of the Lushai tract lies the land occupied by the Chins, a savage and barbarous race over whom the Burmese exercised no control and who had long been accustomed to raid the adjacent plains. The Government of India determined to put an end to their attacks. A force was sent which occupied their hills, and considerable progress has been made in exploring the country and settling the tribes. In the autumn of 1893, however, a sudden and treacherous outbreak occurred in the north. A considerable force of troops was sent to subdue it, and the northern tribes have now been, to a great extent, disarmed. The whole of the Chin Hills have now been placed under the control of a political officer."

The Shan States were granted Sanads by which they were given internal freedom subject to the payment of tribute to the British Government. Negotiations were in progress with the Karens and Kachins. The boundary line between Burma and China, and that between Sikkim and Tibet had been settled.

To Gilgit a British officer was sent during the early part of Lord Lansdowne's rule.

"His report revealed that the weakness and corruption of the Kashmir officials entailed a great loss of life and a vast waste of the British funds, and it was determined to establish a British Agency at Gilgit. The arrangement, however, was opposed by the neighbouring tribes, and they began to plot against it, the most prominent among them belonging to Hunza and Nagar, the two States which occupy the valleys draining into the upper portion of the Kanjar or Hunza rivers, which flow into the Gilgit river, two miles below Gilgit fort. Thirty miles from the junction of the Hunza Valley with the Gilgit Valley is situated the Fort of Chalt, the furthest outpost of Kashmir in that direction. Thirty miles above Chalt are the villages of Hunza and Nagar, the first on the right, the second on the left bank of the river, the respective capitals of the two little States....

"In the autumn of 1891, the Hunza and Nagar chiefs gathered together their fighting men, and marched upon Chalt. The British Agent, Colonel Durand, on hearing of their intention, made a forced march to the front, and reinforced the garrison. The tribesmen, disconcerted by this prompt step, withdrew to their own country. The aspect of affairs was, however, so threatening that the Government of India despatched 200 Gurkhas, two guns of a Native Mountain Battery and a Gatling to Gilgit. The Agent's staff was also strengthened by fourteen officers. An unsettled feeling continued to prevail amongst the tribesmen, and news was received that both Hunza and Nagar were again preparing to attack Chalt. Colonel Durand, on hearing the intelligence, made a rapid march to that fort, and sent a message to the tribes requiring them to desist from their opposition. They refused to accede to his request, and their refusal was couched in most insolent terms. Negotiations having thus broken down, Colonel Durand crossed the frontier with a force of about 900 men, of whom 200 were British Native troops, and the remainder belonged to the Kashmir Army. The day after the frontier was crossed, the strong fort of Nilt, situated on a position of great natural strength, was carried with great dash and determination by a well considered and wisely planned attack. An advance was made on Nagar and Hunza, and both cities were occupied without further resistance. A half-brother of the ex-chief was nominated to the Hunza chiefship, and matters speedily settled down in the two states."†

* *Ibid.*, pp. 51-53.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 55-57.

All this was not in keeping with the spirit of Queen Victoria's Proclamation, "We desire no extention of our present territorial possessions," etc.

In August 1892, Aman-ul-Mulk, the old chief of Chitral, died suddenly while holding a Durbar. His eldest son, Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk, succeeded in establishing his power. Next year Dr. Robertson and Captain Younghusband crossed the Thandar Pass reached Chitral and publicly recognised Nizam-ul-Mulk as the chief of Chitral.

THE AFGHAN QUESTION

As to the British policy in Afghanistan, Lord Lansdowne observed :

"Until this winter all the conditions were calculated to lead to misconceptions and strained relations. You had, on the one side, the British Government, actuated by a strong desire to secure peace upon its marches, and to keep open the great avenues by which they are traversed ; you had, on the other side, an Eastern Ruler, jealous of external influence, conscious of his own strength, the inheritor of a throne to which there have always clung the dim, but glorious, traditions of a suzerainty including the whole of the Muhammadan tribes of the Punjab frontier. To give such a Ruler a kingdom without properly defined boundaries, was to court difficulties and misunderstandings, and we have had a plantiful crop of them. Could we be surprised if, under such circumstances, the tribes, not knowing whether to look to the Amir, or to us, sometimes turned to Kabul, and sometimes to the Punjab Government, or to the Baluchistan Agency ? Was it strange that, in the presence of such a state of things, the trade routes were harried, and raids, followed by bootless reprisals, perpetrated upon British territory, or that every troublesome outlaw and intriguing pretender to the chiefship of a border State should, whenever it suited him to set us at defiance, represent himself as enjoying the special protection of the Ruler of Islam ; or was it unnatural that the Amir should regard with a suspicious eye the extension of our railways and the piercing of the great mountain barriers which screened his possession from our own ?"*

THE AFGHAN MISSION

When Lord Roberts left India, Sir Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India was selected as the British Commissioner to Afghanistan.

"There is every reason to hope that all these heart-burnings and jealousies are at an end owing to the amicable settlement, effected by Sir Mortimer Durand, the chief of the friendly mission sent to Kabul at the close of the Viceroyalty of Lord Lansdowne."

On the 2nd of October, 1893, the British Mission headed by Sir Mortimer Durand made their entry in state into Kabul. In the private interview with the Amir,

"the question regarding the north-east Frontier having been debated and settled in a satisfactory manner, the British Commissioner brought forward the other questions in which the Amir and the Government of India were concerned. Sir Mortimer Durand enlarged on the identity of the interests of the Amir with those of the English Government, and he pressed upon His Highness the necessity of a frontier settlement. During the negotiations the Amir evinced the strongest desire to arrive at an honourable agreement, and his confidence having been won by the tact, patience and sincerity of the British Commissioner all difficulties were surmounted, and a most satisfactory agreement was signed. The settlement defined the respective spheres of influence of the two countries. His Highness the Amir bound himself not to interfere in any way for the future with the Bajauris, Afridis, Waziris,

* *Ibid.*, p. 58

and other frontier tribes, and agreed that the frontier line should hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, wherever such demarcation was practicable aud desirable, by joint British and Afghan Commissioners. The British Commissioner on the other hand consented to the Amir retaining Asmar, and the valley above it as far as Chandak, which is now occupied by the Afghans. His Highness agreeing that he would at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The British Government also agreed to leave to the Amir the tract known as Bermal in the north-western part of the Waziri country. As a token of their appreciation of the goodwill displayed by His Highness, and the friendly spirit in which he entered into the negotiations, the British Government have consented not only to raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, but have promised to grant him some assistance in this respect, and the Government of India have engaged to increase the annual subsidy of twelve lakhs granted to His Highness by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year."*

After the negotiations, the treaty on the above terms was signed. The Amir received the members of the British Mission at a special Durbar. As the result of this Mission "the difficulties and misunderstandings of years have been removed."

'I believe', declared the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, in his farewell address in Calcutta, 'that my successor will find in His Highness the Amir, who has, during the recent negotiations, evinced the strongest desire to arrive at an honourable settlement, and to remove all causes of ill-will between his Government and ours, a firm ally and a friendly neighbour, well content to abide honourably by the contract to which he has lately become a party'.†

THE PETIT BARONETCY BILL

On the 19th January, 1893, a Bill for settling the Endowment of the Baronetcy conferred upon Sir Dinshaw Manockjee Petit "of Petit Hall" in the island of Bombay was introduced in the Viceroy's Legislative Council. A discussion took place in the Council as to the desirability of keeping clauses 11 and 12 of the above Bill. In opposing the above clauses of the Bill, Dr. Rash Behari Ghose said :

"I confess that it is not without a certain degree of reluctance that I move the amendment which stands in my name. One of the foremost captains of industrial enterprise in India, Sir Dinshaw Manockjee, has by his princely charities so endeared himself to all his countrymen that it is by no means an agreeable duty to have to oppose any of the provisions of a Bill which has been settled in concert with his legal advisers and which may therefore be presumed to embody his own wishes. Among a people who have always been distinguished for their munificence, there is probably no name more illustrious than that of the recently created baronet ; and the provisions of the Bill now before us may not altogether unreasonably be regarded as a fitting recognition of the eminent services rendered by Sir Dinshaw Manockjce to the country. But although, I trust, I yield to no one in my appreciation of the many claims to distinction possessed by the Parsi Baronet, I cannot forget that the proposed legislation is of a very exceptional character. It is an encroachment on the rule against perpetuties as known among lawyers—a rule based not on any artificial reasoning but on the most obvious principles of public policy, which lays down that except within certain well-defined limits, you cannot fetter the free transfer of property, unless for purposes useful and beneficial to the public or, as they are technically called, charitable uses. Among Hindus, as t e law now stands, the right to prevent the unrestricted transfer of property exists, if it can be said to exist at all, in a most attenuated form. Greater latitude, and perhaps with more reason, is allowed in the English law, but

* *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

even in England the limits within which alienation may be restrained are rigidly defined; and the well-known process of settling and resettling estates among the great English landowners does not constitute any real exception, as it does not in any way trench upon the rule against perpetuities; but the mode in which this is accomplished is of too artificial a character to be readily intelligible to anyone who is not a lawyer".

After quoting some legal cases, Dr. Ghose proceeded to say:

"It is said that this Bill has been drawn on the model of Act XX of 1860. Now, I have looked into that Act, and I do not find anything in it at all analogous to clause 12 of this Bill. It is altogether a new departure for which I confess I have not been able to find any sufficient justification. It would also seem to be wholly unnecessary. The income of the property comprised in the proposed trust is evidently deemed sufficient, at any rate for the present, to support the dignity of a Baronet conferred upon Sir Dinshaw Manockjee. If, however, at any time in the future, that income should happen to be inadequate for the purpose, the funds might be easily augmented by the less objectionable process of adding to them such securities as are mentioned in clause 11 of the Bill. I would also beg to point out that, even as regards any contemplated addition of immoveable property in the future, the acceptance of my amendment would only make this difference, that instead of applying to the Governor of Bombay in Council, Sir Dinshaw Manockjee, or his successors, as the case may be, would have to move the Legislature, and I am sure any application bearing the honoured name of Sir Dinshaw Manockjee would always secure the respectful attention of Hon'ble Members. Moreover, there is no reason why the Legislature should delegate its functions in such matters to the Local Government, a course, which, in my humble judgment, should be adopted only in cases of imperative necessity. I have only to add that in setting aside the ordinary law of the land in favour of a subject, however distinguished, we cannot proceed too cautiously, that such measures do not always fulfil the expectations entertained by their promoters, and that, in this country specially, exceptional legislation of the present order might create a precedent of a very inconvenient and embarrassing character."*

Lord Lansdowne in closing the discussion said:

"I should myself be inclined to say that, of the two clauses—clauses 11 and 12—to which special attention has been drawn, clause 12 is open to much more serious objection than clause 11. The power to settle land has always been regarded with much greater jealousy than the power to settle securities and my first impression is that the power to settle securities, subject to the consent of the Local Government, is not, on the face of it, an unreasonable power to ask for. The power, however, to settle land has always been regarded, and rightly regarded, with much greater jealousy, and the proposal to confer it in the present case raises much more serious difficulties."†

AN ESTIMATE OF LORD LANSDOWNE'S RULE

The Hon. Mr. Playfair gives the following estimate of the rule of Lord Lansdowne in one of his Calcutta speeches. He says:

"The five years of administration now completed, have been years of freedom from famine and from foreign troubles, excepting such disturbances as wild tribes on the frontier periodically provoke. Over the long mountain range from Baluchistan to the Chin Hills, Lord Lansdowne leaves the frontier stronger than he found it, with additional securities for its peace, and it is a matter of congratulation that His Excellency is able to go away with the proud sense that our relations with the Amir of Kabul have advanced another long stride towards cordiality and confidence. In addition to this, in Kashmir, Khelat and Manipur, Lord Lansdowne has upheld the authority of the Empire

* *Speeches by Dr. Rash Behary Ghose* (Calcutta), pp. 116-18.

† *Speeches by the Marquis of Lansdowne II*, pp. 494-95.

and has insisted upon the duties to be observed to the subjects of the Native States. In justice to the people Lord Lansdowne has not hesitated to limit the powers of, or even to remove, misguided and oppressive rulers, while he has had respect to those family interests and that independence of Native States with which policy the Government of India has identified itself. When we turn to the internal administration of India we find a variety of problems that have commanded attention during the past five years. In spite of almost overwhelming difficulties and discouragements, an attempt has been made to grapple with the currency question, and the Legislature have endeavoured to find a remedy for a very serious disorder. This effort is the outcome of Lord Lansdowne's administration having been beset, in an aggravated form, with what Lord Dufferin described as his greatest difficulty, the fall in the value of silver, the effect of which has necessitated taxation and has continued burdens upon the people of the country that no Government can wish for. It has probably deprived the administration of additional investments of British capital for the further developments of the railway system of India, which is so much desired on the part of the people and for the benefit of commerce, and which development Lord Lansdowne has shown he has had so much at heart. It will deprive Lord Lansdowne, I fear, of the satisfaction of relieving the lower class of contributors to the income-tax, a piece of good fortune, afforded to Lord Canning, and which evoked for that statesman a special outburst of popularity before his departure.

"Questions of the most delicate and intricate character have come into prominence of late. Agitations among the Natives, apparently harmless, have developed a dangerous religious character. The peace of the community has been wantonly disturbed and alarm created over large districts. In such circumstances it was with feelings of great satisfaction that the Viceroy's speech at Agra made it clear, in an unmistakable English manner, that disorder would not be tolerated, and that aggressive religionists would not be permitted to disturb the public mind or endanger the public tranquility."*

Mr. George W. Forrest, Director of Records to the Government of India, thus makes an estimate of Lord Lansdowne's rule:

"The relations between the Government of India and the great States, which are our neighbours, have been placed on a closer and more solid basis; the wild tribes on our borders have been taught that crime and disorder will not be tolerated; the loyalty of the Feudatory Chiefs has been strengthened by friendly intercourse; the Empire has been made secure from foreign attack by the construction of important military works and improvements in our military system ..The educated classes have been admitted to larger participation in the higher functions of administration, and, by introducing the electoral system into the universities and the Legislative Council, an advance has been made towards placing the institutions of India on a liberal basis without injuring the stability and integrity of the Empire."†

RULES UNDER THE INDIAN COUNCILS ACT, 1892

At the meeting of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, held on Thursday, the 2nd February, 1893, His Excellency the President made the following statement, in part, regarding the Rules under the new Indian Councils Act, 1892 :

"The changes introduced by the new Act had reference to the constitution of the Legislative Councils, and to their functions. As regards their constitution, the Act provided for an increase in the number of Additional Members, and conferred upon the Governor-General-in-Council the power of making regulations as to the conditions under which such Members should be nominated. As regards the functions of the enlarged Councils, the Act gave them the right of discussing the Annual Financial Statement and also the right of addressing questions to the Government. With the

* Quoted in *Speeches by the Marquis of Lansdowne*, pp. 664-65.

† *The Administration of the Marquis of Lansdowne* (1884-1894) By George W. Forrest, B.A (Calcutta, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1894).

object of introducing these changes, it was enacted, under clause 1 of the new Act that th› Governor-General-in-Council may, from time to time, with the approval of the Secretary of State in Council, make regulations as to the conditions under which such nominations (*i. e.*, nominations of Additional Members) 'or any of them, shall be made by the Governor-General, Governors, and Lieutenant-Governors respectively and prescribe the manner in which such regulations shall be carried into effect'.

The provision affecting the functions of enlarged Councils in clause 2 of the Act, under which 'the Governor-General in Council may from time to time make rules authoritising, at any meeting of the Governor-General's Council for the purpose of making Laws and Regulations, the discussion of the Annual Financial Statement of the Governor-General-in-Council and the asking of questions but under such conditions and restrictions as to subject or otherwise as shall be in the said rules prescribed or declared'.

The clause contains a like provision authorising the heads of Local Governments to make similar rules, and it is provided that rules made under the Act by Governors-in-Council and Lieutenant-Governors shall be 'submitted for, and shall be subject to, the sanction of the Governor-General-in-Council, 'while the rule's made by the Governor-General-in-Council are to be 'submitted for, and shall be subject to, the sanction of the Secretary of State in Council'.

As a good deal of time was taken up in correspondence with the local Governments and after that it was found that there would be some delay in receiving the views of Her Majesty's Government in London on the subject, what Lord Lansdowne did is given below in his own words :

"Under these circumstances we considered it desirable to apply to Her Majesty's Government for permission to introduce immediately that part of the new procedure which has reference to those enlargements of the functions of the Legislative Councils, of which I spoke just now. I am glad to say that this suggestion was readily agreed to by Lord Kimberley, and that we have received his sanction to introduce at once the new rules under which, in future, Hon'ble Members will have the right of discussing our financial proposals and of addressing questions to us on matters of public interest."

The substance of the new rules was stated by His Excellency as follows :

"The rules for discussion of the Financial Statement are of the briefest and simplest character. They merely lay down that

(i) the statement shall be explained in Council every year and a printed copy given to each member ; that

(ii) after the explanation has been made, each Member shall be at liberty to offer any observations he may wish to make on the statement, and that

(iii) the Financial Members shall have the right of reply and the discussion shall be closed by the President making such observations, if any, as he may consider necessary.

The rules for discussion of the Financial Statement in the Local Legislatures are framed upon the same lines, and I need not further refer to them.

The privilege thus conferred upon the Legislative Councils is, I venture to think, one of great importance. I have, more than once, expressed in this room my strong opinion that the present practice, under which the Council has been allowed an opportunity of criticising the financial policy of the Government of India only upon those occasions when financial legislation was resorted to, could not be defended. The right to criticise the financial administration of a Government is one of which it is impossible to over-estimate the value, and I have never concealed my opinion that it was improper as well as illogical that that right be frequently denied merely upon the technical ground that no Bill upon which a financial debate could be originated happened to be before the Council. The right to discuss, and to criticise, is one which should either be altogether withheld or altogether

conceded. The present arrangement, under which it has been exercised one year and held in abeyance in the next, is altogether indefensible. The financial discussions will now take place with regularity, and not upon sufferance, and I feel no doubt that both the public and the Government of India will gain, the one by wider knowledge and insight into public affairs which it will obtain, and the other by the increased opportunity which will be given to it of explaining its position and defending its policy.

I will now pass to that portion of the new regulation which has reference to the asking of questions under section 2 of the Councils Act of last year. The main point which we found ourselves called upon to consider had reference to the conditions and restrictions under which the newly conferred right should be exercised. We propose that at least six days' notice shall ordinarily be given in writing to the Secretary in the Legislative Department of any questions which an Hon'ble Member intends to ask; but that the President may, if he thinks fit, allow a question to be asked with shorter notice, or may require a longer notice, should the circumstances demand it.

"We have laid down that questions must be so framed as to be merely requests for information, and must not be put in an argumentative or hypothetical form, or in defamatory language. No discussion will be permitted in respect of an answer given to a question. These two restrictions are substantially identical with those under which questions may be put to Her Majesty's Government in the British House of Commons. A question, of which notice has been given by one Member, may, if he so desires, be asked by another Member on his behalf.

"There remains one point of the utmost importance. We had to consider whether it was desirable to specify certain subjects with regard to which questions should be inadmissible. It is obvious that there are some matters with regard to which no Government can allow itself to be publicly interpellated, such matters, for example, as military preparations, at a time when hostilities are in progress or in contemplation, or matters of financial policy involving the premature disclosure of information affecting the market. ... It will be desirable to content ourselves with taking power for the President to disallow a question upon the ground that it cannot be answered with public interests."*

Thus, while the Government conferred upon the people two new rights in the Reformed Council, they took care to circumscribe them with various restrictions.

CONSTITUTION OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

In another speech on the 16th of March 1893, Lord Lansdowne spoke on the constitution of the reformed Legislative Councils. He said :

"In the first place, the maximum number of Additional Members has been, in all cases, fixed by the Act. In Madras and Bombay the present strength is represented by a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 9, including the Advocate-General. Under the Act, there is to be a minimum of 9 and a maximum of 21. The condition laid down in the Act of 1861, that one-half of the Additional Members must be non-officials, still remains in force.

"In the Bengal Legislative Council the present maximum number of Councillors is 12, and this figure is raised by the new Act to 20, subject to the old condition that one-third of the Additional Members must be non-officials.

"In the North-Western Provinces the present strength of Additional Members is 9 and the maximum under the Act is 13, of whom, as in the case of Bengal, one-third must be non-officials."†

It seems strange why there was such anomaly in the distribution of seats in the new Councils. While both Bombay and Madras got the maximum of 21 Additional Members, Bengal (then a much larger province than now) got only 20 Members. Again, while of

* *Speeches by the Marquis of Lansdowne* (Cal. 1894) Vol. II, pp. 509-15.

† *Ibid.*, p. 580.

the Additional Members in Bombay and Madras one-half would be non-officials, in Bengal and North-Western Provinces the proportion would be one-third.

By making this grant of Reforms, the Government thought it desirable

"to improve the present Councils rather than to attempt to put in their plan bodies comprising a large number of persons, and possessing the attributes of Parliamentary assemblies of the European type."*

NO PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM FOR INDIA

The Viceroy tried to make it clear that the Government never wanted to grant a Parliamentary system of government for India. He pointed out the difficulties when he said :

"How, for instance, would it be possible in a province like that of Bengal, with a population of 70 millions, to allot the handful of seats at our disposal so as to divide the country, either in respect of geographical areas, or in respect of the different communities which inhabit it, in such a manner as to distribute the representation equitably, or to make it really effectual ? And I am bound to admit that to the best of my belief even those who are credited with opinions of the most advanced type upon Indian political questions have carefully guarded themselves against being supposed to claim for the people of India any system of Western Europe."†

Lord Lansdowne continued to say :

"..that mandate under which we were called upon to act might be summarised in the four following propositions :

(1) It is not expected of us that we shall attempt to create in India a complete or symmetrical system of representation.

(2) It is expected of us that we shall make a *bona fide* endeavour to render the Legislative Councils more representative of the different sections of the Indian community than they are at present.

(3) For this purpose we are at liberty to make use of the 'machinery of election wherever there is a fair prospect that it will produce satisfactory results.

(4) Although we may to this extent apply the elective principle, it is to be clearly understood that the ultimate selection of all Additional Members rests with the Government, and not with the electors. The function of the latter will be that of recommendation only, but of recommendation entitled to the greatest weight, and not likely to be disregarded except in cases of the clearest necessity"§

Lord Lansdowne then explained the leading features of the Bengal Scheme. He said :

"We have provided that out of the twenty councillors who may be nominated under the Act, no more than ten shall be officials. Under the Act at least one-third of the Additional Members must be non-officials. This would give the Bengal Council seven unofficial Members. Under the Rules there will be ten, and of these seven will be nominated by the Lieutenant-Governor on the recommendation of the following bodies and Associations :

A.—The Corporation of Calcutta ;

B.—Such Municipal Corporations, or group or groups of Municipal corporations, *other than the Corporation of Calcutta, as the Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time prescribe by Notification in the *Calcutta Gazette* ;

* *Ibid.*, p. 531.

† *Ibid.*, p. 535.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 535-36.

C.—Such District Boards, or group or groups of District Boards, as the Lieutenant-Governor may from time of time prescribe as aforesaid ;

D.—Such Association or Associations of merchants, manufacturers, or tradesmen as the Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time prescribe as aforesaid ;

E.—The Senate of the University of Calcutta.

"We have provided that each of the above groups shall (except as hereinafter provided in Rule VII) have at least one Councillor nominated upon its recommendation, but that the Corporation, the Mercantile Associations, and the Senate, shall have not more than one each.

"It is, however, further provided that the Lieutenant-Governor may nominate to such of the remaining seats as shall not be filled by officials, in such manner as shall, in his opinion, secure a fair representation of the different classes of the community, and that one seat shall ordinarily be held by a representative of the great landholders of the province."*

REFORMS OF 1892

About the reforms of the Legislative Councils in 1892, Sir Surendra Nath Banerjee says in his *A Nation in Making :*

"The Legislative Councils were reformed and expanded by the Parliamentary Statute of 1892, and the reformed Councils met for the first time in 1893. The Regulations framed by the Government under the Statute of 1892 were much less drastic than those under the subsequent Statute of 1909, when the Councils were still further expanded and liberalized. The elective principle having been definitely recognised and larger powers having been conferred upon non-official members, the Government assumed authority to interfere with the elections. Dismissed servants of Government and persons bound down for good behaviour under section 110 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code were disqualified ; and above all, Government assumed a general power of declaring a person disqualified whose election would, in the opinion of the Governor or the Governor-General, be contrary to the public interest. It was not indeed necessary to reserve these powers in 1893, for the Government was the final authority in accepting or rejecting an election made by a constituency.

"It has been, I fear, a traditional policy with the Government, when making a concession to popular demands to fence it round with safeguards, prompted by a spirit of caution and sometimes in excess of what may be deemed necessary by the exigenies of the case. In the old days before the Councils were reformed official members were permitted considerable freedom of action to vote as they thought fit and the annals of the Bengal Legislative Council bear testimony to the fact that the President of the Council, the Lieutenant-Governor of the province, was defeated by the voice and vote of the Council, a majority of whom were officials, when, in the course of the debate in connexion with what became the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1876, he supported the motion for three-fourths of the members of the Corporation being elected. A remnant of that freedom still lingered when the Councils were reconstituted in 1893, and I remember my lamented friend, Mr. R. C. Dutt, then Commissioner of the Burdwan Division, who was for some time a member of the Bengal Legislative Council and Mr. Cotton, Chief Secretary, voting against the Government. But all that is now a matter of the past.

"There was another point in which the Regulations under the Statute of 1892 compared favourably with those of 1909. No special electorates representing class or commercial interests were created. The constituenciers were the district boards and the municipalities, the former representing rural, and the latter urban, interests. The middle class received the measure of prominence to which they were entitled, but this was taken away from them by the extraordinary Regulations of 1910. In 1892, although there were no separate electorates and special constituencies, no class interests suffered. The Maharaja of Natore, the Raja of Tahirpur, Nawab Serjul Islam, the two former

* *Ibid.*, pp. 637-38.

representing the interests of the land-holding, and the latter, those of the Mahomedan community, found no difficulty in getting themselves returned to the Council. It is true that the Rajas and Maharajas had partly to depend upon the support of the middle class, and the Mahomedan candidates upon that of their Hindu fellow-subjects. But nobody in Bengal, so far as I know, ever made it a mater of complaint...... .....class representation is the retort courteous of the bureaucracy to the middle class, who clamoured for the reform of the Councils and got it. It seriously curtailed the power which they exercised over the elections under the Statute of 1882, and the whole trend of the Regulations of 1909 was to assign to them a back seat in the new system that was largely their creation."*

INDIAN CENSUS OF 1891

Lord Lansdowne took a great interest in the Indian census operations of 1891. Mr. George W. Forrest observes in this connection:

"A guiding principle of Lord Lansdowne's internal policy was the promotion of a systematic enquiry into the facts and circumstances of the Empire. He realised as keenly as any of his predecessors that a knowledge of the country and its people is the foundation of all sound administration. The Imperial Census of India for 1891, in which he took a personal interest, furnished a mass of information regarding the Indian population, their religions and social customs, and the economic conditions under which they live, the importance of which, to the man of science and the administrator, it would be difficult to exaggerate."†

AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS

Lord Lansdowne desired to collect agricultural statistics from every province and publish them for general information. So says Mr. Forrest:

"During the past four years serious endeavours havel been made to utilise the facts and figures which have been collected from the village records and other sources. Registers in which statistical results are collated and reviewed in an intelligent manner have been drawn up in every administrative circle of about two hundred square miles, from which officers of Government can at once ascertain the progress or decline of the agricultural tract and the condition of its agricultural population. Eight substantial volumes containing a complete and detailed compilation of all the facts and statistics connected with economic products have, in the last year of Lord Lansdowne's Viceroyalty, been published. Two series of official bulletins dealing with agricultural and economic products have also, within the last two years, been founded, and in these, all important facts and statistics derived from the investigation of the current year are published month by month. Measures have also been taken to secure, supply and publish in a useful form the results supplied by the Departments of Forests, Survey, Inland Trade, Geology, Meteorology, Veterinary Science and Agricultural Chemistry".§

LAND REVENUE

The object of collecting these agricultural statistics from each district is to have a complete basis for the assessment of the land revenue of India. So the Viceroy had given so much attention to the collection of the agricultural statistics. In supporting the land revenue policy of Lord Lansdowne Mr. George W. Forrest of the Records of the Government of India writes in *The Administration of the Marquis of Lansdowne*:

"But while careful to secure the interests of the public from encroachment, it has been recognised by the Government of Lord Lansdowne that it is of the highest importance to the people that the

* *A Nation in Making*, pp. 123-25.

† *The Administration of the Marquis of Lansdowne*, p. 2.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

assessment on land should be moderate, and that the State should in every way endeavour to promote measures which would relieve indebted and distressed landowners. The development of the policy which would on the one hand secure the rights and interests of the tax-paying community and on the other keep the agricultural classes which pay the land revenue from distress and embarrassment was, however, a work whieh Lord Lansdowne felt could be no more than commenced by his own hand. It was a task of such great magnitude that he could but lay its foundation. He saw, as many engaged in the administration of the land had seen before him, that the chief error of the past had been in the departure made from the long-establised principles of native administration by substituting an absolutely rigid system of collecting the land revenue for a system which was supremely elastic; and by conferring upon the occupiers and holders of agricultural lands a new and unaccustomed freedom to part with their lands by transfer and sale. This view has recently received strong confirmation in important reports submitted to Lord Lansdowne from Bombay, the Punjab, and the Central Provinces. They have indicated that defects in the land revenue system might be a primary cause of agricultural impoverishment, and that the unrestricted power of transfer which had been suddenly conferred upon landholders and cultivators by past administrations was amongst the most prominent of these defects."*

THE DECCAN LAND COMMISSION

Lord Lansdowne appointed the Deccan Land Commission, which

"were instructed to give their attention to the working of the system of land administration as well as the defects in the special enactment on which they were primarily required to report. Their report has been received and the outlines on which legislation for the amendment of the Deccan Act (of 1879) are to be carried out have been decided upon. The larger questions affecting revenue administration and the policy of land transfer in respect of which their opinion is substantially in accordance with the views indicated by Lord Lansdowne still remain for consideration."

SANITATION

Lord Lansdowne also directed his attention towards the improvement of sanitation in India. Any violent attempt to improve rural sanitation would lead to general discontent in the country. Lord Lansdowne remarked before the Public Health Society of Calcutta that sanitary problems in India "must be approached with the utmost tact, patience and forbearance."

"The path of the sanitary reformer brings him face to face, sometimes with natural indifference begotten of ignorance, sometimes with what appear at first sight to be prejudices and superstitions, but which, on closer examination, prove to have their foundations deep in the customs and traditional habits of portions of the human race." Lord Lansdowne added: "In regard to the distribution of the work to be done, I will venture to say that our great object should be to stimulate local efforts, and, if possible, to render the people themselves alive to the advantages of sanitary reform."

In this connection Mr. Forrest says:

"In pursuance of this policy Provincial Sanitary Boards have been constituted in the different provinces, and measures of village sanitation have been carried out in each part of India. It is impossible to give details of these measures, but of all the sanitary improvements which have been made, none will more greatly add to the comfort, convenience and health of the people than the system of water works, which has been introduced during the Viceroyalty of Lord Lansdowne."†

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

† *Ibid.*, p. 9.

DURBAR AT QUETTA AND BRITISH INFLUENCE IN BALUCHISTAN

On 20th November, 1889, Lord Lansdowne held a public Durbar at Quetta for the reception of His Highness the Khan of Khelat, the Jam of Lus Beyla, and a number of Sardars of Baluchistan. In his Durbar speech, Lord Landsdowne traced the history of British influence in Baluchistan. He said :

"I rejoice that it should be within my power to gixe effect to Lord Dufferin's intention, and I esteem myself fortunate in that it has fallen to my lot to be the first Viceroy of India to interchange personal greetings in Quetta with yourself and the Sardars and chiefs who are colleeted in this room.

"More than twelve years have now passed since the untiring efforts made by Sir Robert Sandeman, the trusted representative of the Government of the Queen-Empress, especially during his Mission to Khelat in 1876, culminated in the well-known settlement of Mustung,—a settlement which was closely followed by the memorable Durbar held at Jacobabad by Lord Lytton, the then Viceroy.

"The Treaty executed at that time by the Viceroy, and by your Highness, bore witness to the reconciliation effected between yourself, the Ruler of Lus Beyla, and the Baluch Sardars. Such a reconciliation was urgently demanded in the interests of peace and stable government. It was also indispensable with reference to an object to which neither the Khelat State nor the Government of India could be indifferent. I mean the opening up of trade communications between our two countries and between India and Afghanistan—a step which would have been impossible without the removal of the risks occasioned in former days by the unsafe condition of the principal trade routes.

"We are now in a position to look back to the result which the arrangements of 1876 have achieved. They are of a nature which must, I believe, be entirely satisfactory to all concerned and not least to your Highness. The Bolan Pass has become a safe and peaceable highway, and your Highness's wise action in subsequently consenting to the commutation of the transit dues formerly levied upon all commodities conveyed through the Pass has given a further stimulus to commerce. The heavy cost of this arrangement was cheerfully borne by the British Government in the general interest......

"Other roads besides that through the Bolan Pass have been opened up, and your country has been thrown into direct connection with the commercial enterprise of the Indian Empire.

"Within two years of the execution of the Treaty of Jacobabad the sincerity of the Ruler of the Khelat State was tested by the outbreak of the second Afghan War, at the close of which the Marquis of Ripon conveyed to your Highness, and the principal Sardars, his high appreciation of the loyalty and friendship which you had displayed and of the effective assistance which you had rendered to British officers during the Military operations in Afghanistan.........

"Much of what I have said has had special reference to the country under your Highness, administration. But I also wish to say a few words to those Khans, Arbabs, and other gentlemen present, who are now subjects of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress of India. Hardly ten years have elapsed since the districts of Pishin, Sibi and That Chotiali first came into British possession during the war with Afghanistan. Since then these districts have been formally declared to form part of the British India ; while more lately the Kakar country and the Khetran valleys have come under our administration. During these years you have had ample opportunity of judging what British rule means. You will, I hope, have learnt that this it is founded on justice, that the British Government neither exacts heavy taxes nor interferes with your private affairs, that it has no wish to meddle with your religion, and that it desires to respect them without injustice to individuals. The British Government desires to see its subjects prosperous, contented and happy. The extension of the railway, of which I spoke just now,—the construction throughout your districts of good metalled roads,—the execution in Pishin of important irrigation works,—have all helped to bring wealth to the country, and have provided employment for thousands of your people.........Your local levies have been employed for the purpose of maintaining order, and your jirgas for the performance of the

ordinary duties of civil administration. In return for these benefits the Government expect from you loyal and faithful service"*

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN THE PUNJAB

On the occasion of the ninth Convoeation of the University of the Punjab (26th Nov. 1889), the Degree of Doctor of Literature *Honoris Causa* was conferred on Lord Lansdowne. The Viceroy, as Patron of the University, addressed the students after the conferring of the degrees. He justified the creation of this new University for the Punjab. He said :

"It has at any rate always seemed to me that the aspiration of the Punjab to have a University of its own was a natural and reasonable one. I am a believer in the maintenance of distinctive types in our educational institutions, particularly in those connected with higher education. The danger with which one is sure to be confronted in a paternally governed country with a centralised Government, is that there will be a tendency to shape all our public institutions too much in the same mould, that they will not be sufiiciently distinctive in type or characteristic of the idiosyncrasies of the different divisions of the community. Such a state of things is no doubt to some extent inevitable in India, but the evil should be minimised whenever an opportunity presents itself. In this Province we have to deal with a population of twenty millions, excluding the Native States, and with an area of about the extent of the whole of Italy. That population includes national types which are strongly marked, and which have a pronounced individuality of their own. The races represented in the Province possess special characteristics, many of them of a very admirable and remarkable kind. I can well understand that the founders of this University should have desired under such circumstances to secure for the Punjab educational institutions of its own, and to save them from inclusion within the mechanical trammels of a system wanting in local colour and indiscriminately applicable to the whole of Northern India. I can understand that for this reason you should not have been content with a college under the direction and influence of an external body, and I donot think that any one will find fault with you it you regard your University with the same kind of feelings as those with which Scotchmen regard those Scotch Universities which in our own country have so honourably maintained their special characteristics and position in the educational system of Great Britain."†

Lord Lansdowne also referred to the provision of Oriental studies made in the Punjab University. He said:

"I am also able to understand without difficulty that the founders of the Punjab University should have desired to give a special prominence to oriental studies. As an Englishman nothing would shock me more than the thought that while we are forcing Western knowledge upon you, we are thereby effacing or pouring contempt upon those forms of culture which are indigenous to the soils of this country. I think, therefore, that it was a wise and generous impulse which led the founder to determine that an attempt should be made to rescue and to preserve here whatever is best worth preservation in your Eastern culture. It has been stated upon high authority that the educational institutions of India are open to the reproach that they have achieved little or nothing in this direction, and I shall be very glad if the Punjab University finds it possible to remove this reproach. Here again, however, we must make it a condition that the efficiency of your teaching, and the value of the intellectual discipline to which your students are subjected, is not to be diminished by any preference which may be shown for oriental studies ; and I am glad to learn that, in spite of that preference even in the studies which are pursued within the oriental

* *Ibid.,* pp. 124-27.

† *Ibid.,* pp. 136-37

colleges, your students are not discouraged from giving a prominent place to the study of the English language, a knowledge of which will be valuable to you, not merely as supplying you with the power of conversing in a foreign tongue, but because it opens to you the mines of knowledge that Western science and research have stored up for those who hold the key by which their treasures can be unlocked. Nor, again, even in your Eastern studies can you afford to dispense with our Western methods of investigation, which are admittedly superior in their accuracy and scientific value. I have no doubt that your students, whether they study the laws of their own country, its history or its science, will bear in mind how much their efforts will be assisted if they are content to bring to bear upon the materials before them the logic and the criticism of the West. There is then, I think, every reason for hoping that the existence of this University may influence not only the whole education of the Province, but that it may prove a centre from which a useful influence will be brought to bear upon the public and social life of the whole community".*

Lord Lansdowne was not in favour of the lowering of the standard of examinations. In the above Convocation speech, he also remarked :

"It has sometimes occurred to me that in this country people go a little too far in this direction (spread of education) and expect almost too much from a University education. It might be worth their while to remember that there are some things which it is beyond the power of colleges and Universities, however well organised, to achieve for those who are members of them, or which at any rate they should not be expected to do for us as a matter of course. I have, for instance, noticed a tendency on the part of our Indian students to expect in the first place that a University Degree should not be made too difficult of attainment, and it is assumed that if a considerable number of those who compete for such a Degree are unsucessful, the fault is not so much with the competitors as with the examiners, The suggestion naturally follows that a remedy should at once be applied, not by raising the proficiency of the candidatec, but by diminishing the stringency of the examinarions. Then, again, I have observed a tendency, no doubt not an unnatural one, on the part of those who have taken the pains of going through the University course to consider themselves personally aggrieved because they find that the public service or the professions do not supply a sufficient number of openings for educated young men. Again, I have read many lamentations, the sincerity and earnestness of which it is impossible to doubt, over the fact that our Universities and colleges are able so provide the student with little except book learning, with the result that he is turned out in the world with a fair intellectual equipment, but with a moral character perhaps weakened instead of strengthened by the studies which he has gone through. I trust that when I tell you that I think that you in India sometimes expect too much in these respects from our Universities. I shall not be understood as having no sympathy with those by whom these cries of despair are from time to time uttered. As an old University student myself I can certainly sympathise with the griefs of those for whom the examination papers have proved a little too stiff. I do not, I must say, remember that we ever proposed anything approaching to a general lowering of the standard insisted upon by the examiners. My impression is that in my time our discontent generally took the shape of a belief that a singularly perverse fate invariably prompted the examiners to set questions in those particular branches of the subject which we had omitted to study with requisite care. At any rate I earnestly trust that, in the case of this University, the public will not press its authorities, and that, if they do, the University authorities will not consent, to debase the intellectual currency in circulation here. It seems to me to be of the utmost importance that, if the Punjab University is to justify a separate existence, its degrees should be above suspicion ; and I would certainly say that if we had to chose between two evils, the maintenance of somewhat too high a standard would be the lesser evil of the two."†

* *Ibid.*, pp. 138-39.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 140-41.

Lord Lansdowne also referred to the question of the employment of the young graduates. He said :

"Again, I can well conceive the vexation and disappointment of the student who has successfully obtained his Degree, and who finds that his laudable ambition to serve the public is doomed to remain unfulfilled. I am afraid, however, that this disappointment is not likely to diminish as time goes on. The number of young men receiving a high education in this country is increasing annually, and I have no doubt whatever, will continue to increase. The number of appointments open to Indian students, if it is to be increased at all, can be increased but to a slight extent. Even if we were to assume that the British element were to be altogether eliminated from the public service, the total number of appointments which it contains bears an infinitesimally small proportion to the number of the young men who, ten years hence, will probably be receiving higher education of one kind or another. We are, I am afraid, asking a great deal of our students when we express a hope that they will learn to value knowledge for its own sake, and not merely as a means of obtaining preferment in the public service or in the professions. I trust, however, that the time will come when the pursuit of knowledge will be so regarded, and that both parents and children will discover that there is no profession or vocation, however humble, the duties of which cannot be better performed by a man whose mind has gone through a certain amount of intellectual discipline."*

Lord Lansdowne then goes on to answer certain charges brought against modern education. He says :

"My warmest sympathy is, however, with those who ask—to use the eloquent expression employed by a writer upon this subject in the public press—what sort of education is that which only would force the brain and consider the heart and soul as of no account ? In regard to this particular count of the indictment, I would venture to point out to you that if you allow yourselves to assume that training of the heart and soul, as distinguished from the intellect, is a work for which your public educational institutions are to be held solely responsible, you are foredoomed to disappointment. Whether morality is taught with or without religious sanctions, whether it is or is not associated with the dogmatic teaching of religion, I do not believe that here, or elsewhere, the highest and best moral qualities can be imparted as a portion of your college course in the same manner as that in which law, or history, or science can be taught to those who study them. They are certainly not so imparted in our great English Colleges and Universities, and I believe that any member of an English University will bear me out when I say that the teaching of the science of ethics, or of the dogma of religion and theology, has borne a comparatively insignificant part in the formation of the character of our English youths. It is by agencies other than these that the moral fibre of our young men is strengthened in Great Britain ; it is agencies other than these that we must look for the moral training of our students in British India. For that training we must depend to some extent upon the personal example of the teachers, to some extent upon the tone prevailing amongst the young men themselves, and upon the personal disposition of those who are most prominent among them : we must depend upon those influences which surround our students in their own homes, in which I will venture to say more moral teaching goes on insensibly than in all the class-rooms put together. And, above all, we must depend upon the state of public opinion in regard to all questions affecting moral rectitude or obliquity. The school, the college, the University is generally a little world of its own in which the prejudices and imperfections of the outside world are reflected, often in a somewhat exaggerated shape, and I do not thing it is too much to say that if society is lukewarm and indifferent in regard to questions of moral conduct, we must expect similar shortcomings amongst the youths who are now undergoing their education at institutions such as these.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 141-42.

"I have dwelt upon this because I think it will be a serious misfortune if the failure of our Indian students in these respects is laid, as it seems to be, entirely at the door of the colleges and universities. These can, no doubt, do something, and the Government of India has admitted this by a recent Resolution which is no doubt familiar to those whom I am addressing; but I cannot insist too strongly upon the fact that no efforts made by those who are entrusted with the teaching of our young men will be successful unless those efforts are seconded by the general tone of the native society, and by the cultivation of a healthy public opinion, the sanctions of which will obtain, because they deserve it, the general respect of the community. Truthfulness and integrity, a sense of honour, respect for authority, whether in the family or in the State—these are all qualities which your professors will inculcate in vain unless they are insisted upon by the general sense of the educated community at large. It is for the leaders of public opinion in this country, for the chiefs and rulers, for the learned men amongst you, for the public press, which undertakes to guide and influence your opinions, and for the heads of families, to show that the people of this country are not indifferent to these matters, and that they are ready to supplement by respect and example the efforts which the State is making to educate your sons."*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

It was in 1890 that for the first time an Indian in the person of Mr. Justice Gooroo Dass Banerjee was appointed as the Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University. In his Convocation Address (on the 18th January, 1890), Lord Lansdowne, as Chancellor of the University referred to the new Vice-Chancellor's appointment. He said:

"There was, however, a special reason for which I was particularly anxious to attend this Convocation: I desired to offer my congratulations to the newly-appointed Vice-Chancellor of this University on his accession to that honourable office. He enters upon it with the goodwill of his fellow-citizens, of the University, and of the Government of India. I do not believe that any more suitable selection could have been made. As a member of the University conspicuous among his contemporaries during his career as a student, as a man of cultivated tastes and scholarly attainments, as a distinguished ornament of the Judicial Bench, and as a gentleman occupying an honourable position in the community which is most largely represented amongst the members of the Calcutta University, he is admirably qualified to take a leading part in its affairs. It has been very gratifying to me, as indeed it must have been to him, to observe the manner in which his appointment has been received. I have been long enough in this country to become aware that in such cases it is not always easy to please everyone, but, as far as I have been able to discover, no discordant note has marred the general expression of approval with which Mr. Justice Banerjee's nomination to the Vice-Chancellorship has been hailed."†

The Chancellor then referred to the question of reducing the number of University Fellows. He said:

"It is the duty of the Viceroy as Chancellor of the University to make the annual appointments to the list of Fellows of the University, and this is the second occasion upon which I have had the honour of making such a selection. I have been led to pay some attention to the present composition of the list. I find that, according to the University Calendar, it contains no less than two hundred and twenty names. The Statute prescribes thirty as the minimum number. No maximum number is, however, laid down, nor is there any restriction, save that the persons nominated are to be fit and proper persons. Now, a Fellowship of the Calcutta University is not only a high honour but also an important trust. The Senate is the governing body of the University, and no precaution should be neglected in order to secure that that body is constituted in the best possible manner.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 142-44.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 145-46.

Can we say that it is so constituted now? I am not quite sure that it is. The list contains the names of many gentlemen against whose character and position not a word can be said, but who either from the fact that they reside at a distance from Calcutta, or from other causes, are not in the least likely to take a useful part in the affairs of the University. In past times it seems to have been usual to bestow a considerable number of Fellowships, not upon the ground that the persons receiving them were likely to take an active part in the administration of the affairs of the University, or because they had specially connected themselves with educational questions. It is not difficult to understand how this came to pass. In the early days of this University the North-Western Provinces and the Punjab were as yet without Universities of their own, and a Fellowship of Calcutta University was the only means of recognising the claims of gentlemen from those provinces who had the right to be given a voice in educational matters. Again, a Fellowship appears to have been not unfrequently bestowed rather as a mark of distinction and as a compliment—in fact, much in the same way as honorary Degrees are bestowed in our Universities at home.

"It appears to me that there is a good deal to be said for the view that, if it is desired to confer an honorary academical distinction, the bestowal of a degree is a more appropriate means of doing so than the bestowal of a University Fellowship. Upon the whole, I have no doubt that the list is needlessly large, and I am told that, as a rule, the ordinary meetings of the Senate are not attended by more than twenty or thirty members, a number which, when questions of special interest are likely to be discussed, rises to a rather higher figure.

"Under these circumstances, there is, I think, a great deal to be said in favour of the view that it would be desirable to effect a gradual diminution in the number of your Fellowships, and I propose to make a moderate beginning by filling up every year only a portion of the vacancies which arise. Upon the present occasion you will have observed that only seven out of eleven vacancies have been filled up."*

Lord Lansdowne also suggested a new way of selection of Fellows. He said:

"It occurs to me that, in reference to a part of vacancies which have to be filled up every year, he (the Chancellor) might go a step further and ask the University itself to select a certain number of names for submission to him. There are several ways in which this might be done. The most practical manner of carrying out such a proposal would, I am inclined to think, be to allow the M. A.s to submit the names of one or two gentlemen selected by themselves from among themselves, upon the understanding that these names, unless they were open to serious objection, which would not be very likely, would, as a matter of course, be accepted. The final nomination must, under the terms of the Statute, rest with the Chancellor, but, speaking for myself, I believe that it would be to him agreeable to receive the assistance of the University in the manner and to the extent which I have described. The remainder of the vacancies would, of course, continue to be filled up by nomination."†

The vast majority of Fellows still continue to be nominated men!

THE CULTIVATION OF SCIENCE

On the 27th March, 1890, Lord Lansdowne in laying the foundation stone of the new laboratory of the Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science (founded by Dr. Mahendra Lall Sircar) remarked:

"The object of the institution is to promote the study of Science by the youngmen of this country, and, in this view, it has, I understand, endeavoured, on the one hand, to encourage the pursuit of scientific research and the study of science for itself, and on the other, to familiarise our

* *Ibid.*, pp. 146-67.

† *Ibid.*, p. 148.

students with the idea that there is a close connection between Science and the Arts, and that the latter will not flourish in a country in which the former is neglected!...

"I said just now that the efforts of this institution had been regarded with favour by more than one high official of the Government of India. It is, however, not upon assistance received from Government, or upon the countenance of high officials, that the success of the institution has depended. Its history has been one of continuous record of private generosity, and the untiring efforts of a few men who had faith in their cause and courage to sppport it. Eight years have passed since the foundation stone of the existing buildings was laid by the then Viceroy. You are now about to add to them a building which will provide the institution with that which is undoubtedly a *sine qua non* for any place of scientific education—I mean a laboratory. No teaching founded upon notes taken in a lecture-room will ever produce the same results as work in the laboratory; but while the want of laboratory accommodation in universally admitted, the expense of providing it is often fatal. I had the honour of serving for several years upon a Royal Commission, to which was referred the task of considering what steps should be taken to improve scientific education in Great Britain, and I remember that, at every turn, we were encountered by this difficulty—I mean that which arose from the excessive cost of laboratory buildings and of the appliances necessary to equip them. I am not surprised that the same difficulty should have been experienced in India, but I confess that I read with surprise the statement contained at page 6 of the Report for 1889, which is to the effect that, throughout the whole length and breadth of the country, there is not a single laboratory where research in any branch of science is being, or may be carried on. I rejoice to know that this reproach is about to be removed, and as Patron of this Association, I tender our cordial thanks to His Highness the Maharajah of Vizianagaram for the magnificient liberality with which he has come forward in order to supply a sum not merely, as he had at first intended, sufficient to justify you in undertaking the commencement of this most useful and important work but sufficient to bear the whole estimated cost of the building.......

"While the institution has friends who are able and willing to give it such support, while it commands the services of gentlemen as devoted to the cause of scientific culture as its distinguished founder Dr. Mahendra Lall Sircar, who has laboured with such singleness of purpose for its sake, we can afford to look forward confidently to its future."*

The Viceroy did not express any surprise that the Government had done nothing for scientific research !

FORECAST OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

To the demand made by the Indian National Congress for constitutional reforms, the British ministry at last agreed to make certain concessions, to which Lord Lansdowne referred in his speech on the financial statement for 1890-91. He said :

"It will be in the recollection of the Council that, when, twelve months ago, a similar opportunity was contrived, I was able to state that, in our opinion, the time had come when the right of discussing the Budget should be secured to the Legislative Council, and when the exercise of that right should no longer depend upon casual facilities such as we have been able to afford this year and last. I stated that this view was shared by Her Majesty's Government, and that the Secretary of State had expressed his concurrence in our proposal that there should be an annual, instead of an occasional, discussion of the Budget in Council. I added that this subject appeared to us, and also to Her Majesty's Government, to be closely connected with another, namely, the propriety of giving to Members ot the Legislative Council of the Government of India, under proper safeguards, the right of addressing questions to the Government upon matters of public interest, and I stated that this subject also was engaging our attention and that of the Secretary of

* *Ibid.*, pp. 159-63.

State. Since I made this announcement, steps have been taken to make good the assurance which I was then able to give."*

NATIVE STATES AND THE BRITISH RAJ

It had been sometimes argued that the British Government were trying to levy an Imperial defence cess upon the Native States. In reply to this charge, Lord Lansdowne said in his address at the Patiala Banquet (on 23rd Oct., 1890):

"We wish to make these State forces a matter of personal pride and emulation amongst the ruling chiefs, and, for this reason, I have persistently turned a deaf ear to all offers, however generous, which have been made to me of assistance in money in lieu of men. We are not seeking to levy an Imperial Defence cess upon the Native States, and, for the same reason, I have discouraged several very well-meant proposals which have from time to time been put forward for the formation of composite corps made up of small contributions of men from a number of the minor States. If such contributions had been accepted, it would have been necessary to merge these small bodies of troops into one or more larger forces, which would not be representative of any particular State, but of a group or body of States."†

But the British Government drove a good bargain by obtaining assistance in men in lieu of money.

PATIALA AND THE BRITISH RAJ

The Viceroy also tried to trace the connection between the British Raj and the Patiala State. He said :

"It is now some 75 years since they first were companions in arms during the Nepal War. Later again, in the dark days of the Mutiny, good service, still fresh in our memories, was rendered by His Highness's grandfather, Maharaja Norendra Singh, and the Patiala contingent, and at a still more recent date, during the Afghan War, a Patiala force served with distinction with the British Army. I feel confident that the troops which we shall see tomorrow will, in case of need, prove themselves no unworthy inheritors of these honourable traditions."††

NABHA'S LOYALTY

In view of the recent deposition of the Raja of Nabha, the following remarks of Lord Lansdowne should prove interesting:

"The State of Nabha has, on more than one occasion, proved its loyalty to the Crown. At the time of the Mutiny, the then ruling chief co-operated with, and rendered good service to, us, and during the Afghan War Nabha was one of the seven States which sent contingents in aid of the British forces. More recently His Highness has placed a part of his forces under special training, in order to fit them to serve with the troops of the Queen-Empress in the event of a great Imperial emergency."§

EDUCATION OF THE RAJPUT CHIEFS

Lord Lansdowne spoke about the education of the Rajput chiefs at the time of the prize distribution of the Mayo College (30th Oct., 1890). He said:

"As members of one of the oldest aristocracies in India, I can well understand that the chiefs and nobles of Rajputana should be animated by what we should call a strong conservative feeling, and

* *Ibid.*, pp. 163-64.
† *Ibid.*, p. 194.
†† *Ibid.*, p. 195.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

that you should regard with suspicion any form of education which might have the effect of breaking down traditions or customs to which you are attached. There is, however, nothing in the education which your sons will receive here which need do violence to such a feeling. That education need not tend to weaken your loyalty to your own race, or your reverence for the long line of brave men from whom you are descended. Depend upon it, gentlemen, that a Rajput noble will not find his usefulness as a Thakur impaired, because he has acquired here some of the qualities which we endeavour to instil into a young English gentleman of good family. It is an education for which we claim that it will, in the first place, engender amongst these young men that healthy spirit of emulation, that love of fair-play, and that ability to control their temper, which are produced by the healthy life of a public school, but which are rarely the result of the education given to a boy in his own home. In the next place, it is an education which will encourage the youths of Rajputana to acquire proficiency in manly sports and out-of-door exercises, and which will give them, not only sound minds, but sound and vigorous bodies, and develop those manly qualities, for the possession of which the Rajput race is proverbial.

"But...while the education given to the students of the Mayo College is designed to achieve the results to which I have just briefly referred, we must not forget that it is also intended to enable the students to obtain a knowledge, not only of your own literature, but of the English language, and of some of those subjects which are regarded as essential in a Western education."*

But it is notorious that the Chiefs' Colleges do not turn out rulers actively interested in the welfare of their people, but produce inferior imitations of Britishers.

COMMUNAL DISPUTES

In his address at the Durbar held at Agra on the 24th November, 1890, Lord Lansdowne spoke on the communal disputes. He said :

"I desire to repeat on this occasion an observation which I lately made in the city of Delhi in reference to the unseemly disputes which have from time to time arisen between the Hindus and the Mahomadan populations. Nothing is more calculated to retard the progress of these provinces than the perpetuation of a feeling of this kind. Nor can any censure be too strong for those misguided persons who have been the means of fanning the slumbering embers of discontent among the people. I may mention to you, in reference to this matter, that Her Majesty the Queen-Empress, whose deep interest in all that concerns India is well known to you, and who watches the progress of events in this country with the closest attention, has more than once expressed to me her abhorrence of the feelings of intolerance and bitterness which have engendered such breaches of peace. I was glad to be able to report to Her Majesty that during the Mohurrum this year the conduct of the citizens of Agra had been exemplary, and I trust that those to whom we naturally look as the leaders of public opinion will use their influence not only to prevent commotions and disturbances, but to promote amongst the different sections of the community, ragardless of their religious denomination, feelings of mutual forbearance and goodwill. The Government of India is fully prepared to do its duty in repressing disorders arising from this cause with a strong hand, but it is for you, rather than for us, to put a stop to the bitter antagonisms and sectional jealousies of which these disorders are the outward symptoms."†

Is it not also the duty of the Government to put a stop to these causes of the disorders?

FEMALE EDUCATION IN INDIA

Lord Lansdowne deplored the lack of encouragement of female education in India in his address on the occasion of the prize distribution in the Bethune

* *Ibid.*, p. 210.
† *Ibid.*, p. 246.

College, though even now the Government neglects its duty to girls and women. He said :

"I am afraid we must admit that, while a great deal has been accomplished within the last few years for the education of the male half of the population, that which has been done for the other half represents a comparatively small measure of achievement. When the Education Commission of 1883 made its report, out of every 1,000 women in Bengal, one only, roughly speaking, was under instruction. The figure compared very unfavourably with those for Madras and Bombay. I gather from recent Provincial Reports that Bengal can now show a better proportion, but the figure is still far below what we should all of us desire. The difficulties which stand in the way of female education in India are obvious to every one. They are most of them inherent in the social system of the country. It is useless to ignore them or to hope that they will be surmounted rapidly and without trouble. We may perhaps find some consolation in the thought that, if the women who have received anything approaching a proper education in India form small minority of the whole female population, India is certainly not the only country in which, whether by accident or design, the women have been deprived of their share of intellectual cultivation and mental discipline. We have only to go back a few years in order to find ourselves at a time when but a very small minority of the women of Great Britain received an education worthy of the name. You all know how rapidly this state of things has been changed at Home.

"Here in India we are only at the beginning of this much-needed reform. It is one which it is not for the Government of India to impose upon the people of the country, although it can do a great deal, and does do a great deal, in the way of granting facilities ; it is one which we may safely predict that in good time the people of the country themselves will insist upon effecting. This school promises at all events to be the means of making good one of our main deficiencies in this respect—I mean the absense of a class of properly trained teachers. The Commissioners of 1883 pointed out that one of the most serious impediments in the way of female education was to be found in the fact that the supply of teachers was scanty in quantity and unsatisfactory in quality. The Bethune School will do a great service to the nation if it succeds in furnishing this part of India with a supply of trained teachers. .

"That in point of intelligence and aptitude for receiving instruction the women of India will show themselves fitted for such recognition is, I think, scarcely open to doubt. The Commissioners of 1883 left upon record their conviction that the 'intelligence of Indian women was far in advance of their opportunities of obtaining school instruction, and promises well for their education in future.'......

"As Chancellor of the Calcutta University I may be permitted to refer with special satisfaction to the fact that this school has since 1888 been affiliated to the University in the Faculty of Arts....

"In the eloquent address which he delivered on the occasion to which I have just referred, the Vice-Chancellor of the University, Mr. Justice Gooroo Dass Banerji, affirmed the great truth that 'no community can be said to be an educated community unless its femals members are educated ; that is, not simply taught to read and write, but educated in the true and full sense of the word,' and he went on to quote the noble saying of the great law-giver Manu -'Where women are honoured there the gods rejoice : where they are not honoured there all rites are fruitless.' In these two wise utterances are summed up the objects with which this school, which may fairly claim to be regarded as a pioneer institution of a great and far-reaching movement, has been founded and maintained."*

THE AGE OF CONSENT BILL

The introduction of a Bill to amend the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, with the object of raising the age of consent of Indian female

* *Ibid.*, pp. 289-92.

children from ten to twelve years, in response to the demands of Indian reformers, roused strong protest from a section of the orthodox Hindu community. On the 9th January, 1891, Sir Andrew Scoble introduced the Bill in the Legislative Council. After he had spoken in support of the Bill, Sir Romesh Chandra Mitter opposed the Bill on the ground that it involved an interference with the Hindu laws and customs. Lord Lansdowne closed the debate with the following remarks :

"I do not think it necessary to add to what has already been said in defence of the Bill on the table except perhaps to the extent of observing that, while we shall always recognize the high authority which attaches to any observations falling from the lips of our Hon'ble collegue Sir Romesh Chunder Mitter, the Government of India, for the reasons urged by the Hon'ble Member in charge of the Bill in his opening statement, cannot admit with him that the existing criminal law is sufficient for the purpose of affording protection to those whom we propose to protect under this Bill. Nor can we accept his view that the Proclamation of 1858, which the Government of India regards as in the highest degree obligatory upon it, can be considered as absolutely precluding us from interference simply because for the purposes of this Bill the same protection is extended to married as to unmarried children. Nor, again, can we join with him in thinking that because there have been no prosecutions under the existing section of the Penal Code with its 10-year limit of age, that section can be regarded as having no effect, or as I think he described it, a dead letter."

"It has been very properly insisted upon by the Hon'ble Member in charge of the Bill that it does not, in any way, affect what may, for convenience sake, be spoken of as the marriage law of this country. There is, as far as I am aware, no social or religious custom or observance in force among the Hindu community to which the Bill does the slightest violence. We propose merely to protect from the unquestioned evils of early prostitution or premature sexual intercourse that great body of the female children of India which lies between the age of 10, up to which the present law affords them protection, and the age of 12, up to which we propose that such protection should be extended. Our measure affects the marriage usage only, in so far as this protection extends to a married as well as to an unmarried child. Under the law, as it now stands, no distinction is made between them for this particular purpose, and we do not propose that, as a matter of principle, any such distinction should be introduced now. The immaturity of a young girl does not vary according as she is married or not, and we cannot, therefore, consistently give protection to the one class and deny it to the other. That is the beginning and the end of the connection of the Bill now upon the table with the marriage law of India.

"It is, however, within the knowlege of Hon'ble Members, and our Hon'ble colleague Mr. Nulkar has dwelt with great force upon the point, that the proposal embodied in the Bill has recently been associated with other proposals widely different from it—proposals which do most distinctly affect the marriage law and the religious and social institutions of the Hindus. This association has been so closely maintained that the whole group of questions has come to be regarded as indissolubly connected, and it is inferred that, if the Government of India intends to deal with any one part of the subject, we are, to a certain extent, committed to deal with the rest."*

On the 19th March 1891, the Report of the Select Committee on the Age of Consent Bill was taken into consideration. There was much agitation against the Bill by an orthodox section of the Hindu community. The Viceroy tried to meet the objections of the leaders of that section in his speech on this occasion. He said :

"The opposition which it (the Bill) has encountered has proceeded from three quarters. There is, in the first place, the general suspicion which has been occasioned in the public mind from the

* *Ibid.*, pp. 269-71.

fact that the Government of India has determined to legislate upon a subject which, although it does not immediately affect the marriage law of any section of the community, has an indirect bearing upon the social usages of one of those sections. To the more ignorant portion of the public, an appeal has been made upon the ground that its religion is threatened by the action of the Government of India ; and this statement has probably been enough to cause uneasiness to many who are entirely unaware of the real scope of the Bill, who do not read the discussions which take place in Council, or even those which are to be found in the columns of the newspapers, and who are ready, upon the mere affirmation of the framers of hostile resolutions, or the conveners of public meetings, summoned under the circumstances so well described by the Hon'ble Mr. Nugent, to testify their alarm, and their conviction that their spiritual welfare is seriously threatened. Of the opposition which we have encountered from this quarter, all I have to say is that I hope and believe that it will be of a transient character, and that the Hindu community, and even the most unenlightened section of it, will in time find out that its religion is not endangered by what we are about to do. Although we cannot blame the credulous listeners who are led to believe assertions of this kind, made on apparently good authority, we have, I think, a right to complain of those who are reckless enough to disseminate such statements and, upon so slender a pretext, to fan the embers of a dangerous agitation. I earnestly trust that even those who are unable to support the Government measure will, at any rate, have the honesty to see that its objects and effects are not exaggerated or misrepresented, and that, if the Government is attacked, it is not attacked for doing what it has neither done, nor intends to do.

"The main volume of the opposition with which the Bill has met has, however, originated not so much in sources of this kind as in the belief, apparently entertained by many devout Hindus, that the new law will involve a direct interference with a specific religious observance. We are told that the Hindu religion requires the consummation of marriage immediately upon the attainment of puberty by the wife ; that puberty is not unfrequently attained prior to the age of twelve ; that, if in such cases the marriage is consummated, the person who so consummates it will find himself an offender against the Penal Code, owing to the performance of an act which his religion requires him not to leave unperformed. Such interference on the part of the British Government is, we are told, in direct opposition to the terms of the Queen's Proclamation ; and this argument has been largely, and I must say most unscrupulously, used for the purpose of discrediting the Bill, and imputing a breach of faith to the Government which has introduced it. Now, with regard to this contention, let me say at once that no Government of India will, I hope, ever be found to admit, that the Queen's Proclamation to which this appeal is made, is capable of any such interpretation as that which has been placed upon it by those who used this argument. .....

"......The question then which we have to decide is whether we are to postpone, or to abandon, a useful measure of reform, demanded in the interests of humanity, calculated to effect a material improvement in the Hindu race, and supported by a majority of the Hindu community, merely upon the ground that it is objected to by a minority of that community upon the strength of a religious canon of a doubtful authority, a religious canon which rests upon sanctions so slight that its transgression can be atoned for by the payment of a nominal fine.

"What I have said seems to lead inevitably to the second of the two reservations of which I spoke a moment ago. It is this: that in all cases where there is a conflict between the interests of morality and those of religion, the Legislature is bound to distinguish, if it can, between essentials and non-essentials, between the great fundamental principles of the religion concerned and the subsidiary beliefs and accretionary dogmas which have accidentally grown up around them. In the case of the Hindu religion, such a discrimination is especially needful, and one of the first questions which we have to ask ourselves is, assuming that the practice with which our proposed legislation will interfere is a practice supported by religious sanctions, whether those sanctions are of first-rate importance, and absolutely obligatory, or whether they are of minor imp rtance, and binding only in a slight degree.

"Now, I venture to affirm that the discussion which has taken place has established beyond controversy that the particular religious observance which we are urged to respect is, in the first place, a local observance, and one far from being universally recognised by those who profess the Hindu faith. It is a practice which is, in the main, peculiar to the province of Bengal, and which is followed only in a portion of that province, and only by certain classes within that portion. It will not be contended that devout Hinduism is not to be found outside this restricted area, but the Hindus of other parts of India do not share the alarm with which this Bill is regarded in Bengal. In the next place, it is admitted that the religious sanctions, by which the practice is supported, are of the weakest kind. The elaborate statement recently published by Dr. Bhandarkar, of the Dekkhan College at Poona, who is admitted to be one of the highest extant authorities upon questions of Hindu religious law, makes it perfectly clear that the precepts upon which the practice in question rests may be regarded as permissive only. It is conceded on all hands that, under certain circumstances, the consummation of the marriage may lawfully be postponed, and that, even where it is not lawfully postponed, the omission of the necessary act is an offence which may be expiated by the slenderest and most insignificant penalties. It was stated a few days ago by Mr. Javerilal Umiashankar Yajnik, in the eloquent speech delivered by him at the meeting recently held at Bombay, that it might be said, without exaggeration, of the eighteen millions of the Hindu population to whom he was referring, that the bulk of them not only did not perform the *Garbhadhan* ceremony, but even the name of it is not known to them. Look, again, at the evidence which we have received from His Highness the Maharaja of Jeypore with regard to the manner in which these questions are regarded by the chiefs and sardars of Rajputana, who are well described in Rao Bahadur Kanti Chunder Mookerjee's admirable letter as 'rigid and orthodox Hindus,' and far from likely to break the laws of their religion without compunction. Look, also, at the outspoken utterances of such men as our Hon'ble colleague Mr. Nulkar, as Mr. Telang, as His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore, as His Highness the Maharaja of Vizianagram, as Mr. Justice Muthusami Aiyar of Madras, and even in Bengal, of such men as His Highness the Maharajah of Bettiah, His Highness the Maharaja of Durbhanga, or in Calcutta itself, as Raja Durga Churn Law, lately our colleague in the Legislative Council, as Babu P. C. Mazoomdar, whose note upon the subject deserves the most attentive study, and as Dr. Rash Behari Ghosh, the eminent pleader, who has stated that, within his knowledge, the *Garbhadhan* ceremony is admittedly not observed in many respectable Hindu families, and is not unfrequently more honoured in the breach than in the observance. I cannot, in the face of the evidence of such men as these, accept without a protest, the statement of our Hon'ble colleague Sir Romesh Chunder Mitter, whose absence from the Council I deeply regret, that we are 'forcing this reform upon an unwilling people.' To them, and to many more who have raised their voices in support of the measure, I desire to offer a public acknowledgment of the service which they have rendered. I feel convinced that the time is not far off when their fellow citizens, without exception, will recognise that such men as these, rather than they who have so noisily, and so thoughtlessly, repeated the parrot cry 'Our religion is in danger,' are the true leaders of public opinion in this country. . . .

"I will, now pass for a moment to the third great objection which has been raised against the measure. It is the objection founded upon the anticipation that it will lead to inquisitorial action by the police, to prosecutions instituted from vindictive motives, and to criminal investigations into family matters of the most domestic and private character. Of this objection I will say that, whatever may be our opinions with regard to some of the arguments which have been brought forward against the Bill, there can be no doubt as to the perfect sincerity with which this argument has been urged upon us. The apprehension, considering the conditions under which a great part of the population of this country lead their lives, is a perfectly natural one; we should, if we were situated as they are, probably entertain a similar apprehension ourselves. I would, however, in the first place, entreat the public to be cautious how, in this or in any other case, it allows itself to be too much influenced by arguments founded upon the possibility that a new law is likely to be abused in this manner. If the Government of India had been deterred from

legislating whenever it could be told that its legislation would place in the hands of the police, or of private persons, a weapon which they might use in an improper manner, many of our most useful enactments would never have found their way into the code. Now, as far as *bona fide* prosecutions are concerned, the assumption that there will be frequent prosecutions under the new section is obviously based on the anticipation that the law will be frequently broken. I am sanguine enough to believe that this expectation will not be fulfilled. It is an expectation upon which the frequently expressed belief that the new law will be a dead letter is a somewhat remarkable commentary. Our proposals, moreover, already command a very large measure of public support, and I do not doubt that, in the end, Native opinion, which has always ended by supporting the law in cases of this kind will end by supporting the law in this instance also. When once it has become established that that which is, I believe, already regarded by a majority of the people of this country as a moral offence, and which our hon'ble colleague Sir Romesh Chunder Mitter himself stigmatizes as a vice, and as a pernicious custom, is also an offence which will render those who commit it, or those who abet it, liable to penal consequences, the offence will, I venture to think, become one of rare occurrence. I may observe, in passing that, it was mainly in deference to the apprehensions of which I have spoken that we found ourselves unable to accept the well-intentioned proposal that we should insert in the Bill, as an alternative for the limit of age which we have adopted, the attainment of puberty of the girl. This proposal, which seemed to us open to objection upon other grounds, was certainly open to criticism, for the reason that its adoption might have led to investigations far more inquisitorial and far more repugnant to family sentiment, than any which are likely to take place under the Bill as it stands."*

IF THERE WERE NO RAILWAYS!

In opening a new section of the Bengal Nagpur Railway, Lord Lansdowne indulged in a lecture on "If there were no Railways in India!" He boasted of the improvements made by the railway system in India. He said :

"If we had no other monument to leave behind us, this (the Indian Railway system) at any rate would bear sufficient testimony to the beneficence and usefulness of our rule. It is only by making a violent effort of imagination that we can picture to ourselves what the India of today would be like if we could suddenly obliterate the 15,000 miles of railway which we have spread over its surface since the Mutiny. I remember, about the time that I left England, reading a short review, published by the direction of the Secretary of State, of some of the results of Indian administration during the past thirty years. In that statement it was estimated that the public as representated by the producers of commodities, the traders in such commodities and the passengers who travelled by rail, benefited to an amount equivalent to no less than Rs. 60,000,600 a year, by reason of the mere cheapness of railway travelling and transport, as compared with the old-fashioned modes of conveyance; and it was pointed out that this calculation did not take into account the saving of time represented by travelling at a rate, of about 400 miles a day, instead of 20. Add to that whatever should be added on account of increased administrative efficiency, on account of additional security due to the ability of moving troops with ease and rapidity, on account of the development of new sources of wealth, on account of the mitigation of famine and scarcity, and on account of the increase of revenue accruing to Government, and we shall arrive at a total almost beyond the reach of conjecture."†

The Viceroy went on to say :

"In the great Railway system by which these results have been achieved, the Bengal Nagpur line will certainly fill a most important place. Half a dozen years ago a person, looking at the railway

* *Ibid*, pp. 306-316.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 295-96.

map of India, would, I think, certainly have been struck by the fact that, although a pretty liberal provision had already been made for the railway traffic of the extreme north, as well as the extreme south, of the country, there remained, on either side of the great arteries by which Bombay was connected with the North-West Provinces, two huge parallelograms, lying respectively to the north-west and south-east, in which lines of railway were, to use a famliar bull, 'conspicuous by their absence....'

"If the same person will now take into his hands the map showing the Indian railways in existence, or under construction, he will see that this great unoccupied space is traversed, or is about to be traversed by two railway arteries of first-rate importance."*

In arriving at a correct estimate of the bearing of railways on the welfare of India, one should bear in mind that they hastened the ruin of most indigenous industries by enabling the foreign manufacturer to bring his goods to the doors of even our villagers, led to the deterioration of India's water-ways, struck a heavy blow at her indigenous inland water-borne traffic and seriously affected the health and sanitation of the country.

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN RAILWAYS

Lord Lansdowne also referred to the question of private enterprise in the construction of railways in India. He said:

"I have heard it said that we desire to keep such construction entirely in our own hands, and that in furtherance of this policy we are always ready to find pretexts for excluding what is spoken of as 'private enterprise.' Let me take this opportunity of saying emphatically that no misconception could be greater. The work, administrative and executive, which is already thrown on the shoulders of the Government of India is of such colossal proportions that you may depend upon it that we shall be too glad, if some of it is taken off our hands by the intervention of companies. If, as is unfortunately the case, we have not unfrequently been obliged to regard proposals laid before us in the name of private enterprise with a critical eye, it has been for the reason that they have been accompanied by conditions so disadvantageous to those whose interests are committed to our charge that it was absolutely impossible for us to accept them. In some cases the offers made to us have involved the proposals that we should virtually assume the whole of the responsibility for any loss which the bargain might entail in the event of its proving a disastrous one; in others, we have been asked to alienate vast areas of land without any sufficient equivalent for thus parting with the national estate; in others, again, we have been pressed to concede monopolies of timber or minerals without really knowing what we were going to part with; in yet other cases we have found private enterprise seeking to construct a section of some great railway, the section selected being, I need not say, the easiest and most profitable, with the certainty that Government would have eventually to undertake the completion of the more difficult and unremunerative sections... They are merely endeavouring, as all men of business should, to make the best bargain they can for their clients, and, so long as India has to suffer, as we do at present, from a fluctuating exchange, it is useless to disguise from ourselves the risk and uncertainty which attach to every Indian speculation...."†

INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS IN 1889

The Indian National Congress was becoming a great political force in the country. In 1889 Mr. Bradlaugh came to India. About his visit, Sir Surendra Nath Banerji writes in his *A Nation in Making* thus:

"The year 1889 was a memorable year in the history of the Congress movement. It was the

* *Ibid.*, pp. 296-97.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 300-301.

year of Mr. Bradlaugh's visit to India, which imparted a new impetus to the Congress cause. Next year, Mr. Bradlaugh introduced in the House of Commons his Bill for the reform and the expansion of the Legislative Councils. While at Bombay he made a point of consulting the more prominent Indian leaders, and the Bill embodied the views of the educated community. I had a bit of work to do in this Congress apart from the Resolution which I had to move. To me was entrusted the task of appealing for funds. I made the appeal. The effect was striking. A wave of enthusiasm passed over the vast gathering that was assembled; and in an hour's time a sum of Rs. 64,000 was subscribed; and more than Rs. 20,000 was paid on the spot. The incident is unique in the annals of any public movement."*

In 1890 a Congress Deputation was sent to England "to represent the views of the Congress and to press upon the attention of the British public the political reforms which the Congress advocates."

THE CONGRESS DEPUTATION TO ENGLAND

The Congress Deputation included Mr. Hume, Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, Mr. Mono Mohan Ghose, Mr. W. C. Bonnerjea, Mr. Sharifuddin, Mr. Eardley Norton, Mr. R. N. Mudholkar and Mr. Surendra Nath Banerji.

About the work done by this Deputation, Sir Surendra Nath Banerji says:

"Unfortunately, a deputation to England on the scale of 1890, backed by the organisation and the resources then at our disposal, was never repeated, though the results achieved by that Deputation were unique in the history of the Congress movement. We addressed meetings in many of the great towns of England, Wales and Scotland, and the Deputation fittingly finished its labours with an interview with Mr. Gladstone, at which the impression was left in our minds that he would speak at the second reading of Lord Cross's Bill on the Expansion of the Councils and support the elective principle. Our anticipation proved true. For on the occasion of the second reading of the Bill, Mr. Gladstone urged that what should be conceded was a real and living representation of the people of India. The elective principle as such was not indeed conceded but a definite advance towards it was made. Under regulations framed by the Government under the Parliamentary statute of 1892, municipalities and district boards were permitted to return members to the local councils, subject to confirmation by Government, and the non-official members of provincial councils were allowed the privilege of returning members to the Imperial Legislative Council. The right of asking questions was conceded, and the annual discussion of the Budget was allowed. Thus the first notable step towards securing representative government was taken, and mainly through the efforts of the Congress and the Deputation of the Congress. The Act of 1892 was still further liberalized by the statute of 1909, but the foundations of representative government had been well and truly laid by the previous statute."†

While the Congress deputation was at Oxford, Mr. Eardley Norton moved the following Congress Resolution at the Oxford union:

"That the House views with regret the non-recognition of the elective principle in the Bill now before the House of Commons."

Sir Surendra Nath Banerji thus says of the debate:

"Mr. Norton moved the Resolution in a speech of great power. The opposition was led by Lord Hugh Cecil. It devolved on me to reply to him. I had partly anticipated, and with accuracy, the line of argument he would follow, and I was prepared with facts and figures to meet him. Our educational backwardness was the deadliest arrow in his quiver. I pointed out in reply that the

* *A Nation in Making*, pp. 110.

† *A Nation in Making*, pp. 113-114.



Sir Phiroz Shah Mehta

number of schools in England in 1821 was only 18,467 and the scholars 650,000 and it was not until 1881 that they reached the number of schools and scholars in India. And yet in 1881, England had full-fledged parliamentary institutions, and we were asking for much less. No reply was possible to this array of facts,... The division was taken, and to our great astonishment it was found that the majority of votes was on our side. The Resolution was declared carried. The vote was a memorable achievement of the Congress deputation. It demonstrated that the Congress programme of reform was so moderate as to commend itself even to the most conservative section of the British public."*

In his reply Mr. Surendra Nath Banerji said:

"The statement has been made in the course of this debate that the Indians before the advent of the English were a pack of barbarians or semi-barbarians; I believe that was the language that was used. Let me remind this House that they come –the Hindus of India, the race to which I have the honour to belong -they come from a great and ancient stock; that at a time when the ancestors of the most enlightened European nations were roaming in their native woods and forests, our fathers had founded great empires, established noble cities, and cultivated a system of ethics, a system of religion, and a noble language which at the present moment excites the admiration of the civilized world. You have only to walk across the way, and place yourselves in the Bodleian library, to witness the ancient records of Indian industry, Indian culture and Indian ethics; therefore it seems to me the remark is somewhat out of place. If the remark was made to prejudice the claim which we have now the honour to put forward, to prejudice our claim for representative institutions, never was it more misplaced, for the simple reason that self-govering institutions formed an essential feature of the civilization of the Aryan race, and we come from the Aryan stock. The honourble opposer of the motion is pleased to refer to the authority of Sir Henry Maine in reference to certain quotations he has made. I am prepared to bow to that authority, and accept him as an authority on Indian matters. What does he say in reference to India? The first practical illustrations of self-governing institutions are to be found in the early records of India. Their village communities are as old as the hills. When we ask for representative institutions, or a partial concession of representative institutions, we ask for something which is in entire accord with the genius and the temper of the people of India, in entire accord with the traditions of their history, and in entire accord with the tenour of British rule in India."†

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* *Ibid.*, p. 115.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 115-16.

CHAPTER XIII

LORD ELGIN II

1894-1899

Lord Lansdowne was succeded by Lord Elgin II as the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. Just before his departure, Lord Lansdowne spoke of his successor in the following terms :

"In a few hours I shall transfer to my successor the responsibilities of the high office which have for the last five years been committed to my charge by Her Majesty. I rejoice to think that those responsibilities will devolve upon one so qualified to bear them as Lord Elgin. He is, to begin with, the son of his father, and I have always held that, particularly in India, that qualification is by no means to be despised when the father happens to be one who deserved well of his country. But that, Gentlemen, is, by no means, Lord Elgin's only title to our confidence. The new Viceroy has, from the time when he left the college at which we were both educated, made for himself a reputation for strong common sense, sobriety of judgment and business aptitude of no ordinary character. In these days of political excitement we are too apt to think that only those public men are entitled to our recognition who have posed before the public as professional athletes in the political arena, and added largely to the yearly swelling flood of platform eloquence. I hold strongly that it is not only among the number of these that strong administrators and wise rulers of men are to be found, and Lord Elgin has, I have good reason to know, more than satisfied those with whom he has been concerned in public and private life of his fitness for the distinguished post which he is about to assume."*

INDIAN TARIFF BILL

On the 10th March 1894, at the meeting of the Supreme Legislative Council the Hon'ble Mr. Westland presented the Report of the Select Committee on the Bill to amend the Indian Tariff, which excluded from the Tariff the imports of cotton fabrics, yarns and thread. The Hon'ble Mr. Playfair opposed the proposal and went so far as to remark "that India's interests are being sacrificed to Lombard Street on the one hand and Manchester on the other." Dr. Rash Behari Ghose supported the amendment of the Hon'ble Mr. Playfair for sending back the Bill to the Select Committee. Dr. Ghose said :

"I venture to think that the exclusion of the cotton duties from the Tariff Act would be not only a cruel wrong to the people of this country, but a grave scandal as well as a financial and political blunder to which the famous saying of Talleyrand might well be applied. We are all aware how public opinion has condemned the proposed exclusion. Not a single dissentient voice, at any rate outside the Council chamber, has been heard—not one jarring note of discord. The Hon'ble Mr. Westland, in introducing the measure, referred to the embarassed condition of the finances, and said, rightly enough, that he was obliged to cast his net very wide. He might also have added that the meshes of this net are very fine ; for besides the articles to which attention has been drawn by the Hon'ble Sir Griffith Evans, we find that the schedule includes the cassia nut and the common shell. But notwithstanding the gravity of the condition of our finances, notwithstanding the obvious necessity for casting the net very wide, notwithstanding the extreme fineness of its meshes, cotton fabrics are conspicuous by their absence.

"It is said in the statement of objects and reasons that, owing to the embarrassed condition of the finances, it has been decided to increase the revenue by the imposition of indirect taxation in the form of import duties and that the present Bill practically re-imposes the Tariff Schedule of 1875 with some exceptions, one of which is the omission of duties on cotton yarns and goods. Now, one would think from the language here employed that cotton yarns and goods do not form an important part of our imports, and although they are excluded, we are practically restoring the Tariff Act of 1875. But what is the actual state of things, and what would the intelligent foreigner who is supposed to be always with us, think of the omission if he was told that the goods which are advisedly omitted constitute nearly one-half of the total imports ? What would be his surprise if he was to read the speech in which the Bill was introduced by the Hon'ble Finance Member ? The speech contains an able defence, if I may say so, of import duties when the interests of the Exchequer require that such duties should be imposed. But for any justification of the invidious distinction in favour of cotton goods which come to us from Lancashire, we shall seek in vain in the utterances of the Finance Member except an echo, somewhat faint, from the report of the Herschell Committee that the duties on cotton goods were the subject of vehement attack in England, and that any attempt to re-impose them would meet with great opposition. But opposition from whom ? Not from the people of this country, not from the people who would have ultimately to pay those duties, as the intelligent foreigner in his innocence might imagine, but from the manufacturers, the merchant princes of Lanceshire !"

Dr. Ghose then tried to answer the objection that an import duty on cotton goods would be a protective duty and therefore objectionable. He answered it in the words of an eminent living English statesman whose name would be always associated with free trade.

"There is not," said Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons, in 1879, "a free trade Government in this or any country which has not freely admitted that the state of the revenue is an essential element in the consideration of the application even of the best principles of free trade."

He then quoted another passage from the speech of Mr. Gladstone which possessed a peculiar appropriateness at that moment. Mr. Gladstone said :

"With regard to the remission of import duties, there seems to me to be something distinctly repugnant in the way it has been done . in the time of India's distress and difficulty by the Government of a party which has done all in its power to retain every protective duty in this country, and which, from year to year as the occasion arises, advises the Crown to assent to Colonial Acts imposing fresh duties upon British manufacturers. What an invidious, almost odious, picture of inequality we exhibit to the millions of India ! The free trade doctrines that we hold so dear, that we apply them against the feelings of the Indian people in their utmost rigour and without a grain of mercy, disappear in a moment when it is a question of dealing with those whose interest and opinions we cannot lightly tamper with, namely, the free colonists of the Empire."

Dr. Ghose proceeded to say :

"I submit that a light duty of five per cent. cannot possibly be regarded as a protective duty; and this conclusion does not rest on speculative opinion only for we are not altogether without experience. What has been the effect of the removal of the duties on Manchester goods? Has Manchester been able to drive Bombay out of the cotton market? No. But, as Macaulay says in speaking of legislation regarding Irish industries by the English Parliament, the jealousy of commerce is like the jealousy of love, it is as fanciful and as unreasonable, and the accomplished historian might have added, it possesses another well-known attribute of 'the green-eyed monster'—it is as cruel as the grave.

"The difficulty again of excluding a particular kind of goods like Manchester fabrics from the

Indian tariff is so obvious that it is hardly necessary to insist upon it. This was pointed out by Major Baring, now Lord Cromer, in one of the speeches quoted by the Finance Minister in his speech in introducing the Bill. In making a clean sweep of the import duties from our tariff in 1882, Lord Cromer spoke of the 'destructive' forces which had been introduced by the partial abolition of the cotton duties in the year 1878. He said:

"Apparel of many kinds, hardware, jewellery, innumerable manufactures of metal, provisions and stones of many kinds, spices, sugar, tea, tobacco, with raw silk and fabrics of silk and wool are all made in India, some to a large extent, and every import duty on them is protective. On what principle, again, are silk and woollen goods, or goods having cotton mixed with silk and wool, to be denied the exemption accorded to cotton goods? 'The duty on *woollen fabrics*,' the Calcutta Trades' Association rightly argues, 'must, if only for the sake of consistency, follow the cotton-duties'."

"My Lord, today it is Manchester, to-morrow it may be New Castle, the next day it may be Birmingham, and so on from day to day till there will be nothing left to tax except sharks' fins and shells. I repeat that a duty on cotton goods cannot be objected to on the ground that it would be protective. But suppose I am wrong. Cannot the objection be met by imposing an excise duty on home manufactures? A countervailing excise duty ought to satisfy Manchester, if not the people of India. And this step will probably be taken by the Government of India if owing to a further decline in exchange they are obliged to re-impose an import-duty on cotton goods. But, to my mind, there is another and a more unexceptional solution. There are some kinds of cotton yarn and goods used by the wealthier classes only which cannot be produced in India, and an import duty levied on such goods only cannot possibly, even by the warmest admirers of free trade, as against fair trade, be regarded as protective."*

It need not surprise anyone if these warnings were unheeded, if these protests were disregarded as 'a tale of little meaning' 'chanted by an ill-used race of men.'†

EXCHANGE QUESTION

During the Viceroyalty of Lord Elgin, one of the most troubled questions was the Exchange Question. About the Exchange problem in 1894-99, Mr. Gokhale in one of his Budget speeches said :

"A slight examination of these surpluses suffices to show that they are mainly, almost entirely, currency surpluses, resulting from the fact that Government still maintain the same high level of taxation which they considered to be necessary to secure financial equilibrium when the rupee stood at its lowest. The year when the rupee touched this lowest exchange value was 1894-95, the average rate of exchange realised in that year being only 13. 1d. to the rupee. Government, however, had in the face of the falling rupee, resolutely maintained an equilibrium between their revenue and expenditure by large and continuous additions to the taxation of the country, and thus even in the year 1894-95, when the rupee touched its lowest level, the national account-sheet showed a surplus of seventy lakhs of rupees. From this point onwards, the currency legislation, passed by Government in 1893, began to bear fruit and the exchange value of the rupee began to rise steadily. In 1895-96, the average rate of exchange was 14.45d. and 15.3d. respectively, but the years turned out to be famine years and the second year also one of a costly frontier war necessitating extraordinary expenditure for direct famine relief and military operations of 2.1 crores in the first year and 9.2 crores in the second. The result was that 1896-97 closed with a deficit of 1.7 crores and 1897-98 with a deficit of 5.36 crores. It will, however, be seen that if these extraordinary charges had not come upon the State, both years would have been years of surpluses and the surplus for 1897-98 would have been close upon four crores of rupees. In 1898-99, exchange established itself in the neighbourhood of 16d.—the average rate

* *Speeches by Dr. Rash Behari Ghose*, pp. 119-23.

† *Ibid.*, p. 124.

realised during the year being 15.98d.—and the year closed with a balance of 3 96 crores of rupees, after providing a crore for military operations on the Frontier—thus inaugurating the era of substantial surpluses. Now we all know that a rise of 3d. in the exchange value of the rupee—from 13d. to 16d.—means a saving of between four and five crores of rupees to the Government of India on their Home Charges alone......"*

FAMINE COMMISSION OF 1898

It was pointed out by some Indian statesmen that it was necessary to have a regular and careful enquiry into the condition of a few typical villages so as to ascertain whether 'the resisting powers of the people' are increasing or diminishing. It was more necessary to have the enquiry in face of the repeated famines occurring in India, during the Viceroyalty of Lord Elgin II and Lord Curzon.

Famine was occurring again and again in Lord Elgin's time. In 1898 a Famine Commission was appointed. This Famine Commission tried, in the course of their enquiries, to collect some evidence as to whether the resisting powers of the people were increasing or diminishing. After referring to certain classes of people whose condition, in the opinion of the Commission, had probably improved, the Famine Commission observes :

"Beyond these classes, there always has existed, and there still does exist, a low section of the community living a hand-to-mouth existence, with a low standard of comfort and abnormally sensitive to the effects of inferior harvests and calamities of season. This section is very large and includes the great class of day-labourers and the least skilled of the artisans. So far as we have been able to form a general opinion upon a difficult question from the evidence we have heard and the statistics placed before us, the wages of these people have not risen in the last twenty years in due proportion to the rise in prices of their necessaries of life. The experience of the recent famine fails to suggest that this section of the community has shown any larger command of resources or any increased power of resistance. Far from contracting, it seems to be gradually widening, particularly in the more congested districts. Its sensitiveness or liability to succumb instead of diminishing is possibly becoming more accentuated, as larger and more powerful forces supervene and make their effects felt when formerly the result was determined by purely local conditions."†

EXCHANGE COMPENSATION ALLOWANCE

In his evidence before the Welby Commission on the 12th and 13th April 1897, Mr. G. K. Gokhale, spoke against the grant of Exchange Compensation allowance to European and Eurasian employees of the Government. He said :

"This allowance was granted to all non-domiciled European and Eurasian employees about the middle of 1893, and the figures for the last three years have been as follows :

Year	Amount in Rs.
1893-94	618,468
1894-95	1,239,275
1895-96	1,327,632

"The allowance consists in converting half the salary of each officer into sterling at the rate of 1s. 6d., subject to the maximum of £ 1,000 and then converting it back into rupees at the current rate of exchange. Practically it has amounted to a general increase of salaries. Now, in the first place, it is admitted that these employees of Government had no legal claim to the compensation......

* *Speeches of G. K. Gokhale*, pp. 2-3.

† *Ibid.*, p. 149.

"Secondly, if the European employees of Government suffered from the fall in exchange, Government itself, as representing the tax-payers, suffered much more from the same cause. When such a general misfortune had overtaken all classes, to single out a particular class for special relief by imposing additional burdens on the remaining classes, and these will not be able to bear them, was entirely unjust.

"Thirdly, though it is quite true that the fall in exchange had considerably lowered the gold value of the rupee salaries, the salaries themselves were so excessively high, considering especially the great change that has taken place in the facilities and means of communication between England and India, that even with the fall in exchange they were very high...

"Fourthly, assuming that some relief was needed, if was most unfair to give the allowance to all. I mean men who went out to India after the rupee had fallen below 1s.4d., *i. e.*, who accepted the rupee salaries with their eyes open, as also those who had no remittances to make to England-- these, at any rate, ought not to have been granted the allowance. The indiscriminate nature of the grant constitutes, in my opinion, its worst and most reprehensible feature. No wonder, after this, that the Indians should feel that India exists for the European services, and not the services for India. While the miserable pittance spent by Government on the education of the people has stood absolutely stationary for the last five years on the ground that Government has no more money to spare for it, here is a sum larger than the whole educational expenditure of Government given away to the European officials by one stroke of the pen."

"The salaries of some of the officers are fixed in rupees by statute. The grant to these men seems to be illegal as long as the statute is not amended. The question, I understand, has been raised, but it has not yet been disposed of by the Secretary of State Meanwhile, the allowance continues to be paid to these officers pending such disposal."*

SUSPENSION OF FAMINE GRANT

A special fund had been created for fighting against the famines in India. In the financial statement for 1894-1895, it was found that the famine grant had been suspended and the bulk of the Famine Insurance Fund utilised for the purposes of general administration. When the financial statement was introduced in the Supreme Council, Dr. Rash Behari Ghose spoke against the proposal. He said :

"I am sorry to say, my Lord, that the financial statement which has been placed before us confirms the worst misgivings felt by the public when cotton goods were excluded from the Tariff Act. The bulk of the Famine Insurance Fund has been appropriated to the purposes of general administration, while the Provincial Governments have been also called upon for contributions out of their not over-abundant means. In the words of the Hon'ble Finance Member, this last measure 'practically means the stoppage for the time of all administrative improvement, a measure which they feel must take all the heart out of Provincial Governments by making them surrender all the fruits of careful administration to fill the yawning gulf of our sterling payments. The suspension of the Famine Grant, or the Famine Insurance Fund, as it is generally and properly called, is a still more serious matter, the gravity of which cannot be over-estimated. In introducing the Tariff Bill, the Hon'ble Mr. Westland said :

'The next head—that of *Famine*—includes, besides what is usually a small amount of actual famine expenditure, the grant which we make out of our surplus revenues, when we have any, towards protective irrigation and protective railways. We have at present a compulsory expenditure under the last category of about Rs. 380,000 towards the loss accruing to Government on account of the Bengal Nagpur and Indian Midland Railways. This amount is now shown in the Railway account, but the balance of Rs. 1,500,000, after this loss is met, is used, when we are able to afford it, for actual construction of railways and canals.'

* *Ibid.*, Appendix, pp. 37-40.

"Now this language can hardly, I venture to think, be reconciled with the declarations of Government when the fund was first created out of the proceeds of certain taxes which were imposed for the first time in 1878 by the Government of Lord Lytton....

"On the 27th December 1877, Sir John Strachey, in laying the financial statement of the coming year before the Council, thus explained the objects of the fund :

'Unless then, it would be proved hereafter by experience that the annual appropriation of a smaller sum from our revenues will give to the country the protection which it requires, we consider that the estimates of every year ought to make provision for religiously applying the sum I have mentioned to this sole purpose and I hope that no desire to carry out any administrative improvement, however urgent, or any fiscal reform, however wise, will tempt the Government to neglect this sacred trust......

'I feel confident that I shall be able to satisfy the Council and the public that the Resolution which the Government has proclaimed will be faithfully carried out, and the proceeds of these new taxes will be expended for the purpose of providing what I have called an insurance against famine, and for no other purpose whatever....

'The object which I have thus stated is a perfectly simple one. These new taxes are required for the sole purpose of giving us, year by year, a sufficient surplus of income over expenditure, to meet these famine charges, which had not hitherto been taken into consideration in our yearly accounts'."

Dr. Ghose proceeded to say:

"It is true that some Finance Ministers have since declared that in their opinion the Famine Insurance Fund could be resumed in a case of imperative necessity, but these declarations are opposed to the solemn pledges given by Lord Lytton as the representative of the Queen-Empress in India. But suppose, in a very exceptional case, to avoid exasperating sacrifices or the imposition of extravagant burdens, to use the language of Sir Auckland Colvin, the Famine Insurance fund may be trenched upon, has any such case been made out in the present instance ? I submit not, and I fear, my Lord, the public would continue to believe that the fund which was created for the purpose of developing the resources of the country and of saving the lives of millions from famine has been sacrificed for the purpose of serving the interests of a few English manufacturers."*

POONA CONGRESS OF 1895

In 1895 Mr. Surendra Nath Banerji (afterwards Sir) was for the first time elected President of the Indian National Congress held at Poona. He writes in his *A Nation in Making* :

"The presidential speech at Poona elicited warm encomiums. Sir Herbert Risley, himself an accomplished writer, wired to me to say that he greatly admired its perfect finish. The ovation that I received at Poona and elsewhere made a great impression in Calcutta. That a school master and an agitator should have been so honoured outside his own province, touched the gods of the official hierarchy. I myself was greatly moved by the cordiality of my reception. I can never forget the scene that took place at the pandal when I had finished my last concluding speech. I was familiar with Congress proceedings, and was ready with a speech that I intended to deliver at the termination of the session. I found that the atmosphere had become electric, seething with an exuberance of feeling for which even I was not prepared. I grasped the spirit of the situation; I cast aside the speech that I had prepared, and threw myself heart and soul into the full flood of the emotions that were swaying that vast audience. I was moved and carried away by the surging current. It was no longer a speaker inspiring an audience. It was the audience that moved and inspired the speaker. Truly a galvanic current was established between them and myself, and as I sat down, after my improvised speech (for here there was real improvisation)—as I sat down, the younger section of the audience rushed up the platform and were at my feet, eager to touch them

* *Speeches by Dr. Rash Behari Ghose, pp. 125-27.*

and take the dust off them....The memory of that day will never be effaced. It was one of the proudest in my life."*

PLAGUE AND FAMINE OF 1898

In 1898 the epidemic of plague broke out in India, specially in the Western Presidency. Famine also came in its wake.

"The year 1898 opened with dark clouds rolling over the political horizon, with popular unrest followed by repression. Famine and plague cast their shadows over the land. The popular excitement was aggravated by the plague measures so ruthlessly enforced at Poona. Upon their heels came the murder of two European officers, the deportation of the Natu brothers, and the alleged disclosure of the existence of secret conspiracies in the Western Presidency."†

CALCUTTA CONGRESS OF 1896

In 1896, the Indian National Congress was held in Calcutta.

"A Reception Committee was formed with Sir Romesh Chunder Mitter as its Chairman. It was a great thing to have secured the services of the eminent judge, who had now retired. He needed no persuasion, no pressure to join the Congress ranks. His sympathies with us were open and undisguised, though, like the late Mr. Justice Ranade, he was not able while still on the judicial bench to associate himself closely with the Congress movement or to influence its deliberations. As Chairman of the Reception Committee, Sir Romesh Chunder Mitter made a notable speech. He asked me (writes Sir S. N. Banerji) for some notes, which I glady supplied him with. But his speech was his own in every sense, bearing in every line the impress of his views and of his personality. One of the most notable declarations made by him (and coming from him it had a value all its own) was that the educated community represented the brain and conscience of the country, and were the legitimate spokesmen of the illiterate masses, the natural custodians of their interests. To hold otherwise, said Sir Romesh Chunder Mitter, would be to presuppose that a foreign administrator in the service of the Government knows more about the wants of the masses than their educated countrymen. And he went on to add that it was true in all ages that 'those who think must govern those who toil'; and 'could it be,' he asked, 'that the natural order of things was reversed in this unfortunate country?' This claim is now practically admitted; and I need not waste words to justify it. But in those days it was still a matter of controversy, and the vigorous pleading of so eminent a man as Sir Romesh Chunder Mitter, who showed no partisan bias even in the advocacy of public interests, was necessary and useful...

"The year 1896 witnessed a further development in the Congress movement. Coming events cast their shadows before, and the industrial upheaval that was soon to find expression in the *Swadeshi* movement was heralded by a new departure for which the Congress was indebted to the foresight and organising capacity of Mr. J. Chaudhuri. Mr. J. Chaudhuri may be regarded as the pioneer of the industrial movement in Bengal. He suggested (and I cordially supported his recommendation) that there should be an Industrial Exhibition in connexion with the Congress. The idea was started somewhat late, but we decided to give effect to it; and we did our best in the circumstances and with the resources at our disposal."§

DEPORTATION OF NATU BROTHERS (1897)

About the deportation of the Natu Brothers, Sir S. N. Banerji writes in his *A Nation in Making*:

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* *A Nation in Making, pp. 143-44.*

† *Ibid.*, p. 155.

§ *A Nation in Making*, pp. 145-46.



M G. Ranade

"I was entrusted with the Resolution (at the Amraoti Congress, December 1897) regarding the deportation of the Natu brothers of Poona. The Natu brothers were Sirdars of the Deccan, whose ancestors had taken an important part in the events which led to the establishment of British power in Western India and were themselves men of light and leading in the capital of Maharastra...

"The Plague, the forced segregations, the compulsary domicilary visit's, had created a feeling of panic and alarm among the population at Poona. Mr. Gokhale, then in England, had received accounts of what had taken place ; and his publication of them brought him into trouble. There is nothing that touches our people so deeply as interference with their household arrangements and invasion into the sanctities of their domestic life. The excitement was intense and it culminated in the unhappy murder of Mr. Rand, President of the Plague Committee, and Lieut. Ayerst. There are always extremists among the organs of public opinion. They called for a gagging act, for deportations and other familiar methods of repression.

"The Natu brothers as leading citizens had formally appealed to the Government to interfere. Soon after they were deported under an old, obsolete regulation (Regulation XXV of 1827 of the Bombay Regulations, corresponding to the Bengal Regulation III of 1818), and their property was taken charge of by the Government. Was it the reward of their efforts for their countrymen, or was it a bureaucratic device to strike terror into the hearts of the people ? Whatever it was, it was useless and superfluous -- in the language of Edmund Burke, 'a waste of the precious treasure of human suffering.' For the murderers of Mr. Rand and Lieut. Ayerst were soon traced. They were tried, convicted and hanged. The Natu brothers had been five months under detention when the Congress met.

"The Congress Resolution on the subject, which I was asked to move, deprecated the exercise of the extraordinary powers vested in the Government by the Regulations at a time of peace and quiet, though the Congress recognised that circumstances might arise in which it might be necessary to put them into force. The Congress recommended that, upon the appearance of such conditions in any province or a specified area, the fact should be notified that the Government intended to take action if necessary under the Regulations, and that in no case should the period of detention without trial exceed three months."*

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE HOME AND INDIAN GOVERNMENTS

During the Viceroyalty of Lord Elgin II there was a conflict between the Home and Indian Governments regarding their relative positions in respect of Indian legislation, and the obligation of the official members to support the Government with their votes.

The Secretary of State gave his "consent to the imposition of a duty on cotton manufactures imported into India, on the condition of an equivalent excise duty being levied on the corresponding Indian manufactures."

On the 17th December, 1895, two Bills were introduced in the Legislative Council by Sir James Westland : one to enable the Government to impose a duty of five per cent. on cotton manufactures imported into India, and the other to enable the Government "to levy an excise duty at the same rate on yarns manufactured in India of a fineness of 20 s. and upwards, and to empower it to raise the limit of goods of a fineness of 24 s. thereafter, should it appear on enquiry that Manchester goods did not contain yarns of coarser counts."

Both Bills were passed after a lengthy discussion, and "after an amendment, moved by the Hon. Mr. Fazulbhai Vishram, to substitute 24s. for 20s. in the Cotton Duties Bill had been negatived by a majority of 11 to 10."

* *A Nation in Making*, pp. 154-55.

COTTON DUTIES BILL

In the course of the debate on the Cotton Duties Bill, Sir Griffith Evans maintained "that, though the Secretary of State might order the introduction of the Bills in the Council by the Executive Government, the Council was admittedly free to reject them wholly or in part. Sir James Westland, after repeating a statement made by him in introducing the Bill, that he declined to discuss it on its merits, and that the decision was that of the Secretary of State, which the Government were bound to obey, went on to object to the terms of a protest against the Bill from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, implying that undue pressure was being exercised on the Legislature by the Secretary of State. If, he added, he had told the Council that these were the orders of the Secretary of State, and that they were bound to carry them out, the resolution passed by the Chamber of Commerce would have been a just one. As regards the position of this Council he quite agreed with Sir Griffith Evans, except that all the members were not independent. This referred to those who were in Government service. It had been stated that the Secretary of State had looked only to the interests of the British public, but this was not so. All the circumstances connected with this measure had been laid before the Secretary of State, who had held the scales fairly and impartially, and after carefully considering the whole matter, as well as the interests of both the Indian and British public, had arrived at the decision he had come to."

Again during the debate on the Report of the Select Committee,

"Sir James Westland again referred to Sir Griffith Evans' view of the conditions under which the Council exercised its functions. Sir Griffith Evans, he said, had described the power of the Council as free and unfettered, and had called upon members to allow no infringement of that procedure. He could not help thinking that this attribute of a quite unfettered power arose in some measure from the fact that the authority which was the ultimate deciding power in executive matters, was also that which exercised legislative authority. The House of Commons, all-powerful as it was, had over and over again to frame its legislation with reference to conditions laid down by the other House. So, although the Council might exercise their powers with reference to the instructions which the Secretary of State had given, he was merely in the position of a Minister, who comes to the House of Commons and, addressing them as practical men, asks them to consider in what way they may best attain the object which the Legislature stands in need of, and also asks them to subordinate their own views in the matter to the necessities of the case. The House of Commons did that over and over again, and he was not infringing the liberty of the Council in asking it to do that which the House of Commons did without the infringement of its liberty or independence."*

At the end of the debate Lord Elgin made the following speech :

"It is alleged in certain quarters that, in consenting to introduce this Bill in its present form, the Government has made a cowardly surrender, and has given way to a pressure which, if not unconstitutional, is, at any rate, unusual and oppressive. I wish to take exception to any such statement, and I am prepared to show that the Government of India has maintained and intends to maintain, firmly and without wavering, a consistent policy in this matter. So far as the individual action of my colleagues and myself is concerned, Sir Henry Brackenbury, in the discussions of the last Tariff Bill and again today, has said that we are bound to obey the order given by the proper and constitutional authority. But, for my part, I do not think that exhausts the question. It is claimed that members must be free to speak and vote in this Council for the measure they honestly think best. I can accept that proposition only with the qualification that they duly recognise the responsibility under which they exercise their rights in this Council. Only in an entirely irresponsible body can members act entirely according as their inclination leads them. In every Legislative body a man must sit, unless he has an hereditary right by what, in modern parlance, is called a mandate, and that

* *Calcutta Review*, 1895, Jan. p. 413.



Bal Gangadhar Tilak

mandate must be given by some authority. I need not remind you that in a Parliament a man is not free to act exactly as he pleases ; he is distinctly subject to the mandate he has received from his constituents ; and practice has shown that even this is not sufficient ; but that to make Parliamentary Government effective it has been necessary to introduce party management, and the bonds of party, in the present day, certainly shows no signs of being relaxed. Here we have no election and I am glad to say no party, but every man who sits here sits by the authority and sanction of Parliament ; and to say that he can refuse to obey the decisions of Parliament would be absurd. But that is not all. Parliament has provided for the Government of the Indian Empire. The British Raj can be provided for in no other way. Parliament has allotted his proper place to the Viceroy and the head of the Executive in India, and it has given him a Council for the purpose of making Laws and Regulations, which cannot have powers in which he does not share. But the Viceroy, admittedly, is not invested with supreme authority. That, as I understand it, is by distinct enactment entrusted to the Secretary of State and his Council ; and to speak of his Council as supreme - if that means that it has independent and unfettered authority --is to say what is not the fact.…I think that he (Sir Griffith Evans) is not correct in the view he took, that a member of this Council is unfettered in the vote he gives here, or that he could 'hand over his responsibility' to the Secretary of State. I am inclined to think that the Hon'ble Mr. Mehta took a more correct view of the matter, when he said, that he would 'leave the responsibility with the Secretary of State, because the responsibility which the Secretary of State would exercise would be the responsibility which belongs to him'."*

Thus Lord Elgin gave his own interpretation of the Indian constitution.

"The fact is the elements of conflict are inherent in the arrangements under which India is governed. The statutes are perfectly clear both in what they express and in what they imply. They confer on the Secretary of State no power of initiative in Indian legislation, and they confer no power to command the votes of members of the Legislature on either the Secretary of State or the Government of India."†

A DEVASTATING EARTHQUAKE

The great earthquake of the 12th June 1897 was "felt with destructive violence from the valley of the Brahmaputra to Calcutta in the south and Monghyr in the west." At Shillong every building of importance was levelled with the ground. In Calcutta few buildings escaped injury, many including the Town Hall were badly damaged."§

TILAK'S ARREST

On 22nd June Mr. Rand, who was in charge of the plague operations at Poona, was murdered by some unknown hand. Government took drastic measures in connection with the outrage. The Natu brothers were arrested under an old Regulation like the Bengal Regulation of 1818.:Bal Gangadhar Tilak, then an elected member of the Bombay Legislative Council and proprietor and manager of the *Kesari* newspaper, was also arrested and charged with the publication of writings calculated to excite disaffection under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code. He was tried and sentenced to transportation for life. While in jail, he wrote his famous commentary on the *Gita,* called *Gita Rahasya.*

* *Calcutta Review*, 1895, January, p. 414.

† *Ibid.*, p. 415.

§ *Ibid.*, 1897, October, p. 388.

BOMBAY PLAGUE RIOT

In March 1898 there occurred a riot in Bombay. In the previous year there were riots in Peshawar and Calcutta.

"The immediate occasion of the riot which took place in Bombay on the 9th instant, appears to have been an attempt on the part of the plague authorities to remove a patient suffering from the disease."*

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL BILL

At a meeting of the Bengal Council on 26th February 1898, it was "announced by the Lieutenant-Governor that a Bill was under the consideration of the Secretary of State ... to remodel the Municipal constitution of Calcutta."

"To the Corporation," he said, "is reserved the power of fixing the rate of taxation, of passing the Budget, and of deciding all the large issues which can properly be discussed by a deliberative assembly of 75 members. The Chairman is vested with all executive power, to be exercised, as is laid down in each case, either independently or subject to approval or sanction of the Corporation or the General Committee."†

DADABHAI NAOROJI IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT

Dadabhai Naoroji had been elected a member of the House of Commons from Central Finsbury in 1892. He ably discussed Indian questions in the Parliament. On August 14th, 1894, when an Amendment was moved for a full and independent Parliamentary enquiry into the condition of India, he seconded it. Before going into the subject, he wanted to say a few preliminary words.

"The Government of India distinctly admitted and knew very well that the educated people of India were thoroughly loyal. The Hon'ble Member for Kingston (Sir R. Temple) had stated that the state of the country and of the people often invited or demanded criticism on the part of the Natives. It was in every way desirable that their sentiments and opinions should be made known to the ruling classes, and such outspoken frankness should never be mistaken for disloyalty or disaffection. Nothing was nearer to his mind than to make the fullest acknowledgment of all the good that had been done by the connexion of the British people with India. They had no complaint against the British people and Parliament. They had from them everything they could desire. It was against the system adopted by the British Indian authorities in the last century and maintained up till now, though much modified, that they protested."§

After these preliminary remarks, Dadabhai Naoroji gave a brief sketch of the condition of the Indian people in the past. He summed up the material condition of India thus :

"To sum up—as to the material condition of India--the main features of the last century were gross corruption and oppression by the Europeans ; in the present century, high salaries and the heavy weight of European services—their economic condition. Therefore, there was no such thing as finance of India. No financier ever could make a real healthy finance of India,—unless he could make two and two equal to six. The most essential condition was wanting. Taxes must be administered by and distributed to those who paid. That did not exist. From the taxes raised every year a large portion was eaten up and carried away from the country by others than the people of British India."**

* *Calcutta Review*, 1898, April, p. 404.
† *Calcutta Review*, March, 1898, p. 405.
§ *Dadabhai Naoroji's Speeches and Writings*, p. 124.
** *Ibid.*, p. 131.

About the proposed enquiry, he remarked :

"They knew that during the rule of the East India Company an enquiry was made every twenty years into the affairs of India. This was no reflection upon the Government ; it was simply to see that the East India Company did their duty. There was such an enquiry in 1853, and he thought it was time, after forty years had elapsed since the assumption of British rule by the Queen, that there should be some regular, independent enquiry like that which used to take place in former days, so that the people and Parliament of this country might see that the Indian authorities were doing their duty. The result of the irresponsibility of the present British administration was that the expenditure went on unchecked. He admitted fully that expenditure must go on increasing if India was to progress in her civilization ; but if they allowed her to prosper, India would be able not only to pay her £ 60,000,000 out of the 300,000,000 of population, but she would be able to pay twice, three times, and four times as much. It was not that they did not want to expend as much as was necessary. Their simple complaint was that the present system did not allow India to become prosperous, and so enable her to supply the necessary revenue. As to the character of the enquiry, it should be full and impartial."*

An amendment, which was moved in the British Parliament, proposed to leave out the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words—

"In the opinion of this House, a full and independent Parliamentary enquiry should take place into the condition and wants of the Indian people, and their ability to bear their existing financial burdens ; the nature of the revenue system and the possibility of reductions in the expenditure ; also the financial relations between India and the United Kingdom, and generally the system of Government in India."—(Mr. S. Smith).†

AN AMENDMENT TO THE QUEEN'S ADDRESS

As a Member of the House of Commons, Dadabhai Naoroji tried his best to serve the interest of India by discussing Indian questions of importance. On February 12th, 1895, he moved the following Amendment to the Queen's speech :

"And we humbly pray that your Majesty will be graciously pleased to direct your Majesty's Ministers to so adjust the financial relations between the United Kingdom and British India, with regard to all the expenditure incurred in the employment of Europeans in the British Indian Services, civil and military, in this country and in India, that some fair and adequate portion of such expenditure should be borne by the British Exchequer in proportion to the pecuniary and political benefits accruing to the United Kingdom from your gracious Majesty's sway over India ; and that the British Treasury should sustain a fair and equitable portion of all expenditure incurred on all military and political operations beyond the boundaries of India in which both Indian and British interests are jointly concerned."

In moving this Amendment, Dadabhai Naoroji made a speech.

"Having expressed his regret that generally it was not the practice to mention India and to indicate any concern for its interests in the Queen's speech, he said he was ready to acknowledge with gratitude the advantage which had ensued to the people of India from British rule. He had no desire to minimise those benefits, at the same time he did not appeal to that House or to the British nation for any form of charity to India, however poverty-stricken she is. He based the claims of India on grounds of justice alone. The question was not at all one of a Party character and therefore he addressed what he had to say to the English people as a whole. He was often

* *Ibid.*, p. 147.

† *Ibid.*, p. 149.

supposed to complain about the European officials personally. It was not so. It was the system which made the officials what they were, that he complained about. They were the creatures of circumstances. They could only move in the one-sided groove in which they were placed by the evil system. Further, his remarks applied to British India and not to the Native States. It had been sometimes said that he resorted to agitation in bringing forward the claims of India.... He would add that their slavery would not be abolished without agitation and it was well that it should be abolished by peaceful agitation, rather than by revolution caused by despair."*

In conclusion Dadabhai Naoroji said that

"They had no voice as to the expenditure of a single farthing in the administration of Indian affairs. The British Indian Government could do what they liked. There was, of course, an Indian Council, but when a Budget was proposed it had to be accepted. The representatives of the Council could make a few speeches, but there the matter ended. The people of India now turned to the people of Great Britain, and, relying on the justice of their claim, asked that they should contribute their fair share in proportion to any benefits which this country might derive from the possession of India."†

INDIA AND LANCASHIRE

On February 21st, 1895, Sir Henry James, a Conservative Member, moved the adjournment of the House "in order to call attention to a matter of definite and urgent public importance—the effect of the imposition of duties on cotton goods imported into India." In opposing the motion Dadabhai Naoroji said:

"At this late hour I shall not occupy the House very long, but I will ask Hon'ble Gentlemen opposite: Does England spend a single farthing in connection with India? Hon'ble Gentlemen say they are maintaining the Empire. It is something extraordinary! For the two hundred years they have been connected with India they have not spent a single farthing either on the acquisition or the maintenance of the Empire. However, I will not go into that large question. Did I wish to see the Empire in India endangered, were I a rebel at heart, I should welcome this motion with the greatest delight. The great danger to the Empire is to adopt methods of irritation, which, if continued, will assuredly bring about disintegration. I appeal to the Unionists to vote against this motion or they will drive the first nail in the coffin of British rule in India. You may, as Lord Roberts has told you, have a stronger and larger army in India than you have at present; you may have that army to perfection itself; but your stability rests entirely upon the satisfaction of the people.... Remember, whatever you are, you are still like a step-mother—children may submit to any amount of oppression from their own mother, and will be affectionate towards her, but from their step-mother they will always demand the strictest justice. You must remember that you as an alien people have to rule over a large number of people in the Indian Empire, and if you do not consult their feelings, you will make a very great mistake. I am quite sure that I appeal not in vain to the Unionists, and can I appeal to the Home Rulers?"§

WELBY COMMISSION

The Welby Commission was appointed in 1895 to enquire into the administration and management of Indian expenditure. Among the Indian witnesses examined by the Welby Commission were: Mr. G. K. Gokhale, Sir Surendra Nath Banerjee and others. Dadabhai Naoroji submitted various notes to the Commission. In October 1895 he wrote to Lord Welby as follows:

* *Ibid.*, pp. 150-51.

† *Ibid.*, p. 164.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-66.

"Dear Lord Welby,—I beg to place before you and other Members of the Commission a few notes about the scope and importance of its work.

The Reference consists of two parts. The first is: To enquire into the Administration and Management of the Military and Civil Expenditure incurred under the authority of the Secretary of State for India in Council, or of the Government of India.

This enquiry requires to ascertain whether the present system of the Administration and Management of expenditure, both here and in India, secures sufficiency and efficiency of services, and all other satisfactory results, at an economical and affordable cost; whether there is any peculiar inherent defect, or what Mr. Bright called 'fundamental error' in this system; and the necessity or otherwise of every expenditure.

I shall deal with these items as briefly as possible, simply as suggestively and not exhaustively:

'Sufficiency.'—The Duke of Devonshire (then, 1883, Lord Hartington) as Secretary of State for India has said:

'There can, in my opinion, be very little doubt that India is insufficiently governed.'

Sir William Hunter has said:

'The constant demand for improvement in the general executive will require an increasing amount of administrative labour.'

'Efficiency.'—It stands to reason that when a country is 'insufficiently governed,' it cannot be efficiently governed, however competent each servant, high and low, may be. The Duke of Devonshire assumes as much in the words, 'if the country is to be better governed.' So does Sir William Hunter: 'if we are to govern the Indian people efficiently and cheaply.'

'Economical and affordable cost.'—The Duke of Devonshire has said:

'The Government of India cannot afford to spend more than they do on the administration of the country, and if the country is to be better governed, that can only be done by the employment of the best and most intelligent of the Natives in the Service.'

Sir William Hunter, after referring to the good work done by the Company, of the external and internal protection, has said:

'But the good work thus commenced has assumed such dimensions under the Queen's Government of India that it can no longer be carried on, or even supervised by imported labour from England except at a cost which India cannot sustain' ...... 'forty years hereafter we should have had an Indian Ireland multiplied fifty fold on our hands. The condition of things in India compels the Government to enter on these problems. Their solution and the constant demand for improvement in the general executive, will require an increasing amount of administrative labour. India cannot afford to pay for that labour at the English rates, which are the highest in the world for official service. But she can afford to pay for it at her own Native rates, which are perhaps the lowest in the world for such employment....'

'Any Inherent Defect.'—Mr. Bright said: 'I must say that it is my belief that if a country be found posssesing a most fertile soil capable of bearing every variety of production, and that notwithstanding the people are in a state of extreme destitution and suffering, the chances are there is some fundamental error in the government of that country.'

I take an instance: Suppose a European servant draws a salary of Rs. 1000 a month. He uses a portion of this for all his wants of comfort, living, etc., etc. All this consumption by him is at the deprivation of an Indian who would and could, under right and natural circumstances, occupy that position and enjoy that provision This is the first partial loss to India, as, at least, the services enjoyed by the Europeans are rendered by Indians as they would have rendered to any Indian occupying the position. But whatever the European sends to England for his varions wants, and whatever savings and pension he ultimately, on his retirement, carries away with him is a complete drain out of the country crippling her whole material condition and her capacity to meet all her wants—a dead loss of wealth together with the loss of work and wisdom, *i. e.*, the accumulated experience of his service. Besides, all State expenditure in this country is a dead loss to India.

This peculiar inherent evil or fundamental error in the present British Indian administration and management of expenditure and its consequences have been foretold more than a hundred years ago by Sir John Shore (1787):

'Whatever allowance we make for the increased industry of the subjects of the State, owing to the enhanced demand for the produce of it (supposing the demand to be enhanced), there is reason to conclude that the benefits are more than counterbalanced by evils inseparable from the system of a remote foreign dominion.'

And it is significantly remarkable that the same inherent evil in the present system of administration and management of expenditure has been, after nearly a hundred years, confirmed by a Secretary of State for India. Lord Randolph Churchill has said in a letter to the Treasury (1886):

'The position of India in relation to taxation and the sources of public revenue is very peculiar, not merely from the habits of the people and their strong aversion to change, which is more specially exhibited to new forms of taxation, but likewise from the character of the Government, which is in the hands of foreigners who hold all the principal administrative offices and form so large a part of the army. The impatience of the new taxation which will have to be borne wholly as a consequence of the foreign rule imposed on the country and virtually to meet additions to charges arising outside of the country, would constitute a political danger, the real magnitude of which, it is to be feared, is not at all appreciated by persons who have no knowledge of our concern in the Government of India, but which those responsible for that Government have long regarded as of the most serious order.'

Lord Salisbury, as Secretary of State for India, put the same inherent evil in this manner: 'The injury is exaggerated in the case of India, where so much of the revenue is exported without a direct equivalent.' And he indicates the character of the present system of the administration and management of expenditure as being that 'India must be bled.' I need not say more upon this aspect of the inherent evil of the present system of expenditure.

'The necessity or otherwise' of any expenditure is a necessary preliminary for its proper administration and management, so as to secure all I have indicated above. You incidentally instanced at the meeting that all expenditure for the collection of revenue will have to be considered—and so, in fact, every expenditure in both countries will have its administration, management and necessity, to be considered.'*

INDIAN CURRENCY COMMITTEE OF 1898

Lord Elgin's Viceroyalty was beset with many currency problems, for the solution of which the Indian Currency Committee was appointed in 1898. As the Committee stated that they would be 'glad to accord their best consideration to any written communication,' so Dadabhai Naoroji submitted a long statement to the Committee.

About the closing of the mints, Dadabhai Naoroji stated:

Closing the mints or introducing a gold standard does not and cannot save a single farthing to the Indian taxpayers in their remittance for 'Home charges' to this country. The reason is simple. Suppose we take roundly £20,000,000 sterling to be the amount of the 'Home charges.' The Indian tax-payers have to send as much produce to this country as is necessary to buy £ 20,000,000, not an ounce less, no matter whatever may be the rupee or whatever the standard (gold or silver) in India. England must receive £ 20,000,000 in gold or produce worth £ 20,000,000. The only way in which relief can come to the Indian taxpayers in these remittances is the rise in the prices of the Indian merchandise in this country (England), and not by any juggling with the currency laws of India.

5. The Government of India, in their despatch to the Secretary of State (Simla, November 6, 1878) themselves admit this in so many words:

* *Ibid.*, pp. 284-38.

"66. Now, it is plain that so long as the amount of the so-called tribute is not changed the quantity of merchandise necessary to pay it will not change either, excepting by reason of a change of its value in the foreign country to which it goes." (c. 4868, 1886, p. 25).

6. Closing of the mints, and thereby raising the true rupee, worth at present about 11d. in gold, to a false rupee to be worth 16d. in gold, is a covert exaction of about 45 per cent. more taxation all round from the Indian taxpayers, and at the same time of increasing the salaries of officials and other payments in India by Government to the same extent, and giving generally the advantage to creditors over debtors, the former being generally well-to-do and the latter the poorer classes, especially in the case of the money-lenders and the rayats.

7. The real and full effect of the closing of the mints must be examined by itself, irrespective of the effect of other factors. First of all, the closing of the mints was illegal, dishonourable, and and a despotic act. It is a violation of all taxation Acts, by which there was always a distinct contract between the Government and the taxpayers based upon the fundamental principle of sound currency—*i. e.*, of a certain definite rupee."*

AN OUTBURST OF FANATICISM IN THE FRONTIER

In 1895 there were several violent outbreaks in the N.-W. Frontier, "which have thrown the extreme North-West borderland of India into confusion and disorder." Of these outbreaks we read in the Despatch of the Secretary of State for India, dated 28th January, 1898 :

"On the 26th of July (1895), within a fortnight of the issue of the proclamation to the Madda Khels, an outburst of fanaticism, as serious as it was unexpected, broke the peace of the Swat Valley which had been maintained without interruption since the close of the Chitral campaign. One Saidulla, known as the 'mad Fakir,' also called the *Soutor* and bareheaded fakir, suddenly gained notoriety as a worker of miracles, and publicly announcing that he had been sent to lead a *jehad* or religious war, prophesied that all British troops would be driven out of the country within eight days. His pretensions were at first disputed by the Mianguls of Swat and by other chiefs of the tribes, but the uncontrollable religious enthusiasm and superstition which his actions excited overbore all opposition on the part of the responsible tribal headmen or Maliks, and in a few hours his supporters increased from a small gathering of boys and men to an army of well-armed fanatics. The tribal levies in the locality fled, and the British positions on the Malakand and at Chakdara, held by about 4000 men, were attacked with great fury on the night of the 26th July. Fighting continued without intermission, notwithstanding the severe losses inflicted upon the tirbesmen, who were constantly replaced by fresh adherents to the cause of the mad Fakir, until the 31st July, when reinforcements under Colonel Reid reached Malakand; and on the 2nd of August a relief column detached by Major-General Sir Bindon Blood completed the relief of Chakdara."—*North-West Frontier Administration—Supplement to the Gazette of India*, March 30, 1901, pp. 682-83.

BURNING OF A VILLAGE

Five days after the relief of Chakdara, "the Adda Mulla of Jarabi, Najam-ud-din, who has, for years past, been active in intrigues and hostility against the British Government, arrived with a following of 5000 men on the frontier of the district of Peshawar, and after burning the British village of Shankargarh attacked the frontier post of Shabkadar."

SIKH DEFENDERS KILLED

Fort Lockhart was vigorously attacked by the Frontier tribes and "the gallant Sikh defenders of Saragari were killed to a man on the 12th of September."

* *Ibid.*, p. 102.

CAUSE OF THE OUTBREAK

The Secretary of State agreed with Lord Elgin "in regarding fanaticism as the principal motive for an outbreak which has been unprecedented alike in the suddenness with which it broke out at each point, in the large extent of country affected, and in the simultaneous action of distinct tribes or sections of tribes." Another cause is said to be "the recent enhancement of the duty on Kohat Salt from 8 annas to Rs. 2 for each Kohati maund."

KHYBER POLICY

On the 23rd June, 1898, Lord Elgin's Government addressed a long letter to Lord George F. Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, about the future policy of the Khyber Pass. Lord Hamilton had indicated that "the maintenance of the Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and of trade was an essential measure." It was decided by Lord Elgin's Government after mature deliberation with the Panjab Government and Lieutenant-General Sir W. Lockhart, that the Khyber Pass should be held "for trade purposes by the *Khyber Rifles,* drawn proportionately from the tribal sections concerned." About the arrangement with the Afridis, Lord Elgin's Government stated :

"In our new arrangement with the Afridis we must make adequate provision for the railway and for the exercise of jurisdiction upon railway lands, the trade road and within the militia posts, as well as for the constitution of the militia as a British force. We think, however, that our terms should be drawn, in some essentials, upon the same lines as the Agreement of 1881 followed, and this is the unanimous opinion of all who have been consulted ; that is to say, first :—the Afridi clans who are connected with the Khyber should still be paid allowances for keeping the pass open and safe, and in commutation of their ancient rights in respect of tolls and otherwise ; and second ;—a local force should be raised from the Afridis themselves for service in the Pass in carrying out the objects with which we dominate it....The form itself of the new document may with advantage perhaps approach rather to that of a sanad than take again the appearance of a treaty."[1]

LORD ELGIN'S MINUTE ON THE PUNJAB FRONTIER

On the 6th of November, 1898, Lord Elgin wrote his Minute on the management of the Punjab Frontier. The question raised was whether the Punjab Frontier should be made a separate unit of administration. The opinion of the Punjab Government was consulted. Lord Elgin makes the following observations :

"This seems so self-evident a proposition that when Her Majesty's Government declare 'that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab Frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India,' it is reasonable to suppose that there is no suggestion that the control is not now supervised by the Government of India, though it is exercised indirectly and through the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. I pass, therefore, to the consideration of the comparison between a control exercised indirectly through the Lieutenant-Governor and a similar control exercised through an Agent to the Governor-General. It may be admitted that in both cases the Foreign Department is relieved from a mass of administrative detail ; but, as already stated, the relief is by no means as complete in the case of the Agent to the Governor-General as in that of the Lieutenant-

* *Supplement to the Gazette of India,* March 30, 1901, p. 695.

Governor, for the simple reason that the full machinery of a Local Government is not available. The Baluchistan Agency was fairly on its legs before I knew it, and is still more firmly established now, and yet it affords overwhelming proof of this proposition. If so, one can only conjecture what would be the result of a new agency on the Punjab Frontier. But besides this there are two other matters on which it is my duty to speak frankly ; and if it be thought that I magnify my office I can only say that I describe circumstances as I myself have found them. The closer supervision and control desired by Her Majesty's Government must be largely exercised by the Viceroy himself, both in his capacity as head of the Government and as having charge of the Foreign Department. It is of the highest importance that the relations between the Viceroy and the officer who, under his supervision, directs the control of their external relations should be close and personal. The Agent to the Governor-General, from the mere fact of his appointment, is expected to reside in his district ; he may be called to Simla or Calcutta or the Viceroy may during his five years, meet him once, perhaps twice, on tour, and that is all. The Lieutenant-Governor resides several months every year at Simla, and is in constant communication with the Viceroy. The Agent to the Governor-General of a district, such as that now under contemplation, would, of course, be a selected officer, deserving the fullest confidence, but the Lieutenant-Governor is an officer in the very highest grade, both by seniority and position. Now it is at the point where Imperial interests must be felt upon the reins. A certain course of action may be proposed which, looking to local circumstances, is beyond doubt the best ; and yet Imperial policy may require that it should be abandoned. If at that moment the officer who must be overruled is one with whom there are opportunities of personal conference and consultation, the chances of friction and misunderstanding are infinitely less than if he is one with whom there can only be communication from a distance by letter, and who must on that account, and perhaps by reason of his standing, be addressed rather as a subordinate than as a colleague and friend."*

Thus Lord Elgin was not in favour of appointing an Agent to the Governor General for the administration of the Punjab Frontiers. He would rather leave the work in the hands of the Punjab Government.

LORD ELGIN'S FRONTIER POLICY

In concluding his Minute, Lord Elgin refers to his Frontier policy. He says :

"It was a policy of non-annexation, of non-interference, which was declared by Her Majesty's Government in the despatch of January 28th, and was expounded on their behalf by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and the future Viceroy. It is a policy of which I heartily approve, and which I claim has been pursued during my administration. Expeditions have been undertaken, and our advanced posts have been still further advanced, the former having been sent, and the latter established, in consequence of obligations which so far as I am concerned, were inherited. We have assumed the protection of the Dauris in the Tochi Valley against their turbulent neighbours, at their own request long and urgently preferred, but no tribe or section of a tribe has been compelled against their will to surrender the local self-government which they formerly possessed, and which it is their desire to retain. It is because I wish to see this policy acted upon in the future, and because I regard it as the best hope of a peaceful and permanent settlement, that I deprecate the establishment on the frontier of an authority which from the nature of things must, in my judgement, endanger its continuance, and that I still prefer to rely on such an adaptation of the machinery we already possess as we proposed in our despatch, believing that, by so doing, we can with less risk and greater efficiency secure the objects which Her Majesty's Government have in view."*

* *North-West Frontier Administration—Supplement to the Gazette of India,* March, 30,1901

† *Supplement to the Gazette of India,* March 30, 1901, pp-787—88.

AN ESTIMATE OF LORD ELGIN'S ADMINISTRATION

Lord Elgin's administration was a sorry failure. A man of excellent intentions and kindly feelings, Lord Elgin had the weakness to take orders from the far stronger Anglo-Indian officials, both civil and military, by whom he was surrounded. The result has been that this inoffensive and amiable personage, with a desire to do his duty and a taste for mild platitudes, will be remembered in India for a series of attacks on the freedom of the people. It is true that it was his lot to rule amid war, pestilenee, and famine and as such he had a trying time. But with a little more strength of mind, tact, courage and sympathy he could have avoided pursuing, as he did, a policy of aggression injurious to the material interests of the country, and a policy of repression fertile in sowing distrust betwen Government and the governed ; and above all, he will go down to posterity as the Viceroy during whose term of office reaction spread throughout the land, leading to arbitrary imprisonment and panic prosecutions, to an organised attack on the self-government of great cities and to a serious infringement of the liberty of the Press. He left the relation between Indians and English more embittered than ever and had to the utmost of his abilities increased that separation between the races which almost every one professes to deplore.

Yet the same Viceroy was recipient of hyperbolic encomiums from the then Prime Minister of England, Lord Rosebery, who in pledging the guests at the Northbrook Club dinner, said among other things that he (Lord Elgin) had left on India the stamp of a memory which is perhaps surpassed by none in that illustrious roll. There is a limit to hyperboles even of an after-dinner speech.

The keynote to Lord Elgin's administrative policy is to be found in his declaration that the Viceroy had to carry out the mandate of the Secretary of State for India.



Lord Curzon



A. O. Hume

CHAPTER XIV

LORD CURZON

In December 1898 Lord Curzon assumed the Viceroyalty of India. "It was when the atmosphere was so charged with the forces that make for unrest that he came out to India, which he had visited previously as a traveller. He was a brilliant parliamentarian and one of the coming leaders of the great political party to which he belonged."

The Indian National Congress decided to offer him a hearty welcome. Says Sir S. N. Banerji :

"When we met in Congress in Madras in December, 1898,...we gave him credit for qualities which we hoped he would display in the government of India. I was entrusted with the Resolution according him a hearty welcome, and we proceeded to add in the Resolution the hope and trust that the policy of progress and confidence that had characterized the best traditions of British rule would be followed during his Lordship's tenure of office.

"In supporting my Resolution I quoted from Lord Curzon's speeches delivered immediately after his appointment as Viceroy of India. In one of them he said : 'I love India, its people, its history, its government, the complexities of its civilization and life.' In another speech delivered about the same time he observed that the essential qualifications of a Viceroy of India, were 'courage and sympathy.' Courage he had in abundance, the courage to defy public opinion and to exalt his personal ideals above those of the community he governed ; of sympathy he had but little. He loved the people of India after a fashion that they did not appreciate, which excited their resentment and prepared the way for those difficulties and embarrassments from which the Government long suffered."*

In February 1899 the Indian Association also presented an address of welcome to Lord Curzon.

LORD CURZON'S DEBUT

When Lord Curzon came to India, he was welcomed by almost every section of the people. But very soon they became disillusioned. Thus the author of *The Failure of Lord Curzon* writes :

"In far India Lord Curzon is busy in making a clean sweep of every principle, on which Indian polity has been built up. He is, in fact, an efficient man of a very noticeable kind, an eager, hardworking man of quite phenomenal activity, interfering in every department, with which he is least acquainted and flouting the advice of every one of experience, European and native alike. Lord Curzon's *debut* in India was the most promising, even brilliant, that man could desire. All classes hastened to welcome him. The most cynical were taken by the idea of this almost boy politician already arrived at such a pinnacle of authority. Europeans, even those who ought to have known better, were glad of a change from Lord Elgin's homely Scotch ways. They had forgotten that what India needs and always will need is patient level-headedness. There are lots of brains in India, but there are keen ambitions too, and there is no field in the Empire, where a pushful man, clothed on in 'patriotism,' can, if unchecked, do himself more good and his country more injury. The natives

* *A Nation in Making*, p. 156.

also welcomed Lord Curzon. That so young a man should have risen by what seemed his unaided ability to the power and far more than the power that centered in the throne of the Moghuls, was a picture that stirred their imagination. Aided by a not ineffective eloquence, with great beauty standing by his side and surrounded by the glamour of much wealth, the new Viceroy was the cynosure of most eyes as he landed at Bombay."*

Though the new Viceroy became the cynosure of most eyes as he landed at Bombay, yet his policy soon after showed that he could not be popular in India. The people of India expected much from him, but "the dream did not last long."

LORD CURZON'S THREE-FOLD FAILURE

In the *Failure of Lord Curzon,* the author has shown the three-fold failure of the Viceroy. He has shown :

"(i) That Lord Curzon in a short four years (the book was published before the end of Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty) has offended beyond forgiveness the educated classes of Indians.

(ii) That, though continually face to face with famine, he has refused to take the most experienced advice, whilst his policy is pushing the mass of the agricultural population lower and lower in the slough of misery and starvation.

(iii) That, although most conciliatory in language, he has initiated a manner of dealing with native princes, which must engender discontent."†

LURID "STATISTICS"

The famine policy of Lord Curzon was thus criticised when Lord Curzon published a Famine Report :

"Last year he (Lord Curzon) published a defence of famine policy in India. I may at once say that no such defence was needed. The relief of famines in India during the past quarter of a century forms one of the most noble pages in the history of the British nation.§ There are many, who regard the excessive demands of land taxation as a cause of famine, but no one denies the splendid charity and efficiency of the system of relief developed by Lord Curzon's predecessors. 'I have looked up,' he wrote, 'the statistics of the last great famine that occurred in Bengal, while the province was still under native administration.** This was in the year 1770.' Statistics in 1770 amidst the utter *debacle* of native government, which made our conquest a matter of a single battle ! This minute was specially intended for home consumption, and was in fact laid before Parliament, and I am quite sure nine-tenths of English readers admired the industry of the 'Great Viceroy.' Lord Curzon's 'statistics,' none of which were quoted, showed that 'the streets of the cities were blocked up with promiscuous heaps of the dead and dying ; even the dogs and jackals could not accomplish their revolting work,' and similar rodomontade. 'Disease attacked the starving and shelterless survivors, and swept them off by hundreds of thousands. Before the end of May, 1770, one-third of the population was officially calculated to have disappeared.' Who were the officials and where are their reports? A few unreliable guesses are extant, but not a single statistical figure. I knew Bengal well and gravely doubt the whole lurid picture. Warren Hastings reported in 1772, when statistically discussing the outturn of the land revenue, that 'the net collections of 1771 exceeded even those of 1768,' up to then a record year.

* *The Failure of Lord Curzon* : *An Open Letter to the Earl of Rosebery*, By "Twenty-Eight Years in India," London, 1903, pp. 2-3.

† *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, p. 4.

§ But were the causes of the famine quite unconnected with British rule?

** This is mere sophistry. The British officers were even then possessed of the supreme power and hence were, humanly, responsible for the famine.

'Lord Curzon's object was to compare this dread state of things with the success of his own measures in the preceding three years. Here again the comparison is uncalled for. The British Government has poured out millions in magnificent profusion of charity, but Lord Curzon must be unreliable and must be inaccurate. 'What the actual mortality may have been,' he wrote, 'it is impossible to tell with complete accuracy. At a later date the forthcoming census will throw useful light upon the problem.' Poor Viceroy! Even the industry which could unearth the 'statistics of 1770 was not equal to the task of discovering in 1902 the figures of the census taken in February, 1901. I think the exact distance of the Census Commissioner's office in Simla from Government House is one mile and a quarter, and that admirable official had published 'completely accurate' figures in October, 1901, and practically accurate figures in March of that year. Perhaps the census figures did not quite fit in with Lord Curzon's theory, which arrived at 'an excess mortality of half a million in British India more or less attributable to famine conditions.' In the same month that this estimate of famine deaths was laid before Parliament, the Census Report of the Central Provinces, one of the minor administrative divisions of the Empire, by Mr. R. V. Russell, showed a decrease of 832,000 in population, chiefly due to famine, whilst Mr. Enthoven's report on the Bombay census summarised a lengthened and truly statistical examination of the population, in these simple but terrible words: 'Thus it seems that the grand total mortality ascribable to special causes in the Presidency, for the areas where such special causes have operated freely, must have been in round figures about 3,000,000,' of which it is known that 268,890 deaths or a little more than one-fifteenth part was due to plague, the immense balance being caused by starvation. I will discuss at much length...the whole question of poverty...Here I wish only to emphasise the hopeless unreliability of Lord Curzon in statistics as in politics. 'No forecast' could be 'more dismally belied.'*

SIR ALEXANDER MACKENZIE'S ATTACK ON SELF-GOVERNMENT

Sir Alexander Mackenzie, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, roused the indignation of the Commissioners of Calcutta Corporation by his speech against that self-governing body. The story is thus told in *The Failure of Lord Curzon*:

"Unfortunately a time came when the Government lost its patience and the Municipal Commissioners lost their temper. At the ceremony of laying the foundation-stone of some new drainage works, the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Alexander Mackenzie, who had been asked in recognition of his high office to perform this honorific task, went for the Commissioners in a slashing speech, which roused extreme bitterness. His entertainers, who had just presented him with a loyal and complimentary address in a handsome casket, were told that their city was 'a disgrace to the Empire,' and that, whereas English town councils were made up of 'shrewd, capable men of business,' the Municipal body in Calcutta talked instead of working, whilst, *horribile dictu*, he broadly hinted there were far too many lawyers amongst them, 'whose individual stake in the town is small.' He quite forgot that these lawyers were the representatives of the great native landlords and merchants, who, as in England, rarely appear in person on vestry boards. But for the unfittingness of the occasion and the personalities the lecture might have done good, but these were things not to be borne. The Commissioners, in meeting assembled, gave vent to their wrath, their 'respectful but emphatic protest' against a speech, 'involving a grave misapprehension of the facts.' The offence was all the greater in their eyes as they had in former days held up Sir Alexander Mackenzie as a model official, and he had in truth been one of the best friends of the natives of India who had ever visited its shores, though rather 'short' with them in his latter years of ill-health. He had also shown in the outset of his speech that he was quite cognisant of the good work done by the Corporation."†

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 6-9.

† *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, pp. 54-55.

In the beginning of this 'slashing speech,' Sir Alexander Mackenzie, however, had said a little of the good work done by the Corporation. He said :

"I have elsewhere sought to vindicate the Commissioners from the charge of having dealt inadequately and perfunctorily with this drainage question. There has been delay, no doubt, in prosecuting these extensions of the system, but the delays have not, as was thought, been inordinate, and the wisdom of caution in undertaking such costly and gigantic operations is vindicated by a comparison between the original estimates and those of the scheme as now sanctioned. The Municipality has, I am afraid, many shortcomings to answer for. But I must say this, that I have never been able to agree that it has shown niggardliness, or been backward in sanctioning money for either water-supply or drainage."*

CALCUTTA AND LONDON—A COMPARISON

Sir Alexander Mackenzie spoke against the Calcutta Commissioners because they failed to improve the sanitary condition of Calcutta. But, the condition of London was not better than that of Calcutta. Thus says an English writer:

"Was it not the other day that a great medical authority described the 'homes of the poor in the East End of London' as 'less comfortable and less healthy than the lair of a wild beast?' 'In the metropolis of the world,' he wrote, 'tens of thousands' of Englishmen and women live in 'pestilent human rookeries,' in 'courts reeking with poisonous and malodorous gases,' in rooms approached by 'dark and filthy passages, swarming with vermin,' in 'dens of intolerable stench' in which 'the sickly air' is polluted by deadly exhalations from 'the putrifying carcasses of animals or viler abominations still.' A horrible picture, but neither the King nor the Prime Minister have placed the blame exclusively on the shoulders of the Lord Mayor and Corporation of London."†

A NEW LAW TO CLIP THE MUNICIPAL WINGS

The Commissioners raised a 'respectful but emphatic protest' against the speech of Sir Alexander Mackenzie. When the Lieutenant-Governor was thus 'answered back' he 'at once had recourse to the big stick, with which an Indian Governor always punishes the recalcitrant. He proceeded to make a new law for the clipping of municipal wings. One of the greatest weaknesses of Indian administration is the facility of legislation. Reform is a grand thing, but when a Lieutenant-Governor has simply to draft a new enactment and send it to a Legislative Council, as it is called, made up of his own nominees, there is a grave danger of scamped and hasty work.' Thus the Mackenzie Municipal Bill came into existence, but Sir Alexander Mackenzie retired through ill-health before the Bill was passed.

"THE UPROOTING OF SELF-GOVERNMENT"

When the Mackenzie Bill was before the Legislative Council, Lord Elgin was the Viceroy of India. But before the Bill was passed, Lord Curzon had succeeded Lord Elgin. Lord Curzon now tried "to uproot the principles of self-government." We read :

"A new Viceroy of ordinary good feeling and intellectual modesty would have hesitated before interfering with legislation, which had been fully thought out and laid down by his predecessor. An 'Imperialist' rarely has these qualities. So Lord Curzon immediately set to work to uproot the principles of self-government, which had been developed and matured by Lords Northbrook,

* *Ibid.*, p. 56

† *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

Dufferin and Elgin, and by half a dozen strong and capable Lieutenant-Governors. Still worse, he did not hesitate to introduce the racial difficulty in all its animosity. The Jingo is always prominent in creating bad blood. The Municipal Council of Calcutta had continued since 1876 to consist of 75 members, 50 of whom were elected and therefore representative, the remaining 25 being Government nominees. The former were mostly Indians, the latter mostly Europeans. By a stroke of his pen Lord Curzon reduced the representative members to 25 and destroyed representative government in the capital of India. The official Chairman's casting vote permanently gives the majority to the official or European or English element....Twenty-eight Indian members of the Corporation immediately resigned, and these men were the representatives of the wealth of Calcutta, which, so far as its landlords go, is practically a Hindu town. They were also mostly men of authority and education, honourable members of the Bengal Legislative Council, graduates of the English Universities, leading Barristers and doctors, the most prominent men of Asiatic blood in Calcutta. The bland 'Imperialist' quite expects that these gentlemen, who made no secret of the fact that they felt themselves outraged, should be exuberantly loyal. They are loyal, but look forward to a day when Lord Curzon's mischievous Indian career is at an end before they trouble the Viceroy with further expressions of their loyalty."*

What was the result of this uprooting of self-government in Calcutta ? The result is thus stated by an Indian newspaper :

"That the feeling against the Corporation is very bitter, is a stubborn fact ; and we state it not to bring any opprobrium upon that body. The general impression is that the Corporation was placed in the hands of the European Commissioners, so that they might lord it over the Indian rate-payers and fill the Municipality with European and Eurasian employees. This impression may or may not have any foundation in fact ; but there is no doubt of it that the vagaries and high-handed proceedings of the Corporation have created alarm and consternation, and it is seething discontent from one end of the town to the other."†

LORD CURZON'S MUNICIPAL POLICY A FAILURE

The Municipal policy of Lord Curzon cannot be called a success. It failed to satisfy the educated Indians and roused their protest. We read :

"It cannot be said that this is a satisfactory state of things after a three years' trial of the new administration, and whom have we to thank for playing the mischief with the affairs of a capital city of a million inhabitants ? It cannot be the natives, on whom blame is so readily thrown, if it is at all possible to do so. They have been extruded from the management of their own town, with which they were so intimately acquainted. Or, is it the meddlesome Viceroy, who, after a bare three months in India, contrary to the advice of his experienced predecessor, Lord Elgin, set to work to harass the wealthiest and most progressive inhabitants of Calcutta ? His expectations of reform have been as 'dismally belied' as were his pronouncements on Persian railways after a 'six months' journey to the country concerned.' Impatient or neglectful of advice, short-sighted and impetuous, Lord Curzon's cleverness only leads him into a morass of failure, yet it is extremely probable one of these days, if the Conservatives continue in power, that the most active and ill-balanced mind now in the service of the State may be chosen to guide the affairs of our vast empire in some great department of administration, War or Foreign Affairs."§

MACKENZIE MUNICIPAL BILL

Sir Alexander Mackenzie introduced the Calcutta Municipal Bill in the Legislative Council about this time. He "in his famous speech at the opening of the Pumping

* *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, pp. 58-59.
† Quoted in *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, p. 63,
§ *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, By 'Twenty-eight Years in India' (London, 1903), pp. 63-64.

Station at Palmer's Bridge, said of the Calcutta Corporation that it was an armoury of talk and an arsenal of delays. The Commissioners talked *ad libitum*; he wanted to curb their loquacity, to reduce their brake power and to add to the vigour of executive authority. The head of the municipal executive was to have independent powers, no longer subordinate to those of the Corporation; he was to be a co-ordinate authority and the supremacy of the Corporation was to be emasculated. The Commissioners could talk as much as they liked; but, within his own sphere, the Chairman would act as he pleased with little or no responsibility to the Corporation. The authority of the Corporation was to be further restricted by creating a General Committee, another co-ordinate and independent authority. The majority of the representatives of the rate-payers in the Corporation was still maintained; but it was left for Lord Curzon, after the Bill had passed the Select Committee stage, to issue the crowning mandate that was to officialize the Corporation, directing the reduction of the elected members, and placing them numerically on the same footing as the nominated element. This, coupled with the fact that the president was an official, gave a standing majority to the official element. Thus was the officialization of the Corporation completed.

"As a protest against this arbitrary action on the part of the Government of Lord Curzon, twenty-eight Commissioners, including all the men of light and leading, tendered their resignation."*

Sir (then Mr.) S. N. Banerji was a member of the Select Committee and had to work hard for the Bill. On the last day of the debate on this Mackenzie Bill, he, for the last time, in opposing the Bill, said:

"Just I was coming to this Council, this morning, I received a letter, which reminded me that today was the anniversary of the death of Raja Rammohun Ray. It seems to me to be most fitting that the anniversary of the death of the greatest Bengali of modern times should correspond with the date which will be remembered by future generations of Bengalis as that which marks the extinction of Local Self-Government in that city where he lived and worked, and which was the city of his love."†

In another place, Sir S. N. Banerji writes thus:

"At the Congress of 1898, we had expressed our gratitude to Lord Curzon for his words of sympathy, and our hope that he would follow a policy of progress and confidence in the people. The events of the following year served to dissipate whatever expectations the most optimistic among us might have formed. The reactionary policy of the Viceroy and his disregard of Indian public opinion was evidenced by the orders he passed in connection with the Calcutta Municipal Bill after it had emerged from the Select Committee stage...They served to officialize the Calcutta Corporation. They were so unexpected that it was widely reported that Sir John Woodburn had threatened to resign. Why he did not, we do not know. They threw Calcutta into the vortex of an agitation that was only surpassed by the anti-Partition demonstration, which also were due to Lord Curzon's policy. People were rapidly losing confidence in the Viceroy, and the popular sense of mistrust found expression in a Resolution of the Lucknow Congress of 1899, which I had to move. The Resolution was in these terms:

'That this Congress expresses its disapproval of the reactionary policy, subversive of Local Self-Government, as evidenced by the passing of the Calcutta Municipal Act in the face of the unanimous

* *Ibid.*, p. 130.

† *Ibid.*, p. 131.

opposition of the people, and by the introduction into the Legislative Council of Bombay of a similar measure, which will have the effect of seriously jeopardizing the principle of Local Self-Government."*

UNIVERSITY COMMISSION OF 1901

Lord Curzon now tried to officialize the Indian Universities. His Educational Conference at Simla and the University Commission were directed against the Indian educational system.

"Of the many disservices which Lord Curzon had done to India, his so-called reform of the Universities was the most far-reaching in its consequences. Under the plea of efficiency he had officialized the Calcutta Municipality ; under the same plea he now proceeded to officialize the Universities, and to bring the entire system of higher education under the control of Government. Efficiency was his watch-word ; popular sentiment counted for nothing, and in his mad worship of this fetish Lord Curzon set popular opinion at open defiance."

Thus writes Sir S. N. Banerji on the attempt of Lord Curzon to officialize the Indian Universities :

"In 1901 Lord Curzon held an Educational Conference at Simla, to which only European educationists were invited. It was a secret conclave, its proceedings have not yet been published, and yet at this very conference Lord Curzon declared, 'concealment has been no part of my policy since I have been in India, and the education of the people is assuredly the last subject to which I should think of applying such a canon.' Never was there a greater divergence between profession and practice. And the effrontery of it lay in the emphatic denunciation of secrecy at the very time, and in connexion with the very subject, in regard to which the speaker had deliberately made up his mind to violate the canon that he had so eloquently proclaimed. But that was Lord Curzon's method and we orientals regarded it with a feeling of amusement, as coming from one who had extolled the ethics of the West above the baser morality of the East.

"The Educational Conference was followed by the appointment of a Universities Commission which, when its personnel was first announced, did not include a single Hindu member. Yet the Hindus had the largest interest in the educational problems that were to be considered. I raised a vigorous protest in the columns of *The Bengalee* against the ostracism of the Hindu element. The organs of the Indian public opinion were unanimous in this view, and as the result Mr. Justice Gurudas Banerjee was subsequently added as a member of the Commission.

"The report was submitted in less than five months' time, whereas the Education Commission of 1882 had taken eighteen months to make their recommendations ; and the report itself was a startling performance. It would be no exaggeration to say that it convulsed educated India from one end of the country to the other. The report was felt as a menace to the whole system of higher education in India. It reversed the policy of the Education Commission of 1882. It recommended, (*i*) the abolition of the second-grade colleges (and they formed the bulk of the colleges in Bengal) ; (*ii*) the abolition of the law classes ; and (*iii*) the fixing of a minimum rate of college fees by the Syndicate, which really meant the raising of the fees. In order to raise the standard of efficiency the area of high education was sought to be restricted.

"The feeling against Indian lawyers, which the report of the majority disclosed, was open and undisguised. 'To do away with the law classes' said the report, 'will in many cases increase the expense of the law students' education, but the central school will have the scholarships ; and even if the net result should be to diminish the number of lawyers in India, we are not certain that this would be an unmixed evil."†

* *Ibid.*, p. 164.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 175-76.

AGITATION AGAINST THE UNIVERSITY COMMISSION REPORT

When the Report of the University Commission was published, an agitation was set on foot by educated Indians. Says Sir S. N. Banerji :

"It need hardly be said that Mr. Justice Gurudas Banerjee recorded a strong dissent, traversing the points to which I have referred. A vigorous agitation was set up against the recommendations contained in the Report. A Town Hall meeting was organised ; and a memorial, which I had a large hand in drawing up, was submitted to Government.

"The agitation was not without its results. The Government of India partially accepted the popular view. In a letter issued by the Home Department, in October, 1902, the Government declared that 'the second grade colleges occupy a definite place in the educational machinery of the country and fulfil a useful function.' As regards the abolition of the law classes, the Government of India were of opinion that 'a Central Law College should be established in each province, but that it should be a model, and there should be no monopoly'. Whatever the spirit of the Government declaration may have been, the law classes in all the Calcutta colleges were abolished, excepting those of the Ripon College. The Government was silent with regard to the question of the minimum college fees.

"Upon the basis of the recommendations of the Universities Commission, a Universities Act was passed. The Universities (I speak specially of the Calcutta University) have assumed in a large measure the function of teaching in the higher branches of Arts and Science, with results that are commendable. An impetus to higher learning and culture has also been imparted by regular lectures delivered by University Readers and Lecturers. But, all the same, the expense of higher education has increased with no sensible increase in the resources of the middle class, from whom the bulk of our college students come."*

THE PARTITION OF BENGAL (1905)

One of the greatest events during the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon was the Partition of Bengal. The year 1905—the year of the Partition of Bengal—was, according to Sir Surendra Nath Banerji, the most memorable in the history of Bengal. It would be no exaggeration to say that it was an epoch-making year, having a profound and far-reaching influence on the public life of Bengal and the future of the country.

Lord Curzon wanted to create a new province of Assam and East Bengal. The interests of the Civil Service, with which undoubtedly the interests of the province were to some extent bound up, demanded that Assam should be a self-contained province.

It was on July 20, 1905, that the announcement of the Partition of Bengal was made and the public came to know of the details of the Partition.

"The announcement fell like a bomb-shell upon an astonished public. But in our bewilderment we did not lose our heads. We made up our minds to do all that lay in our power, with the aid of the constitutional means at our disposal, to reverse, or at any rate to obtain a modification of, the Partition.

"We felt that we had been insulted, humiliated and tricked. We felt that the whole of our future was at stake, and that it was a deliberate blow aimed at the growing solidarity and self-consciousness of the Bengali-speaking population. Originally intended to meet administrative requirements, we felt that it had drawn to itself a political flavour and complexion, and, if allowed to be passed, it could be fatal to our political progress and to that close union between Hindus and Mahommedans upon which the prospects of Indian advancement so largely depended. For it

* *Ibid.*, p. 176.



Sir Surendranath Banerjee

was openly and officially given out that Eastern Bengal and Assam was to be recognised as the basis of the new policy to be adopted in the new province.

"We lost no time in taking action. We held a conference at Maharaja Jotindra Mohan Tagore's palace at Pathuriaghata. The Maharaja was present and took an active part in the deliberations. Among those who attended was Mr. H. E. A. Cotton, then practising as a barrister in Calcutta, and now President of the Bengal Legislative Council. He was in the deepest sympathy with the movement and for the reversal of the Partition ; so was Mr. Ratcliffe, Editor of the *Statesman*, and so was Mr. Fraser Blair, then Editor of the *Englishman*. Anglo-Indian opinion, which generally supports the official view of things, condemned the Partition through its accredited organs. That attitude, however, did not long continue ; but that was the view of the Anglo-Indian Press in the early days of the Partition agitation."*

It was also decided to hold a public meeting at the Calcutta Town Hall on August 7, 'a day that was destined to become famous in the history of the anti-Partition controversy.'

"It was felt that mere public meetings would be of no use. Lord Curzon's Government had shown a systematic disregard of public feeling, and had treated public demonstrations with undisguised contempt. Something more was necessary—something that would be a fitting embodiment of the intense feeling that lay behind the whole movement. I remember the various suggestions made at the meetings held almost daily in the rooms of the Indian Association. One of them was that we should resign all our honorary appointments, such as those of Honorary Magistrate, and membership of district boards and municipalities. The obvious objection to the resignation of our seats on the local bodies and the Magisterial Bench was that they afforded an opportunity of serving our countrymen, and that they were a source of local influence which would be useful in the coming struggle. Further, it was doubtful whether the whole country would be with us in such a view. A partial failure on the threshold of a great controversy would be disastrous, and the idea was therefore abandoned."

It was therefore decided to boycott British goods and use only Swadeshi goods. Thus the Boycott and Swadeshi movements were started in Bengal.

THE BOYCOTT MOVEMENT

As a protest against the Partition of Bengal, the Boycott movement was started. 'From whose fertile brain did it spring—when did it first see the light ? Both these questions it would be difficult to answer with anything like accuracy.' It may be that the idea of a boycott of British goods was started by many at the same time. According to Sir S. N. Banerji, it first found expression at a public meeting in the district of Pabna and was repeated at public meetings held in other mofussil towns.

At the Town Hall meeting held on the 7th of August, the following Boycott resolution was adopted :

"That this meeting fully sympathises with the resolution adopted at many meetings held in the mofussil to abstain from the purchase of British manufactures so long as the Partition resolution is not withdrawn, as a protest against the indifference of the British public in regard to Indian affairs and the consequent disregard of Indian public opinion by the present Government."

About this Boycott resolution, Sir S. N. Banerji, who took a leading part in the Boycott movement, says:

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* *Ibid.*, p. 187-88.

"It will thus be seen that the boycott was a temporary measure adopted for a particular object, and was to be given up as soon as that object was attained. Its only aim and purpose was to call the attention of the British public to Bengal's great grievance, and, when the Partition was modified, and the grievance was removed, the boycott was to cease. That pledge was redeemed.

"That the boycott sometimes led to excesses no one will dispute ; but all constitutional movements suffer from this inherent weakness, which springs from the defects of our common human nature. All causes—the purest and noblest—all have their moderates and their extremists. But the excesses, more or less incidental to all constitutional movements, have never been held as an argument against the adoption of constitutional methods for the redress of public grievances. If such a view were held, some of the noblest chapters of human history would have been left unwritten, and we should have been without the inspiration of self-sacrifice and patriotic devotion, which have so often been associated with the struggle for constitutional freedom. Who will say that because there is unhappily a revolutionary propaganda in Bengal, undoubtedly limited and insignificant in the circle of its influence, all constitutional efforts should be given up ? The enemies of Indian advancement would wish for nothing better. The friends of Indian progress would view it as a calamity."

It should be remembered that the Boycott Resolution did not elicit any marked sense of disapproval from the European Press, certainly not the strong resentment that it subsequently provoked. All that the *Englishman* newspaper said about it was that 'the policy of boycott must considerably embitter the controversy, if it is successful, while in the opposite event it will render the movement and its supporters absurd.' *The Statesman* was inclined to ridicule the whole movement, but there was not a trace of any resentment on the ground that an anti-British agitation had been inaugurated.

"Those who were responsible for the Boycott Resolution," said *The Statesman*, "have doubtless been fired by the example of the Chinese, and they are optimistic enough to assume that a boycott of European goods could be made as effective and as damaging as the Chinese boycott of American goods has, to all appearances, been. The assumption will cause a smile on the European side for more reasons than one. But all the same, it would be unwise for the Government to assume that the whole movement is mere froth and insincerity. On the contrary, it has been apparent for some time past that the people of the province are learning other and more powerful methods of protest. The Government will recognise the new note of practicality which the present situation has brought into political agitation."*

About the attitude of the Bureaucracy towards the Boycott movement, Sir Surendra Nath Banerji says :

"Bureaucracy is always unequal to a new situation or to an unexpected development. So long as things go on in the normal groove, bureaucracy, deriving its light and leading from precedent and from ancient and dust-laden files, feels happy and confident. But when the clouds appear on the horizon and when there is the ominous presage of stormy weather ahead, the bureaucratic mind feels restive ; the files afford no guidance ; the bureaucrat is disturbed ; he loses his equanimity ; his uneasiness slides into resentment ; and, imagining dangers where there are none, he adopts heroic measures, which engender the very troubles that wiser and more pacific counsels would have averted.

"A boycott movement in India had never before been thought of or attempted. It was a bold conception ; and the first impulse of all spectators, as in the case of *The Statesman*, was to treat it with ridicule. But the success that it soon attained disclosed the volume of public sentiment that was behind it. Without a more or less universal feeling supporting it, the boycott was sure to fail. Its success was a revelation to all ; it outstripped the anticipation of its inaugurators. But

* Quoted in *A Nation in Making*, pp. 194-95.

the bureaucracy in those days would learn nothing that was not in its files and was not consecrated by the dust of the Secretariat shelves. It was amazed at the ebullition of public feeling—it was indignant—it lost all self-control; it sought to repress where tactful handling and conciliatory measures would have been more effective, and it thus added to the intensity of the flame.

"The course of events during the whole of the controversy in connexion with the Partition of Bengal bears out what I have just observed. There was throughout a persistent attempt to supress the expression of public feeling in the name of law and order; and, as always happens in such cases, the attempt at repression recoiled upon its authors. More signally did they fail; and the public excitement and unrest grew apace."*

THE SWADESHI MOVEMENT

When did the Swadeshi movement come into existence? Sir Surendra Nath Banerji answers this question in the following way:

"The *Swadeshi* movement did not come into birth with the agitation for the reversal of the Partition of Bengal. It was synchronous with the national awakening which the political movement in Bengal had created. The human mind is not divided into watertight compartments, but is a living organism; and when a new impulse is felt in one particular direction, it affects the whole organism and is manifest throughout the entire sphere of human activities. When the Congress movement was started in the early eighties of the last century, it was, and is even now, a common enough remark among a certain class of writers, perhaps not friendly to Indian interests, that it would have been far better, and a more natural course, to have commenced with the vital problems of social reform than with political considerations, which might have been more usefully dealt with later on, after our social and domestic institutions had been placed on a better and more satisfactory footing. The whole course of our national evolution has belied this confident assertion. Social reform, industrial revival, moral and spiritual uplift, have all followed in the track of the great national awakening, which had its roots in the political activities of our leaders....

"Thus when the anti-Partition controversy arose, the ground for a *Swadeshi* movement had already been prepared, and the political enthusiasm of our people was linked with the fervour to uplift our industrial status. The *Swadeshi* movement was, in spirit, a protectionist movement. Only as we had not the power to make laws, which was in hands other than our own, we sought to surround our domestic industries with a tariff wall not raised by the mandate of the legislature, but by the determined will of our people. Such a movement could only succeed among a highly emotional people, swayed by an impulse that was universal.

"The European Press viewed the whole thing as a huge mistake and was confident that it would soon disappear as a nine days' wonder. That it lasted much longer and was in fairly vigorous operation during the six years that the partition was in force, was the wonder of foreign visitors, accustomed to the economic conditions prevalent in the Western world. That the people of Bengal should continue, and that for several years, to purchase home-made things at a higher price when similar or even superior articles, imported from foreign countries, could be had cheaper, was a striking testimony to their devotion and self-sacrificing spirit. In this they have never been wanting when the occasion required it, but to this quality, I fear, justice has not always been done."†

SWADESHI PROPAGANDA

Meetings began to be held all over the country for *Swadeshi* propaganda. The people of Bengal responded to the call of their leaders. "It was a time of unusual excitement and strenuous work. None spared himself. Everyone did his best. We

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* *A Nation in Making*, p. 195.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 197-99.

travelled to places strange and unknown, often difficult of access. We ate strange food. We minded nothing. We complained of nothing."

GOVERNMENT REPRESSION

The Government did not view with favour the propaganda carried on by the Swadeshi leaders.

"The Government was alarmed at the upheaval of public feeling, and it adopted the familiar methods of repression, which only served to stimulate such feeling. Agricola is reported by Tacitus to have made the shrewd observation that the government of a household is more difficult than that of an Empire. When an explosion takes place in a family the healing influences of time and good sense, aided by friendly counsels, help to bring things to their normal condition; and generally they are found to be effective. But a bureaucracy armed with omnipotent power is tempted to follow short cuts in dealing with an unforeseen situation. Repression is handy and promises to be effective. The heavy price that has to be paid, the disastrous moral result that it produces in the long run, are lost sight of in the eager desire to do the thing quickly. Temporary success is perhaps achieved, but permanent injury is done, and the seeds of future troubles are sown."-

ANTI-STUDENT CIRCULAR

As the students were taking a prominent part in the Boycott and *Swadeshi* propaganda, the Government thought of curbing their activities.

"A circular was accordingly issued by District Magistrates to heads of educational institutions, in which they were told that, unless the school and college authorities and teachers prevented their pupils from taking public action in connexion with boycotting, picketting and other abuses associated with the so-called *Swadeshi* movement, the schools and colleges would forfeit their grants-in-aid and the privilege of competing for scholarships, and the university would be asked to disaffiliate them. The circular was addressed to schools in the mofussil."

About the effect of this circular against the student community we read :

"The circular only served to add to the excitement, and it evoked universal condemnation even among organs of opinion that usually supported the policy and measures of Government. *The Statesman* newspaper, commenting upon the circular, used language that *The Statesman* has since banished from its columns, except when denouncing really bad measures. 'We should really like to know,' exclaimed *The Statesman,* 'the name of the imbecile official at whose instance the Lieutenant-Governor sanctioned this order.' 'The Government, there can be no doubt,' added the same authority, 'has been misled by some person who is either grossly ignorant of the situation or has allowed himself to be frightened by the fantastic scares of the last few weeks'; and the paper concluded by observing, 'Government has blundered apparently into a childish and futile policy which can only have the effect of manufacturing an army of martyrs.' That was the language of a leading English newspaper when the first circular of a restrictive character was issued affecting students. But circular after circular followed, each one adding to the prevailing excitement, and aggravating the evil which it was intended to cure."†

THE 'BANDE MATARAM' CIRCULAR

Another circular which excited the public very much was the *Bande Matarm* Circular.

* *Ibid.,* pp. 203-204.

† *Ibid.,* p. 205.

"It was issued by the new Government of Eastern Bengal, and it declared the shouting of *Bande Mataram* in the public streets to be illegal, and an authority in the person of a high European official supposed to be versed in the ancient lore of our country, was found, who went so far as to assert that it was an invocation to the goddess Kali for vengeance. Where he got this idea from it is difficult to know. The opening lines of the *Bande Mataram* are the words of a song, full of love for, and devotion to, the motherland, expatiating upon her beauty and her strength. 'I salute the mother, the mother of us all, namely, the motherland'—that is the plain meaning of the words. But amid the excitement which prevailed in official circles a sinister meaning was read into this very innocent formula, and a circular was issued by the Government of East Bengal suppressing the cry in the streets. We took legal opinion, and the legal opinion (that of Mr. Pugh, an eminent advocate of the Calcutta Bar) was in our favour, and against the legality of the circular."*

THE PARTITION—THE SETTLED FACT

The Government would not be moved by the agitation of Boycott and *Swadeshi.* From the 16th October the Partition of Bengal was to take effect.

"For Bengal it was to be a day of national mourning. We were resolved to observe it as such and the country warmly responded to our call. The programme of mourning was fixed in consultation with the mofussil leaders, and was widely circulated. There was to be : (*i*) The *Rakhi-Bandhan* ceremoney—the red band of brotherly union was to be tied round the wrists of all whom we welcomed as brothers. It was to be the revival of an ancient Indian custom, and was to be emblematic of the new brotherly bond between the sundered province and old Bengal. (*ii*) The 16th of October was to be observed as a day of fasting."

"FEDERATION HALL"

"But this was not all. The day was to be marked by the inauguration of a plan of constructive work. I proposed the building of a Federation Hall, which, assuming that the Partition was not undone or modified, was to be the meeting-ground of the old province and its several parts, the mark and symbol of their indivisible union. The idea suggested itself to me from what I saw at the Hotel des Invalides in Paris, where round the tomb of the great Napoleon are laurelled statues, representative of the different provinces. Those of Alsace and Lorraine were at that time veiled and shrouded. To me it seemed that we should have a memorial of that sort, statues of all the districts in Bengal, those of the sundered districts being shrouded until the day of their reunion. The Hall would serve other purposes of a public nature. It would keep alive the remembrance of our severance, and thus be an ever-living stimulus to our efforts to secure our reunion."†

Along with it, it was decided to raise a National Fund for encouragement of *swadeshi,* and a sum of Rs. 70,000 was collected for the purpose.

THE POLICY OF THE "FAVOURITE WIFE"

The Government went on with their policy of repression.

"The policy of the Government, especially that of East Bengal under Sir Bampfylde Fuller, added to the tension of the situation. He declared, half in jest, half in seriousness, to the amazement of all sober-minded men, that he had two wives, Hindu and Mahommedan, but that the Mahommedan was the favourite wife. A ruler who could publicly indulge in a display of offensive humour of this kind was clearly unfit for the high office which he held. The civil service took their cue from him; and his administration was conducted upon lines in the closest conformity with the policy which he had so facetiously announced......

* *Ibid.*, p. 205.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 212-13.

"· ...The Partition was followed by a policy of repression, which added to the difficulties of the Government and the complexities of the situation. The cry of *Bande-Mataram* ..was forbidden in the public streets, and public meetings in public places were prohibited. Military police were stationed in peaceful centres of population, and they committed assaults upon honoured members of the Hindu community, which excited the deepest public indignation. Respectable citizens were charged with sedition, for issuing a *swadeshi* circular, and Babu Aswini Kumar Dutt, the revered leader of the people of Barisal, a man universally respected, was so charged by Mr. Jack. The accusation was baseless and Babu Aswini Kumar Dutt obtained damages against him for libel in a civil court. The climax was reached when the police assaulted the delegates of the Bengal Provincial Conference at Barisal in April, 1906, and forcibly dispersed the conference."*

BREAKING UP OF THE BARISAL CONFERENCE (1906)

The policy of repression continued and the Government did not think it necessary to change its policy. Then came the Bengal Provincial Conference at Barisal, where the police assaulted the delegates of the Conference. The story may be told in the words of Sir Surendra Nath Banerji :

"We were allowed to pass unmolested. It was when the younger delegates, the members of the Anti-Circular Society, emerged from the *haveli* into the public street that the whol. programme of the police was developed, and the attack was begun. They were struck with regulation *lathis* (fairly thick sticks, six feet long) ; the *Bande Mataram* badges that they wore were torn off. Some of them were badly hurt, and one of them, Chittaranjan Guha Thakurta, son of Babu Manoranjan Guha Thakurta, a well-known *Swadeshi* worker and speaker, who afterwards was deported, was thrown into a tank full of water in which, if he had not been rescued, he would probably have found a watery grave.

"These young men had done nothing ; they had not even before the assault uttered what to the Government of East Bengal was an obnoxious cry, that of *Bande-Mataram*. The head and front of their offence was that they were going along the public streets in a procession, causing no inconvenience or obstruction to anybody. It was after they had been attacked that they lustily shouted *Bande-Mataram,* and the air re-echoed with the cry. It was difficult to conceive a more wanton and unprovoked assault. The processionists, if they had committed any offence, might have been arrested ; and the procession itself might have been broken up if it was thought desirable ; but that did not suit the authorities, and I have no hesitation in saying, and it was the verdict of contemporary opinion, that a preconceived plan had been arranged, which was a part of the policy of terrorism that was being systematically followed in East Bengal, in the hope that the agitation against the Partition would be crushed out of existence. It was a vain hope. Repression failed here, as it has failed wherever it has been tried. It served only to strengthen the popular forces and to deepen the popular determination."†

This was not all. Then came the order of the Magistrate dispersing the Conference. The order ran thus :

"As it appears from police reports that the breaking up of a meeting of the conference, which is being held at a *pandal* in the town opposite to B. M. College, is likely to be followed by unruly proceedings in the streets, and noisy processions, which have been forbidden by proper authority, I hereby order that the public or any person are not to meet in the *pandal* or elsewhere for the said purpose, and the public are not to form crowds in the streets. As it also appears likely that the crowds may meet in Raja Bahadur's *haveli* and form an unlawful procession, it is hereby ordered that this is also forbidden."

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 218-19.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 222-23.

The story of the breaking up of the Conference is thus told :

"But the story of this act of repression, one of the darkest in the annals of the defunct Government of East Bengal, was not yet closed. The Conference met on the following day, and was transacting its business in the usual way, when Mr. Kemp, District Superintendent of Police, entered the *pandal.* He walked up to the platform, and told the President that the conference must disperse, unless he was prepared to give a guarantee that the delegates would not shout *Bande-Mataram* in the streets after the Conference was over. The President, after consulting the delegates, declined to give the guarantee. Mr. Kemp then read out the order of the Magistrate directing the dispersal of of the Conference under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. A wave of indignation passed over the conference. Mr. J. Chaudhury and other leaders appealed to them to respect authority, however arbitrary the fiat might seem to them, and they responded to the appeal. Throughout these exciting times, the discipline of our people and their readiness to submit to the advice of their leaders was conspicuously in evidence and largely contributed to the success of the movement......

". We all dispersed, somewhat amazed at the extraordinary order, which was *ultra vires* and perfectly indefensible, as no breach of the peace by the delegates could be reasonably apprehended after their quiet submission to the unbridled lawlessness of the police on the previous day..."*

Rai Narendra Nath Sen Bahadur, the most moderate among the political leaders of Bengal, described the Barisal incident as 'hardly having any parallel in the history of British India. The Press and the platform,' he said, 'are the safety-valves of popular discontent,' and he added that 'whenever they have been sought to be suppressed, anarchy has intervened ;

THE SURAT CONGRESS (1907)

The breaking up of the Barisal Conference was followed by that of the Surat Congress. Sir S. N. Banerji tells the story in these words :

"It was in an atmosphere almost electric in its character that the Indian National Congress met at Surat in December 1907. The venue of the Congress had to be changed from Nagpur to Surat, owing to demonstrations of rowdyism, which in the opinion of the Bombay leaders of the Congress rendered it undesirable to hold the Congress at Nagpur. But the disease was there, deep-rooted, having drawn its virus from the unhappy proceedings of the authorities in East Bengal. As I rose to speak there were signs of opposition from the body of the hall. As a past President of the Congress, it was my duty to propose Sir Rash Behary Ghose as President. I had often before performed this duty with the general concurrence and approval of the Congress. It was not to be so this time. The events of the Midnapore Conference, in which I had a hand as the pacifier, were remembered, and repeated attempts were made to prevent me from proceeding with my speech. This was with me an unusual experience ; for my appearance on a Congress platform as a speaker was usually the signal for hushed silence after the first signs of applause had subsided.

"There was a strong party in favour of the election of Mr. Tilak as President, and they would not have Sir Rash Behari Ghose to preside over the Congress. Rather that the Congress should be broken up than that Sir Rash Behari should preside. That was the feeling of this party, and the Congress was broken up. Chairs and shoes and slippers were flung at the leaders, the platform was rushed—I remained on the platform, with some of my friends forming a guard around me. I was led along with Sir Pherozshah Mehta and others to the tent behind, and the police cleared the *pandal.* Thus closed a memorable chapter in the history of the Congress, to be followed by a new departure."†

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 226-27.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 235-36.

LORD CURZON'S POLICY TOWARDS THE NATIVE STATES

Lord Curzon's policy towards the Native Chiefs did not meet with much success. It is said that he had "issued an edict to the Native Princes of India forbidding them to visit Europe without His Excellency's permission." Thus says the writer of *The Failure of Lord Curzon*:

"The few people in England, who take an interest in such things, were amazed a couple of years ago by the announcement that Lord Curzon had issued an edict to the Native Princes of India, forbidding them to visit Europe without His Excellency's permission ! That ukase never saw the light of public print and has, it is believed, been secretly withdrawn, but it also was typical of the spirit in which Lord Curzon approached his great task, the flightiness, with which he offends great and powerful classes under the influence of some whim, some sudden idea, some ill-conceived, ill-thought-out policy. That pressure should be put, if necessary, on our great feudatories not to withdraw themselves often or for long from their wide and populous dominions, is quite right, but there are certain courtesies usual between grown-up gentlemen. One cannot help asking what idea had Lord Curzon of his office, great as it undoubtedly is, that could justify him in requiring puissant princes, like the Maharaja of Gwalior, or the Nizam of Hyderabad, truly the sons of kings, to ask for permission, like school boys, before taking a holiday or visiting an European surgical specialist. Such conduct is no more calculated to rouse loyalty in high places, than did the knocking of Calcutta Self-government about their ears awaken gratitude in the minds of some of our most educated fellow-subjects in Bengal."*

AN "INDEPENDENT" CHIEF!

Lord Curzon's idea of an "independent" chief may be gathered from the following *Sanad* granted by him to the Chief of Seraikella. It runs thus:

"Whereas the status and position with reference to the British Government of the Political State of Seraikella in Chota Nagpore has hitherto been undefined and doubts have from time to time arisen with regard thereto, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council is pleased to grant to you Raja Udit Narain Singh Deo Bahadur the following *Sanad* with a view to assuring you that the British Government will continue, as long as you remain loyal to the Crown and abide by the conditions of the *Sanad* and of your other engagements with the British Government, to maintain you in the position and privileges which you have heretofore enjoyed or which are now conferred upon you :

"SANAD"

"You Raja Udit Narain Singh Deo Bahadur, son of Raja Chakradhar Singh Deo Bahadur, are hereby formally recognised as the Feudatory Chief of the Seraikella State, and you are *permitted* as heretofore to generally administer the territory of the said Seraikella State, subject to the conditions, hereinafter prescribed In like manner your heirs and successors shall became entitled to your privileges and liable to your obligations, provided that *no succession shall be valid* until it has been recognised by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council.

"You shall conform in all matters concerning the preservation of law and order and the administration of justice generally within the limits of your State to the instructions, issued from time to time for your guidance by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. You will *appoint such officers and pay them such emoluments* as, on full consideration of the circumstances and of such representations as you may wish to make, may from time to time appear necessary to His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, for the proper hearing of cases and administration of justice in your State.

* *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, pp. 74-75.

"You shall levy no tolls or duties of any kind on grain, merchandise, or other articles passing into or out of or through your State without the permission of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

"You shall consult the Commissioner of Chota-Nagpur in all important matters of administration, and *comply with his wishes.* The settlement and the collection of the land revenue, the imposition of taxes, the administration of justice, arrangements connected with excise, salt and opium, *the concession of mining, forest, and other rights,* disputes arising out of any such concession and disputes in which other States are concerned, shall be regarded as specially important matters, and in respect to them you shall *at all times conform* to such advice as the Commissioner may give you.

"The right to catch elephants in your State is granted to you *as a personal concession and as a matter of favour* ; but this concession is liable to withdrawal whenever it may seem desirable either on account of abuse or for other reasons, and it will not be necessarily granted to your successor.

(Signed) "Curzon of Kedleston,
"Viceroy and Governor-General
of India."*

Such was the *Sanad* granted by Lord Curzon as the Viceroy of India to the Chief of Seraikella State, who was bound down to take the permission of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal in all important affairs of the State.

The comments on the above *Sanad* by the author of *The Failure of Lord Curzon* are worth quoting. The writer says :

"The nobleman to whom this 'letter of appointment' is addressed is one of the minor feudatories of Chota Nagpur, in East Central India, and is the legitimate heir of chiefs, who held absolutely independeut sway centuries before the British conquest of India. There is something ludicrous as well as impolitic in Lord Curzon's supercilious 'permission' to this princelet 'to generally administer' his own State and property. The policy of interference and control, set out in such detail in this document, is in entire conflict with our policy in the past, and sets at nought our solemn engagements. In a letter, addressed by the Foreign Secretary to the officer, who was sent in 1818 to settle the affairs of the Chota Nagur Chiefs, the Government of India observed : 'It is the decided opinion of the Governor-General that any attempt to introduce the direct authority of the British Government into the internal administration of these provinces will be altogether inexpedient, and indeed not quite free from question in point of equity.' In the same communication, the Government of India referred to the services which the chiefs had rendered to the British Government by resisting the invasions of the Mahrattas and urged that they should be treated with justice and liberality. In 1823 and again in 1875 *Sanads* were granted to these chiefs, fully confirming their authority within their States and guaranteeing their ancient independence. Nothing has occurred to justify interference with their old-time rights, nothing except the fact that there are 'new conditions' as your 'Imperialist' calls them. Their country is being opened up by railways and is known to contain coal, gold, and other minerals in payable quantities. As in South Africa, so in India, your Balliol man has his own interpretation of the principle of *sic vos non vobis.*"†

INTERFERENCE WITH NATIVE STATES

The Bengalee criticised this policy of Lord Curzon of interfering with Native States. It wrote :

"Are ancient obligations to be scattered to the winds in the presence of new conditions ? To say that they may be disregarded, is to lay down a most dangerous doctrine, which would sap the

* *Ibid.*, pp. 75-77.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 77-8.

confidence of the rulers of Native States in the British Government. The treaties with the great States of Hyderabad, Gwalior, and Baroda were concluded under circumstances, which no longer exist. The condition of things has changed ; and are the treaties with these great Feudatories to be disregarded on that account ? And if not, we ask why should there be one law for the great Native States and another for the petty States ? The policy of the Government in relation to the petty States of Chota Nagpur, as embodied in this *Sanad*, is calculated to sap the foundations of all confidence in the declarations of the Government, We trust, it will be abandoned. The rulers of these States have not shown that they are unequal to cope with the altered conditions. No charges of maladministration have been brought against them. The new policy is absolutely without any ustification and is in violation of the recognised policy of the past."*

"THE POLICY OF CHAPERONING"

The following passage from "Famine Notes" by this Highness the Gaekwar of Baroda may also be read with profit. It runs :

"It is, however, a pity that the British Government is so fond of centralisation and so strictly compels Native states to ask for its sanction in matters where they ought to be entirely free to make their own arrangements, even if necessary, in concert with other neighbouring Native States. If Native States are to be preserved in all their vitality, it is necessary to give them greater freedom, and promote in them habits of self-reliance and to stop this policy of chaperoning done out of mistaken kindness. Some blunders are preferable to imbecility and want of timely decision. The tendency of the British Authorities in their treatment of Native Administrations, in periods of famine, seems at times too assertive of supremacy. This proclivity tends to create a gulf between the native governors and the governed, and all manly interest in the pursuit of good and consistent rule is discouraged."†

"WHO IS MAINLY TO BLAME ?"

Mr. Gribble of the Madras Civil Service pertinently raises the question : Who is mainly to blame ? In his article in the *East and West* (May, 1902), he says :

"Again, it is often said that even in his capital the Native Prince cares for little beyond the luxuries and pleasures of his own palace and zenana, and that he loves best to shut himself up with a case of champagne and a troup of dancing girls. This charge is certainly not correct as a general one, but if it were true, who is mainly to blame ? The Prince has no chance of taking a prominent share in the affairs of the world. The *Pax Britannica* prevents him from using his sword. Even in his own dominions, he is scarcely allowed a voice in the government, and is provided with a minister, sometimes against his own choice, who does the governing, whilst he has little more to do than to sign the decrees."§

THE DELHI DURBAR

The Delhi Durbar cost a large amount of money of the Indian Exchequer. About this splendid Durbar at Delhi, an English writer says :

"I have so far avoided much reference to the Delhi Durbar itself and its unpardonable waste of public and privade money, because, knowing the dire straits of the India of the millions, I cannot trust myself. It would need the pen of a Juvenal to adequately portrary the degeneration of English manners involved. Perhaps Rudyard Kipling may find his 'Imperial' ideal in the circus cavalcade headed by an English nobleman, dressed 'in a sky-blue court uniform' (was it *mousseline de soie*

* *Ibid.*, pp. 78-49.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

§ *Ibid.*, p 80.

Pompadour with Imperial purple lace insertion ?) and 'splendidly mounted on a richly caparisoned elephant, the decorations on whose trappings included figures emblematic of Justice and Plenty." Imagine the keen exhilaration it caused Lord Kitchner to trundle along in such a show, and believe me that these epicene apings of the follies of the Moghul sovereigns in the days of their vicious and shameless decadence are offensive to every intelligent and cleanly minded man, European or Indian."*

During the Delhi Durbar, Lord Curzon did not make an 'exchange of State visits, accompanied by salutes of artillery.' The writer of *The Failure of Lord Curzon* thus comments on it :

"On what grounds, then, with what motive did Lord Curzon make use of a great festival of loyalty, held to do homage in a special degree to the King-Emperor, to refuse these visits of high courtesy, these saluting salvoes of well-earned honour, and put an almost intolerable affront on the Princes of India ? I do not exaggerate the fact. The language of the Native Press was loud and angry in protest. It was stated that several of the great feudatories tried hard by various excuses to avoid going to Delhi, and subjecting themselves to such a slight. The feeling was so strong that some explanation had to be attempted. It was urged that the distances were so great between the Delhi camps that His Excellency might overtire himself ! Why then was not a representative, the Lieutenant-Governor or the Senior Member of the Supreme Council, sent ? The extreme estimate of the area of the land occupied by the Durbar at Delhi was eighty square miles, a space measuring ten by eight miles. Where there is a will there is a way. I was at the Delhi Durbar in 1876, when the title of Empress was assumed by her late Gracious Majesty, and I well remember how the Earl of Lytton performed this tiring duty. Day after day for a week the firing of salutes went on during several hours, whilst the Viceroy received and returned visits. The little State processions went by every half hour, each prince receiving the full honours of his rank. All the glow and splendour were not reserved for the glorification of one too prominent individual."†

The expenses incurred by the Native Chiefs in connection with the Delhi Durbar were rather heavy.

"The last official report on the condition of one of the most prominent feudatories at the Durbar declares that it is temporarily bankrupt, unable to meet its debts—three causes being categorically assigned : (1) the recent famine, (2) the expenses of the coronation at Westminster, and (3) the still heavier outlay at Delhi." The result would be that "there will be cruel wringing of the peasants' loins—the *misera contribuens plebs* —over many a broad acre in feudatory India, to pay for peacocking 'Imperialism' at Delhi."§

LORD CURZON'S FRONTIER POLICY

Lord Curzon gave up the Forward Policy with regard to the North-Western Frontier of India. He also ordered the withdrawal of troops from the Frontier. We read about his Frontier policy :

"I have pleasure in recognising that in one particular Lord Curzon's policy has undoubtedly been well advised. I refer to his withdrawal of the outlying garrisons on the North-Western Frontier and his evident recognition of the true meaning of the military collapse, known as the Tirah Expedition. But in doing the right thing he cannot leave well enough alone. Having thrown overboard the so-called Forward Policy and its brood of petty tribal wars, he must proceed to stultify himself by destroying the only effective check on 'Imperialist' adventure on the frontier. He has formed a new sub-province, which has been withdrawn from the control of the civil government of the Punjab and

* *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

† *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, pp. 82-83.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

placed in the hands of a so-called military-civilian, who deals directly with the Supreme Government. To a theorist, like Lord Curzon, this seems a very admirable arrangement, till it is remembered that the Supreme Government is and has always been an 'Imperialist' junta, in which the dominating War Party has for a quarter of a century been trying to get rid of the Punjab civil control, but under strong Viceroys like Lords Lansdowne, Dufferin and Elgin it hopelessly failed."*

"THE FOWLER WAR"

Sir Henry Fowler, the "Liberal Imperialist," engineered an excursion into Waziristan. But he was prevented from doing so by the Punjab Government and the civilian members of the Viceroy's Council. We read about this "Fowler War":

"It was immediately before the first of these foolish excursions (into Waziristan), engineered by the original 'Liberal Imperialist,' Sir Henry Fowler, that the Punjab Government did its last service to peace on the Frontier. All the civilian members of the Viceroy's Council, Sir Charles Pritchard, Sir Antony Macdonnell, and Sir James Westland, protested against the Fowler War, but their hands would have been nerveless but for the high authority and experience of the Punjab Government. These very distinguished men, all of them of over thirty year's service in India, the very flower of the Indian Civil Service, put it on record in their Minute of Protest that –

'It is evident that the Lieutentant-Governor of the Punjab does not anticipate any great difficulties *if our establishments are kept within our present frontier line*, and if, at the same time, due precautions are taken to prevent the provocation of collisions with the tribesmen and to moderate the ardour of those of our civil and military officers *who are eager for adventure*'."†

CREATION OF THE NEW FRONTIER PROVINCE

Lord Curzon created the new Frontier Province and placed it directly under the Government of India. About the creation of this new Frontier Province, we are told:

"To make things smoother and to show how superior 'Imperialist' good manners are, the whole of the correspondence with the India Office on the subject of the new Frontier Province was carried to a conclusion without the Lieutenant-Governor being once consulted. This high official, a sturdy Scot, a long-headed loyal servant of the Crown, protested vigorously against the discourteous exclusion of himself and successors from a field of action preculiarly theirs, and was promptly told, with the minimum of civility, that it was impossible for the Viceroy to breathe the same air as such a rebel and, if he did not keep silent, it would be necessary to turn him and his Government out of Simla to some minor hill station, where he might in loneliness reflect on his presumption."§

THE WRETCHED CONDITION OF ASSAM COOLIES

The condition of coolie labour in tea gardens in the province of Assam was very wretched. When the tea industry began its prosperous career, "the Indian Government under mercantile pressure, was so unwise as to help it by means of a special Act, which enables the planter to obtain labourers at fixed wages for a term of years, under a registered indenture, the breach of which is punishable by the criminal law."

When the question of the sufficiency of the wages of these tea-garden coolies was raised, Lord Curzon realised the justice of the question.

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* *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, pp. 86-87.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

A FEEBLE "BUT"

Lord Curzon considered the question carefully. "He fully recognised that, whilst the price of food had, according to the statistics carefully prepared by Government, advanced 44 per cent. the wages of the tea coolies had been stationary for a quarter of a century and are at the present moment practically starvation payment." Lord Curzon allowed the law to be corrected accordingly, "but—there is often a feeble 'but' where Lord Curzon is concerned—he suggested an 'amendment to the effect that the operation of the wage clause of the Bill should, for special reasons, namely. the present condition of the industry, be postponed for two years,' which, 'in practice will mean that the enhancement will not commence to take effect until the close of the third year from now,' in fact, till his own term of office as Viceroy has expired."

"PRACTICALLY SELLING THESE PEOPLE"

In 1902, it was thought necessary to pass a law, the object of which, in the words of Sir Charles Rivaz, K.C.S.I., of the Viceroy's Council, "was to remedy the abuses and malpractices, which have sprung up in connection with the system of assisted emigration to the labour districts of Assam."

"The consequence was that a horde of unlicensed and uncontrolled labour-purveyors and recruiters sprang into existence who, under the guise of assisting 'free emigration,' made large illicit gains by inducing, under false pretences, ignorant men and women, chiefly in the most backward districts of Bengal and the Central Provinces, to allow themselves to be conveyed to Assam, and practically selling these people to the planters for the purpose of being placed under labour-contracts in that province.'"*

SIR HENRY COTTON AND THE NEW LEGISLATION

The new agitation for the improvement of the condition of the tea-garden coolies of Assam was led by Sir Henry Cotton, the Chief Commissioner of Assam. He was also the father of the new legislation for improving the wages of the coolies. Even *The Pioneer* admitted that "the strongest argument in favour of his views, which is brought forward by Mr. Cotton, is the mortality among Act-labourers. Though a good deal better than that shown by the decennial average, the death-rate in 1900 was 43.5, which is, he says, not much higher than that among the general population, but compares unfavourably with the death-rate among non-Act coolies, 26.2 per 1,000."

Sir Henry Cotton showed how the tea planters were cutting their own throats, the coolies they were able to obtain being "the very scum and riff-raff of the labour market." No one can doubt but that higher wages would buy a stronger, healthier, and more effective labour force."†

"THE PUNISHMENT OF HONEST ADVICE"

Lord Curzon did not like this agitation of Sir Henry Cotton. He also did not favour the new legislation for improving the wages of the tea garden coolies. And what was the reward Sir Henry got from Lord Curzon? The reward was that he was

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.

† *Ibid.*, p. 92.

excluded from the post of Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. About the *punishment of his honest advice*, the writer of *The Failure of Lord Curzon* says :

"How has Lord Curzon treated Sir Henry Cotton? With his habitual weakness. The tea industry is the most powerful in Bengal, and it made the Calcutta journals ring with denunciations of the Chief Commissioner. This gentleman had spent nearly thirty years of his service in that province, and held in it the highest offices next to the Lieutenant-Governorship, being for six yeasr Chief Secretary and Member of Council. His great abilities, as well as his intimate acquaintance with Bengal, added to an exceptional popularity, marked him out as the next Lieutenant-Governor. Lord Curzon knighted him and let him retire on the expiry of his term of service. In fact, the important office of Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal was kept vacant for several weeks after the deeply lamented death of Sir John Woodburn, and his successor, a gentleman who had not served one day in Bengal, was not appointed till two days after the retirement of Sir Henry Cotton had been gazetted. As in the case of Mr. Smeaton and Burmah, to use the words of *The Pioneer*, the transaction 'is apt to raise doubts whether fair play, the public interest and the opinion of the province chiefly concerned have been given due weight.' Jingo organs may wax eloquent over Lord Curzon's strength, but we Anglo-Indians know him better. He collapsed before a commercial outcry just as he climbed down when the educated Indians made it clear that they would not have his education 'reforms' at any price. He has been in the one case weak and wrong as in the other he was weak and right, the want of backbone being the dominating feature of both policies. It only remains again to observe that it is a bad, bad thing, but a grieveous fact that only a very rare official in India can hope for high promotion, unless he is blessed with official blindness in fact, unless he is a 'safe man' without zeal and without convictions."*

"THE UPROOTING OF HONEST DEALING"

Now, comes the turn of Madras, where Lord Curzon "placed upon the Statute book on absolutely unjust Water Cess Act, which has deeply offended that province and which would be impossible in any free country."

In discussing the Bill, the Hon. Mr. G. Venkataratnam made the following remarks :

"Under the existing law, Government stands only in the position of an Irrigation Company. Government supplies water for irrigation only to those who apply for it. Water is sold by the acre irrigated, and the only principle recognised for charging differential rates is, that the value of lands of different classes would be affected in different degrees, according as they are capable or not of bearing sugar-cane, rice, garden stuffs, and the more valuable kinds of crops generally. If self-interest induced the ryot to purchase water, he purchased it; otherwise not. As stated by the Hon. Mr. Grose at the meeting of this Council, on the 22nd January, 1895, 'the rate of the water-cess is determined on the principle that a fair commercial value should be put on all water supplied.' This is the system which has been in force till now in the Godavery and Kistna Deltas."

He continued to say :

"Under the existing law, the supplier of water cannot fix the rates too high, for the demand falls as the price rises. In other words, the maximum gross income is obtained by making rates low enough to develop a good volume of traffic. Accordingly Sir Charles Wood" (Secretary of State for India in the Ministries of the great Liberal Premiers Lord Aberdeen, Palmerston and Russel) "laid down as one of the cardinal principles of policy 'that the water rate should be so adjusted that even the land which benefits least by the application of water will yield to the cultivator an increased profit fully sufficient to enable him to pay it. One of the great reasons for the extensive use of canal irrigation in this country has been its cheapness, and the manner in which the price of water

* *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

has been adjusted to the crops grown. Under a system of voluntary sale, the interests of the supplier and of the purchasers of water are identical. The system has produced excellent results in practical working and the Hon. Mr. Alfred Deakin truly says that taking all things into consideration it may be questioned if there is a more beneficient or more profitable public work *in the world* than the Godavery Irrigation System."*

That was the system prevailing in the Madras Presidency. But it did not commend itself to our "restless upsetter of things long established." The Government of Lord Curzon tried to introduce a change in the existing system. The Hon. Mr. G. Venkataratnam said:

"The old system was very simple in practice and easily understood. Now we are asked to abandon this self-acting system in favour of one, which removes us from the region of fact into that of speculation. The first change proposed is, that Government shall be empowered to levy *any* water-rate it thinks fit, under such rules as it may prescribe, alter or amend from time to time, whenever water, by direct or indirect flow, or by percolation or drainage, from any river, stream, channel, tank, or work belonging to, or constructed by Government, from or through adjoining lands, or otherwise, irrigates any land under cultivation and such irrigation is beneficial to and sufficient for the requirements of the crop on such land. The second change is, that the opinion of the Collector shall be final on the point whether such irrigation is beneficial to and sufficient for the requirements of the crop; that he shall be the *sole interpreter* of the rules under which he professes to act; and that his inquiry shall not be a judicial proceeding. The third change is, that the Civil Courts shall be *divested of jurisdiction* to question any assessment made by the Collector under the Act."†

He went on to say:

"The option of refusing irrigation has been the only safeguard open to the cultivator against any injustice or inequality in the imposition of water-rates which rates it is left to the supplier of water to fix at his pleasure. When you give power to the supplier of water to charge any rate on any land according to his own view of the benefit caused by such water, without regard to the volition of the cultivator, it may be imagined what the consequences of such a drastic change will be. The supplier can enforce his own rates. It will no longer be to his interest to get cultivators to take water for irrigating a great many acres, but to get a maximum price for a few acres. His policy will be one of high prices rather than large sales. You will place the cultivators absolutely at the mercy of the supplier."§

The writer of *The Failure of Lord Curzon* thus comments on this water-cess imposed in the Madras Presidency:—

"I may mention that there was an enhancement of 25 per cent. in the water cess in Madras in 1894, followed by some relinquishments of water agreements by the peasantry. Since then there has been a persistent attempt to introduce compulsion, a proceeding, which, if straightforward, might arouse attention. The end has been arrived at by a manœuvre, a subterfuge, which may commend itself to 'Imperialists,' but is abhorrent to the most elementary ideas of fair-play...The money derived from the enhanced cess was needed not for the extension of irrigation in Southern India but for 'Imperialist' outlay on the Afghan frontier, probably to start a village-burning foray into Waziristan."**

* *Ibid.*, pp, 96-97.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.
§ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.
** *Ibid.*, pp. 100—101.

"THE UPROOTING OF A PEASANT PROPRIETARY"

In Bombay Lord Curzon tried to uproot the peasant proprietary. After the lapse of a century, he tried to destroy the peasants' rights as free holders. It is regarded by some as 'a still more unjustifiable inroad on the rights' of the Indian property in Bombay. In 1901, Lord Curzon gave his assent to a new Amending Act, 'which in a couple of sections has destroyed an ancient Peasant Proprietary.'

In 1879, the Bombay Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879) declared in section 73 that "the right of occupancy shall be deemed an heritable and transferable property." But then came Lord Curzon's Act VI of 1901, which destroyed both these rights, a new section amending the earlier law laying it down that "the occupancy or interest of the occupant in the land shall not be transferable without the previous sanction of the Collector." "The land revenue official can exclude from succession a son, a purchaser, or a creditor, without assigning any reason and without his decision being called in question by a court of law. As in Madras, so in Bombay, Lord Curzon seems to doubt the legality as well as the justice of his proceedings, and forearms himself by slamming the doors of the law courts in the face of the injured native proprietor."

AN EMPHATIC PROTEST AGAINST CONFISCATION

When this measure of confiscation was passed by the Bombay Legislative Council some of the members of the Council made an emphatic protest of the most significant kind. A Bombay journal thus writes about the protest :

> "Then followed a scene, which will be memorable in the annals of the Legislative Council of Bombay. On the result of the voting on the motion being declared, Mr. Mehta, Sir Bhalchandra Krishna, Messrs. Parekh, Khan and Gokhale left the Council Hall before the Bill was read a second and a third time and passed. This is the most emphatic protest which the non-official members could have entered against the extraordinary course of legislation, upon which the Bombay Government is embarked."*

One should notice "the manner in which this plundering legislation was driven through the Council at a single sitting, the Bill being read a second and a third time almost without taking breath."

An English writer comments on this legislation thus :

> "Still after making every allowance for the necessity of protecting the state-beggared farmers from the harpies of usury it may well be questioned whether any one but a past master in reactionary recklessness would attempt to arrive at this excellent object by a policy of wholesale uncompensated confiscation. It ought to be fairly easy, to formulate legislation intended to restrict the alienation of land to money-lenders, but to your 'Imperialist' the Indian, like the Kaffir, is merely a human machine, without rights, whom God has created to pay taxes, to work in gold mines, and generally to make himself financially useful to the pushful."†

LORD CURZON'S EXCISE POLICY

Lord Curzon also allowed the Excise revenue to grow more and more. It may be regarded as one of the items forming the mainstay of Indian revenue. We read in *The Failure of Lord Curzon* :

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* *Ibid.*, p. 104.
† *Ibid.*, p. 105.



Gopal Krishna Gokhale

"His (Lord Curzon's) scamping of the coolie question in Assam is equalled by his neglect to deal with the painful question of intoxicants, liquor and drugs, in that province and throughout India. In Assam English tea planters have for years been on their knees begging Government to remove or even supervise the Excise system that is poisoning their labourers. The revenue from liquor done in Assam has increased by 250 per cent in the past ten years. The day a tea garden is opened a Christian Government sets up a drink shop at its gate, the liquor being made at a Government distillery and found on analysis to contain seven times more fusel oil than the worst unrectified Scotch whisky. And so it is all over the Empire. The total excise revenue has risen from £ 1,755.000 in 1875 to a 4,239,000 in 1901. It would be possible to maintain an entire army corps in Kabul for six months with the increased annual revenue, and this knowledge is joy to the 'Imperialist' conscience. An English M. P. some years ago counted 126 men and women dead drunk on opium in a single den in Lucknow. He was a Nonconformist and rather horrified. The unreasonable man might have foreseen that the proceeds of that shop in one year probably paid for the caparisoning of a dozen State elephants at the Delhi Durbar."*

THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT

At a meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council held on Friday, the 4th December 1903, a Bill was introduced to amend the Indian Official Secrets Act of 1889. Mr. G. K. Gokhale strongly criticised the provisions of the Bill. In opposing the Bill, Mr. Gokhale said :

"Sir, this Bill, both in its principle and its details, is open to such grave objection that it is a matter for profound regret that Government should ever have thought of introducing the measure. *The Englishman,* in a recent issue, describes the Bill as calculated to Russianize the Indian Administration, and says that 'it is inconceivable that such an enactment can be placed on the statute-book even in India.' This, no doubt, is strong language, but I think, it is none too strong, and in view of the quarter from which it comes, it should give Government pause. Fourteen years ago, when the Indian Official Secrets Act was passed, there was no discussion in the Council, as the measure was introduced and passed at Simla. But there were two considerations in its favour : first, that a similar Act had already been passed in England and it was applicable to all the dominions of His Majesty, including India, and so the Indian Act was a mere Indian edition of the English Law already in force in India ; and, secondly, it related principally to naval and military secrets, and it could be argued that, as such secrets concerned questions of the country's safety, it was necessary for Government to have drastic powers for preventing their disclosure. The present Bill, however, proposes to make alterations of so astounding a nature in that Act that it is difficult to speak of them with that restraint which should characterize all utterances in this chamber. To state the matter briefly, the Bill proposes to make three principal changes in the old Act : first it proposes to place civil matters on a level with naval and military matters ; secondly, in place of the present provision that a person who enters an office *for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining information* is liable to be punished under the Act, it is now proposed to enact that whoever 'without lawful authority or permission (the proof whereof shall be upon him), goes to a Government office,' commits an offence under the Act ; and, thirdly, it is proposed to make all offences under the Act cognisable and non-bailable. Now, Sir, it is difficult to imagine that any responsible officer of Government conversant, in any degree, with the administration of the country, and possessing the least regard for the professed character of British rule, could have drafted these amendments. Take the first proposal to place civil matters on a level with naval and military matters. The civil administration of the country ranges from the highest concerns of State policy which engage the attention of the Viceroy down to the pettiest detail of the routine work of a village official. The word 'secret' is nowhere defined, and it must, therefore, include all official information not

* *The Failure of Lord Curzon,* pp. 105—106.

authoritatively notified by the Government to the public. And I want to know if it is seriously intended to make the publication of even the most trivial news in connection with this vast civilr administration of the country penal—such news, for instance, as the transfer of a Government office from one place to another—unless it has first appeared in a Government resolution or any other official notification. And yet this would be the effect of the proposed amendment. *The Englishman* calls this Russianizing the administration, and he is entitled to the thanks of the public for his powerful and disinterested criticism. For the Bill, even if it becomes Law, will not in practice affect him or the other editors of the Anglo-Indian papers. I would like to see the official who would venture to arrest, and march to the police thana, the editor of an Anglo-Indian paper. But so far as Indian editors are concerned, there are, I fear, officers in this country, who would not be sorry for an opportunity to march whole battalions of them to the police thana. It is dreadful to think of the abuse of authority which is almost certain to result from this placing of Indian editors, especially the smaller ones among them, so completely at the mercy of those whom they constantly irritate or displease by their criticism. It might be said that, while Government have no objection to the authorized publication of official news of minor importance they certainly want to prevent the publication of papers, such as the confidential circulars about the wider employment of Europeans and Eurasians in the Public Service, which were published by some of the Indian papers last year. Now in the first place, the Bill does not distinguish between matters of smaller and greater importance. And, secondly, even on the higher ground on which the measure may be sought to be defended, I submit that the Bill, if passed into law, will do incalculable mischief. I think, Sir, that in a country like India, where naval and military secrets require to be protected, if anything, with even geater strictness than in England, the very reverse is the case with matters concerning the civil administration."*

THE INDIAN UNIVERSITIES ACT

At the meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council held on Friday, the 18th December, 1903, the Hon. Sir T. Raleigh moved a Bill to amend the law relating to the Universities of British India. Mr. G. K. Gokhale in protesting against the Bill, first narrated the events leading to the drawing up of the Bill. He said:

"Let the Council for a moment glance at the circumstances which have preceded the introduction of this Bill. More than two years ago, your Lordship (Lord Curzon) summoned at Simla a Conference of men engaged in the work of education in the different provinces of India. Had the Conference been confined to the educational officers of Government, one would have thought that Government was taking counsel with its own officers only, and, of course, there would have been no misunderstanding in the matter. But the presence of Dr. Miller at the Conference at once destroyed its official character, and gave room for the complaint that the deliberations were confined to European educationists in India only. The fact that the proceedings of the Conference were kept confidential deepened the feeling of uneasiness already created in the public mind by the exclusion of Indians from its deliberations. Later on, when the Universities Commission was first appointed, its composition as is well known, afforded much ground for complaint; and though, to meet public opinion halfway, your Lordship took the unusual step of offering a seat on the Commission, almost at the last moment, to Mr. Justice Guru Das Banerjee, the objection remained that, while missionary enterprise was represented on the Commission in the person of Dr. Mackichen, indigenous enterprise in the field of education was again left unrepresented. The hurried manner in which the Commission went about the country and took evidence and submitted its report was not calculated to reassure the public mind. Finally, the holding back of the evidence, recorded by the Commission, on the plea that its publication would involve unnecessary expense, was very unfortunate, as other Commissions had in the past published evidence ten times as voluminous and the question of economy had never

* *Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale* (Third Edition), pp. 213-15.

been suggested. Now, my Lord, every one of these causes of complaint was avoidable and I cannot help thinking that a good deal of the apprehension, which every right-minded person must deplore, would have been avoided, if Government had been from the beginning more careful in this matter."*

The Hon'ble Mr. Raleigh stated that the principal objection to the present system of University education was that it produced the discontented B.A. and a great army of failed candidates. Mr. Gokhale in reply remarked :

"The Hon'ble Member describes these classes as a curse to the country, and he claims that his proposals are intended to abate this evil. Now, my Lord, I would, in the first place, like to know why 'the army of failed candidates, who beset the avenues to subordinate employment' should be regarded as a curse by the Government any more than any other employer of labour regards as a curse an excess of the supply of labour over the demand. These men do no harm to anyone by the mere fact that they have failed to pass an examintion or that they seek to enter the service of Government. Moreover, unless my Hon'ble friend is prepared to abolish examinations altogether, or to lay down that not less than a certain percentage of candidates shall necessarily be passed, I do not see how he expects to be able to reduce the evil of failed candidates. The colleges on the Bombay side satisfy most of the conditions that the Hon'ble Member insists upon, and yet the problem of the failed candidates is as much with us there as it is here. As regards the discontented B. A, assuming that he is really discontented, will the Hon'ble Member tell me how his proposed reconstitution of the universities will make him any more contented? .. The truth is that this so-called discontent is no more than a natural feeling of disaffection with things as they are, when you have on one side a large and steadily growing educated class of the children of the soil and on the other a close and jealously-guarded monopoly of political power and high administrative office."†

Mr. Gokhale then proceeded to quote from the speech of Lord Ripon, who, in addressing the University of Bombay in 1884, spoke as follows :

"I am very strongly impressed with the conviction that the spread of education and especially of Western culture, carried on as it is under the auspices of this and the other Indian Universities imposes new and special difficulties upon the Government of this country. It seems to me, I must confess, that it is little short of folly that we should throw open to increasing numbers the rich stores of western learning; that we should inspire them with European ideas, and bring them into the closest contact with English thought, and then that we should, as it were, pay no heed to the growth of those aspirations which we have ourselves created, and of those ambitions we have ourselves called forth. To my mind one of the most important, if it be also one of the most difficult, problems of the Indian Government in these days is how to afford such satisfaction to those aspirations and to those ambitions as may render the men who are animated by them the hearty advocates and the loyal supporters of the British Government."

Mr. Gokhale continued to say :

"My Lord, I think it is in the power of Government to convert these 'discontented B.A.'s' from cold critics into active allies by steadily associating them more and more with the administration of the country, and by making its tone more friendly to them and its tendencies more liberal. This, I think, is the only remedy for the evil complained of, and I am sure there is none other."

As to the provision for a limited Senate, Mr. Gokhale said :

"The spirit in which the Government has chosen to deal with the Universities in this Bill appears to me to be more French than English. Was it really to revolutionize their position so completely

* *Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale*, pp. 225-26.

† *Ibid.*, p. 227.

in the interests of education alone ?.. My Lord, I am personally not opposed to the idea of a limited Senate, and were the question not complicated by fears of probable injustice in the first reconstruction, I should even be disposed to support the idea strongly....But to make the Fellowships terminable in five years and to keep practically nine-tenths of the nominations in the hands of Government will, in my humble opinion, seriously impair all real independence in the deliberations of the University. My Lord, there are in the special circumstances of this country, three different interests which really require to be adequately represented in the University Senate. These three interests are not—at any rate, are not always thought to be—identical, and I think it is necessary to secure an adequate representation to each one of them. My Lord, I feel that it is only reasonable to ask that, as far as possible, each interest may be represented by about a third of the whole Senate. Thus, taking the case of Bombay, I would fix the number of ordinary fellows at 150, and of these, I would have 50 nominated by Government, 50 either elected by or assigned to different colleges, and the remaining 50 thrown open to election by the graduates of different Faculties of more than ten years' standing....Failing the plan which I have suggested, I would support the scheme proposed by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Guru Das Banerji in his minute of dissent. It is impossible for me to support the proposals put forward on this point by Government in the Bill."

Mr. Gokhale also opposed the proposal to give at least half the number of seats on the Syndicate for the different Faculties to professors and teachers. Mr. Gokhale would give a large representation to these men on the Senate, but having done that, he would leave the Syndicate to be composed of those whom the Senate would consider to be best qualified.

Mr. Gokhale added further :

"I confess that there is a good deal in this Bill with which I am in hearty sympathy. But the main provisions of the Bill are so retrograde in character that it is impossible for me to support the measure. My Lord, I have already admitted and I admit again, that there are serious defects in the methods of teaching and of examination pursued at present in this country. But the present Bill, in my opinion, offers no remedy calculated to cure the evil. I really think, my Lord, that the Government has begun the work of University reform at the wrong end. It is not by merely revolutionizing the constitution of the Universities that the object which all well-wishers of education in this land have equally at heart will be attained."*

When the Report of the Select Committee on the Indian Universities Bill was brought before the Imperial Legislative Council on the 18th March 1904, Mr. G. K. Gokhale again spoke against the Bill. He said :

".... We are further told that the presence of a large unacademic element in the existing Senates has tended to lower the standard of University education and to impair discipline. Especially this has been the case, so we are assured, with the University of Calcutta, and a writer, writing under the name of 'Inquisitor', has spent considerable industry and ingenuity in demonstrating how efficiency and discipline have suffered as a result of Indians—especially Indians unconnected with the profession of teaching—having a substantial voice in the deliberations of that University.. My Lord, I am myself personally unacquainted with the working of the Calcutta University, but I have made inquiries, and I find that, while there may be some room for the complaint which 'Inquisitor' makes, the evil has been greatly exaggerated, and, in any case, there are facts on the other side which he might have included in his statement. For instance, he might have told us that in 1881 no less an educationist than Sir Alfred Croft brought forward a proposal for removing classical languages from the list of compulsory subjects, and it was mainly by the votes of the Indian Fellows present and by the casting vote of the Chairman that the proposal was rejected. I would like to know how the Hon'ble

* *Ibid.*, pp. 283-34.

Mr. Raleigh or the Hon'ble Dr. Bhandarkar would regard such a proposal today. Again we find that in 1893, a committee consisting almost entirely of educational experts, including several prominent European educationists, declined to approve a rule laying down that no teacher in a recognised school should teach more than sixty pupils at the same time, Dr. Guru Das Banerjee being the only member of the Committee who stood out for such a rule. In 1894, on a motion brought forward by Surgeon-Colonel McConnel, supported by Professor Rowe and Surgeon-Colonel Harvey, the regulation which required candidates for the M. D. degree to have passed the B.A. Examination was rescind ed, and it is worth remembering that the motion was opposed by an Indian member, Dr. Nil Ratan Sircar. Even in the well-known case of a prominent Calcutta college, when a serious charge was brought against the working of its Law Department, it is a remarkable circumstance, which, 'Inquisitor' might have mentioned that the Syndicate, which proposed a temporary disaffiliation of the Law branch of the college was unanimous in making the recommendation, and of the nine members who voted for this proposal, seven were Indians, six of them being again unconnected with the profession of teaching. My Lord, I have mentioned these few facts to show that a wholesale condemnation of Indian Fellows—even of such of them as have been unconnected with the work of education—is neither fair nor reasonable, and that the position in reality comes very much to this--that, when Englishmen have proposed changes in the existing order of things, nothing is said, but when similar changes have been proposed by Indian Fellows, the cry that efficiency or discipline is in danger has been raised without much hesitation by those who would like to keep the management of University affairs mainly in European hands."*

Mr. Gokhale also added :

"My Lord, if any one imagines that the passing of this Bill will lead to an improvement in the quality of the instruction imparted in colleges, he will soon find that he has been under a delusion. Even those who make the more guarded statement that the Bill, by providing an improved machinery of control, will bring about a steady and sure reform in the character and work of affiliated institutions, will find that they have been too sanguine in their expectations. My Lord, after nearly twenty years' experience as a teacher, I lay it down as an incontestable proposition that a teacher's work with his students is but remotely affected by the ordinary deliberations of a University, and that, if he finds that he is unable to exercise on their minds that amount of influence which should legitimately belong to his position, he may look within himself rather than at the constitution of the Senate or the Syndicate for an explanation of this state of things."†

LORD CURZON'S CONVOCATION ADDRESS (1899)

In his Convocation address before the Calcutta University in 1899, Lord Curzon defined his attitude towards University reform. After pointing out the difference between a teaching university and an examining university, His Excellency said :

"Nevertheless, inevitable and obvious as these differences are, there may yet be in an examining university—there is in such institutions in some parts of my own country and still more abroad—an inherent influence inseparable from the curriculum through which the student has had to pass before he can take his degree, which is not without its effect upon character and morals, which inspires in him something more than a hungry appetite for a diploma, and which turns him out something better than a sort of phonographic automaton into which have been spoken the ideas and thoughts of other men. I ask myself, may such things be said with any truth of the examining universities of India ? I know at first sight that it may appear that I shall be met with an overwhelming chorous of denial. I shall be told, for I read it in many newspapers and in the speeches of public men, that our system of higher education in India is a failure, that it has sacrificed the formation of character upon

* *Ibid.*, pp. 239-41.

† *Ibid.*, p. 24.

the altar of cram, and that Indian Universities turn out only a discontented horde of office-seekers, whom we have educated for places which are not in existence for them to fill. Gentlemen, may I venture to suggest to you that one defect of the Anglo-Saxon character is that it is apt to be a little loud both in self-praise and in self-condemnation? When we are contemplating our virtues, we sometimes annoy other people by the almost pharisaical complacency of our transport; but, equally, I think, when we are diagnosing our faults, are we apt almost to revel in the superior quality of our transgressions. There is, in fact, a certain cant of self-depreciation as well as of self-laudation. I say to myself, therefore, in the first place, is it possible, is it likely, that we have been for years teaching hundreds and thousands of young men, even if the immediate object be the passing of an examination or the winning of a degree, a literature which contains invaluable lessons for character and for life, and science which is founded upon the reverent contemplation of nature and her truths, without leaving a permanent impress upon the moral as well as the intellectual being of many who have passed through this course? I then proceed to ask the able officials by whom I am surrounded and whose assistance makes the labour of the Viceroy of India relaxation rather than toil, whether they have observed any reflection of this beneficent influence in the quality and character of the young men who enter the ranks of what is now known as the provincial service, and when I hear from them almost without dissent that there has been a marked upward trend in the honesty, the integrity, and the capacity of native officials in those departments of Government, then I decline altogether to dissociate cause from effect. I say that knowledge has not been altogether shamed by her children, grave as the defects of our system may be, and room though there may be for reform. I refuse to join in a wholesale condemnation which is as extravagant as it is unjust."

In commenting on the above speech of Lord Curzon, Mr. G. K. Gokhale had remarked thus before the meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council, at which Lord Curzon presided:

"My Lord, the generous warmth of this most sympathetic utterance at once kindled throughout the country a great hope, and for a time it was thought that we were on the eve of a mighty reform which would change the whole face of things in regard to higher education in India. A liberal provision of funds for the encouragement of original research and of higher teaching, the institution of an adequate number of substantial scholarships to enable our most gifted young men to devote themselves to advanced studies, an improvement in the status and mode of recruitment of the Educational Service so as to attract to it the best men available, both European and Indian, the simplification of the preliminary tests, with a single stiff examination at the end of the course for ordinary students, so as to discourage cramming as far as possible—these and other measures of reform appeared to be almost within sight. It was, however, not long before the new-born hope that had thus gladdened our hearts was chilled to death, and we found that, instead of the measures we were looking for, we were to have only a perpetuation of the narrow, bigoted and inexpansive rule of experts."*

THE UNIVERSITY VALIDATION ACT (1905)

Another reactionary measure of Lord Curzon was the Universities Validation Act, following closely upon the Indian Universities Act. It was a measure to validate the notifications issued by the Chancellors of various Universities. About the hurried way in which the Bill was introduced in the Council, Mr. Gakhale said:

"It was only last night that I received the agenda paper of this meeting and then I saw that it was proposed to introduce a measure of this kind at today's Council. There was, however, no copy of the Bill with the agenda paper—there is no copy even now before me on the table—so

* *Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale* (Third Edition, Madras), pp. 255-56.

I was entirely in the dark until I heard the speech of the Hon'ble Member in charge of the Bill about the precise nature and scope of the proposed legislation."*

At a meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council, held on the 3rd February, 1905, when the Hon. Mr. H. Erle Richards moved for leave to introduce a Bill to validate action taken under the Indian Universities Act 1904, Mr. Gokhale, in opposing the motion, said :

"But as the Government have thought fit to introduce the present measure, and as I disapprove of it most strongly, there is no course open to me but to offer it such resistance as I can. My Lord, I interpret the Hon'ble Member's speech as a practical admission that the notifications which the Chancellors in the different Provinces have issued are illegal and *ultra vires* and that the action taken under them cannot be sustained. For, if there had been the faintest possibility of the notifications being upheld by the High Courts, the Government, I am sure, would not have taken this unpleasant and not wholly dignified course of coming to the Legislature to validate what they have done. Now, my Lord, one might easily ask the question how such illegal notifications came to be issued, for, with the resources at the disposal of the various Governments in the matter of expert legal advice and in other ways, the public have a right, even in this country, to expect work less careless than that. But when a mistake has been admitted, in public life as in private life, the less one dwells on it the better. But though I do not care to press the question how these notifications came to be issued, I must protest emphatically against the course proposed to be adopted to set right the illegality that has been committed. I think, my Lord, the only proper course for the Supreme Government on this occasion would have been to call upon the various Chancellors to withdraw these objectionable notifications and substitute others in their place more in accordance with the law. Instead of following this plain course, the Government have chosen to come to the Legislature with proposals to remedy, not any defect in the law, but a serious illegality committed in taking action under the law, and persisted in, in spite of warnings and protests. My Lord, in all civilized countries there is a well-understood and well-defined distinction between the Legislature and the Executive Government, and the Legislature is regarded as higher than the Executive. In India unfortunately this distinction for the most part is only of a nominal character ; for, with the present constitution of the Councils, the Executive Government can get what law they please passed by the Legislature without the slightest difficulty. I submit, however, that it is not desirable, it is not wise, that this fact should be forced on the attention of the public in so unpleasant a manner as on this occasion, and I think the distinction become a farce if our Legislature is to be thus at the beck and call of the Executive Government, and if it is to be called upon to exercise its powers of legislation to remedy defects, not in existing laws, but in executive action under those laws. My Lord, I respectfully, but emphatically, protest against this lowering of the dignity of the Legislature. Of course, there is nothing to prevent the Government legally from coming to the Legislature with such proposals as they please. But I venture to think that there are moral limits on the competency of the Government in this matter."†

At a meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council held on the 10th February 1905, Lord Curzon presiding, Mr. Gokhale moved that the consideration of the Bill to validate action taken under the Indian Universities Act 1904 be postponed *sine die*. Mr. Gokhale said :

"...I would invite the attention of the Council to what has taken place at Calcutta and Bombay and I take these two universities, partly because it has been easier for me to obtain precise information in regard to them than in regard to the others during the short time at my disposal, but

* *Speeches of G. K. Gokhale*, p. 259.

† *Ibid.*, pp 259-261.

mainly because the circumstances of the Calcutta University are, or ought to be, within the personal knowledge of several members of this Council, and at Bombay matters have culminated in a suit being instituted in the High Court. My Lord, I have no wish today to stir up the ashes of the controversy that raged round the Universities Bill last year, though one may say in passing that some of the fears then expressed by the opponents of the measure about the probable exclusion of independent Indians from the administration of the Universities have already been more or less realized. What, for instance, can be more lamentable than that, on the present Syndicate of the Calcutta University, four Faculties out of five should be without a single Indian representative, and that in Bombay, a man like Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, once a Dean in Arts, who, in point of attainments and of zealous devotion to the best interests of the country towers head and shoulders above many of those who have of late been posing as authorities on high education in this land, should be excluded from the Faculty of Arts ?"*

Mr. Gokhale proceeded to say :

"Let us now see how they have followed this scheme (of the Act) in practice at Bombay and Calcutta. In Bombay the election of ten Fellows by Graduates and by old elected Fellows took place all right. The appointment of eighty Government nominees followed in proper form. Finally, these ninety proceeded to co-opt the remaining ten, sitting and voting together as required by the Act. The Bombay Senate was thus regularly constituted and no one has taken any exception to its constitution. Then came the Chancellor's notification about the election of a Provisional Syndicate, in which he arbitrarily divided the Fellows into groups, which he had no power to do, and directed the several groups to meet and vote separately and on separate days, which also he had no power to do. And when the illegal character of the notification was brought to his notice and opinions of eminent lawyers in support of this view were forwarded to him, the University authorities persisted in acting on the notification, with the result that the aggrieved party had to move the High Court for redress. In Calcutta the catalogue of illegalities was even longer. Here the election of ten Fellows by Graduates and by old elected Fellows took place alright and the Chancellor's nominations were also in regular form. From this point, however, commenced a regular series of irregularities. The ten Fellows were to be co-opted by the elected and nominated Fellows sitting and voting together, as required by the Act. The constitution of the Calcutta Senate itself was thus defective. Then the Chancellor divided the Senate into Faculties for the purpose of electing the Syndicate, which he had no power to do. The old regulations which are still in force recognize only Faculties, but the Chancellor constituted five Faculties on his own responsibility, which was irregular. Under the old regulations every Fellow, *ex-officio* or ordinary, must belong to at least one Faculty ; but the Chancellor did not assign the *ex-officio* Fellows to any Faculty, which was irregular. Finally, the Provisional Syndicate was elected by the Faculties, instead of by the Senate, as expressly required by the Act, and this was irregular. And now after all these irregularities have been committed, the Government of India come to the Legislature with a proposal to validate all that has been done ! In doing so they ignore the fact that they are interfering with a pending suit, destroying the protection of High Courts which the public prizes above everything else, lowering the dignity of the Legislature, and creating throughout the country a most deplorable impression about the practical irresponsibility of the Executive Government. And yet, when it is said that the action of the Government is a practical admission that the notifications were illegal, the Hon'ble Member thinks it necessary to protest against the inference !"†

CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT SOCIETIES ACT (1904)

One measure of Lord Curzon's administration which met with some amount of support from the non-official ranks is the Co-operative Credit Societies Act of 1904.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 264-265.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 266-67.

It has inaugurated a series of new societies for encouraging thrift, self-reliance and resourcefulness. The co-operative movement has met with a large measure of success in this country.

At a meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council, held on the 23rd March 1904, Lord Curzon presiding, the Hon. Sir Denzil Ibbetson moved that the Bill to provide for the constitution and control of Co-operative Societies, as amended, be passed. Mr. G. K. Gokhale on this occasion supported the motion, saying :

"My Lord, after the continuous opposition which it has fallen to my lot to offer to two important measures of Government during this session, it is both a pleasure and a relief to me to find myself in a position to give my cordial and unequivocal support to the present Bill. The proposed legislation is no doubt only a modest measure, so far as its provisions go. But it authorizes a cautious and interesting experiment, which, if it attains any degree of success, cannot fail to exercise a wide and far-reaching influence, especially on the condition of the agricultural classes in India. My Lord, in the growing indebtedness of the Indian agriculturist and the steady deterioration of his general position, the Government of India is called upon to face one of the gravest problems that can confront a civilized administration. The difficulties of the situation are enormous and they can be overcome, if they are overcome at all, only by a long course of remedial action. ..Such action must include a series of cautious measures, intended both to bring him help and relief from outside, and to evoke or strengthen in him those qualities of prudence, thrift, self-reliance and resourcefulness, without which outside help can do him no great or permanent good. The present Bill is a measure of the latter kind, and its operation will be watched by every one interested in the future of the country with deep interest and in a spirit of hope"*

INDIANS IN HIGHER SERVICES

During the Budget discussions in the Imperial Legislative Council in 1903, in which Lord Curzon presided, Mr. Gokhale spoke against the policy of the Government of India of not appointing Indians to higher services. He said :

"The question of the wider employment of Indians in the higher branches of the Public Service of their own country is one which is intimately bound up, not only with the cause of economic administration, but also with the political elevation of the people of India. There is no other country in the world where young men of ability and education find themselves so completely shut out from all hope of ever participating in the higher responsibilities of office. Everywhere else the Army and the Navy offer careers to aspiring youths which draw forth from them the best efforts of which they are capable. These services, for us in this country, practically do not exist. The great Civil Service, which is entrusted with the task of general administration, is also very nearly a monopoly of Englishmen. But it is not of these that I propose to speak today. I recognise that, in the present position of India, our admission into these fields of high employment is bound to be very slow. I can even understand the view that, for the purpose of maintaining British supremacy intact, there must be for many years to come a large preponderance of Englishmen in the ranks of these services. But, my Lord, our exclusion from high office does not end here. In all the Special Departments or Minor Services, as they are called, our position is even worse. In the Judicial and Executive branches of the Public Service, the subordinate ranks at any rate are manned by us. But in such departments as Forests, and Customs and Salt and Opium, our exclusion from even lower ranks is practically complete. Thus in the Survey Department of the Government of India, there are altogether 133 officers, with salaries ranging from 300 to 2,200 rupees a month, and of these only two are Indians and they are in the last grade of Rs. 300. There are moreover 45 officials in this Department whose

* *Ibid.*, pp. 276-77.

salaries range between Rs. 160 to 300, and even among these only ten are Indians. Again take the Government Telegraph Department. There are 52 appointments in it, the salaries of which are Rs. 500 a month and more, and of these only one is an Indian. In the Indo-British Telegraph Branch, there are 13 officers with salaries above five hundred rupees a month and among these there is not a single Indian. So too in the Post Office. Last year there was only one Indian in that Department among the ten men who drew salaries above five hundred. But he was a member of the Civil Service, and it was in this capacity that he was there. In the Geological Survey, 2 out 14 officers, drawing salaries above Rs. 500, are Indians; in the Botanical Survey, none. In the Foreign Department, out of 122 such officers, only 3 are Indians; under Miscellaneous, there are 22 such officers, but not a single Indian is among them. It is only in the Financial Department that there is any appreciable proportion of Indians, namely, 14 out of 59, among those whose salaries are above five hundred a month....

"Now, my Lord, I would respectfully ask if such virtual exclusion of the children of the soil from these Special Departments can be justified on any grounds. Reasons of political expediency may be urged for our exclusion from the Army. It might also be urged with some show of reason that the Civil Service of India must continue to be recruited, as at present, by means of a competitive examination held in London....But why this shutting out of our people from the Special Departments also? There is no question of political expediency involved here. If Indians are found to sit on High Court Benches with dignity to themselves and honour to their country, it cannot be contended that they would be found wanting, if they were entrusted with responsible duties in the Opium or Salt or Customs Department. If it be argued that for the technical instruction that is necessary in the Telegraph and some other Departments there are no adequate facilities in the country, the answer to that is that Government should provide those facilities to the people of this country. But the virtual monopoly of these Departments is so jealously guarded that, where competitive examinations for entrance into them exist, those examinations have been surrounded with stringent restrictions such as are unknown in the case of the great Civil Service. Thus while an Indian, by passing the Indian Civil Service Examination, might one day be the Head of a District, or of a Division as some Indians actually are at present, no Indian is allowed to compete for entrance into the Police Department at the competitive examination that is held in London, because, if he passed, he might one day be the head of the Police in a District. Again only two years ago the rules for admission into the Engineering and Telegraph Departments from Cooper's Hill were altered with the express purpose of preventing more than two Indians in any particular year from entering those services. This alteration of the rules was a grievous wrong done to the people of India, and it has produced a feeling of bitter resentment throughout the country. In the Educational and Public Works Departments, our numbers are slightly more satisfactory than in the other departments, but even here the constitution of a Provincial Service, with a lower status and a lower scale of pay, has caused much dissatisfaction and discontent. My lord, if all posts were equally open to Indians and Europeans, something might be said in favour of paying the Indian a smaller salary, if Government in the interests of economic administration preferred the Indian to the Englishman, when both were equally eligible; but to restrict the employment of Indians and at the same time to pay such of them as are employed a lower salary is to inflict upon them a double disadvantage, the reason for which it is not easy to understand. My lord, the Universities turn out every year a large number of young men who have received a fairly high education. It is a natural aspiration on the part of many of them to seek responsible employment in the service of their own country. If they find a bar in front of them, whichever way they turn, how can they be blamed if they occasionally show signs of discontent? They belong to what may be called the articulate classes of this country, and what they say sinks slowly but steadily into the minds of the mass of the people. We have been promised equality of treatment, both in the Act of 1833 and the Proclamation of 1858. I for one am prepared to allow that such equality of treatment is under existing circumstances possible only within certain limitation; only I am anxious that there should be a constant

movement in the right direction, and that, as year succeeds year, the sphere of employment should widen for my countrymen more and more. I ask this in the name of good policy as well as of justice, and I earnestly trust that the spirit of my remarks will not be misconceived."*

A REMARKABLE PETITION

A very remarkable petition was presented in 1900 to the Secretary of State for India "by a body of retired Indian officials, for the most part men of special distinction, of great experience, and of the highest authority. Of the gentlemen who ventured to offer advice to a Secretary of State, the most noticeable is Sir Richard Garth, late Chief Justice of the High Court of Calcutta, and formerly a well-known Conservative Q. C. in England. Four of them have been Members of the Council of the Viceroy or of local Governors. Most of them have held or passed above the grade of Commissioner of a Division, which in executive rank is next to that of a Governor of a province, a division being a sub-province with a population varying from five to sixteen millions of inhabitants."

The Memorial presented to the Secretary of State runs as follows :

"To The Right Honourable Lord George Francis Hamilton, M. P., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, India Office, White Hall, S. W.

My Lord, –

In view of the terrible famines with which India has been lately afflicted, we, the undersigned, who have spent many years of our lives among the people, and still take a deep interest in their welfare, beg to offer the following suggestions to your Lordship in Council, in the hope that the Land Revenue Administration may be everywhere placed on such a sound and equitable basis as to secure to the cultivators of the soil a sufficient margin of profit to enable them better to withstand the pressure of future famines.

2. We are well aware that the primary cause of famines is the failure of rain, and that the protection of large tracts of country by the extension of irrigation from sources that seldom or never fail has been steadily kept in view and acted on by the Government for many years past; but the bulk of the country is dependent on direct rainfall, and the pinch of famine is most severely felt in the uplands, where the crops fail simply for want of rain. The only hope for the cultivators throughout the greater part of India is therefore that they should be put in such a position as to enable them to tide over an occasional bad season.

3. To place the cultivators in such a position, we consider it essential that the share taken as the Government demand on the land should be strictly limited in every Province. We fully agree with the views of Lord Salisbury, when Secretary of State for India, as set out in his Minute of April 26, 1875 :

"So far as it is possible to change the Indian fiscal system, it is desirable that the cultivator should pay a smaller proportion of the whole national charge. It is not in itself a thrifty policy to draw the mass of revenue from the rural districts, where capital is scarce, sparing the towns, where it is often redundant, and runs to waste and luxury. The injury is exaggerated in the case of India, where so much of the revenue is exported without a direct equivalent."

4. Without going into tedious detail, we consider it very advisable that, in those parts of the country in which the Land Tax is not permanently settled, the following principles should be uniformly adhered to :

(*a*) Where the Land Revenue is paid directly by the cultivators, as in most parts of Madras and Bombay, the Government demand should be limited to 50 per cent. of the value of the net produce

* *Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale*, (Third Edition), pp 58-60.

after a liberal deduction for cultivation expenses has been made, and should not ordinarily exceed one-fifth of the gross produce, even in those parts of the country where, in theory, one-half of the net is assumed to approximate to one-third of the gross produce.

(*b*) Where the Land Revenue is paid by landlords, the principle adopted in the Saharanpur Rules of 1855, whereby the Revenue demand is limited to one-half of the actual rent or assets of such landlords, should be universally applied.

(*c*) That no revision of the Land Tax of any Province or part thereof should be made within thirty years of the expiration of any former revision.

(*d*) That when such revision is made in any of those parts of India where the Land Revenue is paid by the cultivators direct to the Government, there should be no increase in the assessment except in cases where the land has increased in value (1) in consequence of improvements in irrigation works carried out at the expense of the Government, or (2) on account of a rise in the value of produce, based on the average prices of the thirty years next preceding such revision.

5. Lastly, we recommend that a limit be fixed in each Province beyond which it may not be permissible to surcharge the Land Tax with local cesses. We are of opinion that the Bengal rate of 6¼ per cent. is a fair one, and that in no case should the rate exceed 10 per cent.

24, Palace Court, W.,
20th December, 1900.

We have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servants,

R. K. Puckler,
Late Director of Revenue Settlement, and Member of the Board of Revenue, Madras.
J. H. Garstin,
Late Member of Council, Madras.
J. B. Pennington,
Late Collector of Tanjore, Madras.
H. T. Reynolds,
Late Revenue Secretary to the Government of Bengal, and late Member of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General of India
Richard Garth,
Late Chief Justice of Bengal.
Ramesh C. Dutt,
Late Offg. Commissioner of the Orissa Division in Bengal, and Member of the Bengal Legislative Council.
C. J. O'Donnell,
Late Commissioner of the Bhagalpur and Rajshahi Divisions in Bengal.
A. Rogers,
Late Settlement Officer and Member of Council in Bombay.
W. Wedderburn,
Late Acting Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay.
John Jardine,
Late Judge of the High Court of Bombay.
J. P. Goodridge,
Late B. C. S., and formerly Offg. Settlement Commissioner, C. P."*

ITS PRAYER SUMMARISED

To put it briefly: the Petition wanted the Government to accept the following principles of land revenue—

(i) "That, where land revenue is levied direct from the farmers or cultivators, the demand should not exceed one-half or 50 per cent. of their net profit after disbursing the cost of cultivation.

* *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, pp. 17-19.

(ii) That, where land revenue is levied from landlords, the demand should not exceed one-half or 50 per cent of the rental obtained by them from their tenantry.

(iii) That a settlement should have a currency of thirty years, and

(iv) That, local taxation on the land should not exceed a further 5 per cent.

*"In other words, whether taxation, imperial and local, is derived directly from the landlords or from the tenantry, it should not exceed an income tax of 55 per cent."**

LAND REVENUE POLICY IN BOMBAY

It will be seen that the tax-gatherer takes more than 55 per cent. from the cultivator or the landlord. It is specially so in Bombay. We read :

"The history of the Land Tax assessment in Bombay is specially interesting, as Bombay has been for years the by-word of India for perennial famine and pestilence. The Census taken in 1901 proved that the population of the Bombay Presidency has fallen by three millions, although my raiats immigrated from the neighbouring Native States in order to share in the relief measures, recently carried out in ample degree. The official explanation is that the calamities, from which this great province is suffering, are the work of Providence, thn India Office attributing them to the short-comings of the rain god alone. The progress of the assessment of the Land Tax suggests a more mundane origin."†

EXCESSIVE GROWTH OF TAXATION

From the very beginning of the British rule, there has been an excessive growth of taxation in the Bombay Presidency. We read :

"The dominions of the Mahratta sovereign passed under British rule in 1817. The then land revenue, which was assessed in lump sums on each village community, being 80 lakhs of rupees, a lakh being 100,000. The following year it was raised to 115 lakhs, and in 1823 to 150 lakhs, already nearly double the native assessment of six years before. In 1825 a detailed assessment was attempted, separate settlements being made with the individual farmers. Writing nearly seventy years later, the Government of Bombay in its Administration Report for 1892-93, page 76, gave the following description of the operations of that time: 'Every effort was made- lawful and unlawful --to get the utmost out of the wretched peasantry, who were subjected to torture --in some instances cruel and revolting beyond description---if they could not or would not yield what was demanded. Numbers abandoned their homes and fled into neighbouring Native States ; large tracts of land were thrown out of cultivation, and in some districts no more than a third of the cultured area remained in occupation.' In 1836 another settlement was commenced and completed in 1872, with a total assessment of 203 lakhs or an increase of 35 per cent. In 1866 the leases of 1836, which were of a 30 years' currency, began to fall in, and another settlement was commenced, and is still proceeding. Up to March 31, 1899, only 13,369 out of the 27,781 villages in the province had been resettled, their revenue being enhanced from 144 lakhs to 188 lakhs, or a further increase of 30 per cent. In 1896 a few of these new leases began again to come to their limit. and a last settlement was attempted only to be brought to a standstill by famine. Still 78 villages round Poona were resettled, their taxation being increased from 103,530 rupees to 133,590 rupees or again by 30 per cent."§

Now, the result of this 'enormous enhancement' of the second settlement was the break-out of serious riots in 1877. A Commission was soon appointed to enquire into

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

the causes leading to the riots. The members of the Commission were a judge, two revenue officials of the North-Western Provinces, and two revenue officials of Bombay.

AN ANGRY PROTEST OF "THE PIONEER"

The composition of the Commission did not satisfy even *The Pioneer* and it made an angry protest against the Commission. We read:

"*The Pioneer*, which is the most conservative journal in India, and, in fact, is ordinarily regarded as the mouth-piece of the Government, summarised the conclusions of the Committee in these words: 'Of the five members of the Committee, three' (the independent members), 'namely, the judicial and the two North-West members, reply that it (the final element of distress that broke the ryot's heart) must be looked for in the revised land revenue assessments, in themselves extravagantly heavy.' 'The arguments of the majority,' it continued, 'form a grave indictment against the Bombay Revenue Survey. Briefly they may be thus summarised: The enhancements made at the recent revision were, judging by all known standards, excessive. Viewed in conjunction with the status of those, on whom they were imposed, they were *ruinous*. They were framed, finally, for the most part on conjectural and merely arithmetical data, much of which seems wrong. As to the excessiveness of the assessments, it is shown on the survey figures that the enhancement, as imposed originally, ranged in different taluks (Sub-districts) from 33 to 66 per cent. On individual villages it was often doubled; on individual holdings it was constantly more than doubled."

"The assessment," added *The Pioneer*, "is judged from its own mouth; and we find it imposing enhancements of 38 per cent. in the face of admitted depression, or forcing 77 per cent. down the throats of the local officers."

The following is the comment on the angry outburst of *The Pioneer*:


"It is often thus in India. The almost all-redeeming feature of maladministration is that it is ever battled against loyally and often successfully by brave-hearted Englishmen, whose local experience and sympathies have not been blinded and blunted by the so-called necessities of finance. Indeed, I would venture to say that there are few countries where officials have risked more than in India for the sake of the truth that is distasteful in high quarters. One distinguished Bombay officer, Sir George Wingate, did not mince matters. 'What must have been the state of things,' he angrily exclaimed, 'which can compell cultivators, proverbially patient and long-suffering, accustomed to more or less of ill-usage and injustice at all times, to redress their wrongs by murder, and in defiance of an ignominious death to themselves? How must their sense of justice have been violated? How must they have been bereft of all hope of redress from law or Government before their patient and peaceful natures could be roused to the point of desperation required for such a deed?"*

THE PIONEER'S SECOND OUTBURST "THE YOKE OF BRITISH MISGOVERNMENT"

The Pioneer was not content with the first article, it wrote a second one, in which it went so far as to use the expression—"The Yoke of British Misgovernment." *The Pioneer* wrote:

"Worried by the revenue survey, for heavily enhanced public payments, enslaved by his private creditor, dragged into court only to have imposed upon him the intolerable burden of fresh decrees, without even the resource of flight, which was open to his forefathers before the kindred scourge of Holkar, the Deccan ryot accepted, for the third of a century, with characteristic patience and silence, the yoke of British misgovernment. For thirty years, as we now learn from the papers

* *Ibid.* pp. 23-24.



P. C. Mazumdar



B. K. Bose

published, he had been at once the scandal and the anxiety of his masters. Report upon report had been written upon him ; shelf upon shelf in the public offices groaned under the story of his wrongs. If anyone doubts the naked accuracy of these words, let him dip into the pages of Appendix A (Papers on the Indebtedness of the Agricultural classes in Bombay). A more damning indictment was never recorded against a civilised Government. From 1844 to 1874, successive administrations have been appealed to, have been warned, or have been urged. Each, in its turn, has replied -as the present will doubtless answer to the late committee's importunities -with a suave sigh of *non possumus.* The hospitalities of Dapoor or Ganeshkhind (the palaces of the Bombay Governor) have for thirty years been lavished in graceful and generous profusion ; while the rayat, who paid for them, lay hard by in enforced and ruinous idleness, a debtor in the Poona goal ; or ate at their gates in the field, of which the fruits had once been his own, the bitter bread of slavery."*

Commenting on the above passage of *The Pioneer*, an English writer says :

"It is true that this seems the language of exaggeration ; yet, after making every allowance for the influence of a just indignation, it is impossible to deny that the history of this century presents few more lamentable pictures of maladministration by a European nation than does the pragraph from one of the most conservative journals in the Empire."†

The Pioneer went on to say :

"So the survey officers (of the land revenue) came and went, adding each his thousands and tens of thousands to the public assessments. Marwaris (money-lenders) swarmed up, in ever-increasing flights, from the far north-west, and settled down on the devoted acres. Decrees of the courts flew like arrow-flights into the thickest of the population, striking down the tallest and the most notable. *Stupidity, blindness, indifference, greed--inability, in a word, in all its thousand forms -settled down, like the fabled harpies, on the ryots' bread, and bore off with them all that he subsisted upon.*"§

ENHANCEMENT IN CENTRAL PROVINCES

The enhancement of land tax in the Central Provinces was even greater. Thirty per cent. enhancement would be considered merciful there. In 1902 the Hon'ble B. K. Bose, a Member of the Viceroy's Council, thus spoke in the presence of Lord Curzon :

"Proceedings with a view to a second new settlement are also in progress in Bilaspur and Raipur. These districts, especially the former, were very hard hit during the last famine. They are no less so this time, They were both newly assessed only *about ten years ago* ! The enhancement in Bilaspur was 102 per cent. in some groups and 105 per cent. in others."

We read :

"And there was no denial. 'The Great Viceroy' and his council sat silent. Did they even listen ? Their thoughts were probably far away, devising 'Imperialist' schemes of new railways into Persia or China. Other districts were hardly less severely dealt with. The enhancement on the previous revenue demand was in some groups of villages in Saugor District, 68, 48 and 53 per cent. ; in Jubbulpore District, 86,77,64,62 and 50 per cent., in Seoni District, 97,95 and 92 per cent. ; and in Raipur District 98 and 82 per cent. Moreover, the currency or term of the settlement was shortened from thirty to twenty years. The assessor will soon be at work again. The population in this

* Quoted in *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, pp. 24-25.

† *Ibid.*, p. 25.

§ Quoted in *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, p. 25.

comparatively sparsely peopled province of India, instead of increasing 10 or 12 per cent. as in happier parts of India, fell off by nearly one million souls during the past ten years."*

"A VERY VITAL QUESTION"

During the Budget discussion in 1902, the Hon. Donald Smeaton in his speech before the Legislative Council said :

"According to the accounts of 1900-01 over sixty lakhs of land revenue and rates were realised from Bombay, the Punjab and Madras in excess of the collections of 1899-1900, the year of famine, and these sixty lakhs were largely arrears in provinces where there had been either famine or deficient rainfall – arrears which apparently *should not have been demanded at all.* And this brings to my mind a very vital question lately raised, whether the *intensity* of recent famines is, or is not, *largely due* to poverty caused by the operation of our land revenue system as a whole?"†

Following is the comment on the above passage concerning "a very vital question" :

"This means that the surplus was in large part obtained by a procedure, which it is very difficult to condemn in temperate language. An immense sum of money, which had accumulated as arrears of land revenue – the 55 per cent. income tax – during a period of severe famine and plague, was ruthlessly extorted in the year following the famine, in addition to the procedure, which in Madras in the years following the famine of 1877 caused ruin to nearly a million families. To describe revenue so obtained as an evidence of wealth is to say the thing that is not, and Lord Curzon's Government must bear the blame of throwing dust in the eyes of the English people."§

The Hon. Donald Smeaton, who raised 'a very vital question,' had to pay rather heavily for raising the question. The reward that Lord Curzon had in store for the Hon. Mr. Smeaton, is this :

"In May last (1902) the term of office of Sir Frederick Fryer, Lieut.-Governor of Burmah, came to an end, and public opinion nominated Mr. Smeaton, who had served in that province for twenty years, as his successor. The only way to jockey this distinguished public servant out of his rights was to give Sir Fredrick Fryer an extension of office, so as to keep Mr. Smeaton out beyond the period of thirty-five years' service, after which an Indian Civil Servant is bound by a stringent rule to retire. Lord Curzon is alleged to have stooped to this device, a mean ungrateful device, to injure a man who had served his country so long."**

The Pioneer thus writes on the question of appointing a successor to the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma :

"It is also known that the Burmah public have long ago given their vote in favour of one of those candidates, who has for years been identified with the province. Mr. Donald Smeaton, the Financial Commissioner, has twice officiated as Chief Commissioner, and he has represented Burmah on the Supreme Legislative Council for four years. Moreover, Mr. Smeaton's thirty-five years end next November, so that, failing his succession to Sir Fredrick Fryer in May next, his services will be lost altogether to the Province. The fact that in the Supreme Council Mr. Smeaton has always given his opinion fearlessly and independently ought to have told in his favour rather than against him. A province requires a Governor who will frankly give his views regarding what is required in its best interests even if these views do not happen to harmonise with those of the higher powers. In all the circumstances of the case the extension of Sir Fredrick Fryer's tenure of office just long

* *Ibid.*, p. 30.

† *Ibid.*, p. 41.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

** *Ibid.*, p. 42.

enough to make it impossible for Mr. Smeaton to come into competition for the succession, is apt to raise doubts whether in this instance considerations of fairplay, 'the public interest, and the opinion of the province chiefly concerned, have been given weight."*

Thus Mr. Donald Smeation did not get the post in Burmah "The displacement of honest, experienced officials is one of the fine arts of 'Imperialism.' Similarly Sir Henry Cotton, the Chief Commissioner of Assam "lost the Lieut.-Govornorship of Bengal for honestly drawing the attention of the Viceroy to the underpayment of coolies on the tea gardens in Assam."

"A DOUBLE WRONG"

Like Mr. Smeaton, the Hon. Mr. Gokhale also pointed out that the surplus revenue was no evidence of Indian wealth. He said:

'Your Excellency, I fear I cannot conscientiously join in the congratulations which have been offered to the Hon. Finance Member on the huge surplus which the revised estimates show for last year. A surplus of seven crores of rupees is perfectly unprecedented in the history of Indian Finance, and coming, as it does, on the top of a series of similar surpluses realised when the country has been admittedly passing through very trying times; it illustrates, to my mind, in a painfully clear manner the utter absence of a due correspondence between the condition of the people and the condition of finances of the country. Indeed, my Lord, the more I think about this matter the more I feel, and I trust your Lordship will pordon me for speaking somewhat bluntly, that these surpluses constitute a double wrong to the community. They are a wrong in the first instance in that they exist at all that Government should take so much more from the people than is needed in times of serious depression and suffering, and they are also a wrong, 'because they lend themselves to easy misinterpretation, and, among other things, render possible the phenomenal optimism of the Secretary of State for India."

Mr. Gokhale proceeded to show that

"It is not prosperity but currency laws, protecting the value of silver coin from the effects of over-production of bullion in America, that yield these surpluses. 'A slight examination of these surpluses suffices to show that they are mainly, almost entirely, currency surpluses--resulting from the fact that Government still maintains the same high level of taxation which they considered to be necessary to secure financial equilibrium when the rupee stood at its lowest. Now we all know that a rise of 3d. in the exchange value of the rupee—from 13d. to 16d.--means a saving of between four and five crores of rupees to the Government of India on their Home Charges alone, and I think this fact is sufficient by itself to explain the huge surpluses of the last four or five years."

"THE PILING UP OF TAX ON TAX,'

The writer of *The Failure of Lord Curzon* remarks thus about the surpluses:

"The vaunted surpluses are due not to prosperity but to the enhanced value of the rupee, whilst taxation is maintained at the high rate necessary before the recent quinquennium of famine in order to meet a depreciated currency. There is no prosperity, but an excessive merciless taxation which takes from the miserable peasantry three-fifths of the profit of their fields, besides laying heavy burdens on the salt and sugar and fish they eat, on the cotton they wear, on the oil they burn, and 5 per cent. on every article of European manufacture they use, umbrellas, knives, lamps, brass for their utensils and iron for their ploughs. Such 'prosperity' was never seen in the world. All the ahove-mentioned taxation is new, being imposed during the past sixteen years. 'Such

* Quoted in *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, pp. 42-43.

continuous piling of tax on tax,' cried Mr. Gokhale, 'and such ceaseless adding to the burdens of a suffering people is probably without precedent in the annals of finance.' I may here mention that it has recently come to my noties that Sir William Hunter, the distinguished Indian historian, when a member of the Viceroy's Council in 1879, declared that "the Government assessment does not leave enough food to the cultivator to support himself and his family throughout the year."*

This increase in taxation was due to the addition of 30,000 men in the Indian Army.

Sir Edward Law, the Finance Member, in his Budget speech in 1902 showed how the current revenue was spent.

"It must be remembered," he wrote, "that India is defraying from the revenues the cost of undertaking both re-armament and the reform of military reorganisation in important departments. I believe that this is an undertaking which has not been attempted by other countries without the assistance of loans in some form or other."

Thus

"the taxation of one of the poorest nations on earth is kept up to conceit pitch in order to re-arm and equip an army beyond the needs of India in a manner the richest nations of Europe would be ashamed to attempt. I am sure Sir Edward Law is quite unconscious of the sufferings, the starvation, that result from his budgets. It is typical of the topsyturvydum of 'Imperialism' in India that this very capable gentleman had not one day's experience of an Empire so vast when he undertook to administer her finances."†

THE RUIN OF A GREAT INDUSTRY

During recent years there was a great revival of the cotton industry in Bombay and many new mills had been established. But no less than fourteen mills, according to Mr. Moses, a European Member of the Legislative Council, had gone into liquidation. Six more mills followed.

"A European merchant, with the approval of the great commercial community of Bombay, lays the blame of this state of things on Government, or, in other words, on the Viceroy, Lord Curzon. The taxation-ruined industrial labourer must now strive to take his scanty bread from the peasant, whom tax-created famine and poverty-created plague have made the object of world-wide pity."

It is also stated that 'their ruins will probably form a monument to Lord Curzon's neglect to relieve them from the taxation that is killing them'

INDIA TO PAY FOR HOME GOVERNMENT

As the loyal partner of the British Empire, India had to pay for the military charges of the Home Government. Thus writes *Capital*, the organ of European Commerce in Calcutta:

"It seems that the Home Government proposed to toist upon the Indian people a charge of £786,000 (Rs. 1,17,90,000) in the shape of additional pay to the British soldiers stationed in this country. This increase of pay has been the outcome of the war in South Africa, where troops from India saved the situation in Natal in the early part of the conflict a conflict with which the Indian people had nothing whatever to do, and in a country, too, where the natives of this empire are denied the full rights of citizenship, and where a Hindu has actually been fined for walking on the pavement. The Indian Government should resist this impost tooth and nail."

* *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

† *Ibid.*, p. 47.

"There is another charge," *Capital* continued, "that is to be hung round our necks, if Lord Curzon's Government in weak enough to submit to it, *viz.*,—a sum of £548,000 (Rs. 82,20,000), being £7 10s. for each soldier sent to India as the cost price of recruiting and training him. A more unjust imposition could not be made, and it is one which could only be thrust upon a people having no representative institution. The British Army is raised at home for Imperial purposes. The troops are liable to be sent anywhere. A regiment may have seen years of service in other parts of Greater Britain before it comes to India, and yet it is proposed to charge the original recruiting and training charges of the soldiers to the Indian Exchequer. The whole thing is ridiculous."*

Thus the Home Government imposed a contribution on India for the British Army expenses, which was equal to the land-revenue of Bombay. In this case neither the Government of India nor the people of India were consulted. *The Pioneer* in protesting against this treatment to the Indian Government wrote that 'past experience' showed that this treatment was habitual.

"There is an interesting enclosure in a despatch sent Home by the Government of India in 1890, 'showing the annual charges and certain initial charges which have been imposed upon Indian revenues in consequences of orders by the War Office, issued in all cases without the concurrence of the Government of India, and in some cases without that of the Secretary of State having been previously obtained.' The statement shows somewhere about one million sterling added in this way to the Indian Budget between 1864 and 1894."†

WANT OF SYMPATHY OF LORD CURZON

Lord Curzon was an able ruler, but there was a want of sympathy towards the people of India. An English writer gives the following estimate of Lord Curzon. He writes :

"That Lord Curzon is a man of varied intellectual gifts is beyond question. His University career was a brilliant one and he, no doubt, brought away with him very much of the useless knowledge, unpractical culture, and intellectual vanity that distinguish so many Balliol graduates. In the ways of business men he was and is a child. Quick, eager, and highly intelligent, he is without that kindly patience, that tactful art of give and take, which is the root of all successful statesmanship. With the training of a scholar it was at least to be expected that he would have a sincere sympathy with men of education, though in his eyes their education was infinitely inferior to his own. Yet it was the best in India, and that is a fact which he should not have overlooked."§

"THE UPROOTING OF POPULAR EDUCATION"

The educational policy of Lord Curzon was also a failure. The University Commission and the Universities Act were meant to officialise education :

"The destruction of Municipal Self-government was the initial *betise* of Lord Curzon's Indian career. The latest display of his worrithing activity has been quite as fatal to the good relations of Government with the educated classes of India. One of His Excellency's idiosyncrasies is that he thinks himself quite fitted to be an Educational Reformer. It is a common weakness of your high and dry Tory, with a wide knowledge of ancient literature and a narrow acquiantance with the modern conditions of progress......The amusing egoist, who now governs India, immediately dashed

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

† *Ibid.*, p. 51.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

to the opinion that in education as in municipal administration his great predecessors were quite backward folk and that the educational millennium was only awaiting the advent of a certain superior person."*

Even *The Pioneer* could not agree with the educational ideal of Lord Curzon. In a leading article on the 8th of August 1902, *The Pioneer*, which is "generally so pro-Government as to be practically the organ and often the mouthpiece of the Viceroy," dismissed Lord Curzon's educational policy in these words:

"Lord Curzon's ideal seems to be to bring the Indian universities into line with the system at Oxford and Cambridge. This is an idea, which is alluring to all Englishmen, but it is *quite impracticable* in the present stage of education in India, even if it were really desirable—a very wide question. Colleges *cannot be rooted out* of the localities in which they have grown and from which they have drawn their support, and be planted down hundreds of miles away round a University. The absence of means alone is sufficient argument against this scheme."†

LORD CURZON'S EDUCATIONAL POLICY

Lord Curzon's attempt was 'to destroy the indigenous colleges that have grown up all over India in nearly every big town.' We know of Lord Curzon's University Commission, which consisted of seven members, five being Europeans, 'mostly officials from the entourage of the Viceroy,' one Musalman and one Hindu of distinction. 'This unrepresentative body in due course produced a majority report, which, considering its constitution, was naturally only a lengthy exposition of Lord Curzon's expressed ideas and utterly subversive of the existing system of higher education in India.' The report raised a storm of indignant protest from the educated Indians.

"STRIKING AT THE ROOT OF EDUCATION"

The University Commission Report was criticised by many Indian educationists. The Hon. Dr. Mahendra Lal Sircar, the founder of the Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science and the most senior member of the Senate of the Calcutta University, was also strong in the condemnation of the Report. He remarked:

"I have told you often and often that we are enjoying under the rule of this nation more liberty, more freedom of thought and action, than we enjoyed under our own. But alas! that I should live to see this liberty ominously being threatened in a matter, which has been the greatest blessing under British rule. Without imputing any motives to anybody, I cannot but observe, and it breaks my heart to do so, that the recommendations of the Commission seem to me to strike at the root of general education and to discourage the study of science."§

"TO NARROW THE POPULAR BASIS"

Even a loyal Bengal zamindar like the Hon. Raja Piyari Mohan Mukherjea joined the protest meeting at the Calcutta Town Hall as its President. His remark is also worth quoting. He said:

"All that I desire to say is that the recommendations of the Commission being admittedly such as

* *The Failure of Lord Curzon, p. 65.*

† *Ibid.*, p. 66.

§ Quoted in *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, p. 67.

to greatly narrow the popular basis of high education, it is the duty of every well-wisher of the country to avail himself of all constitutional means to get those recommendations set aside."*

"A MATTER OF LIFE OR DEATH"

Another open critic of the Report was the Hon. Narendra Nath Sen, the reputed editor of the *Indian Mirror*, a well-known journal of Calcutta in those days. He said :

"The matter under discussion today may, without exaggeration, be fitly described as one of life or death to the aspirations and progress of our countrymen. The recommendations of the Universities Commission may spell life to a few, but they mean death to countless aspirants after not only fame and fortune, but for very subsistence. They threaten the existence of more than half the colleges in India."

"REVOLUTIONARY PROPOSALS"

The Hon. Surendra Nath Banerjee, the Editor of *The Bengalee* and a Member of the Bengal Legislative Council also condemned the crudity of Lord Curzon's new policy. He wrote:

"If a number of persons, deputed to perform an important public duty, had deliberately set themselves to the task of framing revolutionary proposals, they could not have done better or worse than the Universities Commission. With all possible respect for these gentlemen, we are bound to say that they proceeded as if they had a *tabula rasa* upon which they might inscribe anything they pleased. The great middle class of England are wealthy, and can afford the heavy educational expenses of the Public School and of the University. The middle class in India are poor, and for reasons, which it is needless to enquire into, are poorer now than they were fifty years ago. To transplant the English system into their midst, without reference to existing conditions and the totally different circumstances of the two countries, would be a piece of political unwisdom, which we trust the present rulers of India will permit us not to associate with their names."†

"A POLITICAL MOTIVE SUSPECTED"

Another journal, *New India*, an organ of the educated class, 'plainly accuses Lord Curzon of the intention of reducing the number of educated Indians for political reasons.' It says :

"Since some time past, the Government of India has been seeking to do something to check the 'unhealthy overgrowth' of University education in India. This education, they think, is a source of political danger. It turns out—official exponents of this policy have repeatedly said - an army of discontented young men every year. It is creating an army of half-educated, unemployed, and consequently disaffected persons in the country."

"CLOSING THE DOOR AGAINST THE HIGHER CASTES"

New India goes on to show that the educational policy of Lord Curzon would close the doors of education against the people of the higher castes, who supply nineteen-twentieths of the Universities in India. It remarks :

"However we may condemn it and try to break it down, caste is still a potent factor in India ; and nothing is likely to create deeper and more widespread discontent than interference, direct or indirect, with the inborn caste sentiment of the people. Education alone will, we think, some day pull this barrier down. Where the sentiment has already been weakened, it is education that has

* *Ibid.*, p. 67.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69

done it. To close the doors of this education against the people of the higher castes, and to compel them, through pressure of economic forces, to seek occupations not in harmony with their caste feelings, would be to sow the seeds of a mighty revolution in the peaceful Indian soil. Let the Government understand this, before they make any attempt to curtail the present educational opportunities of the people."*

"A DEATH-BLOW TO MUHAMMADAN PROGRESS"

In the Town Hall protest meeting Moulvi Abul Kasim of the Burdwan Muhammadan Association described the University Commission Report as a death-blow to Muhammadan progress. He said :

"In the resolution, gentlemen, you call attention to some of the most prominent recommendations of the Commission as being open to the gravest objection. All these recommendations mean in some form or other the closing of the door of high education against the middle classes. If these recommendations would seriously affect the prógress of the Hindu boys, they would be ten times more injurious to the Moslem youth. Poverty, you have been told, gentlemen, is no crime, and it is an admitted fact that the Indian Mussulmans are a very poor community ; I may warn you gentlemen, that if these recommendations are given effect to, it would be a death-blow to the spread of high education among the Mussalmans and to Muhammadan progress in general."†

"LORD CURZON CLIMBS DOWN."

It should be noted that Lord Curzon modified to a certain extent his Balliol-*cum*-Eton policy of restricting education to the rich. We read :

"I am glad to say that ..Lord Curzon has climbed down, an operation which, when performed by a Viceroy, is not as balm of Gilead to a sensitive British subject. Still, it is a pleasure to be able to say that our thoughtless, off-at-a-tangent Satrap has found grace and, it is generally believed, will do little harm and less good to the cause of education in India. The indigenous colleges will not be destroyed and the fees will not be raised. Lord Curzon's connection with this all-important subject has, in fact, been flighty and weak where it has not been also mischievous It is impossible for him to ride off on the apology that he is not responsible for the recommendations of the Commission. No one attempts this futile excuse in India, where there is no shirking the fact that the Viceroy had clearly indicated his views and that the fine salaried official members did little but reproduce and expand them. Such proceedings sap the loyalty of a conquered people, and the loyalty of the Indian people is a thing worth preserving."§

REPORT OF THE UNIVERSITY COMMISSION OF 1902

When the Report of the University Commission of 1902 was published, the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, issued a circular letter, in which he said :

"The Commission travelled and held sittings between the 18th February and the 18th April 1902, and within that period many colleges and institutions affiliated to the Universities were visited. The Report of the Commission, which has already been published, has been read by the Governor-General-in-Council with much interest and advantage. In the opinion of His Excellency in Council it covers with accuracy and fulness (but with sufficient condensation) the entire ground which they

* *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

§ *The Failure of Lord Curzon*, pp. 72-73.



Sir Gooroo Das Banerjee

were invited to traverse. It exposes faithfully, but without undue severity, the defects of the present system of University education ; it outlines a comprehensive scheme of administrative and legislative reform : and it testifies to a laborious and minute investigation of the subject by the President and his colleagues which His Excellency in Council has much pleasure in acknowledging. The position occupied by the Honourable Mr. Justice Banerjee and his high authority in educational matters lend great weight, not only to his Note of Dissent, but also to the many recommendations of the Commission in which he agrees." *

NOTE OF DISSENT OF JUSTICE GOORUDAS BANERJEE

Justice Goorudas Banerjee, the only Indian member of the University Commission of 1902, did not agree with all the points of the Report. He, therefore, submitted a Note of Dissent, in which he said :

"I regret very much that I am unable to agree with my learned colleagues on some of the points dealt with in our Report. These points of difference being of importance, more or less, I deem it my duty to state my views upon them, in the order in which they occur in the Report, and to indicate briefly my reasons in support of these views."

About (1), the constitution of the Senate and the Syndicate, he said

"that in whatever way the new Senate may be constituted, whether by appointment alone or partly by election as well, they should fairly and adequately represent Government and private educational interests, and non-educational official and non-official interests, and these interests should be represented by Europeans and Indians in fair, and if possible equal, proportion."

Dr. Banerjee went on to say:

In saying this, I know I am saying what is not quite in accord with ordinarily accepted views on the subject. It is maintained by many that educational interests are all that need be represented on the Senate of a University ; and it is said by some that as a University is a Western institution, the European element should predominate in the Senate, with only a small admixture of the Indian element to enable the European members to know what the views of the Indians are upon any question affecting them. Speaking with all respect for these opinions, I must say that my own view, though opposed to them, is not altogether unresonable, as a little consideration will show.

"Universities exist for promoting the advancement of learning, and in the constitution of their Senates, the educational interests are no doubt entitled to representation before all others ; but there are other interests involved which also require representation, and which must not be ignored ; and they are those of the Government and the general public. ..

Again, though it is quite true that the University is a Western institution, and active friendly co-operation of European scholars and scientists is at the present day absolutely necessary, and must at all times be most cordially welcome, in the management of Indian Univirsities, it should also be borne in mind that it is Indian youths who chiefly resort to them, and that their requirements and difficulties, their habits and modes of life, and even their sentiments and susceptibilities should receive due consideration, and for that purpose educated Indians should be adequately represented on the Senate. In saying this I do not lose sight of a possible danger sometimes apprehended, of Indian members seeking to lower the standard of education in order to make the attainment of academic distinctions easy for their countrymen ; but I venture to think that self-interest, if not also sound judgment, aided by past experience, will serve as a sufficient safeguard, and Indians will no longer fail to see that to make University degrees in this country of any real value, we must raise their standards as high as they are in the great English Universities.

* Quoted in *Reminiscences, Speeches and Writings of Sir Goorudas Banerjee*, p. 174.

In regard to the constitution of the Syndicate, I am unable to agree to the proposal in clause (c) at page 13 of the Report for securing a majority of teachers."*

Dr. Banerjee then considers the question (2) of disaffiliation of colleges by the Syndicate and says:

"The next point upon which I feel constrained to disagree with my learned colleagues is the proposal made in page 13 of the Report, that no decision of the Syndicate for the disaffiliation of a college should be open to revision by the Senate....

It is desirable...that before Government takes action upon any recommendation by the Syndicate for the disaffiliation of a college, that college should have an opportunity of bringing the matter before the Senate, so that the Government may, when passing final order in the case, have before it the opinion of the Senate as well as that of the Syndicate, together with the materials upon which those opinions are based."

Mr. Justice Banerjee also disagreed on the question (3) of raising the fees in Arts colleges. He remarked:

"Another point upon which I am unable to agree in the Report is that relating to the fixing of a minimum rate of fees in Arts colleges, dealt with at pages 16 to 19.

In my opinion the minimum rate of college fees should be left to adjust itself according to the circumstances of each province, and the Universities should not interfere in determining it, unless there be very strong reasons for doing so....

Speaking with all respect, I must say I am wholly unable to accept the first reason as sound. Whether it is to the real interest of a poor student of but ordinary ability to follow a University course, it is for him and for those immediately interested in him to decide. Others may give him proper advice; but no University would be justified in imposing any restriction such as a prohibitive fee for the sole purpose of preventing him from entering it, if he satisfies all other ordinary tests of fitness for doing so....

The principle of excluding students from University education by a fee limit is open to the further objection, that it will, on the one hand, exclude not only the undeserving but also the deserving poor students; while, on the other hand, it will fail to exclude the undeserving rich students. My learned colleagues think that the exclusion of deserving poor students may be prevented by the award of scholarships. I do not see how that will be practicable. The best among the deserving may be helped in that way, but not all. The number of students who pass the Entrance Examination of the Calcutta University in the first division may be taken on an average, roughly speaking, to be about 1,000. They may all be fairly regarded as deserving students; but we can hardly expect to have so many scholarships. Nor can it be said that they all deserve scholarships; and it will be invidious and impracticable to separate the poor from the rich among these 1,000 students for the award of scholarships.

It will, therefore, be unjust and unwise to fix a minimum fee rate for the purpose of excluding poor students of fair average merit from University education." †

Mr. Justice Bannerjee then took up the question (4) of the transfer of students from one college to another. He said:

"The next point upon which I am unable to concur with my learned colleagues is their recommendation at page 19 of the the Report that—

'No transfer should be permitted in the middle of a course of study unless for special reasons to be recorded in writing by the college authorities and reported to the Syndicate.'

* *Ibid.*, p. 175—78.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 181—83.

I am fully alive to the importance of maintaining discipline, and would disallow transfer in the middle of a course, if such transfer is sought for to avoid the enforcement of discipline. But the recommendation just referred to, goes very much farther......

Because a student takes his admission into a certain college, that is no reason why he should be compelled to continue in it until his course is finished. His circumstances may change for the worse or the better, making him unable to pay the fees of that college or able to pay the higher fees of a better college ; or the circumstances of the college may change by changes in its staff ; and it may become desirable for the student to obtain a transfer. To compel him to state his reasons in such a case would be most undesirable, and more injurious to discipline than to allow the transfer freely.

The attachment of a student to his college is no doubt a most laudable and wholesome feeling, and should be always carefully fostered and encouraged. But it should be spontaneous ; and it cannot be created by any compulsory rules against transfer. Such rules may protect the pecuniary interests of colleges ; but they will be far from being conducive to the creation of any such feeling ; indeed, to the Indian mind, they will make the relation between a student and his college appear more mercenary than it ought to be. They may also, by guaranteeing protection against any falling off of students, indirectly tend to impair the desire for improvement on the part of colleges.

I would, therefore, recommend the allowing of tranfer freely, except where it is asked for to evade discipline."*

Dr. Banerjee then proceeded to consider the question (5) of the improvement of colleges. He remarked :

"The next recommendation in the Report, in which I am unable to concur, is that contained at page 19, according to which, second grade colleges, that is, those teaching only up to the standard of the First Examination in Arts, should either rise to the rank of first grade colleges, that is, teach up to the B. A. standard or fall back to the position of high schools.

So far as the recommendation aims at the abolition of inefficient second grade colleges, I entirely concur in it. But that a college should cease to exist merely because it is a second grade college with a school attached, is a proposition to which I am unable to assent. If it does its work efficiently so far as it aims, it is no good objection against it that it does not aim higher. The objection that the distinction between college students and school boys is apt to be overlooked in such institutions, appears to me to be, I must say with all respect, more of a sentimental than a practical character, especially with reference to non-residential educational istitutions such as most of our colleges and schools are."

In speaking of the first grade colleges, he observed :

"With regard to first grade colleges, I should here observe that as high education has made only small progress in this country, and as most of these colleges have been established to meet the educational wants of the people, though it is necessary to introduce improvements in them for increasing their efficiency and for raising the standard of education, the Universities must not only be careful not to press measures of reform with undue haste, but should also actively help the colleges in bringing about the required reforms. And one of the modes in which Universities may render such help would be by establishing Physical and Chemical laboratories, which may, under suitable conditions and restrictions, be available to such of the colleges as are earnestly endeavouring to improve by applying all their resources to increase their efficiency, without reserving any profit for their proprietors. The forced abolition of any such college, owing to its inability to equip itself fully, must be regretted by all, and should be prevented, if possible. Nor will it be any improper diversion of University funds, derived as they are chiefly from fees paid by students,

* *Ibid.*, 185-87.

to apply them in part to help colleges to which the poorer classes of students resort for receiving education at a moderate cost."*

The Government of India wanted to bring the private secondary schools under their control. Dr. Banerjee, therefore, protested against the recommendation of the Commission that the recognition of a school by the University should depend upon its recognition by the Director of Public Instruction. He said :

"So far as Government and aided schools are concerned, there can be no objection to this recommendation. But as regards unaided private schools, the propriety of the recommendation is open to question. These schools receive no aid from Government ; and it does not seem to be right to place them practically under the control of the Education Department, to subject them to the rules made by the Director of Public Instruction, and to compel them to adopt the scheme of studies prescribed by him. It would amount to an undue intereference with their freedom of action in directions in which they might be left free to move, with benefit to themselves and without harm to others ; and it would tend to reduce the school education of each province to a dead level of uniformity not always conducive to progress.

All that the unaided private schools want is recognition by the University, so that they may send up their students as candidates for the University Entrance Examination ; and for that purpose, all that the University is called upon to ascertain is that they are well-conducted institutions, are efficient in teaching up to the Entrance Examination standard, and are not injurious to the interests of discipline. It is true, the University has no adequate machinery for ascertaining these matters, and even if it were to determine the question of recognition of a school for itself, it must depend upon the Director of Public Instruction for information. But though in practice the report of the Director of Public Instruction or of one of his subordinates will have to be accepted, as a matter of principle the determination of the question of recognition should be an act of the University. Moreover, even from a practical point of view, it makes a great deal of difference whether the recognition of a school is an act of the University or of the Education Deparment. For with all respect for an officer of the high position of a Director of Public Instruction, the University, of which he will always be a member and which has other responsible members associated with him, would be a better authority to determine any question than he alone can.

Unaided private schools no doubt concern the Education Department in this respect that they compete with schools recognised by it. But this circumstance, while it entitles the head of the Department to a voice in the determination of the question of their recognition, is itself a reason for not making him the sole judge in the mater.†

Mr. Justice Banerjee could not also agree to the recommendation for the abolition of text books in English for the Entrance Examination. He pointed out that the object intended by the Regulation would be better secured by prescribing suitable text books than by the plan recommended in the Report. He said:

"In the first place, it is not correct to say that the mere prescribing of text books leads student to commit to memory keys and notes without understanding the text. It is the prescribing of texts abounding in obscure allusions, or containing thoughts and expressions beyond the comprehension of those for whom they are intended, or written in a style which cannot serve as a model for students to imitate, that leads to the evil spoken of, as some of the witnesses have said ; and the remedy lies not in abolishing text books, but in prescribing better books than those in use.

In the second place, it is not correct to assume that students mechanically commit to memory keys and notes without reading the text, for the mere pleasure or convenience of doing so. Everyone

* *Ibid.*, p. 189.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 190-91.

who knows anything about the way in which students work at home, must know at what cost of time and trouble, and how reluctantly, they follow that course; and if they do so nevertheless, it is partly because the method of teaching in most places does not discourage that course, and chiefly because the method of examination to which they are subjected, encourages it, as the evidence before us goes to show. The true remedy for the evil of cramming lies then in starting with suitable text books and improving the modes of teaching and examination.

Nor will it be safe to assume that we shall suppress cramming by abolishing text books unless we also improve our methods of teaching and examination. There are already existing many hand-books, for the study of English and books of model essays; and if text-books are abolished, there will soon come into existence many more books of the same type, as well as summaries, abstracts and compendious keys of the several books which the University might recommend; and in place of a careful study of the text book and its keys, there will be substituted a hurried reading of the numerous books just referred to, thus giving rise to a worse sort of cramming than the one we are trying to check."*

Mr. Justice Banerjee was also against the centralisation of Law teaching, as in Madras and Lahore. He protested against the proposal in the following terms:

"The state of things observed at Lahore and the city of Bombay does not, however, make one very hopeful about the efficacy of centralization. Moreover, there is a circumstance connected with the colleges of Bengal which should be noticed here. The income derived by some of them from their Law department goes materially to help their Arts department: and if the former be closed, as will be the case if Law education is centralised, the latter will suffer. This is a result which should be avoided, if possible.

"Another strong reason against centralisation so far Calcutta is concerned, consists in the large number of Law students. No central college, however well managed, can conveniently accommodate or efficiently teach such a large number of students.

"As regards the Universities of Calcutta, Bombay and Allahabad, I would therefore leave Law teaching in the hands of the colleges, provided that they increase their staff where it is insufficient, and make arrangements for tutorial supervision by having classes in the evening as well as in the morning. And I would recommend that those three Universities should establish at their local centres good Law libraries accessible to all Law students of affiliated colleges and Law Societies under the guidance of committee composed of members of the Bench and the Bar of the High Courts and of the Professors of the Law Colleges, where Law students may meet and read papers and have debates on a question connected with Law."†

Then came the question whether and how far the School Final Examination should take the place of the Matriculation Examination. On this question Dr. Banerjee remarked:

"No definite scheme of the School Final Examination being before us, we cannot compare its merits with those of the Matriculation Examination. But whatever the nature of that scheme may be, we may say this that if a literary as distinguished from a technical course of school education is retained, as one may presume it will be, the test of such education and that of a student's fitness to enter a college or University, ought to be the same, and one examination ought to be sufficient as a test for both, instead of examinations being multiplied unnecessarily. A large examination no doubt has its difficulties, but they are not removed by making the School Final to take the place of the Matriculation Examination.

"The question is reduced to this, namely, whether, if there is to be one examination, it should be the School Final or the Matriculation Examination. I think it ought to be the latter. It will serve the

* *Ibid.*, pp. 192-93.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 195-96.

double purpose of testing whether a student has pursued his school course of literary education properly and whether he is fit to enter a college. The opposite view will result in placing all schools, whether they receive aid from Government or not, under the control of the Education Department, though many of them impart education only to enable their students to enter the University. The latter class of schools, where they receive no aid, ought to be placed under the control of the University."

Dr. Banerjee could not agree with the recommendation for the repeal of the rule, that no one engaged in teaching a subject for any examination should be appointed to set questions in that subject for that examination. He said :

"The reason for this recommendation, as I understand it, is that teachers are the persons best qualified to set proper question papers in their respective subjects. Theoretically, perhaps, this may be true ; but judging from practical results, one cannot say much in favour of papers set at our examinations by teachers as examiners. For though the rule prohibiting the appointment of teachers to set papers has been in operation in Calcutta only since 1890, the complaint against the suitableness of the papers set has been of much longer duration ; and the questions set before that date do not compare favourably with those of subsequent years. Nor has there been any practical inconvenience felt in getting competent examiners notwithstanding the operation of the rule, professors of Physics and Mathematics, and of English and History, changing places in setting papers each in the others' subject, professors teaching the B.A. course setting papers for the F.A. examination, and professors of colleges affiliated to one Indian University setting papers for the examination of another.

"While thus the necessity for changing the rule is at best doubtful, the reasons for maintaining it are, in my humble judgment, in full force still."*

Lastly, Dr. Banerjee spoke on the improvement of school education, as the majority of the Commission, disagreeing with him, thought it not quite within their province to consider in detail or express any opinion upon this question. He remarked :

"We are agreed that although there has been a rapid multiplication of colleges and schools connected with our Universities, and the number of graduates and undergraduates has grown largely, the education imparted is not as thorough, and the highest standards attained not as high, as might be desired.

The evidence before us shows that these unsatisfactory results are due to four causes :

(i) unsuitable text books and courses of study,
(ii) inefficient teaching,
(iii) injudicious methods of examination, and
(iv) insufficient encouragement for post graduate study."

Dr. Banerjee maintained that the real improvement of University education must have its foundation laid on an improved system of school education. So he went on to deal with the above causes. He said :

"*(i) Unsuitable text books and courses of study*—One reason why our boys learn English so badly, and why they mechanically commit to memory many things without understanding them, is because we often use reading books in English which are only imperfectly intelligible to them, by reason of their relating to scenes and incidents wholly foreign to the Indian student, and we often prescribe subjects and text books involving ideas which cannot be clearly comprehended and realised by boys of tender age. . . . Again to enable a boy to understand what he reads, and to encourage him to exercise his intelligence along with his memory, we must prescribe for him

* *Ibid.*, p. 199.

books and courses of study which he can understand, instead of appointing, as we often do, books which, though short, are by no means elementary, and subjects such as Physical Science, Physical Geography and the difficult portions of Arithmetic, for boys of 11 or 12 years. ..."

(ii) *Inefficient teaching*—This is due to our employing in our schools untrained and ill paid teachers, and to our making them teach large classes. We should have as teachers men who are properly trained in the art of teaching, that is, trained not merely mechanically but intelligently, and who are of high moral character and even temper and are able to influence their pupils more by love than by fear, and they should be better paid than they are now. And we should have rules requiring (1) that no class or section of a class should contain more than 40 or 50 students and (2) that the higher classes should have regular written exercises so necessary to enable a foreigner to learn to write English correctly.

(iii) *Injudicious methods of examination.*—There are three public examinations which come before the Entrance, namely, the Lower Primary, the Upper Primary and the Middle Varnacular, some of which are compulsory in certain provinces. The question papers set at these examinations are not much better than those set at the Entrance Examination ; and they encourage cramming in the same way. Moreover, the pressure of too many public examinations, as Dr. Miller in his evidence justly says, must have an injurious effect on the infant mind. ...

There is one more reason, not noticed in our Report, why the highest results attained by our Universities are not as high as might be desired , and it is the want of encouragement for our graduates, in the shape of scholarships, or educational posts with suitable emoluments and and sufficient leisure to stimulate them to work in the fields of original research. The Prem Chand Roy Chand studentship in Calcutta, has of late years, been utilised in this direction, and a few research scholarships have been founded. The enlightened liberality of the country should come forward with more help ; and with greater encouragement, better results may be expected."

Justice Gooroodas Banerjee in conclusion made the following remarks :

"My learned colleagues have aimed exclusively at raising the standard of University education and college discipline, and some of the measures of reform they have advocated for the attainment of that exclusive object, naturally enough, tend to place education under the control of Government and small bodies of experts and to reduce the control of what is known as the popular element, to repress imperfectly equipped colleges and schools, to deter students of average ability and humble means from the pursuit of knowledge, and in short, to sacrifice surface in order to secure height. While yielding to none in my appreciation of the necessity for raising the standard of education and discipline, I have ventured to think that the solution arrived at is only a partial solution of the problem, and that we should aim not only at raising the height, but also at broadening the base, of our educational fabric. And where I have differed from my learned colleagues, I have done so mainly with a view to see that our educational system is so adjusted that while the gifted few shall receive the highest training, the bulk of the less gifted but earnest seekers after knowledge may have every facility afforded to them for deriving the benefits of higher education."*

Thus Dr. Banerjee succeeded in showing that the object of the Commission was "to place education under the control of Government and small bodies of experts, to reduce the control of what is known as the popular element, to repress imperfectly equipped colleges and schools, to deter students of average ability and humble means from the pursuit of knowledge, and in short, to sacrifice surface in order to secure height."

* *Ibid.*, p. 206.

ATTACK ON THE UNIVERSITY COMMISSION REPORT

The Majority Report of the University Commission evoked strong criticism from the Indian section of the Press, and the note of Dissent of Mr. Justice Banerjee was highly appreciated. Thus the *Indian Mirror* (7th Aug. 1902) criticised the Report:

"The Anglo-Indian newspapers have had their say about the Report and recommendations of the Universities Commission, and, of course, their approval is unqualified and even ecstatic. Of course, they have the same right as ourselves to discuss all public matters. But they are in the hands of of aliens who have little abiding interest in the country, and who, differing from the people in almost everything, cannot be expected to have any insight into a matter of such foremost importance as the whole future of the people, which the educational problem involves. *They* cannot see with *our* eyes. That they know nothing of it is proved by an utter absence of independent thought or suggestion, and by a complaisant acceptance of the official *imprimatur*. These are faithful henchmen of Government. The pronouncement of such papers as these is utterly valueless. In such a matter of foremost importance as the question of education of the Indian people, it is the purely indigenous Press that can and does voice the popular opinion, and therefore, its expression of that opinion is weighty, and to the point. It will be enough to say for the present, that the purely Indian newspapers have accepted with cordiality and without hesitation the clear-cut sentiments and sentences contained in Mr. Justice Banerjee's Note of Dissent, appended to the Commission's Report. Dr. Banerjee is a man of the people, has risen from the ranks, education and character have made him what he is, he has no personal likes or dislikes, he has no irons of his own to grind in this particular matter, he has ever shrunk from any attempt to give offence to anybody, he holds singularly moderate views. The publicly expressed views of such a man, then, are of the greatest weight and value, and entitled to the closest and most respectful consideration. Mr. Justice Banerjee has had, besides, a long educational experience. He has been long directly connected with the Calcutta University, of which he was at one time the honoured Vice-Chancellor. It was fortunate that he happened to be one of the two 'native' members of the Commission, perfectly familiar with Indian conditions and Indian needs so far at least as British Indian interests are involved. The other 'native' member hails from a backward Feudatory State where education has seriously lagged behind, though the Hyderabad gentleman was himself, if we are not mistaken, a Minister of Education at one time. We, therefore, repeat, that the Note of Dissent written by Mr. Justice Banerjee, is entitled to greater attention than the Report of the Commission. Mr. Justice Banerjee has these many years past enjoyed the unbounded confidence of his countrymen. Government will, therefore, do well to pay due heed to his warnings. He is quite as willing, as indeed we all are, as the other members of the Commission, to raise the educational standard. Raise the standard by all means, but do it in a rational, and not in a revolutionary and reactionary spirit. Education should be the privilege of the many, and not a monopoly of the fortunate and wealthy few. To raise school and college fees at the arbitrary will and direction of Government is to shut out the masses and even middle classes from the benefits of higher education, and even to shut them out from the prospects of bettering themselves in the struggle for existence. Higher fees do not spell better brains or sounder education."

PROTEST AGAINST THE REPORT

To protest against the Majority Report of the Commission a meeting was held at the Calcutta Town Hall. It is described by the *Indian Mirror* (24th August, 1902) as a magnificent and exhilarating event. 'It was magnificent in that all sections of the Indian community were represented thereat, and exhilarating because there was absolute unanimity throughout the proceedings. ... All the speakers were agreed that any legislation, based on the lines of the recommendations of the Universities Commission,

would be a most reactionary and retrograde measure. All were agreed, that the Government's attempt to take up the monopoly of higher education in India was not in line with the Resolutions and Despatches and Acts of former British statesmen, and that the sort of Government interference now attempted, and which seemingly is about to be enforced, is a breach of definite pledges, and an endeavour to confine the people to the apron-strings of their national childhood.'

The *Indian Mirror* went on to say :

"Babu Deva Prasad Sarvadhikari, in moving the fourth Resolution, said that in doing so it was his duty in the first instance to give expression to the deep debt of gratitude they all owed to the Viceroy for having been pleased to give the Hon'ble Dr. Gooroodas Banerjee an opportunity of rendering his country the signal service that he had been permitted and enabled to do. The manner and method of the appointment were in themselves a high, if unintentional, compliment to the distinguished Judge, and Lord Curzon had clearly deserved well of the community by deliberately adding to the Commission one who, inspite of his unobtrusive mildness, was known to be of unbending and unflinching independence of character and opinion, and who was not likely to give in when his country's best interests were at stake. If the present Report and Dissent, with all the connected circumstances could, by any chance, be laid before an unbiased jury of English educational experts, Mr. Justice Banerjee's Dissent would receive much more vigorous and outstoken support than could be expected here. For themselves they could only accord them such support as lay in their power to extend, and this he asked them to do in the terms of the Resolution with all the emphasis and earnestness they could command. The Dissent was a masterly and powerful presentment and enunciation of the popular and therefore the right view of the problems at issue and its author had earned sincere and lasting gratitude. The Resolution he had to move was as follows : "That this meeting desires to accord its emphatic support to the Dissent of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Gooroodas Banerjee so far as it goes, as embodying the views of the Indian community, and the meeting would call special attention to the following recommendations of the Commission as being open to the gravest objections—(*i*) the fixing of the minimum rate of college fees by the Syndicate, (*ii*) the abolition of the Second Grade Colleges which teach up to the First Arts Standard unless they are raised to the status of First Grade College teaching up to the B. A. Standard, (*iii*) the establishment of a Central Law College and the disaffiliation of the present Law classes attached to the colleges, (*iv*) the recommendation that a candidate for Matriculation should pass in certain subjects at the School Final Examination before he is permitted to pass the Matriculation examination which is no longer to be a qualification for employment under Government, (*v*) the curtailment of the authority of the Senate in the matter of the disaffiliation of colleges and the recognition of schools."*

LORD CURZON'S CONVOCATION SPEECH (1905)

On 11th January, 1905, Lord Curzon as the Chancellor of the Calcutta University delivered his Convocation Address, in the course of which he made a severe attack on the Hindu and Moslem character. He said :

"I hope I am making no false or arrogant claim when I say that the highest ideal of truth is to a large extent a Western conception. ...But undoubtedly truth took a high place in the moral codes of the West, before it had been similarly honoured in the East, where craftiness and diplomatic wile have always been held in much repute. We may prove it by the common innuendo that lurks in the words 'oriental diplomacy,' by which is meant something rather tortuous and hyper-subtle. The

* Noted in *Reminiscences, Speeches and Writings of Sir Gooroodas Banerjee* (Calcutta, 1927 pp. 166-168).

same may be seen in oriental literature. In your epics truth will often be extolled as a virtue; but quite as often it is attended with some qualification, and very often praise is given to successful deception practised with honest aim. The English opinions on this subject are strong, distinct. uncompromising in the abstract. Hindu and Mahommedan opinions are fluctuating, vague, and to a great extent dependent upon times, places and persons."

REPLY TO LORD CURZON'S CONVOCATION SPEECH

The Convocation speech (1905) of Lord Curzon roused a volume of protest from the Indian public. A public meeting was held on the 10th March, 1905, of the Indian inhabitants of Calcutta to protest against Lord Curzon's speech and his general reactionary policy. Dr. Rash Behari Ghose in his Presidential address made a severe attack on Lord Curzon, his speech, and his policy. He said :

"I am by profession a lawyer and not an agitator. And if I am here this afternoon, it is not because I take any delight in railing at Government ; but because I honestly believe that Lord Curzon is lacking in that breadth of vision, tactfulness and flexibility of temper which we naturally expect in one occupying the unique position of an Indian Viceroy."

Referring to his Convocation speech, he said :

"The style of that speech was certainly not Asiatic ; nobody could accuse Lord Curzon of such an offence against good taste. But did it possess Attic grace and lightness ? Decidedly not. The whole speech was in, what Matthew Arnold calls, the Corinthian style—a style which his lordship strongly urged our young men to avoid."

Dr. Ghose then went on to say :

"One of the greatest political figures in England said on a memorable occasion that he did not know how to frame an indictment against a whole nation ; but Lord Curzon, dressed in the Chancellor's robe and a little brief authority, was able to frame an indictment not only against the people of India, but also against all the various nations of Asia -Asia which gave to the world Gautama Buddha, Jesus Christ, and Muhammad, who may not have taught men how to rule but who certainly taught them how to live and how to die.

"The truth is, these theories of race, as Sir Henry Maine tells us, have little merit except the facility which they give to some persons, half-educated writers of doggerel for instance, for building on them inferences tremendously out of proportion to the mental labour which they cost the builder. And in this connection I would venture to ask his lordship, who is a scholar, if praise is not often given to successful deception in the ancient classical literature of the West and also in other writings I need not name on which the youth of Europe are nurtured even at the present day ?

"In one of his numerous speeches -there are very few brilliant flashes of silence -Lord Curzon said : 'You will never rule the East except through the heart.' Is the Convocation speech of his lordship likely to win our affection ? And yet it is easy to touch our hearts, as easy, say, as it is to pass a Validating Act through the Viceroy's Council.

"One word more before I part with this painful topic. The Indian, says Lord Curzon, is most certainly a citizen of the British Empire, and his lordship is indignant at the idea that he is a mere hewer of wood and drawer of water; but nobody I think would take such a statement literally, any more than his lordship's reference to High Court Judges, Ministers of Native States, and high Executive and Judicial officers in the service of Government. His lordship, however, has no reason to be surprised, if in moments of spleen such expressions occasionally drop from some of my young and impulsive countrymen ; for I find that in his Guildhall speech Lord Curzon said: 'It is with Indian coolie labour that you exploit the plantations equally of Damerara and Natal; with Indian trained officers that you irrigate Egypt and dam the Nile; with Indian forest officers that you tap the



Dr. Rash Behari Ghosh, Kt.

resources of Central Africa and Siam; with Indian surveyors that you explore all the hidden places of the earth.' In this picture drawn by the hand of no mean artist, the Indian stands in the foreground it is true, but only, you will notice, as a tiller of the earth making it flow with milk and honey not for himself but for his masters."*

LORD CURZON'S REACTIONARY POLICY

Lord Curzon's reactionary policy was severely criticised by Dr. Rash Behary Ghose. In speaking of the Calcutta Municipal Act, Dr. Ghose said that "though Sir Alexander Mackenzie sought to make the Chairman independent of the Corporation in the discharge of his executive duties, we owe the curtailment of the elected element in the new Corporation to Lord Curzon, who proposed the reduction as a most effective though 'hitherto unsuggested check' upon the abuses and anomalies which, it was said, had grown up under the old system. Sir Alexander Mackenzie would have at least left us the shadow of self-government; but to Lord Curzon belongs the credit of reducing it to the shadow of a shade. The Lieutenant-Governor wanted to admonish us only with whips. But his lordship chastised us with scorpions."

Then Dr. Ghose referred to the Partition of Bengal. He said:

"The proposed partition of Bengal is also another 'unsuggested check,' should I be very wrong in saying, on the struggling sentiments and stifled aspirations of the people of Bengal. The alarm which the proposal has created is, I can solemnly assert, perfectly genuine and has spread even to those who are ordinarily in the habit of regarding Government measures as the dispensations of a mysterious power. The grounds on which our opposition to the threatened partition is based were so fully discussed by Sir Henry Cotton in this very hall a short time ago that it would be a work of supererogation to restate them on the present occasion. The Viceroy, however, seems to have made up his mind and determined to divide Bengal."

Lord Curzon's reactionary policy was also visible in the abolition of the competitive test. Dr. Ghose remarked :

"The abolition of the competitive test would also seem to be another 'unsuggested' reform. It is true that the Pubic Service Commission presided over by Sir Charles Aitchison reported that 'in parts of the country where the general educational conditions are more advanced than elsewhere, especially in the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay and the Lower Provinces of Bengal, a system of an open competition would give satisfaction to some important classes of the community and would meet objections that are justly felt to a system of nomination.' But Lord Curzon is wiser than the members of the Public Service Commission, wiser than Mill, wiser than Macaulay, wiser than the distinguished statesman who accomplished a similar reform in the Civil Service in England. Now it may be true that the competitive system has some drawbacks; but experience has shown that it everywhere increases the efficiency of the public service and stimulates the acquisition of knowledge. Above all, as a thoughtful writer who is also a statesman has observed, it strengthens the social feeling for the maxim that the career should be open to the talents. Lord Curzon, however, is anxious to 'free the intellectual activities of the Indian people, keen and restless as they are, from the paralyzing clutch of examinations,' for which every idle lad in this country ought, I think, to be grateful to him."†

Dr. Rash Behari Ghose then turned to the Universities Act, one of the gifts of Lord Curzon to this country. He said :

* *Speeches By Dr. Rash Behary Ghose* (Calcutta, R. Cambray & Co. 1915) pp. 154-57.

† *Speeches by Dr. R. B. Ghose*, p. 158.

"By this Act the whole system of higher education has been practically placed under official control. This is not all. Lord Curzon's measure will place University education beyond the reach of many boys belonging to the middle classes. And here, perhaps, I may be permitted to remark that to talk of the highest mental culture as the sole aim of University training betrays a singular misconception of the conditions of Indian life. Our students go to the Universities in such large numbers, because they cannot otherwise enter any of the learned professions or even qualify themselves for service under Government. I would also point out that education, though it may not reach a very high standard, is still a desirable thing, on the principle that half a loaf is better than no bread. The fallacy that lurks in Pope's well-known couplet has been so clearly exposed by Macaulay, Whately, John Stuart Mill, and last though not least, by Mr. Morley, that I will not occupy your time with discussing it. One word more. The standard of education will never be improved either by Universities' Acts or Validating Acts. It can only be done by attracting to this country, as teachers of our youth, men distinguished by their scholarship or by their scientific attainments, like those who occupy the chairs in European Universities."*

In speaking of the Official Secrets Act, Dr. Ghose remarked :

"The Official Secrets Act is another measure which we owe to Lord Curzon's Government. It was passed in the face of the unanimous opposition of both the European and Indian communities. *The Englishman*, the leading newspaper in this part of the country, thus spoke of the Bill when it was before the Council :

'Very grave rumours, which we mention for what they are worth, credit the Government of India with bringing forward amendments to the Official Secrets Bill, which leaves its principal defects untouched. What those defects are have been clearly and unmistakeably pointed out and they are so serious that the Viceroy, speaking from his place in the Legislative Council in December, professed to stand aghast at the picture of the official Machiavellianism which they reveal. His Excellency also professed to have been moved by these criticisms and he gave a solemn pledge that, so far as in him lay, the provisions which were so universally execrated would be modified or withdrawn. If it be true, however, that the divulgence of civil secrets is still to be penalized, we have not the slightest hesitation in saying that one at least of its worst features is being retained. The public is in no mood to be treated in such a manner and it becomes our duty to warn the Government that, if this provision or any of the other cardinal vices of the Bill remain, it must make up its mind to the renewal of an agitation which will not slacken until the measure has been withdrawn or repealed."

"But Lord Curzon remained unmoved and the Bill was passed into law; for his lordship seems only to care for the opinion of the inarticulate masses—'whose hearts,' I may mention in passing, according to Lord Curzon, 'had been touched with the idea of a common sentiment and a common aim' by the Delhi Durbar, and in whom his lordship has noticed 'a steady and growing advance in loyalty' during his own administration.

'Public opinion in India,' said his lordship from his place as Chancellor of the Calcutta University, 'cannot for a long time be the opinion of the public, that is, of the masses, because they are uneducated and have no opinion in political matters at all.' This probably is the reason why so little attention is paid to the views of the elected members in the Legislative Councils who sit there merely to play the part of the chorus in a Greek Tragedy. But surely we cannot be asked to wait till the masses, who do not know what it is to have a full meal from year's end to year's end, cease to feel the pangs of hunger and become sufficiently educated to discuss the ways of a foreign bureaucracy. In that case, we shall have to wait for that dim and distant future when, according to Lord Curzon's forecast, some approach to an Indian nation will have been evolved. His lordship also said that public opinion, if it is to have any weight, must be co-ordinated with the necessities

* *Ibid.*, p. 159.

and interests and desires of the community which are perhaps hardly capable of formulating an opinion of their own. So long as this co-ordination is not achieved no weight, it would seem, should be attached to public opinion in this country, and I imagine that it was on this account that the Government of Lord Curzon paid no attention to the opinion of the educated minority on the Official Secrets Act, the Universities Act, or the recent Validating Act which compromised the dignity alike of the Legislative Council and of His Majesty's Judges."

Dr. Ghose concluded in these words:

"To sum up. Almost all his lordship's measures have tended towards strengthening the Simla bureaucracy, and Russianising, I thank *The Englishman* for teaching me the word, our system of administration. This has been specially shown by his attack on Municipal Self-government in the case of the Calcutta Corporation; his Education Act, which destroys the independence of the Universities and converts them into a department of Government, and in his measures against the freedom of the Press. The result has certainly not been 'a steady and growing advance in the loyalty of the Indian people' of which Lord Curzon spoke with such unction to an English audience last year. Opitimism, however, is blind. But the moving finger writes and having writ, moves on."*

LORD CURZON'S MINUTE ON FRONTIER ADMINISTRATION

On August 27th 1900, Lord Curzon wrote a Minute on the Frontier Administration in which he proposed the creation of a North-Western Frontier Province. He spoke thus in tracing the history of the proposed scheme:

"This is by no means the first time that the proposal has been made to create a new and separate administration for the North-West Frontier. On the contrary, schemes of varying character and magnitude have been submitted to and debated by the Government of India throughout the last quarter of a century; and it may safely be said that there is no Frontier authority of any eminence during that period who has not discussed, while there are but few who have not approved the principle of such a change. This remarkable unanimity testifies to the depth and range of the conviction upon which the desire for reform has been based and effectively relieves any fresh disputant from the charge either of rashness or of innovation. On the other hand, the fact that all previous endeavours have proved abortive, and that the existing system, though so widely and authoritatively condemned, has continued to survive, suggests that the problem itself is far from easy of solution...."

REASONS FOR CREATION OF A NEW FRONTIER PROVINCE

After giving a brief survey of earlier efforts and an analysis of the causes of their failure, the Viceroy states the reasons for the creation of a new Frontier Province:

"The first objection that I take to the present system is one which in theory must be obvious, but the full force of which in practice no one can adequately realise who has not had direct experience of it. Under the methods of Indian Government, the conduct of foreign affairs in in India is vested in the Viceroy. He is the head of the Foreign Department...Now in India Foreign affairs...in the main arise out of, or are connected with, the Frontier tribes and problems; whilst, if we take the whole of the land Frontiers of India from the Shan States on the extreme east to the borders of Persian Baluchistan on the extreme west, the most critical, most anxious, and most explosive section of the entire Frontier is that between the Swat river and the Gomal Valley, or precisely the section which is handed over to the Punjab Government. Upon this stretch of boundary inhabited by the most numerous, fanatical, and turbulent of the Pathan tribes, the Foreign Minister of India, who is also the Viceroy, cannot issue an order, or make an appointment except through the medium of the Punjab Government, nay he cannot with certain exceptions...make an appointment

* *Ibid.*, pp. 162-63.

at all. The Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, the Political officers, and Commandants of Border Police, in whose hands rests the entire local responsibility upon the Frontier, are nominated not by him, but by the Lieutenant-Governor. The Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government, who is the principal adviser of the Lieutenant-Governor, is selected, without reference to the Viceroy, by the latter. The Viceroy cannot even remove an indifferent or unsuitable official, since promotion in the Punjab is regulated by the conditions of a service of which not he, but the Lieutenant-Governor, is the efficient head. If a debate arises in Parliament as to a Frontier outbreak or a tribal expedition, it will be the Viceroy, and the Viceroy alone, who will be held accountable. Public opinion censures him for failure, or congratulates him upon success. ..But among those who hold up the head of the Government of India to praise or to blame, how many are there who know that he has been working throughout not through his own agents, but through those of another Government, that at each stage he is required to carry the assent of a subordinate, but withal most influential authority, and that in all probability in the early stages (for most Frontier disturbances spring from small beginnings) he has had neither responsibility, knowledge, nor information ? I venture to affirm that there is not another country or Government in the world which adopts a system so irrational in theory, so bizarre in practice, as to interpose between its Foreign Minister and his most important sphere of activity, the barrier, not of a subordinate official, but of a subordinate Government, on the mere geographical plea that the latter resides in closer proximity to the scene of action - a plea which itself breaks down when it is remembered that for five months in the year the Supreme and the Local Governments are both located at the same spot, Simla."

Lord Curzon continued to argue his case thus:

"Now there might be some excuse, perhaps even some solid ground, for such an arrangement, if the Local Government and its officials, who are the intermediaries through whom the Government of India are compelled to act, were themselves deeply versed in Frontier knowledge and experience. But is this the case? Quite the reverse. In practice it is found that as a rule neither the Lieutenant-Governor nor his Chief Secretary knows any thing of the frontier at all ; and that they are selected for their high offices, the former by the Viceroy, the latter by the Lieutenant-Governor himself, on account of their general administrative capacity and ability to do justice to the many aspects of a singularly complex civil administration."

But the question is, was the Viceroy, who was also the Foreign Minister, "deeply versed in Frontier knowledge and experience" as a matter of course ? Certainly not. Moreover, now that the N.-W. F. Province is a "Governor's province," which is destined to receive "provincial autonomy," a "subordinate Government" is again interposed between the Foreign Minister Viceroy and "his most important sphere of activity." It has also to be borne in mind that the creation of a perpetual deficit Frontier Province has cost the rest of ludia crores of rupees and will continue to do so—how long nobody can foretell.

Lord Curzon concluded thus :

"For the reasons, therefore, which have been given, I hold the existing system by which the Frontier is managed through the medium of the Punjab Government stands condemned. It has been reprobated by all the greatest Frontier authorities for the last quarter of a century. It attenuates without diminishing the ultimate responsibilily of the Government of India. It protracts without strengthening their action. It interposes between the Foreign Minister of India and his subordinate agents, not an Ambassador, or a Minister, or a Consul, but the elaborate mechanism of a Local Government, and the necessarily exalted personality of a Lieutenant-Governor. If this is an influential, I have yet shown it in practice to be not an expert medium. Worked as the system has been with unfailing loyalty and with profoundIdevotion to duty, it has yet been the source of friction, of divided counsels, of vacillation, of exaggerated centralisation, of interminable delay."

FORM OF ADMINISTRATION RECOMMENDED

In recommending the formation of a new Province, Lord Curzon said :

"The new Frontier Province would then consist of the following Trans-Indus Districts of the Punjab : (1) Peshawar, (2) Kohat, (3) Bannu, (4) Dera Ismail Khan ; and of the following Political Agencies, at present directly under the Government of India, or under the Punjab Government, (1) Dir, Swat and Chitral, with headquarters at the Malakand, (2) Khyber, (3) Kurram, (4) Tochi, (5) Wana.

"The chief of this administration would be a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, who should be appointed by, and should be directly subordinate to, the Government of India. His position would be closely analogous to that of the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, *i.e.*, he would possess some of the powers of a local administration, and his pay should probably be on the same scale, *i.e.*, Rs. 4000 a month. He would reside at Peshawar, where he would take over the office of the present Commissioner."*

LORD CURZON'S FOREIGN POLICY

Besides the N.-W. Frontier, Lord Curzon's Foreign policy was concerned with Persia and Tibet.

PERSIAN GULF

Great Britain's influence in the Persian Gulf had always been great. She controlled not only the waters of the land-locked sea, but the entire coast line eastward from Aden to Baluchistan. Although Great Britain acquired no land on either sea-board, she exercised some sort of influence over the Muhammadan States who would not allow any other European nation to obtain territorial stations there. Other European Powers, particularly France, Russia, Germany and Turkey, resented this attitude of England and tried hard to test the validity of her claim. In 1898 the Sultan of Oman granted to the French a coaling-station at Bunder Jissal, five miles south-east of Muscat, with a right to fortify it. In 1899, when the news reached Calcutta, Lord Curzon sent a naval squadron to the Persian Gulf, and the Sultan was coerced into revoking the concession. In 1900 a similar attempt on the part of Russia was also frustrated. In 1903 Lord Curzon personally visited the Gulf, established Consulates in the ports and the internal trade centres, and by diplomatic and other defensive measures did much to strengthen British grip over the Persian Gulf.

TIBET

Lord Curzon cast his imperialistic eye even on mysterious Tibet, which had repelled earlier attempts at intimacy made by Warren Hastings. Great Britain then tried to enter Tibet by the back-door. China exercised *de jure* suzerainty over Tibet, though her actual control over Tibetan affairs was very little. British deplomatic pressure at Pekin brought about a convention between Great Britain and China in 1890 by which a trade mart at Yating was established for British goods in Tibet.

* *North-West Frontier Administration*—Supplement to the *Gazette of India*, March 30, 1901, pp. 800-815.

The Tibetans looked sulkily over this Anglo-Chinese convention which bartered their sovereign rights. The result was that no actual trade followed the convention. A British frontier officer declared : "The Tibetan rulers will *never* assent to free intercourse with India except through fear of something which they may regard as a greater calamity." However unreasonable, looked at from the point of view of civilisation, it was for the Tibetans to maintain their isolation in the fastnesses of their hills, shutting themselves off from the light of modern culture, it must be admitted that they suspected British imperialistic designs behind this commercial penetration and that they exercised nothing more than their sovereign right in opposing British commercial penetration. But this exclusive attitude of the Tibetans was too much for the temperament of Lord Curzon to put up with. He determined to use force. Writes Mr. P. E. Roberts, an Anglo-Indian historian of unimpeachable honesty :

"Lord Curzon eagerly pressed upon the Home Government the sending of a mission to Tibet. Complaints were to be made that the Tibetans had encroached upon the Sikhim frontier, established a Customs post at Giagong, thrown down certain boundary pillars and walled off the only road leading from Tibet to Yatung. These detailed grievances were to be supported by the more general statement that the isolation of the Tibetan government is not compatible either with proximity to the territories of a great civilised power at whose hands the Tibetan government enjoys the fullest opportunities both for intercourse and trade, or with due respect for the treaty stipulations into which the Chinese government entered on its behalf. But the alleged reasons foı the mission were flimsy."*

* * * *

"The Home Government was not in favour of any advance into Tibet," continues Roberts, but most weakly "allowed themselves to be squeezed" into giving their consent for the despatch of a mission. Khanba Jong, a place fifteen miles north of the Sikhim frontier, was the place proposed by Lord Curzon for the conference. Colonel Younghusband, the head of the British Mission, reached Khanba Jong in July (1903), but no Tibetan officials were present there. They would have nothing to do with it. After a deadlock, Lord Curzon ordered Younghusband to march on Gyantse, presumably with the idea of forcing a commercial treaty at the point of bayonets. Then ensued one of the most pathetic events at Guru, which 'caused a great outbreak of indignation even in England.'

To quote P. E. Roberts again :

"The Tibetans had ranged themselves across the path of the expedition, and refused to give way when ordered to do so. A few rounds from the British modern weapons of precision left 700 dead and wounded on the Tibetan side ; while only a few casualties, none of them fatal, were sustained by our troops."†

Thus seven hundred Tibetans were killed, who equipped with their crude arms stood up to defend their inherent rights and opposed the advance of strangers into their mountain homes.

The British mission reached Gyantse, but the Dalai Lama refused to negotiate. The mission marched on to Lhasa and yet another fight demonstrated the superiority of the

* Roberts, pp. 530-33.

† *Ibid.*, p. 534.

British army. And on August 3, 1904 the expedition entered the mysterious city. The Dalai Lama fled and the Chinese Resident signed on behalf of Tibet a commercial treaty, the practical utility of which has been nil ; even as the justification of it has been doubtful. The treaty provided for the establishment of trade marts at Yatung, Gyantse and Gantok and the promotion of encouragement of commerce between India and Tibet. Does the statistics of trade between the two countries warrant the spilling of so much blood at the so-called battle of Guru ? We are inclined to think that the high-handed policy of Lord Curzon rather retarded the intimacy of the two countries, which otherwise would have been possible by the adoption of a milder and more patient attitude.

CHAPTER XV.

LORD MINTO (1905–1910)

The departure of Lord Curzon synchronized with the advent to power of a liberal and radical government as a result of the General Election in December, 1905. Mr. (afterwards Viscount) John Morley, a liberal and a believer in constitutional government, took charge of the India Office. The people of India expected much from him. The late Mr. Gokhale, of respected memory, paid a high eulogium to him in his Presidential speech at the Benares Congress. But when called upon to apply his liberal principles to India Morley failed very much in the same way as Ramsay MacDonald did twenty years later. The Reforms bearing his name and that of his co-adjutor in India were a half-way, halting measure, falling very much below the political necessity to ease matters. The refusal to reverse the Partition of Bengal, which Morley called a 'settled fact,' the Seditious Meetings Acts, the Regulation of 1818 under which so many leaders of Bengal were deported without a fair trial, and released afterwards when found innocent, the deportation of Lala Lajpat Rai, the proclamation of the Barisal district as under martial law, the rejection by Government of Gokhale's Elementary Education Bill, etc., are some of the measures for which a liberal of John Morley's reputation was responsible. It is certainly true that there is no party politics in England on questions relating to India.

Lord Minto was the grandson of the first Earl Minto, the Governor-General of India just a century before. On the resignation of Lord Curzon as the Viceroy of India, Lord Minto was appointed to succeed him as the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in 1905. He had six years' experience as the Governor-General of Canada. A year before he left Canada, the possibility of the Indian Viceroyalty had been mooted. Soon after his return from Canada, it was with "a real surprise that, on the morning of August 18, 1905, as he was walking down to Minto before breakfast, he opened a letter from Mr. St. John Brodrick, which told him that Lord Curzon had resigned and that he was nominated as his successor.' 'About his surprise on the appointment, he wrote in his Journal :

"The greatest appointment I have ever hoped for, and still what a pang to leave the dear old place again—and all the difficulties about the children Mary took it so well. I know she feels the same as I do, and it is a recognition of all her good work quite as much as of anything I have ever done. But it is a very high trial."

About the responsibilities of the Indian Viceroyalty, Lord Minto said :

"I am succeeding a brilliant ruler who, in perfecting the machinery of State, has given evidence of abilities and talents which no successor can hope to emulate. And yet my racing days have taught me that many a race has been won by giving the horse a rest in his gallops."

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* For the first Earl of Minto's administration see Major. B. D. Basu's *Rise of the Christian Power in India* 2nd. Edition, p 587—620.

It was in 1806 that the first Earl of Minto came out as the Governor-General of India, and after the lapse of a century in 1905 the fourth Earl of Minto came as the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

On the 2nd November the Mintos left London and on the afternoon of 17th November arrived at Bombay. The public reception of Lord Minto at Bombay may be dismissed with the dry note which is to be found in the official report on his administration :

"These proceedings were not entirely in accordance with precedent, and Lord Minto has decided that they shall not be taken as a guide for the future."*

PROPOSED BOYCOTT OF PRINCE OF WALES' VISIT

The Prince and Princess of Wales arrived in Calcutta on December 29, 1905, and there was a talk of boycotting their visit. Thus says John Buchan in his *Lord Minto: A Memoir*:

"At first there had been a threat that the native population would boycott the visit, but Minto took the bold step of sending for Mr. Gokhale, the leader of the Indian progressives, and talking to him with so much effect that all danger from that source was removed."

Mr. John Buchan further remarked :

"It was a visit in which the future monarchs of Britain won golden opinions from every class, European and native alike, for their graciousness and friendly simplicity, and it was of the first importance, too, in the development of Indian policy. The Prince, in his speech at the Guildhall on his return, declared as the moral he had read from his tour the need of a closer and wider sympathy between government and governed in India, and it fell to Minto to provide means for the realization of this ideal."†

LORD MORLEY'S TRIBUTE

Lord Morley in his *Recollections* pays a tribute to Lord Minto and his administrative qualities. He says:

"Lord Minto, the new Viceroy, had all the manly traditions and honourable associations that gather round the best of youth at Eton and Trinity. In stock he was descended from the patrician Whigs, and he had his share of the intuitive political perception that belonged to that sect since its rise at the revolutionary settlement. His temperament was theirs. He had seen active service under Roberts in India; he had fought on the side of the Turks against Russia : nor, in truth, did friendly feeling for the Ottoman ever leave him. As Governor-General of Canada he had acquired insight into the working technicalities of public administration in a free parliamentary system. Such habits of mind he joined to the spirit of the soldier. The Indian Viceroy is not bound to know political philosophy or juristic theory or constitutional history ; he is first and foremost an administrator, and the working head of a complicated civil and military service. Nature had endowed Lord Minto with an ample supply of constancy and good humour. His loyalty, courage, friendliness, straightforwardness and pressing sense of duty were all splendid ; so was his rooted contempt for those in whom he found such excellences languid. A Viceroy needs to be a judge of men, whether with dark skins or white, and Lord Minto mixed tact and good commonsense and the milk of human kindness in the right proportion for discovering with what sort of man he had to deal. He liked people, though he did not always believe them, and he began by a disposition to get on with people as well as they

* *Lord Minto*: By John Buchan (London, 1925), p. 216.

† *Ibid.*, p. 217.

would let him. If he found on trial what he thought good reason for distrusting a man, he did not change. His vision was not subtle, but, what is far better, it was remarkably shrewd."*

"AN ACRIMONIOUS CONTROVERSY"

Lord Minto's first work was to settle the 'acrimonious controversy' about the military administration which resulted in the break between Lord Curzon and Lord Kitchner. Lord Minto was glad to find in Lord Kitchner 'a man whom he could work with in perfect confidence and ease.' They made a new arrangement, which received the assent of the Home Government and came into force in March 19, 1906. According to this arrangement,

"the Military Department of the Government of India, which had existed for over one hundred and twenty years, was abolished ; the administrative control of the Army in India was distributed between two new departments—the Army Department and the Department of Military Supply ; the former was placed under the Commander-in-Chief, who was now directly responsible to the Governor-General in Council for the administration of the Indian forces."

We read further :

"The scheme was accepted as a reasonable settlement both in Britain and India ; the Cabinet contented itself with altering certain small provisions which the Government of India intentionally inserted that they might be altered. Mr. Morley told Minto that he did not consider the solution particularly brilliant, but that everything depended 'upon the C.-in-C. being held by you strictly within the limits we are assigning him ;' the Viceroy, thankful to be quit of the business, told the Secretary of State that 'it was refreshing to see ideas conveyed in a kind of English unknown to official language here.' So in an atmosphere of mutual compliments an acrimonious controversy was laid to rest."†

POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA

After the Russo-Japanese War. Mr. Morley wrote to the Viceroy indicating a new line of policy towards Russia :

"Supposing, you were coming to some sort of understanding with Russia—a hypothesis which may be many hundred miles of realization—and suppose even that we held the upper hand in the negotiation, *what would be the terms that you would exact from Russia* as essential to a bargain? I mean what, from military, strategic, and political points of view, are the things that she is to undertake to do or not to do?"

Lord Minto consulted Lord Kitchner, whose "conditions were that Russia should publicly recognise that Afghanistan was outside her sphere of influence and that its external relations must be conducted through Britain ; that she should recognise the preponderating interests of Britain in Seistan and Southern Persia, and that she should scrupulously respect the integrity of China in Kashgar and elsewhere and refrain from all interference in Tibet."

Lord Minto criticised the Afghan policy of Sir Edward Grey. He was

"prepared for the most generous concessions to Russia in Persia, but he was nervous about India's North-West frontier. He doubted the wisdom of permitting communications between Russian and Afghan officials even on purely local matters ; he questioned the advisability of a Russo-Afghan

* Morley's *Recollections*, Vol. II, pp. 121-22.

† *Lord Minto*, p. 225.

frontier commission, and he took the gravest exception to the proposed agreement of Britain not to extend her railways in the direction of the Afghan border during a period of ten years. He believed that railways were the true frontier defence of India, a necessary consequence of the frontier military policy."

Lord Minto went on to say :

"We must be masters in our own house. We surely cannot agree to sacrifice the security and internal improvement of a portion of our dominions for the sake of our relations with foreign powers ?...We should have to stand still for ten years, to give up hopes of closer relations with our tribes, and, for the sake of our own safety, to go on fighting them as we have done for generations....I cannot but feel strongly opposed to any agreement with Russia in respect to railways. I should be inclined to let her do what she wants. She has practically in respect to her propinquity to the Afghan frontier got all she wants now, or can get it at very short notice. I earnestly hope it may be realized how such an agreement would tie our hands....I cannot but think that primarily the Amir is a more dangerous neighbour to us than Russia, and therefore in respect to India a more necessary friend....To me it seems infinitely more important to keep on friendly and controlling terms with him than to enter into any bargain with Russia which might lessen our influence with him, or aliente him from us. I believe him to be sensitive, suspicious, and over-confident in his own strength, but in my opinion it is vitally important to keep on good terms with him....If we are to enter upon an *entente* with Russia, let us bargain with her elsewhere than in Central Asia...I have only given you my own views in answer to your letter, but I certainly think that, for reasons affecting the internal administration of India independently of imperial foreign policy, the Government of India should be fully consulted before any agreement is entered into with Russia."*

In reply, Mr. Morley "delivered a lecture on the principles and practice of statesmanship, a vigorous homily which is worth quoting as an example of the aptitude of the Secretary of State for discovering suddenly in the most prosaic connection that fundamentals were endangered."

Mr. Morley wrote thus ;

"You argue...as if the policy of *entente* with Russia were an open question. That is just what it is not. His Majesty's Government, with almost universal support in public opinion, have decided to make such an attempt as Russian circumstances may permit to arrange an *entente*. The grounds for this I have often referred to when writing to you. Be they good or bad, be we right or wrong, that is your policy. ..

"You say, 'If we are to enter on an *entente* with Russia, let us bargain with her elsewhere than in Central Asia.' But then this was not the question laid before you. The question was, in view of the policy resolved upon deliberately by us, what you thought of the line on which in respect of Afghanistan we intended to pursue our policy. An *entente* with Russia that should leave out Central Asia would be a sorry trophy of our diplomacy indeed. Anyhow, His Majesty's Government has determined on this course, and it is for their agents and officers all over the world to accept it. If there is one among them to whom it would be more idle to repeat the *a b c* of the constitution than to another you are that man."

Mr. Morley proceeded to say :

"I am, however, a little frightened when you say at the end of your letter that 'the Government of India should be fully consulted before the agreement suggested is entered into with Russia.' If you mean the Government of India in a technical sense—as the G.-G. in C.—I must with all respect demur. For one thing the G.-G. is his own Foreign minister, and the Foreign Department is under his own immediate superintendence. Second, with sincere regard for

* *Ibid.*, pp. 226-27.

the capacity of your Council, I fail to see what particular contribution they could make to questions of public policy....Third, have you considered how in practice this 'full consultation' could be worked? Diplomacy, as you will agree, is necessarily delicate, flexible, elastic. Is Nicholson in his talks with Isvolsky to pull himself up by thinking how this or that proposal would be taken not only at Whitehall, but also at Simla? You know better than anybody how the pretensions of Canada (I don't use pretensions in any bad sense) fetter and shackle negotiations with the United States. The plain truth is—and you won't mind my saying it frankly because you will agree—that this country cannot have two foreign policies. The Government of India in Curzon's day, and in days before Curzon, tried to have its own foreign policy. I seem to see the same spectre lurking behind the phrase about "full consultation."*

Lord Minto, however, replied back. He said:

"But opinions are a different thing, and it is quite possible and often probable that the opinions of a subsidiary Government may be different from those of His Majesty's Government. In that case it seems to me all-important that the Secretary of State should have the opportunity of hearing these opinions and deciding upon their value."

Both Lord Minto and the Secretary of State, however, agreed that they should foster friendly relations with the Amir of Afghanistan. On hearing that the Amir was anxious to make a pleasure trip to Indian cities, Lord Minto sent him an invitation to be his guest. The Amir accepted the invitation and told his Durbar:

"I was determined never to go to India in the manner desired by Lord Curzon. The attitude adopted by Lord Minto, however, is so friendly and free from motives that I cannot possibly hesitate to accept the invitation of His Excellency, which is couched in such terms of kindness expressing a desire for an interview between friends."†

THE INCEPTION OF THE REFORMS

It would be idle to speculate whether the first suggestion of reforms came from the Viceroy or from the Secretary of State, for 'both men were from the start at one on the desirability of the reform, if it were practically feasible.' Of course, the authorities had to think of some means of allaying the unrest caused by Lord Curzon's policy. In the early months of 1906, Lord Minto turned "his attention to the matter which the Prince of Wales had made the keynote of his speech on his return, and which he and Mr. Morley had canvassed from the beginning of their colleagueship - the possibility of establishing a truer sympathy between rulers and ruled by admitting Indians to some share in the government of their country."

In a letter to Mr. Morley, Lord Minto deprecated the 'importation of British institutions into India *en bloc*." Mr. Morley agreed with him, but argued that British institutions were one thing and the spirit of British institutions another,—that spirit cannot but influence the governance of India. He wrote:

"I have no sort of ambition for us to take a part in any grand revolution during my time of responsibility, whether it be long or short. Just the very opposite. You need have no apprehension whatever of a private telegram reaching you from me some fine morning requesting you at once to summon an Indian Duma. On the other hand, I don't want to walk blindfold in the ways of bureaucracy."§

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* *Ibid.*, pp 227-28.
† *Ibid.*, p. 229.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

Lord Minto saw that "beneath a seemingly calm surface there existed a mass of smothered political discontent, much of which was thoroughly justifiable and due to causes which we were bound to examine." He agreed with Mr. Gokhale, when the latter said in the course of the Budget debate in March, 1906:

"The question of the conciliation of the educated classes ..raises issues which will tax all the resources of British statesmanship. There is but one way in which this conciliation can be secured and that is by associating these classes more and more with the Government of their own country. This is the policy to which England stands committed by solemn pledges given in the past...what the country needs at the moment above everything else is a government national in spirit, even though it may be foreign in *personnel*."

THE REFORMS OUTLINED

On the 15th June, 1906, Mr. Morley in a letter outlined the reforms for the first time. The following passage occurred in his letter:

"I wonder whether we could not now make a good start in the way of reform in the popular direction. If we don't, is it not certain that the demands will widen and extend into 'national' reasons, which I at least look upon with a very doubtful and suspicious eye? Why should you not now consider as practical and immediate things- the extension of the native element in your Legislative Council; ditto in local councils; full time for discussing Budget in your L. C. instead of four or five skimpy hours; right of moving amendments? (of course, officials would remain a majority). If I read your letters correctly you have no disposition whatsoever to look on such changes in a hostile spirit; quite the contrary. Why not, then, be getting ready to announce reforms of this sort? Either you write me a despatch, or I write you one—by way of opening the ball. It need be no long or high-flown affair. I suppose the notion of a native in your Executive Council would not do at all. Is that certain? I dare say it is—and it would frighten that nervous personage (naturally nervous) the Anglo-Indian."*

In reply Lord Minto agreed with the proposal put forth by Mr. Morley. He also mentioned 'that the possibility of a native on His Executive Council had been simmering for months in his mind.' On the 11th July he wrote:

"I need not tell you how heartily I am in accord with all you say as to the necessity of dealing with our Indian political future. Moreover, it appears to me that our opportunity has come. ... I would for the present put aside the question of the Council of Princes and the possibility of a native Member of Council. ... What I think we have distinctly before us is the prolongation of the Budget debate, the encouragement of greater discussion at that debate not only on questions of finance, but on other matters of public moment, and also a larger representation on the Legislative Council of the Viceroy. ... I believe, as a matter of sound improvement, we should do very right in commencing our reforms from the bottom of the tree. The Congress leaders would begin at the top. They want readymade power for themselves. We must remember that our own people at home have been educated for centuries in the idea of constitutional government and have only advanced by slow steps to the popular representation of to-day.† Here everything is different. From time immemorial§ it has been a rule of dictators, and we must be very careful not to thrust modern political machinery upon a people who are generally totally unprepared for

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* *Ibid.*, p. 283.

† But many autocratically governed countries in the world *have actually* taken very short cuts to representative government in our day. Lord Minto's "Rome was not built in a day" argument is more plausible than sound.

§ This is historically false.

it.…What I should venture to propose to you is that you should let me know what you think of my crude suggestion, that we should put our ideas as far as possible into shape by private correspondence, and that I should then place the position before my Council for discussion, with the intention of our sending you our proposals in the shape of an official despatch. I attach great importance to the official initiative being taken by the Government of India. It is better in every respect, both for the present and for the future, that the Government of India should appear to recognise all that is in the air here, and the necessity of meeting new conditions and that they should not run the risk of being assumed to have at last taken tardy action out of respect to instructions from home."*

Thus the inception of the Morley-Minto Reforms began, and Mr. Morley outlined his scheme in a few short sentences. Both Mr. Morley and Lord Minto were in favour of the reforms, of giving a share in the Government to the educated Indians, as suggested by the Prince of Wales after his return from India. After the Indian Councils Act of 1892, they thought of making the Councils more representative.

SIR BAMPFYLDE FULLER

The Partition of Bengal had been effected and Sir Bampfylde Fuller was appointed the first Lieutenant-Governor of the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. About the new Lieutenant-Governor we read :

"Sir Bampfylde Fuller was a man of ability and energy, and single-hearted in his devotion to duty. But he had not the qualities of tact and judgment necessary for the delicate situation in which he was placed ; he was impetuous and hot-headed, apt to use the strong hand, and not inclined to be too deferent to the views of his official superiors, who had to envisage the problems of all India."†

He did not prove a successful ruler.

"Already in the first six months of his tenure of office he had made many blunders, and greatly increased the Viceroy's burden. Mr. Morley was eager that he should be removed ; Minto shrank, not unnaturally, from a step which would be certainly misconstrued by the critics of the Government ; but he was convinced that Sir Bampfylde's administration was a serious danger, since he lacked the qualities of patience and discretion which could alone in time abate the partition ferment."

AN INCIDENT LEADING TO FULLER'S RESIGNATION

Very soon in the month of July 1906, there occurred an incident, which was "not quite unwelcome to either Viceroy or Secretary of State."

Before the Partition of Bengal had been effected, an order of the Bengal Government prohibited the students from taking part in the boycott movement. It further added that if this prohibition was disregarded, the Calcutta University would be asked to disaffiliate such institutions. In February 1906, the Eastern Bengal Government requested the Calcutta University to disaffiliate two schools which had ignored the order. At this juncture, the Home Department of the Government of India interfered and asked the Eastern Bengal Government not to press its request of disaffiliation. We read :

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 233-34.

† *Ibid.*, p. 237.

"Now, at that moment such action would have been dangerous, for Lord Curzon's University Act was not yet in full working order, Calcutta University was in process of reorganisation, and if the disaffiliation request had been pressed forthwith, it might have been refused, with the most awkward consequences. Accordingly, the Home Department of the Government of India suggested semi-officially to the Lieutenant-Governor the advisability of withdrawing the request on the ground that 'the political objections to pressing the application to the Syndicate outweigh the educational advantages which might be supposed to attach to a withdrawal of recognition from the schools.' "*

But Sir Bampfylde Fuller would not agree to this and he "replied with an autograph letter to the Viceroy, in which he announced that he was unable to acquiesce in this view, and that if it were persisted in, he must tender his resignation."

Lord Minto wrote :

"I feel, that, as you had expressed your willingness to resign, it would not be right to ask you to undertake proceedings of which you did not approve."

With the approval of the Secretary of State, Lord Minto accepted his resignation.

Mr. Buchan writes :

"The incident produced a profound sensation, and there was much foolish talk of throwing officers to the wolves. But there can be no doubt that Minto was right. Sir Bampfylde Fuller had not proved a success, and that he should have been unable to perceive the cogent reasons of the Government of India for refusing his request was sufficient proof that he had not the qualifications needed for a most difficult post."†

Mr. Morley wrote to the Viceroy on November 2, 1906 :

"......The Fuller Papers will be laid before the Parliament in a day or two. One matter in connection with them lies rather heavy on my conscience, and it is this. There is not a word to show that the acceptance of Fuller's resignation had my entire concurrence ; and I have a feeling that you may think it rather shabby in me, who clamoured every week for his removal, to remain in the innocence of a lamb before Parliament. The office were obdurate against the production of my telegram on the ground that the Governor-General is technically and constitutionally the sole authority over Lieutenant-Governors, and on the further ground that both Governor-General and Secretary of State should communicate with one another in absolute freedom, and this freedom would be much impaired if either felt that his letter or telegram might be planted in a Blue Book. I will try to get it known in Parliament that I warmly concurred in your acceptance of the resignation. I only hope that you will believe I am not thinking of saving my own skin, which, after all this time, has become dreadfully indurated."

REFORM COMMITTEE

In August, 1906, Lord Minto appointed a Committee, consisting of Sir A. T. Arundel, Sir Denzil Ibbetson, Mr. Baker and Mr. Erle Richards, with Mr. H. Risley as Secretary to consider the question of grant of further reform. The Committee was asked to consider the following questions : (*a*) a Council of Princes, and, should this be impossible, whether they might be represented in the Viceroy's Legislative Council ; (*b*) an Indian member of the Viceroy's Executive Council ; (*c*) increased representation on the Legislative Council of the Viceroy and of local governments ; and (*d*) prolongation of the Budget debate, and increased power of moving amendments.

* *Ibid.*, p. 238.

† *Ibid.*, p. 238.

Lord Minto also wrote a minute on this reform question. In appointing the above Committee, he wrote:

"I feel sure my colleagues will agree with me that Indian affairs and the methods of Indian administration have never attracted more public attention in India and at Home than at the present moment. The reasons for their doing so are not far to seek. The growth of education, which British rule has done so much to encourage, is bearing fruit. Important classes of the population are learning to realize their own position, to estimate for themselves their own intellectual capacities, and to compare their claims for an equality of citizenship with those of a ruling race, whilst the directing influences of political life at home are simultaneously in full accord with the advance of political thought in India.

"To what extent the people of India as a whole are as yet capable of serving in all branches of administration, to what extent they are individually entitled to a share in the political representation of their country, to what extent it may be possible to weld together the traditional sympathies of many different races and different creeds, and to what extent the great hereditary rulers of native States should assist to direct Imperial policy, are problems which the experience of future years can alone gradually solve.

"But we, the Government of India, cannot shut our eyes to present conditions. The political atmosphere is full of change, questions are before us which we cannot afford to ignore, and which we must attempt to answer : and to me it would appear all-important that the initiative should emanate from us ; that the Government of India should not be put in the position of appearing to have its hands forced by agitation in this country,* or by pressure from home ; that we should be the first to recognise surrounding conditions, and to place before His Majesty's Government the opinions which personal experience and a close touch with the every-day life of India entitle us to hold."†

After a month the Committee submitted its report. The report was afterwards circulated among the members of the Viceroy's Council with a note from the Viceroy on the desirability of appointing an Indian Member in his Council.

THE MAHOMEDAN DEPUTATION

The Indian Mahomedans found "themselves outstripped by the Hindus in the securing of public posts, and were beginning to smart under a sense of inferiority. The Partition of Bengal had been to their benefit, but the fate of Sir Bampfylde Fuller, whom they regarded as their special champion, had roused anxiety, and there was a danger that their young men might fall a prey to the peripatetic agitator." A deputation of the Mahomedan leaders, therefore, waited on the Viceroy on the 1st October under the leadership of the Aga Khan. The Deputation pointed out that the position of Moslems "should be commensurate not merely with their numerical strength but also with their political importance and the value of the contribution which they made to the defence of the Empire." It also claimed provision for the election of Mahomedans by special Mahomedan electorate.

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* The British Government in India has always attached great importance to *not appearing* to yield to or to be influenced by popular agitation ! It has always adopted the pose of generosity ! But can the *fact* of agitation and unrest being followed by tardy, inadequate and futile reforms be denied ?

† *Ibid.*, p. 241.

In reply Lord Minto remarked :

"The pith of your address, as I understand it, is a claim that, in any system of representation, whether it affects a municipality, a district board, or a legislative council, in which it is proposed to introduce or to increase the electoral organization, the Mahomedan community should be represented as a body. You point out that in many cases electoral bodies as now constituted cannot be expected to return a Mahomedan candidate, and that, if by chance they did so, it could only be at the sacrifice of such a candidate's views to those of a majority opposed to his own community, whom he would in no way represent ; and you justly claim that your position should be estimated not merely on your numerical strength but in respect to the political importance of your community and the service that it has rendered to the Empire. I am entirely in accord with you. Please do not misunderstand me ; I make no attempt to indicate by what means the representation of communities can be obtained, but I am as firmly convinced as I believe you to be that any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this conitnent."*

Lord Minto made the false assumption that different religious communities in any country had different political interests—an assumption not supported by any of the League of Nations Minority Treaties.

The late Maulana Mohamed Ali said in the course of his Indian National Congress Presidential Address that this Mahomedan deputation was "a command performance," which means that the deputation was got up at the suggestion of the authorities. This statement appears to be confirmed by the following passage in Morley's *Recollections*, vol. ii, p. 325 :

"I won't follow you again into our Mahometan dispute. Only I respectfully remind you once more that it was *your* early speech about their extra claims that first started the M. (Muslim) hare."

The Muslims and their British patrons have often dwelt on the special political importance of the former, but they have not defined wherein it consists. That omission is discreet. At the time when the Aga Khan spoke the Muslims formed less than 25 per cent. of the Indian army, and even now in 1932, when for political reasons more Punjab and Frontier Muslims are recruited than ever before, they form less than thirty per cent. These facts do not support their claims to excessive patronage.

THE AMIR'S VISIT

On January 9, 1907, the Amir arrived at Agra "in a deluge of rain—which he fortunately considered a good omen." He was met by the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief. A great Durbar, described below, was held at Agra.

"Huge silver poles support the great Durbar *shamiana*, where about a dozen gorgeous silver chairs are arranged in a circle. There is a large empty room with prayer carpets, where his devotions will be said. His bed is a silver four-poster with gold and silver embroideries instead of sheets, and his bath is a large inlaid marble tombstone with an iron pedestal beside it, on which a man stands and pours water over him. His other toilet requisites are all encased in plush and embroideries. On his dressing-table is a golden case full of scents—one bottle containing the pure extract of attar of roses."†

* *Ibid.*, p. 244.

† *Ibid.*, p. 248.

The Amir "was—after much anxious discussion—addressed as 'His Majesty' and given a salute of thirty-one guns." He :was highly impressed by "the review which he witnessed of 32,000 Indian troops, and rated his *sirdars* for making him believe that the Afghan army outweighed the combined forces of India and Russia. And the whole army of India, I now learn, is but a fraction of the total military strength of the British Empire, and the whole army of the British Empire, I further find, is one of the smallest among the armies of the world's Great Powers. What ! Have you naught to say? Look to it, I shall require your answer." In his farewell speech, the Amir gave a promise which he kept even during the Great War. He said :

"Before I came to India we called ourselves friends ; now I find myself in such a position that our friendship, which was like a plant before, is now like a big tree. I have gained much experience in India, and from that experience I hope to benefit my country in future. Let me say that at no time will Afghanistan pass from the friendship of India. So long as the Indian Empire desires to keep her friendship, so long will Afghanistan and Britain remain friends."

The Amir's visit, from the point of view of Indian policy, "was an unequivocal triumph, for relations of cordial friendship had been established which made it possible to tide over the difficulties of the agreement with Russia, now approaching completion."

On February 6, Lord Minto wrote to Mr. Morley thus :

"The Amir is still with us. I am afraid these words can hardly convey what they mean to me. Lady Minto and I are at the last stages of exhaustion. He fills up one's every spare moment. He came down to Barrackpore on Sunday for luncheon, after which I hoped for an afternoon to myself, but could not leave him. He then got involved in a game of croquet with my daughters, and finally remained till dark. . .A horrible rumour reached us this evening that he wants to stay for the races on Saturday, but I have told McMahon that he absolutely must insist on his leaving, as His Majesty's ships are specially awaiting his arrival at Bombay, and there is a naval programme there which he cannot neglect. He is simply irrepressible, more like a boy out of school than anything else. Not a word of affairs of state . I only pray that the joys of Calcutta may not have entirely unsettled him ! The responsibility of another such visit would really be more than I could bear, and I hear with apprehension that his *sirdars* say that there is no doubt there will now be an excellent motor-road from Kabul to Peshawar ! I am in great hopes, however, that the attractions of Western life may suggest a visit to you in London rather than to me."*

Poor Amir ! Perhaps he never suspected that he was considered very troublesome and a bore.

In reply Mr. Morley wrote to Lord Minto :

"I felt the horrible force of your opening words, 'The Amir is still with us.' Ah, well, *il faut souffir pour etre beau,* and Viceroys cannot have bright feathers in their caps without prodigious doses of boredom. I am glad His Majesty has at last taken himself off, and without one single bit of new engagement on our part. If, as I most confidently expect, he gets knocked on the head some fine morning by his brother or some other near relative, we are not bound to put him back on his shaky *gadi,* or rather I should say, to avenge his deposition therefrom. One great spring of mischief in these high politics is to suppose that the situation of today is to be the situation of tomorrow. If I were Lord Chesterfield, writing to a son whom I meant to be a

* *Ibid.*, pp. 251-52.

statesman, I should say to him, 'Remember that in the great high latitudes of policy all is fluid. elastic, mutable ; the friend of today, the foe of tomorrow; the ally and confederate against the enemy, suddenly *his* confederate against you ; Russia or France or Germany or America, one sort of power this year, quite another sort, and in deeply changed relations to you, the year after !' Excuse this preachment, and be sure not to suspect any 'application,' such as your Scotch preachers are fond of.'"*

COUNCIL'S VIEW OF THE REFORMS

The Viceroy's Council did not view the proposal of an Indian member in the Executive Council with any favour, with a solitary exception, the chief opponents being Lord Kitchner and Sir Denzil Ibbetson. Lord Minto's opinion was:

"In accepting an Indian member of Council we should at once admit the immediate right of a native to share in the highest executive administration of the country."

On February 27, 1907, Lord Minto wrote to Mr. Morley, on the question of appointing an Indian in the Viceroy's Council :

"The reasons against it as stated in the notes of members of Council are generally very narrow, based almost entirely on the assumption that it is impossible to trust a native in a position of great responsibility, and that the appointment of a native member is merely a concession to Congress agitation. The truth is, that by far the most important factor we have to deal with in the political life of India is not impossible Congress ambitions, but the growing strength of an educated class, which is perfectly loyal and moderate in its views, but which, I think, quite justly considers itself entitled to a greater share in the Government of India. I believe that we shall derive the greatest assistance from this class, if we recognise its existence, and that, if we do not, we shall drive it into the arms of Congress leaders."†

On March 21, 1907, Lord Minto received a deputation of the Hindu and Muhammadan leaders who were anxious to combine in putting down the unrest. Lord Minto was very happy to receive the deputation and wrote thus to Mr. Morley:

"Of all the wonderful things that have happened since I was in India, this, to my mind, was the most wonderful...The burden of it was that they are most anxious to put an end to unrest and bad feeling, and that they propose to organize associations throughout the country with a view to inducing Mohammedans and Hindus to work together for the control of their respective communities... It was simply marvellous, with the troubles and anxieties of a few months ago still fresh in one's memory, to see the 'king of Bengal' sitting on my sofa with his Mohammedan opponents, asking for my assistance to moderate the evil passions of the Bengali, and inveighing against the extravagances of Bepin Chandra Pal. I hope you will forgive me a little feeling of exultation at the confidence expressed to me by these representatives of hostile camps, and their declaration of faith in you and Mr. Hare and myself."§

ANGLO-INDIAN OPPOSITION

Lord Minto, in a letter to Mr. Morley on the 17th April, wrote thus about the Anglo-Indian opposition to his reform proposal :

"I think that Anglo-Indians would be divided into two camps, agreeing and disagreeing with me, and that I should be violently attacked by the latter both here and at home. If he (the Indian

* *Ibid.*, pp. 252-253.

† *Ibid.*, p. 253.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 254. *n.*

member) is appointed, the attacks will, I believe, die down, and gradually disappear; if he is not appointed, we shall have a tremendous revival of agitation, in which moderate natives will join and with which many Anglo-Indians will sympathize. It will be generally known throughout India that the Viceroy (and it will be assumed, I am sure, that your sympathies run in the same direction) and reasonable British opinion as well as native have given way to the clamour of a bureaucracy largely influenced by concern for their own interests. We shall have a row either way, but in the case of the appointment of a native member it would emanate from the official world alone, and would, in my opinion, gradually subside."*

MR. MORLEY "LESS BOLD"

Mr. Morley, in a letter of 31st October 1907, admitted that he was less bold. In another letter he said :

"I have known some slippery places in my ill-spent political days, but I declare I do not recall one when any step, both in reaching a conclusion and in the process of making it known, needs more wary deliberation."

Even in his own Council, ex-Viceroys like Lord Elgin and Lord Lansdowne were hostile to the appointment of an Indian member in the Viceroy's Council. He had also to reckon with the opposition of Sir Henry Fowler, an ex-Indian Secretary, and Lord Curzon. Lord Ripon 'was hostile to the proposal on the merits'--"mainly on the Secrecy argument—that the Member would have to know military and foreign secrets, etc. etc."†

UNREST IN THE PUNJAB

Troubles broke out in the Punjab. There were rioting in Lahore and Rawalpindi "Something was due to the anti-British propaganda of Bengali agitators, something to the recent plague and the wild suspicions which always accompany such a visitation, and much to the unwise handling by the local Government of the canal colonies. Undoubtedly the native army was being tampered with, and in India a little flicker may in a day be a prairie fire." British bureaucrats in India have got the Bengali on their brain and at the same time profess to consider him despicable. But how can he be both contemptible and influential, if only for mischief ?

THE REGULATION OF MEETINGS ORDINANCE, 1907

As unrest broke out in the Punjab, the Government took repressive measures. "Under an old regulation of 1818 the two chief agitators, Lala Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh, were arrested, and deported without trial. An Ordinance was also issued (The Regulation of Meetings Ordinance, 1907) prohibiting the holding of seditious meetings in the provinces of the Punjab and Eastern Bengal."

It is remarked by Mr. Buchan that "these were strong measures for a Liberal Secretary of State."

LORD MINTO DISALLOWS THE PUNJAB COLONIES BILL

The trouble in the Punjab rose out of the attitude of the Punjab Government towards the Chenab Colony, peopled by 1,200,000 souls. The Punjab Government

* *Ibid.*, p. 254.

† Morley's *Recollectious*, vol. ii, p. 211.



Lala Lajpat Rai



Mr. (afterwards Lord) Sinha

"had introduced certain measures which the colonists regarded, and with justice, as a departure from the pledges on which the settlement had been formed."

The Bill as passed by the Punjab Legislative Council was now before the Viceroy for his assent. The Bill was "notoriously unpopular, and to Minto it seemed a clear breach of faith. But he was told, if he disallowed it, that at a critical time he would lessen the prestige of the local Government in the eyes of the people. This was never the kind of plea that appealed to Minto's mind. If it was an unjust bill, he told an inquirer, he would not consider the feelings of fifty Punjab Governments."

Lord Minto wrote to Mr. Morley:

"I hate the argument, that to refuse to sanction what we know to be wrong is a surrender to agitation and an indication of weakness. It is far weaker, to my mind, to persist in a wrong course for fear of being thought weak."

Lord Minto accordingly disallowed the Bill and 'with the most fortunate consequences.'

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION

The negotiations for an Anglo-Russian Convention, carried on by Sir Arthur Nicolson and M. Isvolsky since 1906, now came to a close. In May 1907 the first draft of the Convention was telegraphed to the Indian Government. "Minto had little confidence in the decencies of Russian diplomacy and the assurances of St. Petersburg, and he foresaw that the agreement would leave northern Persia a happy hunting-ground for Russian intrigue."

Lord Minto tried his best "to prevent the British Cabinet from ruining utterly the future relations of India and Afghanistan." The British Cabinet had accepted the following provision:

"Should any change occur in the political status of Afghanistan, the two Governments will enter into a friendly interchange of views on the subject."

Lord Minto clearly saw that 'it might be a fruitful parent of mischief.' He protested against this objectionable clause, which was finally dropped.

The Viceroy could not consult the Amir before the Convention was concluded. Mr. Morley, however, could not induce his colleagues to wait for fear of the break-up of the negotiations. He wrote thus on the 2nd August, 1907:

"It came to this at last—a choice between accepting the drawbacks and losing the convention. Of course, anyone can see that the relations between us and the Amir were never so good as they are at this moment. Nothing can mend them. On the other hand, it is inevitable that the convention between us and Russia should make him suspicious and uneasy. The notion of his two neighbours 'exchanging views' about annexing and occupying him will naturally have a very ugly look of partition in his eyes....If the convention goes on—as in spite of all its drawbacks I am bound to hope that it will—I would ask you to encourage yourself in the delicate diplomacy that we shall in that case impose on you with the Amir....Certainly, if you do not succeed in managing your Kabul friend, the results of the whole proceeding will be disastrous."*

On the 31st August Mr. Morley telegraphed that the Anglo-Russian Convention

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* *Lord Minto,* p. 261.

had been signed. Lord Minto was pleased with the arrangement with Afghanistan and hoped to receive the assent of the Amir to it.

AGITATION IN BENGAL

The agitation in Bengal was carried on vigorously.

"The tour in the Madras Presidency of the Bengali agitator, Bepin Chandra Pal, led to a series of riots, and in the autumn his doings in Calcutta resulted in his going to prison for six months. Throughout the autumn and early winter the capital city was in a disturbed state, seditious meetings were frequent, the police were stoned, and in the beginning of December an attempt was made to murder Sir Andrew Fraser, the Lieutenant-Governor."

This is a mixture of truth and falsehood. The Government again thought of "further steps for the preservation of order." Lord Kitchner wanted another improved Press Act.

SEDITIOUS MEETINGS BILL

In November 1907, the Legislative Council passed the Seditious Meetings Bill, brought forward by the Government. It superseded the recent Regulations of Meetings Ordinance. Lord Minto spoke thus defining his policy :

"The Bill is aimed at the inauguration of dangerous sedition, not at political reform, not at the freedom of speech of the people of India...Far from wishing to check the growth of political thought, I have hoped that with proper guidance Indian capacity and Indian patriotism might earn for its people a greater share in the government of their country...We may repress sedition, we *will* repress it with a strong hand, but the restlessness of new-born and advancing thought we cannot repress We must be prepared to meet it with help and guidance, we must seek for its causes."

No Indian can take these professions of not seeking to strike at freedom of speech at their face value.

RELEASE OF THE PUNJAB DEPORTEES

The passing of the Seditious Meetings Act made it necessary to release Lala Lajpat Rai and Sardar Ajit Singh. Lord Minto wrote on the 5th November :

"I have not a shadow of doubt that we must release them, and that the sooner we do so the better."

So they were released at Lahore on the 18th November.

HOBHOUSE COMMISSION

In December 1907, the Hobhouse Commission of decentralization began its work in India. The Chairman of the Commission was Mr. (now Sir) Charles Hobhouse, who did not turn out a happy choice :

"He contrived to offend many of the officials with whom he came into contact, he disregarded the terms of his inquiry and proposed to report on the most delicate and secret matters completely outside his scope."

HOBHOUSE'S CONFLICT WITH THE VICEROY

Mr. Hobhouse finally came into conflict with Lord Minto. The story of the conflict is thus told by Mr. Buchan :

"One evening about 9 p.m., he sent in eighty-six questions which he asked the Viceroy to

consider before noon next day; when told that this was impossible, and that he was in the range of his inquiries exceeding his powers, he demanded a private luncheon with the Viceroy to discuss the question, which was incompatible with Viceregal etiquette. Minto wrote to Morley on the 3rd January an account of the deadlock. He did not think that the Government of India should be itself examined on any of the great questions of administration, but should keep clear so that it might be able to give an independent opinion upon the report when completed. Above all, it was impossible to have the Commission visiting and interrogating the native States, whose internal relations were a delicate matter and depended mainly upon personal intercourse between the ruling Princes and the Viceroy. On the 9th January, he wrote that the Chairman of the Commission 'is apparently under the impression that some superior power to that of the Government of India has been delegated to him,' and he went on to suggest a principle of which Mr. Morley cordially approved: 'Indian policy should generally depend upon an exchange of views between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. There must be a policy for India as a whole approved by His Majesty's Government and I can see nothing except confusion of ideas if the Secretary of State should be advised by the heads of a number of local governments, in whom generally little reliance can be placed in reference to questions of imperial magnitude'."*

THE RAJPUTANA INCIDENT

Lord Minto "refused, rightly, to let the Commission visit these (native) States, since its purpose would have been misunderstood, and it would have led to endless perplexities, so it was arranged that, so far as that subject was concerned, the Chairman should examine the head of the Foreign Department in Calcutta and political officers belonging to any native State he cared to name."

But Mr. Hobhouse went to Rajputana on a private tour and "called for confidential reports on a variety of subjects, alleging --or so the officials understood him - that he had a secret commission from Mr. Morley to examine into these matters. The Viceroy promptly forbade the officials to furnish a line of information or Mr. Hobhouse to ask for it."

Even before the Rajputana incident, Mr. Morley had written :

"I am in some despair about a certain commission that in a doubtful hour I launched upon you. From many quarters I have the same story of want of tact, and of excessive brusqueness. I can only plead that I did my utmost to warn him, and in every letter I have harped upon the same tune."

Again, on the 12th March, 1908, Mr. Morley wrote about the "secret mission" thus :

"The trouble Hobhouse is giving us really is almost exasperating. The 'secret mission' is wholly unintelligible. Why, I told him fifty times that you were to decide everything in this region. It is as absurd as his talk about my 'delegating' the powers of a Secretary of State to him."†

THE FRONTIER POLICY

The Frontier officials were "inclined to the belief that the strip of no man's land lying between India and Afghanistan should be brought directly under British control." Lord Minto, however, did not agree with this proposal. He proposed a modified occupation of the territory. He wrote thus to Mr. Morley on October 16, 1907 :

* *Lord Minto*, pp. 265-66.

† *Ibid.*, p. 267.

"There need be no necessity for taking the country in the sense of forcing upon it British administration, collection of revenues, etc. We could simply hold it by the creation of one or two roads, or rather by the improvement of the existing roads by means of tribal labour ..and the establishment of a few advanced posts, leaving the tribes as heretofore to carry on their own tribal administration, as we have done in the Swat Valley and other districts. Why should we have a nest of cut-throats at our doors when all our experience has taught us that the mere evidence of British strength means not only safety to ourselves but happiness and prosperity to the districts we have pacified ?...Putting aside the loss of life and property consequent upon perpetual frontier outrages, the pacification of Waziristan would, in the long run, be far less expensive than a succession of expeditions. I hope when an occasion does arise to resort to force that all this may be borne in mind."*

Again he wrote on January 29, 1908 :

"I think perhaps you misunderstood me. I doubt very much if any one who thinks at all would wish to increase our landed property purely for the sake of adding to our possessions. But an examination of our Frontier history would, I should say, undoubtedly prove that when we have assumed control of tribal districts comparative civilization and peace have been the result....The examples that come to my mind are Baluchistan, the Kurram Valley, the Swat Valley, and the tribal country on this side of the Malakand, in which latter district the chief request of the *jirga* which met me was for an improved railway service ! I believe, too, that the responsibility and expense these districts entailed upon us before they came under our control was probably far greater than that which exists at the present day. ..The state of affairs on our Frontier is becoming simply disreputable. We cannot afford any longer to disregard the safety of our own subjects. We shall have to fight, and, of course, we are sure to win. But in doing so, are we to spend lives and money and throw aside what we may gain, with the knowledge that in a few years' time we shall have to repeat the same expenditure, which our Frontier experience has told us we can so well avoid ?"†

ZAKKA KHEL RISING (1908)

The words of Lord Minto We shall have to fight,' came to be true. On the night of 28th January, 1908, the Zakha Khel tribe of the Afridi race made an attack on Peshawar. An expedition was sent against them under the command of Sir James Willcocks. Mr. Morley telegraphed thus :

"Orders are that the end in view is strictly limited to the punishment of the Zakka Khels, and neither immediately nor ultimately, directly or indirectly, will there be a occupation of tribal territory."

The expedition was successful. But there was an attempt "of various *multahs* on the Afghan side to raise a *jehad*." An attack of an Afghan *lashkar* was beaten off. The Mohmands also were to be calmed down. Thus "the campaigns were brilliantly conducted, and the inflammable elements on the Frontier, which might have blazed into a formidable war, were skilfully damped down."

Mr. Morley wrote thus on the 4th March :

"We Indians are all in good spirits here just now at the end of the Zakka...I think the policy of His Majesty's Government has been amply justified in the result ; and the military part of the work has evidently been done to perfection. For this I cannot but feel that we owe Lord K. a special debt...."§

* *Ibid.*, pp. 268-69.

† *Ibid.*, p. 269.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

INDIAN MILITARY BUDGET

Mr. Morley thought that after the Anglo-Russian Convention India should have a reduced Military Budget. But Lords Minto and Kitchner did not agree with him. They asked 'in what respect the Convention strengthened India's security or enabled her to relax her defensive vigilance. Another point of difference was the policy to be pursued as to Southern Persia and the Gulf."

Mr. Morley seemed 'to deny India's right to a view on the larger questions of Foreign policy.' He wrote :

"China, Persia, Turkey, Russia, France, Germany, I have never been able to understand, and never shall understand, what advantages the Government of India have for comprehending the play of all these factors in the great game of Empire. On the contrary, the Government of India is by no means the man on the spot. That, I say again, is just what the Government of India is not.'

To this Lord Minto made the following reply :

"It is not the appearance of German armies that we have to fear, it is the growth of German influence and its effect on Eastern nationalities. Given paramount German influence in Turkey, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Southern Persia, our position in India would be seriously threatened... I don't see how Indian interests in Persia and the Gulf can be handed over entirely to home administration, for if this were done, putting aside political matters, any military expenditure in Persia or naval expenditure in the Gulf could not fairly be charged to India. And yet we know that as a matter of fact, in the case of difficulties arising in Persia it would be upon Indian troops that His Majesty's Government would be obliged to rely. I don't think you can separate Indian interests from the commerce of the Gulf or the strategical position in Persia from the possible necessity of Indian military assistance."*

OUTRAGES IN BENGAL

In 1908, more outrages occurred in Bengal.

"On the night of 30th April a bomb, intended for Mr. Kingsford, a former Chief Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta, was thrown into a carriage in which two English women were returning from the club at Muzaffarpur, and both ladies died of their injuries. A secret murder society, operating in Calcutta and Midnapur, was revealed, connected with the notorious Maniktolla Gardens, and bomb factories were discovered in various quarters. In July there were ugly disturbances in Bombay consequent upon the prosecution of Tilak for sedition, and riots at Pandharpur and Nagpur. In September an approver was shot dead by two of the Muzaffarpur prisoners in the chief prison in Calcutta. In November there was another attempt to murder Sir Andrew Fraser, and a native Inspector of Police was shot in a Calcutta street."

Lord Minto thus spoke of the outrages in the Legislative Council on 8th June:

"I am determined that no anarchist crimes will for an instant deter me from endeavouring to meet as best I can the political aspirations of honest reformers, and I ask the people of India, and all who have the future welfare of this country at heart, to unite in the support of law and order, and to join in one common effort to eradicate a cowardly conspiracy from our midst."†

REPRESSIVE MEASURES

The Government again took repressive measures.

"The English Explosives Act was passed in June as an Indian statute. The Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, passed in December, provided a summary procedure for the trial of seditious

* *Ibid.*, pp. 272-73.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 244-45.

conspiracies, and gave power to suppress associations formed for unlawful acts.... The Press Act of 1908, dealing with newspapers which published incitements to murder and violence, did not create new offences but provided a more drastic procedure, a better machinery for getting at the real culprit, and severer penalties."

Besides these, there were the Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act of 1907 and the old Regulation of 1818, under which nine Bengali leaders were deported, including among others such highly honoured and respectable persons as Aswini Kumar Datta and Krishna Kumar Mitra. Outside Bengal, Lala Lajpat Rai of the Punjab was deported. Barisal was chiefly marked out for Minto's repressive acts. It was made a proclaimed district.

THE REFORMS DESPATCH

"If reforms do not save the Raj, nothing else will," so said Lord Morley. But Lord Minto did not agree with it. He said :

"The Raj will not disappear in India as long as the British race remains what it is, because we shall fight for the Raj as hard as we have ever fought if it comes to fighting, and we shall win as we have always done. My great object is that it shall not come to that."*

It was decided that on 1st November 1908, on the fiftieth anniversary of Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858, a message from the King would foreshadow the reform proposals.

On 1st October Lord Minto sent "the fateful dispatch giving the considered scheme of the Government of India. Lord Morley appointed a small expert committee to report on the proposals, and in a dispatch of 27th November sanctioned the scheme, subject to certain slight modifications."

THE JODHPUR DURBAR

On 1st November 1908, Lord Minto in a great Durbar at Jodhpur delivered the King's message, enlarging the Charter of 1858.

"The time had come when the principle of representative institutions must be prudently extended, and the measures to ensure this would soon be made known. 'For the military guardianship of my Indian Dominion I recognise the valour and fidelity of my Indian troops, and at the New Year I have ordered that opportunity should be taken to show in substantial form this my high appreciation of their martial instincts, their splendid discipline, and their faithful readiness of service'."


The Reform Scheme was made public, both in India and England, in December 1908. In India it received the support of the Moderates. Mr. Gokhale declared that the Viceroy and Lord Morley between them had saved India from drifting "towards what cannot be described by any other name than chaos."

Lord Morley tried to pilot the bill through the Parliament, and he did so with success. He wrote:

"Balfour spoke in his usual pleasant and effective way for a short half-hour, mainly occupied with an interesting analysis of the conditions that are required to make representative government a success, ending in the conclusion that India satisfies none of these conditions... He vouched me as

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 277-78



Sjt. Krishna Kumar Mitra

undoubtedly agreeing with him as to Indian unfitness for representative institutions; and he was quite right. With the bill and the scheme he hardly dealt at all, and his criticism was purely superficial... Though it would never do for me to say so, I must secretly admit that the thing compared very poorly with the strength and knowledge of the debates on the bill in the House of Lords."*

This extract shows that British statesmen of opposite parties held the wrong opinion that India was unfit for representative institutions.

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE INDIAN MEMBER

To remove certain misconceptions, Lord Minto thus wrote to the King on March 4, 1909:

"The Viceroy was inclined when he first came to India to argue with certain of his colleagues on his Executive Council that an Indian member should be added to their number and a seat provided for him by statute. The Viceroy has, however, since come to the conclusion that an Indian member, occupying a seat created by statute, would be an admission of the necessity for racial representation, which would create rival claims for such seat amongst the many nationalities, religions, and castes of India. Moreover, a seat held on racial qualifications would, it appeared to the Viceroy, indicate a disregard for the special qualities which should entitle an individual to hold such a seat, *viz.*, professional ability, administrative experience, and social standing... From the Viceroy's point of view, therefore, the point involved is the question whether, if an Indian gentleman is possessed of the above qualifications, he should be debarred because of his race from holding an appointment for which he may be exceptionally suited. The Viceroy thinks he can no longer in justice be so debarred, and that racial disability should be removed."†

APPOINTMENT OF MR. (AFTERWARDS LORD) SINHA

On March 24, 1909, the newspapers contained the news of Mr. S. P. Sinha's appointment. Mr. Sinha was then the Advocate-General of Bengal and he sacrificed 'his very large private income at the Calcutta Bar.'

Lord Morley wrote thus:

"*The Times* shakes its head a little...they shed tears over the fact that Sinha has not some score of the rarest political virtues in the world—courage, patience, tact, foresight, penetration, breadth of view, habit of authority, and Heaven knows what else—just as if all those noble qualities were inherent in any third-rate lawyer that I could have fished out of Lincoln's Inn, or even as if they are to be found in *all* the members of the Executive Council as it stands to-day!"§

THE REFORM BILL

The Reform Bill was passed by the Parliament on May 25, 1909. By this new Act "the total strength of the various legislative councils was raised from 124 to 331, and the number of elected members from 39 to 135, a majority of non-official members being introduced in every legislative council except that of the Viceroy. Power was given to members to move resolutions on matters of general public interest, to discuss the annual budgets more freely, and to put supplementary questions...the members of the Executive Councils of Madras and Bombay were increased, and power was given to appoint an Indian member of each."

* *Ibid.*, p. 285.

† *Ibid.*, p. 286.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

As to the Muhammadans in the Viceroy's Legislative Council—five were to be elected by Muhammadan electorates, and one to be nominated.

CONCILIATION *vs.* REPRESSION

What should be the policy of the Government of India, conciliation or repression ? Lord Morley wrote thus on 2nd April :

"It may be that the notion of co-operation between foreigners and alien subjects is a dream. Very likely. Then the alternative is pure Repression and the Naked Sword. But that is as dangerous and uncertain as *conciliation,* be that as bad as Balfour thinks, because it is impossible that the Native Army can for ever escape contagion. And railways and telegraphs put new and formidable implements in the hands of even the civil population, if they break into mutiny. Our Liberal expedients may fail. The Tory experiment of grudging and half-and-half concessions is sure...to end in dangerous impotence. The only chance, be it a good chance or a bad chance, is to do our best to make English rulers friends with Indian leaders, and at the same time to do our best to train them in habits of political responsibility."*

ELECTION DISQUALIFICATION

The question came whether the political deportees would be allowed to stand for election. Lord Minto asked for the right of veto after the election. Lord Morely was not willing to go so far. Lord Minto argued:

"What is our main duty ? Surely it is, in the first place, to govern India with due regard to the welfare and peace of its population—not to attempt, irrespective of those interests, to conform with principles which the political training of years may have rendered dear to the people of England, but which are totally unadapted to the conditions we have now to deal with in this country....It is such guidance of the Government of India by a Parliament totally ignorant of local conditions which, if it is to represent a generally accepted principle in our administration of India, is, I must regretfully say, in my opinion certain to prove disastrous....Political disqualification in England, and in India just awakening to political life and governed largely by the mere prestige of British authority, cannot be judged by the same standard. A released political prisoner who becomes a member of Parliament in no way threatens the safety of the constitution, but the election of Lajpat Rai to the Viceroy's Legislative Council would set India in a blaze....We must not forget...that our Councils will be comparatively small, and that the introduction into them of a stormy petrel would have a very different effect to a similar introduction into the historic atmosphere of the House of Commons."†

But Lajpat Rai's election *did not* "set India in a blaze."

The question was afterwards "settled by permitting the Viceroy by regulation to give to himself and the local governments the power to prevent the *nomination* of any irreconcilable."

MORLEY INSISTS ON THE RELEASE OF DEPORTEES

Lord Morley wished 'to signalise the completion of the Reform Scheme by some notable act of clemency.' He telegraphed on October 21, 1909 :

"The continued detention of the deportees makes a mockery of the language we are going to use about reform. It makes a thoroughly self-contradictory situation."

He also wrote thus :

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* *Ibid.,* p. 289.

"Don't be offended if I say boldly that, if I were Governor-General today, I would make up my mind to have an amnesty on the day when the new Council's Act comes into force. As you know, I could argue the other way if I liked, but I have an *instinct* that this is the way that would redound most to the credit and honour for courage acquired by you already."*

Again on the 31st October he sent another telegram to the Viceroy :

"Regarding the deportees—I earnestly hope that I am not to understand that you reject the unanimous suggestion of the Cabinet. Such a result would be most grave, and I am sure you will consider the situation with a full sense of responsibility, as I sincerely try to do."

But the Viceroy would not agree. He replied :

"I have already told you that the decision of my Council against release is unanimous, and is supported by the strong opinions of Lieutenant-Governors."

His argument seemed to be as follows :

"One of the great hopes of our Reform Scheme was to 'rally the Moderates.' Surely it would not be wise to turn loose those firebrands into the political arena just at the very moment when we are hoping that the reasonable and stable characters in Indian society will come forward and range themselves on our side, and on the side of constitutional progress. It seems to me that, if we were to do this, we should indeed be creating a 'self-contradictory situation,' in that, having withdrawn the deportees from political life for nine months or so while nothing was going on, we should be liberating them at the very moment when the whole country will be in the turmoil of a general election, and when we are trying for the first time to work out an entirely novel electoral machinery !"†

FRESH OUTBREAK OF TROUBLE

Again fresh outbreaks broke out :

"In February the public prosecutor in the Alipore case was murdered ; in the early summer secret criminal societies were discovered in Gwalior, the Deccan, and Eastern Bengal ; and on 1st July there was perpetrated the hideous murder of Sir William Curzon Wyllie and Dr. Lalkaka at the Imperial Institute in London....Finally, on 21st December, Mr. Jackson, the Collector of Nasik in the Deccan, was shot dead by a young Brahmin at a farewell theatrical performance given in his honour."

Lord Minto on this occasion thus wrote to Lord Morley :

"I hope that public opinion won't take the unreasonable view that the deeds of a few anarchists are proof of the doubtful loyalty of all India. Of this I am absolutely certain, that if it had not been for our recognition of Indian political ambitions, we should now have had ranged against us a mass of discontent composed not only of extremists, but of those who are now our most loyal supporters."§

Again, on 13th November two bombs were thrown at the carriage in which Lord and Lady Minto were seated, while it was being driven through one of the main streets of Ahmedabad. The bombs, however, failed to explode.

Lord Morley wrote on this affair thus :

"Inspite of your magnanimous refusal to attach any political significance to the bombs, one cannot but feel that the miscreants who planned the outrage were animated by politics, if one can give the name of politics to such folly and wickedness. Anyhow it was fine and truly generous of

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* *Ibid.*, p. 291.

† *Ibid.*, p. 292.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

you to say that you stoutly resisted the idea that it represented anything like the heart of the general Indian population. This is one of the utterances that will stick, and will cause your name to be held in honour."*

LORD KITCHNER'S DEPARTURE

In August 1909, Lord Kitchner retired from the post of Commander-in-Chief of India and was succeeded by Sir O'Moore Creagh.

"His farewell speech at Simla proved to be largely an adaptation of Lord Curzon's farewell speech at the Byculla Club in 1905. Parallel columns in *The Times* showed a damaging identity both in matter and style. There had been no such case of plagiarism since Disraeli cribbed from Thiers his panegyric on the Duke of Wellington, and the situation was made piquant by the fact that copier and copied were old and unreconciled antagonists."

Lord Minto wrote thus to Lord Morley about this farewell address :

"At first I thought the similarity might be mere coincidence—but such a possibility vanishes when one sees the passages side by side. The best explanation I have heard—and I have good reason to think it the true one is that K. merely told Duff that he would find some good points in Curzon's speech, but I am firmly convinced that K. never intended that he should use it as he did, and never had any idea that he had done so. But then, as I say—how is Duff's performance to be accounted for ? Of course there are ill-natured explanations beneath contempt. The supposition that it was irony on K.'s part has also gone the rounds here—sheer impossible nonsense. K. is a very bad speaker—hates having even to say a few words—always reads his speeches, and read the one in question particularly badly....I am very sorry about it all. It is lucky for K. that he is on the high seas !"†

MINTO'S VISIT TO LAHORE

The Viceroy's visit to Lahore was a great success, as such things go. Every house was decorated with mottoes, including the following funny one :

"Ripon, Minto, Morley, England's greatest three,
India sing their praises till eternity."

HIS SPEECH AT UDAIPUR

On 6th November, Lord Minto delivered an important speech on the Native Princes and Native States. He tried to define the policy of Britain towards them. He "emphasised their internal independence, as far as it was consistent with the interests of India and the British Empire, and the need of elasticity and variety in their relations with the Raj. He had no belief in a world steam-rollered out into a uniform flatness to please a certain type of official mind."

He also said :

"I have made it a rule to avoid as far as possible the issue of general instructions, and have endeavoured to deal with questions as they arose with reference to existing treaties, the merits of each case, local conditions, antecedent circumstances, and the particular stage of development, feudal and constitutional, of individual principalities....I have always been opposed to anything like pressure on Durbars with a view to introducing British methods of administration—I have preferred that

* *Ibid.*, p. 294.

† *Ibid.*, p. 296.

reform should emanate from the Durbars themselves, and grow up in harmony with the traditions of the State. It is easy to over-estimate the value of administrative efficiency."*

MORE OUTRAGES

On January 24, 1910, a Mussalman Police officer, who was thought to have unravelled some Bengal plots, was shot dead at the Calcutta High Court. Lord Minto wrote about it this time:

"The worst of it is that the meaning of outrages is so enormously exaggerated at home. I wish the British public would understand that the troubles we have to deal with do not mean the possibility of rebellion."

NEW LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

On January 25, 1910, Lord Minto opened the new Legislative Council, re-organised according to the new Reforms Act. Lady Minto thus described the opening ceremony of the new Council:

"He (Lord Minto) began his speech amid profound silence; you might have heard a pin drop. He spoke gradually with more and more emphasis, and when he announced that whether for good or ill he alone was responsible for the reforms, his strength and determination quite carried his audience with him, and at last they broke out into an enthusiastic burst of applause, a thing hitherto unheard of in the Council Chamber."

Lord Minto in his opening speech traced the history of the Reforms. He said:

"It is important that my colleagues and the Indian public should know the history, the early history, of the reforms which have now been sanctioned by Parliament. They had their genesis in a note of my own addressed to my colleagues in August 1906 -nearly three and a half years a go. It was based entirely on the views I had myself formed of the position of affairs in India. It was due to no suggestions from home: Whether it was good or bad, I am entirely responsible for it."

Then referring to the recent assassinations, he said:

"I had hoped to open this new Council under an unclouded political sky. No man has longed more earnestly than I have to allow bygones to be bygones, and to commence a new administrative era with a clean slate. The course of recent events has cancelled the realization of those hopes, and I can but assert that the first duty of every Government is to maintain the observance of the law—to provide for the present and, as far as it can, for the future welfare of the populations committed to its charge—to rule, and if need be to rule with a strong hand."

He concluded thus:

"I do not for an instant admit that the necessity of ruthlessly eradicating a great evil from our midst should throw more than a passing shadow over the general political situation in India. I believe that situation to be better than it was five years ago. We must not allow immediate dangers to blind us to the evidence of future promise. I believe that the broadening of political representation has saved India from far greater troubles than those we have now to face."†

THE PRESS ACT OF 1910

The Press Act was passed by the new Council on February 9, 1910. It "compelled the publisher or printer of a newspaper to give security for good behaviour, and laid down that, in the event of the paper publishing prohibited matter, the security might

* *Ibid.*, p. 298.

† *Ibid.*, p. 303.

be forfeited, and, on the second offence, the plant itself. An editor was free to publish what he pleased, as in England, but he did it at his own risk; in England that risk took the form of liability to damages or imprisonment, in India of the forfeiture of property.' But in England the risk was almost, if not wholly, theoretical. When an editor is imprisoned, it is not very difficult to find a successor. But when a newspaper and its press are forfeited, resulting in the loss of employment of many innocent men and thus in their punishment in this form, the newspaper and the press cannot be so easily replaced—particularly in poverty-stricken India. Hence the risk in India was very much greater than in England. It is also to be borne in mind that in England punishment followed a judicial trial, in India it was inflicted by executive order.

RELEASE OF THE BENGAL DEPORTEES

The same day when the Press Act was passed, Lord Minto gave orders for the release of the Bengal deportees, who included persons like Babus Aswini Kumar Datta, Krishna Kumar Mitra and others. In a note to one of his colleagues, Lord Minto had written thus:

"That advice (to his Council on the subject of release) was given without any reference whatever, either by letter or telegram, to the Secretary of State. I did not even forewarn him of the possibility of release. I acted entirely on my own responsibility, and I was especially anxious to do so in order to avoid any appearance of any documental suggestion that the Government of India had acted under pressure. As far as I am concerned, the advice I gave my Council was based entirely on what I considered best for India, independently of any influence in England."*

DEATH OF KING EDWARD VII

In the first week of May 1910, the news of King Edward's death reached India. There were stately memorial services. There was a Hindu demonstration in the Calcutta maidan under the leadership of the Maharaja of Darbhanga. Lord Minto thus wrote to the Secretary of State about this demonstration:

"After all that has passed, I am sure you will think the manifestation of feeling most remarkable Surendra Nath Banerji, Bhupendra Nath Basu and Moti Lal Ghose on bended knees before a picture of the King-Emperor! What an emotional people! And yet the fact that they are so ought to give us a master-key to many of the secrets of governing them."†

It would be a mistake to assume that on this occasion the three persons named above truly represented all sections of the people of India in general and of Bengal in particular.

NO MILITARY VICEROY FOR INDIA

Lord Minto had hoped for Lord Kitchner as his successor. Though Mr. Asquith was in his favour, Lord Morley "was adamant on the ground that at that juncture a military Viceroy would be fatal."

DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN MORLEY AND MINTO

A difference of a most serious nature now arose between Lord Minto and Lord Morley. It was due to the Budget speech of Mr. Edwin Montagu in the beginning of August. Mr. Montagu had said:

* *Ibid.*, p. 304.

† *Ibid.*, p. 306.



Aswini Kumar Datta

"The relations of the Viceroy to the Secretary of State are intimate and responsible. The Act of Parliament says 'that the Secretary of State in Council shall superintend, direct, and control all acts, operations, and concerns which in any way relate to or concern the Government and revenues of India, and all grants of salaries, gratuities or allowances, and all other payments and charges whatever out of or on the revenues of India.' It will be seen how wide, how far-reaching, and how complete these powers are, Lord Morley and his Council, *working through the agency of Lord Minto*, have accomplished much...."*

This speech of the Under-Secretary for India "roused a storm of criticism in India, for it asserted unequivocally that the Viceroy was merely an agent of the Secretary of State, and the Government of India a registry office. The doctrine was bad alike in constitutional law and in constitutional practice."

Mr. Morley asked apology "for Mr. Montagu's manner as not felicitous," but he adhered to the substance of the doctrine. Minto contented himself with a good-humoured protest, for he did not wish to mar his last weeks with a quarrel.

Lord Minto, however, spoke out his mind in his personal letters to Sir Arthur Bigge (Lord Stamfordham). He wrote :

"What is important is the constant insistence by the S. of S. on his sole right to appoint members of Council, together with perpetual interference with the details of administration in India. By statute the members of Council are appointed by the King—and there is no mention of recommendation by either S. of S. or Viceroy. I had much correspondence about this when I first came out—my argument being that, whilst quite recognising the S. of S. as the King's constitutional adviser, it seemed to me reasonable to assume that it was intended that the Viceroy should be consulted as to appointments to his own Council which concerned him more than anyone else, and that great weight should at any rate be given to his objections. M., on the other hand, arrogates to himself complete ndependence, and I am bound to say that the appointments he has made off his own bat have been most unfortunate. .I have constantly felt that I must depend upon myself alone with the exception of one or two advisers I had managed to secure, and that those sent me were not only useless but mischievous. As to Lieutenant-Governors, they are appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Viceroy, and consequently have always been considered as the Viceroy's appointments ; but though I have succeeded in maintaining them as such, it has been after any amount of useless correspondence and often of useless objections. Besides the damage done to Indian authority by interference of this sort at home, the door is thrown open to wire-pulling in England by the friends of candidates for appointments, and the Viceroy is bound to feel that his advice is handicapped by that of personally interested and unqualified persons."

The Viceroy went on to say :

"It seems to me that, as regards these high appointments made by the King, the position of the Viceroy is so peculiar, as being answerable for the safety and good administration of India, and that the authority of the King-Emperor is so direct towards India itself, that the King would be fully and constitutionally justified, when such appointments are submitted to him, in asking for the Viceroy's opinion and in being largely influenced by it in his decision. As long as I am here I cannot feel justified in writing to the King about one of his own Ministers. I must serve His Majesty's Government straightforwardly, but if I had been going to stay longer I should have felt bound to ask that the position of S. of S. towards the Government of India should be considered. No one except those who have been behind the scenes here knows what the interference has been about every little thing. I used to imagine that the S. of S. aimed only at directing great principles of Indian policy,

* *Ibid.*, pp. 309-10.

and that the administration of the country rested with the Government of India, but there has been interference in everything. It only results in intense worry for the Viceroy, for, do what he will, *the S. of S. cannot administer India.* ..As a matter of fact, I believe I have gained my point in everything since I have been here, but it has generally been by not losing my temper when I should have been thoroughly justified in doing so—sometimes by not answering—often by asserting myself in the most courteous language—and often by humouring the peculiar personality with whom I had to deal. Ever since I have been in India it has seemed to me of vital importance to run the ship as best I could, regardless of the inexcusable troubles hurled at me from home. . So I have been determined to sit tight, to say what I wanted, and to get it, without raising the personal question on my own behalf, and so far I have won the game—and there are only a few months more. But for the sake of the future of India things must not be allowed to go on as they are."*

LORD MORLEY'S FAREWELL LETTER

Lord Morley in bidding farewell to his colleague said:

"I suppose this will very likely be my last letter to you; and somebody says that to do anything for the last time has always an element of the sorrowful in it. Well, we have had plenty of stiff campaigning together, and it is a comfort, and no discredit to either of us, that we have to go to the end of it without any bones broken, or other mischief. There was opportunity enough, if we had not been too sensible....About the time when you get this, you will know by wire that your famous prediction, that you and I should quit the Indian Government at the same hour, has come true. . I think five years of arduous work are a justification for retirement. And I shall have a short span of serene musing on my own virtues. After all, a short span will be quite long enough for so meagre a topic."†

LORD MINTO'S FAREWELL LETTER

Lord Minto wrote his farewell letter thus to Lord Morley:

"As I look back upon the years that have passed, I must say, if you will allow me, that few people, as far as I can judge, could have differed so little upon big questions of policy and principle as you and I have. In fact, I really think we have hardly differed at all. About questions of actual administration, or rather of the interpretation of executive authority as it should be wielded at a distance from a supreme Government, I know we do hold different views, and when we have done so, I have always told you my opinions and the reasons for them. We have certainly been through very stormy times together, and after all it is the risks and dangers that strengthen comradeship. No one knows as well as I do how much India owes to the fact of your having been Secretary of State through all this period of development, and I hope you will never think that I have not truly realized the generous support you have so often given me at very critical moments, or that I have not appreciated the peculiar difficulties which have surrounded you at home, and from which I have been spared."§

SEDITIOUS MEETINGS BILL

At the meeting of the Supreme Legislative Council on November 1, 1907, Dr. Rash Behari Ghose protested against the Seditious Meetings Bill. He said:

"We have been assured on the highest authority that the present situation is not at all dangerous, and that the heart of India is quite sound. The so-called unrest, we have been also told by one who

* *Ibid.*, pp. 312-13.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 315-16.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

ought to be a competent judge, is only skin-deep—a cutaneous affection which will readily yield to judicious treatment. Again, only in June last, Mr. Morley said that the disturbances were merely local and sporadic. Now, what has happened since? Is the condition of the country now worse than it was in June, and would not the passing of the present Bill be taken as a sign of that very nervousness, trepidation, and fear which, Mr. Morley thought, would be not only unworthy of, but extremely perilous to, the Indian Government?...

"My Lord, I began by saying that this Bill is an indictment of the whole nation. If, however, it is true, and this can be the only justification for the measure, that India is growing more and more disloyal, this Bill is really an indictment of the administration. The position must then be reversed. The Government, and not the people, must then be put on their defence. There is no escape from this dilemma. If there is no general disaffection, you do not want this drastic measure. The prairie cannot be set on fire in the absence of inflammable materials to feed it. If, on the other hand, a spirit of disloyalty is really abroad, it must be based on some substantial grievance which will not be redressed by coercion Acts. You may stifle the complaints of the people, but beware of that sullen and ominous silence which is not peace, but the reverse of peace. Even immunity from public seditious meetings may be purchased too dearly.

"And this reminds me too that the present Bill, which the Member in charge of it frankly admits is a repressive measure of considerable potency, does not seem to be modelled on any law of which I am aware. It may possibly be based on some ukase, though the definition clause seems to be quite original. I cannot, however, speak with confidence, because I never had occasion during the last forty years to study the jurisprudence of Russia, and I sincerely trust I shall not now be called upon to do so. There is no such law in Italy or Belgium, France or Switzerland, though the seditious agitator is not an unknown figure in Europe, which is honeycombed with secret societies of anarchists and socialists. Riots, too, which the soldier is often summoned to quell, are not infrequent; and yet there is no such drastic law in any of these countries for the suppression of public meetings. In America, as Hon. Members are perhaps aware, the right of public meeting is safeguarded by the very constitution of the United States, which provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or of the right of the people, peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances......"

"My Lord, it has been said by a very high authority that, in view of the activity of the extremists, it would be the height of folly not to try to rally the moderates to the side of the Government, but surely, surely, repressive measures are not the best method of attracting their loyalty. The right of personal freedom and of meeting in public has always been regarded by us as an inalienable privilege of every subject of the British Crown. But we were painfully reminded only the other day that we may be deported without a trial, and now that the right of public meeting is going to be taken away from us, with what face can an Indian subject of His Majesty say, *Civis Romanus Sum*, which was at one time his proud boast? We must speak out our convictions, and that, in no hesitating or diffident notes, since our dearest interests are at stake, for this Act, if passed—we know how it would be administered—would, I fear, prove the grave of all our political aspirations. You are taking away from us, who have not, even that which we have. Put down disorder by all means. The civil sword is at present strong enough for that purpose; but do not kill the free play of thought or the free expression of it......"

"Are the Government, I ask, afraid of the rant of a few agitators? Are the police unable to preserve public order and has the Magistrate ceased to be a reality or is the Statute-book a dead letter? If the free right of public meeting is abused, is the ordinaty law incapable of punishing such abuse? The question really comes to this—is the right to meet in public for the discussion of political matters to be taken away from us simply because it is liable to abuse? There was no attempt to interfere with the right in England after the 'No-Popery' riots when London was held by the mob for two days together, or even after the Reform riots when Bristol was sacked and the Magistrates were powerless.

"It has been said that this Bill is a measure of great potency. I agree but potency for what purpose? For putting down sedition? I say, no. It will be potent for one purpose and one purpose only, the purpose of propagating the bacillus of secret sedition. The short title of the Bill I find is—a Bill for the Prevention of Seditious Meetings, but I venture to think the title requires a slight addition. It ought to be amended by the addition of the words 'and the Promotion of Secret Sedition.' Order may be kept, peace may reign in India; but this measure will produce the greatest disappointment among those by whom, though they may not be the natural leaders of the people, public opinion is created and controlled. The logic of coercion, we all know, is charming in its simplicity, but its authors forget that they cannot coerce thought—they cannot make men loyal by legislative enactments. It is true a policy of thorough coercion may, for a time, be successful, but no Englishman at the present day, except possibly some of the oracles of the Press, would counsel anything of the kind."*

MR. GOKHALE ON THE SEDITIOUS MEETINGS ACT OF 1907

Mr. Gokhale criticised the provisions of the Seditious Meetings Act and remarked:

"A few men in Bengal have now taken to preaching a new gospel, and here and there in the country one occasionally hears a faint echo of their teaching. But their power to influence the people—to the extent to which they are able to influence them—is derived mainly from the sense of helplessness and despair which has come to prevail widely in the country, both as regards the prospects of reform in the administration and as regards the removal of particular grievances. The remedy for such a state of things is therefore clearly not mere repression but a course of wise and steady conciliation on the part of the Government. Your Lordship has already taken a most important step in the direction of such conciliation so far as the Punjab is concerned by vetoing the Colonisation Act. Let the work of conciliation be carried further, let the deported prisoners be brought back.... As in the Punjab the Colonisation Act has been vetoed, so in Bengal let Partition be modified in some manner acceptable to the Bengalees. The causes of acute discontent in these two Provinces will then have disappeared and the old stream of a movement for reform will be separated from the bitter tributaries that have recently mingled with it."

He concluded by condemning the Bill strongly. He said:

"The Bill is a dangerous one, and the only satisfactory way to improve it is to drop it. But more than the Bill itself is, to my mind, the policy that lies behind the Bill. I consider this policy to be in the highest degree unwise. It will fail in India as surely as it has failed everywhere else in the world. It will plant in the minds of the people harsh memories which even time may not soften. It will by no means facilitate the work of the administration, and it will in all probability enhance the very evil which it is intended to control."†

DISCONTENT IN THE PUNJAB

There was much discontent in the Punjab, and the Government decided on the deportation of Lala Lajpat Rai and Sardar Ajit Singh to crush the seed of discontent in the Punjab. But the real causes of the discontent were analysed by Lala Lajpat Rai in a letter written by him only a few hours before his arrest. He set forth the causes of discontent in chronological order as follows:

(a) The letters and articles that appeared in the *Civil and Military Gazette* sometime in July and August last year (1906) under the heading "Signs of the times."

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* *Speeches By Dr. Rash Behari Ghose*, pp. 72-81.

† *Speeches of G. K. Gokhale*, pp. 304-305.

(*b*) The prosecution of *The Punjabee* coupled with the refusal of the Government to take similar action against the *Civil and Military Gazette*,

(*c*) The Colonisation Bill,

(*d*) The Land Alienation Act Amendment Bill,

(*e*) The increase of the Canal rates on the Bari-Doab Canal,

(*f*) The abnormal increase of Land Revenue in the Rawalpindi District, and, lastly,

(*g*) The appalling mortality from plague which had made the people sullen and labour scarce."

"This diagnosis," says Dr. Rash Behari Ghose, "was perfectly correct, for as soon as the most pressing grievances were removed, the Punjab become quiet, though the bureaucracy will probably persuade themselves that this happy result was entirely due to the deportation of Lala Lajpat Rai and of Sardar Ajit Singh, and that another mutiny had been averted solely by their foresight and timely precautions."*

MR. GOKHALE ON THE PUNJAB AGITATION

Mr. Gokhale referred to the Punjab agitation in these words :

"At the beginning of this year (1907), another acute agitation sprang up, this time in the Punjab, against the Colonisation Bill and other agrarian grievances, and a fresh element of bitterness was added to the situation by the State prosecution of *The Punjabee* on a charge of exciting racial ill-will, when the *Civil and Military Gazette* had been let off with only a gentle remonstrance. This agitation too on its side swallowed up for the time the general reform agitation in the Punjab, and the reform movement in other parts of India could not escape being affected by it. Then came the demonstrations at Lahore and the disturbance at Rawalpindi, and then the repressive measures of the Government - notably the deportation of Lala Lajpat Rai, the arrest and prosecution of Rawalpindi pleaders and the Public Meetings Ordinance. The whole country was convulsed and while the Punjab itself was paralysed, in other parts of India even the most level-headed men found it difficult to express themselves with due restraint. That a man like Lala Lajpat Rai, loved by thousands not in his own province only, as a man of high character and of elevated feelings, a keen religious and social reformer, and a political worker, who, whatever his faults, worked only in broad daylight should have been suddenly arrested and deported without a trial—this was a proceeding which stunned the people throughout India. And as regards the Rawalpindi case, what shall I say? For four months the whole country witnessed the spectacle of the venerable Lala Hansraj, a man as incapable of promoting disorder as any member sitting at this table—with other gentlemen equally respectable, rotting in the lock-up on a charge of inciting to violence and conspiring against the Crown! My Lord, it will be long before the sufferings of these men is wiped from the public mind. Meanwhile the country is waiting to see how the authorities deal with those who brought these sufferings on them by producing evidence which the trying Magistrate has prononced to be 'most untrustworthy and probably fabricated !' My Lord, with these things happening in the country, is it any wonder that the voice of those who counsel patience and moderation and self-restraint should be for the time at a discount among their countrymen ? The occurrences of the last six months have afforded ample encouragement to those who like to talk strongly and do not occasionally mind talking wildly."†

UNREST IN BENGAL

With the Partition of Bengal, there came unrest in Bengal. Dr. Rash Behari Ghose dwelt on the unrest in Begal in one of his speeches. He said :

* *Speeches by Rash Behari Ghose*, p 30.

† *Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale* (Third Edition, Madras), pp. 300-301.

"And this brings me to the unrest in Bengal, the partition of which has not only strained the loyalty of many people but had led to tragic results which ought to have been foreseen by the author of that measure. One of its objects was to strengthen the Mahommedan influence in East Bengal. That influence has been strengthened; but its strength has been manifested in a peculiar way. I do not wish to dwell on the Mahommedan riots and the atrocities which occurred in East Bengal, but this I am bound to say, that the local officials were lacking in that firmness and thorough impartiality which are the best title of England to our allegiance. I wish to speak with moderation, but what are we to think when a Sessions Judge divides witnesses into two classes, Hindus and Mahommedans, and prefers the evidence of Mahommedans to Hindus, because they are Mahommedans?"

Dr. Ghose then referred to the charge "that the Mahommedans were goaded to madness by the boycott movement of the Hindus; and that this was the real cause of the general lawlessness of the lower classes among the Mahommedans which burst into flame in East Bengal." He quoted the evidence of several English magistrates to prove that the case was not so.

He proceeded to say:

"At Jamalpur, where the disturbances began in the Mymensingh district, the first information lodged at the Police station contained no reference whatever to boycott or picketting. Mr. Beatson Bell, the trying Magistrate at Dewangunj, found that the boycott was not the cause of the disturbances. Another special Magistrate at Dewangunj, himself a Mahommedan gentleman of culture, remarked: 'There was not the least provocation for rioting; the common object of the rioters was evidently to molest the Hindus.' In another case the same Magistrate observed: 'The evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution shows that, on the date of the riot, the accused had read over a notice to a crowd of Mussalmans and had told them that the Government and Nawab Bahadur of Dacca had passed orders to the effect that nobody would be punished for plundering and oppressing the Hindus. So, after the Kali's image was broken by the Mussalmans, the shops of the Hindu traders were also plundered."

Again, Mr. Barneville, the Sub-Divisional Officer of Jamalpur, in his report on the Melandahat riots said: "Some Mussalmans proclaimed by beat of drums that the Government had permitted to loot the Hindus." And in the Hargilchar abduction case, the same Magistrate remarked that the outrages were due to the announcement that the Government had permitted the Mahommedans to marry Hindu widows in *nika* form.

"The true explanation of the savage outbreak is to be found in the 'red pamphlet' which was circulated so widely among the Mahommedans in East Bengal, and in which there is not a word about boycott or Hindu volunteers. 'Ye Mussalmans,' said the red pamphlet, 'arise, awake, do not read in the same schools with Hindus. Do not buy any thing from a Hindu shop. Do not touch any article manufactured by Hindu hands. Do not give any employment to a Hindu. Do not accept any degrading office under a Hindu; you are ignorant, but if you acquire knowledge, you can at once send all Hindus to Jehannam (hell). You form the majority of the population of this Province. Among the cultivators also you form the majority. It is agriculture that is the source of wealth. The Hindu has no wealth of his own and has made himself rich only by despoiling you of your wealth ..... The man who preached this *Jihad* was only bound down to keep the peace for one year! You are probably surprised at such leniency. We in Bengal were not, or were only surprised to hear that the man had been bound down at all."*

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* *Speeches by Dr. Rash Behari Ghose*, pp. 31-33.

BENGAL AGITATION

Dr. Rash Behari Ghose in his welcome address as the Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Indian National Congress at Calcutta, (1906) thus dwelt on the Bengal Agitation:

"Our trials commenced with the partition of Bengal, that ill-starred measure of that most brilliant Viceroy who had nothing but gibes and sneers for our aspirations and prayers, and who found India comparatively contented and left it fermenting with unrest. The notification of the 16th of October 1905 was the parting gift of Lord Curzon to Bengal, a province for which he always dissembled his love. Now, I do not mean to impute unworthy motives to the author of the dismemberment of our province, but he must be a bold man who should say that the separation of East Bengal is not likely to interfere with the collective power of the Bengalees or the growth of our national spirit. He must be a bold man who should say that it is not a menace to the ascendancy of Calcutta, the centre of political and intellectual activity in this part of the country. He must again be a bold man who should say that the Mahommedan population in the new province may not be used as tools by artful and unscrupulous persons to keep in check the growing strength of the educated community; for religious animosities may be easily kindled among an illiterate people, though not so easily subdued. A division on the basis of territory and population was tried, as we all know, by the French Revolutionary Government with the best of intentions, but with the most fatal results to the people,......"

"I do not, however, wish to detain you with the case against the partition of Bengal; for nobody except possibly G. C. I. E.'s, would now care to defend it. But many of you are probably not aware that the public had no opportunity whatever of discussing the scheme which was finally settled, and which fell in our midst like a bolt from the empyrean heights of Simla. Now, we may be, as our friends take care to remind us with perhaps needless iteration, hereditary bondsmen with whom the warlike races in India should have no fellowship; but I must confess, though our friends may not believe it, that we do not like to be treated as so many black beetles even by a brilliant Viceroy. But I am perhaps too hard upon Lord Curzon, who probably meant only to surprise us with this touching proof of his interest in our welfare. His lordship, as we all know, had a horror of playing to the gallery and loved to do good by stealth, and, I have no doubt blushed, when he found it fame in Printing House Square. But even his best friends now admit that it was a great pity his lordship did not rest on his laurels when he had solved his twelve problems—a highly suggestive number; but I dare say this was a mere coincidence."*

"A SETTLED FACT"

Dr. Ghose also referred to and criticised the doctrine of 'Settled Fact' with regard to the partition of Bengal. He said:

"We have been told on high authorities that the partition of Bengal is a settled fact, but Mr. Morley keeps an open mind, and we refuse to believe that the last word has been said or that the subject will never be re-opened. In the meantime, we cannot allow the question to sleep. Unfinished questions, it has been well said, have no pity for the repose of nations. We have been parted from those who are bound to us by the ties of blood, of race, of languages and of country, and bound, too, by the ties of common aspirations; and the wound which has been thus inflicted on us refuses to heal. The sentiments of the people have been trampled under foot by an autocratic Viceroy; and we owe it not only to ourselves but also to you, our countrymen, to give public expression to our feelings. For behind this deliberate outrage upon public sentiment and closely connected with it, there is a very much larger issue affecting the good government of the country. The issue is nothing more, nothing

* *Speeches by Dr. Rash Behari Ghose*, pp. 5-7.

less than this : Is India to be governed autocratically without any regard to the sentiments and opinions of the people, who must be made to know their proper place as an inferior subject race, or on those enlightened principles which are professed by our rulers ? The question of Partition looked at from this point of view involves a trial of strength between the people and the bureaucracy and in that trial, I am sure, we shall have not merely the good wishes but also the active support and sympathy of all our countrymen ; and never, never were we in greater need of that support and sympathy than at the present moment.......''

"The Partition of Bengal was followed by Russian methods of government with this difference : the officials who devised them were Englishmen, while the Russian official is at least the countryman of those whom he governs or misgoverns. The singing of national songs and even the cry of *Bande Mataram* were forbidden under severe penalties. This ordinance was fittingly succeeded by the prosecution of school-boys, the quartering of military and punitive police. the prohibition and forcible dispersion of public meetings, and these high-handed proceedings attained their crown and completion at Barisal, when the Provincial Conference was dispersed by the Police, who broke the peace in order, I imagine, to keep the peace. Now, though we are a thoroughly loyal people and our loyalty is not to be easily shaken, because it is founded on a more solid basis than mere sentiment, I have no hesitation in saying that we should be less than men if we could forget the tragedy of that day, the memory of which will always fill us with shame and humiliation. And this reminds me that it was not cowardice, whatever Mr. MacLeod may think, that prevented our young men from retaliating. It was their respect for law and order—their loyalty to their much reviled leaders that kept them in cheek."*

MR. GOKHALE ON BENGAL AGITATION

Mr. Gokhale in a speech before the Viceroy's Legislative Council spoke thus on the Bengal agitation :

"Lord Curzon's reactionary policy, his attempt to explain away the Queen's Proclamation, his unwise Convocation speech at Calcutta—all these produced intense exasperation throughout India. This exasperation was the worst in Bengal, because, though Lord Curzon's measures affected all India, they fell with special weight on Bengal. And when on the top of these measures the Partition of Bengal was carried through, a bitter and stormy agitation sprang up in that province, in which the general agitation for reform soon got completely merged. The bitterness of the Bengal agitation gradually came to communicate itself to the reform movement all over the country by a sort of sympathetic process. Bengal has always been the home of feeling and of ideas more than any other part of India. The people took to heart very deeply the failure of their agitation against the Partition, and then the more reckless among them began to ask themselves new questions and came forward to preach what they called new ideas. It is true that they have a certain amount of hearing in the country, but that is more on account of the passion and poetry of their utterance than on account of any belief in the practicability of their views. Their influence, such as it is today, is due to the alienation of the public mind from the Government, which has already occurred, but which the Government have it still in their power to set right. Measures of repression will only further alienate the people, and to that extent will strengthen this influence."†

MINTO-FULLER EPISODE

In respect of Sir Bampfylde Fuller's oppressive rule as Lieutenant-Governor of the newly created Province of East Bengal, Lord Minto showed commendable strength and statesmanship. Sir Bampfylde Fuller issued in October 16, a Demi-official Circular to

* *Speeches By Dr. Rash Behari Ghose*, pp. 7-10.

† *Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale* (Third Edition), pp. 299-300.

the Commissioners of Rajshahi, Dacca, and Chittagong Divisions, and all the District Officers of the districts indicating the line "that should be adopted in dealing with the anti-Partition or Swadeshi agitation." The Circular specially marked out the school boys, engaged in Swadeshi and boycott movements, as victims of its wrath.

The Circular went on :

"It is, of course, most undesirable, that young men who are under tuition should be employed in any political agitation whatever, and especially in an agitation which is really anti-British, by whatever name it may call itself. You have, it is understood, already warned the proprietory, managing or instructional authorities of colleges and schools that their pupils must cease to act as touts for the boycotting of British goods. If any institution disregards your advice, the case should be reported to me without delay, and when reporting the case, you should issue a second formal warning that a disregard of the interest of the Government and of discipline in this matter will entail the formal and public barring of the pupils of the college or school from all service under Government. You should also report, giving the necessary details, any who disregarded this second caution."*

Couched in mild and moderate language as the Circular was, the over-zealous officers, presumably under private instructions from the famous head of the East Bengal Administration, created a hell of a time for the East Bengal schools and school children. During the hey-day of the Swadeshi and boycott movements in Bengal as a protest against the unjust partition of their province there was hardly a muffusil town or village in Bengal which did not realise the baneful motive of Lord Curzon in dividing the compact and united Bengali race into two. They held meetings of protest and actively prosecuted the Swadeshi and boycott movements. In those meetings most of the school-boys joined as spectators of the *tamasha*, and the older boys worked as volunteers. In any such meetings in small moffusil towns or villages, the school boy element could not but be present, though mostly as passive spectators.† Attendance at such meetings was considered as a crime under the interpretation of the above Circular and was accordingly punished. Sir Bampfylde Fuller's over-zealous activity to nip the Swadeshi movement in the bud by crushing the spirit of the young children and impressing their young minds with the power of the British-*raj* can be compared with some activities in the Panjab in 1919. Sir Bampfylde Fuller suppressed meetings and broke up conferences by using (or abusing ?) police force. The last cup was filled when Sir B. Fuller, not content with punishing individual school boys and masters concerned of the two schools of Sirajganj for infringing the instructions in the above Circular, determined to make an example of them by disaffiliating the two schools altogether from the Calcutta University and creating a Government school in their place. In this connection the deputation of some Muhammadans of Sirajganj under one Abdul Guffoor will throw interesting light on the Fuller administration. The Deputation submitted among other things that

"in the Sirajganj Sub-Division, where the Muhammadan population is estimated to be 80 per cent,

* Quoted from *The Pioneer*, Nov. 17, 1906.

† The Editor, when he was a boy of twelve, attended one of the Swadeshi meetings out of curiosity to see the fun, and although he could neither hear nor understand the various speeches delivered there, he had the taste of the Headmaster's rod for breaking what was popularly known as the 'Fuller Circular.'

there being no Muhammadan institution to impart English education, we are compelled to place our youths in the local Hindu schools, which have now-a-days the notoriety of being the very hot-beds of evil politics. Here the questions of current constitutional measures are discussed and through them the political ideas of the Indian National Congress are propagated. .. that they (the Muhammadan students) received much ill-treatment in the hands of the Hindu students and teachers. That it has recently come to our notice that school children in Hindu schools are employed in political demonstrations by the teachers and Hindu leaders, and that in the case of the late Hindu disturbances these teachers, quite against our express prohibition, induced the Muhammadan boys, and devised punitive measures, *e.g.* "black bench," which inevitably fell to the lot of the Muhammadans in the schools...."

The got-up nature of the deputation will be evident if we analyse its submissions carefully. It is hard to believe that teachers discussed with the boys "the questions of current constitutional measures." The editor of these pages was a school student in those days and had experience of other schools as well. He never found that politics was ever discussed by teachers in schools. That the Muhammadan students received "much ill-treatment in the hands of the Hindu students and teachers" is another lie—and a foul libel on the teachers. The most ridiculous portion of the petition refers to the recent disturbance in which the Muhammadan boys were induced by their Hindu teachers to join it and then punished them with the "black bench," leaving the Hindu boys free.

The recent disturbance created by the Sirajganj school boys and the above deputation served Sir Bampfylde Fuller with the excuse he needed to disaffiliate the schools of Sirajganj and to establish a Government school there. Lord Minto, probably already exasperated by Fuller's recent activities, disapproved the latter's measure. Fuller therefore submitted his resignation which Lord Minto at once accepted by wire (3rd August, 1906), and thus relieved East Bengal of her undesirable ruler.

LORD SINHA'S APPOINTMENT TO LAW MEMBERSHIP

For the first time in the history of British rule in India an Indian was appointed a member of the Government of India. Lord Sinha (then Mr. S. P. Sinha) was appointed Law Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council. It is now an open secret that his appointment was not looked on with favour by His Majesty, King Edward VII.*

Mr. Sinha accepted the appointment, urged by his sense of duty to serve his motherland, though it entailed a heavy pecuniary loss to him. But he resigned after serving a year, perhaps as he could not pull on with his colleagues.

THE PRESS BILL (1910)

Soon after the inauguration of the new. reforms, Lord Minto introduced a repressive measure against the Press in India. On February 8, 1910, the Press Bill, introduced by Hon'ble Sir Herbert Risley, was taken up for consideration by the Reformed Council. Mr. G. K. Gokhale spoke against the measure in the following terms:

* *Vide* Macaulay *vs.* Sinha, *The Modern Review* for June, 1909.

"My Lord, it is a cruel irony of fate that the first important measure that comes before the Reformed Council is a measure to curtail a great and deeply cherished privilege which the country has enjoyed, with two brief interruptions, for three-quarters of a century."

It was also pointed out that the Bill "was hurried through its several stages by suspending the standing orders and without giving the country practically any opportunity to express its opinion on it." Lord Lytton's Act of 1878 was also introduced and passed at one sitting.

He went on to say :

"My Lord, in the minute of dissent which my Hon'ble friend Mr. Mudholkar and I have appended to the Report of the Select Committee, we have briefly stated our position in regard to this measure... And it is urged that the Government is convinced that the right plan to deal with sedition is to proceed by way of prevention rather than by way of punishment. Now, my Lord, I will at once admit that there is considerable force in the whole of this contention. But even so, section 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code which is a means of prevention and which was introduced into the Code twelve years ago for the express purpose of placing such a means at the disposal of the Government, should have been sufficient, and what I cannot quite understand is why it has not been found effective The only explanation I have heard is that the proceeding under that section being judicial and liable to revision by the High Court, it practically means a trial for sedition, with this difference only that the person proceeded against, instead of being severely sentenced, is merely called upon to give security. But this was precisely the chief merit claimed for the section when it was enacted in 1898, as a reference to the proceedings of the Council of that time will show. My Lord, I cannot help saying that it would have been fairer to the Legislature if the Government had tried section 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code in some cases, instead of allowing it to remain practically a dead letter, before applying for fresh powers....

"My Lord, the principal addition which the Bill makes to the powers already possessed by the Government for dealing with sedition is that it makes the taking of security from printing presses and newspapers a purely executive act. It also empowers the executive to order the forfeiture of such security and even the confiscation of printing presses on the ground that an offence has been committed, though here an appeal is allowed to a special Tribunal of High Court Judges...."

After condemning the assassinations and conspiracies, Mr. Gokhale proceeded to say :

"I have already said that several causes have combined to bring about the present state of things. It is of course impossible to go into all of them, but one of them may be mentioned—it is the writings in a section of the Anglo-Indian Press. My Lord, I doubt if many Englishmen realise how large a share these writings have had in turning so many of my countrymen against British rule. The terms of race arrogance and contempt in which some of these papers constantly speak of the Indians and specially of educated Indians cut into the mind more than the lash can cut into the flesh. Many of my countrymen imagine that every Anglo-Indian pen that writes in the Press is dipped in Government ink. It is an absurd idea, but it does great harm all the same. My Lord, I feel bound to say that this Bill by itself cannot achieve much. It is even possible that the immediate effect of its passing will be to fill the public mind with a certain amount of resentment. And unless the powers conferred by it are used with the utmost care and caution, the evil which they are intended to combat may only be driven under ground. Force may afford temporary relief, but it never can prove a permanent remedy to such a state of things as we have in this country"*

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION BILL

Mr. Gokhale found that the British Government was apathetic in the matter of spreading education among the masses and felt that he must take the lead to rouse the

* *Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale*, pp. 336-41.

conscience of the keepers of our purse. He travelled throughout the length and breadth of our country and addressed hundreds of meetings which passed resolutions in favour of free and compulsory elementary education. Thus backed by a clear and strong public opinion on this question Mr. Gokhale moved on March 18, 1910 his Resolution on Elementary Education in the Imperial Legislative Council. The Resolution ran thus :

"That this Council recommends that a beginning should be made in the direction of making elementary education free and compulsory throughout the country, and that a mixed Commission of officials and non-officials be appointed at an early date to frame definite proposals."

But he had to withdraw the Resolution, assurance being given by the Government that the matter would be enquired into. Again, on March, 16, 1911, Mr. Gokhale introduced in the Imperial Legislative Council, a Bill to make better provision for the extension of elementary education in India. He said :

"Hon'ble Members will recollect that about this time last year, the Council considered a resolution which I had ventured to submit to its judgment, recommending that elementary education should gradually be made compulsory and free throughout the country, and that a mixed Commission of officials and non-officials should be appointed to frame definite proposals. · In the end, on an assurance being given by the Home Member that the whole question would be carefully examined by the Government, the Resolution was withdrawn. Twelve months, my Lord, have elapsed since then, and the progress which the question has made during the interval has not been altogether disappointing....That there is a strong demand for this in the country – a demand, moreover, daily growing stronger—may be gathered from the fact that, since last year's debate, the question has been kept well to the fore by the Indian Press, and that last December resolutions in favour of compulsory and free primary education were passed not only by the Indian National Congress at Allahabad, but also by the Moslem League, which held its sittings at Nagpur. ..

"My Lord, I now come to the Bill, which I hope the Council will let me introduce today ..The Bill, I may state at once, has been framed with a strict regard to the limitations of the position, to which I have already referred. It is a purely permissive Bill, and it merely proposes to empower Municipalities and District Boards, under certain circumstances, to introduce compulsion, within their areas, in the first instance, in the case of boys, and later when the time is ripe, in the case of girls. Before a Local Body aspires to avail itself of the powers contemplated by the Bill, it will have to fulfil such conditions as the Government of India may by rule lay down as regards the extent to which education is already diffused within its area. Last year, in moving my resolution on this subject, I urged that where one-third of the boys of school-going age were already at school, the question of introducing compulsion might be taken up for consideration by the Local Body. I think this is a fair limit, but if the Government of India so choose they might impose a higher limit. In practice, a limit of 33 per cent will exclude for several years to come all District Boards, and bring within the range only a few of the more advanced Municipalities in the larger towns in the different Provinces. Moreover, a Local Body. even when it satisfies the limit laid down by the Government of India, can come under the Bill only after obtaining previously the sanction of the Local Government....Then the Bill provides for a compulsory period of school attendance of four years only....The next point to which I would invite the attention of the Council is that the Bill makes ample provision for exemption from compulsory attendance on reasonable grounds, such as sickness, domestic necessity or the seasonal needs of agriculture. ..On the question of fees, while I am of opinion that where attendance is made compulsory instruction should be gratuitous, the Bill provides for gratuitous instruction only in the case of those children whose parents are extremely poor, not earning more than Rs. 10 a month, all above that line being required to pay or not in the discretion of the Local Body....Coming to the machinery for working the compulsory provisions, the Bill provides for the creation of special school attendance committees, whose duty it will be to

make careful enquiries and prepare and maintain lists of children who should be at school within their respective areas, and take whatever steps may be necessary to ensure the attendance of children at school, including the putting into operation of the penal clauses of the Bill against defaulting parents."*

Mr. Gokhale described the Bill as a small and humble attempt to suggest the first steps of a journey, which is bound to prove long and tedious, but which must be performed, if the mass of the people are to emerge from their present condition. But even this small and humble attempt proved unsuccessful owing to official opposition.

SIR HARCOURT BUTLER'S ESTIMATE OF LORD MINTO'S RULE

The following is the estimate of Lord Minto's administration by Sir Harcourt Butler, written in 1919:

"He (Lord Minto) will long be remembered as the joint author of a scheme of reforms for internal India, and as the originator of a new policy and spirit in the relations between the Government of India and Native States. Nothing new is popular in an intensely conservative country like India. Both reforms were criticized at the time for going too far, and later for not going far enough. Both were inspired by deep and sincere appreciation of the changes at work in India. No one now questions the wisdom of Lord Minto's policy towards Native States. It has been adopted and developed by his successors. As regards the joint reforms, I said publicy at Meerut on July 15, 1918, and repeat here :

'You have been told that the Minto-Morley reforms were doomed to failure and have failed. With all respect to those who hold this view, I must say that this is not my experience as Vice-President of the Imperial Legislative Council, as Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, and as Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces. In my experience, and this was the expressed opinion of Lord Hardinge, the Minto-Morley reforms have been successful. They have been a valuable training to Indian politicians and have prepared them for another forward move. The exceutive government has been far more influenced by the discussions in Council than is popularly imagined, and the debates have been maintained at a really high level. Occasionally time has been wasted. Occasionally feeling has run high. Of what assembly can not this be said ? I was led to believe that in our Legislative Council I should find a spirit of opposition and hostility to Government. I have found, on the contrary, a responsive and reasonable spirit. Indeed, I go so far as to say that it is the very success of the Minto-Morley reforms that makes me most hopeful in regard to the future course of reform.'

"This also I may say. As a reformer Lord Minto showed not once but on many occasions high courge, patience, and clearness of vision. He was as absolutely straight in his public as in his private life. He took large-minded and generous views of things. He met formidable difficulties with a rare sense of duty. 'If I resign, following the action of my predecessor,' he once said to me, 'the office of Viceroy will be lowered for ever.' He never hesitated to do what he thought the right thing......"†

This is a picture of the lion painted by his cousin, so to say.

LORD MINTO'S FAREWELL ADDRESS

In his farewell address in Simla, Lord Minto made a review of his administration. "It was almost the best of his speeches, because it contained not only a just summary of his work, but his whole political creed and philosophy of life." One passage of his speech reads as follows:

* *Speeches of G. K. Gokhale*, pp. 607-618.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 825-26.

"The public, especially the public at home, not fully acquainted with Indian difficulties, has, perhaps not unnaturally, been unable to distinguish between the utterly different problems and risks that have confronted us. The necessity for dealing with reasonable hopes has been lost sight of, while every outrage that has occurred has been taken as indicative of the general state of India. And throughout its time of trouble every action of the Government has been subjected to microscopic examination, to a running fire of newspaper criticism, to questions in Parliament, to the advice of travellers who have returned home to write books on India after a few weeks' sojourn in the country —while sensational headlines have helped to fire the imagination of the man in the street, who in his turn has cried out for 'strong measures,' regardless of the meaning of his words, and for a 'strong man' to enforce them. Gentlemen, I have heard a good deal of 'strong men' in my time, and I can only say that my experince in all our anxious days in India has taught me *that the strongest man is he who is not afraid of being called weak.*"*

LORD MORLEY'S ESTIMATE

Lord Morley paid a final tribute to his colleague, Lord Minto, in a speech in London. He remarked:

"Lord Minto could reflect with confidence that he had left behind him in India high esteem, large general regard, and warm good-will. The great feudatories and native princes had found in him a genial, sincere, and unaffected friend. The Mahommedans respected and liked him. The Hindus respected and liked him. The political leaders, though neither Lord Minto nor the Secretary of State agreed in all they desired, had perfect confidence in his constancy and good faith. The Civil Service, not always averse from criticism, admired his courage, patience and unruffled equanimity. He really got on consummately well with everybody with whom he had commerce, from the Amir in the fastnesses of Afghanistan down to the imperious autocrat who for the moment was Secretary of State in the fastnesses of Whitehall. Having come back from the banks of the Ganges, he found on the banks of the Thames a cordial appreciation and generous recognition of his fulfilment of a great national duty. His predecessor, Lord Curzon, a man of powerful mind and eloquent tongue, had said that a man who could bring together the hearts of sundered peoples was a greater benefactor than the conqueror of kingdoms. Lord Minto was entitled to that praise."†

There may have been good grounds for Englishmen and Musalman communalists to appreciate Lord Minto's rule. The vast bulk of the people of India had nothing to do with such appreciation.

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* *Ibid.*, p. 328.

† *Lord Minto* : by John Buchan (Nelson, London) 1925, pp. 384-35.



Lord Hardinge

CHAPTER XVI

LORD HARDINGE (1910-1916)

Lord Minto was succeeded by Lord Hardinge in 1910. On the 21st November 'the guns announced the arrival of the new Viceroy, and two days later, a little after noon, the Mintos left Calcutta.'

Before Lord Hardinge became the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, he was Sir Charles Hardinge, the permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. When the announcement of the appointment of Sir Charles Hardinge was made, Lord Minto worte :

"I cannot but feel that I am only now commencing to gain an insight into many things, and that no successor could start where I leave off. In many ways he will have to begin the game over again. But I hope the great principles for which we have fought so hard are safe. As far as I can judge, Hardinge's appointment is excellent. I hardly know him myself, but he has a record, and his family connection with India will stand him in good stead, for the stories of British administration of old days are cherished here. Lady Hardinge, too, will, I know, play a great part in a world where a lady leader has great and growing opportunities for good."*

"Lord Hardinge", says Sir Surendranath Banerji, "came out to India as a comparative stranger. He was not in the ranks of English public life ; diplomacy was his profession. The Indian public received the announcement of his appointment with mixed feelings. But, before twelve months had elapsed, we realised that he would take his place in the front rank of Indian Viceroys, by the side of Bentinck, Canning and Ripon."†

THE ANTI-PARTITION MOVEMENT

The British Government had declared the Partition of Bengal as 'a settled fact,' and they were determined not do away with it. Sir Surendra Nath Banerji condemned such a policy. He wrote thus :

"It is a pity that the Partition of Bengal was not modified in 1906, when Mr. John Morley denounced it from his place in the House of Commons as 'a measure which went wholly and decisively against the wishes of the majority of the people concerned,' at the same time declaring it to be 'a settled fact.' A pronouncement in which the conclusion was so wholly inconsistent with the premises only served to add to the irritation and intensify the agitation. The partition and the policy that was adopted to support it were the root cause of the anarchical movement in Bengal and I have no doubt in my mind that, if it had been modified just when the agitation was assuming a serious aspect and the whole country was seething with excitement, the history of Bengal, and possibly of India, would have been differently written, and our province would have been spared the taint of anarchism. Here again the psychological moment was allowed to pass by, and the modification came when it was overdue. The words, 'too late' were once more written on every line of British policy."§

To acquaint the new Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, with all the facts in regard to the Partition question, the Bengal leaders announced a public meeting to be held in January. Sir Surendra Nath Banerji said :

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* *Lord Minto* : by John Buchan, p. 308.
† *A Nation in Making*, p. 284.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 287

"Within a day or two of the announcement I received an urgent letter from Government House inviting me to see His Excellency the Viceroy the day after. I had never before been so summoned; but I guessed the purpose of the invitation. I thought it was the proposed Town Hall meeting about which His Excellency wished to have information. I was right in my anticipation."

As the result of this interview, it was agreed that a memorial on the Partition question should be submitted to Lord Hardinge. We read :

"I drew up a memorial largely assisted by my esteemed friend, Babu Ambika Churn Majumdar, the Grand Old Man of Faridpore, and sent it to the district leaders for signature by influential and representative men. My request was that the memorial was to be regarded as absolutely confidential, so that the other side under official inspiration might not set up a counter agitation. ...

"We submitted this memorial, signed by representative men in eighteen out of the twenty-five districts of Bengal, about the end of June 1911, and the Despatch of the Government of India recommending the modification of the Partition of Bengal was dated August 25, 1911, and some of the arguments that we urged in the memorial were accepted by the Government as valid reasons for the modification of the Partition, and were emphasized in the Despatch."*

At last the Partition of Bengal was modified on December 12, 1911, by the announcement made by His Majesty the King at Delhi. Thus after six long years the efforts of the Bengalee leaders 'to restore to the Bengalee-speaking population, their ancient union and solidarity were crowned with success'—of a sort. We read :

"The secret is told in less than half a dozen words. We were persistent, we were confident of success; we religiously avoided unconstitutional methods and the wild hysterics that breed and stimulate them. Even when attacked by the police, we did not retaliate. We shouted *Bande-Mataram* at each stroke of the police *lathi*, and then appealed to the constituted courts of law for redress. Passive resistance we practised. Soul-force we believed in; but we never were under the delusion that it could be employed to any useful or national purpose, except by men trained in the practice of self-restraint and the discipline of public life. It is the acceptance of naked principles, without reference to the circumstances of their application, which is responsible for many of the deplorable events that have darkened the pages of recent Indian history."†

Whatever the Bengali leaders may have felt or said at the time, the Partition was not really undone, but was followed by a new partition with the exact object of the first partition in view.

THE IMPERIAL VISIT

During the viceroyalty of Lord Hardinge, their Majesties the King-Emperor and the Queen-Empress visited India. They landed at Bombay on December 2, 1911. "It was the first occasion on which the British sovereign had set foot on the soil of his Indian dominions." From Bombay they proceeded to Delhi, where in the magnificent *durbar*, the Coronation was proclaimed and various "boons," including an annual grant of fifty lakhs for popular education, were announced. Fifty lakhs was a paltry sum, considering the vast population of India. "By the Royal announcement in the *durbar* at Delhi the Partition of Bengal was modified, in a manner which inevitably

* *Ibid.*, pp. 284-285.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 286-87.

disappointed the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal but was of political value in allaying a greater grievance; and the simultaneous removal of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi appealed to the popular imagination, particularly as a striking manifestation of the powers of the State."

A re-adjustment of provinces took place as the result of the Delhi Durbar announcement. Eastern Bengal and Western Bengal were united into one Province, Assam became a separate Province, and Bihar, Orissa and Chota-Nagpur were grouped together into another province.

TRANSFER OF CAPITAL

One of the important changes announced by the King-Emperor at Delhi was the transfer of the capital to Delhi. Calcutta had been the capital of British India from the very beginning of the British Empire in India. To transfer the capital from Calcutta was a move to lessen the importance and influence of Calcutta and of Bengal. When Surendra Nath Banerji was asked: "What do you think of the transfer of the capital to Delhi ?" he answered: "We are not likely to lose very much by it." He added: "Subsequent events have demonstrated that I was substantially right in my *impromptu* answer." But he was certainly not right.

During the Budget discussion in the Imperial Legislative Council on the 25th March 1912, Mr. Gokhale spoke thus about the transfer of the capital from Calcutta:

"I say nothing on this occasion about the great, the momentous, changes which were announced by His Imperial Majesty the King-Emperor at Delhi. Looking into the future with the eye of faith and of hope, I do believe that these changes, whatever temporary inconvenience or dislocation they may occasion, will do good in the end both to the Province of Bengal, and to the country taken as a whole. But whatever the future may hold in its womb, the thought that this council, which has grown from the smallest beginnings to its present dimensions in this city (Calcutta), meets here today for the last time, is a thought that must make the heart heavy. My Lord, it is not merely the infinite kindness and hospitality which we members, coming from other Provinces, have always received from the people of Calcutta, it is not merely the friends that we have made here, that we shall miss ; it is the influence of Calcutta and all that Calcutta stands for that will now be lost to us. Some of us, my Lord, have been coming to this city now for many years—I for one have come here continuously now for eleven years—and we have learnt to feel the same enthusiasm for this wonderful land which the people of Bengal feel. Its waving fields, its noble streams, its rich and wonderful vegetation of every kind, throw on us now the same spell that the people of this province experience, and the warm-heartedness of its society, its culture, its spiritual outlook on life, and the intensity of its national aspirations have produced a deep and abiding impression upon our lives. My Lord, we bid adieu to this city with profound regret, and with every good wish for its continued prosperity that the heart of man can frame. And we fervently trust that, great as has been its past, its future will be even greater."*

THE COST OF BUILDING NEW DELHI

When the capital was transferred to Delhi, temporary arrangements were made for housing the Government offices. But the Government of India wanted a new magnificent city of Delhi, worthy to be the new capital of India. In the Government of India

* *Speeches of G. K. Gokhale*, p. 205.

despatch of August 25; 1911, 'recommending the administrative changes, recently carried out, to the Secretary of State,' the question of the cost of building New Delhi had been thus described:

"The cost of the transfer to Delhi would be considerable. We cannot conceive, however, that a larger sum than 4 millions sterling would be necessary, and within that figure probably could be found the three years' interest on capital which would have to be paid till the necessary works and buildings were completed. We might find if necessary to issue a "city of Delhi" gold loan at 3½ per cent. guaranted by the Government of India, the interest, or the larger part of the interest, on this loan being eventually obtainable from rents and taxes."

The Finance Member, however, in his financial statement in 1912 said otherwise. He remarked thus as to the cost of building New Delhi:

"I may say at once that we are not yet in possession of any estimates of its cost. Plans for the temporary housing of the Government of India headquarters are under preparation; but no plans for the permanent Imperial city are to be thought of until the best available experts have studied and advised upon the project in all its bearings. Meanwhile, my immediate duty has been to devise a scheme for financing the work, a scheme which will be as little onerous as possible to the tax-payers of India. Three possible alternatives have presented themselves throughout. The first, and in some ways the most attractive, would be a special Delhi loan. The second would be to charge the whole expenditure as it occurs against current revenue. The third would be to put the Delhi works on precisely the same footing as our large railway and irrigation works, treating them as capital expenditure and financing them partly from loans and partly from whatever spare revenues remain in each year after meeting our ordinary administrative needs. I shall not weary the Council by the various considerations which decided us, with the full approval of the Secretary of State, to adopt the third of these courses. It will, I believe, commend itself to the financial and commercial community of India. By treating the Delhi operations as ordinary capital work, we ensure the greatest possible elasticity in the provision of funds; we avoid unnecessary additions to our unproductive debt; and I hope we allay the fear--so far as I am concerned, a baseless fear—that the new city will be built from the produce of fresh taxation."

Mr. G. K. Gokhale on March 7, 1912, moved a Resolution in the Imperial Legislative Council recommending that the cost of building New Delhi should be met entirely out of loan funds. In moving the Resolution, Mr. Gokhale said:

"My Lord, the Hon'ble the Finance Member says that he wishes to allay the fear--so far as he is concerned, he thinks it is a baseless fear--that the new city will be built from the produce of fresh taxation. Now, in speaking of fresh taxation, I fear the Hon'ble Member is taking only a technical advantage of certain expressions which have appeared in the Press in this connection. It is true that immediately after the Delhi announcement some newspapers started the cry that the new capital would cost a lot of money, and that fresh taxation would be necessary. But, my Lord, whether the Government imposes fresh taxation for building Delhi or keeps up taxation at a higher level than is necessary for the ordinary needs of the country and secures surpluses which it devotes to Delhi, is after all the same thing. For when you devote your surpluses to this work, you practically take that money out of the current revenues of the country....I, for one, have been raising my humble voice year after year against this misapplication of our surpluses since I entered this Council, now eleven years ago. Year after year I have been pointing out that while this may be sound finance in the West, it is not sound finance in this country, where the unproductive debt is really a very small amount....My Lord, there are many useful directions in which our surpluses could be expended or, if that course does not find favour with the Government, advantage ought to be taken of them to remit taxation so that the money remitted might fructify in the pockets of the

people. Of course, if the Government merely borrowed to build Delhi without at the same time utilising the surpluses either for reducing taxation or for expenditure on useful objects, it would in effect be the same thing as devoting the surpluses to the construction of the new capital. For in that case, while you will be borrowing with one hand to build Delhi, you will, with the other hand, be paying off debt by means of surpluses, realized by keeping the level of taxation higher than necessary. What I want is that while Delhi should be built out of loan funds—our trifling unproductive debt provides ample margin for that—the surpluses should be utilised either for non-recurring expenditure on education, sanitation and medical relief, as my next Resolution recommends, or else they should go to the reduction of taxation."*

EXPENSES FOR ROYAL VISIT

About the expenses incurred in connection with the Royal visit, Mr. Gokhale said :

"Then again I find from the Financial Statement that about half a million was spent in connection with the Royal visit on the Civil side ; two hundred and seven thousand pounds on the Military side, and the bonus and other boons came to about six hundred thousand pounds —altogether over one million and three hundred thousand."†

PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION

Lord Hardinge's Government, we are told, were 'anxious to give to Indians as large a share in the public services as was consistent with the best interests of the country.' So in September 1912 they appointed a Royal Commission to examine and report on various matters connected with the Indian public services. The Public Service Commission was asked also to enquire into "such limitations as still exist in the employment of non-Europeans, and the working of the existing division of Services into Imperial and Provincial."

About this Public Services Commission we read :

"The Commission visited India during the cold weathers of 1912-13 and 1913-14 and recorded an immense volume of evidence, official and non-official, in each province. The evidence was naturally conflicting and there were occasions when it was tinged with racial feeling. The Report was completed early in 1915, but owing to the outbreak of hostilities it was decided to postpone publication in the hope of avoiding controversy at a time when all energies should be concentrated on the conduct of the war. But the report could not be withheld indefinitely and was ultimately published in January 1917. By that time the war had raised the pitch of Indian expectations to an extreme height, and we are not surprised that a report which might have satisfied Indian opinion two years earlier was generally denounced in 1917 as wholly inadequate."§

THE SEDITIOUS MEETINGS ACT 1911

Lord Hardinge followed in the footsteps of Lord Minto in having another Seditious Meetings Act passed in 1911. On 20th March 1911, the Hon'ble Mr. Jenkins moved in the Imperial Legislative Council that the Report of the Select Committee on the Bill to amend the Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act be taken into consideration and passed into law. Mr. Gokhale opposed the motion in the following terms :

* *Speeches of G. K. Gokhale*, pp. 548-549.

† *Ibid.*, p. 550.

§ *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms*, p. 5.

"I had hoped, like so many of my friends, that the occasion for this discussion would not arise, that in view of the great improvement which has taken place in the general situation of the country, and to which the Hon'ble Mr. Jenkins bore testimony the other day, the Government would not consider it necessary to prolong this legislation and that in any case they would not seek to place the measure permanently on the statute-book. As, however, the Government have come to the conclusion that they must continue to have this weapon in their armoury, and have it permanently, those who are unable to acquiesce in this view have no choice but to express their dissent, and that is why I must trouble the Council with a few observations.

"Now, my Lord, it is freely admitted that the present situation of the country is not of a character to demand such legislation for immediate use. We have been told that very probably this law—when the Bill becomes law—will not be put into force at all in the near future. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the need of the Government is urgent and immediate, and we are entitled to take it that the measure is intended to serve the purpose of a precautionary measure....The Government naturally, in passing a precautionary measure, has, first of all, to consider how it can be made effective. A measure like this is not worth having unless it is reasonably effective. The representatives of the public, on the other hand, have first of all got to consider, since there is no immediate danger to be met, what harm is likely to result if the powers conferred by the measure are abused, and how to prevent such possible abuses...Now, my Lord, so far as the effectiveness of this measure is concerned, I will freely admit, what has indeed been already admitted by so many of my Hon'ble friends, that, from the standpoint of the Government, it could not have introduced a milder measure than this."

About the abuses of the powers of the Government, he feared much. He said:

"And I distinctly fear that in an area proclaimed under this law, there is no small likelihood of these exceptional powers being abused. It must be borne in mind that district authorities, in their turn, are dependent for their information upon the police and it is well known that the police of the country as a class are feared and not trusted. Therefore, there is a serious danger that the powers under this Act may be abused; and since there is this liability to abuse, it becomes necessary for the representatives of the people in this country to consider what should be their attitude towards a measure of this kind....As soon as the legislation is passed, the matter gets out of the hands of the Government of India; and wherever the legislation happens to be enforced, every officer who administers the law comes to be armed not only with the spirit of the law but also with the letter of the law. And, then, when abuses occur, non-official Members, who have been assenting parties to the legislation, find themselves placed in a very awkward position."

Mr. Gokhale illustrated his meaning with reference to the drastic Press Act of 1910. He said:

"As soon as the Bill was passed, Magistrates in all parts of the country started enforcing the provisions in the harshest manner, and the worst cases occurred, I am sorry to say, in my own province, Bombay. For the most paltry reasons, security came to be demanded, with the result that even thoughtful men, who deplored the excesses of the Press, turned violently against those who had stood by the Government in the matter. I know the Members of the Government were themselves distressed to see this abuse of the Press Act."*

INDENTURED LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA

Indian Indentured Labour in South Africa had been the subject of much agitation about this time. On the 25th February 1910, Mr. G. K. Gokhale had moved the following Resolution in the Imperial Legislative Council:

* *Speeches of G. K. Gokhale*, pp. 320-25.

"That the Council recommends that the Governor-General in Council should be empowered to prohibit the recruitment of indentured labour in British India for the colony of Natal."

The Government of India accepted Mr. Gokhale's Resolution. Again on 4th March 1912, Mr. Gokhale moved another Resolution in the Imperial Legislative Council recommending the prohibition of the recruitment of Indian indentued labour. In moving the Resolution, Mr. Gokhale remarked:

"Hon'ble Members will remember that two years ago this Council adopted a Resolution recommending that the Governor-General should obtain powers to prohibit the recruitment of indentured labour in this country for the colony of Natal. The Government, who accepted that recommendation, gave effect to it by carrying through this Council the necessary empowering legislation and the new law was put into operation on the 1st July last against Natal. I respectfully invite the Council today to go a step further and recommend that the system of indentured labour should now be abolished altogether. It is true that the resolution of two years ago was adopted by this Council principally as a measure of retaliation rendered necessary by the continued indignities and ill-treatment to which our countrymen were subjected in South Africa ; but my own view, expressed even then in this Council, was that apart from the question of retaliation the system should be abolished because it was wrong in itself. I do not think it necessary to describe to this Council at any length what this system really is...Let the Council glance briefly at the origin and the history of the system, and it will at once be struck by three facts which in themselves are a sufficient condemnation of the system. The first is, that this system of indentured labour came into existence to take the place of slave labour after the abolition of slavery. This is a fact admited by everybody, and Lord Sanderson's Committee, whose Report I have before me, put it in the very forefront of its Report. The second fact is that it is a system under which even the negro, only just then emancipated, scorned to come, but under which the free people of this country were placed. And, thirdly, what strikes one is that the conscience of Government - and by Government I mean both the Government of India and the Imperial Government,—has been very uneasy throughout about this question, as may be seen from various inquiries ordered from time to time into the working of the system, its repeated suspension for abuses, and its reluctant resumption under pressure from planters. The first, and in some respects the most important, inquiry that was held was due to the action that the Parliament in England took at the very start in this matter. As I have already mentioned, the system came into existence about the year 1834, after the abolition of slavery. In 1837 the matter attracted the attention of Parliament, and in the debate on the question that followed the system was denounced in strong terms by Lord Brougham and Mr. Buxton, and other great Englishmen of that time. The result was that the system was discontinued at once and an inquiry was ordered into its nature and working. A Committee of four gentlemen was appointed, who sat in Calcutta and considered the whole subject. The Committee after a very careful investigation, submitted a majority and a minority Report. Three members out of four condemned the system altogether, and urged that it should not be allowed to come into existence again. Only one member expressed himself in favour of reviving the system under certain safeguards which he suggested. The matter went back to Parliament, but the Parliament, already exhausted by the great effort that it had made in connection with the abolition of slavery and wearied by the constant wail of the planters in regard to the ruin that was threatening them, ultimately followed in this case a somewhat extraordinary procedure and adopted the minority report of one member, as against the majority report of three members. And this was done in a very thin House, only about 150 members being present. As a result of this vote, the system was allowed to be revived in the year 1842. The conscience of the Government, however, has continued troubled, and there have been, since then, numerous other inquiries into the working of the system, resulting in its temporary suspension, followed unfortunately by its resumption again owing to the influence of the planters....


"My last objection to the system is that it is degrading to the people of India from a national point of view. I do not think I need really say much on this aspect of the question. Wherever the system exists, there the Indians are known only as coolies, no matter what their position may be. Now, Sir, there are disabilities enough in all conscience attaching to our position in this country. And, I ask why must this additional brand be put upon our brow before the rest of the civilised world? I am sure, if only the Government will exercise a little imagination and realise our feeling in the matter, it will see the necessity of abolishing the system as soon as possible."*

Mr. Gokhale then briefly referred to the extent of this evil as it existed at that time. He said :

"But the system still prevails in three British colonies in the West Indies, namely, British Guiana, Trinidad and Jamaica, and in one Dutch colony, named Surinam, about which, however, under our rules I am precluded from saying anything. Then it exists in Fiji, a Crown colony in Australasia; there is also a small supply of indentured labour to the Straits Settlements; and last, there are four or five districts in the Upper Valley of Assam, where the system is still in force. The annual supply to the different colonies comes to a little less than 2,000 in the case of Fiji, about 600 to Jamaica, and nearly 3,000 to Trinidad; and about 2,200 to British Guiana. In Assam the whole labour force is about 800,000, of which the indentured labourers are now only about 20,000. Now taking Assam first—I understand that the Government have decided to stop the system of indenture altogether there from next year. The Hon'ble Sir Charles Bayley stated the other day in one of his speeches in East Bengal that, from July 1st of next year, the system would cease to exist in Assam. ..As the system will be discontinued from next year in Assam, I do not wish to say anything more about that here. I would, however, like to point out that the Committee, appointed in 1906, recommended the complete stoppage of indentured labour in Assam in the course of five years. They would have liked to stop it earlier, but they did not want to inconvenience the planters, and therefore they suggested an interval of five years. According to that, the system should have been discontinued in 1911. And I should like to know why it has been allowed to go on for two years more. ..

"Then, Sir, there is the question of re-indenture in three colonies in Natal, to which indentured emigration has now been prohibited, in Mauritius, where it has stopped of itself owing to economic causes, and in Fiji, where it is still allowed to continue. This re-indenture is one of the most vicious parts of the system, because though a man may indenture himself at the start only for five years, by means of repeated re-indenture he could be kept in a state of perpetual servitude. And this has become a most serious question now in Natal. There the Government of the colony imposes an annual £3 tax on all ex-indentured labourers who want to settle there as free persons. All those who have been emancipated since 1901—males above 16, and females above 13—have to pay this £3 tax. Now see how it works in practice. Take a family of husband and wife and four children—two daughters of 13 and 15 and two boys below 13. The family must pay the tax for four persons—father, mother and the two daughters—or £12 a year, that is, £1 a month. The man can earn an average wage of about 25 Shillings a month, and the wife and the two girls may earn among them about 15 Shillings extra, which means a total income of 40 Shillings or £2 a month for the family. Of this, half or £1 has to be paid as licence tax. Then there are other taxes; and there is house-rent. The Council may judge how much can remain after deducting these expenses for food and clothing for six persons. Is it any wonder that this tax has broken up homes—as has been admitted by prominent Natal men—that it has driven men to crime and women to a life of shame? Sir, there is no doubt whatever that the tax is nothing less than a diabolical device to drive the poor Indians either into re-indenture or else out of the colony. It is, therefore, a

* *Speeches of G. K. Gokhale, pp. 519-29.*



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matter of the utmost importance that the Government should take the earliest possible steps to bring this miserable system of re-indenture to an end. I may mention that the Sanderson Committee has strongly recommended the stoppage of re-indenture.

"...Sir, this is a question which really throws a great responsibility upon the Government.... India is the only country which supplies indentured labour at the present moment. Why should India be marked out for this degradation ? The conscience of our people, unfortunately asleep too long, is now waking up to the enormity of this question, and I have no doubt that it will not rest till it has asserted itself. And I ask the Government not to make the mistake of ignoring a sentiment that is dear to us, namely, the sentiment of our self-respect. We have, no doubt, plently of differences between the Government and the people in regard to the internal administration of this country ; but those are matters which stand on a different footing. Outside the country, the Government of India must stand up for us on every occasion ; must stand up for our dignity, for our honour, for our national pride. If they will not do this, to whom else can we turn ? I feel, Sir, that though this system has been allowed to exist so long, yet its days are really numbered. It will soon cease in Assam, and then it cannot last very much longer in the case of the colonies. And I am confident that a people who have spent millions upon millions in emancipating slaves, will not long permit their own fellow-subjects to be condemned to a life which, if not one of actual slavery, is at any rate not far removed from it."*

THE BENARES HINDU UNIVERSITY (1915)

In the beginning there were three distinct movements in favour of founding a Central Hindu University. The first was under Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the second under Mrs. Annie Besant, who had applied for a Royal Charter for a University to the Government, and the third under the guidance of Maharaja Sir Rameshwar Singh Bahadur of Darbhanga. These leaders soon realised the necessity of a union of forces, and in April 1911 Mrs. Besant and Pandit Malaviya met at Allahabad to consider possible lines of agreement. At last it was agreed to draft a constitution for the proposed University and to wait upon the Education Member to lay the scheme before him.

In October 1911 Sir Harcourt Butler wrote a letter signifying the approval of the scheme and laying down the conditions of the Government of India :

1. The Hindus should approach Government in a body, like the Mahomedans.
2. A strong, efficient and financially sound college with an adequate European staff should be the basis of the scheme.
3. The University should differ from existing Indian Universities by being a teaching and residential institution and by offering religious instruction.
4. The movement should be entirely educational.
5. There should be the same measure of Government supervision as in the case of the proposed University at Aligarh.

At first Government wanted to have some measure of supervision in the affairs of the proposed University. In July 1914 Sir Harcourt Butler wrote :

"The Hindu University, though not empowered to affiliate colleges from outside, will be Imperial in the sense that, subject to regulations, it will admit students from all parts of India, on the other hand, it will be localised in or by Benares. There will be obvious advantages in having as Chancellor of the University the Lieutenant-Governor of the province, who is also Chancellor of the Allahabad

* *Speeches of G. K. Gokhale*, pp. 530-34.

University and who will be able to help to correlate the work between the two, to secure them corresponding advantages and to foster a spirit of healthy co-operation. Moreover, such a constitution is in accord with the general policy of decentralization which is now pursued by the Government of India."

The Benares Hindu University Bill was introduced in the Imperial Legislative Council in 1915 and was passed at the closing session of the Council. The principal features of the Act are as follows :

"It establishes and incorporates a teaching and residential Hindu University at Benares. First of all, it creates a corporation sole of the University. The portals of the University are 'open to persons of all classes, castes and creeds'; but provision shall be made 'for religious instruction and examination in Hindu religion only'; this instruction is compulsory in the case of Hindus. Special arrangements are to be made for the religious instruction of Jain or Sikh students. The Governor-General of India for the time being shall be the Lord Rector, the Lieutenant-Governor for the time being of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh shall be the visitor, who has the power to inspect the University and its colleges; and to annul the proceedings of the University if they are found to be not in conformity with this Act, Statutes and Regulations. The authorities and officers of the University are named to be (1) The Chancellor; (2) the Pro-Chancellor; (3) The Vice-Chancellor; (4) The Pro-Vice-Chancellor; (5) The Court; (6) The Council; (7) The Senate; (8) The Syndicate; (9) The Faculties and their Deans; (10) The Registrar; and (11) The Treasurer. In administrative affairs of the University, the Court is the supreme governing body 'and has the power to review the acts of the Senate. The executive body of the Court is called the Council. The Senate is the academic body of which the executive body is called the Syndicate. To meet the recurring charges, a permanent endowment of fifty lacs of rupees is to be made and invested in authorised securities. The degrees, diplomas, certificates and other academic distinctions granted by the University are to have the same recognition at the hands of Government as those granted by the existing Indian Universities."

In laying the foundation stone of the Hindu University in February 1916, Lord Hardinge remarked :

"It is the declared policy of the Government of India to do all within their powers and within their means to multiply the number of Universities throughout India, realising, as we do, that the greatest boon Government can give to India is the diffusion of higher education through the creation of new Universities. Many, many more are needed, but the new Universities to be established at Dacca, Benares and Bankipore, soon to be followed, I hope, by Universities in Burma and the Central Provinces, may be regarded as steps taken in the right direction. Here at any rate in this city is a case where we can all stand together upon a common platform, for no one can dispute that the Benares Hindu University will add to the facilities for higher education and take to some extent the pressure off from the existing institutions, while, it is the proud boast of at least one of those who have so successfully engineered, this movement that the degrees of the Benares Hindu University shall be not only not lower but higher in standard than those of existing Universities. It has even been claimed that this University will only justify its existence when the education given within its precincts shall make it unnecessary for Indian students to go to foreign countries for their studies and when such expeditions will be limited to advanced scholars and professors, who will travel abroad to exchange ideas with the doctors and learned men of other continents in order to make the latest researches in all branches of knowledge available to their own alumni at Benares."

The diffusion of higher education is undoubtedly a blessing. But free and universal elementary education would have been at least an equal, if not a greater, boon—

particularly in the United Provinces, which can boast of the largest number of Universities but where the literacy figures are the lowest of all the major Provinces of India.

Speaking of the denominational character of the Hindu University, Lord Hardinge observed :

"There are some who shudder at the very word denominational and some who dislike new departures of any kind. Controversy has raged around such points in England and educational problems have a way of stirring up more feeling than almost any other social question. I do not think it is unnatural, for their importance cannot be exaggerated. If you realise that the object of an educational system must be to draw out from every man and woman the very best that is in them so that their talents may be developed to their fullest capacity not only for their individual fulfilment of themselves but also for the benefit of the society of which they find themselves members—if you realise this, is it not natural that men should strive with might and main to attain and be content with only the very best and is it not natural that the strife should produce a mighty close of opinion and conviction ? The question at issue cannot be settled by theory and discussion. Education is not an exact science and never will be. We must also have experiment and I for one consider that Lord Ripon was a sagacious man when he deprecated that the educational system of this country should be cast in one common mould and advocated, as he was never tired of doing, that variety which alone, he urged, can secure the free development of every side and every aspect of national character.

"I should like to remind you too that this new departure of a denominational university is not quite such a novel idea as some of you may think, for the Education Commission appointed by Lord Ripon, while recognising that the declared neutrality of the State forbids its connecting the institutions directly maintained by it with any one form of faith, suggested the establishment of institutions of widely different types in which might be inculcated such forms of faith as various sections of the community may accept as desirable for the formation of character and awakening of thought. They recognised the danger that a denominational college runs some risk of confining its benefits to a particular section of the community and thus of deepening the lines of difference already existing. I am not terrified by the bogey of religious intolerance. Rather do I think that a deep belief in and reverence for one's own religion ought to foster a spirit of respect for the religious convictions of others and signs are not wanting that the day is drawing nigh when tolerance and mutual good-will shall take the place of fanaticism and hatred."

INDIAN CURRENCY COMMISSION

The Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance was appointed in April 1913. Its object was to inquire into questions arising out of the management of the Indian Currency system and control of Indian Finance. The Commission took evidence during the latter part of 1913. It took some time to submit the Report, which was ready on February 24, 1914. As the Report was long, the Commission furnished a summary of it in the following passages :

(1) The establishment of the exchange value of the rupee on a stable basis has been and is of the first importance to India.

(2) The measures adopted for the maintenance of the exchange value of the rupee have been necessarily and rightly rather supplementary to, than in all respects directly in pursuance of, the recommendations of the Committee of 1898.

(3) These measures worked well in the crisis of 1907-08, the only occasion upon which they have been severely tested hitherto.

(4) The time has now arrived for a reconsideration of the ultimate goal of the Indian currency system. The belief of the Committee of 1898 was that a Gold Currency in active circulation is an

essential condition of the maintenance of the Gold Standard in India, but the history of the last 15 years shows that the Gold Standard has been firmly secured without this condition.

(5) It would not be to India's advantage to encourage an increased use of gold in the internal circulation.

(6) The people of India neither desire nor need any considerable amount of gold for circulation as currency, and the currency most generally suitable for the internal needs of India consists of rupees and notes.

(7) A mint for the coinage of gold is not needed for purposes of currency or exchange, but if Indian sentiment genuinely demands it and the Government of India are prepared to incur the expense, there is no objection in principle to its establishment either from the Indian or from the Imperial standpoint : provided that the coin minted is the sovereign (or the half-sovereign) ; and it is pre-eminently a question in which Indian sentiment should prevail.

(8) If a mint for the coinage of gold is not established, refined gold should be received at the Bombay Mint in exchange for currency.

(9) The Government should continue to aim at giving the people the form of currency which they demand, whether rupees, notes or gold, but the use of notes should be encouraged.

(10) The essential point is that this internal currency should be supported for exchange purposes by a thoroughly adequate reserve of gold and sterling.

(11) No limit can at present be fixed to the amount up to which the Gold Standard Reserve should be accumulated.

(12) The profits on coinage of rupees should for the present continue to be credited exclusively to the Reserve.

(13) A much larger proportion of the Reserve should be held in actual gold. By an exchange of assets between this Reserve and the Paper Currency Reserve, a total of about £10,000,000 in gold can be at once secured. This total should be raised as opportunity offers to £15,000,000 and thereafter the authorities should aim at keeping one-half of the total Reserve in actual gold.

(15) The proper place for the location of the whole of the Gold Standard Reserve is London.

(17) The Paper Currency system of India should be made more elastic. The fiduciary portion of the note issue should be increased at once from 14 crores to 20 crores and thereafter fixed at a maximum of the amount of notes held by Government in the Reserve Treasuries plus one-third of the net circulation, and the Government should take power to make temporary investments or loans from the fiduciary portion within this maximum in India and in London, as an alternative to investment in permanent securities.

(18) We recommend the immediate universalisation of the 500 rupee note and the increase of the facilities for the encashment of notes.

(19) The aggregate balances in India and London in recent years have been unusually large. This has been due mainly, though not entirely, to accidental causes and to the exceptional prosperity of India

(20) Caution is justifiable in framing Budgets in India, but has been carried rather further than was necessary in recent years.

(21) A change in the date of the commencement of the flinancial year from the 1st April to the 1st November or the 1st January would probably enable the Government of India to frame more accurate Budgets. Such a change would also enable the India Office to fix the amount of their borrowings in London with closer regard to immediate needs. We commend this proposal for favourable consideration.

(34) We observe that in our opinion the time has come for a general review of the relations of the India Office to the Bank of England.

(35) The working of the present arrangements for the remuneration of the Secretary of State's broker should be watched, and, if necessary, they should be revised.

(38) The Finance Committee should, if possible, contain three members with financial experience, representing—

(*a*) Indian Official Finance

(*b*) Indian Banking and Commerce

(*c*) The London Money Market.

In any case there should be at least one member with Indian financial experience. The absence of any representative of Indian finance on the Committee since 1911 has resulted in giving undue prominence to the representation of London City experience.

(41) We are not in a position to report either for or against the establishment of a State or Central Bank, but suggest the appointment of a small expert Committee to examine the whole question in India.

Sir James Begbie signed the Report subject to a Note of Dissent in which he spoke against extensive token currency.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION, 1915

Since the time of Lord Ripon in 1882, Local Self-government institutions are rising up in India. But their working did not meet with much success. Thus the Decentralization Commission writes of the working of the Local Boards :

"Critics of the present system have dwelt on the failure to develop the principle of election, and on the appointment of official presidents. The Boards, it has been urged, have practically become a department of the Government administration ; their work is done by the official element within the Boards themselves, or by Government departments at the Board's expense ; their proceedings are subject to excessive outside control ; and in present circumstances they can never become, as Lord Ripon intended them to be, effective instruments of Local Self-government.

"While we do not go so far in suggestions for change as many who hold these views, we recognise that their assertion contains a large element of truth. At the same time those who expected a complete revolution in existing methods in consequence of Lord Ripon's pronouncement were inevitably doomed to disappointment. The political education of any people must necessarily be slow, and Local Self-government of the British type could not at once take root in Indian soil....We recognise, however, that much has already been done to carry out the objects which Lord Ripon had in view, and the added experience of a quarter of a century now renders it possible, we think, to attempt a further practical development of Local Self-government."

Lord Hardinge also tried to extend the principle of Local Self-government in India and in 1915 issued the Local Self-government Resolution, which indicated the general lines on which advance should be made.

As regards the municipal bodies, the Government of India

"thought that the time was ripe for appointing non-official chairmen, granting elected majorities, and giving further freedom in regard to taxation, the framing of budgets, and control over establishments. Rural areas are naturally less advanced than municipalities and local knowledge and interest in public affairs are less common. Rural Boards did not therefore afford the same scope for non-official activity, and the Government of India thought that they should still be guided by official chairmen. But in other respects they wished to see progress made on the same lines as in towns. The Commission had recommended the establishment of village panchayats with certain administrative powers, jurisdiction in petty civil and criminal cases, and special sources of revenue. Lord Hardinge urged local Governments to make experiments in any areas where a practical scheme could be worked out. The suggestion that the control of local administration should be placed under a local Government Board did not find favour with the Commission."

REVOLUTIONARY CRIME

During the Viceroyalty of Lord Hardinge there was a fresh outbreak of anarchical outrages. Mr. Yusuf Ali in his *The Making of India* says:

"There was a recrudescence of revolutionary crime in Bengal in 1912, and an attempt was made on Lord Hardinge's own life with a bomb at Delhi (December, 1912). This movement was not connected with the nationalist movement, but pursued its own course, until it was temporarily suppressed under the Defence of India Act, a war measure, of March 1915."*

THE GREAT WAR

The Great War broke out in August 1914, and India took part in that war. Mr. Yusuf Ali remarks thus:

"When the War broke out in August 1914, Lord Hardinge's popularity and his smooth working of the administrative machinery enabled India to make a response which materially improved both her credit and her position in the Empire. A certain amount of panic was at first inevitable among the ignorant masses, and the revolutionary movement among Indians in foreign lands was adroitly used by the enemies of the Empire. ..The value of Indian supplies to the Empire and its Allies during the War has been estimated at 250 millions sterling. In man power India contributed 800,000 combatants and 400,000 non-combatants. They went to most of the theatres of the War -France and Flanders, East Africa, Aden, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli, Salōnika, Egypt, and Palestine, besides undertaking duties at the fringes of the War, as in Persia, the Persian Gulf, and the Afghan border. The Mesopotamian and Palestine campaigns were mainly won from India. Indian casualties amounted to over 100,000, including nearly 30,000 deaths. Eleven Victoria Crosses and hundreds of minor decorations were won. India's financial help may be judged from the addition of 250 crores to her rupee debt (more than 250 million sterling according to the rate of exchange in 1919-1920), in addition to the large sums she contributed to numerous war funds."†

But India gained nothing by this enormous vicarious suffering and sacrifice.

"DISAFFECTED GROUPS"

About the "disaffected groups" in Bengal and other parts of India, an Indian Government publication observes:

"The loyalty of the country generally was emphasized by the attempts made by very small sections of the population to create trouble. The Bengal Revolutionary party, which had been active for many years before the War, scored a notable success in August 1914 by capturing a large consignment of pistols and ammunition in Calcutta. The arms were widely distributed and used in most of a series of outrages which followed for some months to come. We now know that the Bengal anarchists established communication both with German agents, and with agents of the revolutionary party outside India known by the name of their propagandist journal as the *Ghadr* (mutiny) party. They drew money from America and also from German sources, and made plans for running arms and ammunition into India and starting an armed rising: but the conspiracy was disclosed and the leaders eventually arrested. The influence of the *Ghadr* party was, however, more obvious, and probably more dangerous in other directions."

KOMAGATA MARU INCIDENT

The same writer goes on to narrate:

"In September 1914 occurred the unfortunate *Komagata Maru* incident. In its origin this was merely an attempt to defy the immigration rules of Canada. Some four hundred Punjabis sailed from

* *The Making of India*, By Yusuf Ali, p. 290.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 291-92.

ports in the Far East to Vancouver. They were not allowed to land, and after much delay sailed for India. *Ghadr* agents had not lost the opportunity of preaching revolt on board the ship, and the Indian authorities decided to enforce the Ingress into India Ordinance in order to prevent any agitation or disturbance on the return of the emigrants. The Sikhs were excited by the disembarkation arrangements at Budge-Budge and started to march to Calcutta. They were taken back by a force of police and military, and suddenly opened fire at Budge-Budge on the police. Men were killed on both sides and the Sikhs scattered before they could be surrounded. Most but not all of them were rounded up, and the leaders were put under restraint in the Punjab, where they formed a nucleus of disaffection, which led to the events described below.

"When the War broke out there had been a great stir among the Sikhs in America, and the *Ghadr* organization began a campaign to induce them to return to start a revolution in India. In all about 8,000 Sikhs came back to the Punjab from the United States, Canada, and the Far East, and we know that efforts were made to bring them all into the conspiracy. In most cases the attempt failed and in respect of some three-quarters of the returning emigrants no action was necessary : but most of the dangerous characters on their arrival were interned. Some who had merely been restricted to their homes disregarded the orders, and joining with others who had not been interned, attempted to collect a following. In this they had little success, for the countryside as a whole remained loyal and quiet ; but so long as they were active, the gangs were dangerous and made attempts to concert a rising in conjunction with any disaffected elements that they could find in regiments. Happily all miscarried, as in each case timely information was given. But the position was full of serious possibilities. Political dacoities and murders of the type common in Bengal began to be a feature of the disturbance and it was apparent that the Punjab and the Bengal movements were in touch, and that the former derived direct stimulus from the latter. In certain districts of the Western Punjab widespread disorder ensued, to which political, racial, and agrarian causes all contributed, and the gravity of the situation convinced Lord Hardinge's Government of the need for some special weapon to enable them to deal with it promptly."

THE DEFENCE OF INDIA BILL

The writer proceeds:

"The Defence of India Bill was introduced into the Indian Legislative Council and passed without delay. Inevitably it was a drastic measure ; it gave to the Governor-General in Council wide rule-making powers with a view to securing the public safety and defence of the country, and also provided for the creation of special tribunals for the quicker trial of certain classes of cases in specially disturbed tracts. It was comparable to a similar Act passed in the United Kingdom also as a war measure. The Bill was naturally rather a severe trial to the Indian elected members ; as loyal citizens they supported its principle : but they made no secret of their aversion to particular provisions and moved many amendments against which Government used its official majority without hesitation, as they would have destroyed the efficacy of the Bill. The Act was immediately applied in the Punjab, and later elsewhere as circumstances demanded. During a War the Government could not have relied on its ordinary judiciary in dealing with conspiracy cases of such dimensions as those which the special tribunals were called upon to try."*

BENGAL AMBULANCE CORPS

During the last Great War, 1916, Dr. S. P. Sarbadhikari, C.I.E., was able to form the Bengal Ambulance Corps, which did splendid work for the wounded and dying in Mesopotamia. But unfortunately the ship *Bengalee*, which had been chartered for carrying the Ambulance men, sank off the Bay of Bengal.

* *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms*, pp. 11-13.

BENGALEE REGIMENT

It was Dr. S. K Mullick, C.B.E, who first formed the plan of a Bengalee Regiment during the War. He submitted his scheme to Brigadier-General R. G. Strange, the General Officer Commanding, Fort William. In a short time he was able to get the support of Sir Rash Behari Ghosh, Sir Surendra Nath Banerjee, Hon'ble Mr. B. N. Basu, Babu Moti Lal Ghose, Maharaja Bahadur Tagore and others. On August 7, 1916, Lord Carmichael announced at a meeting of the Bengal Council that a Double Company of Bengalees for the Regular Army had been sanctioned.

"No sooner was this announcement made than applications came pouring in and the register began to fill up rapidly. The number required for the Double Company was 228 but within a fortnight nearly 400 names were registered. The enrolments by the military began on the 31st August, and went on regularly. The whole of those enlisted were sent off to Nowshera, their training centre, within a net period of 48 days from start to finish, forming a remarkable record in recruitment in a province from which recruits had never been taken before. Those enlisted were stationed in life vastly superior to that of the ordinary Sepoy. They were well-educated men belonging to some of the highest families in Bengal."


In March 1917, H. E. the Commander-in-Chief wrote to the Governor of Bengal "that if Bengal could furnish a full Battalion with adequate reserves, he would accept it. Efforts were once more renewed, and recruiting began again in real earnest....The success of the Double Company and the rapidity with which it was completed encouraged the military authorities to initiate in Bengal the same machinery which had been adopted in the Punjab and other recruiting centres. Accordingly a senior Recruiting officer was appointed in May 1917 and gradually five other Assistant Recruiting officers have been appointed, together with subordinate non-military officers. At the end of April a platoon of the original Double Company who had finished their training by this time, were brought down on recruiting duty. They went round the districts and roused unparalleled enthusiasm.... The Bengalee Battalion of a thousand men was completed on the 26th June, 1917. It was a red letter day in the history of Bengal."

WEAKNESS OF MORLEY-MINTO REFORMS

The weakness of the position created by the Morley-Minto reforms has been well traced in the following observations:

"We must make up our minds either to rule ourselves or to let the people rule; there is no halfway house, except of course on the highway of deliberate transition. At present we are doing nothing. We are trying to govern by concession and each successive concession has the air of being wrung from us. We keep public business going by bargaining and negotiation—not, however, the healthy bargaining of the market-place, but a steady yielding to assaults which always leave some bitterness behind on both sides. This is in no sense the fault of individuals; it follows inevitably from the influences at work. Up to Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty, there was a steady determination to do what was right for India, whether India altogether liked it or not. The reforms which followed his regime brought in a power of challenge and obstruction -influence without responsibility; and rather than fight we have often to give way. We are shedding the role of benevolent despotism, and the people—especially those who are most friendly to us can not understand what role we mean to assume in its place. If we returned to sheer despotism, we should carry many of the people with us, and should secure an ordered calm. But that being impossible, we must definitely show that we are moving from the Eastern to the Western ideal of rule. And, secondly, we must maintain the full weight and order of government while the move is going on. Otherwise we cannot look for either internal peace or the co-operation of the people, or indeed for anything else except growing weakness, with the fatal consequences that weakness involves in an Eastern country."*

* Quoted in Report on *Indian Constitutional Reforms*, pp. 66-67.



Jamnalal Bajaj



The Hon'ble Mr. B. N. Basu

CHAPTER XVII

LORD CHELMSFORD (1916-1921)

In the spring of 1916 Lord Hardinge left India and he was succeeded by Lord Chelmsford on the April 5, 1916. Lord Chelmsford, previous to his appointment as the Viceroy of India, had served in India as an officer of a Territorial Regiment. Mr. Yusuf Ali writes in his *The Making of India*:

"It fell to Lord Hardinge's successor to see the end of the war. But Lord Hardinge left a great record in India—only marred by the military disaster at Kut in Mesopotamia (December, 1915) and saddened by the death of Lady Hardinge (July 1919), whose work for women and children in India had won universal admiration. Lord Chelmsford (1916-1921) had to deal with the later phases of the war and the difficulties and disillusionments of the peace. New men had come on the scene, and new battle cries were in the air. A new approach was tried for the development of self-governing institutions, in the scheme known by the joint names of Mr. E. S. Montagu (Secretary of State for India 1917-1922) and Lord Chelmsford."*

ADVICE TO THE EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION

Replying to the address of welcome presented by the European Association, at Calcutta, on December 23, 1916, Lord Chelmsford gave them the following candid advice :

"You have referred, in language of appropriate 'gravity, to the responsibilities of the non-official European community as the representatives in the Indian Empire of the British people. I welcome the attitude indicated by these sentiments. The times in which we live are full of difficult and thorny problems. There is a great awakening of consciousness in the ancient races among whom our lot is cast. This is largely due to the traditions of our own country and to teachings for which we ourselves are responsible. The seed we have planted is growing very rapidly and has now become a strong tree, and though we may sometimes think its growth strange, because it is not precisely the same as our own growth, yet we should regard these conditions with interest and sympathy and the words you have used encourage the hope that your Association will not limit its activities to the pursuit of communal interests, but that you recognise that the strength of the British Empire lies, not in the assertion of special privileges, but rather in the ability she has so often shown in the past to understand and enter into the natural aspirations of the various peoples who form the part of her wide Dominions."

FORESHADOWING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY COMMISSION

In his Convocation Address to the Calcutta University on January 6, 1917, Lord Chelmsford foreshadowed the appointment of a Commission to inquire into the condition of the Calcutta University in the following terms:

"We, as the Government of India, have very carefully considered the situation with regard to Calcutta University, and we have come to the conclusion that a small but a strong Commission, appointed to sit next cold weather, on similar lines and with terms of reference following those of the London University Commission, is a necessary preliminary to a constructive policy in relation to

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* *The Making of India*, p. 292.

your problems, and we have every hope that a Commission so appointed may give us a report of equal educational value. I approached Lord Haldane and asked him if he would be willing to preside over this Commission, but he has replied that, while nothing would have given him greater pleasure, he is so deeply engaged in judicial and educational work that acceptance is impossible.

"I am determined, however, that, so far as in me lies, the composition of this Commission shall be of the strongest possible character on the educational side, and that educational qualifications shall be alone considered. I am hoping to get as many as three educational experts from England to advise us, and local representatives will, of course, also have a place on the Commission, of whom the same qualifications will be required. Educational problems should be considered with a single eye to educational efficiency and that has been, and will be, my sole thought in the establishment of this Commission and in its composition.

"As I told you at the outset of my address, I visited recently some of your hostels and messes, and I was struck by the excellent educational material which was there. It must be our care that these young men receive the very best education on the soundest lines that we can give. In this policy I feel sure that I shall have the cordial assent and co-operation of the University and the people of Bengal. As one long connected with education and as your Chancellor, I am anxious that educational questions should be approached from the purely educational standpoint and that our sole objective should be educational efficiency, I believe that a Commission instituted, as I have indicated, will best secure this end."

NEW PROFESSIONS FOR UNIVERSITY MEN

Lord Chelmsford in his Convocation Address also dwelt on the opening of fresh avocations for University men. He advised young men to take to the profession of teaching. He said:

"Each generation has its particular call, and for you in these days I believe the call has come to do something for the education of your country and the improvement of its material welfare. I am fully aware of the difficulties. Only the other day I asked a law student why he was taking up law with all its risks and disappointments. He answered, 'What else is there for me to take up ?'

"I am not going to discuss his answer though it gives cause to think, but this I will say. It is my sincere hope and it is the policy of my Government to endeavour by all means in our power to open up other avenues of employment. So long as students think that the only avenues of employment are in the legal and clerical professions, so long shall we get congestion and overcrowding in those professions with consequent discouragement, disappointment and discontent. Our policy then is first to secure that there shall be as many opportunities of a livelihood as possible open to the educated classes and next to endeavour to divert the students into channels other than those of law and Government clerical employ.

"I hope and believe that we shall be able to do so. Don't imagine that I promise the millennium for tomorrow or the next day; if we can lay the foundation of a policy which will increase the spheres of employment and at the same time switch off the overflowing stream of students into new channels of instruction, we shall at least have done something to remedy what is admittedly a very serious state of things. Take, for instance, the great profession of teaching. At the present time it is only regarded as a form of employment, which will keep the wolf from the door until briefs come in or some other permanent occupation be secured. This is not as it should be. The profession of teaching is a great and honourable profession, and it should engage the whole attention of those who follow it. But this is not likely to be the case so long as teachers are paid an inadeqaate wage. If we are to divert students on to this road, we must increase the pay and opportunities of our teachers and magnify the status of the teaching profession.

"Again, India is asking for industrial and commercial opportunities for her sons. The Commission, which is now sitting, will, I hope, give an answer which will enable us to secure this end. It will

then be our duty so to train our students that when those opportunities are within their reach, they shall be capable of grasping them.

"The call then to your generation is, I believe, to educate your people and to improve their material welfare. For my part, I promise you that I shall do all that is in my power* to enable you to answer that call. And is it not a great call ? Each one of you who takes up the profession of teacher as a sacred calling—and the teacher who regards his work as sacred has a great place in your history will have the teacher's reward of knowing that he has raised his disciples out of the slough of ignorance and has made life full of meaning for them. And for those of you who throw in your lot with the industrial and commercial development of your country, apart from the material prizes which will be yours to win, there will be the vision of an India emerging from a life of rare subsistence, to a life with a higher standard of living of comfort."

THE MEDIUM OF INSTRUCTION

Lord Chelmsford could not make up his mind as to whether Vernaculars should be the medium of instruction in the Indian schools. He asked the Directors' Conference at Delhi on January 22, 1917, to solve the question. He said :

"I refer to the relative claims of English and Vernacular teaching. At the present moment we rely on English as the medium of our higher instruction. This is due mainly to the fact that English is the pass-port to employment and that Vernacular text-books are not available, but the consequence is obvious. Students endeavour to grapple with abtruse subjects through the medium of a foreign tongue and in many cases through their mediocre acquaintance with that tongue have perforce to memorise their text-books. We criticise adversely this tendency to memorise, but to my mind it reflects credit on the zeal of the students who rather than abandon their quest for knowledge commit to memory whole pages and whole books which they understand but imperfectly. This is, of course, a mere travesty of education....The remedy seems to me to lie in one of two directions. Either we must teach in Vernacular as long as we can put off to the latest possible moment the use of English as a medium of instruction, or we must concentrate our attention more closely on the teaching of English, or can any middle course be suggested which is sound on educational lines ?'

"INDIAN" REPRESENTATION IN THE WAR CONFERENCE

India sent three "representatives" to the Imperial War Conference, but they did not represent the true interests of India. Lord Chelmsford in his address to the Imperial Legislative Council on February 8, 1917, thus referred to India's "representation" in the Imperial War Conference :

"His Majesty's Government, as you know, have decided to convene a Special War Conference in London. As the members are aware, His Majesty's Government have invited the Secretary of State for India to represent India, and the Secretary of State has appointed, in consultation with the Government of India, three gentlemen to assist him at that Conference. Criticism has been made of the method of representation and the number and of the manner of selection of India's special delegates."

Lord Chelmsford attached much importance to India's "representation" when he remarked :

"As the French proverb has it, 'It is the first step which counts,' and India has been admitted today for the first time to a place of honour at the Council Table of the Empire. It marks a point in the history of India which, though it may not be seen in its true perspective today will, I have no hesitation in saying, be the beginning of a new chapter in India's history under the Imperial Flag."

* But very little was really done.

POST-WAR REFORM

In his address before the Imperial Legislative Council Lord Chelmsford referred to the Memorandum submitted by the nineteen members of the Council and explained the Government attitude towards the post-War Reform proposals. He said:

"The Hon'ble Members are aware that shortly after the close of the last session, a memorandum was presented to me on behalf of nineteen elected members of this Council embodying a list of reforms which they considered should be undertaken with reference to the present constitution of the Government of India. Gentlemen, let me assure you that the expediency of broadening the basis of the Government and the demand of Indians to play a greater part in the conduct of the affairs of this country, are not matters which have escaped our attention. I think the decision to publish the report of Lord Islington's Commission is a clear indication of our policy in this respect. Until the report of the Commission had been examined, it would have been impossible for us to formulate our policy on the important question of the further employment of Indians in the public services, but, on the general question of political reform, as I have already declared in public, progress must be circumspect and on well considered lines. Subject to these considerations of political prudence inherent in good governance, you may rest satisfied that we shall respond sympathetically to the spirit of progress which exists. I may state officially to-day what is, I believe, a matter of common knowledge that the Government of India addressed a despatch to the Secretary of State on this subject in the autumn of the last year. From May to October, that is to say, before the sessions of the Legislative Council which produced the memorandum to which I have referred, we were engaged in considering it."

THE DEFENCE OF INDIA FORCE

Lord Chelmsford also spoke on February 8, 1917, on the Defence of India Force and on the desirability of enrolling Indians as Volunteers. He said:

"We have no intention of confining the Defence of India Force to European British subjects. We also propose to enrol Indians in their own units for general military service in India for the duration of the War. In their case, considering the numbers available and the possible limitations upon our powers of training and equipment, we are satisfied that it will be sufficient for the present at all events to give Indians the opportunity of enrolling themselves for service as an integral part of this force. The desire of Indians to serve their country has been so widely expressed and so ardently acclaimed that I may feel confident that a great response will be made to this call, and that within the six months which we propose to allow for their enrolment as many men will offer themselves for service as the military authorities can deal with. But it must be borne in mind that though the services of this force will be confined to the limits of India it is intended to be and will be essentially serious military service under strictly military conditions. To them, no less than to the others, the call is their country's and the service they are asked to undertake is the service of the Empire."

INDENTURED LABOUR

The Viceroy spoke thus on indentured labour before the Legislative Council on February 8, 1817:

"Almost at the close of the last legislative session, the Hon'ble Pundit Madan Mohan Malaviya gave notice of his intention to move for leave to introduce a Bill to abolish entirely the system of emigration under indenture to labour. The cursory examination that was possible during the short period of notice, which the Honourable Member gave, elicited the fact that the Bill contained provisions which required my sanction under section 67, sub-section 2 of the Government of India Act 1915, and the Hon'ble Member was so informed. He subsequently

made a formal application for that sanction, and I think I should explain to the Council my reasons for refusing to comply with his request. In the first place, I may say emphatically that there has never been any intention either on the part of the Secretary of State or of the Government of India of departing from the pledges made by Lord Hardinge on behalf of the Government of India. Lord Hardinge made it perfectly clear that the object he had in view was the eventual abolition of the existing system. He made it equally clear that the existing system of recruiting must be maintained until the new conditions under which labour should have been worked out in conjunction with the Colonial office and Crown Colonies concerned until proper safeguards in the Colonies should have been provided and until these should have had reasonable time to adjust themselves to the change. As the policy of the abolition of this system has now been definitely accepted and would be carried out, India could afford to accept this delay in a reasonable and generous spirit. Lord Hardinge's speech was delivered on the 20th March 1916, and having regard to the magnitude of the issues and interests involved, I cannot help feeling that my honourable Friend, in his earnest desire to forward the matter, which lies close to his heart and which, in fact, is of the deepest concern to us all, has been betrayed into some impatience in his action in endeavouring to introduce a Bill which, I fear, can only tend to prejudice the cause which he desires to serve. This Bill, as framed, provided not only for the abolition of indentured labour but also for the absolute prohibition of the departure of any native of British India by land or by sea out of British India under or with a view to entering into an agreement to labour for hire in any country beyond the sea other than Ceylon and the Straits Settlement. It thus went beyond the scope of the Hon'ble Member's own resolution of last year and, in fact, beyond anything that the Government of India have been asked to agree to or have undertaken to consider. The matter has not been allowed to rest either in India or in the Colonies. It has been necessary to obtain the views of Local Governments, who are primarily concerned with the details of recruitment and with the conditions under which this should be conducted in future. Their replies are being received. A special mission has been despatched to Ceylon and the Federated Malay States where labour is chiefly employed under short-term contracts, which gave the labourers frequent opportunities of changing their employers, to ascertain whether the system in force there can be purified of its defects and adapted for employment in the other colonies. The report of this Mission is expected towards the close of this month (*i. e.* February)....I have no hesitation in telling the Council that, as soon as the necessary preliminaries can be got through, the Government of India will themselves undertake whatever legislation may be required in a wholly sympathetic spirit, and I appeal with confidence to all my Hon'ble friends in the Council to be satisfied with this assurance, the fulfilment of which will, I hope, not be long delayed."

Pandit Malaviya was indeed guilty of very great "impatience" !

THE PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION REPORT

After long delay the Report of the Public Services Commission, presided over by Lord Islington, was published in 1917. The Report did not find favour with the Indian public and was severely criticised by many eminent Indian politicians. "The Report will be a bitter pill for India to swallow, "said Pandit Hriday Nath Kunzru. Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim did not sign the Majority Report, but wrote a Minute of Dissent—"It may well be called a Minority Report which deals with the problem, which the Commission was appointed to consider, from the Indian point of view and vindicates the moral rights of the people of this country to control the cause of administration by having an agency, which possesses their confidence to carry out the laws under which they have to live." Mr. Chaubal also appended a valuable minute of dissent.

The Public Services Commission "took evidence in regard to twenty-four services.

Of these, leaving out of account a few specialist appointments, the Post Office, Telegraph (traffic), Railway (stores), Northern India Salt Revenue, Salt and Excise, Registration, Land Records (Burma) and Survey (Madras) departments are recruited for in India. The other departments, recruitment for which takes place either wholly or partly in Europe are divided into three main groups."

"In the first," say the Commissioners, "we place the Indian Civil Service and the Police Department, in both of which the nature of British responsibility for the good governance of India requires the employment, in the higher ranks, of a preponderating proportion of British officers. To the second group belong those services in which, on grounds of policy and efficiency, it is desirable that there should be an admixture in the *personnel* of both Western and Eastern elements. Such are the Education, Military Finance, Medical, Telegraph (engineering), Public Works, Railway (engineering and traffic), and Survey of India departments. In the third group come certain scientific and technical services, such as, the Agricultural, Civil Veterinary, Factory and Boiler inspection, Forest, Geological Survey, Mines, Mint and Assay, Pilots (Bengal), and Railway (Locomotive and Carriage and Wagon) departments. In these there are no grounds of policy for any considerable admixture of officers imported from Europe, and all that limits recruitment in India is the lack of facilities in that country for technical instruction and the consequent deficiency of properly qualified teachers"

Commenting on the above Mr. H. N. Kunzru says:

"Thirty years ago Indian demands for admission into the higher ranks of the Public Services were strenuously opposed on the ground that Indians were lacking in character, which being left undefined, could easily be claimed to be a British monopoly, and that a minimum of Europeans was necessary in order to maintain British methods of administration, and the validity of these grounds was endorsed by the Commission of 1886. The same cry was raised again a quarter century later before the Commission of 1912, but the Commissioners have wisely refrained from repeating these worn-out objections. They have preferred to rest their case on political grounds. The nature of the British connection, they say, implies that the Indian Civil Service and the Police should be continued to be staffed, in the main, by men who are ignorant of our history and language, our manners and customs. So long as the reins of power are in the hands of Great Britain, Indians must yield the first place, as a matter of course, to Britishers. Declarations of responsible British statesmen are ignored, Royal proclamations are disregarded, and even the Act of 1833 is thrown to the winds. Henceforth, not merit but race is to be the test of fitness....

"The policy enunciated by the Commission in respect of the Services included in the third group is as gratifying as it is just. The Commission desires that eventually they should be recruited wholly in India and recommends that 'immediate and determined' efforts should be made to provide suitable educational facilities for this purpose. But the value of these recommendations will be greatly discounted if the transitional stage is not shortened as far as possible. Unfortunately, as Mr. Chaubal points out, the proposals made by the Commission to increase the salaries and better the prospects of the European officers in the scientific and technical departments will tend to prolong this period indefinitely."

Referring to the Indian's share in the Public Services, he says:

"The twenty-four Services, with which the Commission deals, affect 9,949 officers, of whom 4,140 or about 42 per cent. are recruited in Europe. Again, the total number of posts in these departments to which monthly salaries of not less than Rs. 200 are attached is 11,064. Of these, only 42 per cent. or less than one-half are held by Indians. If we take only salaries of not less than Rs. 500 and



Sir Abdur Rahim

Rs. 800 per mensem into consideration, we find that the number of posts is 4,984 and 2,501 respectively and the share of Indians is represented by 19 per cent. in the first case, and 10 per cent. in the latter. Can anything furnish a more eloquent and convincing proof of the utter inadequacy of the steps hitherto taken to give Indians their rightful share in the Public Services and of the urgent necessity for the adoption of radical measures to accomplish this object ? But the Commission has failed to grasp the importance of the problem, which it was called upon to grapple, and there is nothing in its recommendations to show that it regards the present system, which condemns Indians to be hewers of wood and drawers of water, as essentially unjust."

About the Civil Service Examination, he says :

"Public opinion in India has demanded nothing more insistently than that the examination, which qualifies for admission into the Indian Civil Service, should be held simultaneoulsy in England and India, and the rejection of this demand will cause the keenest dissatisfaction throughout the country. If there were a large proportion of Indians in the Indian Civil Service, it would not only gratify the legitimate ambition of Indians to occupy the higher and more honourable positions in the Public Services of their own country, but in all likelihood facilitate the solution of many a question of policy and administration,...

"While disapproving of simultaneous examinations, the Commission recommends the institution of a separate examination in India open to statutary natives of India only. The age-limits for the examination are to be 20-22. Nine posts are to be recruited for in India, of these, seven are to be filled in accordance with the result of the examination and the other two by candidates to be termed, 'King-Emperor's Cadets,' and nominated each year by the Secretary of State, on the advice of the Government of India, from amongst the graduates of the various Universities, and of an age similar to that of the competitors at the Examination. All the nine candidates are to be sent to England for three years, and are to receive the same training as those successful at the examination held in England. The candidates appointed in India are to be on equal footing in every respect to those appointed in England.

"The proportion of posts reserved for statutary natives of India will excite no enthusiasm. According to the rules framed in 1879, one-sixth of the appointments to be recruited for every year were to be given to Indians. Forty years have elapsed since then, during which India has made great progress in education and witnessed the birth of a new national consciousness, but the Commission does not feel iustified in going much beyond the proportion fixed in 1879."

The writer concludes by saying:

"India is pulsating to-day with a new life. She demands that she should soon be made master of her destiny and given a place, compatible with her self-respect and dignity in the British Empire. She asks to be released from leading strings and allowed to manage her own affairs. The Public Services Commission has failed to grasp the situation and thinks that she is hankering after a few more posts. It has approached the question from a wrong standpoint. The question it has asked itself, says Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim, is, 'What are the means to be adopted for extending the employment of Indians ?' But the proper standpoint, which alone furnishes a satisfactory basis to work upon, is that the importation of officials should be limited to cases of clear necessity, and the question, therefore, to be asked is : 'In which services and to what extent should appointments be made from England ?' The report will be received with intense dissatisfaction throughout the country, and should strengthen our determination to win Self-government for India at an early date, for in that alone lies our salvation."*

MINUTE OF DISSENT OF MR. JUSTICE ABDUR RAHIM

The Hon. Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim submitted an ably written Minute of Dissent to the Report of the Public Services Commission. He could not agree with the points

* *Indian Review*, 1917, January, pp. 8*a*—8*d*.

raised by the Majority Report; so, in his Minute of Dissent he dealt with the Indians' case for more liberal employment in the higher Services of India:

In speaking of Indians' fitness for higher appointments, Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim observed:

"In paragraph 18 of the Majority Report, allusion is made to the allegation that the western-educated Indians do not reflect the views or represent the interests of the many scores of millions in India. So far as the views of the latter on any of the matters in dispute, or of an allied character, are concerced, it is impossible to imagine what opinions they are in a position to form so long as they are allowed to remain, as at present, in their illiterate and appallingly ignorant condition. As for the representation of their interests, if the claim be that they are better represented by European officials than by educated Indian officials or non-officials, it is difficult to conceive how such a reckless claim has come to be urged. The inability of English officials to master the spoken languages of India and their different religions, habits of life and modes of thought, so completely divide them from the general Indian population that only an extremely limited few possessed with extraordinary powers of intuitional insight have ever been able to surmount the barriers. As for the sacred books and classics of the Indian peoples, Hindu and Muhammadan, whose study is indispensable to a foreigner wishing to understand the people's national genius, it would be difficult to name more than two or three Englishmen among the thousands that, during a period of more than 100 years of British connection with India, have been employed in the service of Government, whose attainments could be mentioned with a show of respect. Such knowledge of the people and of the classical literatures as passes current among the European officials is compiled almost entirely from the data furnished to them by the western-educated Indians; and the idea of the European officials having to deal with the people of India without the medium of the western-educated Indian is too wild for serious contemplation. It would be no exaggeration to say that without their co-operation the administration could not be carried on for a single day.

"With the educated Indians, on the other hand, this knowledge is instinctive, and the ties of religion and customs, so strong in the east, inevitably make their knowledge and sympathy far more intimate than is to be seen in countries dominated by materialistic conceptions. It is from a wrong and deceptive perspective that we are asked to look at the system of castes among the Hindus more as a dividing force than as a powerful binding factor; and the unifying spirit of Islam, so far as it affects the Muhammadans, does not stand in need of being explained, while in all communities the new national movement has received considerable accession of impulse from the lessons of such arguments as are hinted at in the Majority Report. The evidence is remarkably significant in this connection. His Highness the Agha Khan joined his weighty voice with that of the leaders of the Congress in demanding simultaneous examination for the Indian Civil Service, and the representatives of the Sikh Khalsa and the Pathans of the Punjab, the Moslem League along with the spokesmen of the communities more advanced in western education, were unanimous in entering their emphatic protest against the suggestion that the presence of Indians in the higher official ranks would be distasteful to the people themselves, and specially in a province or a community other than that of the Indian official.

INDIANS' FITNESS FOR HIGHER APPOINTMENTS

"As for the allegation that the Indians are wanting in initiative, driving power, resource, and the faculty of control, so far as it depends upon *a priori* assumptions, it could not affect our deliberations. The facts relating to the services inquired into, however, show that so far the Indians have been mostly employed in the lower ranks of the administrative services. If they have not found their way to the higher appointments in the administration above those included in the cadres of the provincial services, it is because these appointments have been reserved for officers recruited in Europe into the Imperial Services. In the Imperial Services the number of Indians has

been so few that they cannot be said to have been given anything like opportunity for competing in this respect with Europeans. This is clearly made out by the interesting facts elicited by Mr. Gokhale from an English Indian Civil Service witness in Bengal. There are, however, other facts from which a clear inference can be drawn, the reverse of this allegation."

INDIANS TO BEAR THE BURDEN OF ADMINISTRATION

"Looking back to past history, India, until the disruption of the Mogul empire, always produced men of high administrative talents, and at the present day in the more advanced Native States, wherever opportunity exists, Indians are successfully bearing the burden of the entire administration ; some of them achieved notable distinction, such as Sir Salar Jung and Sir T. Madhav Rao. It should also be noted that a fair proportion of these men were originally in the British Indian service but only found an adequate opportunity for a full play of administrative capacity when they were appointed either as ministers or heads of departments in these States. Then where there are larger Indian commercial communities, such as in the Bombay Presidency, Indians successfully conduct the affairs of industrial concerns of considerable magnitude.

SUCCESS OF INDIANS IN OTHER PROFESSIONS

"In professions where success is dominated by free competition and the value of work accomplished is judged under conditions different from what prevails in an Indian official department, the merits of the Indians' work cannot be gainsaid. In the profession of law which, it must be observed, was wholly unknown to the Hindu and Muhammadan systems and is, of all institutions, peculiarly occidental, Indians have acquired such a remarkable proficiency that it is now conceded to them as being particularly suited to their aptitudes. In Western medicine, in the practice of which they suffer from many disadvantages as I shall have to point out, their success has been equally remarkable. Not only is the general level of efficiency of Indian qualified practitioner highly satisfactory, but some of them in the more advanced presidencies have achieved eminent distinction as surgeons, doctors, and gynoecologists, and a few men have also done research work of value with such facilities as were within their reach. Of those who devoted themselves to politics it would not be difficult to mention the names of a number of men of commanding gifts of political judgment and foresight and of platform oratory, debate and organisation. In the region of scientific research of the higher order, at least two names may be mentioned, those of J. C. Bose and P. C. Ray, who have won more than Indian reputation, while the Nobel Prize of literature was awarded the year before last to Rabindra Nath Tagore, whose poems have become familiar to most cultured men and women of Europe and America. Then to everyone who knows India will occur the names of those men who organised momentous movements of social, religious, educational and political reforms that have so largely changed the outlook of India. Under Lord Morley's scheme of reforms, Indians have been found fit for appointment in the Executive Councils of the Viceroy and of the Council of the Secretary of State for India. While on the benches of the High Courts, Indians have long established their reputation. An Indian sits on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In the face of these facts, it is hard to believe that India is deficient in wealth of intellect or character."

THE NECESSITY FOR RECRUITMENT IN INDIA

Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim next referred to the necessity for recruitment of the members of the Public Services in India. He said:

"Then the question of employment in the public service of India has to be considered in its important aspect of affording an adequate career to the educated Indians wishing to serve their country. In this connection it will not be inappropriate to take a bird's-eye view of the field of recruitment in England for Indian public services. The evidence shows what was naturally to be expected that under normal conditions an Indian career does not rank at all high in the estimation

of English youths of more than average capacity and ambition. Such men prefer one of the many careers open to them in England, the army, the navy, the diplomatic service, the church and the law, journalism, literature, education, business and the home civil service. It has also been brought to our notice that the increasing activities of social life in manifold directions have, in England, so augmented the demand for educated men that only a very limited number of young men of superior calibre are available for foreign employment, and to this small number, service in self-governing colonies seems to appeal more strongly than service in India. There can be no doubt that the offers which Indian services ordinarilly get proceed mostly from candidates of average attainments and rather limited outlook, more or less obliged by circumtances to seek for a living in a land which otherwise does not evoke much enthusiasm in their breasts. I am not inclined to depreciate the many good qualities of such men, and have no doubt that they prove quite equal to the daily duties of official business. But we cannot look with confidence to recruits of this type as a body to supply the higher order of administrat ve ta ent, which alone can enable a foreigner to understand the real forces at work in the very complex conditions of modern India and to guide them with sympathy. I have no hesitation in recording my opinion that the country in its present circumstances cannot safely or fairly be called upon to accommodate more than a very limited number of English officials of this class."

Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim then proceeded to refer to recruitment in India. He remarked:

"On the other hand, as was to be expected, the Indian field of recruitment has been steadily expanding. The response of India to the demands of modern ideals of civic life has for some time been growing rapidly emphatic, not only among the Hindus and Parsis, but among the Muhammadans, the Sikhs and in other communities. Western education is spreading in all parts of India and amongst all classes, in castes and families whose hereditary occupations have been of a purely intellectual or literary character, amongst those whose ancestors carried on the military, civil and revenue administration of the country under the Mogul Emperors and also among growing sections of the commercial and industrial communities. The educational institutions of India, from the most primitive primary schools known as *muktabs* and *pathsalas* to the universities and colleges, are literally full to overflowing. If they were multiplied four-fold, they would soon be filled. Indian students are also flocking to foreign countries ; they are crowding, not only at the doors of British Universities, but are spreading to America and Japan, and some also come to France, Germany and Switzerland. Leaving aside a fair proportion of inefficients, the number of those well qualified for a useful civic career has been growing larger day by day.

"But, on the other hand, the careers open to an educated Indian are grievously limited. To him, whether he be a Sikh, a Pathan, a descendant of the Moguls or a Rajput the commissioned ranks of the army and the navy still remain closed. Literature, owing to the absence of a large reading public, affords very limited attractions as a career. Except to the specially gifted journalism presents more difficulties than prizes, while the larger commercial and industrial enterprises mostly belong to foreigners whose reluctance to employ educated Indians, except in purely clerical work, has been specially brought home to us. Law possibly has had more than its fair share of recruits ; and medicine, the only other large independent profession, though crowded in big cities like Calcutta and Bombay, can still accommodate a certain number, and as also teaching as far as it is a private enterprise. Indians cannot look for a career in any capacity in the Colonies, nor for all practical purposes anywhere else outside their own country. The pressure therefore on the public service of India from the Indian side is so great that the question, as is well known, has assumed considerable political proportions. No doubt, the number of men that can be absorbed in such service must necessarily be small compared to the total educated force of the country ; all that can reasonably be expected, and is asked for, is that the disabilities should be removed and the conditions of entry be such as to make the service freely accessible to honest effort and merit. For the rest other forces must be relied upon to open other avenues of employment."

In comparing the English official with an Indian official, Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim says:

"I would also point out the obvious fact that an English official is at best a bird of passage in India, his ties and cherished associations lie outside the country, he stands in need of frequent and prolonged absences from his work, leading to constant shiftings of official arrangements, his knowledge of the people, their wants and aspirations must always be more or less limited, and when he retires at the age varying between 40 and 50, all his training and ripe experience are entirely lost to the country. He is expensive to train, expensive to employ—two men, roughly speaking, being required to do one man's work—and is a dead loss to the country when he retires. Even supposing that he initially brings to his work some superior qualifications, still the balance of advantage must in the nature of things be heavily on the side of the Indian official. Further, an efficient Indian administrator has a value to the country far greater than is to be measured by the actual output of his daily routine work. He becomes a centre of further growth."

THE DISABILITIES OF INDIANS

Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim then proceeds to discuss the disabilities of Indians. He says:

"The policy which I have endeavoured to keep in view in dealing with this question is that which has been repeatedly declared to the people of India in statutes of Parliament, in proclamations of the Crown made on solemn occasions and in other public documents of importance. To these declarations the people of India naturally attach the sanctity of pledges and no apology is, therefore, needed for citing the more important of them, although they may be well known. The statute of 1833 (13+14 Will. IV. cap. 85.s. lxxxvii), lays down that 'no native of India nor any natural-born subject of His Majesty resident therein shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said Company.' In the dispatch of 1834 (No. 44, dated 18th December, 1834), the Court of Directors explained that 'whatever other tests of qualification might be adopted, distinctions of race or religion should not be of the number,' and in another part (paragraphs 105 and 107) of the same Document, after protesting against the presumption on which the authorities in India used to act, namely, that the average amount of native qualifications could only rise to a certain limit, they addressed them in these earnest words, 'To this rule it will be necessary that you should both in your acts and your language conform.' In fact, their instructions required the Government of India to admit natives of India to places of trust as freely and extensively as their individual aptiudes justified. Then they proceeded to suggest practical measures by which this policy could be fully carried out: 'In every view it is important that the indigenous people of India or those among them who by their habits, character, or position may be induced to aspire to office should, as far as possible, be qualified to meet the European competitors. Hence there arises a powerful argument for the promotion of every design tending to the improvement of the natives, whether by conferring on them the advantages of education or by diffusing among them the treasures of science, knowledge and moral culture.'

"The words of the famous Proclamation of Queen Victoria, dated November 1, 1858, are equally clear and forcible:

'We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our said territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our subjects. ... And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects of whatever race or creed be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge." In the last paragraph it is added: 'It is our earnest desire to administer its Government for the benefit of all our subjects resident there....' King Edward VII's Proclamation of 1st November 1908, after endorsing the general policy enunciated in the Proclamation of 1858 and stating that steps were being taken to give effect to it, adds: 'Important classes among you, representing ideas that have

been fostered and encouraged by British rule, claim equality of citizenship and a greater share in the legislation and Government. The politic satisfaction of such a claim will strengthen, not impair, existing authority and power.' The principles of action here laid down are not carried out at present in the following respects....

"The points of view from which the majority of the Commissioners and myself have approached the question of employment of Indians are substantially different. The question they have asked themselves is, what are the means to be adopted for extending the employment of Indians (*see* paragraphs 35-36). But the proper standpoint, which alone in my opinion furnishes a satisfactory basis to work upon, is that the importation of officials from Europe should be limited to cases of clear necessity, and the question therefore to be asked is, in which services and to what extent should appointments be made from England. The suggestion involved in the majority's point of view is that special measures are necessary for finding employment for Indians in the administration, and that the practical question, therefore, is how many or how few posts are to be handed over to them. On the other hand, the veiw which, upon a review of the situation, has forced itself on my conviction, is that, if Indians have not established a footing in the higher ranks of administration, it is not through their own fault; it is due to barriers of many sorts that have been raised in their way. It will be sufficient if the disabilities be removed and the doctrine of equal opportunity and fair dealing be established as a practical measure. No special protection or favour will be necessary if the need for protection is guarded against. It will appear from the tables given in paragraph 34 of the majority report, that out of the existing 11,064 appointments on Rs. 200 a month and upwards, only 42 per cent. was held by Indians and Burmans of pure Asiatic descent on the 1st April 1913. Then, as we ascend higher up in the scale, the position grows much worse. Out of 4,904 posts carrying salaries of Rs. 500 a month and upwards, only 942, or 19 per cent. were filled up by them as against 4,042, or 81 per cent. occupied by Europeans or Anglo-Indians. When we reached the salaries of Rs. 800 a month and upwards, which, to a large extent, though not entirely, indicate the level of higher appointments of supervision and control—for there are some provincial appointments of a less important character which carry a salary of Rs. 800 and a few of Rs. 1000—only 242, or 10 per cent., of the appointments were held by Indians as against 2,259 or 90 per cent. filled by Europeans and Anglo-Indians. Reference is made in paragraph 34 of the majority report to the progress made in this respect from 1887 to 1913. In the region of appointments carrying salaries of Rs. 200 and upwards, the percentage has risen from 34 to 42 since 1887, and in appointments of Rs. 500 and upwards from 12 to 19 per cent. and in those carrying a pay of Rs. 800 and upwards from 4 to 10 per cent. This during the space of a quarter of a century !"

SIMULTANEOUS EXAMINATIONS

Referring to the important question of simultaneous examination, Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim says:

"This important question relating to the problem of giving Indian candidates an opportunity of competing on substantially equal terms with the English candidates for the Indian Civil Service is disposed of in paragraph 16 of annexure X to the majority report. What is asked for is that the open competitive examination, which is now held solely in England, should be held simultaneously in England and in India on the same papers and conducted by the Civil Service Commissioners, the results being embodied in one common list. There is hardly any other demand in connection with the Indian public services to which Indian public opinion attaches so much importance; it has formed the subject of persistent agitation, and its refusal hitherto is cited as a glaring illustration of the wide divergence that still exists between declarations of policy as made by British statesmen and their enforcement in actual practice by those immediately concerned with the Indian administration. The main object of the proposal is to remove the otherwise insurmountable handicap against Indian candidates which now artificially secures for British candidates a virtual monopoly of the most

important and best paid civil appointments. It is based on the principle that appointments to public office in India must be settled on the test of qualifications and not on presumptions arising from race or place of birth. If the desire to secure what is mildly called a "British minimum,' but which, in the contemplation of the majority of the Commissioners, really means 80 per cent. or more of these posts is to be given precedence over the test of qualifications, that can only be justified on *a priori* considerations of racial superiority. This, according to the Indian view, should be regarded as inadmissible. Their contention is that the test of an examination such as that conducted by the Civil Service Commissioners should be supreme, and the advantages which racial characteristics or training give to British candidates ought to, and will, in fact, find expression in the results of the examination. The English candidates have the advantage of the language and of a more efficient system of training and education : that ought to suffice—as all Indian witnesses think it will—to secure for such of them as are of average intellectual gifts, a predominance in the service. Only those British candidates whose mental powers are below the average will fail in the competition. Any arrangements which would secure men of the latter class, far from ensuring the British character of the administration, would only do serious disservice to it as well as to the prestige of the British people."

Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim goes on to say :

"It is suggested that the institution of simultaneous examinations in India will in some way or other retard the development of Indian education. The truth, however, is that it will considerably help such development. The history of western education in India amply justifies this belief. As regards the examination in its present form fitting the Indian University curiculum, there can be no real doubt about it, if one compares the subjects of study in the Indian University Calendars with the syllabus of the Civil Service Examination. The system of options provides ample room for the different subjects of liberal education. Similarly as regards the age, either 22-24 as at present, or 21-23 as I have proposed, will suit the periods of Indian University courses just as well as those of the British Universities. Certain practical difficulties in the way of applying the simultaneous system in 'totally different longitudes and on separate continents' are also vaguely hinted at. These in my opinion are more imaginary than real ; the hours can be easily so adjusted as to enable some of the Civil Service Commissioners to conduct the examination here at the same time that the examination will be held in India, without giving any opportunity to persons feloniously inclined to telegraph the questions to England for the benefit of the candidates here or *vice versa*.

"As far back as 1860, an influential committee appointed by the Secretary of State for India to consider the subject of the employment of Indians in the Indian Civil Service reported in favour of adopting simultaneous examinations "as being the fairest and the most in accordance with the principles of the general competition for a common object." In June 1893 the question was raised in the House of Commons and a resolution was passed that all open competitive examinations held in England alone for appointments to the chief services of India should henceforth be held simultaneously in India and England. And yet the majority of the Commissioners would, at the present day, reject this obvious method of justice essentially on racial grounds, in the teeth of evidence which showed that in making this demand all the different communities of India (excepting, of course, the Europeans and the Anglo-Indians) and all the provinces were united and practically unanimous. His Highness the Agha Khan, in supporting the demand, said : "I am in favour of a simultaneous examination in England and India. I would give full effect to the House of Commons' resolution of June 1893...It will do away with any feeling of discontent that may exist at the idea that the Indian Çivil Service has been kept as a preserve for Englishmen and that the children of the soil are shut out from their proper and legitimate share in controlling the administration of the country.' In my opinion, in the interests of both justice and political expediency, simultaneous examinations should be conceded for the Indian Civil Service proper."

THE HON. MR. M. B. CHAUBAL'S NOTE OF DISSENT

The Hon. Mr. M. B. Chaubal, C. S. I., another Indian member of the Public Services Commission, also submitted a note of dissent to the Report of the Commission. He pointed out the necessity of employing a larger number of Indians in the Public Services of India. He tried to meet the arguments of those who were against the proposal. He said :

"In the first place, it may be pointed out that in relation to the public services under Government there is no such class as *eastern educated classes,* as distinguished or distinguishable from "the *western educated classes.*" For such eastern education as exists now there is absolutely no scope for employment in any of the departments we have considered. If any Indians have to be employed in the higher service at all, they must be from the western educated classes, whether they *represent* the masses of the people or not. Assuming that they do not, the next step implied in the argument is that the ability or capacity to *represent* the masses must be present in any one who claims to be entitled to enter the higher service under Government. Therefore, it is not desirable to employ a large number of these western educated classes in the higher service, and consequently it is impossible with safety and, in the interests of these masses, to narrow the field of employment for Europeans and Anglo-Indians in the higher posts under Government. To employ the educated Indian in larger numbers is, in the words of the late Sir Charles Crosthwaite, 'to give a disproportionate degree of authority in the government of the masses and the aristocracy into the hands of a few thousand men whose heads have been turned by an education they have not assimilated.'

"If this argument is analysed one cannot help being struck with the assumption that this capacity to *represent* the masses is taken for granted in the European and the Anglo-Indian. It is difficult to understand exactly what is intended to be conveyed by the word 'represent.' If it implies a knowledge of the conditions of life of these masses, their habits, their ways of living and thinking, their wants and grievances, the ability to enter into their thoughts, and appreciate what is necessary to educate them, to give them higher ideas of life, and make them realise their duties towards all about them, there ought to be no doubt that the educated Indian has all these in a far higher degree than any European or Anglo-Indian can claim to have. The charge really is that the educated Indian has a class bias, a sort of clannishness, a tendency to favour his own caste or community in the discharge of his official duties which detract from his usefulness in the higher service, and therefore, the presence of the European in large numbers is necessary to hold the scales evenly between these few educated thousands and the dumb and ignorant millions, who would otherwise be oppressed by them.

"This is rather a shallow pretence—this attempt to take shelter behind the masses ; and I think it only fair to state that the class of educated Indians, from which only the higher posts can be filled, is singularly free from this narrow-mindedness and class or caste bias ; *e.g.,* no instances of complaint on this score as against any of the Indian members of the Indian Civil Service would be available, and I have no hesitation in endorsing the opinion of Sir Narayan Chandavarkar, in his recent contribution on village life in his tour through Southern India, that the interests of the masses are likely to be far better understood and taken care of by the educated Indian than by the foreigner. As a matter of fact, all the measures proposed for the regeneration of the lower and depressed classes have emanated from the educated Indians of the higher castes. The scheme for the free and compulsory education of these masses was proposed by an educated Indian of a high caste and supported mainly by the Western educated classes. High-souled and self-sacrificing men are everyday coming forward from this class to work whole-heartedly in improving the condition of the masses.

"Perhaps the truth, however unpalatable, is that there are still a number of the average English officials in India who have a distrust and suspicion about the educated Indian. The explanation of this is probably that given by Sir P. M. Mehta in his evidence—that the English official does not

like the independence, the self-assertion and the self-respect which come naturally in the wake of education. As Dr. Wordsworth stated in his evidence before the last Commission, 'deferential ignorance, conciliatory manners, and a plentiful absence of originality and independence are now, and will always be, at a premium.' It is high time that this shibboleth was exploded. It is indeed hardly consistent that, while on the one hand Government should foster and encourage the the growth of opportunities for educated Indians for participation in public life, in the municipalities and district boards, and in the provincial and imperial legislative councils, they should, on the other, so jealously guard the entrance of educated indigenous agency into the higher and better remunerated posts in the State."

GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE EXISTING PROBLEM

The Hon. Mr. Chaubal then proceeds to make a general statement of the existing problem in the Indian Public Services. He says:

"The questions relating to the salary, leave, pension and prospects in the services, are comparatively only of subsidiary importance. By far the most important part of the existing problem relates to the employment of Indians in the higher branches of the services. The lower branches of the service, and the . subordinate services, have ever been and must continue to be mainly recruited from the natives of the country, partly because Europeans cannot afford to serve on the salaries generally attached to the posts in them. The question relating to the larger employment in the higher service requires, under the present political conditions of India, to be approached and looked at from a broad, far-reaching and statesmanlike point of view, and there are certain factors which must, under the present circumstances, be steadily kept in mind.

"The too limited employment of Indians in the higher service is one of the main causes of the discontent and unrest which have recently become so marked among the educated classes, and about which so much has been heard and written. To understand the genesis of this unrest one must consider what young educated India is at the present day and how it has come to be what it is. Young men of the present generation do not and cannot appreciate the benefits of the British rule to the same degree as did the men of a past generation. The latter contrasted the peace and security of life and property with the troublous times before the British rule, and felt happy and contented. The young man of the present day takes these great blessings as his birth right. When Western education was started and schools, colleges and universities were established, the young Indian began to study eagerly the history and literature of free and advanced Western countries and the biographies of great men, studied their careers and how they struggled for freedom and liberty ; he studied the birth and growth of liberal institutions in Western countries, and he began to contrast their state with his own helpless dependence. A vague discontent took possession of his mind and a wild enthusiasm to break through his environment seized him. He fancied that his progress in every direction was hampered. Nearer home he saw how a small nation, comparatively recently quite as low as his own country in civilisation, rose to splendour and worked out its own salvation. These forces, which had been working silently, found expression in the annual National Congress, came to a head at the noted Surat Congress, and the school of anarchy, of which we now find exhibitions, had its origin in this discontent. The phenomenon of practically all the higher offices in the State being monopolised by the foreigner and the European, loomed large in the view of those young men, who formed originally the extremist school. A few wise and far-reaching men, like the late Mr. Gokhale, saw the trend of events, and were afraid of the pit into which young India was being led. To counterbalance this school they wisely placed before their educated countrymen the goal of a 'colonial self-government' and the privilege of the citizenship of the largest Empire in the world ; and they declared that as they made themselves fit for it, they would draw nearer to this goal, until India took its proper place in the Empire as a self-governing Colony. In the speeches in the Viceroy's Legislative Council, the restricted employment of Indians in the higher service was the frequent theme of attack on the lines on which the

administration of the country was run. By their incessant efforts, they have now been able to persuade a very large body of young educated Indians to adopt this ideal, and those who believe that that ideal is attainable by self-improvement and constitutional agitation form what is recognised as the *moderate* school in Indian politics. A wider and more liberal employment of highly educated and capable Indians in the higher posts under Government will, it is believed, in no small degree strengthen this party and correspondingly break through the strength of the other school.

"Since last August, however, this earnest demand for a larger employment of qualified Indian agency in the higher service has received an added force. This unfortunate war into which the whole Empire has been launched, the response that India has made to the call of the Empire in its need, and the generous and appreciative terms in which responsible British administrators have spoken and are speaking of the loyal support from all classes and communities in India, have raised hopes and aspirations which, if not substantially satisfied, will result in disappointment and cause alarming discontent. Whatever may come after a successful termination of the war, the country is now in a ferment and is anxiously awaiting the final pronouncements of this Commission for some substantial indication of the 'altered angle of vision' towards Indian problems.

Mr. Chaubal concludes thus :

"The question, therefore, of the proportions in which indigenous agency is to be utilised in the near future in the higher services of the State is of vital importance. These proportions must be such as will cumulatively throughout the services help to create the feeling that we Indians are in a substantial degree carrying on the government of the country. At present the Indians are far and few ; and every Indian officer, whether high or low, feels that he is not serving himself or his country, but is an individual hired to labour for somebody else. He can rarely put his whole heart into the work, because he is always conscious of the presence of his taskmaster and never works but with his eyes upon his superior officer and always thinking of what he will say of the work turned out by him. To dispel this feeling there must, in the higher service in all departments of the administration, be present a large number of Indians, so that they may collectively feel that the responsibility for a strong and wise government of the people rests mainly on them. This consideration, indeed, appears to have been present to the mind of the last Commission, but I think it did not realise the extremely limited employment of the Indians in the services....The evidence received by us in India during the last two years has left on my mind a painful impression that a much more sympathetic treatment by, and a far more liberal association with, Englishmen is required before that sense of subjection is appreciably reduced, and before the desired sentiment of a common citizenship is *created*, for at present it is indeed non-existent, except perhaps in platform speeches. When, therefore, in this minute I am dissenting from the proportions allotted, in the Report and annexures, to the Indians in the different services, I am doing so because I look at the question from this point of view, and I feel that the proportions recommended by the majority are insufficient and inadequate. I believe that what I claim for them in my Minute would be the minimum likely to secure this end and would go far to satisfy the expectation and hope which have been raised. The whole country is even now grumbling at the fate of an innocent Bill, like the United Provinces Councils Bill, and is afraid that this is but an indication of what it may expect. At the same time I believe that the minimum claimed for each service in this minute is that which can, at the present time, be conceded to India, without any loss to the British spirit of administration and perhaps with some advantage in the efficiency of the different departments."

WHAT INDIA THINKS OF THE REPORT

India was not satisfied with the findings and recommendations of the Report of the Public Services Commission. The Report was criticised by many leading men of India. The minutes of dissent of Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim and of Hon. Mr. Chaubal found

favour with the public opinion in India. A writer in *The Modern Review* observed thus :

"The Commission was not composed entirely of 'sundried bureaucrats' ; but some of its members were trained in the bracing atmosphere of the House of Commons, and there were others who may be supposed to have brought a fresh outlook to bear on Indian affairs ; yet the result of their deliberations was not very different from what the findings of a body of narrow-minded civilians might well be conceived to be. The reason is that so long as the bureaucrat rules supreme in the executive councils, it is idle to expect any views inconsistent with the interests of the bureaucracy, who are in possession of the field, to prevail. Mr. Chaubal contrasts the liberality displayed by Government in regard to the educated Indians' claim for participation in public life, in the municipalities and district boards, with the jealousy betrayed in guarding the entrance to higher offices against them. In the one case the material prospects of the bureaucracy are not affected, in the other, they have to be substantially curtailed. This is the explanation of the contrast to which Mr. Chaubal draws attention."

About the Indian members of the Commission, he remarks :

"The two Indian members on whom, upon the lamentable death of Mr. Gokhale, devolved the duty of championing Indian rights, have nobly played their part. The mastery of fundamental principles, the courage born of a righteous indignation, and the facility of vigorous expression, which Mr. Justice Rahim especially has displayed will long be admired by his countrymen, and the more so because he happens to belong to a community which in the past did not look with favour upon the political views of the advanced school of Indian thought. Neither of the two Indian representatives are disappointed place-hunters or failed B. A.'s—a class which, according to the favourite official theory, is alone responsible for the agitation against bureaucratic rule. On the contrary, both are Government officials, and hold the highest posts open to the natives of India, one in the judicial and the other in the executive line. Their opinions, therefore, possess all the authority which high English officials claim for their own, and more, for, being Indians, they are in a far better position to interpret the thoughts and aspirations of their countrymen.'"*

"MORAL VICTORY"

In speaking of the minutes of dissent of the two Indian members, the writer thinks that they have gained a moral victory. He says :

"Even the most superficial reader cannot fail to rise from a perusal of the report and its annexures and minutes of dissent without feeling convinced that the *moral victory* lies with the Indian members of the Commission, though they have failed so eggregiously in liberalising the recommendations of the majority. We may be sure, however, that the time will come, sooner or later, sooner perhaps than later, when this moral victory will be converted into a triumph in the region of practical politics. Education will spread, for the schoolmaster is abroad, and the Legislative Councils will gain in power and influence. In the opinion of the majority of Commissioners, the function of these Councils at present is to bring the Government 'under effective *criticism*' (paragraph 20 of the Report). This is a function which the Legislative Councils of no other country in the world are confined to, for everywhere else their proper business is to bring the Government under effective *control.* And if the Legislative Assemblies of India are to maintain their usefulness, nay, even their existence, they must be gradually assimilated to the standard of the rest of the world. At present Indian interests on the Government are represented by a foreign bureaucracy which, however well-meaning in the abstract, looks first and foremost to serving its own interests ; and not till Indian interests are represented in the Councils of the executive Government by Indians who are there in sufficient strength to make their influence felt, will the justice of the arguments in favour of the larger employment of

* *The Modern Review*, June, 1917, p. 736.

their countrymen in high offices receive its due recognition. Till such a time comes, the plain logic of facts will continue to be over-ridden by such vague and often unmeaning phases as 'grounds of policy,' and 'British character of the administration.' But British administration is democratic and not autocratic in character, and democracy means fully representative government."*

DEMAND FOR FURTHER REFORMS

In October 1916, nineteen elected additional members of the Imperial Legislative Council submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy a Memorandum with regard to post-War reforms. The signatories included Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nandy, Messrs. D. E. Wacha, Bhupendra Nath Basu, Bishan Dutt Shukul, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Kamini-Kumar Chanda, M. A. Jinnah and others. The Memorandum stated:

"There is no doubt that the termination of the war will see a great advance in the ideals of Government all over the civilised world and especially in the British Empire, which entered into the struggle in defence of the liberties of weak and small nationalities and is pouring forth its richest blood and treasure in upholding the cause of justice and humanity in the international relations of the world. India has borne her part in this struggle and cannot remain unaffected by the new spirit of change for a better state of things. Expectations have been raised in this country and hope held out that, after the war, the problem of Indian administration will be looked at from a new angle of vision."

It added:

"If after the termination of the war, the position of India practically remains what it was before and there is no material change in it, it will undoubtedly cause bitter disappointment and great discontent in the country, and the beneficent effects of participation in common danger, overcome by common efforts, will soon disappear, leaving no record behind save the painful memory of unrealised expectations. We feel sure that the Government is also alive to the situation and is contemplating measures of reform in the administration of the country. We feel that we should avail ourselves of this opportunity to respectfully offer to Government our humble suggestions as to the lines on which these reforms should proceed. They must, in our opinion, go to the root of the matter. They must give to the people real and effective participation in the government of the country, and also remove those irritating disabilities as regards the possession of arms and a military career, which indicate want of confidence in the people and place them in a position of inferiority and helplessness. With this view we would take the liberty to suggest the following measures for consideration and adoption:

(i) In the Executive Councils, Provincial and Imperial, half the numbers of the members should be Indians... The elected representatives of the people should have a voice in the selection of the Indian members of the Executive Councils and for that purpose the principle of election should be adopted.

(ii) All the Legislative Councils in India should have a substantial majority of elected representatives.... The franchise should be broadened and extended directly to the people....

(iii) The total number of the members of the Supreme Council should not be less than 150, and of the Provincial Councils not less than 100 for the major provinces and not less than 60 to 75 for the minor provinces.

(iv) The Budget should be passed in the shape of money bills, fiscal autonomy being conceded to India.

(v) The Imperial Legislative Council should have power to legislate on, and discuss and pass resolutions relating to, all matters of Indian administration...

(vi) The Council of the Secretary of State should be abolished.

* *The Modern Review*, June, 1917, p. 789.



M. A. Jinnah



Sir D E Wacha



Dr Saifuddin Kitchlew

(*vii*) In any scheme of Imperial Federation, India should be given, through her chosen representatives, a place similar to that of the self-governing dominions.

(*viii*) The Provincial Governments should be made autonomous, as stated in the Government of India's Despatch, dated August 25th, 1911.

(*ix*) The United Provinces, as well as the other major provinces, should have a Governor brought from the United Kingdom and should have an Executive Council.

(*x*) A full measure of local Self-government should be immediately granted.

(*xi*) The right to carry arms should be granted to Indians on the same conditions as to Europeans.

(*xii*) Indians should be allowed to enlist in units of a territorial army established in India.

(*xiii*) Commissions in the army should be given to Indian youths under conditions similar to those applicable to Europeans.

THE CONGRESS-LEAGUE REFORM SCHEME

At the annual meetings of the Indian National Congress and Moslem League at Lucknow in December 1916, a post-War reform scheme was framed and passed by both the bodies. Like the above scheme, it also asked for the abolition of the Council of the Secretary of State for India. It also recommended that half the members of the Executive Council of the Viceroy should be Indians. The strength of the Imperial Legislative Council should be 150, of which four-fifths should be elected.

The franchise for the Imperial Legislative Council should be widened as far as possible on the lines of the Muhammadan electorates. The President of the Council should be elected by the Council itself. The Budget should be submitted for the vote of the Imperial Legislative Council. The strength of the Provincial Legislative Councils should be not less than 125 members in the major provinces and from 50 to 75 in the minor provinces, of which four-fifths should be elected and one-fifth nominated. The members of Councils should be elected directly by the people on as broad a franchise as possible. Half the members of the Executive Councils of the Provincial Governments should be Indians to be elected by the elected members of the Legislative Councils.

The Congress-League Scheme also demanded that the military and naval services of His Majesty, both in their commissioned and non-commissioned ranks, should be thrown open to Indians. Indians should also be allowed to enlist as volunteers and should be placed on a footing of equality in respect of status and rights of citizenship with other subjects of His Majesty the King-Emperor throughout the Empire.

As regards communal representation in Legislative Councils, the following percentages were agreed upon :

Mahommedan representation for the Punjab 50 per cent; Bengal 40 per cent ; Bombay 33½ per cent; United Provinces 30 per cent ; Central Provinces 15 per cent. ; and Madras 15 per cent.

MRS. ANNIE BESANT ON POST-WAR REFORMS

Writing on the post-War Reforms, Mrs. Annie Besant observed :

"The memorandum of the nineteen members of the Supreme Legislative Council, and the scheme passed by the National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, mark out the road of reforms which the nation is determined to tread. The latter affords a workable scheme for a peaceable and

easy transition from the present entirely irresponsible but partially representative Government to a Government responsible to the almost wholly representative Legislative Council. As the President of the National Congress (of 1916) pointed out, it is a transition scheme and should be regarded as such. The third clause of the Congress resolution marks the end of the transition, the entry of India into the proposed Imperial Council, as a Self-governing Nation, equal in status to the Self-governing Dominions....

"It seems to me unnecessary to put forward any post-War Reforms except the United Scheme. Obtaining that, we obtain power to repeal all the obnoxious and repressive laws which disgrace our Statute-Book, and to place on it the beneficent legislation necessary for Indian prosperity. We can then adjust taxation, regulate expenditure, educate our people, foster our industries, improve our agriculture. It is unwise to dissipate energy over many reforms when one reform, that of our legislatures, will give us power. Let us then concentrate on the Congress-League Scheme, and carry it to a triumphant conclusion."*

SELF-GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION

The most important Resolution passed at the Lucknow Congress of 1916 was the one on "Self-government for India." It was proposed by the Hon. Babu Surendra Nath Banerjee, seconded by Mrs. Besant and supported by Mr. Tilak. The Resolution ran thus :

"(*a*) That having regard to the fact that the great communities of India are the inheritors of ancient civilisations and have shown great capacity for government and administration, and to the progress in education and public spirit made by them during a century of British rule, and further having regard to the fact that the present system of Government does not satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people and has become unsuited to the existing conditions and requirements, the Congress is of opinion that the time has come when His Majesty the King-Emperor should issue a Proclamation announcing that it is the aim and intention of the British policy to confer Self-government on India at an early date.

"(*b*) That this Congress demands that a definite step should be taken towards Self-government by granting the reforms contained in the Scheme prepared by the All-India Congress Committee in concert with the Reforms Committee appointed by the All-India Muslim League.

"(*c*) That in the constitution of the Empire, India shall be lifted from the position of a Dependency to that of an equal partner in the Empire with the Self-governing Dominions."

The Hon. Mr. Surendra Nath Banerjee remarked on this occasion :

"We want Self-government in the interests of the Empire to which we are so proud to belong. We want Self-government in the interests of the efficiency of the administration. We want Self-government for self-protection. And finally, we want Self-government for the highest ends of national existence, for the moral and spiritual elevation of our people."

HOME RULE MOVEMENT

Along with the Congress demand for Self-government for India, Mrs. Besant's Home Rule movement also began to gain strength. For making an organised demand for Home Rule for India, she started the Home Rule League, which rendered valuable services to the cause of India. About this agitation for Home Rule, we read :

"By her forceful contributions to the Press, her inimitable and touching eloquence, by her books, her numerous brochures and pamphlets, she (Mrs. Annie Besant) made the country from one end to the

* *Indian Review*, 1917, p. 2.



Dr. Annie Besant

other ring with the cry of Home Rule for India. The attitude adopted by some of the Provincial Governments towards her served to give a fresh stimulus to the cause she was advocating. It would be but bare justice to say that the Home Rule movement inaugurated by her gave a tremendous momentum to Jndia's claim for Self-government which the Çongress had been advocating for years. Mrs. Besant attended the various sittings of the All-India Congress Committee and the Lucknow sessions of the Congress and the Muslim League at which the famous scheme of reforms was adopted by both the bodies."*

INTERNMENT OF MRS. BESANT

But the Home Rule movement carried on by Mrs. Annie Besant was not liked by the English officials, who resented the manner in which she criticised the actions of the Government. There were rumours that the Government of Madras were contemplating drastic steps to prevent her from carrying on the Home Rule agitation. We read thus the story of her internment :

"Not only the Presidency of Madras but the entire country read with astonishment and indignation His Excellency Lord Pentland's speech, delivered in the Madras Council, on the 24th May 1917, which was regarded as a direct attack on Mrs. Besant and the Home Bule propaganda and also on the demands made by the nineteen non-official members of the Viceroy's Council duly ratified by the Congress and the Muslim League in the scheme of Self-government for India. H. E. Lord Pentland went so far as to call upon educated India to give up all thoughts of the early grant of responsible Self-government.

"His Excellency wound up his speech with the threat of repressive measures if the agitation was persisted in in the manner it had gone on hitherto. But Mrs. Besant was not the person to be easily daunted by threats of repression, however high may be the authority from which they proceeded. Immediately after His Excellency Lord Pentland's speech was delivered she began writing a series of articles in *New India* pointing out how the speech of the Governor was utterly reactionary in tone, and how it sought to stifle even constitutional agitation for the attainment of Self-government or Home Rule for India, by whichever term people chose to describe the yearning of the Indian people to be in their country what other people are in their own native land. In strong and telling language she urged on all her followers and on all Congressmen and Muslim Leaguers to protest against the speech of Lord Pentland and to continue constitutional agitation, come what may.

Mrs. BESANT'S FAMOUS INTERVIEW WITH THE GOVERNOR

"While all this was going on, Mrs. Besant was summoned by His Excellency to Ootacamund to meet the Governor, but for some reason or other the arrangement was dropped and on Friday, the 15th June, the Governor proceeded direct to Madras, with a view, it was said, to speak to Mrs. Besant to suspend her political activities."

Mrs. BESANT'S FAREWELL TO FELLOW-WORKERS

But Mrs. Besant rightly apprehending that her liberty would soon be fettered, had written on the previous day one of the most soul-stirring farewells ever addressed by a leader to her devoted followers. The following is her farewell message:

"It is better to suffer than to consent to wrong. It is better to lose liberty than to lose honour. I am old, but I believe that I shall see India win Home Rule before I die. If I have helped ever so little to the realisation of that glorious hope, I am more than satisfied."

* *Indian Review*, June, 1917, p. 404.

ORDER FOR Mrs. BESANT'S INTERNMENT

"Mrs. Besant was a true prophet. Quite as she anticipated, on Saturday the 16th June, 1917, an hour after her famous interview with His Excellency, the news flashed forth that Mrs. Besant, Mr.B. P. Wadia and Mr. G. S. Arundale had been interned."

PROTEST MEETINGS

"The news of the internment of Mrs. Besant and also of two of her devoted followers and fellow-workers, Mr. G. S. Arundale and Mr. B. P. Wadia, was received everywhere with deep disgust and indignation. Protest meetings were held all over the country and principally in all important cities like Madras, Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad, etc., in which even Indian leaders who had had sharp differences with Mrs. Besant took part."*

It has been well observed 'that those who believed that with the internment of Mrs. Besant, the cause for which she fought so long, so nobly, so bravely and so heriocally would perish had seriously misread the situation and the mind of the country.'

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY COMMISSION

In January 1917, the Chancellor of the Calcutta University foreshadowed the appointment of a Commission to enquire into the condition and prospects of the University of Calcutta. Later on, the Governor-General in Council appointed a Commission with Dr. M. F. Sadler, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Leeds, as President, and the following gentlemen as members: Dr. J. W. Gregory of the University of Glasgow, Mr. P. J. Hartog, Academic Registrar of the University of London, Professor Ramsay Muir, Sir Asutosh Mukerjee, Mr. W. W. Hornell, Dr. Ziauddin Ahmed. Mr. G. Anderson of the Education Department was appointed Secretary to the Commission.

As to the terms of reference, the Commission was

"empowered to enquire into the working of the present organisation of the University of Calcutta and its affilliated colleges, the standards, the examinations and the distribution of teachers, to consider at what places and in what manner provision should be made in Bengal for teaching and research for persons above the secondary school age, to examine the suitability of the present situation and constitution of the University and make such suggestions as may be necessary for their modification, to make recommendations as to the qualifications to be demanded of students on their admission to the university, as to the value to be attached outside the University to the degrees conferred by it and as to the relations which should exist between the university and its colleges or departments and between the University and the Government, and recommend any changes of constitution, administration and educational policy which may appear desirable."

MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS

The Viceroyalty of Lord Chelmsford was remarkable as offering another proposal of reforms to India. The Morley-Minto reforms could not satisfy the educated Indians, who demanded a closer association of Indians in the machinery of Government. The non-official members of the Imperial Legislative Council submitted a demand for further reforms. The Congress-League scheme also presented to the bureaucratic Government what the people of India wanted. Both Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, were considering the prospects of fresh grant of reforms

* *Ibid.*, pp. 404-405.

to the Indian people. At last on August 20, 1917, the Secretary of State for India made the following announcement in the House of Commons:

"The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible, and that it is of the highest importance as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinions between those in authority at Home and in India. His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided, with His Majesty's approval, that I should accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss these matters with the Viceroy and the Government of India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of local Governments, and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and others.

"I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility.

"Ample opportunity will be afforded for public discussion of the proposals which will be submitted in due course to Parliament."*

It has been remarked that the announcement marks the end of one epoch, and the beginning of a new one. It pledges the British Government to the adoption of a new policy towards the people of India.

In 1917 Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of State, accepted the invitation of Lord Chelmsford and visited India to discuss the reform proposals with the Viceroy and the Government of India. Both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State toured all over India, discussed the problem with the leading men of India and formulated a Reform Scheme. The Report of Constitutional Reforms was published in 1918.

METHOD OF INQUIRY

In the Report, the method of inquiry followed by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, has been explained thus:

"As soon as the announcement was made in the House of Commons, the Government of India in Simla and a Committee of the India Office in London devoted themselves to the preliminary consideration of the problems involved. The Secretary of State and those who accompanied him from England reached India in November. We began work at Delhi and then visited in turn Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, receiving deputations at each of these places and giving interviews to representative men. Efforts have been made to ascertain all shades of opinion. We have been throughout the inquiry in constant consultation with the members of the Government of India. We met the heads of certain provinces in Delhi in November, and the presidency Governors and Governments in their own capitals later on. On our return to Delhi a continuous series of conferences began; there were meetings of the Secretary of State and those associated with him and the Government of India; meetings with all the Heads of provinces; meetings with a committee of the Ruling Princes; meetings of committees to consider details; and frequent private interviews and informal discussions."

* *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms*, p. 1.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT

The Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms made various recommendations of far-reaching character. For the India Government it recommended that another Indian member be appointed. The Legislature should have two chambers: the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State. The Legislative Assembly should have a total strength of about 100 members, of which two-thirds should be elected. The Council of State will be composed of 50 members, exclusive of the Governor-General, who would be President. Not more than 25 members would be officials, four would be nominated and 21 elected by non-official members of the provincial Legislative Councils.

As for the Executive Government in the provinces, the Report recommended that in all the provinces there should be collective administration, the system of a Governor in Council. At the head of the Executive will be the Governor with an Executive Council of two members, one Englishman and one Indian, both nominated by the Governor. Associated with the Executive Council as part of the Government will be one or more Ministers chosen by the Governor from among the elected members of the Legislative Council.

As regards the Provincial Legislatures, the Report recommended that in each province there would be established an enlarged Legislative Council, differing in size and composition from province to province, with a substantial elected majority elected by direct election on a broad franchise, with such communal and special representation as may be necessary.

As regards the India Office, the Report recommended that a committee should be appointed forthwith to reconsider the organisation of the India Office, with a view to providing for the material alteration of functions involved by these proposals and for the more rapid discharge of its business. The Secretary of State's salary should be defrayed from home revenues and voted annually. This would enable any live questions of Indian administration to be discussed by the House of Commons in Committee of Supply.

A Council of Princes would be created as a permanent consultative body, ordinarily meeting once a year to discuss agenda approved by the Viceroy, who should be President. The opinion of such a body would be of the utmost value upon questions affecting the States generally of British India and the States in common.

As to the future development, it was suggested that ten years after the meeting of the new Councils, a Commission should be appointed to review the whole working of these institutions in order to determine whether it would be possible to improve in any way the existing machinery or to advance further towards the goal of complete responsible government in any province or provinces. This Commission should be authoritative, deriving its authority from Parliament itself; and the names of the Commissioners should be submitted by the Secretary of State to both Houses for approval. The functions of the commission will, indeed, be of the utmost importance: it will represent a revival of the process by which the affairs of India were subjected to periodical examination by investigating bodies appointed with the approval of Parliament It is proposed that the further course of constitutional development in the country shall be investigated at intervals of twelve years.*

RECEPTION OF THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD SCHEME

The Montagu-Chelmsford Scheme was received by the Indian moderates with joy, but it separated them from the other and larger section of Indian public men, who would reject the scheme wholesale. The Moderates hailed the scheme with applause, because they thought that it was a great advance on the Morley-Minto Reforms. But it could not satisfy the advanced school of Indian politics. Mrs. Annie Besant declared the

* *The Montagu-Chelmsford Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform—Their Scope and Object.* (Oxford University Press, 1918).



Dr. S. Subrahmania Aiyer

scheme to be unworthy to be offered by Britain and received by India. Dr. S. Subrahmania Aiyer also wrote thus :

"If a scheme of reforms is produced by any section of our countrymen, we have a duty to carefully examine that scheme. Anything which originates with foreigners, violates the principle of self-determination and, therefore, time and energy should be economised in dealing with them. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report falls in the second class, and a strong, wholesale and prompt rejection is all that is necessary."

In commenting on the attitude of the Indian politicians towards the Reform Scheme Mr. Ramananda Chatterjee wrote thus :

"Indian politicians have been discussing for the last few weeks whether the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform Scheme has given them milk or 'water mixed with powdered rice.' That it is not pure unadulterated milk, admits of no doubt. It is possible that it is water mixed with powdered rice. Whatever it may be, our political Aswatthamas should be wiser than to dance in joy, saying, 'We have got milk, we have got milk !' The free peoples of the earth who know by experience what milk is, cannot but deride us if we mistake water mixed with powdered rice for milk.*

"Our own opinion is that the mixture consists of 5 per cent. milk and 95 per cent. water mixed with powdered rice. This is a rough estimate, not the result of careful chemical analysis."†

PUFFING THE REFORM SCHEME

The learned Editor of *The Modern Review* in commenting on the British Press opinions on the Reform Scheme, made the following observations :

"Our impression that the Reform Scheme is not likely to undergo any important modification is strengthened by the loud acclamations with which it has been generally received in the British Press. British politicians like British traders know how to puff their goods. The Report has been so extolled to the skies as if it recommended that the people of India should be immediately liberated and made independent ! Men of British descent have expressed grave doubts as to whether educated Indians would be able to prove themselves fit for exercising the rights which the Report proposes to confer on them ! After all this the wonder is that large numbers of Indians having 'a stake in the country' have not declared in public meeting assembled that the Report is too much in advance of the times and that the proposals should be considered five centuries hence. The encomiums bestowed on the Report in the British Press are calculated to create an impression among the 'allied nations' and in the 'civilised world' in general that the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals are a feat in statesmanship unparalleled in history for boldness and generosity. The attacks on the Report in the same Press, not so much in evidence as the panegyrics, are calculated to

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* The allusion here is to the following story told by the Brahmin warrior Drona in the *Adiparva* of the *Mahabharata*, section 133, relating to his son Aswatthama :

"It so happened that one day the child Aswatthama observing some rich men's sons drink milk, began to cry. At this I was so beside myself that I lost all knowledge of direction. Instead of asking him who had only a few kine, I was desirous of obtaining a cow from one who had many, and for that I wandered from country to country. But my wanderings proved unsuccessful, for I failed to obtain a milch cow. After I had come back unsuccessful, some of his playmates gave him water mixed with powdered rice. Drinking this, the poor boy, from inexperience, was deceived into the beliefl that he had taken milk, and began to dance in joy, saying, 'O, I have taken milk, I have taken milk !' Beholding him dancing with joy amid his playmates smiling at his simplicity, I was exceedingly touched."

† *The Modern Review*, Aug. 1918, p. 194.

produce the same impression in an indirect manner. They are meant to lead the world to believe that the British people are by their excess of liberalism, generosity and boldness going to produce a political revolution in India similar to the Russian revolution. But how far removed from the reality are both the encomiums and the denunciations ! And how hollow all this camouflage !"

THE POLITICAL "UNIQUENESS" OF INDIA

The Editor proceeded to observe:

"In the world's history, no nation ever obtained self-government by such stages or compartments as are proposed in the case of India. In the government of the whole country of India we are still only to criticise and influence, we are not to control the Government. In the provinces, we are to have in theory control over some politically 'unimportant' or 'non-essential' subjects, the ministers in charge thereof being subject to the advice, guidance and control of the Governor. The Governor-General and the Secretary of State are to have the power of the veto. The Government of India are also to have the power of overriding legislation. The Governors and the Governor-General are to have the power of dissolving their legislatures, which, as they are not like constitutional rulers acting in this matter on the advice of responsible ministers, they ought not to have.

"It is not known what the electoral qualifications of voters are to be for the Indian Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislative Councils. The qualifications, to be decided upon by a committee, are to vary not only from province to province, but may be different even within the same province from district to district according to differing stages of political, educational and economic advancement. The 'transferred' subjects to be under the charge of 'responsible' Indian ministers, have not yet been named. They are to be listed by another committee. They will not be the same for different provinces, for the provinces are not exactly at the same stage of development.

"So, here is a lesson for the world in the varied character of the provinces and regions of India. And neither the whole of India, nor any part of it, is fit for 'self-determination,' for which, *of course outside the dependent portions of the British Empire*, the British people are fighting. But in all regions of the world (particularly in Europe) which lie beyond the bounds of the British Empire, *in esse* or *in posse*, there is not the least difference in the political capacity of the peoples, absolutely no differing stages of political development. Serbians, Bulgarians, Belgians, Montenegrins, Rumanians, Poles, Czechoslavs, Yugo-slavs,—all are equally fit for *immediate independence* and *self-determination*. When the Russian Revolutionaries drove out the Tsar and set up a republic, the Allies, including the British people, recognised all the inhabitants of the Russian Empire, -speaking numerous languages, professing various religions, belonging to widely differing ethnological groups, at various stages of civilisation from the nomadic to the industrial—as equally fit for political independence and self-determination! But when you come to India, why even Sir. S. P. Sinha, the Anglo-Indian Government's show-boy, is not fit for self-determination! Verily we are a unique people, living in a unique country. and governed by the most efficient and the most altruistic bureaucracy in the world! May we never cease to take comfort from the thought !"*

POWER OF THE PURSE

About the power to modify the Budget, Mr. Ramananda Chatterjee says:

"The power of the purse is the very corner-stone of all popular governments. But neither in the Government of India nor in that of the provinces, are we to have the power of the purse. Freed from all technicalities, the financial arrangements would be something like this. Of the total revenues of India, provincial and imperial, the Government of India will first take what is sufficient to meet all their needs. That will be the first charge on the revenues of India. The Legislative Assembly of

* *The Modern Review*, 1918, Aug. pp. 195-96.

the Government of India will have no power to modify the budget in any way contrary to the wishes of the Governor-General-in-Council...

"So far, then, as the budget is concerned, the representatives of the people in the provincial councils will have slightly more power than the elected members of the Indian Legislative Assembly. But the little power which they will have can by no means be called power of the purse. The Governor will not have any appreciable difficulty in getting and spending whatever amounts he wishes."*

REPORT OF THE ROWLATT COMMITTEE

The publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was followed by that of the Sedition Committee's Report. While the Montagu-Chelmsford Report proposed a further step towards the realisation of responsible government, the Rowlatt Committee proposed a number of reactionary measures. We read:

"The Sedition Committee of 1918, known as the Rowlatt Committee, has submitted its report, and Government has published it. Perhaps Government is now considering what action should be taken on it. We submit for the consideration of the highest officers of the Crown a piece of advice which Machiavelli has given to princes. 'Never let a prince,' says he, 'complain of the faults of the people under his rule, for they are due either to his negligence or else to his own example.'

"It may be taken for granted that there has been and is a revolutionary movement confined to a very small section of the population. But nothing happens without a cause. History teaches that in all countries where there have been revolutionary movements, the causes have been political and economic. Government ought to find out these causes in India, and apply remedies which will go to the root of the matter. Without such remedies mere repression will not succeed. And the repressive measures suggested by the Rowlatt Committee are calculated to perpetuate the state of unrest."†

The recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee "would permanently place on the Statute book all those provisions of the Defence of India Act which have placed the liberty of the subject entirely and absolutely at the mercy of the C. I. D., the Police, and the Executive." In commenting on the recommendations of the Committee, the *Tribune* said:

"Most of the recommendations are such that the public can adopt but one attitude in regard to them, that of strong and unqualified condemnation. The police and the executive are all-powerful, even as things are. If the recommendations of the Committee were given effect to, their power would be immensely increased, and public men and public movements would be at their mercy in a far larger measure and degree than they are at present. We cannot help thinking that the Report, judging from the summary, is the outcome of minds not only imperfectly acquainted with Indian conditions, but with either an inadequate grasp of the fundamental principles of the British constitution or with an inadequate equipment of that active and burning faith in liberty and justice without which mere knowledge is of no avail. Let us not be misunderstood. We are as anxious as any member of the Commission that crime should be suppressed and the spirit of revolution rooted out. If India became self-governing tomorrow, this task would yet have to be faced, and we should face it deliberately and determinedly. But it is one thing to suppress crime, another to adopt measures for this purpose that in their actual operation would make free public activities, except under sufferance, difficult, if not impossible. It is precisely because we believe this last to be the inevitable tendency

* *Ibid.*, pp. 205-206.

† *Ibid.*, p. 317.

of the measures proposed by the Committee that we consider it our duty to enter our strong and emphatic protest against them."

The Rowlatt Committee made a historical survey of the revolutionary movements in India. They carried the beginning of the revolutionary movement as far back as 1893. The *Tribune* remarked thus :

"It has hitherto been generally believed that what is called the revolutionary movement in India had its origin in 1905, the year of the Partition of Bengal. The Committee goes as far back as 1893 to find the first indication of the movement, on the single ground, so far as one gathers from the summary, that in that year certain isolated crimes were perpetrated. At this rate we fail to see why they should not have taken us as far back as the Mutiny or even earlier, and included the assassination of Lord Mayo and all other tragic incidents in India's chequered history in one master plot."

The historical survey of the revolutionary movements in India, given by the Sedition Committee, is not complete and impartial. The *Tribune* said :

"We do not know what material the Committee had before it for the compilation of this history. On the face of it its commission was a limited one, and the only evidence it was able to take was the evidence which the Executive Government placed before it. We should think this was a very inadequate as well as unfair basis on which to place a verdict on the most difficult and complicated situation that the Government and the public in India have had to face since the Mutiny. Nor was the limitation of the material the only drawback in this case. For so stupendous a task as that of judging a political revolution the composition of the Committee itself was extremely defective If it was the intention of the authorities that the work of political leaders like Mr. Tilak and Babu Bipin Chandra Pal and its supposed relation to the revolutionary movement should be judged, it was essential to constitute a committee not merely with judges and lawyers but with statesmen, and not only should every opportunity have been afforded to the gentlemen concerned and other political workers to state their side of the case but evidence should have been gone into both as regards the state of the law and of the country at the time, and as regards all the attendant circumstances We are not aware that anything like this was done or attempted. What importance can the public, in the circumstances, be expected to attach to the verdict of the Committee ?"*

The *Kesari,* in commenting on the Report, characterised it "as giving power similar to court martial to the bureaucracy in India." The paper said, "the bureaucracy desires to launch a policy of repression and it has tried to satisfy its conscience by this report. When feelings of genuine loyalty are not in question, it is a most reactionary measure to add to the powers of the bureaucracy." "Publication of the report," added the paper, "is an attempt to coerce unwilling public opinion into acceptance of the Montagu Scheme."

THE ROWLATT BILLS

On the basis of the recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee, Bills were introduced in the Imperial Legislative Council, known as the Rowlatt Bills. There was tremendous opposition to the passing of these Bills, both by the non-official members of the Council and by the general public.

"During the debate on the Rowlatt Bills in the Imperial Legislative Council Mr. Gandhi toured round the country organising an effective opposition to the passing of the Bills. Despairing of the

* Quoted in *The Modern Review,* Ang., 1918, pp. 208-209.



Mahatma Gandhi

efficacy of mere non-official opposition in the Council, Mr. Gandhi inaugurated what is known as the Satyagraha movement, as the only legitimate weapon in the hands of the people to make their opposition felt."

Mr. Gandhi organised the Satyagraha movement against the Rowlatt Bills. He thus commented on the Satyagraha pledge on February 28, 1919:

"The step taken is probably the most momentous in the history of India. I give my assurance that it has not been hastily taken. Personally I have passed many sleepless nights over it. I have endeavoured duly to appreciate Government's position, but I have been unable to find any justification for the extraordinary Bills. I have read the Rowlatt Committee's report. I have gone through the narrative with admiration. Its reading has driven me to conclusions just the opposite of the Committee's. I should conclude from the report that secret violence is confined to isolated and very small parts of India, and to a microscopic body of people. The existence of such men is truly a danger to society. But the passing of the Bills, designed to affect the whole of India and its people and arming the Government with powers out of all proportions to the situation sought to be dealt with, is a greater danger. The Committee ignore the historical fact that the millions in India are by nature the gentlest on earth.

"Now look at the setting of the Bills. Their introduction is accompanied by certain assurances given by the Viceroy regarding the Civil Service and the British commercial interests. Many of us are filled with the greatest misgivings about the Viceregal utterance. I frankly confess I do not understand its full scope and intention. If it means that the Civil Service and the British commercial interest are to be held superior to those of India and its political and commercial requirements, no Indian can accept the doctrine. It can but end in a fratricidal struggle within the Empire. Reforms may or may not come. The need of the moment is a proper and just understanding upon this vital issue. No tinkering with it will produce real satisfaction. Let the great Civil Service Corporation understand that it can remain in India only as its trustee and servant, not in name, but in deed, and let the British commercial houses understand that they can remain in India only to supplement her requirements, and not to destroy indigenous art, trade and manufacture, and you have two measures to replace the Rowlatt Bills.

"It will be now easy to see why I consider the Bills to be an unmistakable symptom of a deep-seated disease in the governing body. It needs, therefore, to be drastically treated. Subterranean violence will be the remedy applied by impetuous, hot-headed youths who will have grown impatient of the spirit underlying the Bills and the circumstances attending their introduction. The Bills must intensify the hatred and ill-will against the State of which the deeds of violence are undoubtedly an evidence. The Indian covenanters, by their determination to undergo every form of suffering, make an irresistible appeal to the Government, towards which they bear no ill-will, and provide the believers in the efficacy of violence, as a means of securing redresss of grievances, with an infallible remedy, and withal a remedy that blesses those that use it and also those against whom it is used. If the covenanters know the use of this remedy, I fear no ill from it, I have no business to doubt their ability. They must ascertain whether the disease is sufficiently great to justify the strong remedy and whether all milder ones have been tried. They have convinced themselves that the disease is serious enough, and that milder measures have utterly failed. The rest lies in the lap of the gods."

THE SATYAGRAHA PLEDGE

The pledge of *Satyagraha* ran thus:

"Being conscientiously of opinion that the Bills known as the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill No. I of 1919, and the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill No. II of 1919, are unjust, subversive of the principles of liberty and justice, and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals on which the safety of the community as a whole and the State itself is based, we

solemnly affirm that in the event of these Bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as a Committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit and further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property."*

THE "BLACK" BILLS

Mr. B. G. Horniman thus traces the origin of the Rowlatt legislation. He observes:

"The armistice was no sooner signed than they set about the task of getting this (Rowlatt Bills) legislation through. The two Bills were gazetted early in 1919 and introduced in the Imperial Legislature shortly afterwards. They were received with amazement by the public, who, accustomed as they had become to the harsh and repressive attitude of Lord Chelmsford's Government, had hardly believed that the triumph of the Allies in the struggle for world-freedom, so largely bought by Indian sacrifices, and the announcement of August, 1917, would be quickly followed by the introduction of drastic legislation, depriving people of their most elementary human rights and unparalleled in the laws of any modern civilised State."†

It is worthy of note that the introduction of the Morley-Minto reforms had been followed by the passing of the Seditious Meetings Act, and now, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms proposals came with the passing of the Rowlatt Act.

Mr. B G. Horniman thus commented on the passing of the Rowlatt legislation:

"But one need not analyse legislation of this sort closely, to justify the opposition to and fear of it by a people on whom it was being thrust by an autocratic Government. The broad fact is sufficient that, at the conclusion and not the commencement of a war, at a time when no emergency existed, when no danger to the State was indicated it was proposed to take away, not from persons of hostile origin or hostile association, but from subjects of the British Crown, the right of trial, and to expose them to all the terrors of arrest without warrant, imprisonment without trial, drastic restrictions of liberty of other kinds, and Star Chamber tribunals. And deeper still, perhaps in its effect upon the public temper, was the moral hurt to the self-respect and the awakened sentiments of freedom of a people who had just made ungrudging sacrifices to win victory for the freedom of the world; while the indifference to the popular sentiment and will with which every protest and every appeal was ignored, and the measure forced through the Legislature by the *bloc* of bureaucrats appointed to the Council for the express purpose of carrying Government legislation against the elected representatives, was in itself enough to rouse the fury of the most submissive population. It is impossible to conceive a more deliberate or culpable provocation of the people. Lord Chelmsford's Government was warned, by men whose loyalty and moderation is unquestioned, of the dire consequences likely to result from the step they were taking. They refused to listen. Appeals were made from the same quarter even for a postponment of the measure and time for further consideration. They went ruthlessly on, and they had no excuse for haste, even if they believed in the ultimate necessity of the measure. The official termination of the war, as they knew, was far distant, and there were six months to spare after that. They might even have done what the Government in England has just done. They might have provided for a temporary extension of the Indian D. O. R. A. But they seemed to be set upon showing the Indian people that the war-won freedom was not for them, that Government in India was still, and would remain, an autocracy, unrepresentative of and antagonistic to the sentiments of the people, able to ride roughshod over their protests and to rob them, if it so willed, of the liberties and rights solemnly guaranteed to them in the proclamations of three successive sovereigns."§

* *Speeches and Writings of M. K. Gandhi* (Natesan) pp. 417–19.

† *Amritsar: Our Duty to India*, p. 49.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-67.

AGITATION AGAINST THE ROWLATT ACT

A vigorous agitation was carried on by the Indian leaders against the Rowlatt Act. But the Government was not inclined to pay any heed to the agitation. Mr. Horniman wrote thus:

"The agitation against the Rowlatt Act was treated by the Government and its agents as though it were a factitious ferment excited by a few noisy politicians eager to seize any opportunity to discredit the Government. That, at least, was their attitude in the early stages. It is doubtful whether any official authority now, however, could be found who would attempt to deny that, rightly or wrongly, the whole population was stirred to the depths by resentment against the legislation and apprehensions of its consequences. They would tell you that this state of feeling, unparalleled in the history of Crown rule in India, was brought about by 'wicked misrepresentations' of the Act and the Government's motives in passing it on the part of unscrupulous agitators; but whatever the cause, the wide extent of the popular indignation, spreading through every class and every part of the country would not be denied."*

A PEACEFUL AGITATION

The agitation carried on against the Rowlatt Act was peaceful in nature, as pointed out by Mr. Horniman, who wrote:

"What was also remarkable about the agitation against the Rowlatt Act, and equally undeniable, was its absolutely peaceful character. It must not be supposed that the people of the Punjab burst into riot and disorder, or, what has been called most extravagantly by the Government, 'open rebellion' against the Act itself. We shall see, presently, how disorder followed upon aggression and gratuitous provocation of demonstrators pursuing very peaceful methods. What has been called the 'Passive Resistance' momement--and the term may be used here for convenience, though Mr. Gandhi, its leader, will not accept it -was based upon *Satyagraha*, a Sanscrit word which it would be impossible to translate in all its fullness into any English term.......

"Before the movement was definitely launched, notice of the intention was given in a private letter to the Viceroy by Mr. Gandhi, and a final appeal made to Lord Chelmsford to withdraw the Bills. There were many stages at which the Government, without hurt to itself, might have withdrawn from the contest that was daily lowering it further in the public estimation. But Lord Chelmsford would not wait, and lost no time in giving his formal assent to the Act as soon as it had passed through the Council. And the hope that Mr. Montagu would interfere at the eleventh hour, and advise the King to disallow it, knowing as he did the turmoil it was creating, proved vain."

It was arranged that there would be *Satyagraha* demonstrations on April 6, all over the country. "The response to the call was extraordinary and provided a widespread popular manifestation of feeling unparalleled in India."

Mr. Horniman went on observe:

"It remains only to be said that all these immense popular manifestations passed with an absence of disorder that was remarkable. Here and there, there were, may be, isolated instances of shopkeepers who refrained from joining in the general *hartal* being subjected to something a little stronger than moral suasion; here and there there were, may be, minor collisions with the police, which were quickly subdued by the influence of leaders. But taken as a whole, these demonstrations of millions of people were marked only by their peaceful and inoffensive character.......

"It was only in Delhi, on March 30, that a *Satyagraha* demonstration was disturbed by an outbreak of disorder.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

"...The affair at Delhi, however, is important as showing the reckless and culpable haste which the authorities in India displayed in opening fire on crowds at the least prospect of a disturbance, and because it played its part in bringing about the causes of disturbances which occurred elsewhere...."*

FIRING IN AMRITSAR

The trouble in Amritsar began with the arrest and deportation of Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew, two local leaders. About the firing on the Amritsar crowd, we read:

"The next step followed when a wholly peaceful and not very large crowd of demonstrators, on hearing of the arrests, proceeded to the bungalow of the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar to plead for the release of the prisoners. There is no reason to suppose that anything dreadful would have occurred had they been allowed to proceed. The reports of the people on the spot show that they were not, up to that time, a threatening crowd; and the official report tells us that 'the crowd passed several Europeans on the way but did not molest them.' But they were stopped at a place called the Hall Gate Bridge, and their further passage was barred by a military picket or, as the official report rather curiously puts it, the crowd 'was angrily opposing' the picket. Mounted troops were then requisitioned, but were, so the report says—a very different version is given from the popular side—pressed back, which seems to have been a remarkable achievement on the part of an unarmed crowd. The mounted troops, it is also alleged, were heavily stoned, and 'the first-class magistrate, who had written instructions to deal with any crowd attempting to pass this point as an unlawful assembly'—why and by right of what law?—'called on the troops to fire.' Several people were killed and wounded. The crowd then rushed back to the city, infuriated by the sight of their dead and wounded comrades on the ground and the action of the authorities, who had dealt in this manner with a demonstration which set out with peaceful intentions.

"Thereafter followed series of brutal acts of violence on the part of the coarser elements in the mob, which had got entirely out of hand. No one would attempt to defend the violence that occurred, which was considerable and involved the loss of human life and great destruction of property. ..During the afternoon the Commissioner of the Division, who had arrived, handed over charge to General Dyer, the officer commanding the troops, with instructions to 'take whatever steps he considered necessary to re-establish civil control.' Reinforcements arrived and by night order was restored."†

THE AMRITSAR MASSACRE

"This firing was followed by what is known as the Amritsar Massacre. At that time the city was at peace and was, in fact, as the Report admits, under military control." About the massacre at Amritsar, we read:

"It was at this juncture that General Dyer proceeded with an armed force to the Jallianwalla Bagh and opened fire without warning on a large mass meeting of a wholly peaceful character, shooting down in cold blood without a word of warning two thousand of them, and leaving the dead and wounded lying on the ground.

"Martial Law had not been declared. But General Dyer held, as he said in his evidence before the Hunter Committee, that it existed *ipso facto*. There were times, he said, when one had to act without rules and regulations. He had previously made a proclamation that no meetings were to be held, and had marched round the city in the forenoon of the 13th to give a warning that no meetings were to be held. In the Report it is said that 'at every important point the column stopped

* *Ibid.*, pp. 78-82.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 88-91.

while this was announced by beat of drum.' In his evidence before the Hunter Committee, General Dyer had to admit, with a map of the city in front of him, that this statement was not true ; that the proclamation was not made at every important point ; important localities were omitted and large numbers of people, even if his proclamation could be taken as a preliminary justification of what he did, could not have known of it. Nor did he, on his own admission, take any steps to communicate with the organisers of the meeting and warn them, though he knew for several hours beforehand that it was going to take place.

"He just let things go on. And when the thousands of people who assembled, including many who came as pilgrims to the fair, were standing or sitting on the ground listening to an address, he marched up his force of infantry, opened fire, and himself directed the fire so that the soldiers should shoot where the crowd was thickest. *He had no evidence at all to justify his assumption that this was a seditious assembly.* The people themselves say it was a meeting called to consider what should be done to ensure the preservation of peace, and to mourn for the victims of the Hall Gate Bridge incident.

"Here is the summarised description of this massacre as given in the 'Chronological Statement, published with the 'Reports on the Punjab Disturbances':

'In the forenoon the Officer Commanding Troops, accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner, marched through city at head of some troops, announcing by beat of drum, at every important street, that no meetings would be allowed. Notwithstanding this warning, just after the troops had returned (about 4 p. m.), a meeting began assembling at the Jallianwalla Bagh, and this large crowd *only dispersed on being fired on by troops,* the casualties being considerable.'

"It would be hard to conceive a more misleading and dishonest summary of what actually occurred."*

The Amritsar massacre had its prototype in the Punjab massacre of 1858.

MARTIAL LAW IN THE PUNJAB

The Amritsar incident was followed by disturbances in Lahore, Gujranwala and Kasur. Then came the proclamation of Martial Law in the Punjab.

"What followed on the Amritsar *battue*—and it is not unreasonable to argue that it was a result—was wholesale shooting and bombing of unarmed people in other parts of the Punjab, and six weeks' agony under Martial Law."†

Lord Chelmsford was guilty of neglect of duty for not proceeding to the Punjab to hold an enquiry on the spot before sanctioning Martial Law. And what precaution, one may enquire, did he take against excessive and inhuman application of that law which the Hunter Committee found to be the case ?

HUNTER COMMITTEE

A Committee, known as the Hunter Committee, was appointed to inquire into the Punjab disturbances. The Indian National Congress also appointed another independent Committee, which collected a mass of evidence, which was not heard by the Hunter Committee. The Congress Committee published its Report separately.

During the inquiry, General Dyer was

"asked if his idea was to strike terror in the people. He said, if he found they had disobeyed

* *Ibid.,* pp. 95-98.

† *Ibid.,* p. 99.

his order he meant to punish them and teach them a lesson. His idea was that, from a military point of view, it would make a wide impression throughout the Punjab!

"It was a merciful act. It was a horrible act, and it required a lot of doing. It was his opinion it did a lot of good."

"He did not think it was a disservice to the British Raj. What he did was right, and they ought to be thankful for it."

"After the firing he did not take any steps to attend to the wounded." "Certainly not. It was not his job. Hospitals were open and they could have gone to them."

"Mr. Justice Rankin, a member of the Hunter Committee, said with somewhat uncalled-for politeness: 'Excuse me putting it in this way, General, but was it not a form of frightfulness?' And the General replied:

'No, it was not. It was a horrible duty I had to perform. I think it was a merciful thing. I thought that I should shoot well and shoot strong, so that I, or anybody else, should not have to shoot again.'

'And, finally:

'I think it is quite possible I could have dispersed the crowd without firing, but they would have come back again and laughed, *and I should have made what I consider to be a fool of myself.*'"*

TAGORE RENOUNCES KNIGHTHOOD

On hearing of the Jallianwalla Bagh Massacre the Poet, Rabindra Nath Tagore, renounced his Knighthood. This was the first protest in deed by any distinguished Indian.

ARREST OF MR. GANDHI

While the disturbances were taking place in the Punjab, Mr. Gandhi proceeded to Delhi. But he was arrested on the way. About the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Horniman says:

"The arrest of Mr. Gandhi was even more reprehensible and gratuitous in its provocation of the popular temper than those of the Amritsar leaders. Mr. Gandhi 'was the chief leader of a great movement, in which abstention from violence was preached without cessation. He was actually proceeding to Delhi, and thence to Amritsar, to persuade the people there to end the *hartal,* which was being prolonged without his authority, and to urge upon them by personal exhortation the necessity for strict adhesion to peaceful methods, even in the face of official provocation and violence, when two Governments, those of Delhi and the Punjab, were guilty of the extraordinary folly of issuing orders prohibiting his entry into the areas over which they had jurisdiction. When inspite of this he proceeded on his way, he was arrested and sent back under escort to Bombay. The news of his arrest created the wildest excitement throughout the country, and was responsible for much that followed. It is impossible to doubt that had he been allowed to proceed, and had the Government of the Punjab not been guilty, also, of the folly of the arrest and deportation of Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew, and the aggressive attitude adopted towards the demonstrators in Amritsar, there would have been no tale of horror to tell."†

CONGRESS COMMITTEE'S REPORT ON PUNJAB DISORDERS

The Indian National Congress appointed a Committee to inquire into the Punjab disturbances. The Committee submitted its Report in 1920. We read :

"The Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress to inquire into the Punjab disorders have submitted their report, and it has been published. *The*

* *Ibid.*, pp. 118-19.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 102-104.



Rabindranath Tagore

Bombay Chronicle has published in the form of a supplement a fuller summary than any other that we have seen. The Report is signed by Messrs. M. K. Gandhi, C. R. Das, Abbas S. Tyabji, and M. R. Jayakar. They are all trained lawyers. The Secretary, Mr. K. Santanam, is also a barrister-at-law. The two other members of the Commission, who also worked hard and at great sacrifice up to a certain stage when they were called away from this duty by other urgent public work, were Pandits Madan Mohan Malaviya and Moti Lal Nehru, both trained lawyers. The method adopted by the commission was such as would be approved by the highest jurists. The tone of the Report is judicial, dispassionate and dignified. The recommendations, which are all entitled to full public support, far from being vindictive, in most cases rather err on the side of moderation and leniency. The whole of India and civilized humanity have been placed under a heavy debt of gratitude by the self-sacrificing labours of the commission.

"The publication of the Congress Commission's Report before that of the Hunter Committee's Report is a distinct gain, for which both the commissioners and those entrusted with the onerous work of printing and publishing the Report, are entitled to additional thanks."*

THIRD AFGHAN WAR

The Third Afghan War broke out in 1919:

"Exaggerated reports of these (Punjab) riots and of the effect of the Rowlatt Act may be presumed to have had some influence on the Amir of Afghanistan when he declared war and invaded British territory. Amir Habibullah Khan, who had been loyal to his treaty obligations throughout the war, was murdered in February and, after a brief occupation of the throne by his brother Nasrulla Khan, his son Amanulla had been declared Amir. A sequel to this war was the renewal of trouble along a great part of the North-western Frontier where the tribesmen, who had at first appeared to be impressed by the British successes, took the offensive against our advance posts especially in southern Waziristan. The operations which necessarily followed and the severity of the fighting were on a scale never previously reached in frontier war, and made the campaign of unusual length."

The war began on May 3, with the attack on the Khyber region by the Afghans. But the Amir soon learnt the lesson that, however brave and well-led his army might be, they were powerless and hopelessly ineffective against modern and scientific weapons of warfare, such as aeroplanes, high explosives, wireless and tanks, etc.,—a lesson which the Amir, one of the shrewdest rulers ever occupying a throne, afterwards tried his best to utilise for the benefit of his own country.† The Afghan army concentrations and military objectives in important places, such as Jalalabad and Kabul, were successfully bombed. The action in Thal cleared Waziristan of the enemy. The Khyber region, which was the first objective of the Amir, and invaded by his general Zarshah, was also cleared by effective action. In the south the strong fort of Spin Baldk near the British railhead of Chaman was attacked. The effect of high explosive shells and howitzer batteries was decisive and on the 27th May the fort was captured with 169 prisoners. The Amir sued for armistice the next day, and on the 26th of July the parties met at Rawalpindi to draw up the conditions of the treaty of peace, which was finally ratified on February 21, 1921.

Under the terms of the treaty

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* *The Modern Review*, April, 1920, p. 486.

† For further light on King Amanullah's eventful life and history of his short reign, see Prof. N. N. Ghosh's article on 'The Afghan Civil War –1928-1929' in *The Modern Review* for February, 1930.

(*i*) Great Britain recognised the complete independence of Afghanistan, and there was an interchange of ministers in London and Kabul, and of consuls in India and Afghanistan.

(*ii*) Afghanistan accepted the Anglo-Afghan frontiers.

(*iii*) Subject to the continuance of friendliness and the provisions of the general Arms Traffic Convention that may hereafter come into force, the privilege formerly enjoyed by the Afghan Govenment of importing munitions of war through India was restored, and further trade facilities granted.

Since the signing of this treaty, Afghanistan has been progressing by leaps and bounds in the process of modernisation. Under the energetic rule of her progressive ruler Amanullah she has been breaking through her exclusiveness. Now a British minister is established in Kabul as well as the representatives of other European nations. Afghan students are being despatched in large batches to European countries to learn various sciences, so that they may apply their knowledge to equip Afghanistan materially and militarily well enough to defend her newly-got independence and in the process of time to rank her with the advanced countries of the world. The King's present European tour is also a step in the process of modernisation of Afghanistan and recalls to mind the historic tour of Peter The Great of Russia preceding the Europeanisation of Russia, so many centuries ago.'

THE AFGHAN AND N.-W. FRONTIER WARS

About the Afghan War and the war in the North-western Frontier, the following remarks of Mr. Ramananda Chatterjee, Editor of *The Modern Review* will be read with interest :

"In explaining why military expenditure in 1919-20 exceeded the budget allotment of 64 crores by 21 crores, the Finance Member said : 'The Afghan War has involved us in a heavy deficit ?' He also said ·

'The peace, which for a generation has existed on our borders, has been broken , and the armies of India have returned from France, Mesopotamia and Palestine only to find laid upon them the further task of defending the soil of India from a threatened invasion from Afghanistan. That peril averted, they have had to face a prolonged compaign, and in the most arduous conditions, in reducing the Mahsud and Wazir tribes.'

"What were the causes of the 'threatened invasion from Afghanistan ?' The Afghan version was that the Amir had heard of revolutionary and rebellious movements in the Punjab, and, in order to prevent the spread of revolutionary propagarda across the border into his territory, was manoeuvring his troops ; this was mistaken by the British Government for an intended invasion. The British version was that the Afghan troops were really aggressors who were coming to invade India If the Afghan version were accepted as true, the Afghan military movements were due to the reports of the rebellion in the Punjab, spread by among others the British officials and journalists themselves. If the British version were accepted as true, the Afghans had the serious intention of invading India. But the Afghans, though not scientifically civilised like the British, are not fools. Why should they, a small nation with not much material resources, seek to provoke a quarrel with the British people, now the most powerful in the world ? Even Bolshevik intrigues, if there were such, could not possibly have deceived them into believing that a successful invasion of India would be an easy task. If they

* This was written before the outbreak of rebellion in Afghanistan and the subsequent accession to its throne of King Nadir Khan. *Editor.*



Ramananda Chatterjee

seriously intended to invade India, it must have been because they believed the British reports of a rebellious Punjab and India and expected help from the Punjabis and other Indians. So, here again, it is the reported rebellion in the Panjab which was one of the indirect causes of the threatened invasion from Afghanistan. Supposing there was really a rebellion in the extra-loyal Punjab of the recent war-period, was not the Punjab administration to blame in the least ? But if there was no rebellion, why were reports of a rebellion spread ? So, either the Punjab rulers ought to have so acted as to be able to keep their extra-loyal Punjab loyal when the great war was over, and then there would not have been a rebellion to tempt the Afghans into an invasion, or the British officials and journalists ought not to have spread false reports of rebellion, having the effect of misleading the Afghans into cherishing hopes of receiving help from the Indians in case they invaded India. If the British official and non-official sojourners in India really believed that there was a rebellion, it was because they knew that the people were discontented. If the people had been contented, there would not have been any rebellion or a wrong belief that there was a rebellion. Discontent produced either a rebellion, or a belief that there was a rebellion and a report in accordance therewith, and the former or the latter tempted the Afghans to invade India. And it was mis-government which produced discontent. So, it is clear that the remedy for threatened invasions is not merely increase of military expenditure, but such good government as would make the people contented."

The writer proceeded to observe:

'For more than a generation the N.-W. Frontier tribes have been occasionally raiding India. It has seemed to us a mystery why the British power which has humbled mighty Germany to the dust has not been able to bring the small frontier tribes permanently to their senses, or to subdue them They dwell in a difficult mountainous country, no doubt. But the British people have been successful in military expeditions even in more difficult regions. And Western nations have not hesitated even to practically exterminate very troublesome foes. It may be supposed that the border tracts have been kept as a sort of training ground for the army, but that would be considered a rather wild guess unsupported by facts. In any case, an explanation is needed which will convince lay men why the border tribes cannot be made to refrain permanently from troubling India."*

MONTAGU'S DESPATCH ON THE HUNTER COMMITTEE'S REPORT

When the Hunter Committee's Report was published, the London *Daily Herald* held that "the (Majority) Report is a fairly comprehensive whitewash of everybody concerned." It proceeded to say:

"The bombing of unarmed crowds and peaceful villagers from aeroplanes is held by the majority to have been invaluable. The gentleman who careered about with armoured train, turning guns on the villagers who were not, as far as evidence shows, doing anything wrong, is commended by the majority for his promptness and decision. For the rest, there is some very mild criticism of the crawling order and of other excesses, such as Colonel Johnson's treatment of students, but excuse is found for the young officers who were acting under orders."

We also read:

Mr. Montagu's despatch alone convinces us that the following paragraph from the *Daily Herald* cabled to the *Bombay Chronicle* does not contain any undeserved condemnation :

"...the Massacre at Jallianwalla Bagh sent a thrill of horror across the whole world. It has won international notoriety, and lovers of freedom in every country will look eaglery for an indignant repudiation of this horror. But they will not find it. The European majority on that Committee considers that General Dyer was guilty of a grave error, not because he began slaughter but because he let it go too far. A whiff of grape shot would have served but he exceeded his ration of fright-

* *The Modern Review*, April, 1920 pp. 484-485.

fulness and erred gravely. The majority is entitled to its opinions on the nature of the error but we have sufficient faith in our fellowmen to believe that this opinion will not be popular. In our view this astounding decision will constitute as black a stain upon the record of this country as the crime it condones. It is the final step in the moral degradation of British Imperialism, for it shows that our Militarists commit atrocities in a temper and that our Bureaucrats excuse them in cold blood. The ruthlessness of the offence is equalled by the shamelessness of the veidict."*

About Mr. Montagu's Despatch on the Hunter Committee's Report, we read:

"To damn with faint praise is a familiar phrase. Mr. Montagu's despatch should make the art of warmly eulogising with faint censure equally familiar. Where censure is administered, it is done in a very roundabout and diluted form, but the praise always comes out straight and stiong."*

About General Dyer, we also read:

"So Dyer has neither been dismissed nor forced to resign his commission. He will enloy his pension, and he may in addition receive some high military appointment. He is precluded from further employment *only in India*. All this would really mean promotion, and our guess is that he would receive this sort of promotion."*

It should be on record that General Dyer received a big purse from his admiring countrymen.

THE ESHER COMMITTEE'S REPORT

In July 1919, the Secretary of State for India, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, appointed a Committee to inquire into the administration and organisation of the Army in India.

The Committee were asked (*i*) to inquire into and report, with special reference to post-*bellum* conditions, upon the administration and, where necessary, the organisation of the Army in India, including its relations with the War Office and the India Office, and the relations of the two offices with one another.

(*ii*) To consider the position of the Commander-in-Chief in his dual capacity as head of the Army and member of the Executive Council, and to make recommendations.

(*iii*) To consider and report upon any other matters which they may decide are relevant to the inquiry.

The Esher Committee submitted its Report in May 1920, which was published six months later. The Report met with bitter criticism in India. Mr. C. F. Andrews criticised the Report in the following terms:

"I would wish to be allowed a space in this present issue of *The Modern Review* to express my own personal opinion, that no graver menace of an external character has ever threatened India during the present century than this reactionary Esher Report. It is strange to me to see how very little notice has been taken of it. We can now understand, from this Report, what it means for India to be 'within the Empire.' Apart from all other considerations, of a most humiliating character, which at once arise in the mind on finding out how India is to be made the tool of aggressive British economic imperialism in the Middle East, there is this supremely important issue: *India is by far the poorest country in the whole world.* Its peasantry are already taxed often beyond the margin of subsistence, by the land revenue and other burdens. It has been proved, beyond a doubt, that the agricultural districts of India have become poorer instead of richer, over a series of recent

* *The Modern Review*, June, 1920 pp. 712-13.

years. With the possible exception of certain areas in the Punjab (which have been opened up by irrigation) the *comparative* poverty of the agriculturalists is being more and more keenly felt. The slightest shortage of rain, in any district, means hunger and want and misery to hundreds of thousands of people, and in certain cases, to millions. Yet this Esher Report, if actually put into practice, is certain to mean increased Army Expenditure just at the very time that we have been promised a reduction of all armaments. It is this *Army Expenditure*, which has every year, hitherto, depressed the rural Indian population. It is this *Army Expenditure*, which has made progress in Education and Sanitation well nigh impossible for the lack of the necessary funds. It is this *Army Expenditure*, which has lain like a dead weight on the whole country, and has made the lightening of the heavy incidence of the land revenue charges impossible. Yet now, it is as clear as anything can be, (and the London papers have quickly noticed the fact) that the heavy burden of the militarism of the past is to be made still heavier for the poverty-stricken people of India. The thing is humanly impossible. The new burden cannot and must not be borne."*

The Esher Report evoked a storm of criticism in India, which protested *in toto* against the main principle underlying it, namely, that the Army in India was not for the defence of India, but must be considered in relation to the general defence of the Empire. So strong was the criticism that the Government appointed a representative committee of the Legislatures, who focussed their opinion in a report which embodied the following resolutions:

"This Assembly recommends to the Governor-General in Council:

(*a*) That the purpose of the Army in India must be held to be the defence of India against external aggression and the maintenance of internal peace and tranquility. To the extent to which it is necessary for India to maintain an army for these purposes, its organisation, equipment and administration should be thoroughly up-to-date, and with due regard to Indian conditions, in accordance with present day standards of efficiency in the British army so that when the Army in India has to co-operate with the British Army on any occasion, there may be no dissimilarities of organisation, etc., which would render such co-operation difficult. For any purpose other than those mentioned in the first sentence the obligation resting on India should be no more onerous than those resting on the Self-governing Dominions, and should be undertaken subject to the same conditions as are applicable to those Dominions.

(*b*) To repudiate the assumption underlying the whole Report of the Esher Committee:

(*i*) That the administration of the Army in India cannot be considered otherwise than as part of the total armed forces of the Empire, and

(*ii*) That the military resources of India should be developed in a manner suited to Imperial necessities."

OVERSEAS SERVICE

"This Assembly recommends to the Governor-General in Council that the army in India should not as a rule be employed for service outside the external frontiers of India, except for purely defensive purposes, or with the previous consent of the Governor-General in Council in very grave emergencies, provided that this resolution does not preclude the employment on garrison duties overseas of Indian troops at the expense of His Majesty's Government and with the consent of the Government of India."

INDIAN OFFICERS

"This Assembly recommends to the Governor-General in Council:

(a) That the King-Emperor's Indian subjects should be freely admitted to all Arms of His

* *The Modern Review*, Dec. 1920, p. 659.

Majesty's Military, Naval and Air forces in India and the ancillary services and the auxiliary forces, that every encouragement should be given to Indians including the educated middle classes, subject to the prescribed standards of fitness, to enter the commissioned ranks of the Army, and that in nominating candidates for the entrance examination, unofficial Indians should be associated with the nominating authority.

(b) That not less than 25 per cent. of the King's Commissions granted every year should be given to His Majesty's Indian subjects to start with."

THE REFORMS OF 1919

The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms marked some advance on the Morley-Minto Reforms. Some changes were introduced into the system of government of British India by the Government of India Act of 1919. The Reforms of 1919 came into general operation in January 1919. In the nine major provinces "the executive Government is a dual organism which owes its unity to the Governor. One half of the organism consists of the Governor and his Executive Council, all of whom are appointed by the King. This body is responsible for the administration of those subjects which are 'reserved.' The other half of the executive organism is the Governor acting with the advice of Ministers who are appointed by him, hold office during his pleasure, and must be elected members of the Provincial Legislative Council. To the Governor acting with Ministers is entrusted the administration of 'transferred' subjects."

The Provincial Legislatures have one chamber with an elected majority of 70 per cent. The strength and composition of each of the Provincial Councils are as follows :

Province	Elected	Officials	Non-officials	Total
Madras	98	23	6	127
Bombay	86	20	5	111
Bengal	113	20	6	139
United Provinces	100	18	5	123
Punjab	71	16	6	93
Bihar and Orissa	76	18	9	103
Central Provinces	53	10	5	68
Assam	39	9	5	53
Burma	78	15	8	101

The notable changes made by the Act of 1919 in the powers of the Provincial Councils are :

(*i*) the power to vote (and consequently to withhold) supplies,

(*ii*) an enhanced freedom of initiation in the matter of legislation,

(*iii*) power to frame their own rules of procedure in matters of detail, subject to the Governor's concurrence,

(*iv*) the power to elect President and Deputy President.

The Act of 1919 has set up for the Central Legislature of India, a

"bicameral body, known collectively as the Indian Legislature, consisting of two chambers, the Council of State, and the Legislative Assembly, which replace the old single chamber legislature of the Central Government. The Council of State consists of 59 members, of whom 33 are elected, and

26 nominated. Of the nominated members 19 are officials. The Legislative Assembly consists of 143 members, of whom 103 are elected, and 40 nominated. Of the nominated members 25 are officials."*

Thus in both the Chambers the elected majority is predominant. The following table shows the allotment of the elective seats open to Indians :

	Legislative Assembly	Council of State
Madras	15	5
Bombay	14	5
Bengal	14	5
United Provinces	15	5
Punjab	12	3
Bihar and Orissa	12	4
Central Provinces	6	2
Assam	3	1
Burma	3	1
Delhi	1	...
	95	31

It is noteworthy that in the Legislative Assembly the allotment of seats to Bengal was most unjust, as its population was the largest in the provinces—two and a half times as great as that of Bombay or of the Panjab.

The Act of 1919 also provides for the appointment of a Parliamentary Commission after a period of ten years "for the purpose of inquiring into the working of the system of government, the growth of education, and the development of representative institutions in British India, and matters connected therewith", and such a Commission, when appointed, is directed to "report as to whether it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible government, or to extend, modify or restrict the degree of responsible government then existing in British India."

VISIT OF H. R. H. THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT

In 1921 H. R. H. the Duke of Connaught visited India to inaugurate the Reformed Councils. A boycott was organised by the Indian nationalists against the Duke's visit. He visited every principal province and formally opened the Reformed Legislatures.

INAUGURATION OF THE INDIAN LEGISLATURE

On February 9, 1921, H. R. H. the Duke of Connaught formally inaugurated the Legislature of India. Lord Chelmsford remarked on this occasion :

"The forces which had led to the introduction of these reforms continued to gain in intensity and volume ; the demand of educated Indians for a larger share in the government of their country grew year by year more insistent ; and this demand could find no adequate satisfaction within the frame-work of the Morley-Minto constitution. This constitution gave Indians much wider opportunities for the expression of their views, and greatly increased their power of influencing the policy

* *India in 1921-22*, p. 278.

of Government, and its administration of public business. But the element of responsibility was entirely lacking. The ultimate decision rested in all cases with the Government, and the Councils were left with no functions save that of criticism. The principle of autocracy, though much qualified, was still maintained, and the attempt to blend it with the constitutionalism of the West could but postpone for a short period the need for reconstruction on more radical lines.

"Such then was the position with which my Government were confronted in the years 1916-17. The conclusion at which we arrived was that British policy must seek a new point of departure, a fresh orientation. On the lines of the Morley-Minto Reforms there could be no further advance. That particular line of development had been carried to the furthest limit of which it admitted, and the only further change of which the system was susceptible would have made the Legislative and Administrative acts of an irremovable executive entirely amenable to elected councils, and would have resulted in a disastrous deadlock. The Executive would have remained responsible for the government of the country but would have lacked the power to secure the measures necessary for the discharge of that responsibility. The solution which finally commended itself to us is embodied in principle in the declaration which His Majesty's Government in full agreement with us made in August 1917. By that declaration the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government was declared to be the goal towards which the policy of His Majesty's Government was to be directed. The increasing association of the people of India with the work of Government had always been the aim of the British Government. In that sense a continuous thread of connection links together the Act of 1861 and the declaration of August 1917. In the last analysis the latter is only the most recent and most memorable manifestation of a tendency that has been operative throughout British rule. But there are changes of degree so great as to be changes of kind, and this is one of them. For the first time the principle of autocracy which had not been wholly discarded in all earlier reforms was definitely abandoned ; the conception of the British Government as a benevolent despotism was finally renounced ; and in its place was substituted that of a guiding authority whose role it would be to assist the steps of India along the road that in the fullness of time would lead to complete self-government within the Empire. In the interval required for the accomplishment of this task, certain powers of supervision, and if need be of intervention, would be retained, and substantial steps towards redeeming the pledges of the Government were to be taken at the earliest moment possible."*

THE ROYAL MESSAGE

In inaugurating the Legislature of India, the Duke of Connaught read out the following message from His Majesty the King-Emperor :

"Little more than a year has elapsed since I gave my assent to the Act of Parliament which set up a constitution for British India. The intervening time has been fully occupied in perfecting the necessary machinery : and you are now at the opening of the first session of the legislatures which the Act established. On this auspicious occasion I desire to send you, and to the members of the various Provincial Councils, my congratulations and my earnest good wishes for success in your labours and theirs.

"For years, it may be for generations, patriotic and loyal Indians have dreamed of Swaraj for their motherland. Today you have beginnings of Swaraj within my Empire ; and widest scope and ample opportunity for progress to the liberty which my other Dominions enjoy."†

THE DUKE'S APPEAL

The Duke concluded his speech with the following appeal :

"Gentlemen, I have finished my part in to-day's official proceedings. May I claim your patience

* Quoted in *India in 1921-22*, pp. 46-48.

† *Ibid.*, p. 48.

and forbearance while I say a few words of a personal nature? Since I landed I have felt around me bitterness and estrangement between those who have been and should be friends. The shadow of Amritsar has lengthened over the fair face of India. I know how deep is the concern felt by His Majesty the King-Emperor at the terrible chapter of events in the Punjab. No one can deplore those events more intensely than I do myself. I have reached a time of life when I most desire to heal wounds and to re-unite those who have been disunited. In what must be, I fear, my last visit to the India I love so well, here in the new Capital, inaugurating a new constitution, I am moved to make you a personal appeal, but in the simple words that come from my heart, not to be coldly and critically interpreted. My experience tells me that misunderstandings usually mean mistakes on either side. As an old friend of India, I appeal to you all, British and Indians, to bury along with the dead past the mistakes and misunderstandings of the past, to forgive where you have to forgive, and to join hands and to work together to realise the hopes that rise from today."*

SPECIAL CALCUTTA CONGRESS AND NON-CO-OPERATION PROGRAMME

The year 1920 was a turning point in the history of the Congress. A special Congress was held at Calcutta under the presidency of Lala Lajpat Rai to consider the Non-Co-operation programme presented before the Congress by Mahatma Gandhi. So long the Congress was only passing resolutions and petitioning the authorities that be, but now the Congress took to a practical programme.

Lala Lajpat Rai in his presidential address observed :

"The country is at the present moment in the throes of a momentous struggle. The Anglo-Indian Press has designated it as revolutionary. There are many people to whom the word 'revolution' is like a red rag to a bull. I am not one of them. Words do not scare me. It is no use blinking the fact that we are passing through a revolutionary period, nay, we are already in the grip of a mighty revolution, a comprehensive and all-covering one, religious, intellectual, moral, educational, social, economic and political. We are by instinct and tradition averse to revolutions. Traditionally, we are a slow-going people; but when we decide to move, we do move quickly and by rapid strides. No living organism can altogether escape revolutions in the course of its existence. Our national history records many such."

CHARGES AGAINST SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER

In the course of his presidential address, Lala Lajpat Rai brought the following twelve serious charges against Sir Michael O'Dwyer :

(i) I charge him with having deliberately intensified the policy of 'divide and rule' by keeping apart the Mahomedans from the Hindus and both from the Sikhs.

(ii) I charge him with having created fresh political divisions between the people of the Province by drawing purely artificial and mischievous distinctions between martial and educated classes and between the rural and urban interests and creating unhealthy rivalry between them.

(iii) I charge him with having made illegal use of the processes of law and of his authority for recruitment purposes, and for getting contributions for the War loan and other War funds.

(iv) I charge him with having condoned and in a way encouraged the most brutal and diabolical deeds of those who were his tools in recruiting and War Loan campaigns and with having failed to check bribery and corruption among the subordinate Police and Magistracy.

(v) I charge him with having debased and misused the forms and processes of law for the purpose of crushing those who would not bend their knees to him and who showed the slightest independence of spirit and a desire for political advancement.

* *Ibid.*, p. 47.

(vi) I charge him with having deliberately deceived the Government of India as to the necessity of Martial Law, and as to the necessity of trying cases of ordinary sedition under the processes of that law. He was guilty of a clear falsehood at this stage when he suggested to the Government of India that the General Officer Commanding in the Punjab agreed with his views.

(vii) I charge him with having deliberately manipulated the continuance of Martial Law for vindictive and punitive purposes when there was no rebellion and there was no likelihood of a recrudescence of disturbances in that Province.

(viii) I charge him with having been instrumental, by express or tacit consent and by encouragement, by word or deed, in the promulgation of barbarous orders and the infliction of barbarous punishments and humiliations on the people of the Punjab.

(ix) I charge him at least with being an accessory after the event of the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre. By his unqualified approval of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre he made himself responsible for all the outrages committed by the Martial Law administrations in pursuance of his policy.

(x) I charge him with having connived at perfectly illegal exactions from the people of the Punjab in the shape of punitive fines and penalties.

(xi) I charge him with culpable neglect of duty in not going to Amritsar, first on the 11th after the deplorable events of the 10th, and then on the 14th after the massacre at the Jallianwala Bagh.

(xii) I charge him, lastly, with having extorted addresses from the people of the Punjab, on the eve of his departure, by illegal and mean threats, one of them having been altered in a material particular when in the custody of his minions, and having made a dishonest use of them in his defence in England."*

NATIONAL EDUCATION

In speaking of national education, Mr. Lajpat Rai said :

"I want the whole attention of the country to be directed to and concentrated on this, that you must have a National Government before you have National Education. There is a great deal in the contention of Mahatma Gandhi that the education is a false education which you receive. You want to be Indians, but what you want to be is not a body of the ancient Indians, but modern, up-to-date and progressive Indians. You should not go backwards but must go forward. You must combine Western and Eastern cultures together."

NON-CO-OPERATION

About the Non-co-operation programme, Mr. Lajpat Rai spoke thus:

"I may say that you will not be able to paralyse the Government unless you strike at the root of economic exploitation. Economic bondage is the root of political bondage. If you want non-co-operation to be carried into actual practice, you must strike at the root of the economic bondage. Now you have added another clause, that is, boycott of foreign goods. You have passed that resolution, and I wish you complete success from the bottom of my heart, absolutely."

BOYCOTT OF THE COUNCILS

As regards boycotting the Councils, Mr. Lajpat Rai 'confessed that his sympathies were entirely with Mahatma Gandhi, but his head sometimes reeled and began to go over to the other side.' He said :

"What have you been doing for the last 35 years ? The leaders of the nation have been crying for co-operation. In the course of a year you cannot change 315 millions of the population of this country from an attitude of co-operation to an attitude of non-co-operation. If you do so,

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* *The Modern Review*, Oct. 1920, pp. 445-46.

you are liable to fall into pitfalls. You require time to face that. I am afraid that the time is inadequate. I am entirely in favour of that programme provided it is considered by a joint committee consisting of the best men of the country to give details, but at the same time not to give away the programme of Mahatma Gandhi, who is a national asset."

MAHATMA GANDHI'S PROGRAMME

The special Calcutta Congress accepted the programme of Mahatma Gandhi. It was a new programme presented to the public in India. The resolution of Mahatma Gandhi as accepted by the Congress ran as follows:

(*a*) Surrender of titles and honorary offices and resignation from nominated seats in the local bodies,

(*b*) refusal to attend Government Levees, Durbars, and other official and semi-official functions held by Government officials or in their honour,

(*c*) gradual withdrawal of children from schools and colleges owned, aided or controlled by Government, and in place of such schools and colleges establishment of National schools and colleges in the various provinces,

(*d*) gradual boycott of British courts by lawyers and litigants and establishment of private arbitration courts by their aid for the settlement of private disputes,

(*e*) refusal on the part of the military, clerical and labouring classes to offer themselves as recruits for service in Mesopotomia,

(*f*) withdrawal by candidates of their candidature for election to Reformed Councils and refusal on the part of the voters to vote for any candidate who may, despite the Congress advice, offer himself for election.

BOYCOTT OF FOREIGN GOODS

As regards the boycott of foreign goods, we read:

"And inasmuch as Non-co-operation has been conceived as a measure of discipline and self-sacrifice without which no nation can make real progress, and inasmuch as an opportunity should be given in the very first stage of Non-co-operation to every man, woman and child, for such discipline and self-sacrifice, this Congress advises adoption of *Swadeshi* in piecegoods on a vast scale, and inasmuch as the existing mills of India with indigenous capital and control do not manufacture sufficient yarn and sufficient cloth for the nation, and are not likely to do so for a long time to come, this Congress advises immediate stimulation of further manufacture on a large scale by means of reviving hand-spinning in every home and hand-weaving on the part of the millions of weavers who have abandoned their ancient and honourable calling for want of encouragement."

THE PROGRAMME OF NON-CO-OPERATION

Commenting on the programme of Non-co-operation, Mr. Ramananda Chatterjee wrote:

"The greatest significance which attaches to the adoption of a programme of non-co-operation by the Congress is the change in the mentality of the people which it definitely indicates, though it is neither a sudden nor an entirely new change. After the Partition of Bengal there was such a change, but it was confined for the most part to the Bengalis. Before and after that period there was the resignation of about thirty municipal commissioners of Calcutta and a similar attitude of many municipal commissioners in the U. P. after the passing into law of the Jahangirabad amendment. The change that has now taken place has affected all the provinces. Speaking generally, the mental attitude of the people has hitherto been dependent on the sense of justice and generosity of the British people for the attainment of political freedom. That is no longer the prevalent attitude. The Indian people now want to win their right to freedom by their own

strength. It is evident that a section of them would have resorted to physical force, if they had arms and if they had not been kept under control by wiser heads. So the choice has fallen on the adoption of non-violent methods. The programme adopted may or may not be effective ; but what are most noteworthy are the revolt from previous methods and the confidence of the people in their own strength.

"The programme of non-co-operation may have two objects in view. One object may be to paralyse the administrative machinery, and another to perform all those functions which are usually discharged by the State—thus forming a State within the State, like the Sinn Fein republic in Ireland without its methods of violence. The first stage of the programme may also be meant to be mainly disciplinary, the striking of the effective blows coming afterwards.

"Our opinion is that even the carrying out of the whole of the first stage of the programme sketched out in Mr. Gandhi's resolution will not paralyse the Government. What can paralyse it is the non-payment of taxes by all or a majority of taxpayers and the resignation of their posts by all or most Indian Civil and Military employees of the Government without others coming forward to take their places. In *Young India,* September, 15, 1920, Mr. Gandhi mentions the first of these means but not the second, saying :

'My resolution adopted the principle of the whole of the Khilafat programme, even non-payment of taxes, and advised for immediate adoption, boycott of titles and the honorary offices, law courts by litigants, schools and colleges and reformed Councils.'

"But in the Congress resolution we do not find any mention of non-payment of taxes. That, however, may be a somewhat remote contigency. As against non-payment of taxes, Government might no doubt adopt the use of physical force, in which case the non-co-operators or passive resisters must be able to bravely suffer without yielding. For, non-co-operation being a non-violent method, there can be no question of meeting force by force, and, even if there were, a disarmed and unarmed people cannot use physical force. If, however, the principle of non-co-operation were accepted in the distant future by the Indian Civil and Military servants of the State, Government might find it inexpedient and somewhat difficult to coerce non-taxpayers."*

The Modern Review, Oct. 1920, pp. 457-58.

CHAPTER XVIII

LORD READING (1921-1926)

Lord Reading is the hero of F. Maryon Crawford Noble Isaacs. The noble Lord's rise to fame and power was almost romantic—"from log-cabin to White House." It was a transformation of the gutter-blood to true blue. Born of Jewish parents, he began his life as a newspaper boy, then rose to a ship boy, and visited India twice in the latter capacity. Then he took to law, and rose almost with meteoric rapidity to be the first lawyer of the country, and then the Lord Chief Justice of England. During the war he proved his worth as a great and successful diplomat, and was then rewarded with one of the highest and grandest offices in the gift of the British Government—the Viceroyalty of India.

As Viceroy and Governor-General of India, Lord Reading proved his genius as a strong and tactful ruler of a foreign people, whom he was even more successful than his equally brilliant prototype Lord Curzon to keep down under the weight of the gilded collar. In this his native Jewish shrewdness served him well. By faith and temperament an Imperialist, Lord Reading brought to bear all his courage, tact, ability and learning upon his task of dragging India through a period of autocratic and even reactionary rule. The Jewish Lord prefaced his assumption of office with conciliating and sweet speeches which promised a golden age for the unhappy people. He said in one of his speeches that he was going to India to administer British justice. But his subsequent actions belied his profession to the hilt. Sweet in speech, cool in in head, deliberate, strong and calculating in his measures, Lord Reading left his impress as a terribly efficient administrator.

On the 3rd of April 1921, His Excellency the Rt. Hon. Rufus Daniel Isaacs, Earl of Reading, succeeded Lord Chelmsford as the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. He came out to India to render justice to the cause of India. An official publication goes on to observe :

> "The great judicial career of Lord Reading, his liberal opinions, his services to the Empire as a diplomat, combined to mark him out as the man of all others to complete the work which Lord Chelmsford had so well begun."

Indian leaders expected much from Lord Reading. So the attitude of the Indian leaders towards him in the beginning was rather friendly.

> "His (Lord Reading's) great judicial reputation, which had preceded him, was not without its influence even upon the non-co-operators. Mr. Gandhi declined to declare *hartals* on the day of the new Viceroy's arrival, expressing willingness to allow him an opportunity of forming independent conclusions upon the Indian situation."

FORTHCOMING VISIT OF THE PRINCE OF WALES

In his first address to both Houses of the Imperial Legislature, Lord Reading referred to the forthcoming visit of the Prince of Wales. He said :

"You will remember that a little more than a year ago His Majesty the King-Emperor, by Royal Proclamation, informed the Princes and people of India of his decision that the visit of the Prince of Wales to India must be deferred for a time in order that His Royal Highness might recover from the fatigue of his labours in other parts of the Empire. We have recently heard, to our great joy, that the health of His Royal Highness has been sufficiently restored to enable the visit to take place in November next."

THE AFGHAN TREATY STILL IN EMBRYO

Lord Reading also referred to the progress made in the negotiations with Afghanistan. He observed :

"You will naturally wish to know the result of our negotiations with the Afghan Government, I had hoped that I should be in a position today to make an announcement to you respecting them; but though it was so far back as January last that at the invitation of the Afghan Government we despatched a mission to Kabul for the negotiation of a treaty of friendship, its outcome is still uncertain. Negotiations of this character, especially when supervening on actual war, are often not brought to a speedy close, and these negotiations have been protracted by developments beyond the limit of my Government's anticipations, but, despite all untoward complicatious or unexpected difficulties, I hope that we may before long conclude a new and abiding treaty of friendship with Afghanistan which will ensure the continuance of our traditional relations with this nation."

UNREST ON THE FRONTIER

About the unrest on the Frontier, the Viceroy observed :

"The Frontier, unhappily, is still suffering from the unsettling influence of the Great War and other excitements and instigations of recent years, but notwithstanding the drought and great scarcity of the present year, which have done much to accentuate the economic difficulty that lies at the root of the frontier problem, unrest in Baluchistan has almost wholly subsided. Even in the North-West Frontier Province, with its narrow belt of British districts between the Indus and the frontier hills exposed at all times to the brunt of tribal lawlessness, there is comparative quietude, save in Waziristan. Military operations have now been in progress in Waziristan for several months. They have been conducted by our troops in the face of many hardships and against an elusive enemy, with a fortitude and gallantry worthy of all praise. I trust that these operations may not long have to be continued. They are slow and costly. The problem of the inhospitable frontier, does not lend itself to a cheap or easy solution, but India's duty seems clear and it must always be remembered that the expenditure on frontier defence is incurred not merely for the defence of the sorely harassed inhabitants of our border districts against transfrontier lawlessness and raids; it is incurred for the defence of India as a whole and is an expenditure which India will assuredly not grudge."

THE MOPLAH REBELLION : LORD READING'S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS POLICY

We give below the official version of the Moplah rebellion. Lord Reading thus tries to justify his policy during the Moplah outbreak :

"The most recent manifestation (of unrest) is in the district of Malabar and thoughts naturally turn to the grave reports of crime and disorder which necessitated the issue by me of an Ordinance proclaiming Martial Law in certain parts of this district. I trust I need not assure you that having passed my life in the profession of the law and steeped as I am in the liberal traditions of England I would never proclaim Martial Law unless I was convinced that it was absolutely necessary for the security of the country and for the safety of the population in the disturbed areas. In my judgment I should have failed in my duty if I had not taken this step in the emergency that arose

and had not given to the local Government all the assistance and support that could be rendered in quelling the uprising of the Moplahs and in protecting innocent citizens against the criminal acts of a violent mob.

"We must, however, be careful to view those disturbances in their proper setting. It would be rash and, in my view, wrong to assume that this rising is to be taken as symptomatic of the condition of the whole of India. It must be remembered that this district has always been a storm centre and serious disorders have occurred in the past. I shall not enter into a lengthy discussion of the events and conditions that led to this serious outbreak which may be said without exaggeration of language, to have assumed the character of a rebellion because, I am well aware that you will have opportunities of discussing these matters in the course of your debates."

ORIGIN OF THE MOPLAH OUTBREAK

Lord Reading thus referred to the origin of the Moplah rebellion :

"I shall only make some general observations for your consideration. It is obvious, from the reports received, that the ground had been carefully prepared for the purpose of creating an atmosphere favourable to violence and no effort had been spared to rouse the passion and fury of the Moplahs. The spark which kindled the flame was the resistance, by a large and hostile crowd of Moplahs armed with swords and knives, to a lawful attempt by the police to effect certain arrests in connection with a case of house breaking. The police were powerless to effect the capture of the criminals, and the significance of the incident is that it was regarded as a defeat of the police and therefore of the Government. Additional troops and special police had to be drafted to Malabar in order to effect the arrests. The subsequent events are now fairly well known, although it is impossible at present to state the number of the innocent victims of the Moplahs. These events have been chronicled in the press. I shall not recapitulate them."

SOME OF THE RESULTS OF THE OUTBREAK

The Viceroy then proceeded to mention some of the results of the Moplah outbreak. He said :

"The situation is now, to all intents and purposes, in hand. It has been saved by the prompt and effective action of the military and naval assistance, for which we are duly grateful, although some time must necessarily elapse before order can be completely restored and normal life under the civil Government resumed. But consider the sacrifice of life and property. A few Europeans and many Hindus have been murdered ; communications have been obstructed ; Government offices burnt and looted and records have been destroyed ; Hindu temples sacked ; houses of Europeans and Hindus burnt. According to reports, Hindus were forcibly converted to Islam and one of the most fertile tracts of South India is threatened with famine. The result has been the temporary collapse of civil Government, offices and courts have ceased to function and ordinary business has been brought to a stand-still. European and Hindu refugees of all classes are concentrated at Calicut, and it is satisfactory to know that they are safe there. One trembles to think of the consequences, if the forces of order had not prevailed for the protection of Calicut. The non-Moslem in these parts was fortunate indeed, if either he or his family or his house or property came near the protection of the soldier and the police. Those who are responsible for causing this grave outbreak of violence and crime must be brought to justice and made to suffer the punishment of the guilty, but apart from direct responsibility, can it be doubted that when poor unfortunate and deluded people are led to believe that they should disregard the law and defy authority, violence and crime follow this outbreak as but another instance, on a much more serious scale and among a more turbulent and fanatical people, of the conditions that have manifested themselves at times in various parts of the country ?"*

* Quoted in *India in 1921-22*, p. 336.

ANOTHER VERSION OF THE MOPLAH OUTBREAK

We give below another official version of the Moplah outbreak. We read :

"As soon as the activities of the Khilafat Committee were in full progress, Government had realised the dangerous consequences which might result from the application of inflammatory propaganda to Malabar. Considerable pains were, therefore, taken to exclude from the Moplah area the notable figures among Mr. Gandhi's Muhammadan contingent. But during the early months of 1921, excitement spread speedily from mosque to mosque, from village to village. The violent speeches of the Ali Brothers, the early approach of Swaraj as foretold in the non-co-operating press, the July resolutions of the Khilatfat Conference—all these combined to fire the train. Throughout July and August innumerable Khilafat meetings were held, in which the resolutions of the Karachi Conference were fervently endorsed. The doctrine spread that 'Government was satanic' and should be paralysed so that 'Swaraj' might be set up. The stipulation of non-violence attracted little attention. Knives, swords and spears were secretly manufactured, bands of desperadoes collected, and preparations were made to proclaim the coming of the Kingdom of Islam. Soon policemen were obstructed in the course of their duty. Worse was to follow. On August 20th, when the District Magistrate of Calicut, with the help of troops and police, attempted to arrest certain leaders who were in possession of arms at Tiruzangadi, a severe encounter took place, which was the signal for immediate rebellion throughout the whole locality. Roads were blocked, telegraph lines cut, and the railway destroyed in a number of places. The District Magistrate returned to Calicut to prevent the spread of trouble northwards, and the machinery of Government was temporarily reduced to a number of isolated offices and police stations which were attacked by the rebels in detail. Such Europeans as did not succeed in escaping—and they were fortunately few—were murdered with bestial savagery. As soon as the administration had been paralysed, the Moplahs declared that Swaraj was established. A certain Ali Musaliar was proclaimed Raja, Khilafat flags were flown, and Ernad and Walluvanad were declared Khilafat kingdoms. The main brunt of Moplah ferocity was borne, not by Government, but the luckless Hindus who constituted the majority of the population. Somewhat naturally they did not join a purely Muslim revolutionary movement, and accordingly paid a bitter price for their loyalty when the temporary collapse of Government authority placed them at the mercy of their savage neighbours. Massacres, forcible conversions, destruction of temples, foul outrages upon women, pillage, arson and destruction—in short, all the accompaniments of brutal and unrestrained barbarism, were perpetrated freely until such time as troops could be hurried to the task of restoring order throughout a difficult and extensive tract of country."*

IMPENDING PROSECUTION OF THE ALI BROTHERS

As the result of the propaganda of the Ali Brothers, the authorities decided to prosecute them. Mahatma Gandhi, on their behalf, had a series of interviews with the Viceroy, arranged by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. After this, the Ali Brothers published an apology in the following terms :

"Friends have drawn our attention to certain speeches of ours which, in their opinion, have a tendency to incite to violence. We desire to state that we never intended to incite to violence, and we never imagined that any passage in our speeches were capable of bearing the interpretation put upon them. But we recognise the force of our friends' argument and interpretation.

"We, therefore, sincerely feel sorry and express our regret for the unnecessary heat of some of the passages in these speeches, and we give our public assurance and promise to all who may require it, that so long as we are associated with the movement of non-co-operation we shall not, directly or indirectly, advocate violence at present, or in the future, nor create an atmosphere of

* *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.



Maulanas Shaukat Ali and Mohamed Ali

preparedness for violence. Indeed we hold it contrary to the spirit of non-violent non-co-operation to which we have pledged our word."

A few days later Lord Reading spoke on the subject as follows :

"As you may be aware, the result of these visits and discussions was that Mr. Mohamed Ali and Mr. Shaukat Ali have issued a public pronouncement, which doubtless you have seen today, expressing their sincere regret for certain speeches that they had made inciting to violence, and have given a solemn public undertaking that they will not repeat these speeches or similar speeches so long as they remain associated with Mr. Gandhi. I do not want to discuss this matter at any length, I merely refer to it as showing that the interviews were not entirely fruitless, because, as far as Government is concerned, we achieved our immediate object, which was to prevent incitement to violence."*

TRIAL OF THE ALI BROTHERS

But the trial of the Ali Brothers was not postponed by the Government for a long time. In October 1921, the Ali Brothers were arrested and their trial began in Karachi:

"In the course of the trial which took place at Karachi in October, the Judge pointed out that, however permissible the Khilafat movement might have been in the earlier stages, those who were controlling it soon began to rely upon dangerous religious propaganda. They openly gloried in hatred of the British Government, and maintained 'first, that their religion compels them to do certain acts : secondly, that no law which restrains them from doing those acts which their religion compels them to do has any validity : and thirdly, that in answer to the charge of breaking the law of the land, it is sufficient to raise and prove the plea that the act which is alleged to be an offence is one which is enjoined by their religion'."

The Judge sentenced the Ali Brothers to two years' rigorous imprisonment.

AHMEDABAD CONGRESS

The Indian National Congress at its Ahmedabad session confirmed 'the resolution adopted at the special session of the Congress at Calcutta and reaffirmed at Nagpur' and placed 'on record the fixed determination of the Congress to continue the programme of non-violent Non-co-operation with greater vigour than hitherto in such a manner as each province may determine, till the Punjab and Khilafat wrongs are redressed and Swarajya is established.'

The Congress also organised a National Volunteer Corps, because of

"the threat uttered by His Excellency the Viceroy in his recent speeches and the consequent repression started by the Government of India in the various provinces by way of disbandment of volunteer corps and forcible prohibition of public and even committee meetings in an illegal and high-handed manner and by the arrest of many Congress workers in several provinces."

The Congress also called upon

"all students of the age of 18 and over, particularly those studying in the National institutions and the staff thereof to sign the pledge and become members of the National Volunteer Corps."

In view of the impending arrests of a large member of Congress workers, Mahatma Gandhi was appointed by the Congress as 'the sole executive authority of the Congress.'

About the Moplah outbreak, the Congress passed the following resolution :

* *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

"This Congress expresses its firm conviction that the Moplah disturbance was not due to the Non-co-operation or the Khilafat movement, especially as the non-co-operators and the Khilafat preachers were denied access to the affected parts by the District authorities for six months before the disturbance, but is due to causes wholly unconnected with the two movements, and that the outbreak would not have occurred had the message of non-violence been allowed to reach them. Nevertheless this Congress deplores the acts done by certain Moplahs by way of forcible conversions and destruction of life and property and is of opinion that the prolongation of the distrubance in Malabar could have been prevented by the Government of Madras accepting the proferred assistance of Maulana Yakub Hassan and other Non-co-operators and allowing Mahatma Gandhi to proceed to Malabar and is further of opinion that the treatment of Moplah prisoners as evidenced by the asphyxiation incident was an act of inhumanity unheard of in modern times and unworthy of a Government that calls itself civilised."

ANGLO-AFGHAN TREATY

The recent changes in Afghanistan brought about a change in the political relation of Afghanistan with India. Russian influence began to be felt in Afghanistan. Negotiations were opened by the Government of India to have a new treaty concluded with Afghanistan. "Satisfactory written assurances having been given by Afghanistan that Russian consulates -that is, of course propaganda bases—should be excluded from the neighbourhood of the Indo-Afghan Frontier, the way seemed open to fruitful negotiations." A Treaty was signed by the representatives of Afghanistan and Great Britain on the 22nd of November, 1921.

As to the terms of the Treaty we are told that

"the two Governments agreed to respect one another's internal and external independence; to recognise boundaries then existent, subject to a slight readjustment near the Khyber; to receive Legations at London and Kabul and Consular officers at Delhi, Calcutta, Karachi, Bombay and Kandahar and Jalalabad respectively. The Afghan Government are allowed to import free of customs duty such material as is required for the strengthening of their country. So long as the British are assured that the intentions of the Afghans are friendly, this proviso applies to arms and ammunition also. The export of goods to British territory from Afghanistan is permitted, while separate Postal and Trade Conventions are to be concluded in the future. Further, each party undertakes to inform the other of major military operations in the vicinity of the border line."

About the appointment of a Minister, the Treaty says :

"Article III.—The British Government agrees that a Minister from His Majesty the Amir of Afghanistan shall be received at the Royal Court of London like the Envoys of all other Powers and to permit the establishment of an Afghan Legation in London, and the Government of Afghanistan likewise agrees to receive in Kabul a Minister from His Britannic Majesty the Emperor of India and to permit the establishment of a British Legation at Kabul.

"Each party shall have the right of appointing a Military Attache' to its Legation."*

About the appointment of Consulates, the Treaty lays down :

"The Government of Afghanistan agrees to the establishment of British Consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad, and the British Government agrees to the establishment of an Afghan Consul-General at the headquarters of the Government of India and three Afghan Consulates at Calcutta, Karachi and Bombay. In the event of the Afghan Government desiring, at any time to appoint Consular officers in any British territories other than India, a separate agreement shall be drawn up to provide for such appointment, if they are approved by the British Government."†

* *Ibid.*, p. 319.
† *Ibid.*, p. 320.

Thus Afghanistan got the same status by this Treaty of 1921, as other independent countries. The Amir now has the right to appoint a Minister in London, a Consul-General at Delhi, and Consular officers at Calcutta, Bombay and Karachi.

According to Article VI of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921, the British Government agreed

"that whatever quantity of material is required for the strength and welfare of Afghanistan, such as, all kinds of factory machinery, engines and materials and instruments for telegraph, telephones, etc., which Afghanistan may be able to buy from Britain or the British dominions or from other countries of the world, shall ordinarily be imported without let or hindrance by Afghanistan into its own territories from the ports of the British Isles and British India.' The British Government could also purchase materials from Afghanistan and export them to India. 'With regard to arms and munitions, the British Government agrees that as long as it is assured that the intentions of the Government of Afghanistan are friendly and that there is no immediate danger to India from such importation in Afghanistan, permission shall be given without let or hindrance for such importation'."

Article VII of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty provides that

"'no Customs duties shall be levied at British Indian ports on goods imported under the provisions of Article VI on behalf of the Government of Afghanistan, for immediate transport to Afghanistan.' It is further added that 'nothing in this Article shall prevent the levy on imports from Afghanistan of the present Khyber tolls and of octroi in any town of India in which octroi is or may be hereafter levied, provided that there shall be no enhancement over the present rate of the Khyber tolls'."

About the appointment of Trade agents, Article VIII of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty says :

"The British Government agrees to the establishment of trade agents by the Afghan Government at Peshawar, Quetta and Parachinar, provided that the personnel and the property of the said agencies shall be subject to the operations of all British laws and orders and to the jurisdiction of British Courts ; and that they shall not be recognised by the British authorities as having any official or special privileged position."*

As regards the exchange of postal matter the two parties agreed "to afford facilities of every description for the exchange of postal matter between their two countries provided that neither shall be authorised to establish Post Offices within the territory of the other." This Article X also provided for the conclusion of a separate Postal Convention.

According to Article XII the two High Contracting Parties agreed that representatives of both the Governments should be appointed to discuss the conclusion of a Trade convention.

According to Article XIV the provisions of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty should come into force from the date of its signature (*i.e.* 22nd November, 1921) and would remain in force for three years from that date.

The Anglo-Afghan Treaty was signed on November 22, 1921, by Mahmud Tarzi, Chief of the Delegation of the Afghan Government for the conclusion of the Treaty and Henry R. C. Dobbs, Envoy Extraordinary and Chief of the British Mission to Kabul.†

* *Ibid.*, p. 321.
† *Ibid.*, p. 323.

PRINCE OF WALES' VISIT

As regards the object of the Prince of Wales' visit, Lord Reading said :

"I desire, with all the authority at my command, emphatically to repudiate these suggestions, and to assure the Indian people that neither I nor my Government have ever had the faintest intention of using His Royal Highness' visit for political purposes....His Royal Highness' visit to India is in accordance with the precedent set by his august father and grandfather, and he comes to India as the Heir to the Throne and the future Emperor of India, and in that capacity alone."

The Prince arrived in Bombay on November 17, 1921 and was welcomed by Lord Reading and a large number of Ruling Princes. The Prince delivered the following message from the King-Emperor :

"On this day, when my son lands for the first time upon your shores I wish to send through him my greetings to you, the Princes and Peoples of India. His coming is a token and a renewal of the pledges of affection which it has been the heritage of our house to re-affirm to you...."

BOMBAY RIOTS

While the Prince landed at Bombay, there was an outbreak of violence in the city of Bombay itself. We read the following account of the Bombay riots in an official publication :

"The local non-co-operators had for some weeks been concentrating their efforts upon the task of spoiling the unanimity of the welcome (to the Prince). They had inoculated the more turbulent elements of the population with a determination to break the peace. Mr. Gandhi addressed a meeting held simultaneously with the Prince's landing, at which the attendance was disappointing. But the hooligan element, giving no heed to his admonitions against the use of violence, was even at that moment engaged in terrorising those other elements of the population who desired to welcome the Prince. Parsi and European passers-by were severely assaulted by mobs armed with bludgeons. Tramcars were damaged, rails torn up, motor cars destroyed, and liquor shops set on fire. Disorder developed rapidly owing to the withdrawal of numbers of police and military to the processional route. As soon as the forces of order arrived on the scene, the situation became more quiet. Numerous arrests were made and on several occasions fire had to be opened upon violent mobs. Serious rioting lasted for nearly three days, as a result of which the total casualty list amounted to 53 killed and approximately 400 wounded. Too late, Mr. Gandhi attempted to stop the disturbances by personal appeals, and he issued a series of pathetic proclamations in which he sternly rebuked his followers and stated that the outbreak of mob violence had convinced him that his hopes of reviving mass civil disobedience were illusory. 'With non-violence on our lips', he wrote, 'we have terrorised those who happened to differ from us. The *Swaraj* that I have witnessed during the last two days has stunk in my mostrils.' And he openly admitted his responsibility. 'I am more instrumental than any other in bringing into being a spirit of revolt. I find myself not fully capable of controlling and disciplining that spirit'."

HARTAL IN OTHER TOWNS

"Nor was the trouble of the 17th November confined to Bombay. Throughout Calcutta and the principal towns of Northern India, there was a general cessation of business, produced in the majority of cases by undisguised and open intimidation on the part of 'national volunteers.' Violence and obstruction of every kind were freely employed, inflicting the gravest inconvenience upon law-abiding citizens, and for the moment discounting the authority of the State. The terrorism practised by the volunteers not merely transcended all bounds but was widespread, organized and simultaneous."*

* *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

The official version alone has been given above.

The arrival of the Prince saw a general hartal in Calcutta, Allahabad and other principal towns in India.

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN BARDOLI

At the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee held in Delhi in the first week of November 1921, it was decided to have recourse to mass civil disobedience. In his letter to Lord Reading Mahatma Gandhi wrote:

"It was intended under the resolution of the All-India Congress Committee...to make Bardoli the first unit for mass civil disobedience in order to make the national revolt against the Government for its consistently criminal refusal to appreciate India's resolve regarding the Khilafat, the Punjab and Swaraj.

"Then followed the unfortunate and regrettable riots on the 17th November last in Bombay resulting in the postponement of the step contemplated by Bardoli."

REPRESSION IN VARIOUS PROVINCES

Mahatma Gandhi pointed out the reason why he had decided again to have recourse to mass civil disobedience. He observed:

"Meantime repression of a virulent type has taken place with the concurrence of the Government of India, in Bengal, Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab, the Province of Delhi and in a way in Bihar and Orissa and elsewhere. I know that you have objected to the use of the word 'repression' for describing the action of the authorities in these Provinces. In my opinion, when an action is taken which is in excess of the requirements of the situation, it is undoubtedly repression. The looting of property, assaults on innocent people, brutal treatment of the prisoners in jails, including flogging, can in no sense be described as legal, civilized or in any way necessary. This official lawlessness cannot be described by any other term but lawless repression."

SUPPRESSION OF VOLUNTEERING

Mahatma Gandhi proceeded to say:

"Intimidation by non-co-operators or their sympathisers to a certain extent in connection with hartals and picketting may be admitted, but in no case can it be held to justify the wholesale suppression of peaceful volunteering or equally peaceful public meetings under a distorted use of an extraordinary law which was passed in order to deal with activities which were manifestly violent both in intention and action, nor is it possible to designate as otherwise than repression action taken against innocent people under what has appeared to many of us an illegal use of the ordinary law, nor again can the administrative interference with the liberty of the Press under a law that is under promise of repeal be regarded as anything but repression."

FREE SPEECH, FREE ASSOCIATION AND FREE PRESS

As to the duty of the country, Mahatma Gandhi said:

"The immediate task before the country, therefore, is to rescue from paralysis freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of Press.

"In the circumstances, there is nothing before the country but to adopt some non-violent method for the enforcement of its demands, including the elementary rights of free speech, free association and free Press. In my humble opinion, the recent events are a clear departure from the civilized policy laid down by your Excellency at the time of the generous, manly and unconditional apology of the Ali Brothers, *viz.*, that the Government of India should not interfere with the activities of

non-co-operators so long as they remained non-violent in word and deed. Had the Government policy remained neutral and allowed public opinion to ripen and have its full effect, it would have been possible to advise postponement of the adoption of Civil Disobedience of an aggressive type till the Congress had acquired fuller control over the forces of violence in the country and enforced greater discipline among the millions of its adherents. But the lawless repression (in a way unparalleled in the history of this unfortunate country) has made immediate adoption of Mass Civil Disobedience, an imperative duty. The Working Committee of the Congress has restricted it only to certain areas to be selected by me from time to time and at present it is confined only to Bardoli. I may under the said authority give my consent at once in respect of a group of 100 villages in Guntur in the Madras Presidency, provided they can strictly conform to the conditions of non-violence, unity among different classes, the adoption and manufacture of hand-spun *Khaddar* and untouchability."

THE MAHATMA'S ULTIMATUM

In conclusion, Mahatma Gandhi presented the following ultimatum to Lord Reading

"But before the people of Bardoli actually commence Mass Civil Disobedience, I would respectfully urge you as the head of the Government of India finally to revise your policy and set free all the non-co-operating prisoners who are convicted or under trial for non-violent activities and declare in clear terms the policy of absolute non-interference with all non-violent activities in the country, whether they be regarding the redress of the Khilafat or the Punjab wrongs or Swaraj or any other purpose and even though they fall within the repressive sections of the Penal Code or the Criminal Procedure Code or other repressive laws, subject always to the condition of non-violence. I would further urge you to free the Press from all administrative control and restore all the fines and forfeitures recently imposed. In thus urging I am asking your Excellency to do what is today being done in every country which is deemed to be under civilized Government. If you can see your way to make the necessary declaration within seven days of the date of publication of this manifesto, I shall be prepared to advise postponement of Civil Disobedience of an aggressive character till the imprisoned workers have after their discharge reviewed the whole situation and considered the position *de novo*."*

GOVERNMENT'S REPLY

In a *Communiqué* (dated, Delhi, Feb. 6, 1922) the Government of India rejected the demand made by Mahatma Gandhi in his manifesto of 1st February, 1922. The Government *Communiqué* stated :

"The manifesto issued by Mr. Gandhi on the 4th February justifying his determination to resort to Mass Civil Disobedience contains a series of misstatements. Some of these are so important that the Government of India cannot allow them to pass unchallenged. In the first place, they emphatically repudiate the statement that they have embarked on a policy of lawless repression and also the suggestion that the present campaign of civil disobedience has been forced on the non-co-operation party in order to secure the elementary rights of free association, free speech and of free press."

REJECTION OF THE MAHATMA'S DEMAND

In rejecting Mahatma Gandhi's demand, the *Communiqué* observed :

"The Government of India are confident that all right thinking citizens will recognise that this manifesto constitutes no response whatever to the speech of His Excellency at Calcutta and the demands made are such as no Government could discuss, much less accept. The alternatives that

* *Ibid.*, pp. 326-27.

now confront the people of India are such as sophistry can no longer obscure or disguise. The issue is no longer between this or that programme of political advance but between lawlessness with all its dangerous consequences on the one hand, and on the other, the maintenance of those principles which lie at the root of all civilised Governments. Mass Civil Disobedience is fraught with such dangers to the State that it must be met with sternness and severity. The Government entertain no doubt that in any measures which they have to take for its suppression they can count on the support and assistance of all law-abiding and loyal citizens of His Majesty."*

CHAURI CHAURA OUTRAGE

On the rejection of his demands by the Government, Mahatma Gandhi made preparations for Civil Disobedience in the *taluka* of Bardoli. When all preparations were ready, there occurred an untoward outrage at Chauri Chaura. About this outrage we read :

"Mr. Gandhi himself went to Bardoli in order to supervise the commencement of civil disobedience in that taluka. But at the critical moment there occurred a disorder of the very type which Mr. Gandhi had obviously feared. At Chauri Chaura in the United Provinces, a terrible outrage occurred on the 4th of February. Some twenty-one policemen and rural watchmen were murdered in the most deliberate manner by a mob of 'volunteers' and infuriated peasantry. Both the brutality of this outrage and its unprovoked character combined to deal the final blow to Mr. Gandhi's hopes of immediate success Responsible opinion all over the country, irrespective of creed and race, was horrified at this sudden revelation of the appalling possibilities of non-co-operation. Men felt that they had been walking insecurely upon the edge of an abyss, into which they might at any moment be precipitated. A recrudescence of agrarian trouble in the United Provinces, under the form of an *eka* or 'one big union' of anti-landlord cultivators ; a serious strike, obviously political in its bearing, upon the East Indian Railway all combined to arouse public opinion against non-co-operation. To his credit be it said, Mr. Gandhi did not hesitate. Whether, as some have maintained, he made Chauri Chaura the excuse for suspending a movement which he had always regarded as dangerous and now knew to be, at least for the present, hopeless ; or whether this outbreak convinced him of the impossibility of carrying civil disobedience to a successful conclusion by non-violent methods, may be open to question. The fact remains that at an emergent meeting of the Working Committee held at Bardoli on the 11th and 12th of February, he resolved to suspend every preparation of an offensive nature."†

BARDOLI RESOLUTIONS

After the terrible outrage of Chauri Chaura, Mahatma Gandhi and other members of the Working Committee of the Congress met at Bardoli on the 11th and 12th February 1922 to consider the new political situation. The Working Committee decided to suspend the Mass Civil Disobedience programme and drew up a new programme for the Congress workers. About the outrage of Chauri Chaura, the resolution ran as follows :

"The Working Committee deplores the inhuman conduct of the mob at Chauri Chaura in having brutally murdered constables and wantonly burned the Police Thana and tenders its sympathy to the families of the bereaved."

The second resolution called upon the Congress workers to suspend the Civil Disobedience programme .

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 329-31.

† *Ibid.*, p. 100.

"In view of Nature's repeated warnings, every time mass civil disobedience has been imminent some popular violent outburst has taken place indicating that the atmosphere in the country is not non-violent enough for mass disobedience, the latest instance being the tragic and terrible events at Chauri Chaura near Gorakhpur, the Working Committee of the Congress resolves that mass civil disobedience contemplated at Bardoli and elsewhere be suspended and instructs the local Congress Committees forthwith to advise the cultivators to pay the land revenue and other taxes due to the Government and whose payment might have been suspended in anticipation of mass civil disobedience, and instructs them to suspend every other preparatory activity of an offensive nature."

This suspension of mass civil disobedience should be continued till 'the atmosphere is so non-violent as to ensure the non-repetition of popular atrocities such as at Gorakhpur or hooliganism such as at Bombay and Madras respectively on November 17, 1921, and 13th January last.'

The Congress also adopted a new programme of work. The Working Committee advised all Congress organisations to be engaged in the following activities :

(*i*) To enlist at least one crore of members of the Congress.

(*ii*) To popularise the spinning wheel and organise the manufacture of hand-spun and hand-woven Khaddar.

(*iii*) To organise national schools.

(*iv*) To organise the Depressed Classes for a better life, to improve their social, mental and moral condition, to induce them to send their children to national schools, and to provide for them the ordinary facilities which other citizens enjoy.

(*v*) To organise the temperance campaign amongst the people addicted to the drink-habit by house to house visits and to rely more upon appeal to the drinker in his home than upon picketing.

(*vi*) To organise village and town *Panchayats* for the private settlement of all disputes, reliance being placed solely upon the force of public opinion and the truthfulness of *Panchayat* decision to ensure obedience to them.

(*vii*) In order to promote and emphasise unity among all classes and mutual goodwill, the establishment of which is the aim of the movement of non-co-operation, to organise a social service department that will render help to all, irrespective of political differences, in times of illness or accident.

(*viii*) To continue the Tilak Memorial Swaraj Fund and to call upon every Congressman or Congress-sympathiser to pay at least one hundredth part of his annual income for the year 1921.

THE REPORT OF THE PRESS ACT COMMITTEE

A Committee was appointed on March 21, 1921 to examine the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, the Indian Press Act, 1910, and the Newspapers (Incitements to offences) Act, 1908. In their Report the Committee maintained that the Press Act was an emergency measure. The Committee observed :

"Turning to the question of the necessity for such legislation, we find that it was an emergency measure enacted at a time when revolutionary conspiracies, the object of which was directly promoted by certain organs of the Press, were so active as to endanger the administration. We believe that this revolutionary party is now quiescent, that the associations supporting it have been broken up, and that many members of the revolutionary party have realized that the object which they had in view can, under present conditions, be achieved by constitutional means. Further, the political situation has undergone great changes since 1910, and the necessity for the retention of the Act must be examined in the light of the new constitutional position created by the inauguration of the Reforms.

"Many of us feel that the retention of this law is, in these circumstances, not only unnecessary, but incompatible with the increasing association of representatives of the people in the administration of the country."

The Report also adds :

"A general feeling was also apparent among the witnesses that the Act is irritating and humiliating to Indian journalism, and that the resentment caused by the measure is the more bitter because of the great services rendered to Government by the Press in the War.

"Many witnesses, indeed, are of opinion that the Act is fatal to the growth of a healthy spirit of responsibility in the Press and that it deters persons of ability and independent character from joining the profession of journalism."

The recommendations of the Committee were as follows :

"(*i*) The Press Act should be repealed.

(*ii*) The Newspapers (Incitements to offences) Act should be repealed.

(*iii*) The Press and Registration of Books Act, the Sea Customs Act and the Post Office Act should be amended, where necessary, to meet the conclusions.

(*a*) The name of the Editor should be inscribed on every issue of a newspaper and the Editor should be subject to the same liabilities as the Printer and the Publisher as regards criminal and civil responsibility.

(*b*) Any person registering under the Press and Registration of Books Act should be a major, as defined by the Indian Majority Act."*

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE REPRESSIVE LAWS

Another Committee was appointed in March 1921 to examine the repressive laws. The Committee examined the following Regulations and Acts :

(1) The Bengal State Offences Regulation, 1804, (2) Madras Regulation VII of 1808, (3) Bengal State Prisoners Regulation, 1818, (4) Madras Regulation II of 1819, (5) Bombay Regulation XXV of 1827, (6) The State Prisoners Act, 1850, (7) The State Offences Act, 1857, (8) The Forfeiture Act, 1857, (9) The State Prisoners Act, 1858, (10) The Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1098, (11) The Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1911, (12) The Defence of India (Criminal Law Amendment) Act, 1915, and (13) The Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, 1919.

The Committee observed :

"Dealing with the older Acts first, we notice that they relate generally to an unsettled condition of affairs which no longer exists. We regard it as undesirable that they should be used for any purpose not contemplated by their authors. The objections to them are obvious. Some, as for example, Bengal Regulation 10 of 1804, or the Forfeiture Act of 1857, are inconsistent with modern ideas; others are clothed in somewhat archaic language and are applicable only to circumstances which are unlikely to recur. Many arm the Executive with special powers which are not subject to revision by any judicial tribunal."

The Committee went on to say :

"It is undesirable that any statutes should remain in force which are regarded with deep and genuine disapproval by a majority of the Members of the Legislatures. The harm created by the retention of arbitrary powers of imprisonment by the Executive may, as history has shewn, be greater even than the evil which such powers are directed to remedy. The retention of these Acts could in any case only be defended if it was proved that they were in present circumstances essential to the maintenance of law and order. As it has not been found necessary to resort in

* *Ibid.*, pp. 296-97.

the past to these measures save in cases of grave emergency, we advocate their immediate repeal. In the event of a recurrence of any such emergency we think that the Government must rely on the Legislature to arm them with the weapons necessary to cope with the situation."

The Committee recommended

"the repeal of all the statutes included in the terms of reference to this Committee, with a reservation as to Bengal Regulation III of 1818 and the corresponding Regulations of the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, but we advise that the repeal of the Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1911, and Part II of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, should be deferred for the present. Their retention is necessary in view of recent declarations which we cannot but regard with the gravest apprehension."*

GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM ON THE TREATY OF SEVRES

In 1922, Lord Reading's Government "once more laid before His Majesty's Government their conviction of the intensity of the feeling in India regarding the necessity for a revision of the Treaty of Sevres. In particular, they urged upon His Majesty's Government three points as being of the first importance, subject to certain safeguards; the evacuation of Constantinople; the suzerainty of the Sultan over the Holy Places; the restoration to Turkey of Ottoman Thrace including Adrianople, and of Smyrna."

MR. MONTAGU'S RESIGNATION

With the publication of the Government Memorandum on the Treaty of Sevres there came the news of Mr. Montagu's resignation. With it "a general feeling of apprehension spread over the country. It was feared lest the disappearance from office of a Secretary of State whose name had been associated, even by enemies of the British connection, with the utmost friendship and liberality towards Indian aspirations, might indicate a determination on the part of the British Government to change its angle of vision."

Mr. Montagu would be long remembered as a friend of the Indian cause and as the joint author of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform Scheme, which he saw materialised in the Government of India Act of 1919.

ARREST OF MAHATMA GANDHI

At last Lord Reading's Government decided to arrest Mahatma Gandhi. He was arrested on March 10, 1922. The news of his arrest spread like wild fire throughout the length and breadth of the country. There was great excitement among the general public. In his farewell message Mahatma Gandhi asked the people to be calm and not to resort to violence.

About the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi, Prof. L. F. Rushbrook Williams says:

"This step had long been contemplated, but had been postponed from time to time for various reasons. In the first place there was a natural reluctance to incarcerate a man who, however mistaken might be his activities, was by all widely respected and by millions revered as a saint. Moreover, he had consistently preached the gospel of non-violence, and done all that he could to

* *Ibid.*, pp. 309-10.

restrain the more impatient of his followers from embarking upon forcible methods. It was further impossible to ignore the fact that, until a substantial body of Indian opinion was prepared to support measures against Mr. Gandhi's person, and until the popular belief in his divine inspiration had been weakened by the efflux of time, there was reason to fear that his arrest would have been attended with bloody outbreaks in numerous places, by the intensification of racial bitterness, and by the creation of conditions in which the new constitution would have little or no chance of success."*

Mahatma Gandhi pleaded guilty to the charges brought against him by the Government. In the course of his speech to the Court, he said :

"And I wish to endorse all the blame that the Advocate-General has thrown on my shoulders in connection with the Bombay occurrences, the Madras occurrences and the Chauri Chaura occurrences. Thinking over these things deeply, and sleeping over them night after night and examining my heart I have come to the conclusion that it is impossible for me to dissociate myself from the diabolical crimes of Chauri Chaura or the mad outrages of Bombay. He is quite right when he says that as a man of responsibility, a man having received a fair share of education, having had a fair share of experience of this world, I should know the consequences of every one of my acts. I knew them. I knew that I was playing with fire. I ran the risk and if I was set free I would still do the same. I would be failing in my duty if I did not do so. I have felt it this morning that I would have failed in my duty if I did not say all that I have said here just now. I wanted to avoid violence ; I want to avoid violence. Non-violence is the first article of my faith. It is the last article of my faith. But I had to make my choice ; I had either to submit to a system which I consider has done irreparable harm to my country, or incur the risk of the mad fury of my people bursting forth when they understood the truth from my lips. I know that my people have sometimes gone mad ; I am deeply sorry for it ; and I am therefore here to submit not to a light penalty but to the highest penalty. I do not ask for mercy. I do not plead any extenuating act. I am here therefore to invite and submit to the highest penalty that can be inflicted upon me for what in law is a deliberate crime and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen."

The trial was watched with anxious eagerness by the whole of India. The Judge paid full tribue to Mahatma Gandhi but emphasised that it was his duty to judge him as an individual subject to the law. He further stated :

"I do not forget that you have consistently preached against violence and that you have on many occasions, as I am willing to believe, done much to prevent violence. But having regard to the nature of your political teaching and the nature of many of those to whom it was addressed, how you could have continued to believe that violence would not be the inevitable consequence, it passes my capacity to understand. There are probably few people in India who do not sincerely regret that you have made it impossible for any Government to leave you at liberty. But it is so."

Mahatma Gandhi was sentenced to six years' simple imprisonment.

PRINCE OF WALES'S FAREWELL MESSAGE

While leaving the shores of India, the Prince of Wales sent to the Viceroy the following farewell message :

"I bid farewell to India to-day with feelings of the deepest regret. I pride the hand of friendship which India has extended to me and shall ever treasure the memories of my first visit in future years. By God's help I may now hope to view India, her Princes and peoples with an understanding eye. My gathered knowledge will, I trust, assist me to read her needs aright and will enable me to approach her problems with sympathy, appreciate her difficulties and appraise her achievements."†

* *Ibid.*, p. 104.
† *Ibid.*, p. 117.

INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The condition of Indians in South Africa began to grow worse and worse:

"In March 1922 an official deputation consisting of members of the Council of State, of the Legislative Assembly and of the Imperial Indian Citizenship Association of Bombay, together with delegates of the Transvaal British Indian Association and of the Natal Indian Congress, waited upon His Excellency Lord Reading. The deputation urged upon the Viceroy the grave importance of the questions connected with the position of Indian residents in South Africa. Considerable alarm was expressed lest the working of the scheme embodied in the Asiatic Enquiry Commission's Report for the voluntary repatriation of Indians might be utilised to drive Indians out of South Africa. The Government of India was requested to urge the Union Government to settle satisfactorily the Indian question once and for all. In his reply to this deputation Lord Reading demonstrated that his Government were fully alive to the importance of the whole matter. The Government of India, he said, felt that, so long as Indians did not enjoy full parliamentary and municipal franchise throughout the Union, they could not dissociate themselves from responsibility for the welfare of a community whose very existence originated in an organised system of recruitment to which they themselves had been in the past a consenting party. Public opinion throughout the Empire, he said, was moving in the desired direction, and the Government of India were doing everything in their power to secure a satisfactory settlement. Deep-rooted prejudice and long misunderstandings could not, of course, be swept away in a day, but His Excellency assured the deputation that the points raised in their address would be borne in mind and that his Government would not fail in their attitude of constant watchfulness and in their policy of urging the justice of Indian claims."

Lord Reading also observed:


"I note with pleasure your statement that the domiciled Indian community in South Africa desire to progress in education and are determined to prove themselves in all respects as deserving as the Europeans of the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship. This, I am confident, is a true avenue of advance. The British citizen, in whatever part of the world he may be, has a strong sense of fairplay; and I feel sure that when he finds his Indian fellow citizens in the Union steadfastly proving themselves by their conduct useful and loyal members of the body politic, he will not persist in withholding from them the status which they justly claim. I am glad that you recognise that it is to the Union Government that Indians must look for the redress of their grievances. While we are determined to do whatever lies in our power to forward the reasonable aspirations of Indians domiciled in the self-governing Dominions, and to press constantly and consistently for the recognition and application of the broad principles of equal citizenship for which we contend, we are sure that you will agree that we must respect the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the self-governing Dominions, and that any interference which might seem to infringe this principle would not be conducive to the good of the Indian community."*

In short, the Government of India would not interfere in the domestic affairs of the Dominions, but would not fail in their attitude of constant watchfulness over the Indian cause abroad. But mere watchfulness is not enough.

SRINIVASA SASTRI'S MISSION

To assist the Governments of the Dominions to give effect to the Resolution recognizing the rights of Indians in other parts of the British Empire, the Rt. Hon. Srinivasa Sastri was deputed to visit Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Accompanied by Mr. G. S. Bajpai, Mr. Sastri left India in May, 1922. He was also "instructed to

* *India in 1922-23*, pp. 6-7.



The Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri

look into any other disabilities of Indian residents in the three Dominions and to request the authorities concerned to remove them."

Lord Reading in his speech at the inauguration of the third Session of the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly at Simla on September 5, 1922, spoke thus of the mission of Mr. Sastri :

"The important aspects of the Right Honourable Sastri's mission were referred to by me in a speech I made on the eve of his departure. We have every reason to be gratified by the impression which he has made and by the warm reception extended to him. Mr. Sastri has already been successful in obtaining the removal of some minor disabilities affecting domiciled Indians, and we trust that in course of time on larger questions also, on which ministers cannot immediately extend promises in advance of the mandate of their electorates, the atmosphere of friendly feeling towards India created by his visit may conduce towards the realisation of our reasonable expectations."*

But Mr. Sastri expressed the opinion of the Government of India whenever he had occasion to speak in the Dominions he visited. So he was regarded more as the Government's rather than as the people's ambassador.

ASIATIC INQUIRY COMMISSION

In speaking of the action taken by the Government on behalf of the Indians in South Africa, Lord Reading said :

"My Government have been in correspondence with the Government of the Union of South Africa regarding the recommendations of the Asiatic Inquiry Commission. We have not been able as yet to reach an agreement in principle, but we are still engaged in attempts to arrive at a better understanding. The Union Government by their recent action in suspending the operation of two Ordinances in Natal have given proof of their desire that most careful and impartial inquiries should be made before any step is taken which is likely to affect the position of Indians in any part of the Union."

PRINCES' PROTECTION BILL

A measure of Lord Reading's Government which roused bitter criticism, was the Princes' Protection Bill. When the Press Act of 1910 was repealed, it was proposed to give special protection to the Princes by the introduction of a special Bill. Lord Reading observed :

"We have decided that we are bound by agreements and in honour to afford to the Princes the same measure of protection as they previously enjoyed under the Press Act which is the only protection available to them ; and a Bill to secure this object will be brought before you in the present session. This protection to the Princes was first given by the Act of 1910. It is not suggested that it has been abused, and the only reason for its repeal is because in British India we have decided to dispense with the special remedies under the Press Act and to rely upon the general law which is not applicable to the Princes."†

The Chamber of Princes also asked for "special protection for the Indian States to replace that taken from them by the repeal of the relevant provision in the Press Act." Accordingly the Princes' Protection Bill was drawn up. But the Indian public opinion was opposed to the measure. The Legislative Assembly "voiced the view

* *Ibid.*, p. 307.

† *Ibid.*, p. 309.

prevailing among the educated classes of British India, and vigorously opposed any measure of special protection."

ASSEMBLY REFUSE LEAVE TO INTRODUCE THE BILL

The members of the Legislative Assembly decided to oppose the measure vehemently. They took 'the unprecedented course of refusing leave for the introduction of the Bill.' The Government was in an awkward position, but it resolved to go on with the Bill.

LORD READING'S FIRST EXERCISE OF POWER OF CERTIFICATION

This refusal of the Legislative Assembly "provided the occasion for the first exercise by the Governor-General of the extraordinary powers alloted to him by the Government of India Act. He certified that the Bill was essential for the interests of British India, and recommended it to be passed in that form in which it was presented. It was passed by the Council of State ; and despite efforts to secure a compromise with the Legislative Assembly, the measure was compelled to continue on its course without the assent of that House."

This step of Lord Reading was bitterly criticised by the Indian public.

Even a moderate association like the National Liberal Federation at its Nagpur session in 1922 thought it necessary to pass the following resolution:

"This Federation is of opinion that the Indian States (Protection against Disaffection) Act passed by the Council of State on the Governor-General's certificate is not in the interests of British India or subjects of Indian States and therefore Parliament should advise His Majesty to withhold his assent to it."

THE GURU-KA-BAGH AFFAIR

Another incident which caused much excitement throughout India and specially in the Panjab was the Guru-ka-Bagh affair. The Sikh shrine of Guru-ka-Bagh is situated about ten miles from Amritsar city. The Akalis managed to take possession of the shrine, while the *Mohunt* continued to be in possession of the house, the garden and the land. The trouble arose with the cutting of a tree by the Akalis, who were arrested by the Police. The trouble did not end there. More trees were cut down and a detachment of Police was sent by the District authorities, complaints being made by the *Mahunt*. Then began the real struggle :

"The Shiromani Gurudwar Prabandhak Committee took up the challenge ; and Akalis began to concentrate on Guru-ka-Bagh. The continued influx of these bands, who were becoming a source of embarrassment alike to the public and district anthorities, led to the placing of police pickets along the roads leading to Guru-ka-Bagh, so that parties, as they arrived, might be turned back. The bands were treated as unlawful assemblies . . . and they were stopped at different points and directed to disperse. They refused to obey the order, and advanced upon the police pickets, whereupon they were dispersed by force. As each member of a *Jatha*, before setting out upon this enterprise, had taken an oath of non-violence, no resistance was made to the efforts of the police. The spectacle of the forcible dispersal of a number of people, who, although they advanced into contact with the police cordons, made no effort to defend themselves from the batons of the constables, shortly aroused considerable excitement in the neighbourhood. . . . That the Akali bands displayed remarkable self-control may be freely acknowledged. ... Throughout the



Seth Narottam Morarji

Sikh community, as can readily be understood, these incidents excited much feeling ; and those who had received injuries at the hands of the police became popular heroes and martyrs for the faith. ... Before long, the Local Government found it desirable to abandon the forcible dispersion of Akali *Jathas*, and instead to arrest individual members. The excitement thereupon gradually died down, and in November 1922, a public-spirited individual obtained from the *Mohant* a lease of the land which had given rise to the dispute and himself made no objection to the Akalis cutting wood thereon."*

The Gaya Congress (1922) passed the following resolution about the Akalis who were engaged in the Guru-ka-Bagh affair :

"This Congress records with pride and admiration its appreciation of the unexampled bravery of the Akali martyrs and the great and noble example of non-violence set by them for the benefit of the whole nation."

THE FISCAL COMMISSION REPORT

In October 1921, the Government of India appointed a Fiscal Commission to examine the Tariff policy of the India Government. The Commission consisted of Sir Ibrahim Rohimtoola, as President, and Mr. T. V. Seshagiri Aiyar, Mr. G. D. Birla, Mr. J. C. Coyajee, Sir M. B. Dadabhoy, Mr. Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Sir E. Holberton, Mr. R. A. Mant, Mr. Narottam Morarjee, Mr. C. W. Rhodes and Sir M. de P. Webb, as members. The terms of reference of the Commission were as follows :

"To examine with reference to all the interests concerned the Tariff policy of the Government of India, including the question of the desirability of adopting the principle of Imperial Preference and to make recommendations."

The Fiscal Commission began its work in November 1921, and their Report was published in the summer of 1922. The main report was signed by all the members, but the President, and Messrs. Seshagiri Aiyar, Birla, Jamnadas Dwarkadas and Narottam Morarjee appended a minute of dissent. The recommendations of the main report were :

I. (*a*) "That the Government of India adopt a policy of protection to be applied with discrimination along the lines indicated in this Report.

(*b*) That discrimination be exercised in the selection of industries for protection, and in the degree of protection afforded, so as to make the inevitable burden on the community as light as is consistent with the due development of industries.

(*c*) That the Tariff Board in dealing with claims for protection satisfy itself (*i*) that the industry possesses natural advantages ; (*ii*) that without the help of protection it is not likely to develop at all or not so rapidly as is desirable ; and (*iii*) that it will eventually be able to face world competition without protection.

(*d*) That raw materials and machinery be ordinarily admitted free of duty, and that semi-manufactured goods used in Indian industries be taxed as lightly as possible.

(*e*) That industries essential for purposes of National Defence, and for the development of which conditions in India are not unfavourable, be adequately protected if necessary.

(*f*) That no export duties be ordinarily imposed except for purely revenue purposes and then only at very low rates ; but that when it is considered necessary to restrict the export of food grains, the restriction be effected by temporary export duties and not by prohibition.

2. That a permanent Tariff Board be created whose duties will be *inter alia* to investigate the

* *Ibid.*, pp. 282-83.

claims of particular industries to protection, to watch the operation of the Tariff and generally to advise Government and the Legislature in carrying out the policy indicated above.

3. (*a*) That no general system of Imperial Preference be introduced : but (*b*) that the question of adopting a policy of preferential duties on a limited number of commodities be referred to the Indian Legislature after preliminary examination of the general cases by the Tariff Board. (*c*) That if the above policy be adopted, its application be governed by the following principles :

(*i*) That no preference be granted on any article without the approval of the Legislature.

(*ii*) That no preference given in any way diminish the protection required by Indian industries.

(*iii*) That preference does not involve on balance any appreciable economic loss to India.

(*d*) That any preferences which it may be found possible to give to the United Kingdom be granted as a free gift.

(*e*) That in the case of other parts of the Empire preference be granted only by agreements mutually advantageous."

MINUTE OF DISSENT

As already referred to, the Minute of Dissent was signed by the President, Mr. Sheshagiri Aiyar, Mr. Birla, Mr. Jamnadas Dwarkadas and Mr. Narottam Morarjee. They set out the reasons for writing the Minute of Dissent thus:

(*a*) "The main recommendation has been hedged in by conditions and provisos which are calculated to impair its utility

(*b*) In places, the language employed is half-hearted and apologetic.

(*c*) We are unable to agree with the views of our colleagues on Excise, Foreign Capital, Imperial Preference and the Constitution of the Tariff Board."

They continued:

"Our first objection is to the statement in the Report that 'we recommend a policy of protection to be applied with discrimination along the lines of the Report.' To formulate a policy in these words is open to objection, because, (*i*) in the first place, it mixes up policy with procedure. (*ii*) In the second place, by emphasising the method of carrying out the policy, the vital issue of the problem is obscured. (*iii*) In the third place, it ignores the fact that every country applies protection with discrimination suited to its own conditions. (*iv*). Fourthly, in our opinion the outlook of our colleagues is different from ours. We do not, therefore, feel justified in subscribing to the view that protection should be applied with discrimination 'along the lines of the Report'."

"In our opinion, there should be an unqualified pronouncement that the fiscal policy best suited for India is protection."

TARIFF BOARD


In pursuance of the recommendations of the Fiscal Commission, the Government of India announced in July 1923 the appointment of a Tariff Board for a period not exceeding one year in the first instance.

The Tariff Board was constituted as follows: President—Mr. G. Rainy, C. S. I., C. I. E.; Members—the Hon. Mr. V. G. Kale, Mr. P. P. Ginwala, and Rai Bahadur S. N. Banerjee.

The Government of India "will select the industries to be taken up for investigation and determine the order of the inquiry, and it will be the duty of the Tariff Board after such examination, as it thinks necessary, to make recommendations regarding the protection (if any), to be extended to those industries and the nature and extent of the protection."



Jamnadas Dwarkadas



C. R. Das

THE GAYA CONGRESS

The Indian National Congress met at Gaya in December 1922 under the presidency of Mr. C. R. Das. Though Mr. C. R. Das was the President, the influence of Mahatma Gandhi was still predominant in the Congress. Mr. Das and Pandit Moti Lal Nehru were in favour of Council entry, while Mahatma Gandhi and his followers were for Council boycott. "Even before the meeting, there had been a tendency for the more experienced and possibly more intellectual leaders to range themselves upon the side of Council entry, while their opponents counted less upon reasoned arguments than upon youth, enthusiasm and loyalty to the Mahatma." In the open Congress the Council entry party was defeated, and the Congress passed the following resolution boycotting the Councils:

"Whereas the boycott of the Councils carried out during the elections held in 1920 has destroyed the moral strength of the institutions through which Government sought to consolidate its power and carry on its irresponsible rule:

"And whereas it is necessary again for the people of India to withhold participation in the elections of the next year as an essential part of the programme of non-violent non-co-operation:

"This Congress resolves to advise that all voters shall abstain from standing as candidates for any of the Councils and from voting for any candidate offering himself as such in disregard of this advice, and to signify the abstention in such manner as the All-India Congress Committee may instruct in that behalf."

The Congress voted for the triple boycott—the boycott of Councils, the boycott of Educational Institutions and the boycott of Law Courts. The Resolution on the boycott of Educational Institutions ran as follows:

"With reference to the boycott of Government and Government-aided educational institutions, this Congress declares that the boycott must be maintained and further resolves that every Province should be called upon to put the existing national institutions on a sound financial basis and to improve their efficiency in every possible way."

About the boycott of Law Courts, the Resolution was as follows:

"This Congress declares that the boycott of Law Courts by lawyers and litigants must be maintained, and further resolves that greater efforts should be made to establish *punchayets* and to cultivate pubilc opinion in their favour."

It is noteworthy that the Gaya Congress directed its attention to the question of labour organisation and appointed a committee to assist in this direction. The Resolution was as follows:

"Whereas this Congress is of opinion that Indian labour should organise with a view to improve and promote their well-being and secure to them their just rights and also to prevent exploitation of Indian labour and of Indian resources: It is resolved that this Congress, while welcoming the move made by the All-India Trade Union Congress and various Kishan Sabhas in organising the workers of India, hereby appoints the following committee, with power to co-opt, to assist the Executive Council of the All-India Trade Union Congress for the organisation of Indian labour, both agricultural and industrial.

"Committee: 1. Mr. C. F. Andrews, 2. Mr. J. M. Sen-Gupta, 3. Mr. S. N. Haldar, 4. Swami Dinanand, 5. Dr. D. D. Sathaye, 6. Mr. M. Singaravelu Chettiar."

DEMAND FOR FURTHER REFORMS

The advanced Indian politicians were not satisfied with the Reforms of 1919. They wanted a revision of the Government of India Act of 1919. Lord Reading in his speech on the 5th September, 1922, said :

"Almost from the first moment of my arrival I observed that agitation was proceeding with a view to obtaining an immediate or almost immediate extension of the powers given under the new constitution, which had then been but a few months in operation."

Even the Legislative Assembly in the early stage of its life passed a motion recommending that the Secretary of State should be informed that the Assembly was of opinion that the progress made by India on the path to responsible government warrants a re-examination or revision of the constitution at an earlier date than 1929.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S DESPATCH ON THE REFORMS

The Secretary of State, Viscount Peel, sent the following Despatch on the Reforms on November 2, 1922, to the Governor-General in Council. He gave three reasons for not amending the Government of India Act of 1919. He said :

"It would have been a matter for surprise had any speakers in the Indian debate of September last year attempted to prove as the result of six months' experience of a new constitution that its possibilities were exhausted and that nothing remained to be learned from further experience of its operation. No such attempt was made and the arguments used in support of the motion consequently lose some of their cogency, in my view, for three reasons.

"In the first place, they assume that progress is impossible under the existing constitution and can be achieved only by further amendment of the Government of India Act. This assumption I believe to be fundamentally erroneous. The outstanding feature of the change made by the Act of 1919 was that it provided British India with a progressive constitution in place of an inelastic system of government, and that consequently there is room within the structure of that constitution for the legislatures to develop and establish for themselves a position in conformity with the spirit of the Act.

"In the second place, however great the merits shown by the legislatures as a whole and by individual members—and I am far from wishing to underrate them—the fact remains that the merits and capabilities of the electorate have not yet been tested by time and experience. The foundation of all constitutional development must be the presence of a vigorous and instructed body of public opinion operating not only in the legislatures but, what is even more important, in the constituencies. Until this foundation has been firmly laid progress would not be assisted and might indeed be retarded if fresh responsibilites were added to those with which the electors have so recently been entrusted.

"Thirdly, the new constitutional machinery has to be tested in its working as a whole. Changes have been made as the result of the Act of 1919 in the composition, powers and responsibilities not only of the legislatures but also of the executive governments. No estimate of the success of the new system could pretend to completeness which was not based upon proof of the capacity of these bodies as now constituted to administer the duties entrusted to them, duties which from the point of view of public welfare are at least as important as those of the legislatures. And a trustworthy proof of such capacity can only be established by experience of the extent to which the increased association of Indians in the sphere of executive responsibility has justified itself in practice."*

That was the reply of the Secretary of State to the demand for further reforms made by the Legislative Assembly. Inspite of the repeated demands of the Assembly,

* *Ibid.*, pp. 525-26.



Sir Purshottamdas Thakurdas

India Under the British Crown

the Secretary of State would not amend or revise the Government of India Act before 1929.

DEMAND FOR RETRENCHMENT

The educated community persistently clamoured for retrenchment in the expenses of the Government of India. The Legislative Assembly voiced the view of the educated public in the course of the Budget discussion. The Government was having deficit Budgets almost every year. In 1922-23, there was a deficit of Rs. 32 crores, to meet which the Government decided to have extra taxation of 29 crores of rupees, leaving Rs. 3 crores uncovered. In 1921-22 for "the fifth year in succession India laboured under a deficit; the accumulated total of which amounted in 1923 to no less than 100 crores; and this despite the fact that in the last two budgets additional taxation had been imposed, estimated to bring in, during the year 1922-23, the sum of Rs. 28 crores." At last both the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State recommended that retrenchment should be effected by the Government.

In May 1922, the Government of India announced their intention of appointing a Committee with the following terms of reference :

"To make recommendations to the Government of India for effecting forthwith all possible reduction in the expenditure of the Central Government, having regard especially to the present financial position and outlook. In as far as questions of policy are involved in the expenditure under discussion, these will be left for the exclusive consideration of Government. But it will be open to the Committee to review the expenditure and to indicate the economies which might be effected, if particular policies were either adopted, abandoned or modified."

THE INCHCAPE COMMITTEE

The Retrenchment Committee thus appointed was like the Geddes Committee in England. Lord Inchcape was appointed the President and the other members were Sir Thomas Catto, Mr. Dadiba Dalal, Mr. Purshottamdas Thakurdas, Sir Rajendra Nath Mukerjee and Sir Alexander Murray.

Towards the end of May, a Deputation waited on Lord Reading and "impressed upon him the paramount necessity, in the interests of commerce and industry, for drastic retrenchment, particularly in military expenditure, so that financial equilibrium might be established and confidence revived. Lord Reading in his reply assured the deputation that Government would be content with no half and half measures; and that even pending the investigations of the Retrenchment Committee, all steps possible would be taken to reduce expenditure."

The report of the Committee was published in March 1923.

MILITARY EXPENDITURE

About the military services the Committee observed :

"The expenditure which has been incurred in the past may have been inevitable but the question is whether India can afford to maintain the military expenditure on the present scale as an insurance against future eventualities. In our opinion repeated huge deficits of the last few years in spite of the imposition of heavy new taxation have made it abundantly clear that India cannot afford this

expenditure. So long as peace conditions obtain, the first essential is for India to balance her budget and this can only be secured by a very substantial reduction in the military estimates. In this connection it must be remembered that the budget estimate for 1922-23 did not represent the full annual expenditure which would have been incurred on the military services, but for certain fortuitous circumstances the strength of the army was under the establishment. The purchases of supplies were below normal as there were large accumulations of stocks of provisions, clothing and other stores, and the estimate also assumed large non-recurring receipts from sales of surplus war stores and other sources. Further we understand that inadequate provision was made for the maintenance of the Royal Air Force and that considerable additional expenditure will be necessary in future years. If allowance were made for these factors the expenditure required for 1922-23 would have been Rs. 71,37,82,000."

The Committee recommended the reduction of British Infantry and in the strength of Artillery on the ground of introduction of modern machinery.

The main recommendations about army expenditure were:

"(1) The reductions which we have indicated be effected in the strength of fighting services; saving Rs. 303 lakhs per annum.

(2) Steps to be taken to organise an effective reserve and so enable the peace strength of the Indian battalions to be reduced to 20 per cent below war establishment; saving Rs. 63 lakhs net per annum.

(3) The stocks of stores generally be largely curtailed, the stocks of ordnance stores including reserves be reduced from Rs. 14 crores to Rs. 8 crores, all surplus ordnance stores being disposed of.

(4) The Budget estimate for 1923-24 be limited to Rs. 51,47,00,000, a reduction of Rs. 8,95,30,000 compared with the budget estimates for 1922-23, subject to such adjustment as may be necessary on account of the delay which must ensue in carrying out the proposed changes."

REDUCTION IN THE MILITARY BUDGET

After devoting 58 printed pages to the military services the Committee makes the following observations, which suggest the possibility of fixing the military budget in the years to come at 50 crores:

"As we stated in our introductory remarks, although the budget estimate for the military services in 1922-23 was Rs. 67,57,26,000, the full expenditure required during that year would, but for certain fortuitious circumstances, have amounted to Rs. 71,37,82,000. The gross reductions which we have indicated amounted to Rs. 13,95,52,000, but additional provisions of Rs. 23,00,000 for practice ammunition and Rs. 9,15,000 for gratuities to demobilised officers are required for 1923-24. If our recommendations are accepted and if they could all be brought into effect at once, the military budget for 1923-24 could be reduced to Rs. 57,75,05,000, but we recognise that it will take some time for the whole of these savings to materialise."

The Committee proceeded to say:

"We do not, however, consider that the Government of India should be satisfied with a military budget of Rs. 57 crores and we recommend that a close watch be kept on the details of military expenditure with the object of bringing about a progressive reduction in the future. Should a further fall in prices take place we consider that it may be possible after a few years to reduce the military budget to a sum not exceeding Rs. 50 crores, although the Commander-in-Chief does not subscribe to this opinion. Even this is more, in our opinion, than the tax-payer in India should be called upon to pay and though the revenue may increase through a revival of trade, there would we think, still be no justification for not keeping a strict eye on the military expenditure with a view to its further reduction. Having reviewed the expenditure of the military services we recommend that '

(*a*) the total net budget for 1923-24 be fixed at Rs. 57,75,00,000 subject to such addition as may be necessary on account of the delay which must ensue in carrying out the proposed changes and

(*b*) the military expenditure after a few years be brought down to a sum not exceeding Rs. 50 crores."

PROPOSED REDUCTION IN RAILWAY EXPENDITURE

The Committee next dealt with the Railway expenditure:

"The most critical of all the reviews of the Committee relates to the Railway expenditure, where the subject is examined from a business point of view, by a Committee which consisted solely of business men, and some strong strictures are passed where the Committee think there has been deviation from ordinary business rule."

The Committee recommended that:

(1) "Steps be taken to curtail the working expenses, as necessary, to ensure that under normal conditions an average return of at least 5½ per cent. is obtained on the capital invested by the State in Railways.

(2) The present system of programme of revenue expenditure be abolished and that adequate financial provision be made annually by each Railway for the maintenance and renewal of the permanent way and the rolling stock in the manner indicated in paragraph 7.

(3) Agents of Railways be designated General Managers and made responsible for the administration, working and financial results of their Railways.

(4) A financial adviser be immediately appointed to ensure that financial considerations are given their due weight before expenditure is incurred.

(5) Preparation of a scheme of grouping the Railways be taken up forthwith.

(6) The budget provision for working expenses, including surplus profits, in 1923-24, be limited to Rs. 64 crores, subject to a further allowance to meet any increase in traffic reduction of Rs. 4,59,00,000 on the budget estimate for 1922-23 and of Rs. 3,50,00,000 on the preliminary estimate proposed for 1923-24."*

The Committee recommended a drastic reduction of four and a half crores of rupees in the working expenses of Railways. In making this recommendation, they strongly criticised the Railway policy in India and remarked:

"We are of opinion that the country cannot afford to subsidize Railways and that steps should be taken to curtail the working expenses, as necessary, in order to ensure that not only will the Railways as a whole be on a self-supporting basis but that an adequate return should be obtained for the large capital expenditure which has been incurred by the State. We consider that with economic working it should be possible for Railways in India to earn sufficient net receipts to yield an average return of at least 5½ per cent. on the total capital at charge. The average return to the State during the three years prior to the war was 5 per cent. and in view of the fact that large amounts of additional capital are being raised at 6 per cent. or over we think a return of 5½ per cent. cannot be regarded as excessive. A return of 5½ per cent. on the total capital at charge in 1922-23 after an allowance for all interests, annuity and sinking fund payments would yield roughly Rs. 85 crores to the central revenues."†

The Committee recommended reductions in every department of the Government of India. The Departments of Education and Health, Revenue and Agriculture, Commerce,

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* *Ibid.*, p. 331.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 331-32.

Industries and Public Works, which cost Rs. 24,68,900, might, by a re-allocation of their activities, be compressed into two Departments, Commerce and General, both costing Rs. 13,00,000, thus making a saving of about Rs. 11,50,000.

One would not agree with Sir R. N. Mukerjee when he suggested that the Indian members of the Executive Council might receive one-third less salary than their European colleagues.

The Committee recommended that the post of Indian Trade Commissioner in London be abolished, because with the creation of the High Commissioner the duties of the Trade Commissioner could more economically be carried out by the High Commissioner.

REDUCTIONS IN THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

The Committee recommended the following reductions under General Administration:

"(1) The Railway department and Posts and Telegraph department be grouped in a single portfolio; that the activities of certain departments be curtailed, and the remaining subjects dealt with by them be concentrated in two departments, namely, the Commerce department and the General department, the total cost of the Secretariat being restricted to Rs. 53,55,000, a saving of Rs. 14,08,000.

(2) The appointment of Inspector-General of Irrigation be abolished, and the functions of the Central Intelligence Bureau curtailed, and a saving of Rs. 3,95,000 effected in the cost of attached offices.

(3) Reduction of Rs. 40,500 be made in the expenditure of minor administrations.

(4) The grant-in-aid from the Treasury to the cost of the India Office be reviewed and the net cost of that office be reduced by £48,700 under the head 'General Administration' and by £2,700 under Stationery and Printing.

(5) The arrangement for the purchase of stores by the High Commissioner be reviewed.

(6). The net cost of the High Commissioner's office be reduced by £52,000 under General Administration, and by £2,000 under Stationery and Printing.


(7). The budget estimate for 1923-24 for General Administration be limited to Rs 1,48,68,000, a reduction of Rs. 49,89,000 (including £109,000 or Rs. 16,35,000 transferred to the head Interest). This will give a net saving to the country of Rs. 33,54,000."*

The Committee concluded the Report with the following remarks :

"The budget of the Government of India for 1922-23, as finally passed, left unbridged a revenue deficit of Rs. 9,16,28,000. This was the fifth of a succession of deficits amounting in the aggregate to about Rs 100 crores and it is now apparent that the current year's deficit will work out at a figure considerably higher than the budget estimate. The causes of these deficits are well known and it is unnecessary to state them, but it is clear that *the country cannot afford the heavy charge* involved by further huge additions to the unproductive debt and that if India is to remain solvent immediate steps must be taken to balance her budget. The problem does not end here. Under the existing settlement annual contributions to the extent of Rs. 983 lakhs are (subject to a temporary remission of Rs. 63 lakhs in the case of Bengal) payable by the provinces to the Central Government. It is contemplated that these contributions should be progressively reduced and the matter is being continually pressed by the provinces which are also suffering from acute financial difficulties by their Legislatures and by the Press. Since 1913-14 new taxation estimated to yield Rs. 49 crores annually has been imposed and the extent to which it is possible to impose further burdens on the tax-payer is now very limited. While, therefore, it is evident that an improvement of something like Rs. 20

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* *Ibid.*, p. 337.



Pandit Moti Lal Nehru

crores will have to be obtained in order to make the position secure it is no less evident that the main source of relief must be looked for in the retrenchment of expenditure.

"We recognise that it will not be possible to secure in the ensuing year the complete reductions proposed, as under the rules notice must be given to surplus establishments. Large reorganisations cannot be effected immediately, and large terminal payments will be necessary. In some cases it will also be necessary to make provision for increments to establishments on time-scale salaries. We recognise also, as stated in paragraph 3 of our general conclusions on the military services, that some of the reductions proposed represent reductions in stocks of stores and are therefore non-recurring. Even allowing for these factors, however, we believe that our recommendations, if carried out, will go far towards solving the problem of restoring India's finances to a secure basis."*

The Report of the Inchcape Committee has justly been regarded as remarkable as it was authoritative. It is clear from the Report that the country cannot bear the heavy burden of expenditure and the heavier burden of fresh taxation. The Report stated clearly that repeated huge deficits of the last few years in spite of the imposition of heavy new taxation have made it abundantly clear that India cannot afford the military expenditure. The Report also pointed out that the country cannot afford the heavy charge involved by further huge additions to the unproductive debt.

GOVERNMENT'S ACTION ON THE REPORT

It may be asked : What action did the Government take on this authoritative Report of the Retrenchment Committee? The action taken by the Government was rather halfhearted. They effected some retrenchments as recommended by the Committee and took shelter under the pretext of some imagined difficulty. We read thus in a Government publication :

"It was, of course, impossible, as the Retrenchment Committee itself clearly realised, that Government should obtain the full value of the proposed reductions in the first year of their operation. Further, the difficulties in giving effect to the proposals of the Committee were enhanced by the fact that the Report was received after much of the work of preparing the 1923-24 budget had been completed. None the less, by strenuous efforts, Government succeeded in including the major portion of the proposals of the Retrenchment Committee in their 1923-24 budget. In the non-military portion of the budget, excluding interest, the Committee had recommended reductions of about Rs. 8½ crores on a total estimate in 1922-23 of Rs. 103.9 crores. Government had themselves already effected a reduction of Rs. 2·6 crores ; and they now assumed the responsibility of a further reduction of Rs. 4 crores. Hence, as against the Inchcape Committee's ultimate recommendation of Rs. 8 crores the Government succeeded in making an immediate reduction of Rs. 6.6 crores even in the 1923-24 budget. ...As in the case of the Civil Estimates, the reductions suggested by the Inchcape Committee for the military side could not be brought fully and effectively into operation during the ensuing financial year."†

FORMATION OF THE SWARAJ PARTY

In the Gaya Congress, *Deshabandhu* C. R. Das and his party wanted to have a resolution passed in favour of Council-entry. But being unsuccessful, Mr. C. R. Das with Pandit Motilal Nehru, Hakim Ajmal Khan and others announced on the 1st January 1923 the formation of a new Swarajya Party, within the Congress, which

* *Ibid.*, pp. 340-41.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 113-14.

would work out the programme laid down by Mr. C. R. Das in his Presidential Address. In his address he had announced 'that Swaraj must be for the masses and not for the classes only; and he had declared that the most urgent step, in the present political situation of India, was to rally labour to the support of the national cause.'

THE SALT TAX AND CERTIFICATION

The enhanced Salt duty was distasteful to the Legislative Assembly, which protested against the imposition of this tax on the poorest of the poor in the country. But the Government was bent upon wiping out the deficit by the imposition of this Salt tax. Though the Council of State allowed the tax to be imposed, the Legislative Assembly voted against it. Lord Reading restored the tax by his autocratic power of certification—which was received with alarm and indignation by the Nationalists as well as the Liberals.

Even the National Liberal Federation in 1923 entered its 'emphatic protest against the certification by His Excellency the Viceroy of the Indian Finance Bill, 1923, providing for the enhanced Salt Tax in the face of the clearly expressed opinion of the Legislative Assembly to the contrary.' In their opinion the Bill should not have been certified either on economic or political grounds. They were further of opinion that section 67 B of the Government of India Act is wholly inconsistent with any true responsibility of the Legislature and that even under the constitution as it is, it is necessary that the power of certification vested in the Viceroy should be strictly limited to genuine cases affecting the safety and tranquility of British India or any part thereof.

FIRST SO-CALLED INDIAN PARLIAMENT

In his speech to the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly on 28th July 1923, Lord Reading recounted the achievements of the first so-called Indian Parliament. He said :

"Today we are bringing to a conclusion the proceedings of the first Indian Parliament under the Reforms and we are assisting at the obsequies of our first Legislative Assembly; it is therefore meet and proper that we should review past action as we pronounce its funeral oration; but we are also at the stage which precedes and heralds the birth of a second Assembly; and we may for this reason also fitly assess our experience and hand on its fruits for the benefit of our successors."

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE LEGISLATURE

In pronouncing its funeral oration, as Lord Reading put it, the Viceroy spoke thus of the work of the Legislature :

"I came to India immediately after the initiation of the Reformed constitution, pledged to carry on that constitution and entrusted with special and new responsibilities by His Majesty as Governor-General to that end. On me was the charge laid that it was His Majesty's will and pleasure that 'the plans laid by our Parliament for the progressive realisation of responsible government in British India as an integral part of our Empire may come to fruition to the end that British India may attain its due place among our Dominions. ..'

'The achievements of the Indian Legislature have been decried. Their position and privileges have been ridiculed; their motives have been misinterpreted. Their sincerity and patriotism have



V. J. Patel

been attacked. Let history be their judge. I am confident that no difficulty will be found in sweeping aside those travesties of their earnest and constructive labours; but this is not all. The Assembly itself has been at times despondent. There have been moments in this House when voices have been uplifted crying on the Reforms as a niggardly gift and a sham. My sympathy at all times is with laudable desires for constitutional advance and longing for a wider horizon; but when I examine the position the Legislative Assembly has attained, the use it has made of its opportunities, the effect and dignity with which it conducts its debates and the broader aspect of its powers upon the policy of the Government of India, I cannot but feel that the Assembly at times takes far too narrow and restricted a view of its potentialities and real influence; and I must suspect that sentiment on occasion tends to obscure reason and dims the vision of those solemn promises of the British Government and of the charter of Indian liberties of which the Government of India Act is the repository. Weigh for a moment the influence and power of the representative elements of this House against that of its predecessor, the Imperial Legislative Council. Compare the realities of its responsibilities with pre-existing conditions. Reflect on the establishment on a firm basis in this House of Parliamentary traditions and on their incalculable effect on the future."*

LORD READING'S OWN ACHIEVEMENTS

Lord Reading thus gave his "impressions of the burning questions of the day in Indian opinion :"

"In the first place, there was a deep tide of resentment regarding curtailment of liberties. The more progressive considered the statutory restrictions on the freedom of the Press to be unnecesssary, unduly restrictive and incompatible with the spirit of reforms. The same exception was taken to a number of special enactments restrictive of certain aspects of political agitation and known as the Repressive Laws, and particularly included the Rowlatt Act. Strong views were expressed to me as regards the number of British troops employed in India, the strength of the Indian Army and the burden of military expenditure. The military position was represented as showing a total want of confidence in India and as strangling the material expansion of the country by weight of army expenditure. Though Indianisation had begun in the Civil Services, the absence of any regular scheme of Indianisation of the Army was quoted as a proof of the mistrust of Indians by the British element and as designed effectually to prevent the ultimate realisation of responsible self-government in India. A like suspicion was alleged to be at the root of the failure to associate elected representatives of the people in advisory capacities with the problems coming before the Departments of the Executive Government."†

ANOTHER CERTIFICATION BY LORD READING

In the new Legislative Assembly of 1924, out of the total strength of some 140 members, there were 45 Swarajist members. The Assembly also included well-known Indian politicians like Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Pandit Moti Lal Nehru, Mr. V. J. Patel, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Lala Hans Raj, Mr. Bipin Chandra Pal and Sir Purushottamdas Thakurdas. The Swarajists with the help of the Independent members of the Assembly threw out the first four heads under the demand for grants in the Finance Bill for 1924. This step was regarded by some as an 'unprecedented course.'

Lord Reading again exercised his power of certification to restore the four grants—namely, the demands for the Customs, Income-Tax, Salt and Opium Departments,

* *India in 1923-24*, pp. 295-96.

† *Ibid.*, p. 296.

four of the main revenue earning departments of the Government. In restoring the grants on 28th March 1924, Lord Reading made the following statement :

"It is to me a matter of regret that the Legislative Assembly, to whom important responsibilities are entrusted in voting expenditure to be incurred by Government and in authorising the provision of the necessary funds to meet that expenditure, should have failed on this occasion to consider these important financial matters on their merits. The action which my Government was compelled to take to restore the four grants rejected by the Assembly and that which I have found it necessary to take in exercise of the special power conferred upon me as Governor-General, have as their sole object the maintenance of the administration and the provision of the funds necessary for that administration to be carried on."*

COCONADA CONGRESS

The Coconada Congress in December 1923 tried to bring about a compromise between the no-changers and the Swarajists. The followers of Mahatma Gandhi were in favour of the triple boycott, while Deshabandhu Das was anxious to have the Council-entry resolution passed. The Congress at last passed the following triple boycott resolution :

"This Congress reaffirms the Non-co-operation resolutions adopted at Calcutta, Nagpur, Ahmedabad, Gaya and Delhi.

"Since doubts have been raised by reason of the Non-co-operation resolution adopted at Delhi with regard to Council-entry whether there has been any change in the policy of the Congress regarding the triple boycott, this Congress affirms that the principle and policy of that boycott remain unaltered.

"This Congress further declares that the said principle and policy form the foundation of constructive work and appeals to the nation to carry out the programme of constructive work as adopted at Bardoli and prepare for the adoption of Civil Disobedience. This Congress calls upon every Provincial Congress Committee to take immediate steps in this behalf with a view to the speedy attainment of our goal."

Another bone of contention in the Congress camp was Mr. C. R. Das's Bengal Pact. It was a Pact arrived at between the Swarajists and Moslems with regard to certain rights and privileges of either community. In the Congress this Bengal Pact was bitterly attacked by the Hindu members. At last both the Bengal Pact and the National Pact were referred to a Committee for examination.

The Congress did not devote much attention to the study of the question of Indians abroad. But "in view of the humiliating treatment accorded to Indian labourers in various parts of the British Empire," the Congress advised the people of India to consider the question of stopping all kinds of emigration from India for labour purposes.

The Congress also adhering to the opinion that "unless Swarajya is won for India, the sufferings and grievances of Indians abroad cannot be properly remedied", authorised Mrs. Sarojini Naidu and Mr. George Joseph to attend the forthcoming Indian Congress in Kenya and study the situation and advise the Indian community there, as to what steps they should take in carrying on their struggle against the insults and injustices imposed upon them.

* *Ibid.*, p. 312.

About the Akali struggle the Congress passed the following resolution :

"This Congress declares that the attack made by the Government on the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee and the Akali Dal is a direct challenge to the right of free association of all Indians for non-violent activities and being convinced that the blow is aimed at all movements for freedom, resolves to stand by the Sikhs and calls upon Hindus, Musalmans, Christians, Parsees and all people of India to render all possible assistance to the Sikhs in the present struggle, including assistance with men and money.

"The Congress authorises the All-India Congress Committee to take all necessarv steps in this behalf."

The Congress also formed an All-India Khaddar Board consisting of Srijuts Jamnalal Bajaj (Chairman), Vallabhabhai Patel, Maganlal Gandhi, Reva Shankar Jagjivan Jhaveri, Velji Nappu, Belgaumwalla, Shaukat Ali and Sankarlal Banker (Secretary) ; 'with full power to organise and carry on Khaddar work throughout India under the general supervision of the All-India Congress Committee, and to raise funds (including loans) therefor in addition to the allotments that may be made from the general funds.'

NEPAL TREATY

The British Government entered into a new agreement with the Nepal Government in December 1923. By this new Treaty

"each agrees to inform the other of any friction or misunderstanding with the States in territories adjoining their common frontiers. The British Government agrees that Nepal should be free to import through British India arms, ammunition and warlike material, as long as the British Government is satisfied that the intentions of the Nepal Government are friendly. The Nepal Government in its turn agrees that the export of arms and ammunition across its frontiers shall be prohibited. Other articles of the Treaty provide for the free passage through the Indian customs of goods imported under the mark of the Nepal Government."*

This Nepal Treaty was ratified on the 8th April 1925.

TARIFF BOARD

Lord Reading in his speech before the Legislative Assembly and Council of State referred thus to the work done by the Tariff Board :

"It is gratifying to observe the very keen interest taken by the Legislature in the working of the Tariff Board. During the past year, my Government have placed before you proposals based on two of the reports of the Board. The most important of these resulted in the passing of the Steel Industry (Protection) Act, which imposed heavy protective duties on a wide range of steel products covering most of those in ordinary consumption. The rates embodied in that Act were the result of careful investigation by the Tariff Board, but since they were brought into force, the Steel Industry has represented that further protection is required largely owing to a rapid and marked fall in the prices of Continental steel. This question was referred to the Tariff Board for enquiry, and during this session a Resolution based on their report will be brought forward for consideration by the Legislature. The fall in prices of Continental steel had been so heavy that an attempt to deal with the position by means of increased import duties would have resulted in practically doubling the existing duties, with the consequence that from 50 to 70 per cent. of the landed cost of imported steel would have been represented by the duties charged. Obviously my Government could not agree to duties on such a high scale on articles which are largely used in agriculture and many

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* *Ibid.*, p. 21.

other importat industries. They have, however, accepted the general conclusions of the Tariff Board, and the Legislature will be asked in this session to agree to the grant of bounty on steel produced in India between October 1st, 1924, and September 30th, 1925. The total amount of bounty proposed is fifty lakhs, which is the sum that it is calculated the industry would receive under the Tariff Board's proposals, were the rates recommended by the Board to become fully effective. This is a very favourable interpretation of the recommendations of the Board, especially as it allows the industry to obtain the advantage of the protection accorded without waiting for sales. If the grant of this bounty is made, it should prove of material assistance to the steel industy of India in its difficulties."*

Thus the Tata Iron and Steel Works Ltd. got a bounty of Rupees fifty lakhs from the revenue of the Government of India on the recommendation of the Tariff Board as sanctioned by the Indian Legislatures.

KOHAT RIOTS

Lord Reading also referred in his speech to the terrible communal riots which broke out in Kohat. He said :

"I have been deeply gratified to learn that the leaders of the two communities in Kohat have reached agreement, and that there are now good prospects of the return of the Hindus and of the resumption of past friendly and neighbourly relations. I was grievously distressed by the wound which communal tension had inflicted upon Kohat. I shall not refer to the painful events at the riots or their causes, as these have already been dealt with in the Resolution of my Government, and I shall serve no useful purpose by re-discussing them ; but leaving these aside, the question which caused me the most acute anxiety and thought was the problem of reconciliation and of the future relations of the two communities. From the outset I have done all in my power to try to heal the wound and to bring the parties tegether."†

The communal riots at Kohat and other cities in India have come as a curse on Indian national life. Indian statesmen are puzzled to find a solution to these communal troubles under British rule.

SHUDDHI AND SANGATHAN MOVEMENTS

Many writers refer to "the apprehension caused in Muslim quarters by the so-called Shuddhi movement." It seems strange why there should be such an apprehension, while the Moslems indulge freely in taking converts from the Hindu society. The Shuddhi movement as started by Swami Sraddhananda aims at claiming back those people who were originally Hindus, but who have accepted another faith. When Swami Sraddhananda began to re-convert the Malkana Rajputs and others, there was much agitation among the Moslems.

With the Suddhi movement, there began the Sangathan movement. The Hindus began to organise themselves to protect their rights and privileges. Hindu .Sabhas were started in every province. These again are affiliated to the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, which holds its annual session in different central places,

* *India in 1924-25*, pp. 353-54.

† *Ibid.*, p. 359.

MORE OUTRAGES

The year 1924 witnessed various outrages, which reminded one of the Bengal Partition days.

"In December a serious dacoity was perpetrated by armed middle-class youths at Chittagong ; followed by the assassination of a Sub-Inspector who had arrested one of the accused. In January 1924, Mr. Day was murdered in broad daylight in Calcutta in mistake for the Commissioner of Police. And in April a similar attempt was made upon the life of Mr. Bruce. In March a bomb factory was discovered in Calcutta , and evidence came to light of the existence of another at Faridpur. In July, a member of the party was arrested in Calcutta with a fully loaded revolver in his possession and, at the end of this month, there appeared 'The Red Bengal' leaflets announcing a campaign of assassination against the police, and threatening with the same fate any of the public who interfered."

The Government of Bengal became alarmed at the outbreak of these outrages and asked the Viceroy to promulgate an Ordinance to deal with these crimes. The Government of Bengal thus mentions the reasons for asking for this extraordinary power :

"The necessity for dealing with this terrorist movement swiftly and effectively, so as to ensure the arrest of the most dangerous conspirators without giving them warning which would enable them to carry on and direct the conspiracy whilst in hiding, has compelled the Governor-in-Council to ask the Governor-General to promulgate an Ordinance."*

Lord Reading accordingly promulgated the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance of 1924. In a statement he made the following remark :

"I have therefore come to the conclusion, after the fullest consultation with the local Government, that it is necessary to arm the Government of Bengal with special powers to deal with preparations for crime, with the object of protecting not only the officers of Government, whose lives are threatened, but equally private citizens, who have frequently been the innocent sufferers from such outrages, and the misguided youths who are its tools and often themselves its victims. I am convinced that preparations and plans for criminal outrages are now so dangerously developed that it is necessary to provide immediate safeguards by an Ordinance. Permanent measures to remedy the situation will in due course be presented by the local Governments."†

By this extraordinary power, the Government of Bengal set about arresting many youths. Under this Ordinance 63 arrests were made in October and November 1924 and 19 persons were incarcerated under Regulation III of 1818, but afterwards dealt with under the Ordinance. Among the persons arrested were Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, the Chief Executive Officer of the Calcutta Corporation, Mr. Satyendra Mitra and another member of the Legislative Council.

When the youths of Bengal were thus brought under the Ordinance and sent away to different jails in different countries, a storm of protest was raised against the action of Lord Reading. Even Indian politicians of the moderate school denounced the step taken by the Government of Bengal with the help of the Government of India. Extreme bitterness was caused by the fact that these youths were not brought before the Courts of Justice for their trial. Sir P. C. Ray characterised the Ordinance as the Star Chamber method.

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* *Ibid.*, p. 383.

† *Ibid.*, p. 383.

THE SERAJGANJ RESOLUTION

A controversy raged over what is known as the Serajganj Resolution. In the Bengal Provincial Conference held at Serajganj and presided over by Maulana Akram Khan a resolution was passed, which while paying tribute to the basic principle of non-violence, spoke of the "high and noble ideal" and "noble self-sacrifice" of the murderer of Mr. Day.

This Serajganj Resolution has been characterised by many as unfortunate and mischievous. The Government of Bengal state:

"There can be no doubt that the impetus thus given to revolutionary aims was directly responsible for the increase in strength and activity of the terrorist associations against which action had finally to be taken by the Ordinance."*

THE UNITY CONFERENCE

The Kohat tragedy came as a great shock to Mahatma Gandhi, who declared on September 18, 1924 that he would begin a fast of three weeks, 'in penance for the responsibility which he himself acknowledged for the manner in which his campaign had fomented bitter feelings.' It was an anxious time for the whole of India when Mahatma Gandhi began his fast for three weeks. Everyone was eager to know the state of his health every day. It must be said to the credit of Mahatma Gandhi that he was able to keep his vow, and it was a proud day for India when he broke his fast.

To solve the communal problem, it was at last decided to summon a Unity Conference. Accordingly the Conference met in Delhi on September 26, 1924, and was attended by many Hindu, Moslem, Parsee, Sikh and Christian leaders, including the Metropolitan of India. The Conference passed a series of resolutions, which

"proclaimed it to be improper for any person who considered his religious feelings affronted to take the law into his own hands. All differences should be referred to arbitration and failing that, to the Courts. The universal toleration of religious beliefs, and freedom of expression and practice, with due regard to the feelings of others, was proclaimed. Upon the crucial question of cow-killing a resolution was passed admonishing the Hindus of the impossibility of stopping the practice by force alone. Muhammadans were advised to exercise their rights with as little offence to the Hindus as possible; while the Mussalman leaders of the Conference personally pledged themselves to do everything in their power to reduce the number of cows annually slaughtered. Other resolutions discouraged the practice of disturbing rival communities by music, calling to prayer and the like without regard to conflicting susceptibilities. The Conference also established an All-India Panchayat of 15 persons, including Christians and Sikhs as well as Hindus and Muhammadans, whose task it was to appoint local Panchayats for the purpose of conciliation between the two communities."†

DEMAND FOR A REVISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT

The Legislative Assembly again made a demand for further reforms. In 1924 a Resolution was moved in the Assembly recommending an early revision of the Government of India Act with a view to secure for India full self-governing Dominion status

* *Ibid.*, p. 99.

† *Ibid.*, p. 322.



Dr. R. P. Paranjpye

within the British Empire, together with responsible government within the provinces. The Swaraj Party moved an amendment suggesting the summoning of a round-table conference to recommend a draft constitution for India. The amended resolution was passed by the Assembly in February 1924.

Soon after the Government of India appointed a Committee to examine the Government of India Act and to suggest improvements. Sir Alexander Muddiman was appointed the Chairman of the Committee and the members were: Sir Muhammad Shafi, the Maharaja of Burdwan, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Sivaswami Iyer, Sir Arthur Froom, Sir Henry Moncrieff Smith, Mr. M. A. Jinnah and Dr. R. P. Paranjpye. The Report of the Committee was published in March 1925. The Majority Report was signed by Sir Alexander Muddiman, Sir M. Shafi, the Maharaja of Burdwan, Sir A. Froom and Sir H. M. Smith. The Minority Report was signed by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Sivaswami Iyer, Mr. Jinnah and Dr. Paranjpye.

THE MUDDIMAN COMMITTEE'S REPORT

The Reforms Enquiry Committee recommended that

(1) "high officials mentioned in sub-section (1) of the Section 110 of the Government of India Act should be exempt from the jurisdiction of all Courts, and not merely as at present from the original jurisdiction of High Courts ;

(2) that Courts should be barred from premature interference with Presidents of the Legislatures ;

(3) that the Presidents, Deputy Presidents and Council Secretaries should not be required to vacate their seats on accepting their office ;

(4) that the powers of the Governor-General in Council to secure by declaration that the development of a particular industry shall be a central subject should be modified so as to relax the existing restriction and allow the power to be exercised with the concurrence of the local Government or Governments concerned ;

(5) that the existing disqualification for Membership of the Legislatures because of conviction by a Criminal Court should be modified by increasing the period of sentence constituting such disqualification from six months to a year, and, subject to provisions to secure uniform action, by enabling its removal to take effect through the orders of the local Government, instead of only by pardon ;

(6) members of all Legislatures should be exempted from serving as jurors or as assessors and from arrest and imprisonment for civil cases during the legislative session and for a period of a week before or after the session ;

(7) that the corrupt influencing of votes within any Legislature by bribery, intimidation and the like should be made a penal offence."*

About the Ministers, the majority, with the concurrence of the minority, recommended that

"the Ministers' salaries should be fixed by statute at a minimum of three-fifths of the salary of an Executive Councillor ; otherwise the salary may be varied by an Act of the local Legislature."

The majority Report pointed out that it never intended that there should be no Ministers. They recommended that

"motions for nominal reduction of salary during voting on demands, and motions of no confidence should be allowed to enable responsibility of the Ministers to Council being enforced."

About the control of the Ministers, the majority recommended that

* *Ibid.*, p. 378.

"the control of the Governor over the Ministers should be more expressly indicated by amending the Instrument of Instructions, so that, subject to the power of interference to prevent unfair discrimination between classes and interests and to protect minorities and to safeguard his own responsibility for reserved subjects and members of the Services, the Governor should not dissent from the opinion of his Ministers."

About the transfer of other departments to the charge of the Ministers, the majority recommended the transfer of Forests, of Excise (in Assam), of Gas, Boilers and Housing of Labour, of Land Acquisition, of Provincial Law Reports, and Provincial Government Presses.

On the assumption that the principle of dyarchy must be maintained, Mr. Jinnah proposed

"to transfer all subjects except Law and Order, subject to such adjustments and further definition of Central and Provincial subjects as might be determined."

Dr. Paranjpye and Sir Sivaswami Iyer agreed with him.

Hon. Mr. Sinha of Bihar Council in expressing his opinion about the working of the reforms stated that

"the inherent defects of dyarchy are patent. The system is too complex and complicated and is unwarranted by political experience. Educated Indians contend that they understand a benevolent despotism but cannot appreciate the dyarchic hybrid. Professor Lowell points out that 'the foundation of government is faith, not reason.' If this be true of European states it can be predicated with even greater certainty of Asiatic countries and their governments. It may be that the full political paraphernalia of a constitutional governor and a responsible minister must await the revision of the constitution in 1929. He accordingly agrees with the Honourable Ministers that all departments of the provincial government, other than those relating to the political and the judicial departments, should be transferred. He desires this change not with the object of pacifying or placating the avowed opponents of the present system......Dyarchy has failed to evoke that faith which is the foundation of government. His recommendations for transfers are intended to avoid too rapid changes and to avert the chances of prospective insecurity."*

Mr. P. C. Datta, one of the Ministers of Assam, thought that


"in the present temper of the people nothing short of full responsible government in the provinces or at least a sure prospect of its early attainment will placate them. If this line of advance is not within the scope of the enquiry the preamble to the Government of India Act should be altered so as to declare that India will get responsible government within a definite period subject to such reservations as may be found absolutely essential. If Parliament is unwilling to commit itself to this, the only alternative is to revert to a council form of Government with such modifications as may be necessary to conform to the declaration of 1917. The position of Ministers is unenviable. All the fury of the new party is directed against them."†

Syed Muhammad Saadulla, another Assam Minister, said that the position of Ministers under the constitution was one of great delicacy and difficulty. They were under two cross-fires and had to please both the Governor and the Council. So long as the constitution would remain a dual one, it would encounter vigorous criticism.§

LEE COMMISSION REPORT

The Report of the Lee Commission roused bitter criticism from the educated Indians. It looked more to the interests of the European members of the Services and put a very long limit to the Indianisation of the Services.

* *Ibid.*, p. 876 † *Ibid.*, p. 877. § *Ibid.*, p. 877.



Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyar, K.C.S.I.

The Report recommended that the Public Services Commission "contemplated by the Government of India Act should be constituted without further delay. It should be an All-India body and consist of five commissioners of the highest public standing." It should be charged with the duty of recruitment for the All-India Services and should be the final authority for determining the standards of qualification and the methods of examination for the Civil Services with regard to recruitment in India.

The process of Indianisation of the Services as recommended by the Lee Commission was rather a slow one. We find that a proportion of 50 per cent. Europeans and 50 per cent. Indians in the Indian Civil Service should be attained within about 15 years. In the Indian Police Service such a proportion of Indianisation would take 25 years. In the Forest Service, the recruitment should be in the ratio of 75 per cent. Indians and 25 per cent. Europeans. In the Indian Service of Engineers, recruitment should be in the ratio of 40 per cent. Europeans and 60 per cent. Indians. But in the Political Department 25 per cent. of the total number of officers recruited annually should be Indians. No change is recommended for the system of recruitment for the Imperial Customs Service.*

DEBATE ON THE LEE COMMISSION REPORT

In the September session of the Legislative Assembly Sir A. Muddiman brought forward a motion based on the Report of the Lee Commission. Pandit Moti Lal Nehru, the Swarajist leader, moved an ammendment which,

"after reciting the dissatisfaction of the Assembly with the genesis and operation of Lord Lee's Commission, put forward the view that the House was unable on the materials before it to satisfy itself of the propriety and reasonableness of the recommendations; but would none the less be prepared, if recruitment were stopped outside India, to consider the alleged grievances of the present incumbents of the Services and to recommend such measure of redress as a committee elected by the House might recommend. A long debate lasting over three days resulted. With the exception of the European elected members, and of certain Independents, the majority of non-official opinion in the House showed itself hostile to the recommendations of the Lee Commission....The Swarajist leader, in particular, maintained that the present constitution of the Indian Services was an anachronism; and the Government was attempting the impossible task of working a reformed constitution by means of an unreformed administrative machine. He condemned the concentration, in the hands of administrative cadres, of the control of policy; asserting that it lay with the Legislature to define the power of permanent officials and to lay down the conditions of their recruitment, and to define the policy which they must execute."†

The Amendment of Pandit Moti Lal Nehru was finally carried by 68 votes to 46. But it was not passed by the Council of State.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDIA BILL

Mrs. Besant took upon herself the task of framing a constitution for India. In 1924 she produced the Commonwealth of India Bill and tried to attract support to her draft Bill at the All-India Leaders' Conference and at the Belgaum Congress. The Bill was published in 1925.

"Its main characteristic was the classification of units of administration into a five-fold grade ranging from the village to the Central Government. In each of these units, there were to be three

* *Ibid.*, pp. 407-411. † *Ibid.*, pp. 817-18.

bodies functioning, legislative, executive and judiciary, each with its sphere defined and working independently of the others. The qualifications of voters were similarly defined in a progressive manner, becoming higher and higher as the scale of units proceeds. The Bill also contained a declaration of the fundamental rights of the people of India ; including elementary education ; inviolability of the liberty of person ; freedom of conscience ; free expression of opinion ; right of assembly ; equality before the law ; equality of the sexes ; and the use of roads and places dedicated to the public. It was suggested that the Viceroy, as representing the King, should retain the supreme control over naval and military forces as well as over foreign relations until the Indian Parliament should by its own Act signify its readiness to assume control. A further limitation suggested upon the power of the Central Legislature was the necessity of the previous approval of the Viceroy for any step concerning the Indian States."*

Mrs. Besant submitted the Bill to the All-Parties Conference which met in Delhi in January and February, 1925. It was afterwards adopted by a Convention under the presidency of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru at Cawnpur in April 1925.

LORD READING'S FAILURE

Lord Reading, once the Chief Justice of England, had come to India to do justice to India's cause. But his viceroyalty was a failure. His great judicial reputation could not work magic in India. The people of India expected that he would do justice to the political prisoners. But they were disappointed on that score. No doubt he repealed the Press Act, but he thrust a Princes' Protection Bill on an unwilling Legislature. His attempt to curtail the liberties of the people also met with bitter opposition. His repressive laws, his Rowlatt Act—roused the indignation of the whole of India. He failed to tackle the Non-co-operation movement. He suppressed the public right of assembly and the freedom of the Press. The arrest of Mahatma Gandhi was another mistake in the policy of Lord Reading. He had come to India pledged to carry on the Reformed Constitution. But he failed in working out the new Constitution. He had to have recourse to his special power of certification in the case of the Princes' Protection Bill and of the Salt Tax and of the refusal of four grants by the Assembly. The Swarajists tried to wreck the Councils. In Bengal and in the Central Provinces they had brought about a deadlock by the refusal of Ministers' salaries. The Moplah tragedy, the Guru-ka-Bagh affair, the Kohat, Panipat and other riots would remain as dark spots in the administration of Lord Reading. He also could not satisfy the Indian demand for further reforms.

LORD READING'S TREATMENT OF THE INDIAN PRINCES

The imperialistic and autocratic nature of Lord Reading is best illustrated by the way he treated some of the Indian Princes. Despite the handsome help that His Exalted Highness the Nizam and His Highness the Maharaja of Nabha gave, during the War, both these Princes had a taste of the unjust and high-handed dealing by the strong Viceroy. The Nizam's activity in India and England for the restoration of Berar evoked a strong and insulting reproach from the Viceroy. The Maharaja of Nabha had some cause of dispute with the Maharaja of Patiala, the pet of the British Government in India. The result was the deposition of the Sikh ruler of Nabha for reasons best known to the Government.

* *Ibid.*, p. 341.

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